Articles

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The current issue is the second of the eighth volume of the *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts (AJHA), published by the Arts, Humanities and Education Division of ATINER*.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
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7-10 June 2021, Athens, Greece

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The Cosmology of Cognitive Science from Hesiod, Socrates, and Plato to Wittgenstein

By Richard McDonough[*]

Cognitive science, the attempt to provide an account of human intelligence and behavior by reference to physical "mechanisms" in the alleged neural control center of human beings, is one of the dominant philosophical projects of our time. The paper argues that Wittgenstein in para. 608 of Zettel develops an alternative to this almost universally accepted modern paradigm. However, his efforts have been widely misunderstood, in a fashion clarified by Kuhn, because scholars read competing paradigms in the light of their own cognitive science paradigm. In the present case, scholars have assumed that the words in Zettel (para. 608), especially "the center" and "chaos," must have the same meanings that they would naturally be assigned in cognitive science. The result is, inevitably, that Zettel (para. 608) either looks like it anticipates one of the various cognitive science paradigms or it looks absurd. In opposition to this, the paper argues that the language in Zettel (para. 608) is not the language of modern cognitive science, but, rather, is the language of the emergence of order from chaos by virtue of a stabilizing center with which the Western intellectual tradition began in ancient Greek cosmology. When read against this background, it becomes clear that Zettel (para. 608) is an attempt to formulates an alternative to the cognitive science paradigm by retrieving a paradigm found in ancient Greek philosophy and literature. The idea that the brain is not the control center of the human organism is in Plato. The idea that the order in language and thought may arise out of "chaos" is prefigured in Hesiod. It is also argued that the core spirit of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is summed up in the ancient Socratic virtue, for which there is no precise modern equivalent, of sophrosyne. The "new" alternative to the paradigms of modern cognitive science that Wittgenstein sketches in Zettel (para. 608) is rooted in ancient Greek paradigms for thinking about the cosmos - and the human microcosm.

The Cosmology of Cognitive Science from Hesiod, Socrates, and Plato to Wittgenstein

> [The Greek Masters from Thales to Socrates] invented … the archetypes of philosophic thought. All posterity has not made an essential contribution to them since.
> Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (31)[1]

"Cognitive science" is, arguably, one of the dominant philosophical projects of our time. As the heir to the 18th century Enlightenment project to realize the

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1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,* trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1969), 31.

vision of *l'homme Machine*, it purports to provide an account of human intelligence and behavior by reference to physical or material "mechanisms" at the human neural center.[2] Many scholars are *certain* this project is correct. Patricia Churchland claims that the only alternative to this mechanistic view is "magic."[3] Similarly, Colin McGinn states that there "just has to be" some mechanistic explanation of the way brains "subserve" minds.[4] To be sure, there have been objections to this program by philosophers like Heidegger and Wittgenstein, but they are, admittedly, obscure.[5] Kuhn teaches that establishment science is extremely resistant to the development of alternative paradigms, even invoking purely "*ad hoc*" ways of saving the favored paradigms.[6] Is it even possible to develop a genuine alternative to this near universally accepted materialistic and mechanistic cognitive science paradigm? What would an attempt to do so look like? The present paper follows Heidegger's suggestion that if one is to produce fundamental new ways of thinking, one must repeat the beginnings of philosophy, which means its beginnings in ancient Greece, in order to "reawaken" the possibilities there that have been lost to subsequent ages.[7] The main text for the paper is para. 608 of Wittgenstein's *Zettel*.[8] This passage from Wittgenstein's "later philosophy" has generally been claimed to say that language and thought may arise from physical chaos at the neural center.[9] In order to show that this is

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2. Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein and the Possibility of a Science of Man," *Idealistic Studies, Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science,* ed. Richard McDonough. 29, no. 3 (1999): 125-26

3. Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 461-462.

4. Colin McGinn, *Wittgenstein on Meaning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 353. In general, philosopher's claim that something "just has" to be a certain way when they can find no actual evidence it is that way.

5. Richard McDonough, *Martin Heidegger's Being and Time* (New York: Peter Lang, 2006); Richard McDonough, "Towards a non-Mechanistic Theory of Meaning," *MIND* XCVIII no. 389 (1989), 1-21; Richard McDonough, "Bringing Cognitive Science Back to Life," in *Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science,* ed. Richard McDonough, *Idealistic Studies,* Special Issue. 29, no. 3 (1999b), 173-213; Richard McDonough, "Bringing Consciousness Back to Life". *Metascience.* 9, no. 2 (2000): 238-245; Richard McDonough, Review of Jerry Fodor, *The Mind doesn't Work that Way,* in *Metascience.* 10, no. 3 (2001).

6. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970): 77-91.

7. Rudgier Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil,* trans. Edward Osers (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 246, 278.

8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Zettel,* trans. *G.E.M.* Anscombe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

9. By "Wittgenstein's later philosophy "is here meant the *Blue and Brown Books, Philosophical Investigations, Zettel, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, On Certainty,* and the remarks in *Culture and Value* cited here. References to *the Blue and Brown Books* and *Culture and Value* are by page number, to *Philosophical Investigations* by paragraph number

wrong, and that *Zettel (para. 608)* is proposing a radically "new" paradigm for thinking about language and mind, the paper argues that the language in *Zettel (para. 608)* is not the language of modern science, but, rather, is the *literary* religious-cosmological language of the emergence of a cosmos from chaos with which the Western intellectual tradition began in Hesiod and Plato. Call this the "Religious-Cosmological Interpretation" of *Zettel (para. 608).*[10] The paper distinguishes Hesiod's and Plato's models of the sense in which the cosmos arises from chaos. This includes a discussion of Plato's microcosmic doctrine because it is this doctrine that licenses the application of cosmological models to human beings in order to produce the framework for modern cognitive science. The paper argues that modern mechanistic cognitive science is an application of a *stunted* interpretation of Plato's cosmology to the human microcosm, but that *Zettel (para. 608)* makes a novel application of these ancient cosmological models to human beings in order to propose a "new" paradigm for thinking about language and thought. This new paradigm has *some* affinities with Plato's cosmology, but also, in a different respect, with Hesiod's cosmology and with certain of Socrates' views.

The first part of the paper describes the core of the modern program of cognitive science. The second shows why the orthodox interpretations of *Zettel (para. 608)* cannot be correct. The third briefly sketches the "religious-cosmological" interpretation of *Zettel (para. 608)*. The fourth explains Plato's relevant cosmological and microcosmic doctrines. The fifth discusses the cosmological model that provides the foundation for cognitive science and shows how the ancient microcosmic doctrine reappears in one highly influential version of cognitive science. The sixth shows how Hesiod's, Plato's and Socrates' views enable one better to appreciate the "new" paradigm Wittgenstein proposes in *Zettel (para. 608)*. Finally, the last part explains why Wittgenstein's real program in *Zettel (para. 608)* has proved so elusive to modern philosophers.

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or page number as required, to *Zettel* and *On Certainty* by paragraph number, to *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* by section and paragraph number.

10. Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein's *Zettel* 608: An Analogy with Martin Buber," *Iyyun* 63 (July) (2014): 259-288; Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein from a Religious Point of View?" *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, 15 no. 43 (2016): 3-27.

The Basic Program of Cognitive Science

> The central nervous system is composed of the brain and spinal cord and can be thought of as the control center for interpreting sensory input and directing our thoughts and actions. Stillings, Chase and Feinstein, *Cognitive Science: An Introduction*[11]

There are three main paradigms in Cognitive science, the "representational theory of mind," defended by Jerry Fodor,[12] connectionism, defended by P.S. Churchland, P.M. Churchland and Steven Stich,[13] and dynamic systems theory, defended by Port and Van Gelder.[14] Despite the differences between these paradigms, all agree that mind and intelligence are realized in the brain. Fodor holds that information is available to an organism when it is "encoded" in causally effective neural states.[15] P.S. Churchland, apparently believing that there is no distinction to be made between the personal and the sub-personal level, does not ask how Susan visually recognizes shapes but how her brain does recognizes them.[16] Port and Van Gelder claim that "the [self-organizing] brain may achieve autonomous control [of perception and behavior] in a rapidly changing environment."[17] All three of these paradigms agree with the basic

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11. Neil Stillings, Christopher Chase and Mark Feinstein, *Cognitive Science: An Introduction* (Cambridge*:* MIT Press, 1995), 271.

12. Jerry Fodor, *The Language of Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1979); Jerry Fodor, *Psychosemantics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); Jerry Fodor, *LOT 2* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

13. Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*. Paul Churchland, *A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Paul Churchland, *The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain* (Cambridge: MIT, 1995). Steven Stich, *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1983). For those not familiar with the precise terminology in "cognitive science," note that whereas in Fodor's "Representational Theory of Mind," information is encoded in the brain in *discrete* states, but in the "connectionist" model, defended by the two Churchland's, Stich and others, information is "distributed holistically" over the entire "neural net," not encoded in any discrete state. See P.M. Churchland, *The Engine of Reason*, 47 and Ho, Edward Kei Sjhin and Chan, Kei Lan, "How to Design a Connectionist Holistic Parser," *Neural Computation*, 11 no. 8 (1999): 1995-2016! For arguments against connectionism see Richard McDonough, "A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology," in *The Future of Folk Psychology*: *Intentionality and Cognitive Science,* ed. John Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Richard McDonough, Review of Paul Churchland, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul, *Metascience* 7, no. 2 (1998): 374-380.

14. Robert Port, and Timothy Van Gelder, *Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition* (Cambridge: MIT, 1995).

15. Fodor, *Language of Thought*, 52

16. Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*, 239.

17. Port and Van Gelder, *Mind as Motion*, 450

tenant of Cognitive science that the brain is the central control system of human language, thought and behavior.

Richard Green points out that "central state materialism" involves two sub-theses, first, the "identity theory," the view that mental states are *identical* with brain states, and, second, the view that the brain works like a machine, in which brain states are correlated with mental states, that obeys the principles of physics and chemistry.[18] The present paper is not concerned with the strong "identity thesis," but only with the more moderate mechanistic thesis of central state materialism because, as Putnam points out, the identity thesis is considered controversial, but "everyone knows that there is at least a correlation" between mental states and states of the brain.[19] The machine model is ubiquitous in cognitive science. Fodor states that "I shall continue to rely heavily on the machine analogy."[20] P.S. Churchland states that "If you root yourself in the ground [i.e., plants], you can afford to be stupid. But if you move [i.e., animals], you must have mechanisms for moving."[21] Port and Van Gelder (purport to describe the exotic cognitive "mechanisms" posited by "mathematical dynamical systems" theory.[22] Despite various differences, all versions of cognitive science agree that human intelligence and behavior are produced by this physical machine at the cranial or neural center.[23] But is it really obvious than that some version of this of nearly universally accepted materialistic mechanistic paradigm is correct – or is it the case that the inability to envision alternatives is either a failure of imagination or a failure to know our own history tracing to the Ancient Greeks?

The Orthodox Interpretation of *Zettel* (608)

> No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought processes from brain processes. I mean this: if I talk or write, there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the *system* continue further in the direction of the center? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos?
>
> Wittgenstein, *Zettel* (608).[24]

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18. Richard H. Green, "Central State Materialism and Consciousness," *Philosophy* 56, no. 215 (1981): 106

19. Putnam is here being sarcastic since his whole point in this passage is that this confidence is misplaced.

20. Fodor, *Language of Thought*, 68.

21. Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*, 13

22. Port and Van Gelder, *Mind as Motion*, 559ff

23. Susan Greenfield, *Journey to the Centers of the Mind* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1995), 24-56.

24. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, para. 608.

Zettel (para. 608) is a striking passage, especially for the anti-metaphysical philosopher Wittgenstein.[25] For it has been interpreted to say that language and thought may arise from chaos in the brain. Call this the "neurological interpretation" of *Zettel* (para. 608)! Colin McGinn thinks *Zettel* (para. 608) states that normal human heads might turn out to be filled with sawdust; Richard Scheer believes it suggests that causal indeterminism may occur in the brain; Martin Davies, Stephen Mills and John Sutton separately claim it anticipates recent "connectionist" models of neural processing; Hanoch Ben-Yami thinks it holds that it is possible that the brains of normal people might be in physical chaos; Ter Hark thinks it suggests an alternative to Köhler's theory of electric brain-fields.[26] But all agree that the "center" and "chaos" mentioned in *Zettel* (para. 608) are the neural center and neural chaos. Thus, all hold that *Zettel* (para. 608) suggests that language may arise out of physical chaos in the brain. Since the case against the neurological interpretation has been made in detail elsewhere only the most basic points are repeated here.[27]

The first obvious problem with the neurological interpretation is that *Zettel* (para. 608) explicitly *denies* that the brain is in chaos. The second sentence of the passage *affirms* that "there is, I assume, a *system* [LW's emphasis] of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts." Indeed, the neurological interpretation has to be wrong here because it is a basic tenant in Wittgenstein's later philosophy is that "what is hidden is of no interest to us" and that, therefore, "we must not advance any kind of theory,"[28] which includes theories about sawdust in the head, connectionist processing, quantum

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25. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para. 116.

26. McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning, 12–13, 112–114; Richard Scheer, "Wittgenstein's Indeterminism," *Philosophy*. 66, no. 255 (1991): 5-23; Martin Davies, "Concepts, Connectionism, and the Language of Thought," in *Philosophy and Connectionist Theory*, ed. Ramsey, Stich, Rummelhart (Hillsdale: Psychology Press, 1991); Stephen Mills, "Wittgenstein and Connectionism," *Philosophy and Cognitive Science*, ed. Christopher Hookway and Donald Peterson (Cambridge University Press, 1993); John Sutton, "Remembering as Public Practice: Wittgenstein, Memory, and Distributed Cognitive Ecologies," *Mind, Language and Action*, ed. V.A. Munz and A. Coliva (Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2014); Hark, Ter. "Electric Brain Fields and Memory Traces: Wittgenstein and *Gestalt* Psychology," *Philosophical Investigations* 18 no. 2 (1995): 113-138; Hanoch Ben-Yami, "The Hercules in the Machine: Why Block's Argument against Behaviorism is Unsound," *Philosophical Psychology* 18, no 2 (2005): 179–286.

27. McDonough, "Towards a non-mechanistic theory"; McDonough, "A Culturalist Account"; Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein, German Organicism, Chaos, and the Centre of Life," Journal of the History of Philosophy XLII, no. 3 (2004): 297-324; Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein's Augustinian Cosmogony in *Zettel* 608," *Philosophy and Literature* 39, no. 1 (2014): 87-106; Richard McDonough, "A *Gestalt* Model of *Zettel* 608," *Idealistic Studies* 46, no. 2 (2016): 163-82 and Richard McDonough, "A Music Model of *Zettel* 608: Haydn and Beethoven," *The Journal of Music and Meaning* 14 (2018): 21-40.

28. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para's 109, 435.

indeterminacy in the brain, and Köhler's theory of electric brain fields. Indeed, at *Zettel* (para. 447), Wittgenstein states that his aim is to replace "wild conjectures and explanations by quiet weighing of linguistic facts."[29] None of these extravagant theories invoked in the neurological interpretation remotely resembles "a quiet weighing of linguistic facts." The idea that in *Zettel* (para. 608) Wittgenstein has suddenly begun theorizing about hidden neural processes simply does not make sense.

The second obvious problem is that *Zettel* (para. 608) does *not* state that language and thought may arise out of chaos. It states that they may, "*sozusagen* [so to speak]" do so. Wittgenstein's later philosophy does not state theories but, rather, makes philosophically illuminating *comparisons*.[30] *Zettel* (para. 608) *compares* the production of language with the emergence of order from chaos, but it does not assert any *theory* that language and thought might *literally* arise from chaos. There can be no emergentist *theory*, of the sort that one does finds in R.W. Sellars, in *Zettel* (para. 608).[31]

The third obvious problem is that *Zettel* (para. 608) does not say that the system of brain impulses continues towards the neural center. That is asserted by the neurological *interpretation*, but it is *not* stated in the text. If one reads *Zettel* (para. 608) closely, it is clear that the neural impulses are moving *from* the brain *towards* the center, which means that the "center" is in the external world, that is, in the same region as "my spoken or written thoughts." Wittgenstein's later philosophy explicitly identifies this center. Anscombe translates para. 108 of the *Philosophical Investigations* to say that Wittgenstein's later philosophy focusses on "the fixed point [*Angelpunkt*] of our real need," but the literal translation of "*Angelpunkt*" is "center-point."[32] Wittgenstein's later philosophy sees "ordinary life" as the true "center" around which language, *sozusagen*, turns. Wittgenstein's notion of the center of a language in his later philosophy is also *explicitly* identified in his *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* as the notion of a *life-phenomenon*, not the notion of a neural phenomenon.[33] What could be clearer than that Wittgenstein's later philosophy holds that language is *centered* in ordinary life

29. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, para. 447.

30. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para's 130-131; Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), V.12; Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1980), 19.

31. Richard McDonough, "Roy Wood Sellars," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* §'s 3 & 4, http://www.iep.utm.edu/sella-rw/

32. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para. 108; John Traupman, *German & English Dictionary* (New York: Bantam Books, 1991): 17.

33. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, §'s III. 15 and V.12

rather than the brain? In the *Philosophical Investigations*, he asks, "Now ask yourself: what do you know about these things [in the brain]."[34]

The single most significant scientific and philosophical advance in the past several thousand years is, arguably, the "Copernican Revolution" in astronomy, in which Copernicus replaces the entrenched Ptolemaic view that the earth is the center of the universe with his new view that the true center is the sun. What was thought to be the center, the earth, is reassigned to the periphery, and what was thought to be periphery, the sun, is identified as the true center. *Zettel* (para. 608) proposes its own "Copernican Revolution," not in astronomy, but in our views of language and thought.[35] Whereas cognitive science holds that language and thought "revolve," *sozusagen*, around the central brain, *Zettel* (para. 608) suggests that they "revolve," *sozusagen*, around human activities in "forms of life."[36] Whereas cognitive science sees the brain as the *control center* of the organism, Wittgenstein's later philosophy, reflected in para. 608 of *Zettel*, sees the brain as a *mere instrument* employed by the human-organism-situated *in-the-world*.[37][37] *Zettel* (para. 608) does not deny that one needs a functioning brain to think. It only denies that our brain is the autonomous *control center* of human intelligence. Rather, *Zettel* (para. 608) suggests that the human organism is *centered* in their public world of human activities. It is, roughly, Susan-situated *in-her-world*, not the brain imprisoned inside her cranium, *who* decides what she thinks or means.

Wittgenstein's "Copernican" reversal on the identity of the true center also clarifies the nature of the "chaos" referenced in *Zettel* (para. 608). Since Wittgenstein's later philosophy identifies the center as human forms of life, and since the chaos is where the center is, *Zettel* (para. 608)'s point is that language and thought "emerge," *sozusagen*, from the chaos of activities in those "forms of life."[38] Indeed, Wittgenstein's later philosophy employs this chaos-imagery

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34. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para. 158.

35. McDonough, "Towards a non-mechanistic," 18-21; See also Ilham Dilman, *Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution: The Question of Linguistic Idealism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 18-37.

36. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 174, 226.

37. Richard McDonough, "The Last Stand of Mechanism," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 6, no. 3 (1992): 206-25, § V. The idea that an organism is properly conceived as "the-the-world," in something like Heidegger's sense, not in a cranial vat, is crucial here. On the notion of being-in-the-world, see Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1962), §'s 12-13! On the fallacies in the view that human beings might be brains in a vat, see Richard McDonough, "Putnam's Argument that the View that we are Brains-in-a-vat is Self-Refuting," *Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy*, 10, no. 1 (2018): 149-159.

38. McDonough's "A *Gestalt* Model" argues that the way an image of a dog "emerges" from the spots on the paper in *Gestalt* psychology offers a better model of the kind of *non-theoretical non-causal* emergence Wittgenstein has in mind here. One literally can "see" the image of the dog "emerge" from the spots.

elsewhere. In *Culture and Value*, he suggests that philosophers must learn to make a home in "primeval chaos"—but there is nothing "primeval" about the brain and one cannot make a "home" in it.[39] Wittgenstein's later philosophy also refers to this chaos in human life when he states that "what determines our judgment" about what something means is "the background" consisting of "the *ganze Gewimmel* [great swarm] of human actions."[40] Roughly, expression E means M if and only if E is part of a pattern that arises against the chaotic background "swarm" of human actions. That is why Wittgenstein that philosophizing requires a descent into the chaotic swarm of activities in human forms of life. This "descent" is required for the philosopher because in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, it is in these activities, not in processes in the brain, that linguistic meaning resides. Thus, *Zettel* (para. 608) does not say that language and thought may arise from chaos at the neural center. Rather, it suggests that language and thought arise, *sozusagen* (one cannot forget the "*sozusagen*"), from the "chaos" of human activities in the "*Angelpunkt* of our real need" (ordinary life). If *Zettel* (para. 608) had been written by a cognitive scientist, it might make sense that its references to the center and to chaos are properly understood as referring to the neural center and neural chaos, but this makes no sense for a philosopher among whose primary purposes is to criticize the materialistic mechanistic program of cognitive science.[41][41]

The Religious-Cosmological Interpretation of *Zettel* (608)

Wittgenstein told] his close friend Drury: … "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view."
Malcolm, *Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View?*[42]

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39. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 65.

40. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, para. 567.

41. Bruce Goldberg, "Mechanism and Meaning," in *Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays*, edited by Carl Ginet and Sydney Shoemaker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Bruce Goldberg, "Are Human Beings Mechanisms?" *Idealistic Studies*, Special Issue. *Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science*, ed. Richard McDonough 29 no. 3 (1999): 139-152; Norman Malcolm, *Memory and Mind* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); Norman Malcolm and David Armstrong, *Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); Norman Malcolm, *Nothing is Hidden* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); McDonough, "Towards a non-mechanistic theory"; McDonough, "A Culturalist Account," and McDonough, "Bringing Cognitive Science Back to Life," 173-213; D. Proudfoot, "On Wittgenstein on Cognitive Science. *Philosophy* 72, no. 280 (1997): 189-217; Peter Hacker and Max Bennett, *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience* (Blackwell: Oxford, 2003).

42. Norman Malcolm, *Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View?* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 1.

One of the keys to understanding *Zettel* (para. 608) is the recognition that it is not speaking in the language of cognitive science, but, rather, in the literary religious-cosmological language of the creation of a cosmos from chaos with which the Western intellectual tradition began in Hesiod's *Theogony* and which was subsequently carried down through the entire Western cultural tradition.[43] The ancient cosmological notions of the emergence of order from chaos at the center is found in a plethora of literary, religious, scientific and philosophical thinkers throughout the Western tradition. The language and imagery in *Zettel* (para. 608), the emergence of some kind of meaning from chaos at the center, is found, respectively, in Augustine and Buber, in Austrian economics, in *Gestalt* psychology, in Borges, in Wittgenstein's own "labyrinth" imagery, and in Haydn and Beethoven.[44] Indeed, the key concepts in *Zettel* (para. 608), the emergence of a meaningful order from chaos at the center can be found in the cosmology in first few paragraphs of Milton's *Paradise Lost* and throughout the work and also in Goethe's *Faust*.[45] In each of these areas, one finds various versions of the view that religious meaning (Augustine, Milton, Goethe, and Buber), economic meaning or value (Austrian economics), perceptual meaning (*Gestalt* psychology), and musical meaning (Haydn and Beethoven) arises out of the relevant kind of chaos by virtue of movement towards the relevant center. In Augustine, Milton and Buber, the relevant center is, roughly, God or human communion with God, and the relevant chaos is the moral chaos of fallen human life. In Austrian economics the relevant center is the market activity that forms the "center of gravity" of a free market economy and the chaos is the chaotic behavior of the market actors. In *Gestalt* psychology the relevant center is the stabilizing center of the visual field and the relevant chaos is the chaos of perceptions out of which the *Gestalt*-image arises. In Haydn and Beethoven, the relevant center is the tonal center of the musical piece and the relevant chaos is the dissonant sounds out of which the musical harmony arises by virtue of the movement towards that stabilizing tonal center. That is, each of these areas, religion, Austrian economics, *Gestalt* psychology, literature, and music is treated as a microcosm of the cosmos in which the relevant cosmic structure, the emergence of order from chaos by virtue of movement towards an order-producing center, is reproduced, with modifications due to the special requirements of the specific area. The religious-

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43. Robert Lamberton, Introduction to *Hesiod: Works & Days and Theogony* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).

44. Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein's Augustinian Cosmogony" and Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein's *Zettel* 608: An Analogy"; Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy and Austrian Economics," *Studies in the Sociology of Science* 5 no. 4 (2014): 1-11; Richard McDonough, "A *Gestalt* Model." Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein's and Borges Labyrinth Imagery," *The Athens Journal of Humanities and the Arts* (2018); and Richard McDonough, "A Music Model."

45. Richard McDonough, "Philosophy in a Fallen Language: Wittgenstein, Goethe, Milton," *Studies in Language and Literature* 10, no. 4 (2015): 1-14.

cosmological interpretation of *Zettel* (para. 608) holds that the cosmological model developed in ancient Greece reappears in these and other areas of the Western intellectual and cultural traditions. *Zettel* (para. 608) simply applies the cosmological model implicit in all of these diverse areas to the cases of language and mind. The religious-cosmological interpretation does not claim that *Zettel* (para. 608) is advancing cosmological *theories* about language and thought, but, rather, that it *compares* the genesis of language and thought to the genesis of the cosmos in order to shed light on the natures of language and thought. There is no need to repeat the specific arguments here since the next section develops the argument in connection at one of its primal sources: Plato.

The Emergence of Order from Chaos at the Center in Plato's Cosmology

> Wherefore finding the whole visible sphere … moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder [God] brought order … [so that] the world came into being, a living creature … [God] made [the cosmos] …in every direction equidistant from the center [where] he put the soul, …. [W]hen the creator had framed the soul according to his will, he formed within her the corporeal universe … and united them center to center.
>
> *Timaeus* (30a-c, 34a-b, 36d-e51)[46]

Whitehead suggests that "the European philosophical tradition … consists in a series of footnotes to Plato."[47] However, if the views in the previous section are correct, there is a sense in which the entire Western intellectual and cultural tradition, not just the philosophical tradition, consists in a series of footnotes to Plato. For the cosmological model articulated by Plato reappears repeatedly not just in philosophy, but in religion, literature, economics, psychology, music and other areas. The present section discusses Plato's cosmology with a view to illuminating Wittgenstein's real method and aims in *Zettel* (para. 608).

Plato's *Timaeus* describes the cosmos as a living organism created by God, the "*Demiurge*," who follows "eternal patterns" (which resemble Plato's "Forms").[48]

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46. Plato, *Timaeus*, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): 30a-c, 34a-b, 36d-e51. McDonough elsewhere contrasts Plato's organicism with the very different species of organicism in Taoist philosophy. See Richard McDonough, "Plato's Cosmic Animal vs the Daoist Cosmic Plant," *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, 15 no 45 (2016): 1-22. McDonough also discusses the surprising unexpected remnants of Plato's organism in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. See Richard McDonough, "The Unspeakable Organicism in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*," *Iyyun* 66 no. 1 (2017): 1-17.

47. A.N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (corrected edition) (New York: Free Press, 1978), 39.

48. Gabriela Roxana Carone, *Plato's Cosmology and its Ethical Dimensions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 69ff; For a definition and taxonomy of the various

Unlike the Christian God, who creates *ex nihilo*, Plato's *Demiurge*, like a craftsman, fashions the cosmos out of pre-existing materials.[49] For Plato, the creation consists in putting "intelligence in soul and soul in body" according to the eternal patterns, where the soul as the source of life and principle of self-motion.[50]

Alluding to Hesiod's view that the cosmos arises from chaos, Plato describes the pre-existing materials as "disordered," but by this Plato does not mean the complete absence of order. Vlastos points out that Plato thinks of mechanism as disorderly, [unless] it is teleologically ordered."[51] Thus, Plato would see a thoroughly Newtonian world unguided by rational purpose as chaotic. Thus, Plato's view that the cosmic organism arises out of chaos is consistent with its arising out of a mechanical order. That is, Plato's God, the Demiurge, is "a divine mechanic," but, as Vlastos also points out, not *merely* a divine mechanic.[52] This extremely important if one is to understand the origins of the modern mechanistic cognitive science paradigm as another "footnote" to Plato's cosmology.

The pre-existing chaotic materials take the form of a sphere, but it turns out that a sphere is also the most rational shape for the cosmic organism created out of that pre-existing chaos. The *Demiurge* imposes an order on that pre-existing chaotic visible sphere that makes it suitable to house the soul. One could not install a rational soul into a chair. A being must have a complex body and brain if it is to be capable of housing a soul. Thus, Plato does not deny that there are material or mechanical *conditions* for life and mind. In fact, he insists that there are such conditions. He only holds that these are subordinate to the teleological concerns of sovereign reason.[53]

Plato's view that the *Demiurge* synchronizes the pre-existing "visible sphere" and the spherical cosmic organism "center to center" means that it makes the mechanical and mental dimensions of the organism harmonize with each other.

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notions of organism, see Richard McDonough, "Organicism," *Dictionary of the Philosophy of Mind*. (2016), https://sites.google.com/site/minddict/organicism.

49. Wilfrid Sellars, "The Soul as Craftsman," in *Philosophical Perspectives* (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1967); F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1997): 37, 173, 176.

50. Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. Hugh Tredennick. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 105c; Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. R. Hackforth, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed's. Edith Hamilton and Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): 245c; Plato, *Timaeus*, 30a-c; Plato. *Laws*, trans. A.E. Taylor. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Ed's. Edith Hamilton and Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): 896a, 966e.

51. Gregory Vlastos, "The Disorderly Motion of the *Timaeus*," in *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, ed. R.E. Allen (London: Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1968): 398 & n 2.

52. Gregory Vlastos, *Plato's Universe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), 27.

53. Vlastos, "The Disorderly Motion," 397-8.

In doing so, Plato formulates an early version of the "correlation thesis,"[54] the view that there must be a correlation between the mental and material states of the organism. Thus, the world-organism possesses an organic unity by virtue of its central order-imposing soul. Since there is nothing outside the cosmic organism, and since it is controlled by its own soul, it is autonomous in the visible (material) world. It does depend on the eternal Forms, which are the ultimate causes of its being,[55] but it does not depend on anything more basic within the visible world.

Unlike Pythagoras, who anticipated Copernicus' view that the earth is a planet that moves around the central fire.[56] Plato holds that the earth is at the center of the cosmos and that the heavens revolve around it. It is significant that the center of the sphere is more *chaotic* than the heavens at the cosmic periphery: Although Plato states that the earth is "as pure as the starry heavens," he adds that "the earth" and "the regions in which we live are marred and corroded just as in the sea everything is corroded by the brine."[57] For example, animals on earth move in a haphazard fashion, while the heavenly bodies move in near perfect circles. This is because the movements at the periphery of the cosmos in the heavens better reflect the perfectly rational Forms,[58] the true causes of what is, while the earth, at the imperfect center of the cosmic sphere, is fraught with chaos and imperfection.[59]

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54. Putnam, Hilary. *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 81

55. Plato, *Republic*, 509b; *Timaeus* 30b-c, 90c.

56. John Mansley Robinson, *An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), 76.

57. *Phaedo*, 109e-110a.

58. Plato, *Tim*aeus, 28a-b, 39d.

59. Plato, *Statesman*, 273b-c; Plato, in a stirring passage, has Phaedrus, in the *Symposium* refer to Hesiod's account of the god Chaos, but Plato is generally highly critical of Hesiod. Plato, *Symposium*, trans. Michael Joyce, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): 178b. Protagoras, in Plato's *Protag*oras, describes Hesiod as a Sophist in disguise. Plato, *Protagoras,* trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato,* ed. Edith Hamilton and Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 316d. Socrates, in the *Republic*, states that Hesiod's stories are not appropriate for children. Plato, *Republic*, 377d. In the *Epinomis,* Hesiod's astronomy is criticized on the grounds that it is merely observational and does not make sufficient use of mathematics. Plato, *Epinomis*, trans, A.E. Taylor, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Edited by Edith Hamilton and Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 990a. Since Plato holds that true philosophy searches always for the unchanging order underlying the apparent chaos, Plato sees Hesiod's sort of view that emphasizes the inherent chaos in the cosmic organism as inherently unphilosophical. A word is required about the reference to the *Epinomis*. Although the *Epinomis* is generally believed to have been authored by one of Plato's disciples, not by Plato himself, it is believed to represent the "spirit" of Plato's

Plato's microcosmic doctrine is his view that mortal organisms are copies, although imperfect ones, of the cosmic organism.[60] Since an ordinary mortal organism, like a human being, is a *microcosm* of the whole cosmos, the structure of a mortal organism, like a human being, parallels that of the macrocosm. Just as the cosmos is a sphere that contains a "chaotic" mechanism at the imperfect earthly center, the human head is a sphere that contains a, so to speak, "chaotic" mechanism, the brain, at its imperfect center. However, although Plato acknowledges that the neural mechanism at the center of the head is important, he holds that the true final causes (*telos*) of human behavior are reflected at the *periphery* of the cosmos in the heavens, for the perfect mathematical motions in the heavens mirrors the perfect unchanging eternal Forms that are the true *ultimate* cause of all existence.[61]

In summary, Plato's *Timaeus* holds that the earth is at the center of a unique cosmic organism, in whose image human beings have been created, and whose nature and destiny has been ordained by eternal perfect unchanging causes. The night sky does not merely display physical bodies moving mindlessly in accord with blind mechanical laws.[62] Rather, it is the display of the radiant periphery of that perfect cosmic life, the image of our own better selves, from which we, mostly unknowingly, unless we achieve the required wisdom, draw our being and our destiny. Plato does not deny that the brain is involved in human behavior. What he denies is that it is the *control center* of human beings. The true "cause" of human behavior is not the machine between the ears, but is outside the human being, reflected in the celestial periphery of the cosmos, whose more perfect motions better reflect the perfection of the perfect eternal Forms. Plato does not, therefore, subscribe to cognitive science's "central state materialism." Indeed, the *Timaeus* makes clear that materialism cannot account for what takes place in the world.[63]

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views. See John Cooper, (ed.), *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 1617. Cooper goes on to say that the *Epinomis* gives a "selective and distorting emphasis" to various elements of Plato's view, such as its view that "wisdom is constituted solely by knowledge of astronomy," but the present paper only requires that astronomy is *an* element in Platonic wisdom, not that it is the "sole" repository of Platonic wisdom. See also Richard McDonough, "Plato: Organicism," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, § 2.a, http://www.iep.utm.edu/platoorg/.

60. McDonough, "Plato's Organicism," § 2.b; Carone, *Plato's Cosmology*, 30, 98, 161.

61. Allen Silverman, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2014), § 13, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-metaphysics.

62. Plato, *Epin*omis, 982e-983a. Recall the qualification about the *Epinomis* and its consilience with Plato's views in note 59 above.

63. Cairns, Huntington, Introduction to the *Charmides*. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): xxv. McDonough, "Plato's not to Blame."

The Cosmology of Cognitive Science

> It follows … that not all languages one knows are languages one has learned, and that at least one of the languages one knows without learning is as powerful as any language one can ever learn. I admit that these conclusions may really seem scandalous.
>
> Fodor, *The Language of Thought*[64]

The basic framework of modern cognitive science is implicit in Plato's cosmology and his associated microcosmic doctrine, which is not to say that Plato endorses anything remotely like modern materialist mechanistic cognitive science. Rather, the core framework of cognitive science is just one more of those many "footnotes to Plato". It is present in Plato's cosmology somewhat as the statue is present in the stone (where one must destroy the stone to get the statue). The present section shows, first, how the place for the cognitive science framework is prepared in Plato's views, and second, how the ancient microcosmic doctrine appears in one highly influential modern version of cognitive science, Fodor's "language of thought" doctrine.

The core cognitive science framework can be found in Plato's cosmological views by *excising* certain key parts of Plato's views. Recall, first, that Plato held that the cosmic organism is created by "uniting" the corporeal (material mechanical) sphere and the sphere of the cosmic organism "center to center" (a metaphorical way of saying that the material and the spiritual dimensions of the organism must work harmoniously together). Recall also that he holds that the center of the cosmic organism, the earth, is "chaotic," but this is consistent with the existence of some kind of mechanism there. Recall also that, given Plato's microcosmic doctrine, and his view that the brain is the seat of human intelligence, Plato also agrees that there is a mechanism of some kind at the neural center that underlies human intelligence. But he also holds that the mechanical causes operative at the neural center are profoundly *dependent* on the more basic causes at the cosmic periphery (which latter better reflect Plato's eternal final causes). Thus, if one eliminates Plato's final causes at the cosmic periphery, which are, in the 20th and 21st centuries, largely seen as metaphysical superstitions, one is left with the material mechanical causes at the cosmic center, and, via Plato's microcosmic doctrine, *one is left with the material mechanical causes at the neural center of the human microcosm*. That is, cognitive science's framework of the controlling central state neural machine is derived from Plato's cosmology by eliminating the final causes, which are the most fundamental causes for Plato, from both the cosmos and from the microcosm, the human being, modelled on it. This *truncated* picture of the human organism, stripped of the primary and most fundamental causes in Plato's cosmology and microcosmic doctrine, provides the

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64. Fodor, *The Language of Thought*, 82.

core model for cognitive science. One might put this somewhat bluntly, by saying that one obtains the core paradigm of modern mechanistic cognitive science by starting with Plato's view of the human microcosm and denuding it of everything that is of "ideal" or "spiritual" importance.

It is also useful to show how Plato's microcosmic doctrine appears in one of the seminal views in modern cognitive science, Fodor's "language of thought" doctrine.[65] Since Plato's microcosmic doctrine holds that mortal organisms are miniature copies of the cosmic organism, he holds that the human organism can think about the cosmos only if its brain imitates the motions of the heavens. It is true that, for Plato, the human brain, at the chaotic center, only imitates those heavenly motions imperfectly, but that explains why human beings do not think about the cosmos perfectly accurately. Plato holds that humans can only think about the cosmos at all *to the degree that* the motions in their brains imitate the motions of the divine bodies in the heavens.

A similar view, which, Fodor admits, might seem scandalous, is implicit in Fodor's "language of thought" doctrine, the view that a human being can only learn a natural language if they already possess an innate language that is more powerful than any natural language that they can ever learn (see epigraph above). First, Fodor here follows in the tradition of Plato's view in the *Meno* that a person is born in innate possession of all the knowledge that they can ever learn.[66]

The first thing that seems scandalous about Fodor's view is that it is supposed to explain how a humble human child, like newborn Carlos, can learn a natural language like Spanish. Fodor claims that Carlos can only learn Spanish because he already possesses an innate language, which he calls "Mentalese,"[67] that can express anything about the world that can be expressed in Spanish, *as well as anything that can be expressed by any natural language that Carlos can ever learn*. The view that Carlos can only learn a natural language like Spanish because he was born possessing an innate mental language that he never learned and that is more powerful that any natural language that he could ever learn is, putting it mildly, somewhat unsatisfying.

That is supposed to be an *explanation*? One would hope that the theory that is supposed to provide the explanation is less controversial that the humble fact that is purports to explain. In Fodor's "language of thought" doctrine, this is reversed. For his "language of thought" doctrine requires one to endorse an extravagant theory about an enormously powerful innate mental language invoked to "explain" how a humble child learns to say "*Sí mamá!*"

In fact, Fodor's "language of thought" doctrine implies the microcosmic doctrine. If one defines a "world" in terms of the set of all the possible facts that

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65. See Fodor, *The Language of Thought* and Fodor, *LOT* 2.

66. *Plato, Meno*, 86a. On Plato's view that knowledge is innate, see Richard McDonough, "Plato's Doctrine of Moral Education," in *Moral Perspectives and Moral Education,* ed. Chong Kim Chong. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1991: 63-83.

67. Fodor, *Psychosemantics*, 98, 107, 114-15.

might obtain in that world, then the "language of thought" doctrine requires that a person is born with an innate representation any possible facts in their world, and all of the possible relations of these facts to each other, that they could ever conceivably learn to express in language. That is, Fodor's "language of thought" doctrine requires that a normal linguistically competent human being is born with an innate "mentalese" representation of *their entire knowable world in all of its multifarious possibilities*. But that is nothing other than the view that a normal newborn child innately possesses a microcosmic representation of their entire knowable cosmos! It is, indeed, remarkable the way the ancient Greek paradigms keep reappearing in entirely new, sometimes initially unrecognizable forms.

The Cosmological Reading of *Zettel* (608)

> Philosophy … must remain cosmology, and cannot become theology.
> Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and as Representation*, vol. II[68]

It is clear that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* was influenced by Schopenhauer,[69] but Schopenhauer's influence remains in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, though in a more diffuse way. For Schopenhauer's view that all philosophy remains cosmology offers a key to understanding *Zettel* (para. 608), with the proviso that *Zettel* (para. 608) only *compares* the genesis of language and thought with the genesis of the ancient cosmos but does *not* offer any literal cosmological *theories* to that effect. The first subsection of the present section argues that Plato's cosmology bears a certain similarity, up to a point, with the cosmological imagery in *Zettel* (para. 608). The second briefly argues that, in another respect, the view in *Zettel* (para. 608) is, in a deep sense, Hesiodic rather than Platonic.[70] The third argues that there is also an important sense in which *Zettel* (para. 608) (and Wittgenstein's later philosophy generally) is profoundly Socratic rather than Platonic. In other words, the Platonic analogies explored in the previous section still hold up to a certain point, but a deeper analysis reveals that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is more profoundly Hesiodic and Socratic rather than Platonic *per se*.

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68. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and as Representation*, vol. II, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1966), 611-612.

69. Max Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970): 308, 311, 367, 372, 377-78; Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Penguin, 1991), 18-19, 137, 142-144, 428.

70. The key to understanding Wittgenstein's *Zettel (para. 608)* is to recognize that it is a profoundly Hesiodic passage.

The Platonic Cosmology and *Zettel* (608)

Plato can never be considered a biologist, or a founding father of neuroscience; [but] he writes about the intellectual powers of the head and brain in a number of his dialogues.

Wickens, *A History of the Brain; From Stone Age Surgery to Modern Neuroscience*[71]

It is shown in §V above that the place for the basic modern program of mechanistic cognitive science is prepared in Plato's archetypal cosmological views by eliminating the final causes that Plato himself holds are actually the most fundamental causes. This leaves the material mechanical causes at the "chaotic" (mechanical) earthly center of the cosmos. Since the human being is, on Plato's microcosmic view, modelled on the cosmos, where the brain at the center of the spherical head corresponds to the earth at the center of the spherical cosmos, this means that the control center of the human being is a material mechanism, stripped of final causation, at the center of the human head.

Although this view can, in this sense, be found in Plato's cosmology, Plato does not himself propose anything like a cognitive science: Indeed, his reasons for rejecting cognitive science offers a key insight into the new paradigm that Wittgenstein suggests in *Zettel* (para. 608). Recall from above that *Zettel* (para. 608) does not, as the neurological interpretation claims, hold that language and thought may arise from chaos at the neural center. Rather, *Zettel* (para. 608) implicitly distinguishes between the neural center and the new center for language and thought identified in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, namely, the "*Angelpunkt* [center-point] of our real need" in "ordinary life." Thus, the point in *Zettel* (para. 608) is that language and thought may arise from the very different kind of "chaos," the chaos of human activities, that one finds in that everyday earthly "center-point of our real need." Since the "center-point of our real need" in ordinary life is external to the organism, this means that Wittgenstein in *Zettel* (para. 608), like Plato, holds that language and thought arise from what goes on at the periphery of the *organism* (even though Plato and Wittgenstein disagree *greatly* on the specific nature of that periphery). However, despite major disagreements about the nature of the periphery, Plato's cosmology states the *archetypal* version of the view that the *primary* determination of human matters is at the *periphery* of the material mechanical organism - not at its material mechanical neural center.

Just as Copernicus, in astronomy, reassigned the old center, the earth, to the periphery, and the old periphery, the sun, to the new center, *Zettel* (para. 608) reassigns the old view of the cognitive center, the brain, to the periphery, and the old view of the cognitive periphery, the sphere of human activities, to the new center. That is, *Zettel* (para. 608) can be profitably seen as making a broadly

71. Andrew Wickens, *A History of the Brain; From Stone Age Surgery to Modern Neuroscience* (Oxford and New York: Psychology Press, 2014), 18.

"Copernican" move by suggesting that the human organism is, so to speak, *centered in the world of human activities*—not, as cognitive science holds, in its brain. But that is, roughly, what Heidegger means by saying that human being is "Being-in-the-world."[72] Thus, whereas Plato held that the true determinants of human life are found in the heavens, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, in their distinctively 20th century views, hold that human being is centered in the activities "in the world" towards which human beings comport themselves in ordinary life. Plato's views are more "metaphysical," while Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's are, so to speak, more "existential." Despite these significant differences, Plato paves the way for Wittgenstein's view in *Zettel* (para. 608) by producing a seminal ancient archetype that frees one from the idea that human intelligence is controlled by a material machine at the neural center. There is, however, one *momentous* difference between Plato's view and Wittgenstein's view in *Zettel* (para. 608).

Hesiod's Cosmology and *Zettel* (608)

> How could anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out or error? …
> The things of highest value cannot be derived from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, paltry world, this turmoil of delusion and lust. Rather from the lap of Being, the hidden god, the "thing-in-itself"—there must be their basis, …
> Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*[73]

Although there are certain similarities between Plato's and Wittgenstein's views about the peripheral function of the brain in human intelligence, there is one momentous difference between their views. Whereas Plato holds that, at the most fundamental level, the order in human life must be produced by a prior order (the *Demiurge* and the Forms that it uses as patterns), Hesiod holds that even the gods emerge out of the chaos.[74] Thus, there is, for Hesiod, no prior *Demiurge* looking to the Forms to shape the primal chaos into a cosmos. *Zettel* (para. 608), in this respect, revives the Hesiodic paradigm that has been embraced only by a tiny minority of thinkers in the Western tradition.[75] For it is, apparently,

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72. Heidegger, *Being and Time*: §'s 12-13. See note 37 above! The present author holds that Wittgenstein agrees, roughly, with Heidegger, that language is not a way that human beings, from inside the prison of their craniums, *represent* the world, but that language is a way human-beings dwell-in-a-world. Richard McDonough, "Heidegger's *Ereignis* and Wittgenstein on the Genesis of Language," *Open Journal of Philosophy* (2014): § 4.2

73. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), para. 1.

74. Lamberton, Introduction to *Hesiod*, 13.

75. Krell discusses the Hesiodic dimension of Heidegger. David Farrell Krell, Notes on Martin Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, vol. 2, in *Nietzsche,* vol. 1 & 2, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991). See McDonough, "Heidegger's *Ereignis*, § 5.

very difficult to conceptualize the Hesiodic idea that *order can arise in the world that is not produced by a prior order*. Jerry Fodor, to take one notable example, cannot understand it. For Fodor holds that the order in our public language *must* be the mere reflection of a prior order in the innate Mentalese mechanism in the head.

Bertrand Russell remarks that, "as philosophy [Plato's *Timaeus*] is unimportant" but, significantly, goes on to admit that its "account of creation as bringing order out of chaos is to be taken quite seriously."[76] The present argument is *not* that Plato's account of the creation of order out of chaos is true. The argument is that the Platonic view that order can only arises out of a prior order, and the Hesiodic view that order (and even the gods) can actually arise out of chaos, represent two fundamentally different archetypes for the human mind. In the West, the Platonic paradigm has dominated (even in non-Platonists). It remains, therefore, for rare thinkers like Nietzsche and Wittgenstein to revive this Hesiodic view that the order in the world arises out of "chaos" *without the involvement of any pre-existing ordering principles whatsoever*. Indeed, it is part of the importance of *Zettel* (para. 608) that it is a distinctive modern reincarnation, applied to language and thought, of the ancient Hesiodic view that order and meaning can arise, not from some prior order, not from some eternal God or eternal patterns, not some prior neural machine that has been "organized" by evolutionary processes, but from "chaos."

Bringing Philosophy (and Human Language) "down to earth"

> [We] in a sense, bring the question "What is [linguistic] meaning?" down to earth.
> Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*[77]

Although Wittgenstein in *Zettel* (para. 608) agrees with Plato's archetypal view that the brain is not the control center of the human organism, he does not agree with Plato's view that the true determinants of human existence lie at the divine celestial periphery of the cosmos. Rather, Wittgenstein's later philosophy brings philosophy, and, with it, language and thought, "down to earth." But this is the explicit reincarnation of Socrates' mission, as described by Cicero, to bring philosophy "down from the heavens to earth."[78] Just as Socrates was only interested in what goes on in people's lives, rather than at the heavenly periphery

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76. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 143.

77. Wittgenstein, *Blue and Brown Books, 1.*

78. A.E. Taylor, *Socrates* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1952), 138. See also Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein in the Midst of Life, Death, Sanity, Madness – and Mathematics," in Stanley Cavell on Aesthetic Understanding, ed. Gary Hagberg (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), § 5. See also Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein's Rejection of the Queer," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, (2020) [Forthcoming, Fall].

of the cosmos, Wittgenstein's later philosophy is similarly only interested in what people can do in their lives: "The form of expression we use [when we are doing philosophy] seems to have been designed for a god ... For us [mere humans], of course, these forms of expression are like pontifical which me may put on, but cannot do much with ...."[79] That is, whereas Plato and Wittgenstein agree that the brain is not the control center of the human organism, Plato's view invokes metaphysical and cosmological views that Wittgenstein cannot accept. Given Socrates' relative lack of interest in cosmology,[80] in favor of a focused interest in human affairs on the imperfect "dim vast vale of tears,"[81] the earth, Plato did not choose Socrates, but, rather, the 5th century Pythagorean, Timaeus, to present the cosmology in the *Timaeus*. Thus, despite an abstract similarity with Plato's views at a certain level, Wittgenstein's later philosophy has a profoundly Socratic dimension. Indeed, there is, perhaps, no greater insight into the spirit of Wittgenstein's later philosophy than it is infused by the ancient Greek virtue, central to Socrates' argument in the *Charmides*, of *sophrosyne*, which involves "accepting the bounds which excellence lays down for human nature," refusing all "excess," including, of course, metaphysical excess.[82] Similarly, Wittgenstein's later philosophy, respecting the *limits* of human existence, does not purport to plumb the metaphysical depths of the cosmos. This is why *Zettel* (para. 608) only *compares* the genesis of language to the genesis of the cosmos, but does not offer any *theories* to that effect. Since *Zettel* (para. 608) presents a picture of language and thought proportional to human abilities, the cosmological imagery in *Zettel* (para. 608) is, so to speak, "existential" rather than metaphysical.

Summary

> Let us bear well in mind that both the theme of our question – "philosophy" – as well as the way in which we ask "what is that …" are Greek in origin. We ourselves belong to this origin even when we do not mention the word "philosophy."
> Heidegger, *What is Philosophy?*[83]

In summary, there are three distinct ancient Greek archetypes at work in *Zettel* (para. 608), one Platonic, one Hesiodic, and one Socratic. First, although Plato's cosmology agrees that there is a neural machine in the cranium it disagrees with modern cognitive science that the ultimate causes, which for Plato are teleological rather than mechanical, are found in that neural control center in the head. Thus, Plato's cosmology provides the archetype of the sort of view that

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79. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para. *426.*
80. Plato, *Phaedo*, 97b-99d.
81. The expression is from Shelley's "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty."
82. *Huntington and Cairns, Introduction to Plato's Charmides, 99.*
83. Martin Heidegger, *What is Philosophy?* trans. Jean Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven: College and University Press, 1956), *39.*

frees one from the dominance of the modern cognitive science view that the neural machine at the center of the cranium controls the human organism. However, Wittgenstein's later philosophy cannot agree with Plato's *metaphysical* views about the final causes at the cosmic periphery and, therefore, cannot agree with Plato's views about the ultimate causes of events in the human microcosm as well. Rather, in keeping with the more modest views of 20th century philosophy, Wittgenstein's later philosophy holds that the human organism's language and thought is centered in the periphery of the organism, i.e., in the activities in Wittgenstein's "human all too human"[84] "forms of life,"[85] not the *Phaedo's* sublime eternal unchanging "Form of life."[86] Wittgenstein's later philosophy holds that it is not in the synapses of the brain that thought and meaning are at "home," but, *sozusagen*, in the activities of everyday human life.[87]

The second ancient Greek archetype needed to understand *Zettel* (para. 608) is Hesiod's view that the order of the cosmos arises not out of a prior order but rather out of "chaos." *Zettel* (para. 608) belongs with that rare set of thinkers in the West, such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, who hold that order, like the orders of language and thought, do *not* need to be the mere *repetition* of some pre-existing order but actually arise out of "chaos." In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, however, the "chaos" is not cosmic chaos but the chaos of human activities in the "*Angelpunkt* of our real need" (the everyday arena of human activities).

The third Greek archetype needed to appreciate *Zettel* (para. 608) is Socrates' mission to bring philosophy down from the cosmic periphery to earth that Wittgenstein *explicitly* endorses on the first page of his *Blue Book*.[88] Thus, the reference in *Zettel* (para. 608) to continuing further in the direction of the center is not a reference to continuing further toward the center of the brain, but is a *Socratic* call for the philosophies of language and mind to continue further in the direction of the relevant existential center of human life (the arena of human actions). The difference is only that whereas Socrates understood his task to bring every area of philosophy "down to earth," Wittgenstein's later philosophy undertakes this task specifically with regard to the philosophies of language and thought.

The claim is not that there are no major differences between Wittgenstein's later philosophy and these paradigms in ancient Greek philosophy. The point is rather that given all the enormous changes in philosophy between the time of the ancient Greeks and the advent of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy in the 20th century, changes required by the Renaissance, Descartes' subjectivist revolution,

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84. The expression is from Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human,* trans. R.J. Hollingwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

85. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 226

86. Plato, *Phaedo, 106d.*

87. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations, para. 118*

88. Wittgenstein, *Blue Book, 1*

the 18th century Enlightenment, the development of 20th century physics,[89] the ancient Greek philosophies and literature continue, as Nietzsche pointed out, to provide the *archetypes* of philosophic thought.

Trapped in a Paradigm

> The history of philosophy is the *lingua franca* which makes communication between philosopher's, at least of different points of view, possible. Philosophy without the history of philosophy, if not empty or blind is, at least, dumb.
>
> Wilfrid Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*[90]

It is worth asking how commentators have managed to read various kinds of extravagant neurophysiological *theories* into *Zettel* (para. 608) when it is quite clear that such interpretations *cannot* be the correct reading of a passage in the philosopher whose signature view is that one must not advance any kind of theory.[91] How can it be that virtually all scholars have managed to attribute such utterly un-Wittgensteinian views to a passage in Wittgenstein's later philosophy?

The answer is that, in a fashion made clear by Kuhn,[92] scholars tend to presuppose their own paradigm when evaluating opposing paradigms—which guarantees that the alternative paradigm must either look absurd or like a version of their own paradigm. Thus, since virtually everybody (except a few outliers like Heidegger and Wittgenstein) think they know that the brain is the control center of the human organism, then, when Wittgenstein asks why must "the *system* [of neural impulses] continue further in the direction of the center?" it is assumed that surely he must be asking why the system of neural impulses must continue further in the direction of the neural center. What alternative center could it be? And when *Zettel* (para. 608) goes on to ask why the order of language and thought cannot "proceed, so to speak, out of chaos?" surely it must be asking why this order cannot proceed out of chaos *in the brain*! What alternative chaos could it be? That is, when, following the Copernican analogy, *Zettel* (para. 608) attempts to replace the dominant cognitive science paradigm's view about the center of the linguistic microcosm, i.e., the neural center, with a new paradigm that identifies a new center, i.e., the existential "*Angelpunkt* of our real need" in "ordinary life," the established cognitive science paradigm can only see this as just as absurd as Copernicus' new paradigm seemed to the defenders of the entrenched Ptolemaic paradigm. Kuhn describes the "reasons" the Ptolemaic paradigm gave to reject the new Copernican paradigm,

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89. Whitehead, *Process*, 39.

90. Sellars, Wilfrid. *Science and Metaphysics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 1.

91. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations, para.* 109.

92. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, chap. 5.

> The earth is not part of the heavens; it is the platform from which we view the heavens. And the platform shares few or no significant characteristics with the celestial bodies seen from it. The heavenly bodies seem bright points of light, the earth an immense nonluminous sphere of mud and rock. Little change is observed in the heavens: … In contrast, the earth is the home of birth and change and destruction. … It seems absurd to make the earth like the heavenly bodies whose most prominent characteristic is that immutable regularity not to be achieved on the corruptible earth.[93]

That is, confronted with the new Copernican paradigm, defenders of the Ptolemaic paradigm simple *rehearse* their own paradigm, and feel justified in doing so, even though, to the Copernicans, they appear to be begging the question, because, for the defenders of the Ptolemaic paradigm, *their own paradigm determines what makes sense for them and what does not*. Similarly, since virtually everyone in the 20th-21st centuries thinks they know that the brain is the "platform" from which human beings view the world, it seems absurd to suggest that it is not the control center of the human organism. One can practically *see* that this is true (just as Ptolemy can see with his own eyes that the earth stands still while the heavens revolve around them). If one's brain is injured, one cannot think or speak properly, whereas an injury to one's hand or foot or stomach does not have the same devastating consequences for linguistic or cognitive ability. From cognitive scientists perspective, to deny that the brain is the control center of the human being seems as nonsensical as it seemed to be nonsensical to the defender of the Ptolemaic paradigm to deny that the earth is the center of the cosmos—but, for all that, the earth is *not* the center of the universe.

It should now be clear that the orthodox view that *Zettel* (para. 608) suggests some extravagant theory about neural processes is the result of reading it in the light of the very paradigm it is attacking. The present paper attempts to liberate one from this error, and show that *Zettel* (para. 608) is proposing Wittgenstein's own "Copernican Revolution" in the understanding of language and thought,[94] by taking the reader back to certain archetypes in ancient Greek philosophy and literature. For the framework for cognitive science did not, so to speak, "fall from heaven."[95] It was developed by the philosophers of ancient Greece and passed, in ever new forms, down through the ages. The present paper attempts to show that the archetypes for the alternatives to the materialistic mechanistic cognitive science paradigm, one version of which is developed by Wittgenstein in *Zettel*

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93. Thomas Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), 43.

94. McDonough, "Towards a non-mechanistic," 18-21; McDonough, "A Culturalist Account", 281-286; Richard McDonough, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Mechanistic Atomism," *Philosophical Investigations* 14, no. 3 (1991): 246-251.

95. The expression is from Heidegger, Martin. "The Question Concerning Technology." *The Question Concerning Technology* and other essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1982)

(para. 608), and Wittgenstein's later philosophy generally, were also developed in ancient Greek philosophy and literature.

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The Phenomenology of Proairesis in the Stoic Philosophy of Epictetus: 'Desire' and 'Aversion'

*By Franco Scalenghe**

If we agree that Proairesis, and not simply Reason, is the fundamental and sovereign faculty the man is naturally endowed with, it appears appropriate to identify the actions that this reality sets in motion. With regard to them, Epictetus calls 'deeds of proairesis' our desires and aversions, our impulses and repulsions, our assents and dissents. The present paper is devoted to a discussion of the phenomenology of desire and aversion only. It shows how the only four basic possible attitudes of human proairesis towards both proairetic and aproairetic things generate the corresponding kinds of desires and aversions.

Introduction

If we agree, as Epictetus[1] tells us, that the proairesis[2], is the fundamental and sovereign faculty the man is naturally endowed with, and the one that enables us: A) to operate the diairesis[3] between what is proairetic, i.e. what is in our exclusive power; and what is aproairetic, i.e. what is not in our exclusive power; B) to recognize the nature of things[4], and to make the proper use of impressions[5]; C) to

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1. Franco Scalenghe, "A new Italian and a new English translation of all the works of Epictetus" according to the Greek text edited by Oldfather, William Abbot: 'Epictetus. The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual and the Fragments' (London, Heinemann 1961). Unpublished translations available at www.epitteto.com.

2. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 17, 21); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book II, ch. 10, 1); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 13); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book IV, ch. 4, 23); Franco Scalenghe, 'Proairesis', 'Proairetic' and 'Aproairetic': Synopsis of All the Passages Containing these Terms in the 'Discourses' and the 'Manual' of Epictetus. *International Journal of Philosophy*, 3, no. 3(2015): 24-33. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20150303.11.

3. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book II, ch. 6, 24); Franco Scalenghe, "Epictetus: Diairesis and Contradiairesis" in 'Prometeus' Ano 7, Numero 15, Janeiro-Junho 2014, E-ISSN: 2176-5960; Epictetus "The Manual" 51, 1.

4. Franco Scalenghe, "'Nature' and the 'Nature of Things' in the Stoic Philosophy of Epictetus: A Synopsis," *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts 4, no 4(2017): 259-282*; Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 4, 18); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 11, 9-15); Epictetus "The Manual" 4; Epictetus "The Manual" 1.

5. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 1, 7); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 30, 4).

take a diairetic attitude[6], i.e. an attitude that is in harmony with the nature of things and therefore makes human life virtuous and happy; or a counterdiairetic attitude[7], i.e. an attitude in contrast with the nature of things and that therefore makes human life vicious and unhappy; then it seems appropriate to try to identify the actions that the reality of proairesis sets in motion.

With regard to this, Epictetus identifies three main fields of action of the proairesis, and calls 'deeds of proairesis'[8], the operations in which the man who intends to be virtuous and happy, has to train himself and achieve perfection. The 'first field' concerns our desires and aversions. The man must train himself in this field so as to obtain always what he desires and never stumble into what he averts[9]. The 'second field' has to do with our impulses and repulsions, i.e. with our rights and duties as simple animals and as social beings, so that we may act rationally and without negligence[10]. The 'third field' concerns our assents and dissents; so that we may avoid logic mistakes and randomness of judgment[11].

In the "Discourses" as collected by his pupil Arrian, Epictetus quotes many more deeds of proairesis, but according to him the cardinal ones are the six that have been just quoted: desire and aversion, impulse and repulsion, assent and dissent. Moreover, he explicitly tells us that, according to him, for man's life the order of importance of the three fields is the same in which they have just been listed[12]. Some more deeds of proairesis quoted by Epictetus are the following (this list is far from being a complete one and, for the sake of brevity, I quote here only the first appearance of each in the 'Discourses'): purpose[13], design[14], judgment[15], conception[16], preparation[17], proposition of assent[18]. The present paper is devoted to a presentation of the phenomenology of two proairetic deeds: 'desire' and 'aversion'.

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6. Franco Scalenghe, "The diairesis at work". Unpublished text. www.epitteto.com/Dialogue 3.html

7. Franco Scalenghe, "Gyges: Diairesis and Counterdiairesis, Good and Evil," Unpublished text. www.epitteto.com/Dialogue 5.html.

8. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 22, 10); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book II, ch. 1, 12).

9. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 1); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 3).

10. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 2); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 4).

11. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 2); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 5).

12. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 3); Epictetus "Discourses" (Book III, ch. 2, 4).

13. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 21, 2).

14. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 12, 8).

15. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 3, 1).

16. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 11, 33).

17. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 7, 28).

18. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 4, 11).

Human 'Desire' Is a Proairetic Deed

What is desire? 'Desire' is a movement of the soul of the virtuous man, a movement that incorporates the due reservation[19], that is directed towards the attainment of something that can be proairetic or aproairetic, and which is judged to be a good. In order to indicate this movement, Epictetus consistently uses the noun ὄρεξις (*òrexis*) and the verb ὀρέγομαι (*orégomai*). What is craving? 'Craving' is the name that the desire takes when the movement of the soul towards what *is not present* and that is judged to be a good, lacks the due reservation[20]. To crave for something is the typical attitude of the vicious man. In order to indicate the craving, Epictetus consistently uses the noun ἐπιθυμία (*epithumìa*) and the verb ἐπιθυμῶ (*epithumò*). What is passion? 'Passion' is the name that the desire takes when the movement of the soul towards what *is present* and is judged to be a good, lacks the due reservation[21], and the soul is unable to obtain it. In extreme cases, the soul reiterates its failed attempts to get the good, till it can attain a state of frenzy. To conceive a passion for something is the typical attitude of the vicious man. In order to indicate the passion, Epictetus consistently uses the noun πάθος (*pàthos*), calls ἀπάθεια (*apàtheia*) not the impossible state of a permanent and total absence of any passion, but the state of full control over the passions, and calls ἀπαθής (*apathés*) the virtuous man who is able to attain this state.

Phenomenology of the Desire for Aproairetic Things

Desire is the first of the six cardinal deeds of proairesis and is the opposite of aversion. As we have just said, its action takes place in the field of 'good and evil', of 'virtue and vice'. The desire is 'proairetic' and can be addressed both to what is aproairetic (for example a sum of money) and to what is proairetic (for example the peace of mind).

Now, according to Epictetus there are two kinds of possible ways of desiring something aproairetic. The first kind of desire is the desire of the man who operates the diairesis between aproairetic and proairetic things and therefore knows and respects the existence both of the nature of things and of his own proairesis[22]. This man is the 'Homo proaireticus'. The desire of this man is a desire

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19. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.
20. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.
21. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.
22. Franco Scalenghe, 'Proairesis', 'Proairetic' and 'Aproairetic': Synopsis of All the Passages Containing these Terms in the 'Discourses' and the 'Manual' of Epictetus. *International Journal of Philosophy* 3, no. 3(2015): 24-33. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20150303.11. Franco Scalenghe, "'Nature' and the 'Nature of Things' in the Stoic Philosophy of Epictetus: A Synopsis". *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts 4, no. 4(2017): 259-282.*

that incorporates a perfect knowledge of the natural difference between the proairetic and the aproairetic things and, as a consequence, incorporates unequivocally the following reservation[23]: 'I know that the fulfillment of my desire of an aproairetic thing is not in my exclusive power, and I shall blame nobody, not even myself, in case of failure, nor take it as something evil that has happened to me; and in case of success I shall never become elated[24] and never believe that something good has happened to me'[25]. The second kind of desire is the desire of the man who ignores or denies the existence of the nature of things and therefore of his own proairesis. Due to the fact that he does not operate the diairesis between aproairetic and proairetic things, we cannot say that the desire of this man is directed to something aproairetic or to something proairetic, because the ignorance or the denial of the existence of the nature of things means by definition ignorance or denial of both aproairetic and proairetic things. This man is the 'Homo sapiens', the one who is proud to call himself a man endowed with and a strict follower of 'Reason' in every circumstance[26]. The desire of this man is a desire that incorporates the following explicit or implicit assumption: 'I believe that the fulfillment of my desire is in my power. In case of failure I shall blame and curse other people or Nature, and take it as an evil that has happened to me; while in case of success I shall become elated and believe that something good has happened to me'[27].

Phenomenology of the Desire for Proairetic Things

There are also two kinds of possible ways of desiring something proairetic, and even in this regard the two men totally differ. The desire of the 'Homo proaireticus' who knows and respects the nature of things and his own proairesis cannot be but successful, because by the definition itself of the nature of things[28], proairetic things are the only ones that are in our exclusive power. But what happens to the 'Homo sapiens' who denies the existence of the nature of things? This man can well ignore or deny the existence of the nature of things and accordingly of his own proairesis, but he has no power at all to cancel the existence of the nature of things, and no power at all to cease to be a natural creature[29]. Thus, he constantly reveals himself unprepared to face the consequences of his own desires and finds himself continually in contradiction, because he pretends

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23. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.
24. Epictetus "The Manual" 6.
25. Epictetus "The Manual" 5.
26. Epictetus 'Fragments' XXVIIIa = Marcus Aurelius "Meditations" (Book XI, ch. 39).
27. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book II, ch. 22, 15-21).
28. Franco Scalenghe, "'Nature' and the 'Nature of Things' in the Stoic Philosophy of Epictetus: A Synopsis". *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts, 4, no. 4(2017): 259-282.*
29. Epictetus "The Manual" 4.

to be able to get what the nature of things absolutely forbids: i.e. that both aproairetic and proairetic things are in his power. And if he denies being able to fulfill his desire of something, he is again ignoring or denying the existence of the nature of things[30].

To sum the things up, due to the existence and to the inviolability of the nature of things, we can say that the man who desires something without the due reservation[31] cannot be certain to succeed and inevitably, sooner or later, he is doomed to fail. And even if he could once fulfill his desire he would become elated[32], drawing the false conclusion that he has power over what he has no power at all. Epictetus, therefore, advises the beginner in philosophy to refrain completely from desire, because he is not yet able to clearly understand the difference between proairetic and aproairetic things and consequently he ignores what, of what is in our exclusive power, is contrary to the nature of things[33].

Human 'Aversion' Is A Proairetic Deed

What is 'aversion'? 'Aversion', like desire, is a movement of the soul of the virtuous man, a movement that incorporates the due reservation[34], that is directed with hostility and repugnance against something that can be proairetic or aproairetic, and that is judged to be an evil. In order to indicate this aversion, Epictetus consistently uses the noun ἔκκλισις (*ékklisis*) and the verb ἐκκλίνω (*ekklìno*). What is fear? 'Fear', like 'craving', is the name that the aversion takes when the movement of the soul against something that *is not present* and that is judged to be an evil, lacks the due reservation[35]. Fear is a typical attitude of the vicious man; and the most common fear that the humans have, is the fear of death. In order to indicate the fear, Epictetus consistently uses the noun φόβος (*fòbos*) and the verb φοβούμαι (*fobùmai*), calls ἀφοβία (*afobìa*) not the impossible state of a permanent and total absence of any fear, but a state of full control over it, and calls ἄφοβος (*àfobos*) the virtuous man who is able to attain this state. What is grief? 'Grief', like 'passion', is the name that the aversion takes when the movement of the soul against what *is present* and is judged to be an evil, lacks the due reservation, and the soul is unable to get rid of it. In extreme cases, the soul reiterates its attempts to get rid of the evil but, being unsuccessful, it can attain a state of deep depression. In order to indicate the grief, Epictetus consistently uses the noun λύπη (*lùpe*) and the verb λυπῶ (*lupò*), calls ἀλυπία (*alupìa*) not the

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30. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 11, 9-15).
31. Epictetus "The Manual" 5.
32. Epictetus "The Manual" 6.
33. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.
34. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.
35. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.

impossible state of a permanent and total absence of any grief, but a state of full control over it, and calls ἄλυπος (*àlupos*) the virtuous man who is able to attain this state.

Phenomenology of the Aversion to Aproairetic Things

Aversion is the second of the six cardinal deeds of proairesis and is the opposite of desire. Like desire, aversion is 'proairetic' and can be directed both against what is aproairetic and against what is proairetic.

As in the case of desire, according to Epictetus there are also two kinds of possible ways of averting something aproairetic. The first kind of aversion is the aversion of the 'Homo proaireticus', i.e. the man who operates the diairesis between aproairetic and proairetic things and therefore knows and respects the existence of both the nature of things and his own proairesis[36]. The aversion of this man is an aversion that incorporates a perfect knowledge of the natural difference between the proairetic and the aproairetic things and, as a consequence, incorporates unequivocally the following reservation[37]: 'I know that the fulfillment of my aversion to an aproairetic thing (for example an illness) is not in my exclusive power, and I shall blame nobody, not even myself, in case of failure, nor take it as something evil that has happened to me; and in case of success (i.e.: if I recover from an illness) I shall never become elated[38] and never believe that something good has happened to me'[39]. This happens because, due to the inviolability of the nature of things, sooner or later, he who averts an aproairetic thing is bound to run into what he averts. Epictetus, therefore, advises repeatedly the beginner in philosophy to never avert something aproairetic and to limit himself only to avert what, of what is proairetic, he knows well, has so far practiced and is against the nature of things: for example, anger, disdain, envy and pity[40].

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36. Franco Scalenghe, 'Proairesis', 'Proairetic' and 'Aproairetic': Synopsis of All the Passages Containing these Terms in the 'Discourses' and the 'Manual' of Epictetus. *International Journal of Philosophy*, 3, no. 3(2015): 24-33. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20150303.11. Franco Scalenghe, "'Nature' and the 'Nature of Things' in the Stoic Philosophy of Epictetus: A Synopsis.". *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts*, 4, no 4(2017): 259-282.

37. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.

38. Epictetus "The Manual" 6.

39. Epictetus "The Manual" 5.

40. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.

Phenomenology of the Aversion to Proairetic Things

There are also two kinds of possible ways of averting something proairetic, and even in this regard the two men totally differ.

The aversion of the 'Homo proaireticus' who knows and respects the nature of things and his own proairesis cannot be but successful, because by the definition itself of the nature of things[41], proairetic things are the only ones that are in our exclusive power.

But what happens to the 'Homo sapiens', the one who denies the existence of the nature of things? This man is proud to call himself a man endowed with and a strict follower of 'Reason' in every circumstance[42]. As we have already said, he ignores or denies the existence of the nature of things and therefore of his own proairesis. Due to the fact that he does not operate the diairesis between aproairetic and proairetic things, also in this case we cannot say that the aversion of this man is directed to something aproairetic or to something proairetic, because the ignorance or the denial of the existence of the nature of things means by definition ignorance or denial of both aproairetic and proairetic things. The aversion of this man is an aversion that incorporates the following explicit or implicit assumption: 'I believe that the fulfillment of my aversion is in my power. In case of failure I shall blame and curse other people or Nature, and take it as an evil that has happened to me; while in case of success I shall become elated and believe that something good has happened to me'[43]. This man can well ignore or deny the existence of the nature of things and accordingly of his own proairesis, but he has no power at all to cancel the existence of the nature of things, as he has no power at all to cease to be a natural creature[44]. Thus, he constantly reveals himself unprepared to face the consequences of his own aversions, and so finds himself continually in contradiction, because he pretends to be able to get what the nature of things absolutely forbids: i.e. that both aproairetic and proairetic things be in his exclusive power. And if he denies to be able to fulfill his aversion to something, he is again ignoring or denying the existence of the nature of things[45]. As it is evident, this happens because the man who averts something without the due reservation[46] cannot be certain to succeed and inevitably, sooner or later, he is doomed to stumble in what he averts. And even if he could once fulfill his aversion, he would become elated[47], drawing the false conclusion that he has power over what he has no power at all. Epictetus, therefore, is right in

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41. Franco Scalenghe, "'Nature' and the 'Nature of Things' in the Stoic Philosophy of Epictetus: A Synopsis". *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts*, 4, no. 4(2017): 259-282.

42. Epictetus 'Fragments' XXVIIIa = Marcus Aurelius "Meditations" (Book XI, ch. 39).

43. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book II, ch. 22, 15-21).

44. Epictetus "The Manual" 4.

45. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book I, ch. 11, 9-15).

46. Epictetus "The Manual" 5.

47. Epictetus "The Manual" 6.

advising the beginner in philosophy to completely remove his aversion to all aproairetic things and, among the proairetic things, to avert only what is not in accord with the nature of things[48].

Three Remarks

As a conclusion, at this point it appears useful to add three considerations. The first is that the difference between desire, craving and passion is not a difference of intensity or of nature, but simply of the presence, in the desire, of the due reservation; and of the absence, in crave and in passion, of the due reservation. The same is true for the difference between aversion, that incorporates the due reservation; and fear and affliction, which are aversions lacking the due reservation. The second consideration is that although desire and aversion, at first sight, might seem two distinct deeds; actually, they are one and the same proairetic deed, simply seen from two opposing points of view. Indeed, the desire of something automatically means the aversion to its opposite. The desire (a proairetic thing) of good health (an aproairetic thing) means aversion (a proairetic thing) of illness (an aproairetic thing). The desire of serenity (a proairetic thing) automatically means aversion to disconcertment (also a proairetic thing)[49]. The third and most important consideration, (and this is the brilliant contribution of Epictetus to Stoicism) is that the desire and the aversion of the 'Homo proaireticus' are always proairetic deeds, while the objects of his desire and aversion can be both proairetic things (such as anger and envy) or aproairetic things (like money and health). This, unfortunately, is not true of the 'Homo sapiens', who is unable to add the due reservation to any of his soul's movements.

The Guiding Principle of the Synopsis

The present synopsis is divided in two sections. The first section is an analytic synopsis that collects the quotations of all the different grammatical forms (i.e. noun, adjective, adverb, verb, etc.) of the terms 'desire' and 'aversion' as they appear in the first and second book of the Discourses' of Epictetus. This choice has been dictated by the fact that an analytic synopsis of these two terms in all the works of Epictetus would have taken a larger space than the one reasonable in a research paper, while it would have added nothing to what already emerges very clearly from the quotations of the first two books.

If not otherwise stated, all the English translations of Epictetus quoted in this paper are taken from a new English translation of all Epictetus, that I have found

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48. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.
49. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book IV, ch. 4, 1-5).

especially useful, because its distinctive feature is the fact of having being strictly based upon the analysis of the "Index Verborum" included in H. Schenkl's critical edition of Epictetus[50]. This means that the translator has been very scrupulous in giving to each word of the Greek text, one or the least possible number of meanings consistent with the different contexts in which they appear, and so has been able to keep in the English translation essentially the number of occurrences that each word has in the Greek text. In this first synopsis, all the fragments are labeled with the notation P^2DA (Proairetic Desire and Aversion) followed by a serial number (P^2DA1, P^2DA2, etc.) The reason for the choice of this notation, that has already been used[51] in order to label as P^2 anything that is 'proairetic', is the discovery, as has been shown analytically in a paper recently published[52], that it is possible to formally treat the human proairesis as a natural exponential function written in complex numbers. In particular, if one analyzes its arithmetic and its geometry, one finds that the proairesis can be understood and treated as a negative real number which is the one and the same fourth grade power (P^4) of four different complex numbers (for example $p_1= 1+i$, $p_2= -1+i$, $p_3= -1-i$, $p_4= 1-i$). Moreover, it turns out that if one squares each of these four complex numbers, one gets a couple of imaginary numbers that differ only for their sign: in this case $+2i$, $-2i$. If we consider that desire and aversion are proairetic deeds and that they can be actually treated as the same deed simply seen from two opposite points of view, exactly as 4 is the square of both +2 and -2, I believe that we are entitled to continue the use of the notation (P^2) in order to label everything that is 'proairetic'.

The second section contains a synthetic summary of the total occurrences not only of the terms 'Desire' and 'Aversion', but also of the terms 'Craving', 'Passion', 'Fear' and 'Grief', that have been discovered and shown to be so strictly connected to the previous ones.

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50. Franco Scalenghe, "A new Italian and a new English translation of all the works of Epictetus" according to the Greek text edited by Oldfather, William Abbot: 'Epictetus. The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual and the Fragments'. London, Heinemann 1961. Unpublished translations available at www.epitteto.com

51. Franco Scalenghe, 'Proairesis', 'Proairetic' and 'Aproairetic': Synopsis of All the Passages Containing these Terms in the 'Discourses' and the 'Manual' of Epictetus. *International Journal of Philosophy*, 3, no. 3(2015): 24-33. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20150303.11

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The Analytic Synopsis

(P²DA1) - I gave you a certain particularity of yours: the faculty […] of **desiring** and **averting**; a faculty, in short, able to use impressions.
'Discourses' I,1,12

(P²DA2) - This is […] to have arranged an unhampered **desire** and an unstumbling **aversion**.
'Discourses' I,1,31

(P²DA3) - Having learned from the philosophers that **desire** is towards good things and **aversion** is towards evil things, […] he <who profits> gets an unfailing **desire** and an unstumbling **aversion** <if> he has fully removed **desire** from himself or has deferred it, and uses **aversion** only towards what is proairetic.
'Discourses' I,4,1

(P²DA4) - For if he **averts** something aproairetic, he knows that some time he will stumble on it in spite of his **aversion**.
'Discourses' I,4,2

(P²DA5) - And where is your work? In **desire** and **aversion**, that you may be unfailing in **desire** and unstumbling in **aversion**. […] If you seek to have an unstumbling **aversion** while trembling and mourning, how do you profit?
'Discourses' I,4,11-12

(P²DA6) - Slave! I don't seek that, but how […] you **desire** and **avert** […]: if in harmony with the nature of things or not in harmony with it.
'Discourses' I,4,14

(P²DA7) - Come on, is it otherwise in the topic of **desire** […]? What can overcome […] a **desire** and an **aversion** except another **desire** and another **aversion**?
'Discourses' I,17,24

(P²DA8) - <If > it is unmanageable to determine one thing useful and yet to **desire** another, […] why are we any longer embittered against the multitude?
'Discourses' I,18,2

(P²DA9) - Can you <the tyrant> secure me an unhampered **desire**? […] An unstumbling **aversion**? Do you have it?
'Discourses' I,19,2

(P²DA10) - Who ever sacrificed for having **desired** as a virtuous man?
'Discourses' I,19,25

(P²DA11) - I am content if I **desire** and **avert** in accord with the nature of things.
'Discourses' I,21,2

(P²DA12) - To **desire** something with a shameful crave makes no difference to us, if only we hit the mark in the aproairetic things.
'Discourses' II,1,10

(P²DA13) - For if one transposes his caution there where proairesis and the deeds of proairesis are, […] he will also have his **aversion** in his exclusive power. If, on the contrary, he transposes his caution there where lies what is not in our

exclusive power and is aproairetic, having his **aversion** turned to things that are in power of other people he will necessarily fear.

'Discourses' II,1,12

(P²DA14) - Show me […] how you stand towards **desire** and **aversion**; if you do not fail in what you want, if you do not stumble on what you do not want.

'Discourses' II,1,31

(P²DA15) - "See how I do not fail in my **desire**. See how, in my **aversion**, I do not stumble on what I **avert**".

'Discourses' II,1,35

(P²DA16) - Appear to know only this: how you never fail in your **desire** nor stumble on what you **avert**.

'Discourses' II,1,37

(P²DA17) - Who will constrain you to **desire** what does not seem to you to be **desirable**, and to **avert** what it does not appear to you that should be **averted**? But someone will perform against you things that seem to be frightful. And how can he also make you to experience them with **aversion**? When, then, it's in your exclusive power to **desire** and to **avert**, what do you turn anymore your mind towards?

'Discourses' II,2,4-6

(P²DA18) - He <is lord> who has power over any of the things that you are eager for or that you **avert**.

'Discourses' II,2,26

(P²DA19) - We ought to come to them <the seers> apart from **desire** and from **aversion**, just as the traveller tries to know […] which one of two roads brings forth to his destination, without **desiring** that the road <be> the right or the left one.

'Discourses' II,7,10

(P²DA20) - I'll show you the sinews of a philosopher: […] an unfailing **desire**, an unstumbling **aversion**.

'Discourses' II,8,29

(P²DA21) - What is the profession of a citizen? To […] deliberate […] like the hand or the foot, which, if they […] understood the structure of nature, would never […] **desire** otherwise than by referring to the whole.

'Discourses' II,10,4

(P²DA22) - Yet he does not […] seal up a bond with his seal amiss or write a guarantee amiss, and nevertheless he uses **desire** and **aversion** apart from any lawyer.

'Discourses' II,13,7

(P²DA23) - When, then, you see someone who turns pale, as the physician looking at someone's complexion says: "This fellow's spleen is affected; and this fellow's liver is"; so, you also say: "This fellow's **desire** and **aversion** are affected".

'Discourses' II,13,12

(P²DA24) - And from this ensues […] not to fail in **desire** and, in **aversion**, not to stumble on what is **averted**; […] while keeping with the mates the relationships - both natural and acquired- of son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife.
'Discourses' II,14,8

(P²DA25) - But if you say to someone: "Your **desires** are inflamed, your **aversions** are those of a slave-minded fellow, […] your conceptions are rash and false"; straightaway he goes out and says: "He outraged me!"
'Discourses' II,14,22

(P²DA26) - When you dispose and **desire** along with him <Zeus>, why do you still fear to fail? Give graciously your **desire** and your **aversion** to poverty in money and to money's wealth: you will fail, you will stumble on what you **avert**.
'Discourses' II,17,23-24

(P²DA27) - And then […] you return again to the same things. You **desire** in the same way, you **avert** in the same way.
'Discourses' II,17,36

(P²DA28) - You sir, your program was to fashion yourself able to use the impressions that befall you in a way which is in accord with the nature of things: unfailing in **desire**, unstumbling in **aversion**.
'Discourses' II,23,42

(P²DA29) - But if he < who listens> lies nearby like a stone or fodder, how can he move such **desire** <to speak> in a man?
'Discourses' II,24,16

(P²DA30) - The person unaware of who he is […] and who will neither **desire**, nor **avert** […] in accord with the nature of things; on the whole this person […] is nobody.
'Discourses' II,24,19

(P²DA31) - Three are the topics in which the man who will be virtuous must train himself: that which deals with **desires** and **aversions**, that he may not fail in his **desire** and, when he **averts**, that he may not stumble on what he **averts**.

The Synthetic Synopsis

Synthetic summary of the occurrence of the terms Desire, Craving, Passion, Aversion, Fear, Grief in the works of Epictetus

DESIRE
Total occurrences of the term 'Desire' - ὄρεξις - (noun + verbal forms) in Epictetus
118
I,1,12 - I,1,31 - I,4,1 - I,4,11-12 - I,4,14 - I,17,24 - I,18,2 - I,19,2 - I,19,25 - I,21,2 - II,1,10 - II,1,31 - I,1,35 - II,1,37 - II,2,4-6 - II,7,10 - II,8,29 - II,10,4 - II,13,7 - II,13,12 - II,14,22 - II,17,23-24 - II,17,36 - II,23,42 - II,24,16 - II,24,19 - III,2,1 - III,2,3 - III,3,2 - III,6,6 - III,7,26 - III,7,34 - III,9,18 - III,9,22 - III,12,4-8 - III,12,13 - III,12,16 - III,13,21 - III,14,10

- III,18,2 - III,21,23 - III,22,13 - III,22,31 - III,22,36 - III,22,43 - III,22,48 - III,22,61 - III,22,104 - III,23,9 - III,23,12 - III,24,54 - III,24,56 - III,26,13-14 - IV,1,1 - IV,1,4-5 - IV,1,27 - IV,1,74-77 - IV,1,81 - IV,1,84 - IV,1,89 - IV,4,6 - IV,4,16 - IV,4,18 - IV,4,28 - IV,4,33 - IV,4,35 - IV,5,27 - IV,6,18 - IV,6,2 - IV,8,20 - IV,10,4-6 - IV,11,6 - IV,11,26 - 'Manual' 1,1 - 'Manual' 2,1-2 - 'Manual' 14,1 - 'Manual' 15 -'Manual' 29,6 - 'Manual' 31,4 - 'Manual' 32,2 - 'Manual' 48,3

AVERSION

Total occurrences of the term 'Aversion' - ἔκκλισις - (noun + verbal forms) in Epictetus **114**

I,1,12 - I,1,31 - I,4,1 - I,4,2 - I,4,11-12 - I,4,14 - I,17,24 - I,19,2 - I,21,2 - II,1,12 - II,1,31 - II,1,35 - II,1,37 - II,2,4-6 - II,2,26 - II,7,10 - II,8,29 - II,13,7 - II,13,12 - II,14,8 - II,14,22 - II,17,23-24 - II,17,36 - II,23,42 - II,24,19 - III,2,1 - III,2,3 - III,3,2 - III,6,6 - III,7,26 - III,7,34 - III,12,4-8 - III,12,13 - III,12,16 - III,14,10 - III,22,13 - III,22,31 - III,22,36 - III,22,43 - III,22,48 - III,22,61 - III,22,104 - III,23,9 - III,23,12 - III,24,54 - III,24,56 - III,26,13-14 - IV,1,1 - IV,1,4-5 - IV,1,81 - IV,4,6 - IV,4,16 - IV,4,18 - IV,4,28 - IV,4,33 - IV,4,37 - IV,5,27 - IV,6,18 - IV,6,26 - IV,8,20 - V,10,4-6 - IV,11,6 - IV,11,26- 'Manual' 1,1- 'Manual' 2,1-2- 'Manual' 31,4- 'Manual' 32,2- 'Manual' 48,3

CRAVING

Total occurrences of the term 'Craving' - ἐπιθυμία - (noun + verbal forms) in Epictetus **46**

I,6,24 - I,9,26 - I,19,29 - II,1,10 - II,16,45 - II,18,8-9 - II,18,19 - II,19,24 - II,19,27 - II,24,1 - III,5,9 - III,9,3 - III,9,6 - III,9,21-22 - III,11,2 - III,15,7 - III,15,11 - III,19,5 - III,24,112 - IV,1,23 - IV,1,33 - IV,1,84 - IV,1,170 - IV,1,174-175 - IV,4,1-2 - IV,4,21 - IV,6,36 - IV,7,28 - IV,9,3 - IV,9,5 - IV,11,19 - IV,13,22 - 'Manual' 21- 'Manual' 22- 'Manual' 29,3

FEAR

Total occurrences of the term 'Fear' - φόβος - (noun + verbal forms) in Epictetus **100**

I,5,4 - I,9,6 - I,9,8 - I,9,26 - I,17,25 - I,23,4 - I,24,13 - I,25,1 - I,25,25 - I,27,10 - I,29,8 - I,29,12 - I,29,61-62 - II,1,8-9 - II,1,11-14 - II,1,21 - II,1,24 - II,5,12 - II,5,17 - II,7,9 - II,8,15 - II,8,24 - II,10,18 - II,13,5 - II,13,9 - II,14,8 - II,16,11-12 - II,16,19 - II,16,45 - II,17,23 - II,17,29 - II,18,30 - II,22,6 - II,23,30 - II,23,33 - III,2,3 - II,10,13 - III,10,17 - II,18,7 - III,22,16 - II,22,25 - III,22,48-49 - II,22,61 - III,22,106 - II,24,112 - III,24,116-117 - II,26,21 - III,26,23 - II,26,27 - III,26,38 - IV,1,4-5 - IV,1,10 - IV,1,23 - IV,1,48 - IV,1,60 - IV,1,81-85 - IV,1,114 - IV,2,7 - IV,4,19-20 - IV,5,27 - IV,6,16 - IV,4,7 - IV,9,5 - IV,10,5 - IV,10,22 - 'Manual' 12,1- 'Manual' 35

PASSION

Total occurrences of the term 'Passion' - πάθος - (noun only) in Epictetus **10**

I,4,26 - I,27,10 - II,9,20 - II,18,11 - III,1,8 - III,2,3 - IV,1,57 - IV,1,115 - IV,8,28

GRIEF

Total occurrences of the term 'Grief' - λύπη - (noun + verbal forms) in Epictetus **33**

I,2,21 - I,9,7 - I,23,4 - II,1,24 - II,12,7-8 - II,14,8 - II,16,45 - II,18,14 - II,22,6 - III,2,16 - III,8,3 - III,11,2 - III,13,11 - III,22,61 - III,24,23 - III,24,43 - III,24,72 - III,24,81-82 - III,24,90 - IV,1,4-5 - IV,1,84 - IV,3,7 - IV,4,32 - IV,6,8 - IV,12,20 - 'Manual' 5 - 'Manual' 12,1

There are only Four Basic Attitudes of the Human Proairesis with Regard to Desire and Aversion

Since it is empirically true that any man judges good to get what he desires, and judges bad to run into what he averts, the 'virtuousness' or the 'viciousness' of any man is strictly correlated with the 'diairetic' or 'counterdiairetic' attitude of his proairesis[53]. This means that the only virtuous man is the man whose proairesis respects its nature, who recognizes the 'nature of things' and treats accordingly what is 'proairetic', led by the judgment that the outcome of the operation is in his exclusive power, and thus obtains what he wants; and interacts with what is 'aproairetic', led by the judgment that the outcome of the operation is not in his exclusive power, and therefore with the due reservation, so as not to run into self-failure and distress[54]. It is evident that, on the contrary, the man who does not use the diairesis and doesn't apply the due reservations to his desires and aversions, will be a vicious and unhappy fellow, because he is treating what is 'proairetic' as if it were not in his exclusive power, and what is 'aproairetic' as if it were instead in his exclusive power.

Now, if we assume as reasonably proven that the human proairesis (P^4) can be considered and treated as a natural exponential function whose arithmetic and geometry are written in complex numbers[55], we can easily deduce that the proairesis can take only four basic attitudes. And remembering that the nature of things tells us that all the existing things divide themselves into proairetic and aproairetic ones[56], the only four basic possible attitudes of our proairesis can be obtained in the following way.

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53. Franco Scalenghe, "The diairesis at work". Unpublished text. www.epitteto.com/Dialogue 3.html; Franco Scalenghe, "Gyges: Diairesis and Counterdiairesis, Good and Evil". Unpublished text. www.epitteto.com/Dialogue 5.html

54. Epictetus "The Manual" 6; Epictetus "The Manual" 5.

55. F. Scalenghe, "About the Arithmetic and the Geometry of Human Proairesis and the Natural Asymmetry by Which Unhappiness Wins the Game against Happiness 3 to 1". *International Journal of Philosophy*, 3, no. 6(2015): 72-82. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20150306.14

56. Franco Scalenghe, "'Nature' and the 'Nature of Things' in the Stoic Philosophy of Epictetus: A Synopsis". *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts, 4, no. 4(2017): 259-282.*

Let us give to the attitude 'proairetic things are in my exclusive power' the value +1, and to the attitude 'proairetic things are not in my exclusive power' the value -1; and to the attitude 'aproairetic things are in my exclusive power' the value +i, and to the attitude 'aproairetic things are not in my exclusive power' the value -i. It logically follows that the first attitude (p₁ = +1+i) is the one that can be called 'exaltation'; the second (p₂ = -1+i) is the one that can be called 'foolishness'; the third, that is (p₃ = -1-i) the one that can be called 'depression' and the fourth and last (p₄ = +1-i) the one that can be called 'wisdom'. Moreover because, according to this model, proairesis can be seen as a negative real number which is the one and the same fourth grade power of four different complex numbers (in the present case P⁴ = - 4 = p₁⁴ = p₂⁴ = p₃⁴ = p₄⁴), we can postulate that all these four attitudes are continuously available to the proairesis and that the transition from one attitude to another one is possible via a simple proairetic operation that in mathematical language consists, for example, in the multiplication of p₁ (or p₂ or p₃ or p₄) by the imaginary unit i. In fact if we multiply p₁ by i we obtain p₂ (+1+i) x i = (-1+i); if we multiply p₂ by i we obtain p₃ (-1+i) x i = (-1-i); if we multiply p₃ by i we obtain p₄ (-1-i) x i = (+1-i); and if we multiply p₄ by i we are again back to p₁ (+1-i) x i = (+1+i). Now, what happens to the desires and aversions in these four different proairetic attitudes?

The 'exalted' (+1+i) man is the man convinced that everything is in his exclusive power and, in Epictetus' terms, that both proairetic and aproairetic things are in his exclusive power. Therefore, he hurls himself without the due reservation[57] into the desire of both what is proairetic and of what is aproairetic, ignoring or denying the existence of the nature of things and applying no diairesis at all[58].

The 'foolish' (-1+i) man operates the diairesis and recognizes the distinction between what is proairetic and what is aproairetic but he strongly believes to have power only over aproairetic things and concentrates all his desires and aversions over them. He desires money and averts the lack of money, while judging to have no power at all to modify the attitude of his own proairesis. And if one tries to draw his attention upon the contradiction that he is trapped in, he justifies himself by saying that all men do what he does, and that it is a good thing to behave as the majority of men behave.

The 'depressed' (-1-i) man is disconsolately convinced that nothing is in his power. Like the exalted man, he also does not recognize the existence of the nature of things nor operates the diairesis between what is proairetic and what is aproairetic. His usual occupation is to think while standing still, and staring at the insurmountable wall that he sees in front of him. He is the man who desires to never desire and who always averts to avert.

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57. Epictetus "The Manual" 2.

58. Franco Scalenghe, "Epictetus: Diairesis and Contradiairesis" in '*Prometeus*' 7, no. 15 (Janeiro-Junho 2014). E-ISSN: 2176-5960

Finally, the 'wise' (+1-*i*) man is the only one of the four who, through the constant and correct use of the diairesis between what is proairetic and what is aproairetic opens himself without fear nor elation to a full interaction with the universe in its complexity; who lives well, and, as Marcus Aurelius tells us[59], shines of the light with which he sees the truth of the nature of things and the truth that is in himself[60].

Conclusion. The Words of Epictetus

Let now Epictetus to draw some conclusion for us: "Remember that it is not only the craving for offices and money's wealth that make people slave-minded and subordinated to others, but also the craving for quiet, for leisure, for setting off, for scholarship. In short whatever is the external object, its price subordinates you to another. Which difference does it make to crave for being a Senator or not being a Senator? Which difference does it make to crave for an office or for not having it? Which difference does it make to say 'I fare badly, I have nothing to do but am tied down to books like a corpse', or say 'I fare badly, I have not enough leisure to read'? For, as salutations and offices are external and aproairetic objects, so is also a book. Why do you want to read? Tell me. If you turn to reading because your soul is won by it or in order to learn something, you are a cold and slothful fellow. If you refer reading to what it ought to be referred, what else is this but serenity? And if reading does not secure you serenity, of which avail is it to you? -It secures me serenity, one says, and for this reason I am vexed when I must leave reading behind- And which serenity is this, that a chance comer can hinder, I don't say Caesar or a friend of Caesar but a crow, a flute-player, a fever and thirty thousand other things? Serenity cleaves to nothing so strongly as to continuity and freedom from hindrance[61]".

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61. Epictetus "Discourses" (Book IV, ch. 4, 1-5).

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Memory, Place and Pain in W.G. Sebald's
The Emigrants

By Kobi (Yaaqov) Assoulin[*]

When we discuss the concept of place, we mostly do so geographically, or as a metaphor. That is, by representing what we think about by geographical notions. This paper avoids this literary tendency by discussing directly the role of actual place in W.G. Sebald's The Emigrants. Not only that, While still acknowledging melancholy's main role in the novel, and the way in which it is discussed in Freud and through Freud et al, the paper takes this melancholy to be a phenomenological spring board for explicating the centrality of place within The Emigrants's melancholy. In order to do this, the paper discusses the role of place within major phenomenological thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and the way their discussion dissolves the classical dichotomy of subject/object. However, as this dichotomy is dissolved, it becomes clearer as to the way places do not only belong to human-beings – simultaneously, humans belong to places. Through explicating this, we come to understand in The Emigrants what makes it such a tragic story. While the emigrants find their home to be rooted in places and memories of places, these places carry at the same time a mood of being-at-home and alongside that, a sense of ruins which haunt. Thus they become trapped between the conflicting urges of running toward and running from these memories. A dilemma that is finally solved only, in the novel, through death.

Introduction

In *The Emigrants,*[1] Sebald presents the story of four emigrants, all of whom are Jews or crypto-Jews, all of them old, born and raised in Europe, and all "forced" to leave Europe due to war, pogroms and antisemitism. Thus, we find the retired Dr. Henry Selwyn, born in the end of the 19th century, now living in a shattered house in England. As he grows older, he becomes increasingly homesick for the place where he was born and lived in until the age of seven. Paul Bereyter is an old teacher who was forced to leave his position and home village due to the Nuremberg Laws, as he is one-quarter of a Jew. We then have Ambrose Adelwarth, who in 1910, at the age of 14, leaves Germany to America to only to begin a life of wandering, leading up to his depression and solitary confinement. Finally, there is Max Ferber, an old painter who as a

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1. W.G. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, trans. Hulse Michael (London: Harvill, 1996).

child was sent away to England by his parents, who later on perished in the Holocaust.[2]

The Emigrants has been interpreted many times via discussing the melancholy that envelops the main characters. While not disregarding this tendency, I would like to take this psychological situation and provide it with a phenomenological point of view, or rather, to express it within the phenomenological language: to take it from the ontic level to the existential-ontological level.

When reading Sebald's books one cannot ignore the way *journey* is a main motif. Sebald's heroes, as well as the narrator himself, wander constantly from one place to another. However, 'place' and 'journey' are not just metaphors, their function in Sebald's oeuvre, and *The Emigrants* especially, is to express the firm connection between place, thought and memory. It is a journey from the 'here' and 'now' to the 'there' and then'; from being -"*at-home'* to being "*not-at-home"*. It is a back and forth journey, performed through a constant, even obsessive, act of remembering. In *The Emigrants*, This pendulum movement of allegedly-forgetting and remembering again forces the protagonists, over and over again, to hide and disclose their world and authenticity all up to a final moment of decision that is comprised of death, mentally at the beginning and finally physically. Thus, there is Dr. Selwyn, who "had been beset in homesickness"[3] up to committing suicide with his hunting rifle; And Bereyter, who constantly visits his home-village only to return and "be in the gloomiest of spirit"[4] and finally committing suicide. Symbolically, he does this as he lies in front of a train, thereby finally and willingly identifying himself as a Jew. We also have Adelwarth, who suffers up to the point where he commits himself to a sanitarium, that way "longing for extinction as total and irreversible as possible of his capacity to think and remember".[5] And finally Ferber, who attests to the fact that "beyond a certain point, pain blots the one thing that is essential to its being experienced –consciousness " and thus finds his peace ends when he is hospitalized up to his death.

In order to understand this tragic journey I would like to start by posing the following leading question: what role does *place* play in their melancholy and memory? However, for doing this let us dwell before on the question of melancholy in the book.

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2. In Sebald's original and German written *Die Ausgewanderten* (1991) Ferber was originally named as *Frank Aurach* after the real character of *Frank Aurach*, the English painter. However, later on as Aurach preferred not to be closely identified with the book, Sebald changed it to Ferber.

3. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 18.

4. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 57.

5. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 114.

Melancholy

When we discuss memory and recollection we usually think of two modes of memory. The first one is the "trivial", regular mode. In this mode, through recollection, we bring from the past into the present, into consciousness, a meaningful event, and we dwell upon it momentarily. Within that dwelling we picture it, and then we mostly locate ourselves and others in that picture. Such a memory brings about a mental-emotional reaction: a laugh, a tear, sharp sadness, sharp longing, an urge, and so on. These memories can actually fill our field of consciousness vividly, for some time, and we are fully aware of them. Mostly, these moments are relatively brief and they pass away through forgetfulness, through everydayness which takes consciousness away from memories, thus allowing life - within the world - to go on. However, there exists another mode of memory, one that is much less visual and concrete, much more "moody". In this mode, and though the trigger may still be a specific recollection, when that specific recollection disappears visually from consciousness, metaphorically, a certain weight or color remains within consciousness and accompanies our actions, thoughts and personal relations, for a relatively lengthy period of time, maybe even all the time. In *The emigrants*, the latter possibility rules. Thus, Selwyn "lives in his hermitage, giving his entire attention, … to thoughts which on the one hand grow vaguer day by day, and, on the other hand, grow more precise and unambiguous".[6] We can see the way those memories and the thoughts that accompany them fill his entire life, thus becoming his hermitage. It should be noted that it is not that they unwillingly haunt him; on the contrary – he is willingly committed to them, he dwells in them, is totally occupied with them. For him there is nothing beyond them, they are ultimate and encapsulate time in its wholeness.[7] This mode expresses what Heidegger termed a "state of mind" (*Stimmungen*)[8]. According to this, not only does the human subject (*Dasein*) always find himself thrown into some facticity, he also projects this mood upon his situations and the beings that surround him:

> In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed mood-wise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be".[9]

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6. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 11.

7. This constant seclusion is eminent also in "Paul Bereyeter" (p. 58), "Ambros Adelwarth" (p. 103), "Max Ferber" (p. 169).

8. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New-York: Harper &Row, 1962, 7ed.), 172-182.

9. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 173.

And though states of mind might change over time, we are always under a certain state-of-mind[10]. What makes this concept of state-of-mind so meaningful is the fact that as a disposition, it makes *Dasein* comprehend things in the world almost consistently according to this state-of-mind. As Dreyfus describes it:

> Mood colors the whole world and everything that comes into it, so that even what I remember, anticipate and imagine is bright or drab, … In this way moods are like the weather. On a sunny day not only are all present objects bright, but it is difficult to imagine a drab world, and, conversely on dull days everything that can show up is dull, and so is   everything one can envisage.[11]

Thus, state-of-mind dissolves the subject-world distinction: the world becomes what the subject makes of it (in terms of intention, apprehending, understanding, caring, approaching, and so on), the subject becomes what the world allows it to be (in terms of identity, consciousness, memories); Dasein becomes a walking state-of-mind. That is why, regarding the protagonists of this book, we can say that 'they live their memories', not as a metaphor, not as a literary cliché, but literally. His protagonists live their memories as an internal, ongoing process – one that fills their daily routines, that navigates and disciplines their daily consciousness; They become enslaved to these memories and to the very act of memory.

What is then the mood that rules the lives of the emigrants? Following Freud it is clear that it is melancholy, as:

> The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment".[12]

Thus, melancholia became a key point for many papers regarding *The Emigrants*. Carter and Wolff, for example, discuss the way narcissism, part of being melancholic, invites an ethical discussion;[13] Aliaga-Buchenau, Ceuppens,

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10. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 174.

11. Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991), 174.

12. Sigmund Freud, ″Mourning and Melancholia," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV (1914-1916): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works* (London: Hogarth Press), 237-258, 243.

13. Josephine Carter, "The Ethics of the Melancholic Witness: Janet Frame and W.G. Sebald," in *Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal* 46, no. 1 (2013): 1-18; Lynn L. Wolff,

Garloff and Furst do so regarding the way melancholy creates tension between giving public testimony and withdrawing into personal pain (confession).[14] What this paper intends to do however, is somewhat different. Though I maintain melancholy as a starting point of the discussion, my aim is an ontological-existential analysis, one that takes melancholy, and *The Emigrants*, to be its ontic-existeniell "object" of analysis[15].

My main interest and central clue for this is the centrality of place within *The Emigrants*. This centrality can be observed in two complementing ways. Thus, the emigrants' choice not to be in touch with the real world can be seen from the physical geography of their existence. Selwyn chooses to live within a ruined house (a symbol of his memories and consciousness), "scarcely ever in the house. He lived in his hermitage, giving it his entire attention[16]", Bereyter, who closes himself in his room and garden[17], Adelwarth who leaves his house only to close himself up in a mental sanitarium[18], and Ferber, who says, "I have rarely been anywhere in my life, except of course Manchester; and even here I often don't leave the house or workshop for weeks on end"[19]. All of them try not to have any contact with other people, with the world, and generally with what is outside of their body and house. Selwyn has no real connection with his wife and children, Bereyter keeps human contact only with his friend Mme (Lucy) Landau, Adelwarth loses any connection with his widespread family, and at last, Ferber, who imprisons himself in his atelier with his works. We should keep in mind that even the encounters they have with the narrator are when the narrator is the one who penetrates into their physical life, as a fact there is no initiated encounter coming from them. However, on the other hand, it is interesting, when it comes to their memories, a clear dissonance comes to the fore— they are immersed in open and dynamic

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"H.G. Adler and W.G. Sebald: From History and Literature to Literature as Historiography," *Monatshefte* 103, no. 2, (2011): 257-275.

14. Ana-Isabel Aliaga-Buchenau, "A Time He could not Bear to Say More about: Presence and Absence of the Narrator," in *W.G. Sebald: History, Memory, Trauma*, ed. S. Denham and M. McCulloh (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2006),141-155; Jan Ceuppens, "Transcripts: An Ethics of Representation in *The Emigrants*," in *W.G. Sebald: History, Memory, Trauma*, ed. S. Denham and M. McCulloh (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co, 2006), 251-264; Katja Garloff, "The Emigrant as Witness: W.G. Sebald's *Die Ausgewanderte*," in *The German Quarterly* 77, no. 1(2004), 76-93, 83; Lilian. R. Furst. "Memory's Fragile Power in Kazuo Ishiguro's "Remains of the Day" and W. G. Sebald's "Max Ferber"." In *Contemporary Literature* 48, no 4(2007), 530-553.

15. My use of ontic-existentiell distinction as to ontological-existential relies of course on Heidegger. For a clear and thorough explanation of this see Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 20-23.

16. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 11.

17. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 57.

18. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 103.

19. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 169.

places – this fact is intensified by endless pictures given in the book of those places. Look at the way Sebald describes Adelwarth's trip to the Holy Land. He dedicates an extended paragraph to listing places, around and in Jerusalem: "the Russian cathedral, the Russian Men's and Women's Hospice, the French Hospital de St. Louis, the Jewish Home for the Blind …. "[20]— and so on for 31 lines! What is the purpose of presenting such a list? Why does he provide such a list without any details to go along with these places, just names? And after that he suddenly dedicates the last part of the story to a lengthy description of their stay in Ain-Jidy. Look at the way Selwyn describes his journey, with his friend Johannes, to the Alps, or his last memory of leaving his village in a cart. There, he meticulously describes the road and the scenery[21]. Or Ferber's recollection of his trip with his father to Jungfrau Mountain (the Alps again). There is no way of avoiding the centrality and homology between on one hand, melancholy, closed place and being "*not-at-home"* and on the other hand, open places and *being-at-home*.[22] This centrality goes hand in hand with the places traveled by the narrator himself. However, if for the narrator these places are explicated physically, for the emigrants they are explicated through remembrance. For understanding this one has to understand the role of *place* and its relation to *being-in-the-world*, a concept developed phenomenologically and brilliantly through Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Casey.

Place and the Event of Belonging

First, it should be admitted that for philosophically explicating the meaning of *place*, there had to be prior philosophical-historical elimination of its meaning or centrality, and only then a phenomenological resurrection of it. So, as Casey historically-philosophically shows, the scientific-mathematical revolution of the 17th century transformed place, as a subjective concept, to what is "largely discredited, hidden deeply in the folds of the all-comprehensive fabric of space"[23]. The idea of place lost its intellectual legitimacy up to a point where it was analyzed mathematically and that way objectively, and allegedly accurately. It was understood through the overall concept of space, to be considered not as a place but as a *site*.[24] That is, as Descartes' scientific point of view conceived it, containing "nothing but extension in length, breadth, and

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20. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 137-140.

21. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 19.

22. For the centrality of journey in Sebald's see also John Wylie, "The spectral Geographies of W.G. Sebald," in *Cultural Geographies*, 14(2007): 171-188.

23. Edward Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 199.

24. Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 165.

depth",[25] if there are internal positions and boundaries they become so and described so through geometry, not through any subjective qualities.

However, phenomenologically speaking, as humans we act and think of those "sites" in a human way, normally our intentionality discloses them differently than the physical-mathematical language, or as Husserl puts it most eloquently and ironically: "The disdain with which everything "merely subjective and relative" is treated by those scientists who pursue the modern ideal of objectivity changes nothing of its own manner of being, just as it does not change the fact that the scientist himself must be satisfied with this realm whenever he has recourse, as he unavoidably must have recourse, to it".[26]

And thus phenomenology had to create its own language for what is a place. Yet, it should be said, there is some similarity between *place* and *site*, otherwise *site* could not replace the place of *place* in our intellectual thinking! We can see this similarity in the way Merleau-Ponty analyzes the relation between the figure [place, site] and the background [world, space], "it [the figure] has an 'outline', which does not 'belong' to the background and which 'stands out' from it",[27] What makes a figure such is the fact that it has an outline which differentiates it from space which a-priori has no limits. Though these limits allegedly are neutral (they belong to space and to figure at the same time), they actually direct us inside the place, they belong to it. Now, when it comes to site these limits are geometrical, when it comes to place what makes these limits? Now they are perceptual and subjective. When we discuss the notion of *site* it is clear that the distance is determined geometrically, theoretically and in potential at least, it is infinite. However, when we speak of a place it is assumed to be limited in some subjective ways. Thus, when we live in an apartment we take the walls to be the boundaries of our home, when we live in a private house maybe we will take the yard and its fence to be as such, and maybe as children when we spend much of our daily time in our father's store[28] we will tend, emotionally at least, to identify it as home. Unlike a site, a place has its human distance, but it is not too much of a distance as it has to keep itself humanly near in some way. Following Heidegger, Casey points out that when we say that things are near we in fact seek "the closeness, the intimacy of things as they are gathered, and themselves actually gather, in *a particular place*".[29] But, gathering around what? Let us look at the way the term 'here' works, as Husserl reflects upon this geographical phenomenon. Though 'here' bears, analytically, no defining feature, nor mathematical coordinate, it is

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25. Quoted in Casey, Edward, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000, 3ed.), 185.

26. Edmond Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Northwestern University Press, 1970), 125.

27. Morice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of perception* (London: Routledge, 2002), 15.

28. See the lengthy description of Bereyter's family store, *The Emigrants*, 51-52.

29. Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 281.

totally relativistic, it still functions pragmatically pretty well within a dialog, it is known and relatively precise to our interlocutor, or our consciousness, as it relates to "the privileged position"[30] of the human lived body. Albeit, 'here' holds two opposite properties, it is us a stable point of reference on the one hand (as it refers to the same body), and it is also dynamic as it moves (with the body) within place. Thus, our body becomes a focal point, a necessary condition for the way 'here' functions. When we pay attention to some object within a place, in a way it is always in relation to our body, we put, even imaginatively, our fuzzy location and feeling of 'here' within reach of that object. That way we imaginably gather things around our body, around our 'here', and thus establish a place within place; our body becomes a lived-body as it **travels** from A to B, it makes B a new focal point for a place, situation and intentionality.[31] The question that comes is what are the limits of our travelling the 'here' from here to there? As Casey points out to a fragmented text of Husserl, "The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World External to the Organism" (1931)[32], it is simply by walking.[33] This is done as in walking we find three phenomenological ingredients: The (1) 'here', the (2) 'near' and the (3) 'out there'. Thus, though we constantly move on and on in walking, from one point to another, we always stretch our notion of nearness as to our current physical-subjective place ['here', lived-body) and our current intended walking limits as a starting line for what is 'out there'.

Husserl's way of understanding place complies also with the way Heidegger analyzes this, boundaries are defined not by some formal grid or mathematics, but from the inside outward, through the things the subject gathers in his involvement with that environment. Thus, we negotiate with it in terms of closeness, ready-to-hand,[34] as we humanly measure things in ways like "a good walk", a "stone's throw", or "as long as it takes to smoke a pipe"".[35] Walking, should be said is not just a formal matter of crossing some distance, walking has its own features of involvement. When we walk for a stroll, when we travel, with no intention or hurry to get somewhere, we can activate and involve our attention. This given attention, for a certain thing, creates its place. That way, as we move from one thing to another we create a 'place of all places', or as Heidegger calls this: a *region* (*Gegend*).[36] That is, every object

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30. Edmond Husserl, *Ding and Raum,* 80, quated in *Casey, the Fate of Place,* 219*.*

31. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of perception*, 112-116.

32. Edmond Husserl, "The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World External to the Organism," in *Husserl: Shorter Works,* trans. F. A. Elliston and L. Langsdorf (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 246.

33. Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 224.

34. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 134.

35. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 140.

36. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 136.

(thing) has a place of his own and region becomes the matrix which connects them all.

In *The Emigrants* we can see very clearly the way those emigrants attach their home-memories to such activities consisting of walking and its derivations: Selwyn's trips by foot to the Alps and Crete, and especially the way he describes his departure of his home village:

> I can still see the teacher who taught the children in the *cheder*, where I had been going for two years by then, placing his hand on my parting; I can still see the empty rooms of our house. I see myself sitting topmost on the cart, see the horse's crupper, the vast brown earth, the geese with their outstretched necks in the farmyard mires and waiting room at Grodno station, …..

Thus he continues on and on. We can observe in this, to the way in which the 'here' is changed. At first, the *cheder* (the religious-traditional Jewish class) is a static I. As he travels with the cart the 'here' changes and along with it places are created on and on within memory. For those who might object to the fact that riding on a cart is not walking, what is important and crucial is of course not the technical action itself, but what it entails phenomenologically. Walking encapsulates a certain rhythm, which at the same time gives us movement while not robbing us of the opportunity to investigate our surrounding, dwell on it, cause us to stop (to rest, to give special attention to something, to allow encountering along the way) and move again. It allows us to get closer, take some distance, touch, smell, look at things from a different angle, and focus. Look what happens when other technologically developed kinesthetic tools (car, train, plane) are adopted, or even - certainly in our capitalist-modern times - when we walk in a rush to our workplace, then the option for attention is very much robbed from us. We start to lose more and more those abilities sketched above, our perceptual capabilities lag behind these tools in terms of rhythm and accessibility. Not only that, if with the body our kinesthetic movement is done through the body, which is "the bearer of the 'I'" as Husserl termed it,[37] now we meet the world through a technological mediator. We are getting alienated from what is outside that mediator, our immediate surrounding becomes that technological transportation, and the outer surrounding becomes in a way what is 'out there'. In fact, as Malpas claims, technology "replaces the *things* themselves with images or *representations* (*vorstellungen*) of things – that is, it re-presents things within a particular "frame" and in a way that is it abstracted from their original locatedness".[38]

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37. *Ding and Raum*, 162, quoted in Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 219.

38. Jeff Malpas, "Uncovering the Space of Discloedness: Heidegger, technology, and the Problem of Spatiality," in *Heidegger, Authenticity, And Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 205-228, 226.

One of the key existentials in *Being and Time* is the way Dasein is "born", or *thrown*, into *being-in-the-world*. That is, when Dasein is thrown it is into a public arena of mutual understandings, which also helps us "negotiate" or take care of our surrounding (*sorge*).[39] What is means is that, paradoxically, "the worlding of the world [das Welten von Welt]"[40] is mainly done through a certain limited place. Dasein's real *World* is actually its home-surrounding, while world, as that which is total and nothing exists behind it, is what he "infers" only as some abstraction or mood. The way we understand ourselves, and internalize this existential mode as *being-in-world*, happens not directly through some structured notion of world as a whole universe, and not through unlimited spaces, but through concrete places, mostly very few in number. It becomes clear that though we consciously live with an "abstract" sense of *world*, what we actually dwell in is a pre-given, human and limited "piece of" of that world. However, this facticity of the world, these pre-ontological understandings, are those which allow Dasein to move hermeneutically in space, or rather in places around him, to disclose an already "partly" given place into a larger place, or as Heidegger terms it, "making-room (*einraumen*)[41]. As, Sheehan analyses it:

> the ultimate source of world is the ontological movement of human being that opens the clearing"…. Dasein's world-opening movement is what Heidegger calls *Ereignis*, a term that covers the three moments of a unified process: Dasein's ontological condition of (a) *being-opened-up* so as to (b) *come-into-its-own* and thus (c) *finitely appearing* – emergence, fulfillment, appearance.[42]

Thus, though its boundaries are fuzzy and subjective they are the ones which bound the place, place becomes more and more "mine", as I become more and more "his". This locality of place is nicely expressed through the fact that Sebald's heroes refer in their home memories mainly not to Germany, Russia or Europe, which are too abstract for being a place; rather, their memories and longings are for certain localized places such as the Selwyn's *"cheder"*, Bereyter's class, Adelwarth's Ain Jidy, