Athens Journal of History - Volume 9, Issue 4, October 2023 – Pages 299-310

It Seemed Like Such a Good Idea at the Time … - Expected and Unexpected Consequences when Athens & Other Major Greek City States Leveraged Philip V to Draw Rome into the Eastern Mediterranean

By David P. Wick[*]

The grand theme of the "liberation of Greece" is peculiar in the second and first centuries B.C. by being proclaimed more often by outsiders than by Greeks, and far more often by outsiders than by Athenians. The Athens that ultimately became wholly Roman after the disastrous hostage crisis provoked by Mithridatic forces on the Acropolis in the 80's started down that road by joining with a few other Greek city states to call in Roman aid against Philip V of Macedon in the 190's, and did so, arguably, believing it could leverage a projection of force by a war-weary Roman Republic to make itself again political master of the Greek mainland. To attract Roman aid against the raids of Philip V's Macedon, Athens and its allies had to make both a case that Macedon posed a genuine threat to the eastern Mediterranean (and to Rome, in the aftermath of its war against Hannibal, and Philip's apparent offer to support that war), and the case that it was a key strategic asset for Rome not only in defeating Philip, but also for stabilizing Greece. To play this hand effectively, Athens not only mobilized its legendary propaganda skills, but also worked public feeling hard in its own streets to make Rome feel welcome, and to make Roman intervention feel natural and attractive at home. By playing this hand, Athens also provoked reprisals from Philip, the damage to Athens' physical heritage foreshadowing more extreme destruction a century later when the city would be caught between the insurgents of Mithridates and the renegade Roman forces of Sulla. The Athenian public became, as a result, even more ready to 'be Roman.' At the time, the intent of Athenian politicians to create a specially protected micro-empire for the city on the Greek mainland appeared achievable, but the Roman response, as so often, moved in unexpected directions, and pulled Athens inexorably into the future empire of Rome. Athens' secondary intention: to become the default educator of the whole ruling culture in Rome's next generations (it believed it was reaching this goal with the Hellenistic east) would require secondary tactics – including a demonstration using a staged lawsuit in Rome. This study intends to examine the earliest stages of the piecemeal, and only partially intentional, first step of Romanizing in Athens – I addressed a later stage in my study of the Mithridatic hostage crisis on the Acropolis.

The grand theme of the "liberation of Greece" is peculiar in the last century and a half of the Roman Republic (the period when the eastern Mediterranean slipped into Roman control) by being proclaimed more often by outsiders than by Greeks, and far more often by outsiders than by Athenians. The Macedonians, the Asians of Antiochus the Great, the Macedonians again, the Romans (punctuated

[*]Director, Arts, Humanities and Education Division, ATINER & Professor (Retired), Gordon College, USA.

https://doi.org/10.30958/ajhis.9-4-1 doi=10.30958/ajhis.9-4-1

between the Greek outbursts, perhaps even causing them by the repeated withdrawal of their conquering armies), and finally the Pontic propagandists of Mithridates – all pressed the phrases about liberation upon the old lands round Attica. Judged by any reasonable standard, Athens did not raise a major voice in this chorus, much less lead it. The expected watchdog of Greek liberty, to use the phrase about the silent guard dog in the Sherlock Holmes anecdote, became a "curious incident" because it did not bark. There were many Greeks of that day – among them more radical members of the Achaean League, or the Hellenic separatists dazzled by the future free of intrusive Hellenistic kingdoms (or of Rome) prophesied by independence movements in Anatolia (most famously by Mithridates), or by refugees from Delos (the Athenian prize for bringing Rome eastward) – who did not quickly forgive her.

