Articles

ATHENS INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
A World Association of Academics and Researchers
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Mission

ATINER is a *World Non-Profit Association* of Academics and Researchers based in Athens. ATINER is an independent **Association** with a **Mission** to become a forum where Academics and Researchers from all over the world can meet in Athens, exchange ideas on their research and discuss future developments in their disciplines, **as well as engage with professionals from other fields**. Athens was chosen because of its long history of academic gatherings, which go back thousands of years to *Plato's Academy* and *Aristotle's Lyceum.* Both these historic places are within walking distance from ATINER's downtown offices. Since antiquity, Athens was an open city. In the words of Pericles, **Athens"…*is open to the world, we never expel a foreigner from learning or seeing".* (**"Pericles' Funeral Oration", in Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War). It is ATINER's* **mission** to revive the glory of Ancient Athens by inviting the World Academic Community to the city, to learn from each other in an environment of freedom and respect for other people's opinions and beliefs. After all, the free expression of one's opinion formed the basis for the development of democracy, and Athens was its cradle. As it turned out, the Golden Age of Athens was in fact, the Golden Age of the Western Civilization. *Education* and *(Re)searching* for the 'truth' are the pillars of any free (democratic) society. This is the reason why *Education* and *Research* are the two core words in ATINER's name.

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Before you submit, please make sure your paper meets some basic academic standards, which include proper English. Some articles will be selected from the numerous papers that have been presented at the various annual international academic conferences organized by the different divisions and units of the Athens Institute for Education and Research.

The plethora of papers presented every year will enable the editorial board of each journal to select the best ones, and in so doing, to produce a quality academic journal. In addition to papers presented, ATINER encourages the independent submission of papers to be evaluated for publication.

The current issue of the Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts (AJHA) is the second issue of the sixth volume (2019). The reader will notice some changes compared with the previous issues, which I hope is an improvement.

Gregory T. Papanikos, President
Athens Institute for Education and Research

Athens Institute for Education and Research
A World Association of Academics and Researchers

10th Annual International Conference on Visual and Performing Arts
10-13 June 2019, Athens, Greece

The Arts & Culture Unit of ATINER is organizing its **10th Annual International Conference on Visual and Performing Arts, 10-13 June 2019, Athens, Greece** sponsored by the Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts. The aim of the conference is to bring together academics and researchers of visual and performing arts, and other related disciplines. You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair of a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (https://www.atiner.gr/2019/FORM-ART.doc).

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Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **29 April 2019**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **13 May 2019**

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- Exploration of the Aegean Islands
- Delphi Visit
- Ancient Corinth and Cape Sounion

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Conference fees vary from 400€ to 2000€
Details can be found at: https://www.atiner.gr/2019fees

Athens Institute for Education and Research
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4th Annual International Symposium on Religion & Theology 27-30 May 2019, Athens, Greece

The Arts and Humanities Division of ATINER is organising its **4th Annual International Symposium on Religion & Theology, 27-30 May 2019, Athens, Greece**. The aim of the conference is to bring together academics and researchers of Religion, Theology and other related disciplines. You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair of a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (https://www.atiner.gr/2019/FORM-REL.doc).

Important Dates
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- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **29 April 2019**

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference

- **Dr. William O'Meara**, Academic Member, ATINER & Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University, USA.

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"Blood Suckers Most Cruel:"
The Vampire and the Bat In and Before Dracula

*Kevin Dodd**

The relationship between the nineteenth century vampire monster and the vampire bat has not yet been seriously investigated in English. Three common assumptions made by experts are examined in this paper. Current vampire historiography has held that Stoker's use of a huge bat as the vampire was either mistaken or a creative innovation and therefore requires explanation in those terms. It supposes that people in the nineteenth century understood the word "vampire" the way we do today. It presumes Dracula to be the first story to have a vampire monster transform into a bat. To consider these positions, we must first analyze the use of the bat in Dracula and then set it in the context of 19th-century conceptions of the vampire bat to see how mistaken or creative Stoker actually was. Thereafter a survey of 19th-century works that are said to be leading the way to Dracula is initiated to see if "vampire" had the same meaning then as it does today. Finally we will examine if Dracula's metamorphosis from a monster into a vampire bat had any precursors and, if so, how distinctive Stoker was in developing it.

Introduction

Study of the vampire as an artifact of popular, and even of high culture in the 19th century is, in several ways, arrested. It has its topoi, its familiar places, especially concerning vampires and bats, to which researchers regularly return and assume the validity of their consensus. I want, in this paper, to introduce three areas that need careful reconsideration. I will pose them as questions. Does the nineteenth century use the word "vampire" the way we use it today or do we project our ideas back on to it? How did the 19th century understand the vampire bat? Was it the microbat we designate today or was it something else entirely? Finally, how did it work out the relationship between the vampire monster and the vampire bat? Were the two commonly conflated, but awaited Bram Stoker's *Dracula* before they could transform into each other? Or was a blurring between them relatively rare, with mutual metamorphosis, equally uncommon, nonetheless preceding the book?

The Bat in *Dracula*

The vampire is a complex shapeshifter in *Dracula*.[1] There are four types in evidence: two are dispersive—to particulate matter and to vapor; two are concrete—to a wolf and, of course, into a bat.

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The bat is the primary way Dracula approaches Lucy and may be the predominant way he feeds on her as well. There are ten mentions of a large bat in the context of Lucy, several times emphasizing the flapping, scratching, buffeting, and striking of its wings against the window, which at times appear to have an almost hypnotic effect.[2] One reference is by Quinsey Morris where he compares Lucy's precipitous decline with that of a horse he saw in the plains of South America drained of its blood "from those big bats that they call vampires."[3] She dies with a great bat circling around outside.

Afterward, disappearances of children are reported; they are found alive, but they have marks on their throats. Van Helsing prepares for his revelation that the postmortem Lucy is responsible by reminding his audience of nocturnal bats that "open the veins of cattle and horses and suck dry their veins" and others which flit down on sleeping sailors and take their lives.[4] The attending physician of one of the victims conjectures the child was bitten by a bat: "Out of so many harmless ones ... there may be some wild specimen from the South of a more malignant species. Some sailor may have brought one home, and it managed to escape, or even from the Zoological Gardens a young one may have got loose, or one be bred there from a vampire."[5]

With the vampire Lucy dispatched, Van Helsing explains to the five that comprise the group of would-be slayers as much information as he can about Dracula, including the fact he can appear as a bat. As discussion ensues, Quincey leaves and a pistol shot rings out. Quincey had left the building and fired at a "big bat" that had perched on the window sill.[6] Also, when Dracula makes his fifth metamorphosis to vapor after blood-raping Mina, a bat is seen to rise from Renfield's window. Following this, as the six pursue Dracula to

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1. Bram Stoker, *Dracula* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1897). Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2t3EMpw.

2. Stoker, *Dracula*, 8.89-90; 9.103; 12.148-49.

3. Ibid. 141. Part of the Pampas region referred to by Morris is within the range of the *Desmodus rotundus*, the real vampire bat, and therefore would be associated with bat attacks. But as Morris makes clear, the vampire bat in question is the large mythic one, which has no presence there. I therefore have no idea why Stoker might have chosen this area; he probably found reference to bat attacks in a travelogue. The large bat, by the way, was placed there in Thomas Carlyle's "Dr. Francia" and Oliver Wendell Holmes' "Farewell to Agassiz" [Thomas Carlyle, "Dr. Francia," *The Foreign Quarterly Review* 31 (July 1843), 564; Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Farewell to Agassiz," *The Atlantic Monthly-A Magazine of Literature, Science, Art, and Politics* 16, no. 97 (November 1865), 584].

4. Stoker, *Dracula*, 14.179.

5. Ibid., 15.182.

6. Ibid., 18.224-25.

his eventual demise, the fact that he can turn into a bat regularly enters into their calculations.[7]

Thus Stoker's is a large bat which drinks human blood, hovers and travels with purpose, surveils, sedates, mesmerizes, and feeds with an intention to kill. It is not called a vampire bat—just a vampire.

The Mythic Vampire Bat in the 19th Century

Since at least the 1970s, Stoker's bat has posed a problem for experts because the true vampire is not big. When *we* refer to the vampire bat, we almost always mean the common one (*Desmodus rotundus*), the only one, until recently,[8] of the three, all indigenous to Central and South America, to feed upon humans. It is known as a "microbat:" it has a body about the size of an adult human's thumb, a wingspan of 14-16 inches from tip to tip, and drinks up to one fluid ounce of blood in a feeding. Its saliva contains an anticoagulant called, tongue in check, "draculin," which causes the wound to continue to bleed after feeding.[9] So how do scholars deal with the discrepancy between Stoker's bat and the real vampire bat?

Elizabeth Miller, one of a few who has shown real interest in the relationship of the vampire monster and the bat, has argued that "Stoker obviously did not know (or chose to ignore) the fact that the vampire bat is quite small," and thus could not do the damage attributed to it in the book. However, by making it a transformation of a vampire, he created one "quite capable of attacking and draining humans."[10]

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7. Ibid., 25.312; 26.322, 328. Had the Icelandic version been the one originally released in England, Dracula would hardly be associated with bats [Bram Stoker and Valdimar Ásmundsson, *Powers of Darkness; The Lost Version of Dracula*, trans. Hans Corneel de Roos (New York: Overlook Duckworth, 2017)].

8. Fernanda Ito, Enrico Bernard, and Richard A. Torres, "What is for Dinner? First Report of Human Blood in the Diet of the Hairy-Legged Vampire Bat Diphylla ecaudata," *Acta Chiropterologica* 18, no. 2 (December 2016).

9. Arthur M. Greenhall, Gerhard Joermann, and Uwe Schmidt, "Desmodus rotundus," *Mammalian Species* no. 202 (December 1983), 1-6; Jacqueline J. Belwood and Patricia A. Morton, "The truth about the bats people love to hate is even more fascinating than the myths...," *BATS Magazine* 9, no. 1 (Spring 1991); Bill Schutt, "The Curious, Bloody Lives of Vampire Bats," *Natural History Magazine* 117, no. 9 (November 2008). Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2KuGues.

10. Elizabeth Miller, "Bats, Vampires & Dracula," *The Night Flyer: News for the Friends of Florida's Bats* 3, no. 4 (Fall 1998); Miller, *Dracula: Sense and Nonsense* (Essex: Desert Island Books, 2000), 34; Miller, *A Dracula Handbook* (Xlibris, 2005), 46; Miller, "Coitus Interruptus: Sex, Bram Stoker, and Dracula," *Romanticism on the Net* 44 (November 2006a), 15; Miller, "Getting to Know the Un-Dead: Bram Stoker, Vampires and Dracula," in *Vampires, Myths and Metaphors of Enduring Evil*, ed. Peter Day (New York: Rodopi Press, 2006b), 105.

Miller is likely the first to face the issue directly. Leonard Wolf in 1975 simply dismissed Stoker's vampire bat and educated the reader on the small one instead.[11] Matthew Bunson, over fifteen years later, did much the same thing, noting that Europeans named the microbat (not a large one) "vampire" because they were horrified it survived on blood.[12] Christopher Frayling deviated little from this.[13]

More recently Christopher David was able to annotate a scholar's edition of *Dracula* without a single comment on the bat.[14] J. Gordon Melton, on the other hand, recognized an early tradition concerning vampire bats that goes back to the 16th century but treated it, like Bunson, as if it had always designated small ones.[15] David Skal likewise noted that bats have a rich place in folklore but then turned to the vampire microbat for the rest of his observations.[16] Felix Oinas riffed a little on the same.[17]

Basil Copper diverted from his description of the small bat with a single sentence drawing attention to the fact that "vampire" was first attached to a large bat.[18] Jan Perkovski included in his anthology Ditmars and Greenhall's significant study on the vampire bat, which introduced the history of the large mythic vampire bat, but attached no importance to it in his enthusiasm for the microbat.[19]

So what has interested these professionals is setting the record straight. The true vampire bat is small, therefore Stoker was either in error with his bat or was taking literary license. If the latter, then experts might ignore it or conjecture a reason. Miller, as we saw, holds that the size is important mainly to explain the extent of blood loss. Clive Leatherdale guesses that Dracula must adhere to a "crude law of constant physical mass," so if he turns into a

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11. Bram Stoker and Leonard Wolf, *The Annotated Dracula* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1975), 141.

12. Matthew Bunson, *The Vampire Encyclopedia* (New York: Crown Trade Paperbacks, 1993), 266.

13. Christopher Frayling, *Vampyres: Lord Byron to Count Dracula* (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), 36.

14. Bram Stoker and Christopher David, *Dracula: Scholar's Edition* (Self-published, Google Play, 2015).

15. Gordon J. Melton, *The Vampire Book: The Encyclopedia of the Undead* (Michigan: Visible Ink Press, 2011), 50-51.

16. David J. Skal, *Vampires: Encounters with the Undead* (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal, 2001), 402.

17. Felix Oinas, "East European Vampires," in *The Vampire: A Casebook*, ed. Alan Dundes (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 49.

18. Basil Copper, *The Vampire in Legend and Fact* (New York: Citadel Press Book, 1973), 48.

19. Jan Perkovski, *Vampires of the Slavs* (Cambridge, Mass: Slavika Publishers, Inc., 1976), 19-21.

bat it must be a big one, whereas if he were to become an elephant, it would have to be a small one.[20]

There has been, therefore, virtually no interest in locating an antecedent for Stoker's large bat. Miller is the exception, but the best she has been able to do is locate a single source as a possibility.[21] She writes that since Stoker referred to Sarah Lee's book entitled *Anecdotes of Habits and Instincts of Birds*[22] in his notes for *Dracula*, perhaps he also read her companion volume, *Anecdotes of the Habits and Instincts of Animals*.[23] There Lee speaks of a bat of "monstrous size." But in point of fact, all of Lee's comments are derivative from sources Stoker could easily have encountered elsewhere, as we shall see directly.

Therefore scholars, who have been so determined to reconstruct the development of the vampire myth in the West when it pertains to the monster, have given little attention to the other vampire, to the slow unfolding of the myth of the monstrous bat. Yet the story is equally as interesting and rewarding.[24]

For help, we can turn to the aforementioned 1935 study on the bat by Ditmars and Greenhall. They argued that when Cortez's followers returned "with tales of blood-sucking bats, founded on acquired knowledge of an actual blood-drinking creature," superstitions soon arose of such bats being in the Old World "where no sanguivorous bats have ever occurred." Early naturalists, then, working from legends and deductions from dead specimens rather than by observation, thought the "ugliest and largest bats ... to be the vampire."[25]

Early reports from South and Central America were no doubt a complex intermixture of experience, exaggeration, indigenous folklore and art, and sheer imagination, shaped by expectations drawn from Christianity, classical mythology, and bestiaries.[26] Already in 1511, before Cortés sailed to the

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20. Bram Stoker and Clive Leatherdale, *Dracula Unearthed* (Westcliff-on-Sea: Desert Island Books, 1988), 158.

21. Miller, *Dracula: Sense and Nonsense*, 34-35; Miller, "Coitus Interruptus:, 15.

22. Sarah Lee, *Anecdotes of the Habits and Instincts of Birds, Reptiles, and Fishes* (London: Grant & Griffith, 1853).

23. Lee, *Anecdotes of the Habits and Instincts of Animals* (London: Griffith, Faran, Okeden, & Welch, 1852), 28-30.

24. David E. Brown, *Vampiro: The Vampire Bat in Fact and Fantasy* (Silver City: High-Lonesome Books, 1994).

25. Raymond Lee Ditmars and Arthur M. Greenhall, "The vampire bat; a presentation of undescribed habits and review of its history," *Zoologia: Scientific Contributions of the New York Zoological Society* 19, no. 2 (April 1935), 70-71.

26. Elizabeth P. Benson, "Bats in South American Folklore and Ancient Art," *BATS Magazine* 9, no. 1 (Spring 1991); Benson, "Bats in South American Folklore and Ancient Art," *Andean Past* 1 (1987), 165-190.

mainland, Peter Martyr d'Anghiera wrote "in many places bats as large as pigeons flew about the Spaniards as soon as twilight fell, biting them so cruelly that men, rendered desperate, were obliged to give way before them as though they had been harpies."[27] In 1516 he added that "[d]uring the night the men were tortured by bats, which bit them; and if one of these animals bit a man while he was asleep, he lost his blood, and was in danger of losing his life. It is even claimed that some people did die on account of these wounds."[14] Ulisse Aldrovandi in 1599 noted that in the hot regions of the world, like India, bats were reported to be savage. They are the size of doves and "attack the faces of people, by striking and wounding in such a way that they sometimes mutilate noses or ears or other parts."[28] Accounts have even surfaced, he says, of people being beaten down by their wings.

Joseph Gumilla described a different function for their large wings in 1731: "if by misfortune a vein is opened, which happens not infrequently, [victims] slip from dream to death, so subtle is the penetration of their teeth, while their wings softly beat the air to cool and lull the sleeper, whose life, they intend to take."[29] In 1745, Charles Marie de la Condamine described the bat as being "monstrous in size," a phrase used repeatedly thereafter;[30] it was first translated into English as "of a monstrous Bignes."[31] Then in 1758 Carl Linnaeus, in a fateful move, named the Malayan flying fox, a megabat with a wingspan of nearly five feet, *vampyrus*.[32]

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27. Pietro Martire d'Anghiera, *De Orbe Novo: The Eight Decades of Peter Martyr D'Anghera*, 2 vols. trans. Francis Augustus MacNutt (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1963), 1: 179.

28. Ulisse Aldrovandi, *Ornithologiae, hoc est de avibus historiae libri XII* (*Ornithologiae, this is about birds history books 12*) (Bonogna: A Sienese Franciscan, 1599), 12: 579.

29. Joseph Gumilla, *El Orinoco ilustrado, y defendido: historia natural, civil, y geográfica de este gran río y de sus caudalosas vertientes* (*The Orinoco illustrated, and defended: natural, civil, and geographical history of this great river and its mighty slopes*) (Madrid: Manuel Fernandez, 1745), 406. Leslie Klinger, in a bizarre pseudo-scientific move, adapts this myth of the wings for his readers. "Scientists are quite interested in the bat's saliva, which numbs the victim's skin and lulls the victim to sleep while preventing the blood from clotting" [Bram Stoker and Leslie S. Klinger, *The New Annotated Dracula* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2008), 232].

30. Charles Marie de la Condamine, *Relation abrégée d'un voyage fait dans l'interieur de l'Amérique méridionale* (*Abbreviated relationship of a trip made in the interior of South America*) (Paris: Veuve Pessot, 1745), 171.

31. George Edwards, *A Natural History of Birds* (London: College of Physicians, 1751), 201.

32. Carl Linnaeus, *Systema Naturae*, 10th ed. (Stockholm: Salvius, 1758), 1.31. MacNally and Floresçu advance the ludicrous claim that Cortés himself named them vampire bats [Raymond MacNally and Radu Floresçu, "Vampirism: Old World Folklore," in *The Vampire in Slavic Cultures*, ed. Thomas J. Garza (San Diego: University Readers, 1994/2009), 47.

In English, Thomas Pennant mentioned in 1771 the vampire, which was enormous, fanning the air with its wings to create "a still sounder sleep" and "insinuat[ing] its aculeated tongue into a vein without being perceived, and then suck[ing] the blood till it is satiated."[33] John Gabriel Stedman in 1796 gave one of the most quoted descriptions in the 19th century. Therein he spoke of being bitten by a "*vampire* or *spectre* of Guiana." He described it as "a bat of monstrous size, that sucks the blood from men and cattle when they are fast asleep, even sometimes till they die." It does this by feeding to satiation, disgorging, and sucking again until it can hardly fly; it has a wingspan as wide as three feet.[34] The naturalist William Wood in 1807 extended the span to four feet.[35] In 1825 Charles Waterton wrote a book that was reprinted throughout the century, describing several visits by these large "nocturnal surgeons."[36] Always ready for a nice turn of phrase, he called them elsewhere, "sanguinary imps of night."[37]

These reports were confirmed in 1847 by Richard Schomburgk[38] and in 1853 by Alfred Russel Wallace.[39] Wallace identified the second largest bat in Latin America, the *Phyllostomus hastatus*, as the one in question, rather than the largest one. He appended an interesting theory from his brother about how the bat creates the incision: it places a canine tooth on the victim and then drills it in slowly by flying around in circles, all the while fanning the victim into deeper sleep.

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33. Thomas Pennant, *Synopsis of Quadrupeds* (Chester: J. Monk, 1771), 361-362; on the tongue [Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, *Histoire Naturelle, générale et particulière, avec la description du Cabinet du Roi* (*Natural History, general and particular, with the description of the Cabinet of the King*) 10, 1763, 64-65, 78].

34. John Stedman, *Narrative, of a Five Years' Expedition, Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam, in Guiana, on the Wild Coast of South America; from the Year 1772, to 1777: Elucidating the History of that Country, and Describing Its Productions, Viz. Quadrupedes, Birds, Fishes, Reptiles, Trees, Shrubs, Fruits, & Roots; with an Account of the Indians of Guiana, & Negroes of Guinea 2* (London: J. Johnson and J. Edwards, 1796), 142-144.

35. William Wood, *Zoography, Or, The Beauties of Nature Displayed: In Select Descriptions from the Animal, and Vegetable, with Additions from the Mineral Kingdom Systematically Arranged* (London: Dadell and Davies, 1807), 347-349.

36. Charles Waterton, *Wanderings in South America, in the North West of the United States, and the Antilles, in the Years 1812, 1816, 1820, and 1824* (London: J. Mawman, 1825), 11, 153, 174-179, 287-289.

37. Waterton, *Essays on natural history, chiefly ornithology* (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1838), 70-72.

38. Richard Schomburgk, *Travels in British Guiana During the Years 1840-1844* (Leipzig: J. J. Weber, 1847), 225-226.

39. Alfred Russel Wallace, *A Narrative of Travels on the Amazon and Rio Negro: With an Account of the Native Tribes, and Observations on the Climate, Geology, and Natural History of the Amazon Valley* (London: Reeve & Co., 1853), 449.

"Vampire" entered taxonomy with Linnaeus and it leaves a legacy to this day. The most prodigious bat in the Americas is named the *Vampyrum spectrum*. Linnaeus' vampire is known today as the *Pteropyus vampyrus*. There are the genera and subgenera *Vampyressa* (1843), *Vampyrops* (1865), and *Vampyrodes* (1889). Many others became popularly known as vampires, although their scientific names today do not reflect it; they are now called "false vampire bats."[40] Johann von Spix famously designated the *Glossophaga soricina* as "a blood-sucker most cruel" (*Sanguisuga crudelissima*); it was sometimes known as the "long-tongued vampire."[41]

In the 1840s the descriptions of the bat began to be tempered by Darwin's direct observation of the *Desmodus rotundus* feeding on blood, the first sighting to be taken seriously.[42] Before him, by the way, in 1801, Felix de Azara described this blood-sucking bat with considerable care, but was immediately ignored.[43] By Stoker's time, sources might deal with the mythic one by itself or some compromise between it and the proper one.[44] A few even dealt with the true vampire with no reference to the large one.[45] In popular culture, it was strictly the legendary one that was used.

So Stoker had readily available to him a vampire that was very large, had predatorial instincts, and sucked blood to such a degree that it could take a life. It used its wings to sedate hypnotically, both while hovering and while feeding. Stoker did not invent it, by making it a human-like vampire monster in a transformed state, but utilized a bat that already existed, albeit in people's imagination, and affixing it to the monster. It is correct, then, that he may have ignored the *Desmodus rotundus*, but is not so in insinuating the mythic one to

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40. Barbara French, "False Vampires and Other Carnivores: A glimpse at this select group of bats reveals efficient predators with a surprisingly gentle side ...," *BATS Magazine* 15, no. 2 (Summer 1997).

41. Johann von Spix, *Simiarum et Vespertilionum Brasiliensium species novae ou Histoire Naturelle des espèces nouvelles de singes et de chauves-souris observées et recueillies pendant le voyage dans l'interieur du Brésil exécuté par ordre de S M Le Roi de Bavière dans les années 1817, 1818, 1819, 1820* (*Simiarum and Vespertilionum Brasiliensium species novae or Natural History of the new species of monkeys and bats observed and collected during the journey in the interior of Brazil executed by order of S M The King of Bavaria in the years 1817, 1818, 1819, 1820*) (Munich: Typis Francisci Seraphi Hybschmanni, 1823), 66-67.

42. Charles Darwin, *Narrative of the surveying voyages of His Majesty's Ships Adventure and Beagle between the years 1826 and 1836, describing their examination of the southern shores of South America, and the Beagle's circumnavigation of the globe. Journal and remarks. 1832-1836* (London: Henry Colburn, 1839), 3: 24-25.

43. Felix de Azara, *Essais sur l'histoire naturelle des quadrupèdes de la province du Paraguay* (*Essays on the natural history of quadrupeds in the province of Paraguay*) (Paris: Charles Pogens, 1801), 2: 273.

44. For an extensive compromise, see Lydekker [Richard Lydekker, ed., *The Royal Natural History 1* (London: Frederick Warne & Company, 1893-94), 1: 299-306].

45. *Alden's Cyclopedia of Natural History 2* (New York: John B. Alden, 1893).

be hard to account for. And the language was most often of the vampire rather than the vampire bat.

The Conflation of Monster and Bat

Because the 19th century uses "vampire" to designate both the bat and the monster, we have to be careful when reading literature from the period. In fact, the latter half of the century seems to represent a shift away from a supernatural monster to a more normalized vampire, and the bat is part of this. For this we shall look at an article by Andrew Boylan that lists works he believes lead up to Stoker to see if a pattern emerges.[46] He is a respected enthusiast and the only one I know to investigate the issue at any length. All the references are intended to designate a blurring of boundaries between the monster and bat, with the idea that Stoker might have got his idea of metamorphosis from one or more of the references.

Boylan notes first the 1888 entry in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and an 1896 article from the *New York World* dealing with "vampirism" in New England. In each case both the monster and the bat are brought together in a single article. He goes on to reference Richard Burton's 1870 story *Vikram and the Vampire* where a creature, identified as a vampire, hangs from a bough, "like a flying fox;" a cartoon in *Punch* (1885) where the Irish National League is identified as the Irish "Vampire," and pictured as a bat, "replete with human face;" Goya's print *Las Resultas* (1810-20) which shows a bat "with a humanoid face suckling on the chest of a corpse;" Dumas' 1851 play where Ruthven, the vampire, is revived from death, spreads his "great wings and flies off;" "A. Y."'s 1829 story, "Pepopukin in Corsica," of an "invented vampire" who sings of flying over the alps; Bruxas in William Kingston's 1863 short story who are ordinary women during the day but become vampires at night and can transform into "gigantic bats;" Baring-Gould's 1884 "Margery of Quether" whose vampire has hands and arms "shrivelled and like those of a bat;" Christian iconography like the painting of St. Michael by Carlo Crivelli (c. 1476) where the devil (which translates to "Dracula") has bat wings; and the 1896 short film, *Le Manoir du Diable*, by Georges Méliès where Mephistopheles turns from a large bat to a human.

Elizabeth Miller adds two others: first a "bat-like vampire appears ... as a cover illustration in the novel VARNEY THE VAMPIRE, which appeared fifty years before DRACULA."[47] Then, "*The Mysterious Stranger*, as Count Klatka

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46. Andrew Boylan, "Stoker and the Bat," *Vamped* (April 1, 2014); see also Boylan, *Media Vampire: A Study of Vampires in Fictional Media*, Lulu.com. (2012), 183-184.

47. Miller, "Bats, Vampires & Dracula." Miller writes, "The first literary connection with vampires—I am not aware of any connection in the folklore—may be the cover

keeps company *with the bat and the owl*."[48] Boylan concludes his paper, "[W]hat we have seen is a rich pre-Stoker connection between bats and vampires ... Certainly Stoker was not the first to suggest that a vampire could transform into a bat. The best that can be said is that he popularised the connection."

I will look at these chronologically, changing any problems with dating.

First is Crivelli's painting. Christianity picked up the notion of wings on its devils and angels early on. For instance, the early Latin father, Tertullian, wrote in the late second century, "Every spirit is possessed of wings. This is a common property of both angels and demons."[49] The first differentiation of them into feathered and bat-like, albeit meant strictly metaphorically, is probably by the Greek Father, Basil of Caesarea, in the mid-fourth century: "The bat is indeed winged, yet it is not furnished with feathers, but flies through the air by means of a fleshy membrane. Such are demons as well."[50]

It does not seem to have occurred in earnest until the late high Middle Ages. The frescoes by Giotto, "The Exorcism of the Demons" [Scene 10] and "The Confession of the Woman of Benevento" [Scene 27] dated between 1295 and 1299 were quickly followed by Duccio Di Buoninsegna's "The Temptation of Christ on the Mountain" and "Descent to Hell" (1308-11). Dante around 1314 insisted that the devil's wings were not feathered, "but were in form and texture like a bat's."[51] So Crivelli is just a later instance of this. Boylan is right insofar as it is a conflation of a monster and a bat, but it is a stretch to see it leading up to Dracula.[52]

Goya's print adds nothing: it is merely his use of the mythic vampire bat sucking the life out of a victim while resting on his stomach as a symbol for the

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illustration of an early edition of *Varney the Vampire*" (Miller, *Dracula: Sense and Nonsense*, 34). There in fact is a slight connection in folklore. Paul Barber says, "In Romania it is reported that by flying over a corpse a bat can create a vampire" [Paul Barber, *Vampires, Burial, and Death: Folklore and Reality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 33].

48. Miller, *Dracula: Sense and Nonsense*, 34.

49. Tertullian, *Apologeticus. Ante-Nicene Christian Library 11. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1869), 68.

50. Saint Basil (Bishop of Caesarea), *Commentary on the Prophet Isaiah*, Texts and Studies in the History of Theology 7, trans. Nicolai A. Lipatov, ed. Kinzig Wolfram and Vinzent Wolfram (Cambridge: Edition Cicero, 2001), 110.

51. Dante, *Inferno*, trans. Carlyle John Aitken (London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1904), 385; cf. Luther Link, *The Devil: A Mask Without a Face* (London: Reaktion Books, 2004), 67-68.

52. In fact I think it is the opposite, but this is pure conjecture. In prospect I believe one reason it took some time before the two vampires were brought together intimately was because the bat was already taken by Christianity's evilest figure. On the other hand, in retrospect, when Stoker adopted the name for his monster, he may have made some interesting connections between the satanic wings, the vampire monster, and the vampire bat. On the other hand, the vampire bat and Satan were linked together closely by 1866 [Thomas Carlisle, "Natural History: Bats," *The Juvenile Instructor and Companion* 17-5 (1866), 118].

horror of war to a nation. He is probably working with the famous picture *Nightmare* by Henry Fuseli where the *mare* of folk stories sits upon the chest of a sleeping beauty giving her nightmares (1781). The 19th-century vampire bat in literature, whether or not dependent upon Goya, is henceforth likely to be sitting on the ribs or stomach sucking blood from the chest or throat.[53]

A.Y.'s 1826 story is significant.[54] The vampire is a prank, but taken on its own terms, the monster is said to rise from its grave clothes and fly over the alps, dripping from his "blood-swol'n body." Yet it does not tie together the monster either with the bat or with bat wings, but only with wings and flying. Heaven is promised to him and he attacks only sinners, so there is no reason his wings not be feathered.

"The Mysterious Stranger" was published in German in 1844 and a translation into English printed in 1854.[55] The passage in question—keeping company with the bat and the owl—simply means he is asleep during the day. In the German it is *ich mit Kauz und Uhu niste*, "I nest with the screech and eagle owls."[56]

Next is Dumas and this does appear to be a genuine conflation of the two vampires.[57] He has two supernatural vampire characters that are set in conflict with each other. He calls the female one "a ghoul" and links her with Arabs.[58]

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53. Goya has a much earlier etching that obviously uses vampire bats in the background: "There is Plenty to Suck" (c. 1798). Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2NsWBH1.

54. Arthur Young, "Pepopukin in Corsica," in *The Stanley Tales 1*, ed. Ambrose Marten (London: W. Morgan, 1826), 53-54.

55. 1860 was given by Montague Summers as the date of the English translation in *Victorian Ghost Stories* (1934) and it was used in English sources thereafter. Recent critical studies place it in 1854. The research of Douglas A. Anderson and Thomas Honegger resulted in locating the original German and so the record was finally set straight by Mike Ashley, who credits them [Mike Ashley, *Vampires: Classic Tales* (Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc., 2011), 33].

56. Carl Adolf von Wachsmann, "Der Fremde," *Erzälungen und Novellen* 3: 7 (Leipzig: Carl Jocke von Wachsmann 1844), 167, Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2JyrIPe; Anonymous, "The Mysterious Stranger," *Chambers's repository of instructive and amusing tracts 4* (Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, Tract 62, 1854), 15, Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2zZbZcC.

57. Alexandre Dumas, *The Return of Lord Ruthven the Vampire*, trans. Frank J. Morlock (Tarzana: Hollywood Comics, 2004).

58. The "ghoul" first appeared in "The Story of Sidi Nouman" in Antoine Galland's translation/ adaptation of the Arabian Tales [*Les Mille et Une Nuits*, 10, 1712; see the reprint, 1785, 35-56, retrieved from https://bit.ly/2zSyTlM]. It is most likely a creation of Galland himself. The ghoul was later "vampirized" by Collin de Plancy (1820, 104-16), where de Plancy doubtless fabricated an "Arabic" story based on "Sidi Nouman." Dumas is simply pulling from this tradition. For an important perspective on the ghoul, see Ahmed K. Al-Rawi [Ahmed K. Al-Rawi, "The Arabic Ghoul and its Western Transformation," *Folklore* 120 (December 2009)].

Ghouls are said to be coquettes, choosing handsome young men and then lying in wait for them. "They watch for the passing of their prey, lull him to sleep with the movement of their vast wings and when he is asleep in a mortal bliss, they aspirate his blood and his life."[59] There is no doubt about her being a preternatural monster, with vampire bat wings which sedate. Lord Ruthven, the other vampire, dead among the mountain rocks, is revived by moonlight. "Lord Ruthwen first sits up—then rises completely, ... deploys great wings and flies off."[60] Dumas uses the same construction he does for the ghoul: *grandes ailes*—vast wings. Both are surely hybrids of the vampire monster and bat.[61]

Miller's reference to the illustration in *Varney the Vampire* also appears to be a conflation of the two. The story was originally printed between 1845 and 1847 as a "penny dreadful." It was published in book form in 1847. What Miller is referring to is the cover of the 1853 edition.[62] A skeletonized Varney spreads his cloak to form bat wings and hovers over a sleeping beauty. He is surrounded by four demons complete with bat wings watching eagerly. So the illustration does seem to bring together the vampire monster and the bat. But because of the emphasis on the bat by the appearance of the four demons and of him hovering over her like a bat, the illustration is more about it than the monster. A similar picture, by the way, is painted by Charles Dickens in *Bleak House* (1852-3): Mr. Krook finds his tenant dead on the bed and calls for help, "with his lean hands spread out above the body like a vampire's wings."[63]

We turn to Burton's very free translation of *The Baital-Pachisi* or *Vetala Panchavimshati* entitled *Vikram and the Vampire*.[64] It ends up being largely irrelevant to our study. "Vampire" is a misleading translation for *baital* or

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59. Dumas, *The Return of Lord Ruthven the Vampire*, Act 2, scene 2.

60. Dumas, *The Return of Lord Ruthven the Vampire*, Act 3, scene 3.

61. A vampire of a similar sort is also described in the anonymously written adolescent novel, *The Vampire, or Detective Brand's Greatest Case* 1885, 8. It uses "bird" for "bat" throughout the story. "Tain't a bird, ... but a sort of a devil w'ot comes in the shape of a big bird; it's got the figger of a man, but the wings of a bird, a kinder hitched onto a man's arm, and the only thing it can live on is human blood." So too the famous picture by Albert-Joseph Penot *La chauve-souris* circa 1890. See Rossbach [Susanne Rossback, *Des Dandys Wort als Waffe: Dandyismus, narrative Vertextungsstrategien und Geschlechterdifferenz im Werk Jules Barbey d'Aurevillys* (*The dandy's word as a weapon: Dandyism, narrative strategies of articulation and gender difference in the work of Jules Barbey d'Aurevilly*) (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2002), 138].

62. Edward Pettit, *Varney the Vampire by James Malcolm Rymer*. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2KBgk9Y.

63. Charles Dickens, *Bleak House* (London: Bradbury & Evans, 1853), 97.

64. Richard F. Burton, "Vikram and the Vampire; or, Tales of Indian Devilry," *Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country* 77 (April 1868); for a contemporary proper translation see Platts [John Tompson Platts, *The Baitāl Pachchīsī, or, The Twenty-five Tales of a Sprite* (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1871)].

vetala, a Hindu impish and devious trickster spirit that can inhabit corpses in charnel grounds. "Vampire" refers to the spirit, whether incarnate or disembodied; it corresponds to the way the word became used by Spiritualism and Theosophy.[65] Insofar as it inhabits a dead human body, there is a parallel with the monster. Here it animates an altered body that looks like a flying fox, i.e., a vampire bat. So "vampire" refers to neither the monster nor the bat as such, but to the spirit behind them both.

Margery of Quether, over two hundred years before the story of the same name, used to sit in church and pray for everlasting life and her Christian God granted it.[66] She now lives like a bat in the belfry of the church, shrunk to the size of an infant in mummified flesh. This is how George Rosedhu encounters her. She drops from the bell rope, scrambles on the ground "much as [he has] seen a bat scramble," has hands and arms shrivelled "like those of a bat," and when his heart goes out to her and he decides he will protect her in his home, she clings to his chest clutching him with her "bat like hands and claws" and sinks her one remaining tooth deep into his flesh. She is a bat situated on his breast and feeding. Thus begins a strange relationship where George suckles her back to youth as he himself slips into decrepitude and old age. Her "vampirism" (the word "vampire" never appears) is imaged 100% as that of a bat; her transformation from being "bat like" to being "normal" is slow and in stages as was her change from human to being bat like beforehand. The figure of a bat is superimposed on the human at one stage of her life; there is no conflation of a monster and bat, for there is no monster.

The 1888 entry on "vampire" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* follows.[67] The two vampires are put together because they share the same name. The bat gets more space because it is the object of greater interest. Instead of conflation, it displays the bat's primacy. In fact, the author writes that the word vampire "originally applied in eastern Europe to blood sucking ghosts, but in modern usage [is] transferred to one or more species of blood sucking bats inhabiting South America."[68] In other words, usage for the monster is archaic; for the bat it is current. So too the 1896 article from the *New York World*; although it is

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65. Burton, "Vikram and the Vampire; or, Tales of Indian Devilry," 409.

66. Sabine Baring-Gould, "Margery of Quether," *The Cornhill Magazine* (April 1884). Baring-Gould is Christianizing classical myths which counsel human beings to avoid hubris and accept their mortality. Those who wish to be like the eternal gods live to regret it. The Sibyl of Cumae shrivels up with her increasing years like a cicada—so does Tithonus, Eos's favorite; both, in their withered condition, plead for their ever-elusive death.

67. G. E. Dobson, "Vampire," *Encyclopaedia Brittanica* 24 (New York, 1888), 52.

68. Cf. "They Burned the Vampire," *Healdsburg Tribune, Enterprise and Scimitar* 14 (June 22, 1893). Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2lPN3ua.

only about the monster, the author devotes the final paragraphs to the bat, since it is "more recent" and is "founded on fact" rather than superstition.[69]

The illustration in *Punch* is misunderstood if one holds "The Irish *Vampire*" as meaning anything more than the bat. A huge bat, with the National League written on its wings, hovers over the sleeping body of Ireland (or "Hibernia") ready to take her life.[70] *Punch* was a humor weekly which saw any nationalist movement, like the Irish League, to be destructive of the British Empire. That is why superimposed on the bat's face is that of Charles Stewart Parnell, an "infamous" supporter of home rule and organizer of the National League.[71] Parnell is a vampire to the staff at *Punch* only in the sense of the bat.

Images like this were prevalent at the time. A particularly provocative one appeared in the January 28, 1893 issue of the *Worker* out of Brisbane, Australia, with the caption "Queensland and the Vampire." A vampire bat with Q. N. Bank on its wings is on the belly of a prostrate topless woman sucking blood and milk from her breast. On the head is the face of the general manager of the Queensland National Bank, Edward Robert Drury, who is extracting the assets of Queensland for the sake of outside investors. In the terms of the time, both are "human vampires."[72]

Along the same lines, at the beginning of Mary Elizabeth Braddon's 1896 "Good Lady Ducayne," a story in which a wealthy elderly woman hires lower middle class women in order secretly to have their blood transfused into her to extend her life at the threat of their own, is an illustration of an old woman in a fur coat with a huge imposing bat hovering behind her. She is acting like a vampire (bat).[73] The first instance of this kind of illustration of which I am

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69. Bram Stoker, Richard Eighteen-Bisang, and Elizabeth Miller, *Bram Stoker's Notes for Dracula: A Facsimile Edition* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2008), 186-193.

70. John Tenniel, *The Irish Vampire, Punch, or The London Charivari* 39 (October 17, 1885), 198-199. It is preceded by a poem with the same name, wherein the luckless Erin (Ireland), beset by problems, has attracted yet new ones. She is counselled to wake up and put up her guard lest they take her life. She is facing the preditorial National League which arose in her midst from her lack of vigilance.

71. Dalby comments how the face reminds him of Stoker's [Richard Dalby, *Dracula's Brood* (New York: Dorset Press, 1987), 11-12].

72. A "human vampire" is used during the final decades of the 19th century to denote someone acting like a vampire bat. A good example is Napier [Charles Ottley Groom Napier, *The Book of Nature and the Book of Man* (London: John Camden Hotten, 1870), 263-264]. Cf. the "Death Watch" dinner put on by the Order of the Vampires, i.e., vampire bats, October 2, 1892 in New York city. The program had a large vampire bat flying over a grave with the words "Homo Desmodus" streaming across its body. Homo Desmodus is translated in this context "Human Vampire." Anonymous, *Death Watch* (New-York Historical Society: October 28, 2011).

73. Mary Elizabeth Braddon, "Good Lady Ducayne," *The Strand Magazine: An Illustrated Monthly* 11 (February 1896), 185.

aware features a frightful human face placed on the body of a vampire bat with a handsome mask dangling down on his chest. As the description that accompanies it makes clear, the vampire is to represent the sadistic hypocrite who seems a friend but secretly slanders behind one's back. It is entitled "Vampire," and refers solely to the bat.[74]

Perhaps most striking comes from a review of Dion Boucicault's "The Phantom," an 1852 adaptation of Charles Nodier's 1820 play, "The Vampire." The notation is from a revival of it and appears in the January 20, 1875 *New York Times* by M. E. W. Sherwood. "Then somewhere along here, I think in a summer season, comes a vision of Boucicault playing the *Vampire*, a dreadful and weird thing, played with immortal genius. That great playwright would not have died unknown had he never done anything but flap his bat-like arms in that dream-disturbing piece."[75]

The Metamorphosis into a Bat

Nina Auerbach and David Skal wrote in 1997 that "the now-inevitable association of vampires with the bat" began with *Dracula*.[76] J. Gordon Melton and Heide Crawford aver much the same.[77] In 1998, Elizabeth Miller declared more strongly "Stoker's major contribution to the association of vampires with bats was his introduction of the idea that a vampire could shapeshift into the form of a bat (as well as a wolf and mist)." Anthony Hogg, an accomplished amateur, has asserted "that Stoker invented one of the most popular "folkloric" characteristics associated with vampires: they could change into bats."[78] Hogg also holds that finding a list that predates *Dracula* and includes a bat as something into which a vampire (monster) can turn would be "an exciting find."[79]

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74. Henry L. Stephens, *The Comic Natural History of the Human Race* (Philadelphia: S. Robinson, 1851), 184-188.

75. M. E. W. Sherwood, Review of Boucicault's "The Phantom," in *Actors and Actresses of Great Britain and the United States: From the Days of David Barrick to the Present Time 5*, ed. Brander Matthews and Laurence Hutton, 87-88 (New York: Cassell & Company, 1886/1875).

76. Bram Stoker, Nina Auerbach, and David J. Skal, *Dracula: A Norton Critical Edition* (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997), 90.

77. Melton, *The Vampire Book: The Encyclopedia of the Undead*, 52; Heide Crawford, *The Origins of the Literary Vampire* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 41.

78. Anthony Hogg, "Bats Before Bram," *The Vampirologist* (April 6, 2014). Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2lMIQas.

79. Hogg, "Bats Where They Don't Belong," *Diary of an Amateur Vampirologist* (January 25, 2011). Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2tMgK3A.

First, we must deal with the remaining sources to which Boylan refers. William H. G. Kingston's *The Vampire*; or, Pedro Pacheco and the Bruxa (1863) is not an early instance of metamorphosis.[80] Ordinary women by day, bruxas become demon possessed by night and have orgies. The name *bruxa* means a witch, and witches are already associated with night orgies and demon possession. They can also shapeshift, so it is no surprise that following the orgy they turn into bats, ducks, or owls. As such they lead passers-by on a wild goose chase, leaving them lost, scratched, and humiliated, and finally return home and with a "vampirish hunger," seize their children, fan them with their huge black wings, bite them, and "suck the life-blood from their veins." The vampire in the title refers only to the bat. There is no vampire monster, only a witch. Stoker read a highly abbreviated story similar to this, by the way.[81]

Le Manoir du Diable by Georges Méliès (1896) has been called "the first vampire film."[82] It features a monster, Mephistopheles, turning into a bat and vice versa. But Mephisopheles is an imp of the devil created in the sixteenth century along with the first Faust tales and thereafter a surrogate for the devil; he is never a vampire monster. It does demonstrate the interchangeability between a human-like devil and a bat (there is no evidence it is a vampire bat), but bats have been associated with the devil for a long time. Nonetheless transformation is important, even if it does not apply immediately to the vampire. So there are only two on Boylan's and Miller's lists that are germane.

There is nothing controversial about the folklore vampire being a shapeshifter. What is of significance, we are told, is the absence of the bat from any such list. In *Wendische Sagen, Märchen und abergläubische Gebräuche* (1880), however, which refers to the stories and rituals of the Western Slavs, there is a sentence on the issue: *Die Vampyre nehmen die Gestalt von Katzen, Fröschen, Kröten, Fliegen, Spinnen oder Fledermäusen an*—"Vampires take the form of cats, frogs, toads, flies, spiders, or bats."[83]

Another can be found a year earlier in a textbook entitled *Simple English Poems* (1879). In an explanatory footnote to Robert Browning's "The Pied Piper

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80. The same story was published in 1846 and 1863, albeit with different names for the lead character. In 1863, however, an introduction was affixed and it is that alone which concerns us.

81. Stoker, Eighteen-Bisang, and Miller, *Bram Stoker's Notes for Dracula: A Facsimile Edition*, 206-209; Isabella Lucy Bird, *The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1883), 451-452.

82. Phil Hardy, Tom Milne, and Paul Willemen, ed. *Overlook Film Encyclopedia: Horror*, (Overlook Press, 1995), 17; Roxana Stuart, *Stage Blood: Vampires of the 19th Century Stage* (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1994), 218.

83. Edmund Veckenstedt, *Wendische Sagen, Märchen und abergläubische Gebräuche* (*Wendish legends, fairy tales and superstitious customs*) (Graz: Leuschner and Lubensky, 1880), 354.

of Hamlin," which makes a passing reference to "Vampyre bats," we read that they are "huge bats found in the tropics, so called from the superstition about vampyres. A vampyre is supposed to be a dead man who returns in body and soul from the other world, and wanders about the earth doing mischief to the living. He sucks the blood of persons asleep, and these persons become vampyres in turn. He lies as a corpse during the day; but at night, especially at full moon, he wanders about in the form of a dog, bat, &c, biting sleepers on the back or neck."[84]

With regard to literature, there is at least one story that features a vampire monster turning into a vampire bat.[85] It is entitled "A Vampire" and is by Karl May.[86] May wrote his Orient Cycle between 1881 and 1888, and it was published in installments in the Catholic weekly, *Deutscher Hausschatz in Wort und Bild*. The fourth volume of the cycle, *In den Schluchten des Balkan*, appeared in the 1885-86 issues. It was then revised and published in book form in 1892. This is found in the seventh chapter.

Kara Ben Nemsi is traveling in the Bulgarian Mountains with his companions. They spend the night at the home of a poor Christian man, Kerpitschi. Kara learns that the man and his wife are fasting that night, so he goes outside to eat and notices there the grave of their daughter who recently had died. When he is finished and returning to the house, Kerpitschi stops him to ask whether he believes in ghosts. Kara says he does not, but Kerpitschi responds that he knows they exist for their daughter is a vampire; his wife and he fast in order to redeem her.

He is told that their daughter, who was already ill, cared for her fiancé's mother as she was dying of small pox. She returned home after her death frightened—something had happened to her there—and soon became delirious. In this state, she would say that Wlastan's son, her fiancé, must die. When she was near death the priest was gone so she made no confession and received no absolution; because she died of small pox she could not be buried in the cemetery. So presently she becomes a bat, knocks on their door, and then flies over to Wlastan's home and feeds on his son, who has started to waste away. "Now she is a vampire and she is keeping him for herself." The

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84. Courthope H. Bowen, ed. "Simple English Poems: English Literature for Junior Classes," in *Four Parts* (London: C. Kegan Paul and Co., 1879), 42 (part two).

85. The jury is still out on "The Vampire Maid" by Hume Nisbet. In *The Vampire Archives*, Otto Penzler, writes that "The Vampire Maid" was first published in a magazine in 1890 and then reprinted in book form in 1900. Penzler cannot recall where he found the datum. Mike Ashley, Douglas A. Anderson, James Doig, and I can find no evidence for the claim.

86. Oliver Kotowski, ed. *Lasst die Toten ruhen: Deutsche Vampirgeschichten aus dem 19* (*Let the dead rest: German vampire stories from the 19th*) (Jahrhundert, Stolberg: Atlantis Verlag, 2012), 189-217.

priest has said the only way to stop her is to stake her, but they will not allow it. Thus, Wlastan, who was once a close friend, is now his enemy.

Kara decides to keep watch over the house, even though Kerpitschi tells him he must not, for no one can look at a vampire and live. That is the reason why they have never answered the door. Kara says he will do so anyway for he wants to see a "ghostly leech behind membrane-wings." Kara sees a man come that night and make bat noises and knock on the door; he is eventually caught and confesses. It is Wlastan's servant who has slowly been poisoning Wlastan's son, so that he himself could become heir. Kerpitschi's daughter caught him, but he threatened to kill her parents if she ever told anyone. That is why she spoke as she did.

There is, by the way, another: "The Stone Chamber" by H. B. Marriott Watson. It is often dated 1898 or 1899, taken from the publication of the book in which it appears, but it was actually printed first in mid-1896. It clearly implies the turning of Priscilla, Lady Marvyn, dead some 150 years, into a bat which is currently feeding on occupants in the stone chamber but it is worked out only in 1898; the 1896 version is too abbreviated.[87]

Final Reflections

There does seem to have been an almost inevitable collision course between the two vampires—monster and bat—if for no other reason than they shared the same name and tended to have similar traits. That started when soldiers, naturalists, even taxonomists began naming bats with the name of the folklore monster and creating a list of lurid characteristics for them. In this way, many of the terrifying aspects of the monster were preserved but the "superstitious" elements could be removed—no more revenants, or ritualized desecrations and stakings, or the victims becoming vampire monsters, or theological problems about how such fit into the order of a benevolent, but just God's creation.

In the latter half of the century the monster seems to be in the process of being naturalized. If referred to at all and not the bat, the monster becomes a psychic vampire mesmerizing, a medical one transfusing, a scientist electrically magnetizing, a *femme fatale* or *homme fatal* seducing; a killer murdering; a necrophile desecrating, etc. All draw the life force, resources, dignity from their victims. At the same time the unreconstructed monster

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87. In the US, it appears on page 29 of the June 28, 1896 issue of the *New York World*. Retrieved from https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/4014154/. Mike Ashley seems have located an earlier appearance on June 11 in *Vanity Fair*. The 1898 version can be read at https://archive.org/stream/-heartofmirandaot00wat siala#page/140.

becomes largely the property of folklorists, early psychologists, and love poets. After Dumas, Lord Ruthven slips increasingly into the shadows of redundancy or parody.

Nonetheless, the monster does still live on at the margins of 19th-century literature. Most of the authors of these stories, however, prefer to keep their options open between coincidence, illusion, trickery, and reality, as May does. A world like ours where the monster can operate unapologetically becomes rare. Yet a few masterpieces still arise like J. Sheridan Le Fanu's *Carmilla* in English;[88] Marie Nizet's *Le Capitaine Vampire* in French;[89] and Heinrich Ulrichs' "Manor" in German,[90] but these, for the most part, were overlooked at the time of their publication.

Dracula should have joined them here at the fringes, but instead it broke out and has become one of the best selling novels to this day. Stoker's use of the contemporary large and menacing bat—to spy, to sedate, to hypnotize, to prey upon, to escape—as one weapon in an arsenal to be wielded by a relentless, foreign, imperial monster bent on conquest in the very heart of the British Empire at the time is quite staggering. In comparison, the previous literary associations of a corpse and a bat are rather anemic.

This is where we must see the significance of the book. It does not lie in its being the first to utilize the bat as something into which the monster can shapeshift. Nor is it the climax of a mainstream movement in its direction. Rather it plays a key role in reasserting the primacy of the monster over the bat that typified the first half of the century. In the latter half, if one used the word "vampire," chances are one meant the bat. Today we mean by it the monster alone and if we refer to the bat, it is merely an adjective.

Finally, the 20th century saw the victory of the microbat over the macrobat as the true vampire, so when a monster turns into a large bat, it is not technically into a vampire bat anymore. *Dracula* is the greatest example of an era when that was not the case, when the monstrous bat still reigned as the vampire.

Acknowledgements

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88. J. Sheridan Le Fanu, "Carmilla," *The Dark Blue* 2 (December 1871).

89. Marie Nizet, *Captain Vampire*, trans. Brian Stableford (Tarzana, CA: Black Coat Press, 2007; first published 1879).

90. Heinrich Ulrich, "Manor," in *Lasst die Toten ruhen: Deutsche Vampirgeschichten aus dem 19* (*Let the dead rest: German vampire stories from the 19th*), ed. Oliver Kotowski (Jahrhundert, Stolberg: Atlantis Verlag, 2012).

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Jabra Ibrahim Jabra's *In Search of Walid Masoud*. A Polyphony of (Un)Orchestrated Opus

*Ibrahim A. El-Hussari**

This paper makes use of Mikhail Bakhtin's notion of polyphony to approach In Search of Walid Masoud, a novel written in Arabic by the Palestinian writer Jabra Ibrahim Jabra in 1978 and translated into English by Roger Allen and Adnan Haydar in 2000. It is the story of the mysterious disappearance of the protagonist Walid Masoud who does not flesh out as a character in his own right although he fills the world of the novel from beginning to end. As the novel hosts multiple characters with distinct voices, each telling his/her own version of the reminisced memories with the protagonist, there is a need to stitch up these parts in search of a possible vision lurking in the offing of the tale. In this context, Bakhtin's polyphony is used to deconstruct and reconstruct the fictional world which Jabra must have pedantically created in this fragmentary novel to send a holistic, non-fragmentary message. Pulling the threads of the various voices of characters rehashing non-identical pieces of the jigsaw puzzle that makes the story of the physically absent hero, this paper demystifies the un-orchestrated polyphonic ambiguities in order to unify the seemingly disconnected events that make the plotline of Walid's story and his baffling disappearance from the outset of the novel. In particular, this study looks at the narrative technique used by Jabra to create from a variety of reminisced and shredded personal narratives a totality of a clear-cut vision at the centre of which stands one image epitomizing the drama of a national saga that is worth-telling. Focusing on the impact of Jabra's narrative technique, this paper explores areas long viewed by some literary critics as marginal and unimportant. To this effect, the paper authenticates the voice of the absented hero as the ever-present figure who excels himself to address his homeland, Palestine, as a reverberating national cause.

Introduction

A multi-talented and perceptive Palestinian man of letters and arts, Jabra Ibrahim Jabra (1920-1994) has gracefully left a memorable imprint on both the Arab and the World literary and cultural scenes. Educated in Jerusalem, Cambridge and Harvard, Jabra stands out as a mold of a prolific writer, a gifted oil painter, an uncompromising literary-and-art critic, a connoisseur of classical music, a professional translator, a creative poet, a modernist novelist, and above all a distinguished educator and university professor. To quote him, "Had I not been all of these at the same time, I would have probably been none of them at all."[1] This statement simply amplifies the assumption that Jabra's bit of genius featuring in his novels and short stories is in no way separable from the other skills which he constantly developed over time almost fairly equally. However, this paper focuses only on one of his sides: Jabra the novelist. It is his narrative talent that makes him stand out amidst his

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1. From a dialogue with Jabra I. Jabra in Baghdad, Iraq. The dialogue was conducted in Arabic by Najman Yassin, *al-Jamia'a*, April 1978, Vol. 8, Issue: 4: 7-12. [My translation]

great Arab contemporary novelists, such as Ghassan Kanafani,[2] Naguib Mahfouz[3] and a few others. Jabra's novel, *In Search of Walid Masoud* (1978), is one of the four great novels shaping his fictional world. It was greatly influenced by the twentieth-century modernist trends and non-traditional narrative techniques attempted and perfected by the pioneers of the Western novel, such as Franz Kafka in Austria, James Joyce in Ireland and William Faulkner in the United States of America.

Jabra translated William Faulkner's masterpiece *The Sound and the Fury* (1929) into Arabic in 1954. Although literary translation poses challenges that cannot be squarely met even by professional translators in the field, Jabra seems to have succeeded to create, in his novel *In Search of Walid Masoud* (1978), a fictional world that does not only simulate but also excels the fine technical threads of the complex narrative that Faulkner builds in his novel *The Sound and the Fury*. More specifically, Jabra employs a multiple focus of narration to play up the enigmatic life-story of a single character whose missing physical existence gradually coheres into a cryptic and fascinating portrayal of a full-blown character of flesh and blood. Like Faulkner, who uses a fragmentary language that reflects the disjoined voices doing the narration of the central scene of the Compsons' household story in *The Sound and the Fury*, Jabra pulls the threads of the various narrative voices telling the story of the missing Walid Masoud (henceforth Walid) into a coherent whole with a thematic value underlying yet unifying the disconnected events that make the plotline of Walid's mysterious disappearance. This paper looks at the narrative technique used by Jabra to create from a variety of reminisced and shredded voices a totality of a clear-cut vision at the centre of which stands one image epitomizing a rightful national cause that is worth-telling. The national cause is that of Palestine, the only home for the Palestinian people. This homeland has been usurped and renamed, a great number of its population dispossessed, cheated and forced to flee their birth-right space and property across borders only to discover soon enough that they have become homeless refugees -- Jabra one of them -- in the neighboring countries and the world at large.[4] This turning point in the history of Palestine and the Palestinian population has by all means yielded massive tragic consequences. The tragedy was orchestrated by a number of accomplices: the British colonial

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2. A Palestinian journalist and novelist influenced by Jabra's translation of Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*, and that influence appears in his novel *All That's Left to You* (1966).

3. An Egyptian Nobel Prize winner for Literature also influenced by Jabra's translation of Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*, and that influence appears in his novel *Miramar* (1976).

4. Roza I. M. El-Eini, *Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine, 1929-1948* (London: Routledge, 2006); Gideon Biger, *The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840-1947* (London: Routledge, 2004); Guillaume Vareilles, *Les Frontieres de la Palestine, 1914-1947* (*The Frontieres of Palestine, 1914-1947*) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2010).

administration, the Zionist immigrant militia forces, and the inexplicable silence of some newly-independent Arab states neighboring Palestine. This was abruptly done in the wake of the British ending their mandatory rule over Palestine (1920-1948) on May 14, 1948. Bitterly and resentfully enough, the first act in the Palestinian drama took place under the eyes of the British mandatory police force operating in Palestine then. Thousands of homeless Palestinians in unwanted diasporas would keep telling their own exilic stories. Jabra, himself, would also use his sharp memory to blow life into the not-yet-dimming familiar past by concocting tales in which every geographical detail described thereof is solid and lively enough to keep Palestine in history.

For Jabra, as the bulk of his work[5] shows, Palestine remains a living entity in its peoples' shared memories and national history, their incessant aspirations to return home and reunite with their broken families, as well as their uncompromising will to maintain a national identity resistant to oblivion. Jabra's novel *In Search of Walid Masoud* is an indirect dramatization of Palestine as a just cause through the discourses of all those characters in the tale who inadvertently take part in pulling together the threads of the jigsaw puzzle as they rehash their reminisced episodic relationships and points of view that are alike when it comes to the last scene although often in sharp contrast with that of the absented protagonist of the tale, Walid Masoud.

Accordingly, this paper studies the significance of the polyphonic form encompassing the multi-sided world of *In Search of Walid Masoud*. The artistic end of polyphony in this regard is to show both interaction and interdependence of several distinct voices that are doing the narration and simultaneously, yet unintentionally, reshaping Jabra's vision while playing an un-orchestrated opus in honor of art. The opus thus produced by that polyphony seems to be carrying Jabra's voice and message to the world. Such an approach to Jabra's polyphonic novel would, therefore, be useful in the context of analyzing the author's vision captured not only through the lens of one character's single consciousness but also through the scope of a plurality of consciousness for a clearer dialogic understanding of the constituents of the world depicted within the unity of the novel.

Literature Review

As a concept taken up by literary theory, speech act theory and linguistics, polyphony refers to the simultaneity of points of view, voices within a

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5. Jabra's oil painting is also included.

particular narrative plane.[6] Polyphony also evokes a number of interpretations in the fields of art, culture and literary criticism. In music, for example, polyphony is a style of musical composition employing two or more simultaneous, but relatively independent, melodic parts, lines, or voices to shape the overall sound of a certain work of music.[7] In culture, polyphony refers to the characteristic discourse of a diversified cultural context which reflects distinctive linguistic features of voices of various social-class groupings. In literary criticism, and more particularly in the area related to the study of the novel as a type of popular narrative art, Bakhtin's polyphonic theory marked a turning point in the field of literary criticism. In his *The Dialogic Imagination*, Bakhtin[8] illustrates polyphony as both concept and theory where the authorial voice and position are redefined in a literary narrative. The author's voice, that is, turns out to be one amongst other voices standing for characters, where each voice is viewed as an independent melody that fits within the harmonious opus produced in the multifarious world created. In contrast to homophony where the author is the mastermind of the whole narrative game and his voice is the only one audible, polyphony allows for a multiplicity of independent voices which are combined in a unity of a higher order.

In practical terms, the Bakhtinian approach to Dostoevsky's novels says it all. Bakhtin describes the main characters in Dostoevsky's novels as having very different and often conflicting points of view and discursive voices. However, they create the unique world of poetics without being even dialectical. That is, in their spatial and temporal context, these characters maintain the unity of their being together through pluralism of ideas, for there is no universal ideology that drives all these characters. They are equally independent.[9] The author does not place his narrative voice between the character and the reader; characters can subvert and rebel or break loose from the grip of the author, thanks to their autonomous nature in a pluralistic medium of individual consciousnesses. In other words, truth is established by addressivity, engagement and commitment in a particular context.[10]

As polyphony deals with a diversity of individual voices, which are artistically orchestrated, the polyphonic nature of the novel arises from the interaction of those distinct voices and discourses. The novel in this sense is constructed as a great dialogue among unmerged souls or perspectives.[11] In the

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6. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

7. Merriam-Webster Dictionary.

8. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist and trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

9. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*.

10. Ibid.

11. Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson, *Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social Movements and Hierarchies* (London: Routledge, 2010).

same vein, David Lodge argues that a polyphonic novel is a novel in which "a variety of conflicting ideological positions are given a voice and set in play … without being judged by an authoritative authorial voice."[12]

For Bakhtin, polyphony in literature essentially means "an attempt to refute the objectification of man through the pluralistic intervention of the dialogue."[13] The dialogic nature of the text is the significant unifying element without which "the harmonic principle of the polyphonical [sic.] accomplishment would disintegrate into anarchic cacophony."[14] Artistically, polyphony shows that the world of the whole text is greater than the worlds constituted by its parts. In Jabra's *In Search of Walid Masoud*, there is no effort on the part of the author to reconcile and conflate the various versions into a single, definitive one. None of the characters, alone, holds the absolute "truth" about Walid Masoud, the protagonist, even though each may, implicitly or explicitly, claim it. Within the novel, the recurring events achieve a plurality of meaning through their representation by simultaneous, distinct consciousnesses which are polyphonically contrasted in the text. In this sense, Jabra must have made an innovative, strategic achievement within the modern and contemporary Arabic novel during the 1960s and 1970s by replacing the omniscient voice of the author/narrator with multiple voices doing the narration. Dialogue mobilizes the course of transition from the fragmentary pieces of the jigsaw puzzle to the holistic image these pieces represent to form an ensemble. In this connection, the interactive reader can be part of this game in order "to recreate and, in so doing, renew the text."[15]

Does this mean that Jabra's *In Search of Walid Masoud* as text is open to an endless number of dialogic possibilities? Does this novel foster and address an open-ended dialogue in favor of a further search – a search for the "truth" which does not appear to the various characters as identical? The opening and the closing lines of this narrative text betray signs in the direction of tracing two types of journey: the first one is a quixotic journey through the psychic and political landscape of the compelling central character who is "intensely present yet irretrievably lost."[16] The second journey is a hopeless search, not only for the missing Walid Masoud, but also for the foggy world hosting the lost generation represented by a few bourgeois intellectuals doing the narration and telling more than one story.

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12. David Lodge, *After Bakhtin: Four Essays on Fiction and Criticism* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 86.

13. M.-Pierrette Malcuzynski, "Polyphonic Theory and Contemporary Literary Practices," *Studies in 20th Century Literature* 9, no. 1 (1984), 77.

14. Ibid., 78.

15. Ibid., 86.

16. Samah Selim, "Jabra's *In Search of Walid Masoud*," *Institute for Palestine Studies* 31, no. 2 (2006), 89.

The Story

Although the central event that triggers off a chain of other events in Jabra's *In Search of Walid Masoud* is explicitly stated in its title and the opening lines endorsing that event, the focal point of the story is somewhere else. The search, assumingly the central event, is soon eschewed in favor of character delineation and the dramatic role of memory replete with intricate personal and cultural relationships. It is Walid's memory and the memories of the rest of characters who do the narration that really make the novel the complex text it is, the starting point being the baffling sudden disappearance of Walid Masoud.

It is on the road leading out of Baghdad in the direction of the Syrian desert that Walid Masoud disappears one dark night in the early 1970s. An audio-tape recording his own voice is left in the car. Listening to that tape, Walid's friends start to search arduously for him, not in the physical world around them but within their own memories and their experiences with him. As they partake in this activity, they do not only probe the mysterious disappearance of Walid as an end in itself, but they also probe all the memories that store a variety of tales and reflections on and about this enigmatic character. The closing scene, however, restores the central event, only to imply that Walid's absence has been in the interest of his constant presence in the heart of his national cause, the occupation of Palestine.

The Double Journey

The opening lines of the story are poetic and suggestive. They initiate a move towards the redemptive power of writing through Walid's wish to bring memory back to life.

> If only there were an elixir for the memory, something that could bring events back in the order they happened, one by one, then turn them into words that would cascade out into paper![17]

The closing note embedded in the following lines that keep recurring here and there in the novel betrays signs of another possible reading: that Walid's personal vision is still blurring out and his wish to write it up is still going unfulfilled.

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17. Jabra I. Jabra, *In Search of Walid Masoud*, trans. Roger Allen and Adnan Haydar (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 1.

… no no no that's not what I wanted to say even though I did want to say some of it when everything I've already said is merely marginal and the main text is missing so let me try again …[18]

Within this framework of a seemingly endless search, Jabra sketches a double journey into the memories of Walid and the other characters. It is the audio-tape left in the deserted car that sets off a lot of things in motion, compelling Walid's friends to give their own accounts of the protagonist -- each account inaccessible to the others. All those accounts remain fragmentary for they are subjectively rendered. Accordingly, it is the reader's irksome role to piece all these accounts together for the approximation of a fuller sense of the novel. Hence the deconstruction and the reconstruction of the text.

If the first journey implied through the tape-recorded monologue should say anything at all, that thing would be filtered through the memories of the other characters. Walid's tape delivers rampant, disconnected shreds of his life, but all these shreds are mediated by the other narrators, albeit in different versions. With each of the narrators recalling one part or more of Walid's life-story, the reader is compelled to dive with a waver into those memories to retrieve who and what Walid was. His compiler, Dr. Jawad Husni, can hardly decipher a clear message from the tape although he has played it several times.

> For some reason I can't pin down, I got the impression Walid was out to confuse us all with this "final" tape of his, or maybe he wanted, for the last time, to be frank with all of us, to put his cards on the table, so to speak.[19]

Issa Nasser, an old carpenter and a native of same Palestinian city, recalls Walid's childhood in Bethlehem and his departure for Italy to study theology to become a priest but Walid changes his mind and studies literature at Cambridge. Dr. Tariq Raouf, a psychiatrist, sees Walid as an Oedipal case whose attachment to the image of woman-as-mother persists in almost every relationship with a woman. Amer Abdel-Hamid, an architect, remembers him as a poet with lofty and refined expressions. Women characters have their own say in this regard. For instance, Maryam al-Saffar, a historian, and Wisal Raouf, the young journalist and researcher, both lament his loss as their intimate ex-lover. However, Wisal insists that Walid has not died; she claims that he is still alive and that he has joined the Palestinian Resistance movement in Lebanon. In short, through the eyes of all those characters, Walid's image stands out from the crowd as a revolutionary soul who dreams and fights at the same time to change the world through love, rebellion and politics.

The journey in the memories of this circle of friends goes beyond the hard-to-retrieve parts of Walid's past, only to touch upon speculation. Speculations regarding Walid's fate vary. To mention only a few, Ibrahim al-Hajj Nawfal

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18. Ibid., 20-21.
19. Ibid., 7-8.

would see him as kidnapped and then as a dead man in Lebanon. Wisal believes he is alive working in Palestine, perhaps to avenge the death of his son, Mawan, a young freedom fighter who has lost his life in a battle with an Israeli army unit in an Israeli-occupied Um El-Ain village in northern Palestine. However, all these speculations seem to be no innocent talk; they must be serving each character's psychological needs. Hence, the second journey into the psychological states of mind of the other characters as understood through the lapses of their own memories.

Dr. Jawad Husni, the serious sociologist and academician who frames the tale, opens the novel by reflecting on Walid's tape entrusted to him in person: "We remain the playthings of our memories."[20] Then the tape is played for all of Walid's narrow circle of friends at a garden party hosted by the architect Amer Abdel-Hamid. Having listened to the grabbled tape on which a lot of things are stuffed and interwoven, such as childhood memories, spiritual ruminations, love adventures, Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, poetry, and many other things, each one of those friends would voice different reflections on the tape, for Walid's voice has haunted them all and compelled them to react.

The search for the mysterious disappearance of Walid has indirectly acquired another dimension, a parallel search for the self as the reader dives into the complex lives of those characters themselves. As the reader finds himself sliding into the world of this classy group of people, both men and women, he soon encounters a bunch of Baghdadi bourgeois intellectuals divided between two conflicting affiliations: their social class and their political persuasions. We also encounter all those characters in the plane mirrors that reflect their daily behavior and intricate relationships as well as their association with the compelling character of Walid.

With all those characters, Walid's language of the tape-recorded monologue addresses the need for a dialogue, a reaction. Language is dialogic, as Bakhtin illustrates, for "To be heard is in itself a dialogic relationship. The word wants to be heard, understood; it wants to be an answer as it implies back to a question, and so on."[21] This polyphonic novel allows for a wider vantage point through which the reading critical mind can analyze personal attitudes as discursive spaces when conflicting voices engage in a contest for audibility and power. None of the characters doing part of the narration can keep her/his sobriety all the way to the end; each of them soon slips unto the unconscious to uncover a double face shaping their experiences and the network of their relationships. Even Dr. Jawad Husni, the sociologist entrusted with Walid's personal papers and documents to compile a biography, admits that his wish to keep a bright intellectual stature through framing Walid's life-story still needs much

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20. Ibid., 1.

21. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 301.

reworking. He expresses an anxiety over the impossibility of deciphering, rearranging and composing into narrative form the entirety of a life like Walid's.

> I wonder if I'll ever reach a definite conclusion about Walid. Can there ever be a definite conclusion about any event in life, let alone a man's life as a whole?[22]

Like Jawad Husni, all the other characters involved in presenting other versions of Walid's eventful life as they know it, lapse into their own fantasies and soon resign the arduous job of going further into the search. In fact, each one of them tries to polish that dark area which the search for Walid has provoked or at least awakened in them. This assumption, however, does not apply to Walid's son, Marwan, who seems to have nursed no hidden agendas or uneasy memories. Marwan has unequivocally chosen his way back to Palestine through joining one of the Palestinian armed struggle liberation movements working from Lebanon. That is, he has got no illusions about his people's national cause and their unalienable right to return home.[23] His martyrdom in the battlefield is the clearest message ever voiced throughout the novel. Hence, Marwan is not part of the group of narrators whose discourses with and about Walid and other topics are grounded in ambiguous conflict. One of the possible options which Walid, as assumed by Wisal Rauf, might have taken on the eve of his disappearance from the scene is likely to be Marwan's. The other search routes attempted by the other characters seem unlikely or less likely to pay off.

Impact of Memory

Novels that use memory as a key element of the narrative text are not rare in literature.[24] In *In Search of Walid Masoud*, memory plays a dramatic role as regards plot build-up and character revelation. Regarding plot, memory is viewed as an opportunity for the illumination of the past in the present. Moments held dear by Walid, especially the Bethlehem memories, are tape-recorded to punctuate the main text. By so doing, Jabra is expanding his narrative text and adding an extra dimension to the plot. The other characters, who dive into their memories while recalling their own versions of Walid's story, also add more layers to the already complex plot structure. In brief, the incorporation of memory in the narrative text grounds it in some sort of identifiable time frame from which the reader can, with much labor, follow the progression of the story.[25]

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22. Jabra, *In Search of Walid Masoud*, 288.
23. Ibid.
24. See Marcel Proust's seven-volume novel *In Search of Lost Time*, 1908-1922.
25. Roland Barthes, *Mourning Diary*, trans. R. Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010); Geoffrey Batchen, *Forget Me Not: Photography and Remembrance* (The Netherlands:

Memories also function in the process of character revelation. The various individual memories referred to, while the main text is in progress, illuminate the inner selves of the narrators and invite emotional resonance with the readers. All the character-narrators, except for Marwan, are to some varied degrees intrigued in this game of remembrance. Batchen[26] argues that memories "are nostalgic-gripped refusals to be erased or forgotten."[27]

Conflicting Discourses

In *In Search of Walid Masoud*, the protagonist keeps moving between two conflicting worlds. One of these worlds belongs to the past, to Walid's childhood and boyhood in Bethlehem, Palestine, which his memory sustains and pushes to the surface every now and then; the other belongs to the present, to his world with the circle of his classy and intellectual friends where they agree and disagree over many issues. However, if there is a clear cutoff with them for good, it is in the first world, his world, where memory reworks out the image of Walid as a happy child with aspirations. The present world arguably sets all characters apart despite their frequent gatherings. Hence, it is a source of anxiety over a lot of things: culture, art, language, politics, women, commitment, etc. If the text is replete with an atmosphere of anxiety on the part of most of the characters, including women, part of that anxiety lies in the making of Walid's image which exists in the eyes of all narrators not only as "an ideal uprooted Palestinian" but also as an unfinished text that keeps expanding. The portrait of Walid, as painted by his circle of friends, does not show him as an ideologue or populist with a loud voice. It shows him as a quiet man but also as a powerful agent of change, a messenger who might have come too soon or perhaps too late. In this regard, Edward Said emphasizes this voice of the visionary individual over the voice of "mass institutions."[28] The text does say it so flatly: in a world where words get "pulverized," the only room left for the exile Palestinian, like Walid, is to recall his childhood memories in Bethlehem, Palestine, to nurse his daydream as a child with a vision:

> I perched there between the branches, eating green almonds, watching people pass to and fro below me … I wanted the world to change to my will…[29]

Princeton Architectural Press, 2004); Jens Brockmeier, "Remembering and Forgetting: Narrative as Cultural Memory," *Culture and Psychology* 8, no. 1 (2002).

26. Batchen, *Forget Me Not: Photography and Remembrance*.

27. Barthes, *Mourning Diary*.

28. Edward Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

29. Jabra, *In Search of Walid Masoud*, 130.

It is in this part of the text that Walid and his companions depart. Where he is involved in the national cause, they are not although they understand it. The engagement in personal acts of remembrance "is itself a political act, and to record and transmit one's memories in written or spoken form is akin to engage in an insurrectionary activity that defies the prohibition of self-narration imposed by Zionist historiography."[30] In the other part of the text, the present world, where Walid has left a footprint, the others find themselves, ironically so, in constant search for themselves in the missing Walid, he being the "other." They seem to be projecting all their miseries and discontent on the "other," on that spot left by Walid and recorded on his tape. This image is best expressed at the end of the novel, Chapter 12, through which Jawad Husni is trying to add a closing note to the novel.

> … we still have to ask the question: who was it they were actually talking about? Was it a man who occupied their minds and feelings at a certain point in time, or was it themselves and the fancies, frustrations, and uncertainties that beset them in their own lives? Were they in fact the mirror, with Walid serving as the face surveying them from its depths? Or was he the mirror, and their faces the ones rising up, while they, perhaps, weren't even aware of it?[31]

Concluding Remarks

Jabra Irahim Jabra's novel *In Search of Walid Masoud* is a polyphonic text in which a variety of consciousnesses send different messages in different directions as they deal with one central issue: the mysterious disappearance of one of their remarkable friends, Walid Masoud. However, what remains common to all of them and relatively shared by all is a bourgeois touch and a narcissistic tendency towards self appraisal or self-lamentation as they mediate that enigmatic issue. They are all mediators who finally blame it on their inability to put their memories and experiences with Walid into orderly and meaningful texts. That is why, the search for Walid yields no result; in fact, there is a hint that the story is unfinished, exactly like Walid's unfinished autobiography. This novel, therefore, comes to an abrupt halt, not a logical ending. This simply implies that the power of the Arab intellectual production in the wake of the 1967 *Naksa*[32] is explored and tested in the novel as limited and dysfunctional. The polyphonic text furnishes

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30. Said, "Permission to Narrate," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 13, no. 3 (1984).
31. Jabra, *In Search of Walid Masoud*, 276.
32. Arabic term for defeat.

the stage for multiple ways of approaching the central event, but it seems that reading that event has failed as a mode of accessing the truth.[33] (Johnson 2009).

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33. Rebecca Carol Johnson, "The Politics of Reading: Recognition in Jabra Ibrahim Jabra's *In Search of Walid Masoud,*" in *The Poetics of Narrative: Interdisciplinary Studies*, ed. Philip F. Kennedy and Marilyn Lawrence (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 187-192.

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A Natural Ethics of Gratitude

*William M. O'Meara**

Cicero has affirmed that gratitude "is not only the greatest of virtues but the parent of them all" (Pro Plancio, #80). This paper will argue against Kant's defense of the second formulation of the categorical imperative by attempting to show that no rational argument can prove the basic principle of morality but that it is a deeply felt and profound choice of the central value of the dignity of person both in one's own life and the lives of all others. Then, following Cicero, this paper will explore how we can find a deeply felt and profound choice of gratitude at the center of the virtues of faith, hope and love. The paper is not arguing that everyone must find gratitude at the heart of faith, hope, and love, but that it is possible to do so. Next, this paper will examine how gratitude can be found at the center of the virtues of practical reason, courage, temperance, and justice. The paper is not arguing that everyone must find gratitude at the heart of practical reason, courage, temperance, and justice, but that it is possible to do so. Finally, this paper will reflect with Augustine and Aquinas on the centrality of the virtue of love in all other virtues and on how love leads to gratitude.

Evaluation of Kant's Defense of the Categorical Imperative

In his defense of the second formulation of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-Itself, Kant argues that there must be some ultimate end worth being chosen for its own sake because otherwise all actions would simply be means chosen to ends which themselves would be means and so on into infinity and restlessness. He lectures as follows:

> That the existence of something must be an end in itself, and not all things can be merely means, is just as necessary in the system of ends as *Ens a se* is in the existence of efficient causes. A thing that is an end in itself is a *Bonum a se*. What can be considered merely a means has its value as a means only when it is used as such. There must be therefore a being that is an end in itself. A thing in nature is a means for another; that goes on forever, and it is necessary at last to think of a thing that is itself an end, otherwise the series would come to no conclusion.[1]

Kant's presupposition of humanity as the *Bonum a se*, as "the ultimate purpose of creation here on earth," itself depends upon the assumption of human freedom as the condition which makes moral obligation possible. But Kant himself insists that freedom of the will is a noumenal presupposition which he himself cannot demonstrate. Korsgaard emphasizes that Kant reveals a central point of his ethics in the practical postulates of immortality, freedom

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1. Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Natural Right*, read in the winter semester year of 1784, Gottfried Feyerabend, trans. Lars Vinx (October 2003), 4-5. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2NHgDh5.

of the will, and the existence of God, and "it is primarily your own freedom that you are licensed to believe in … ."[2]

Kant has assumed three points, (1) a teleological description of the plant, animal, and human kingdoms, which culminates (2) in human beings having the absolute moral purpose of realizing the value of humanity as an end in itself, which itself assumes (3) the noumenal freedom of our human will. However, all three points can be challenged.

First, a teleological description of nature in physics, chemistry, and biology is not a presupposition of these sciences. There are billions of galaxies with billions of stars, and the chance occurrence of a star with a planet with temperate climate and water which can by chance evolve living forms may be simply a fortuitous occurrence. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of evolutionary biologists there is no necessity that the human species had to evolve, but it may be our lucky accident that our specific species evolved from pre-existing species of homo.

Second, the assumption of human beings as having the absolute moral purpose of realizing the value of humanity as an end in itself is itself, as Kant tells us, "a moral principle [which] is nothing but a dimly conceived metaphysics, which is inherent in every man's rational constitution."[3] Such a dimly conceived metaphysics can be challenged by those deeply affected by the absurdity of life in the 20th and 21st centuries. As Camus argues, "At a certain point. On his path the absurd man is tempted. History is not lacking in either religions or prophets, even without gods. He is asked to leap. All he can reply is that he doesn't fully understand, that it is not obvious."[4]

Furthermore, even Kant's own adoption of a teleological perspective on nature, plants, animals, and humans, is, he points out, not a constitutive metaphysics of things in themselves, "but only … a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty."[5] However, as Guyer emphasizes for Kant, "By seeing our freedom as the ultimate end of nature, we can give ourselves a dignity that we lack as mere organisms of nature, or elevate ourselves above nature, but nature itself cannot force us to dignify ourselves in this way, nor can any theoretical proposition about nature force us to see ourselves in this way."[6]

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2. Christine M. Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of* Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 174.

3. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* (1797), trans. James Ellington, in Immanuel Kant: Ethical Philosophy (VI) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 376.

4. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus, and Other Essays*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 52-53.

5. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (1790), trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Library of Classics, 1951), 5: 197.

6. Paul Guyer, *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 169.

This affirmation of human dignity is precisely a choice, a choice which the absurd person may accept, but it is not compelled by evidence.

Indeed, the person who has accepted absurdity can easily reject Kant's argument that there must be a *Bonum a se* since otherwise there would be only means to further means. There is nothing absurd in a series of efficient causes there goes on in regression endlessly, as Kant himself has argued about the phenomenal world; we do not have to conclude to an *Ens a se* as the Uncaused Cause of a series of efficient causes. So also, we do not have to conclude to a *Bonum a se* because all things chosen as ends could also be chosen as means to further ends and further means even though the human heart would ever be restless in seeking new goals which would never finally satisfy human desire. We might very well wish that all action is ultimately for a *Bonum a se*, specifically, in human freedom, but there is no proof of human freedom.

Third, Kant's assumption of the noumenal freedom of our human will can be challenged. Whereas Kant has attempted to root absolute morality in human rationality and freedom alone, other philosophers such as David Hume have attempted to root morality precisely in human feeling without the assumption of noumenal freedom of the will. Such empirical attempts of Hume and others to emphasize human feelings can make better sense out of such cases as this:

> Rachel Bachner-Melman, a clinical psychologist at Hadassah University Medical Center in Jerusalem who specializes in underlying eating disorders, has seen the impact of extreme selflessness on the anorexic young women who populate her ward.
> "They are terribly sensitive to the needs of those around them," she said in an interview. "They know who needs to be pushed in a wheelchair, who needs a word of encouragement, who needs to be fed."
> Yet the spectral empaths will express no desires of their own. "They try to hide their needs or deny their needs or pretend their needs don't exist," Dr. Bachner-Melman went on. "They barely feel they have the right to exist themselves." They apologize for themselves, for the hated, hollow self, by giving, ceaselessly giving.[7]

Reasoning alone seems insufficient to reestablish a deep sense of value in their own value. Such spectral empaths need rather a deep feeling for and/or a profound existential choice of the value of their own selves. If correct reasoning were enough to establish this deep value, then mere conversation with them would be sufficient to convince them rationally of the value of themselves. For just as they value other humans so highly in their deep empathy for others, so also they logically should value a deep empathy for themselves. However, mere logical conversation cannot heal this disease of

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7. Natalie Angier, "The Pathological Altruist Gives Till Someone Hurts," *The New York Times* (October 3, 2011). Retrieved from https://nyti.ms/2NE5XzK.

feeling. They must learn experientially to feel for themselves as they feel for others Such a genuine feeling of the value of both oneself and others is essential for a general morality that would embrace all humans, the Humean would argue.

If reasoning alone cannot transform such people, then either such transformation can occur only through feeling or through existential choice or through both. Either such transformation can be found in the deepest feelings for the value both of self and all other rational agents which deeply felt emotional therapy may help a person recover, or such transformation can occur both with the feeling for and profound existential choice of the value both of self and all other rational agents Kant's defense of the Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself needs to be supplemented either with the empiricist's deep usage of human feelings as a key source of human morality and/or with the existentialist's profound choice of the value of self and others as ends in themselves.

The Choice of Gratitude at the Center of the Virtues of Faith, Hope and Love

The theologian, Richard McBrien, has identified three models of ethics that have influenced Christian ethics, the teleological model of Aristotle, the deontological model of Kant, and the personalism model of Catholic moral theology through most of the 20th and 21st century. H. Richard Niebuhr has a famous description of the personalism model of ethics in his book, *The Responsible Self*, in which he explores and evaluates the teleological model, the deontological model, and the kathekontogical model of ethics. He defends this last model of ethics as superior to the other two. We will follow Niebuhr and McBrien in exploring the personalism, that is, the kathekontological model, and also use McBrien's point that recent moral theologians have gone beyond the traditional distinction between the theological virtues of faith, hope and love by which we relate to God and the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and fortitude by which we relate to humanity. Some theologians have adopted a distinction between general virtues, such as faith, hope and love, applicable in all our moral life and special virtues, such as a good sense of humor, applicable only in some aspects of our life.

When we are born, we do not have any general or specific virtues well developed that form our character, but we learn good actions and consequent good habits primarily, Aristotle points out, from others.[8] This paper argues

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8. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. David Ross; revised with an intro. and notes Lesley Brown (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

that we develop our general virtues of faith, hope and love through a three step process:

(a) Faith: (i) A Gracious Gift from Others: Others first teach me to believe in my own self-worth, most especially in the power of my own understanding of the world and others and in the efficacy of my own will to be creative. (ii) Hard Work by Myself and A Gracious Gift from Myself: As a high school student, as a college student, as a person striving for excellence in my own field of study, I choose to believe in the efficacy of my own intellect and my own creative will even when I encounter teachers who do not understand me or appreciate me. (iii) A Gracious Gift for Others: I choose to believe in the power of the intellect of my students and in the efficacy of their own creative wills.

(b) Hope: (i) A Gracious Gift from Others: Others first teach me to hope in my future and our mutual future. When I do not see a future for myself, when I am all knotted-up in my own failures and my own despair, others trust in me, helping me to envision a new future and encouraging me to work for that new future. (ii) Hard Work by Myself and A Gracious Gift from Myself: Even when I may have fallen into despair, even so, something deep within me may rise up and teach me to see a new future, to hope for that new vision, and to work for that. (iii) A Gracious Gift for Others: Even though others may be trapped in profound despair or depression, I choose to believe in the power of the intellect of others and in the efficacy of their own creative wills.

(c) Love: (i) A Gracious Gift from Others: Others first teach me to love myself and others, to affirm the dignity of self and others, and to forgive myself and others when we fail. (ii) Hard Work by Myself and A Gracious Gift from Myself: Even when I fail myself and others, I can love myself, forgive myself, and start anew. (iii) A Gracious Gift for Others: I choose to treasure others, to forgive them, and to affirm their worth as persons.

The Choice of Gratitude at the Center of the Virtues of Practical Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice

(a) Practical Wisdom: (i) A Gracious Gift from Others: Others first teach me to learn practical wisdom, for example, in avoiding the profound mistake of trying to be perfect (perfectionism, often with an accompanying inability to forgive self and others). They teach me The Middle Way, The Golden Mean, helping me to avoid the extremes both of too much certitude and of too little confidence in my own intellect. Also, they teach me to avoid both the rigidity of a perfectionist effort at morality and of a lackadaisical effort in my

moral endeavors. Morality is meant to be much more an art of living for positive values, not a rigid science of avoiding what is wrong. (ii) Hard Work by Myself and A Gracious Gift from Myself: Even though I may misinterpret morality as an attempt to be perfect and even though I may fail in my moral endeavors, I can from deep within myself learn to correct my moral failures, to forgive myself, and to reconceive moral life as the art of living for generous love, hope, and faith. Even though others may judge me harshly for my failures, I can choose from deep within to renew myself. (iii) Gracious Gift for Others: As others have taught me the value of practical wisdom in the adventurous art of creating goodness in self and others, so also I can do the same for others who may learn from me.

(b) Courage: (i) A Gracious Gift from Others: Others first teach me to be courageous, for example, against discrimination by risking myself to affirm the dignity of others, and, for another example, in forgiving myself and others when we fail. A few years ago, I reflected on the fact that I have been born into a long line of my human ancestors, my parents, my grandparents, my great grandparents, and back into centuries of my ancestors, and I realized that these women and men had risked themselves courageously hundreds of times, gracing me with their courage. I was deeply grateful. (ii) Hard Work by Myself and A Gracious Gift from Myself: Even when I face great dangers, I can summon my strength to be courageous and to act boldly for my values. (iii) A Gracious Gift for Others: My courage can be a Gracious Gift for others as when I taught my children to climb trees with me.

(c) Temperance: (i) A Gracious Gift from Others: Others first teach me to be temperate in fulfilling my desires and, especially, in the interweaving of sibling rivalry to moderate my desires and competitiveness to involve all in the family into the fulfillment of the essential desires of all. (ii) Hard Work by Myself and A Gracious Gift from Myself: Even when I fail myself and others through overindulgence, I can choose to be temperate and to start anew. (iii) A Gracious Gift for Others: My temperance which comes from my generous love of others and of self can be an exemplar for others, teaching them the values of sharing and of inclusiveness.

(d) Justice: (i) A Gracious Gift from Others: Others first teach me fairness and justice which enable me to learn the dignity of self and others. For example, the history of America as a story of expanding justice for all can teach us to be truly generous with our use of medical resources so that we have true and fair health care for all in our country. (ii) Hard Work by Myself and A Gracious Gift from Myself: Even when I fail myself and others through unjust actions, I can love myself, forgive myself, and start anew with renewed actions of justice. (iii) A Gracious

Gift for Others: I choose through a rich sense of expanding justice to treasure others, to forgive them, and to affirm their worth as persons and to re-involve them in a community of forgiveness.

Commentary on Love at the Heart of All Virtues by Augustine and Aquinas

Augustine offers us a vision of Christlike love as the heart and soul of the four cardinal virtues:

So that temperance is love, keeping the self entire and uncorrupt for the beloved. Courage is love, bearing everything gladly for the sake of the beloved. Righteousness [justice] is love serving the beloved only, and therefore ruling well. And prudence is love, wisely discerning what helps it and what hinders it" (Augustine, footnote 20).[9]

Although we can think of temperance as a virtue devoted unto proper care of one's body and its appetites, we can also think of temperance as a way of loving oneself for the sake of loving others. For the sake of love and though love, a person is temperate in one's actions and appetites for the sake of the beloved. Although we can think of courage as a wise way of responding to dangers and obstacles threatening to oneself, we can also think of courage as a way of sustaining one's moral purpose of love for the sake of the beloved when both self and others are undergoing threat and danger. Although we can think of justice as the wise way of protecting self and others from harm to their basic human dignity, we can also think of justice as the habit of affirming, enhancing, and enriching the human dignity of the beloved, thereby ruling well for the sake of the others governed. Finally, although we can understand practical wisdom as a virtue of responding thoughtfully to all the needs of self and others, we can understand this thoughtful response as the response of love, as the response of deep and true caring for self and others.

We can understand, then, Augustine as offering an addition to Aristotle's famous definition of virtue: "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it."[10] Augustine is accepting the whole definition, adding to the ending phrase: "by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom and generous love would determine it."

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9. Bernhard Haring, *Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity Volumes I and II* (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982), 41.

10. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*.

Although both Augustine and Aquinas are quite rightly to be understood as offering us a religious ethics rooted in God's love, they understand this rootedness as first in *the order of being*, that is, as coming from the origin of love, God, who has created all. However, as this paper has defended, they clearly hold that we first need to experience being loved generously by others in *the order of learning* before we can conceptualize or experience God's generous love for humanity.

Bernhard Haring, a 20th century Catholic moral theologian, offers us the commentary from Augustine and Aquinas on 1 John, chapter 4:

> 16 We have come to know and to believe in the love God has for us. God is love, and whoever remains in love remains in God and God in him.
> 17 In this is love brought to perfection among us, that we have confidence on the day of judgment because as he is, so are we in this world.
> 18 There is no fear in love, but perfect love drives out fear because fear has to do with punishment, and so one who fears is not yet perfect in love.
> 19 We love because he first loved us.
> 20 If anyone says, "I love God," but hates his brother, he is a liar; for whoever does not love a brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not seen.
> 21 This is the commandment we have from him: whoever loves God must also love his brother [1 Jn 4:16-21].

Verse 19 clearly says that people can love because God loved people first. And I always then read verse 20 as saying that there was a contradiction between claiming to love God and failing to love one's brother. That understanding is surely correct.

However, Bernhard Haring has added what may be an even richer understanding of the verse 20. He notes that Aquinas calls this love referred to in verse 19, which God first gives, the *ontological priority* of God's love. God's love is the creative source which enables people to love. However, in the *psychological priority* of how we learn to love, both Augustine and Aquinas say that there must first be in our human learning some experience of true love of neighbor before we can love the invisible God. The great psychologist, St. Augustine, is quite clear on this:

> The love of God is first in the order of precept but the love of brother is the first in the order of action. ... Love, therefore, your neighbor, and look into yourself to see where this love of neighbor comes from. There you will see God insofar as you are capable. Begin, therefore, by loving your neighbour, share your bread with the hungry, open your house to the roofless, clothe the naked and despise no one of the same human race (Augustine, *Tract. XVII in Jo. Ev.6ff, PL35, 1531*).[11]

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11. Haring, *Free and Faithful in Christ:*, 427.

Thomas Aquinas is equally clear: "In the order of perfection and dignity, love of God comes first before love of neighbor. But in the order of origin and disposition, love of neighbor precedes the act of loving God" (*Summa Theologica I II, q 68, a 8 ad 2*).[12]

Conclusion

In the analysis of this paper, we have found a three-fold process in the virtues generally and also especially in the virtues of love and practical wisdom. In this three-fold process of Love, (1) we are first loved by others who guide us into proper self-love and proper love of others. (2) Then we work at developing proper self-love and at times even give unto our self a gift of self-love. (3) Finally, as we have received generous love from others, we can now give the same unto others.

So also, in a similar three-fold process of practical wisdom, (1) we can first receive a gift of wisdom from others who teach us to avoid the mistake of trying to be perfect, avoiding perfectionism which is so often accompanied with an inability to forgive self and others. (2) Then we work at developing morality as meant to be much more an art of living for positive values, not a rigid science of avoiding what is wrong. Also, even though others may judge me harshly for my failures, I can choose from deep within to renew myself. (3) Finally, as others have taught me the value of practical wisdom in the adventurous art of creating goodness in self and others, so also I can do the same for others who may learn from me.

Since others have graced us by the gift of their generous love and practical wisdom and since generous love and practical wisdom are at the heart and soul of the practice of all the moral virtues for Augustine and Aquinas, we can choose to live all of our moral lives in gratitude to others for their love and practical wisdom. It is true that a person can choose to live morality as a series of obligations both to others and to oneself, especially if morality has been taught to that person as a series of harsh commands and punishments. However, it is possible to transcend the moral life as series of obligations whose breaking would require appropriate punishments whether severe or light. It is possible to choose to live from the more profound motive of gratitude in agreement with Cicero who has affirmed that gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues but the parent of them all.

Confirming this approach to how gratitude may fittingly be understood as the heart of the moral life, Bernhard Haring notes how Abraham Maslow finds "in the spiritually healthy person who has had [in a]"peak experience" a

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12. Ibid.

vision of gratitude, a perception of the gift character of all life."[13] Also, in a religious perspective, Haring finds Confucius seeing the best virtues as the gifts from the Tao. For Confucius writes, "The four greatest gifts heaven has bestowed on the wise people are benevolence, gentleness, justice and prudence."[14] Finally, Haring understands Catholic theology as affirming that the virtuous believer: "truly open to the [Divine] Spirit sees everything in the dimension of gratuitousness and graciousness. He does not appropriate virtue to his own glory but renders thanks ... . Everything is perceived and honoured as gift ... ."[15]

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13. Ibid., 200.
14. Ibid., 201.
15. Ibid., 421.

How Testimony Can Be a Source of Knowledge[1]

Nicholas Smith[*]

Much of what we regard ourselves as knowing came to us from the testimony of others. But recently epistemologists have debated just how testimony can be a source of knowledge at all. Must we have some independent way to confirm what we receive through testimony, or is there perhaps some reason why we should suppose that testimony is all by itself an adequate source of knowledge? This problem, I claim, is actually a version of a much older and better known problem: the so-called problem of the criterion. I will first explain this other, older, problem, and lay out the available options for solving it. I will then show why I think the problem of testimony is simply a version of the problem of the criterion. I will conclude by arguing that the best way to solve these problems comes from a theory of justification that few epistemologists seem to support these days: holistic coherence theory. In doing so, I hope I will provide some powerful new reasons for reconsidering this theory of justification.

The Problem of Testimony

There are lots of things we ordinarily think we know. Here are a few examples:

- John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Texas.
- The world existed before any of us was born.
- Smoking causes cancer.
- The moon orbits the earth.

Now, of course, radical skeptics will deny that we know any of these things, because they can make up scenarios within which we would believe such things even though they would be false, and we cannot know for sure that we are not actually such a scenario. But these days, few epistemologists are inclined to accept radical skepticism, and thus allow that we can know things even if the way in which we achieved that knowledge is fallible. High standards still need to be met, in order for something to qualify as knowledge rather than some weaker form of true belief; but these standards do not require us to be invulnerable to error. It is enough that they are met and no error has actually been committed.[2]

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1. I am indebted to Ian Evans for an earlier collaboration in which we worked on this topic together, and from which most of what appears in this paper derives.

2. I put this in a way that is deliberately ambiguous: The "no error" rule is typically used not only to require that knowledge has a truth condition, but also to avoid Gettier problems. Gettier problems seem to require that some error is made in

If we accept this fallibilist approach, then, we might accept that we really do know the examples above. But each of these has an interesting—and recently very controversial feature: Each of these beliefs, at least for most of us, is based on the *testimony of others*. The first two beliefs in the list we might call *historical* beliefs; they are beliefs about events before some of us were born. Clearly, any justification you have for historical beliefs must rely heavily on the testimony of others (whether that be from historical documents, textbooks, or conversation with a friend). The second two beliefs in the list we can call *scientific beliefs*; they are beliefs about scientific matters. A great many – probably *most* – scientific beliefs regard subject matters in which most of us are not experts. In such cases, most of us rely almost entirely on the expertise of scientists.[3]

Historical and scientific beliefs are but two categories of belief that depend heavily or entirely on testimony. And there are many others. To name but one other example: think of someplace you have never been, but may regard yourself as knowing some things about that place (such as, for example, the name of some city there). Since the only way you receive evidence about places you have never been is from what has been reported by others, the knowledge you have in such cases derives from testimony.[4]

So a moment's reflection reveals that our body of beliefs depends heavily – perhaps ineliminably – on the testimony of others. This raises an immediate worry: Is the testimony of others really very reliable? At first glance, it does not seem like it. People lie. People say things about which they have no knowledge. News reporters are often lazy in checking their facts. And politicians are notorious for misleading their constituents. Testimony, it would seem, is a rather fragile basis for our beliefs, much less for knowledge.

But perhaps testimony is reliable; perhaps lies, deception, and laziness are the exceptions that prove the rule. Still, if we are to base our beliefs on testimony—beliefs that we think are at least candidates for knowledge, then

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the process of justification. I do not simply assume this approach provides an adequate answer to the Gettier problem, however; I intend only to report a common response to that problem, which I now set aside as not pertinent to the problem that is the focus of this paper.

3. Even the scientist who does some of the key experiments that establish a scientific belief relies on the testimony of others: inevitably, many (most?) of the data he uses will have come from the reports of other scientists. So even the scientist who does the experiments proving the existence of tectonic plates believes in those plates at least partly on the basis of testimony.

4. By "testimony," I obviously include non-verbal information, as well, such as photographs, maps, etc. In brief, I take any evidence that comes from another human source to count as testimony for my purposes herein. Obviously, there are other types of evidence—such as what we receive from ordinary perception, memory, reasoning, and so on.

do not we need to know that such testimony is reliable? And would not we have to gain such knowledge without relying on testimony? But without recourse to things we learned from others, would we really have enough resources to justify our trust in testimony?

This problem, which has received a great deal of attention lately from epistemologists, is, I claim, actually a version of a much older and better known problem: the so-called problem of the criterion. I will first explain this other, older, problem, and lay out the available options for solving it. I will then show why I think the problem of testimony is simply a version of the problem of the criterion. I will conclude by arguing that the best way to solve these problems comes from a theory of justification that few epistemologists seem to support these day. In doing so, I hope I will provide some powerful new reasons for reconsidering this theory of justification.

The Problem of the Criterion

A general principle that generates what is called the problem of the criterion might be the reliable source doctrine:

> **Reliable Source Doctrine (RSD)**. A belief source K can produce justified beliefs for S only if S is justified in believing that K is reliable.

We obviously believe that some belief sources are reliable and others are unreliable. Given this fact of epistemic life, it would seem like a bad policy to trust a belief source blindly before we know whether it is reliable. Now to make the problem of the criterion concrete, consider a particular belief source, sense perception. If knowledge requires justification, and **RSD** is true, then we cannot know that something we come to believe through perception is true unless we are justified in believing that sense perception is reliable. Of course, intuitively, we *are* justified in thinking that at least *some* belief acquisition via sense perception is reliable. A problem arises, however, when we reflect on *how* we might get such justification. It seems that the only way we can learn about the reliability of sense perception is through experience. You might, for example, discover that your ability to recognize faces at 500 yards or more is very unreliable by seeing faces from that distance and then getting closer to confirm or disconfirm who you thought you saw. And, of course, psychologists who study our perceptual faculties run all sorts of interesting experiments that teach us about where and when our faculties are reliable and unreliable. But now there seems to be a real problem, which I will call the "skeptical problem of the criterion for sense perception:"

1. Sense perception can produce justified beliefs for us only if we are justified in believing that sense perception is reliable.
2. We can be justified in thinking that sense perception is reliable only if we have justified perceptual beliefs that provide support for this conclusion.
3. Either *(i)* we must have justification for thinking that sense perception is reliable prior to gaining justification for our sensory beliefs, or *(ii)* we must have justification for our sensory beliefs prior to gaining justification for thinking that sense perception is reliable.
4. By 2, *(i)* cannot be the case.
5. By 1, *(ii)* cannot be the case.
6. Hence, sense perception cannot produce justified beliefs.

The argument, in a nutshell, says that since we need to be justified in thinking that sense perception is reliable before it can produce justified beliefs, and that the only way to find out whether sense perception is reliable is to use justified beliefs generated by sense perception, there is no way for sense perception to generate justified beliefs. This skeptical conclusion obviously generalizes to other belief-sources like memory, deduction, and induction.

If we want to avoid skepticism, we will have to reject one of the first three premises of this argument. Which premise we reject will determine which sort of theory of justification we endorse.

Dogmatism is the view that rejects premise 1 (and accepts 2). Dogmatists think that we can get justified beliefs from, for example, some belief-source (again, such as sense perception) even if we are not justified in believing that the belief-source is reliable.

Reductionism is the view that rejects premise 2 (and accepts 1 and 3). Reductionists claim that our justification for thinking that some belief-source is reliable derives from the justification we have in believing that some *other* (prior) mode of belief acquisition is reliable, *and* our justification for believing in the reliability of the dependent belief-source derives entirely from the justification provided by that *other* (prior) mode of belief acquisition.

Holistic Coherentism is the view that rejects premise 3 (and accepts 1 and 2). Holistic coherentists do not think that the justification for either sort of belief is prior to the other – it is only when we have enough together in a coherent way that *any* of them become justified; and then they become justified all at once.

Some may find my account of the second sort of strategy unfamiliar, but that is only because of the specific example of perception that I have used. The only form of reductionism I have ever heard of, with respect to sense perception, has been called "apriorism," according to which we have *a priori* justification for thinking that sense perception is reliable and that this is what enables sense perception to produce justified beliefs for us. Apriorism is the view most associated with Descartes, who sought an *a priori* proof that a non-

deceiving God exists and endowed us with reliable sensory faculties. The perceived failure of Descartes's project provided much of the impetus for the rise of contemporary dogmatism. But apriorism is "reductionist" in the sense just described, because it holds that our justification for thinking that sense perception is reliable derives entirely from our justification in believing in whatever *a priori* justification is provided in support. Of course, the apriorist must then face the problem of the criterion again with respect justification *a priori*. And that same postponement of the problem of the criterion will be found in any other form of reductionism, as well: once the justification for believing some process is reliable is identified in some *other* process, then the problem of the criterion will appear again with respect to that *other* process. At any rate, there is a reason why I have subsumed *apriorism* under the general heading of "reductionism," and that reason will become clear in a bit.

The Problem of Testimony as a Version of the Problem of the Criterion

Recent discussions of the problem of testimony have not actually identified the problem as a version of the problem of the criterion, but I hope the brief survey of that problem makes clear enough how and why the problem of testimony is simply a variant of this more familiar problem. In brief, the problem of testimony creates the problem of the criterion by substituting belief acquisition via testimony into principle **RSD**, as follows:

> **Reliable Source Doctrine for Testimony (RSD$_t$)**. Testimony can produce justified beliefs for *S* only if *S* is justified in believing that testimony is reliable.

We can then simply replace sense perception with testimony in the skeptical argument I gave before to see how testimony has become a problem for epistemologists:

1. Testimony can produce justified beliefs for us only if we are justified in believing that testimony is reliable.
2. We can be justified in thinking that testimony is reliable only if we have justified beliefs that derive from testimony, which provide support for this conclusion.
3. Either *(i)* we must have justification for thinking that testimony is reliable prior to gaining justification for the beliefs we derive from testimony, or *(ii)* we must have justification for the beliefs we derive from prior to gaining justification for thinking that beliefs we derive from testimony are reliable.
4. By 2, *(i)* cannot be the case.
5. By 1, *(ii)* cannot be the case.
6. Hence, testimony cannot produce justified beliefs.

Again, our options for justifying our trust in testimony are three: dogmatism (rejecting premise 1), reductionism (rejecting premise 2), and holistic coherentism (rejecting premise 3). It is worth remarking that many important general theories of justification are versions of dogmatism[5] and many other import theories of justification are versions of holistic coherentism,[6] though dogmatism seems to be the more common view.

My aim here is not to survey all these views – excellent critical surveys already exist.[7] Instead, I will first take up examine a recent (and influential) dogmatist theory and notice a serious problem – a problem that is shared by all versions of dogmatism, including those epistemologists have attempted to apply to the problem of testimony.

Dogmatism and the Problem of Easy Knowledge

Distinctive of dogmatism is the claim that some belief sources can produce justified beliefs for *S* even if *S* does not know that such sources are reliable. A recent influential version of dogmatism with respect to sense

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5. See, for examples, Conee and Feldman's "evidentialism" (2004), BonJour's (2001) and Fumerton's (1995) defense of traditional foundationalism, Norman's unjustified foundationalism (1997), Leite's "localism" 2005, and (for basic logical knowledge) Wright (2001). [Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, *Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Laurence BonJour, "Toward a Defense of Empirical Foundationalism," in *Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism*, ed. Michael. R. DePaul (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); Richard A. Fumerton, *Metaepistemology and Skepticism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995); Andrew Norman, "Regress and the Doctrine of Epistemic Original Sin," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 47, no. 189 (1997); Adam Leite, "A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83, no. 3 (2005); Crispin Wright, "On Basic Logical Knowledge," *Philosophical Studies* 106, no. 1/2 (2001).] Most forms of externalism also qualify as dogmatist theories, in the sense that they treat our cognitive processes as conferring warrant on their products, but do not require warrant from some other source themselves.

6. So see, for examples, Harman's "negative coherentism" (1973), and the positive coherentisms proposed by Lehrer (2000), BonJour (1985), and most recently (and tentatively) by Cohen (2002). [Gilbert Harman, *Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); Keith Lehrer, *Theory of Knowledge* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000); Laurence BonJour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Stewart Cohen, "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65, no. 2 (2002).]

7. Plantinga's 1993 is a notable example, as is Pollock and Cruz 1999. [Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant: The Current Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, 2nd edn. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).]

perception is Pryor's 2000.[8] One of the main theses of Pryor's view is the following principle:

> **PFJ**. If (i) *S* has an experience as of *p*'s being the case, (ii) *S* has no reason to think that her experience is misleading, and (iii) *S* believes *p* on the basis of this experience, then *S* is justified in believing that *p*.

The idea is that, absent a special reason for doubt, you are justified in taking your experiences at face value. If you have an experience as of there being a large red cylinder in front of you, and you believe, on this basis, that there *is* a large red cylinder in front of you, you will have formed a justified belief (provided that you have no reason for thinking that your experience is misleading in this case).

PFJ explains how we acquire basic, non-inferentially justified beliefs. These basic beliefs will, further, count as evidence for other propositions.

This version of dogmatism has many points in its favor. For one, it avoids the skeptical conclusion of the problem of the criterion. Further, it explains how we can begin to acquire justified beliefs about the world around us even before we know much about our belief-forming processes or their varying degrees of reliability. Finally, it does seem plausible to think that that, if you have an experience as of *p*, then you are justified in taking that experience at face value (absent special reasons for doubt) – at least, it seems as though we ordinarily conduct our epistemic business in this way.

There is, however, a rather serious problem with dogmatism, and it is one that epistemologists have begun to appreciate only recently. Stewart Cohen has called it "*the problem of easy knowledge*."[9] Let's suppose we are considering a version of dogmatism that entails the following:

> **E**. If (i) *S* has an experience as of *O* being the color *X*, (ii) *S* has no reason to think that her experience is misleading, and (iii) *S* believes *O* is the color *X* on the basis of this experience, then *S* is justified in believing that *O* is the color *X*.

It is an intuitive enough principle. If something looks red to you, that is all the reason you need for thinking that it is red. One way of encountering the problem of easy knowledge, however, is via what is known as the closure principle:

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8. Pryor's theory of justification appears to be a somewhat less detailed version of John Pollock's 1974 *defeasible reasons* theory. [James Pryor, "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist," *Noûs* 34, no. 4 (2000); John L. Pollock, *Knowledge and Justification* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).] I present it instead of Pollock's because (a) it has recently received a lot of attention, and (b) the nuances of Pollock's view do not concern us here.

9. Cohen, "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge."

Justification Closure. If *S* justifiedly believes that *p*, and *S* competently deduces *q* from *p,* then *S* justifiedly believes that *q*.

This principle is also quite intuitive. If you grant that someone is justified in believing that *p*, and you agree with them that *p* entails *q*, how on earth could you fault them for thereby believing *q*, once they have made the deduction? Consider now the version of the closure principle for knowledge:

Knowledge Closure. If *S* knows that *p*, *p* entails *q*, and *S* competently deduces *q* from *p*, then *S* knows that *q*.

If justification is required for knowledge, it is hard to see how **Knowledge Closure** could be true but **Justification Closure** false.[10] But dogmatism seems to require precisely this. To see why, consider the following case: Suppose Plum has an experience as of *O* being red and has no reason for thinking this experience is misleading. He forms the belief that *O* is red on the basis of experience. According to **E**, Plum is justified in believing that *O* is red. But if *O* is red, this entails that *O* is not white with red lights shining on it, and Plum knows this. So suppose Plum competently deduces that *O* is not white with red lights shining on it. Is he thereby *justified* in believing that *O* is not white with red lights shining on it? It is not so clear that he is. Imagine the following conversation at a furniture store:[11]

Dad: Here you go son, this is a fine red table for your room.
Son: But Dad, how do you know it is not a white table with red lights shining on it?
Dad: Well, Son, it *looks* red, so it *is* red. And if it is red, then it is not white with red lights shining on it.
Son: ?!

The "reason" Dad gives Son for thinking that the table is not white under red lighting is patently absurd. Ordinarily, of course, Dad *would* be justified in believing that the table is not white with red lights shining on it – only the skeptic denies that – but surely Dad cannot know this simply by carrying out the absurd reasoning above. Justification that the table is not white with red lights shining on it is simply not that easy to come by – it depends on all sorts of other knowledge (such as how often furniture stores have red lights, how a white table under red lights usually differs in appearance from a red table under white lights, and so on).

Now, it might be objected at this point that Son has actually given Dad a reason not to believe that the table is red, and so requirement (ii) of principle

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10. Some epistemologists have denied versions of closure. This is plainly not the place to review this issue, however.

11. Cohen, "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," 315.

E is no longer met in this case. The problem is that **PFJ** seems to supply Dad with sufficient grounds not to suppose that the reason Son has provided is defeated: as soon as Dad has perceived the table as being red, **PFJ** ensures that he now has a reason to believe that it is red. But if it is red, it is not white, and Dad knows this. So, the reason Dad has for thinking that the table is red is a defeater for the claim that it is white. Hence, **PFJ** would allow Dad to reject Son's proposal in precisely the way the case presents. Defeated "reasons" for not making the inference ensured by **PFJ** do not block the inference.

But even without closure, we encounter the problem of easy knowledge. It is often seen as a virtue of dogmatism that it can explain how we *do* eventually come to know that perception is reliable. Once we have a complete enough picture of the world around us and our perceptual faculties (which **PFJ** explains how we can acquire), we can then infer various things about the reliability of our faculties. Dogmatism seems to be in a good position to explain how, for example, modern vision science is possible.

But if dogmatism is right, there is a much easier way of determining whether our color vision is reliable – a way that is much *too* easy. Suppose Son asks Dad whether color vision is reliable. Dad picks up a stack of colored construction paper and tells Son that they can investigate the matter together:

> *(Dad picks up a red piece of paper.)*
> Dad: Well, this one is red. And it *looks* red. So color vision worked that time.
> *(Dad picks up a blue piece of paper.)*
> Dad: Let's see ... this one is blue. And, why, what do you know – it *looks* blue. Color vision worked again!
> *(Hundreds of sheets later.)*
> Dad: Well, son, our color vision got it right 345 times out of 345. That seems pretty darn reliable to me!

Once again, this procedure is patently absurd. Surely this is no way of coming to justifiedly believe that color vision is reliable! The trouble is, according to principle **E**, there is nothing wrong the procedure. For each time Dad flips over a piece of paper and sees that the paper is color *X*, **E** says that Dad justifiedly believes that the paper is color *X*. Furthermore, if something looks color *X* to us, dogmatists will presumably allow that we can justifiedly *believe* that some looks color *X* to us. But if we assume that enumerative induction is a way of gaining knowledge of reliability – and how else could we learn about reliability? – then the dogmatist will have to allow that Dad's procedure is a good one. But this is an unacceptable result. For all its intuitive appeal, dogmatism makes knowledge about our reliability *much too easy*.

Application to the Problem of Testimony

Two general sorts of responses have been given to the problem of testimony, and we are now in a better position to see what is wrong with at least one of these approaches:

> **Reductionism.** Our justification for testimonial beliefs comes from perceptual evidence that testimony is reliable (which evidence does not itself depend on testimony).[12]
>
> **Anti-Reductionism.** Our justification for testimonial beliefs is basic – if someone tells you that *p*, then that gives you justification for believing that *p*, unless you have some special reason to doubt *p* or the trustworthiness of the testifier.[13]

I hope it is now clear why I earlier identified one of the general strategies for answering the problem of the criterion as "reductionist." As I said, the only form of reductionism that I know to have been applied to the problem of the criterion with respect to sense perception was a reduction of the justification for the belief in sense perception to some *a priori* justification. But apriorism has been rejected by contemporary epistemologists, and in any case, this is not the version of reductionism that epistemologists have applied to the problem of testimony, so I will not discuss it any further here. In the case of testimony, reductionism has taken a different form: reductionists claim that we are justified in believing in the reliability of testimony, *only if* we can derive that justification from other (presumably reliable) cognitive processes. As I said earlier, this has the effect of postponing the problem of the criterion with respect to testimony: for now, that problem only arises with respect to

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12. A classic statement of reductionism can be found in Hume's *Enquiry*, Part 1, para. 4-5. Adler 1994, Fricker 1994, and Lyons 1997 are more recent examples. [Jonathan E. Adler, "Testimony, Trust, Knowing," *Journal of Philosophy* 91, no. 5 (1994); Elizabeth Fricker, "Against Gullibility," in *Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony*, ed. A. Chakrabarti and B. K. Matilal (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 125-161; Jack Lyons, "Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 75, no. 2 (1997).]

13. A classic statement of anti-reductionism can be found in Reid's *Inquiry*, chapter 6, sec. 24. Coady 1992 and Burge 1997 are important recent defenders of the view. [C. A. J. Coady, *Testimony: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Tyler Burge, "Interlocution, Perception, and Memory," *Philosophical Studies* 86, no. 1 (1997).] See also Foley 1994 and Audi 2002. [R. Foley, "Egoism in Epistemology," in *Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge*, ed. Frederick Schmitt (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), 53-74; Robert Audi, "The Sources of Knowledge," in *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology*, ed. Paul K. Moser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 71-94.]

the *other* processes on the basis of which we justify our acceptance of testimony.

The anti-reductionists, with respect to testimony, are plainly providing a version of a dogmatism in their defense of testimony. But like Pryor's version of dogmatism, anti-reductionism with respect to testimony seems to run afoul of the "easy knowledge" problem: Anti-reductionists claim that testimony is a unique source of justification: the fact that someone told you that *p* is, all by itself, a reason to believe *p*. But if anti-reductionism were right, it would be too easy to find out that a testifier was reliable: you could simply believe everything she says, infer that everything she has ever told you is true, and so conclude that she is very reliable. That, however, would be a very unreasonable way to proceed!

So perhaps the reductionist strategy is more promising. The idea behind reductionism is simple enough. When you receive a bit of testimony, you are often in a position to check it yourself. For example, if a weather forecaster predicts rain in the afternoon then you can simply watch for rain in the afternoon to find out if the forecaster was right. If you do this often enough, you can get a feel for how reliable the forecaster is. If you discover that the forecaster is sufficiently reliable, then in the future you justifiedly believe her predictions. The key point to notice is that your justification would not rely on any sort of ineliminable trust in testimony. Through ordinary perceptual experience you have learned that this forecaster usually gets it right: you have personally verified her reliability.

The reductionist claims that reliance on non-testimonial evidence is the only way testimony can give us justified beliefs. If you believe *p* on the basis of testimony, then you had better have reason – derived from personal experience – for thinking that the person who told you that *p* is reliable (in the present circumstances, anyway). Now reductionists do not want to be skeptics. And they recognize that the vast majority of our beliefs are based on testimony. So consider the horde of testifiers on whom you have relied in the past – reporters, authors, scientists, governmental agencies, doctors, strangers, mechanics, advertisers, family, preachers, talk show hosts, Wikipedia, Dictionary.com, etc. The reductionist is committed to claiming that you have done enough personal verification to believe reasonably that most of these testifiers are reliable.

But this is unrealistic. The problem is that there is just far too much information that all of us come to believe—and thus to apply in our judgments of whether or not to accept new information presented to us— through testimonial sources. We simply do not have the epistemic resources to verify most of what we have come to believe through testimony. Reductionism, then would seem to lead to deep skepticism about most of our beliefs. I see no way to avoid this result, taking a reductionist approach. The only reasonable way to resolve the problem of testimony, I contend, is to

return to a theory of justification that has very much gone out of style in recent years: holistic coherentism. Recall the reliable source doctrine with respect to:

> **Reliable Source Doctrine for Testimony (RSD$_t$)**. Testimony can produce justified beliefs for *S* only if *S* is justified in believing that testimony is reliable.

The reductionist also embraces **RSD$_t$**. Butas I have now shown, reductionism leads to skepticism, for without relying on testimonial beliefs, we will not be able to establish the reliability of testimony. But if we look again at the skeptical argument of the problem of thecriterion applied to testimony, we can now fruitfully consider the idea that both reductionists and anti-reductionists are endorsing a false dilemma in premise 3 of that argument:

> 3. Either *(i)* we must have justification for thinking that testimony is reliable prior to gaining justification for the beliefs we derive from testimony, or *(ii)* we must have justification for the beliefs we derive from testimony prior to gaining justification for thinking that beliefs we derive from testimony are reliable.

There is, in fact, a third option: according to the holistic coherentist account,[14] neither our justification for our testimonial beliefs nor our justification for thinking that testimony is reliable needs to be *prior* to the other. According to holistic coherentism, beliefs are justified only insofar as they cohere well with a broad system of beliefs that is itself coherent. A sufficiently coherent system of beliefs will include beliefs about the reliability of belief sources (testimony, perception, reason). But these reliability beliefs are themselves justified by their coherence with the rest of the system, not by some antecedent source of justification.

As children, we implicitly trust the testimony of a great many unverified sources. This is a crucial step in acquiring the beliefs that we do. But it is only once we have developed a broad and sophisticated body of beliefs (one which includes beliefs about when and what sort of testimony to trust), that we begin to have *justified* beliefs. And these beliefs are justified "all at once" – beliefs *about* testimony and beliefs *based on* testimony becoming justified by fitting together into a broad and coherent system of beliefs. I conclude that holistic coherentism offers the best available account of testimonial justification.

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14. Versions of this view may be found in Harman 1973, BonJour 1985, Lehrer 2000, and Cohen 2002. [Harman, *Thought*; BonJour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*; Lehrer, *Theory of Knowledge*; Cohen, "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge."]

Holistic Coherentism and Justification

Let's reconsider the picture the dogmatist gave us of justification. Her view is that justification for individual beliefs is *generated (ex nihilo*, as it were) from some source, whether perception, or testimony, or whatever. This justification can then be *transferred* to other beliefs by means of inference. The problem with this picture is that it creates the problem of easy knowledge.

But consider a different picture of justification. The holistic coherentist suggests that justification for a belief is generated by the *overall coherence* of the system of beliefs within which it is situated and the degree to which the belief fits into (or coheres with) that system. After enough time in the world, we will form an overall picture of ourselves and our environment (a system of beliefs). If this system has a high degree of coherence, then particular beliefs within the system earn their justification by adding to the overall coherence of the system.

A famous old analogy will help. A large ship at sea keeps the crew out of the water, not in virtue of any particular plank of wood, but because there are numerous planks of wood fitting together in the right way. Any particular plank of wood contributes to the ship's seaworthiness by fitting in its spot and plugging a potential leak. This might be contrasted with a building: What supports a man on the fifth floor is, ultimately, the foundational pillars on the ground – those provide support independently of the rest of the structure, which merely adds height. In the ship, however, each plank is of roughly equal importance and without enough planks, the ship cannot float in the first place.

The holistic coherentist views justification as analogous to a ship at sea. None of our beliefs can be justified until we have enough of them fitting together to have a coherent picture of the world. At that point, and only then, do the beliefs within the system (including beliefs about that system itself) acquire justification "at once" (all those that cohere well, that is). The key thesis for the holistic coherentist is the following:

> **HC**. *S*'s belief that *p* is justified just in case *p* coheres well with *S*'s belief system, which itself has a high degree of coherence.

Critics of holistic coherentism have sometimes confused it with a much less plausible account, which might be called "linear coherentism," according to which justification might go in circles. For the holistic coherentist, no circular inferences take place. If asked what ultimately justifies a belief, the holistic coherentist does not point to another belief, and then another and another until she winds up in a circle. Instead, she points to the *fact* that the belief fits into a coherent system.

But now we are in a position to see how we can, in fact, learn that perception and testimony are reliable. As we begin our epistemic lives, we have implicit trust in our perceptual faculties and in testimony we receive. This allows us to acquire a large stock of beliefs from these sources – to exercise our innate cognitive equipment. As time goes on, some of the perceptual beliefs we acquire are about circumstances in which perception seems to work quite well and circumstances in which it does not, and the same goes for testimony. By this point, we have achieved a fairly sophisticated understanding of our own environment and our cognitive faculties. Once we reach this point (and of course, only if our belief system is coherent), by principle **HC** both the individual beliefs that derive from sense perception and testimony—*and also the beliefs about the reliability of these forms of belief acquisition*—acquire *justification*.

Holistic coherentism, then, provides a solution to the problem of the criterion *without encountering the problem of easy knowledge*. Holistic coherentists embrace the idea that we must be justified in thinking that perception and testimony are reliable if we are to be justified in our perceptual beliefs. They also endorse the claim that knowledge about the reliability of perception and testimony are based on our experiences of using these sources of belief. What they reject, however, is the idea that there are chronological priority relations between justified beliefs. It is not as though you need to be justified in believing that perception is reliable *before* you can be justified in using perception (or *vice versa*). Rather, justification arises once you have both ordinary perceptual beliefs and beliefs about the reliability of perception – the coherence of such a system creates justification all at once. Again, the same goes, *mutatis mutandis* for our justification in believing in testimony—we are not justified in believing that testimony is reliable *before* we have formed beliefs based on testimony, nor does the justification process go the other way around. What is more, this solution avoids the problem of easy knowledge, because knowledge (at least, the sort[s]of knowledge that require[s] justification[15]) can only be the result of a system that has been built up over time and as a result of both experience and reflection on that experience. I tentatively conclude, then, that some version of holistic coherentism is the best account of epistemic justification, both for perception and for testimony. In fact, I am inclined to think that holistic coherentism is the best general account of *all* justification, but an argument for that claim would need to survey all of the sources of belief acquisition.

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15. I am not at all committed to the claim that knowledge always has justification as a necessary condition. I am committed to the claim that there are at least some cases in which justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. For defense of this view, see the arguments in Evans and Smith [Ian Evans and Nicholas D. Smith, *Knowledge* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012)].

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