Nor, in the centuries since, have Hellenist historians entirely done so. W. S. Ferguson – the classic collector and defender on post-Alexander Athens – shows an unusual feel of labor and strain (even with all the customary eloquence in his toolkit) to find a thread of nationalist Greek resistance to Rome in the Athens of the Philip-Antiochus or Mithridatic siege era, and – tellingly – he was in the end driven to rely on the desperate argument that so proper a sentiment "must be there".[1] In 'Students in the (Ancient) Streets' I noted how Badian and others, when the narrative reaches Medeius and Mithridates in the 90s and 80s, had in the late 20th century cut away much of the scaffolding that propped his defense.[2] Jean-Luis Ferrary worked hard to make the confused intervention of Athenion and Aristion (sent from, and supported by, Pontus though both claimed to have studied in the city) sparking that crisis part of a civic philosophical renaissance toward liberty – a revolt of the heart or conscience of the quintessential Greek *polis* against the plausibility of Roman influence and its allies in the business class.[3] I shall return to Ferrary later: the last years of the 80s would have made a more stirring tale for Hellenists anxious about the honor of Athens, but his revolt of the heart, planted hopefully there, is as difficult to discover in our evidence as Ferguson's popular uprising. Some recent writers on the Piraeus – Christos

1. I dealt with this episode in detail in the study "Students in the (Ancient) Streets, or Agent(s) Provocateur? The Liberal Arts Schools of Athens and the Hostage Crisis of 88" Athens Journal of History Vol. 6, Issue 4 (Oct 2020). For Ferguson, W.S., see Hellenistic Athens: an Historical Essay. (London, 1911, reprint Cornell 2008), 284, 418, 427 ff. Badian, E "Rome, Athens, and Mithridates" in *American Journal of Ancient History*, vol. 1 (1976), pp. 505 ff. Tracy, S. V. Inscriptiones Graecae II² 2336: *Contributors of First Fruits for the Pythaïs*, (Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1982) pp. 174-180.

2. Badian, "Rome, Athens, and Mithridates" pp. 501-505. Cf. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, pp. 268-277, 428-429; Mossé, C. Athens in Decline: 404-86 B.C. (London, 1973, Routledge edtn. 2013), pp. 138, 142-143.

3. Ferrary, Jean-Louie. Philhellénisme et Impérialisme: Aspects Idéologiques de la Conquête Romaine du Monde Hellénistique, de la Seconde Guerre de Macédoine à la Guerre Contre Mithridate. (Rome, 1988, rev. edtn 2014).

Panagos indirectly, Robert Garland almost stridently – have built a shrine to the last spark of willful Greek independence around the Docks and the Munychia (glad at least that the port city held out against Sulla longer than Athens proper).[4] For the older City above the port Garland has only, in the parting paragraphs of his narrative chapter, a note of contempt.[5]

But all this is really a skirmish over portents of the future for our present study. In that earlier look at the 80s (published in the Athens Journal of History), I have argued that the European campaigns of the Mithridatic war that began in 89 of the old era were not about Greek freedom, but about advance bases and a buffer zone for Mithridates himself. The resignation (or defection, or collapse, or suburbanization) of the Athenian spirit in upon itself had begun much earlier, and many of my historical studies in these pages have looked at this transforming phenomenon from different angles. By 200 (of that age) the city faced a crisis of self identity which it began to solve, encouraged by the flattering attentions of Rome and Pergamum, by concentrating on a mellowed reflection of its own past. By 150 it had grown dependent on the rewards that internalized quietism had given it, though the wealthiest reward (Delos) would be gone before long. By 100, not all that far from the now-ruined Corinth, Athens would already be an increasingly cosmopolitan tourist center and refuge; one in which Athenian-ness was a becoming more a flavor of nostalgia than a call to freedom. When in 88, the wars of "Greek freedom" finally washed directly against its walls, the iron tyranny of outsiders was necessary to make it fight (if it ever truly did) against the coming of Rome.

How then did the Athens that should have been the beacon of Greek freedom end up not only *not* protesting the arrival of Roman military involvement on the Greek mainland, but manage to actually talk herself into inviting it? Athens' transformation and survival as a suburb (political and spiritual), willingly quiescent, in the end, under the shadow of Rome, began, as I see it, with the belief that Rome was a politically useful tool, one that sophisticated politicians could safely employ and then put back in the box. The outcome was of course so predictable to twenty-first century critics that for us it almost loses its irony. But Athenians in the few generations before the forming of the Roman Empire were among the most politically educated in the Mediterranean, and in fact the educators of most others. They were not any longer the leaders of Greece, but I

4. Garland, Robert. The Piraeus from the Fifth to the First Century B.C. (London, 1987), 55-57, 190-191. See also Panagos, Christos Th. Le Pirée: étude économique et historique depuis les temps plus anciens jusqu'a la fin de l'empire romain, (Athens, 1968). Trans. from Greek into French by Pierre Gerardat., 133-143.

5. Garland, p. 56. "It is perhaps not too fanciful to suppose that its terrible destruction was in part inspired by loathing for the democratic sentiments which its population had consistently espoused and probably (sic) continued to uphold..." Garland in fact implies that Athens *propter*, the 'uptown' city, or the "Asty" as he insists upon calling it, was the normal prey for aristocratic sentiment.

would like to suggest the argument that by attracting Rome into the Aegean for a few years in the chaos following Italy's war with Hannibal, that is exactly what the political elite of Athens hoped to become.

Philip V - The Uses of a Plausible Threat

In 201, after the Battle of Zama, the Roman Senate tried to lay the long disaster Italy had endured against Hannibal and Carthage to rest in its own terms. It demanded reparations from Philip V of Macedon, and it used an Athenian request for help against the revenue-scavenging raids Philip frequently made south into Greek territory as its justification.[6] Athens simply wanted them to stop; Rome sensed an opportunity in Athens that neither of the two "great powers" in contemporary Greece had exploited. During the third century power over the majority of the Greek mainland had passed back and forth in a tug of war between the Antigonid kingdom of Macedon and the Achaean League formed (originally) in southern Greece to oppose it.[7] It is not too startling an irony that the theme of "Greek liberation" passed naturally to whichever of these contestants at any given moment held second place.[8]

Macedon was weak enough by around 200 that it tended to magnetize other sources of threat – it attracted the attention of Antiochus III in the East, just as it did Rome in the West – to any stronger powers with interests in Mediterranean trade, the constant Macedonian raids into the Aegean meant safety in Greece, and security of trade "needed" someone to eliminate the old thorn in the Greek side by means of an armed protectorate. When Macedon could, it would still throw mobile troops south and occupy Philip II's old garrisons -- the three "fetters of

---

6. While the Senate, as mentioned, was concerned at the moment to be seen winning or ending the war in some way that rehabilitated the reputation of the Fabian faction, did not involve recognizing a rescue by the irritating outsider Scipio Africanus, it did, at need, use as many of his troops in Greece (without him) over the next few years of the 'Philip' and 'Antiochus campaigns, as it could.

I have argued elsewhere (Διδασκαλία Στρατηγικής Ισότητας: Μια Σύντομη Μελέτη για το πως ο Σκιπίων δίδαξε τους Καινοτόμους Στόχους και τους Αυτοσχεδιασμούς του την Παραμονή της Αφρικανικής Εισβολής, *Athens Academic Journal*, Vol. 2, No 1 March 2022, pp. 49-67) that the secret to the success of this patchwork ploy was the ability Scipio had shown to teach his strategic improvisations to his junior officers and even unit commanders, who then applied them even in his absence. The ResearchGate post of this article includes an English version.

7. Ferrary, "Le Thème de la Liberté des Grecs pendant la Seconde Guerre de Macedoine," and "Le Thème de la Liberté des Grecs et son Évolution de la Guerre D'Antiochos À la Guerre de Mithridate," in Philhellénisme et Impérialisme, pp. 45-218.

8. Engels, Donald. Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City (Chicago, 1990), pp. 14 ff.

Greece." The Achaean League formed to protect Greece sent embassies to Rome to advertise the danger of Macedon itself, and perhaps also of Antiochus waiting greedily just across the Aegean, and argued that with only a little help an Achaean "legal protectorate" would stabilize trade between the east and west instead, and in it one can almost see an early form of "Greek nation" developing. The Achaean League had, if J.A.O. Larsen is correct, already begun to put together a representative assembly by which a regular federate government (dominated at first by the Achaean commercial cities) could arbitrate Greek disputes and organize (its own) "Greek" foreign policy.[9] The principle bone over which these dogs fought was not Athens but Corinth.

Set against whatever symbolic value Athens might have had in any campaign for Greek hegemony, any cold-eyed and pragmatic strategist had to weigh the obvious immediate importance of the city on the Isthmus. Corinth had always been one of the "fetters" outsiders had garrisoned to control the Greek mainland – perhaps the most indispensable of them because its position on both land *and* sea trade routes; whatever wished to cross Greece economically had to pass through it.[10] Cicero passed on the common observation that in the years before 146 so many Corinthians had tied their livelihoods to commerce that the city was in danger of letting its agricultural base fall into neglect.[11]

The westward-facing trading towns along the Corinthian Gulf felt this strategic importance keenly. Their ships and exports could not continue easily into the eastward Hellenistic world if the Isthmus were locked against them. Aratus of Sicyon ejected the Macedonian garrison in 243 with a "League" army, and Corinth gratefully joined the federation, only to fall back into the hands of Macedonian raiders after the Battle of Sellasia in 222. With armed northerners back in place on the Akrocorinth (however little they may have resembled the old phalanx-spearmen Philip II had put there), the Achaean League found its focus for survival thrust once again westward. Macedon pushed the individualist Greek cities back toward Rome.

Denied Corinth as a practical symbolic focal point, the Achaean League cast about for an alternative of sufficient cultural or political *auctoritas* to impress her Roman allies. Athens had offended Philip in 205 by rousting two Acarnanians out of an Eleusinian ceremony and executing them for sacrilege.[12] Acarnania was a Macedonian ally, which meant in practical terms the poorer, smaller settlements of the western Greek hills traded some safe but circuitous access for Macedonian marauding parties in return for the security of their own meager farms. Athens had called the bluff. Worse still, though less directly so, Athens had developed an informal alliance with Ptolemy Euergetes I in the 220's. Athens' traditional

9. Larsen, J.A.O. Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History, (Oxford, 1968), p. 86.

10. Engels, pp. 12-13, 50-52, 58-61, 113-114.

11. Cicero, *De Republica* ii, 6.

12. Livy XXXI, xiv, 6. Polybius XVI, xxxiv, 5.

immunity from Macedonian interference had accumulated around the understanding that it would remain a neutral city, but none of these actions could be made to look neutral.[13] It could therefore be presumed to lie in danger as Philip, faced with the consequences of his bad gamble – he had offered publicly, or had been caught offering, to partner with Hannibal during the 2nd Punic War – began to increase his raids southward into Greece and to settle old scores. A flying column of Macedonian plunderers swept through Attica and did as much quick damage as it could. Athens, its accumulated symbolic value, its strategic location, and its well-preserved naval base, seemed ripe for the plucking.

Yet the Achaean League moved too slowly. Philip, perhaps to their surprise, did move against Athens, and faster than calculated, and Athens did ask for help – from Aetolia, from Rhodes, especially from Egypt, but not from the much-closer Achaea. Whether or not some distrust of being swallowed up in the changed political landscape of Greece was at play in the Athenian mind at this moment, to southern Greeks the city's behavior must have seemed very dangerous indeed. Athens' principal appeal was to Egypt, but the harried government of Ptolemy Epiphanes merely made some comforting noises and referred the matter to Rome.[14]

It was from Rome and from their smaller Hellenistic ally in Pergamum that Athens suddenly received a strange and unsettling burst of attention. An Attic embassy to Rome waited nervously on the Senate as the Roman *patres* sent a parallel mission from Aetolia packing back home (Aetolia had defected in the dark years of the Hannibalic War). The urban crowd around the Forum – swollen by a host of veterans – seemed heartily sick of military service and expenditure, the Athenian appeal for help too late in the long, recent, list of dangerous military gambles.

Yet the Athenians found the Senate courteous, even anxious to please.[15] Each side had something the other wanted: the Roman Senate desired a pretext to settle scores with Philip V for his "treachery" back in the dark year after Cannae, or at least to show the western Mediterranean public it was doing something more aggressive about the intentionally publicized threat than its hero Fabius had done about Hannibal for two decades. It may also have hoped to hand the fame of a major victory to someone besides the alarming and cocky young Greekling outsider Scipio Africanus – a nuisance the government was now working to shuffle out of the public eye. Instead it could now, if it could play up the legendary symbolic value of Athens, show off a pretext by 'saving' a culture dazzling in its prestige, ancient and steeped in the *auctoritas* of eastern Mediterranean history. Athens of course had its own doubts about the

13. Diodorus Siculus xxviii, 7.

14. Livy XXXI, ix. Pausanias I, xxxvi, 5 ff. (which is based perhaps on an Athenian honorary decree which Pausanias may have seen). Cf. Ferguson, 269.

15. Livy XXXI, ii. Pausanias I, xxxvi, 5 ff.

involvement of "barbarians" in saving the Greek world, but quieted them with pseudo-scholastic chatter about the Trojan legend and Aeneas.[16] Rome worked at speaking the language of rescue to its friends in the Aegean (and not just to Athens – Rome had an outrigger to play, hints of east-Mediterranean intelligence that the Asian super-monarch Antiochus III, worn down by patrols on the Silk Road, would soon also be setting his sights on invasion of the west, that changed the 'center of gravity' in the upcoming mission, one that would in less than two decades make Greece much feel nearer to, a bit more of a suburb of, Rome).

The result of all this mission-talk over the Aegean was an explosion of diplomatic pomp – some Roman, some Asian – in the Athenian streets. Roman legates, bearing a satisfying and stern ultimatum for Philip, met Attalus of Pergamum (who had far more reason to worry about Antiochus than Philip V) himself in the Piraeus. The impression its military docks made upon those Romans with an eye for logistics (especially logistics against a more Asian invasion) weighed substantially upon the practical Roman military mind for generations. Attalus and an embassy from Rhodes, after a solemn procession up between the ruins of the Long Walls and into the City, made their common declaration of war against Macedon in a grand session of the *ekklesia*.[17] The Roman delegation, quiet in the background, had already sounded a bass note that deepened the chorus of adulation and prestige: Athens and Rome were to be not merely *amici* but *symmachoi*, allies whose foreign policy was each their own, who owed military service only when they chose to give it.[18] Athens, battered into silence by repeated failures against the first generation of Macedonians after Alexander, and for some years now almost an afterthought among the shifting federations of free and captive Greece, lay suddenly in the limelight again. Her fleet consisted perhaps of only a few *aphract* ships, each carrying a ram but no fighting decks;[19] her army was a small force of mercenaries and traditionally armed graduates of the *ephebeia*;[20] but she owned in some sense more of the

16. Ferguson, 270-271, esp. note 5.

17. Polybius xvi, 25.

18. Ferguson, 270, 272.

19. Livy XLV, x. The small, undecked *aphract* ships used so often by Hellenstic cities as 'harbor patrol' were intended only to chase local lawbreakers or pirates, their limit being perhaps pirate-craft the displacement of fishing boats, and their rams were likely intended more to stabilize the narrow, oar-powered craft in rough sea – the original purpose of ram-like undershot bows in ancient watercraft – than to attempt combat hits (the police crew of archers were the real offense most carried). The *ephebeia* (the ancient equivalent of an urban 'high school'), taught the ancient rudiments of phalanx formation along with 'local heritage civics' and some general education, but its principal military use was really to prep young citizens for manning walls or crowd control. Athens would never again pose a traditional military threat to anyone on its own, which made the story of Deuxippos rallying students and other local military hobbyists to defend the walls against the Heruli in the later Empire an even more satisfying local legend.

20. Livy XXXI, xxiii-xxvi.

shared Greek past than most Greek cities cared to remember. Rome sighted this value with the fresh eyes of an outsider and set it spinning again. It flew Athens like a flag. Perhaps partly from necessity and the stress of the moment, the ambitious citizens of Athens missed something of what was really happening to their status - it was important, but important because it tied Rome to Greece, not because it was in any way what it had imagined it would be a few years earlier: the political manager of Rome in the Aegean.

Athens survived the war wounded, but walking with a fresh stride. Roman assistance duly arrived, and though primarily naval and concentrated upon the excellent facilities in the Piraeus, it showed Rome meant to play the new hand it had dealt in Attica.[21] Philip, after his raid-commander Nicanor had been bluffed back,[22] was forced to lead a flying rampage through the Attic farm country himself. Though he was able to beat the Athenian hoplite force handily enough (likely because he was more mobile), he found the newly reinforced city impregnable. Frustrated, he moved round to its quiet southeastern outskirts and sacked its *gymnasium* (hitherto largely untouched by warfare), damaging the Cynics garden of Cynosarges and the Lyceum in the process.[23] As he retreated, he attacked and mutilated statues and shrines in the Athenian suburbs and the country villages of Attica – if Athens wanted to play at this new game of spiritual *auctoritas* with its symbolic heritage, it could pay by seeing the symbols destroyed. Like its declaration, the prosecution of the war was full of prophecy of things to come.

Athens retaliated by mutilating all its monuments to Philip and his forebears.[24] It was angry, but most importantly, it suddenly felt vulnerable and - if not small - at least much smaller than it had imagined on the scale of the events playing out around it. Athens seems very significantly to have sent no troops to the final reckoning at the Battle of Cynoscephalae, whether because of exhaustion, or fear, or a new instinct that it had become a different creature on the Greek mainland than its old dreams of power had pictured. The duty Athens now was apparently to survive *being* Athens, and to be "Athens against Macedon." Livy (or perhaps Polybius before him) rather missed the point carping sourly that it fought with words alone.[25] Its business was to fight with words, or perhaps more particularly with those words woven up into its history in Greece. Athens, wittingly or not, had begun to redefine Greekness and "Greek freedom" not as Athenian or Greek in some independent sense, but (out of sheer anxiety and the drift of the war) in the direction of dependence on Rome.

This was not at first quite so clear inside Athens as it was to Greeks afterward.

---

21. Livy XXXI, xiv, 3; and XXXI, xxii, 4 ff.
22. Polybius xvi, 27. Livy XXXI, xvi, 2 (where the general is called Philocles).
23. Diodorus xxviii, 7.
24. Inscriptiones Graecae, vol. II, 417. Cf. Ferguson, p. 277.
25. Livy XXXI, xliv.

Of the allied commanders stationed in the City (Byzantines, Rhodians, Romans, Pergamenes) Attalus of Pergamum maintained the highest profile, culminating in the autumn of 199, when he was initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries.[26] The city proper played host to the military staffs, was the command center for the minor theater of war in southern Greece, and acted as the departure point for a flurry of diplomatic activity.[27] The Romans bent their practical attention on the Piraeus, packed now with a variety of fleets staging themselves toward the northern Aegean.[28]

In the aftermath of Cynoscephalae and Philip's surrender, Athens had a clearer taste of her new position. No former Athenian dependencies or conquests were "returned" to her. The conqueror Flamininus declared, not from the Acropolis or the *Pnyx*, but from a *faux* 'Olympic games' created for him in the Peloponnese, that Greece was to be "free" – meaning each *polis* ought to attend to its own business and remember with due gratitude its patrons and protectors in Rome, and that Rome's armies were heading home assuming the new arrangement would run itself locally. This assumption that an understanding of *clientage* was universal marked the initial and fundamental Athenian error when it started the play aimed at its "Roman settlement of Greece;"[29] it leaned on, but misunderstood, the counter-intuitive Roman secondary assumption (or hope?) that Athens would not only understand but delight in its new limited role. It was to provide leadership by example, to become quiet and independent like a good Latin *civitas* should, and the other Greek cities, impressed both by its heritage and newfound honor, would follow suit. Never mind that Athens 'leading by being quiet' was (to any Greek) an oxymoron, or that doing so would have crippled the schools. 'Seemed like such a good idea' was suddenly defined by how things 'seemed' in the western Mediterranean, not in Greece, and no university town could process enough students to shape a thought-ecology so large. To those Athenians who began to grasp this, it must have been very unsettling.

All this was not remarkable to anyone else; it was the Roman way of operating, and Polybius would before long build a career by leveraging himself to

---

26. Livy XXXI, xlvii.

27. Livy XXXII, xvi.

28. Livy XXXI, xlv; XXXII, xvi; XXXI, xlvii.

29. Badian, Foreign Clientelae, 54, 74. Cf. Sherk, Robert K., ed., Roman Documents from the Greek East: Senatus Consulta and Epistulae to the Age of Augustus (Baltimore, 1969), no. 33 (p. 211 ff.). Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew, ed. Patronage in Ancient Society, (London, 1989), 120, 125. The confusion is perhaps most vividly portrayed in a Rhodian speech in Livy (XXXVII, liv, 17) which speaks of a *patrocinium* of Greek "freedom." Cf. Livy XXXIV, lviii, 11. I have followed this thread elsewhere in papers presented to ATINER and published in both the Athens Journal of History and the Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies, following both the stories of political teaching in the Athenian schools, and that of the hostage crisis spurred by the Mithridatic War (and see note next page).

Rome and then "explaining it eastward." What is remarkable, or ought to be, is the surprise it caused in Athens. The city that had intended a rather spurious form of Greek freedom under Athenian control was left to use its political teachers and practicing elite, and the students (young and elderly) it could attract, over the coming generation, to find a way to 'spin' the Roman "freedom" of the client from outside threat and the worry of making big decisions for itself into something less troubling.[30] The schools, not the elected officials or the money behind them, became the real center of gravity in the new political Athens. That, the schools had planned on. It was the limit of their role, and the limit of their footprint in the mental ecology of the coming Mediterranean, that they had confidently over-estimated, something similar academic or management cultures have likely over-estimated many times since.

Bibliography

Classical sources, unless otherwise noted, are – or can be usefully pursued for this paper's purposes – as editions in the Loeb translated series. Useful more recent editions of some books indicated, but first versions also marked. (Ancient references may mark the most appropriate section given the topic – for precision see notes).

Badian, E. "Rome, Athens, and Mithridates." *American Journal of Ancient History* 1 (1976).

Balsdon, J. P. V. D. *Life and Leisure in Ancient Rome*. London, 1969 – reprint 2002.

Cicero. *de Republica,* though the themes Rome used Athens to reinforce in the eastern Mediterranean run, taken to heart, all through the *Letters*.

Davies, John K. "Athenian Citizenship: the Descent Group and the Alternatives." *Classical Journal* 73 (1975).

30. I have followed some of this particular story – most recently on the use of Carneades from the Platonic *akademe* in the Oropus lawsuit of the 150's to shape a Roman impression of Athenian political wizardry and to attract students (actually helped by the expulsion of political teachers from Rome by Cato which it precipitated) in D. P. Wick, *"Plato's Academy and the 'Roman Market': A Case Study in 'Humanities Education During Times of Crisis or Recession,"* published in the Athens Journal of History, Vol. 9, Issue 3, July 2023 – Pages 249-260. Academics have forgiven Athens, when they have, for failing to agitate the cause of Greek freedom by seeing this ending or change for the city as the triumph of intellect over politics, but it would be wise to remember the intellectual ecology that created Carneades, and the effect of his (and the schools behind him) in winning this partial victory. Selling an ability to massage or herd votes or popular opinion in real time – the object of the new Platonic *akademe* and of the Aristotelian and Epicurean political schools outside Athens – never created a 'Greek-led Senate,' but helped create success in unexpected forms as 'shaped populist' movements unraveled the Roman Republic (and those new cultures joining it, even more than those conquered, in the last expansive century). The trail of the Athenian-Roman schools and their changes I have followed in recent articles were not experiments of intellect or 'rhetoric' cultured in glass dishes. The tools helped to devastate a great deal in 'real time.'

Diodorus Siculus, *Universal History*, xxviii.

Diogenes Laertius. *Lives*, iv.

Dodds, E. R. *Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley, 1981; Martino edtn. 2019. Though not referenced here, the last chapters of the book set the tone for what Athens accepted in the Roman shade over what it had begun imagining it might dominate.

Engels, Donald. *Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City*. Chicago, 1990.

Ferguson, W. S. *Hellenistic Athens: a Historical Essay.* London, 1911; Palaia Press edtn. 2016.

Ferrary, Jean-Louie. *Philhellénisme et Impérialisme: Aspects Idéologiques de la Conquête Romaine du Monde Hellénistique, de la Seconde Guerre de Macédoine à la Guerre Contre Mithridate*. (Philhellenism and Imperialism: Ideological Aspects of the Roman Conquest of the Hellenistic World, from the Second Macedonian War to the War Against Mithridates.) Rome, 1988, rev. 2014.

Garland, Robert. *The Piraeus from the Fifth to the First Century B.C.* London, 1987.

Grenier, Albert. *The Roman Spirit – in Religion, Thought and Art.* Translated by M. R. Dobie. New York, 1926; Routledge edtn. 1997.

Habicht, C. *Athens from Alexander to Antony*. London, 1997.

Larsen, J.A.O. *Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History*. Oxford, 1968.

Livy, *Histories*, esp XXX-XXXVII, XLV.

Marrou, H. I. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. Translated by G. Lamb. London, 1956; Wisconsin, 1982.

Mossé, C. *Athens in Decline*. London, 1973; Routledge edtn. 2013.

Osborne, M. J. *Naturalization in Athens*. 2 vols. Brussels, 1982.

Panagos, Christos Th. *Le Pirée: étude économique et historique depuis les temps plus anciens jusqu'a la fin de l'empire romain*. (Piraeus: economic and historical study from ancient times to the end of the Roman Empire.) Translated from Greek into French by Pierre Gerardat. Athens, 1968.

Pausanias. *Description of Greece*, (bk 1), xxxvi.

Pliny. *Natural History*, xviii.

Plutarch. Lives of *Brutus, Cicero, Lucullus, Marcus Cato, Sulla*.

Polybius. *Histories*, xvi.

Rawson, Elizabeth. "Cicero and the Areopagus." *Athenaeum* 63 (1985), and, though not referenced here, her *Intellectual Life in the Late Republic.* London, 2002; Bristol, 2013, like the Dodds reference above, makes an excellent introduction to the wider place of Athens in the narrative Rome would slowly stumble onto.

Sherk, Robert K. (Ed.) *Roman Documents from the Greek East: Senatus Consulta and Epistulae to the Age of Augustus*. Baltimore, 1969.

Starr, Chester. *The Emergence of Rome*. Cornell, 1953-60; Praeger edtn. 1982.

Strabo. *Geography* i, xviii.

Tracy, S. V. Inscriptiones Graecae II² 2336: *Contributors of First Fruits for the Pythaïs*. Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1982.

Walbank, F. W. *A Historical Commentary on Polybius.* Oxford, 1957-79; Clarendon reprint 1999.

Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew (Ed.) *Patronage in Ancient Society.* London, 1989.

Wick, D. P. "Plato's Academy and the 'Roman Market': A Case Study in 'Humanities Education During Times of Crisis or Recession." *Athens Journal of History* 9, no. 3 (2023): 249-260.

____. "Stoics and Epicureans for the 'Modern Market': How Athenian Educators Re-Tooled the Old City's 'Modernist Schools' for Republican Rome." *Athens Journal of History* 3, no. 4 (2017): 265-274.

____. "Students in the (Ancient) Streets, or Agent(s) Provocateur? The Liberal Arts Schools of Athens and the Hostage Crisis of 88." *Athens Journal of History* 6, no. 4 (2020): 299-312.

____. The Lyceum in Twilight: Athens' 'Second School' and its Struggle to Re-Invent Itself and Survive in the Last Years of the Roman Republic." *Athens Journal of History* 8, no. 2 (2022): 99-108.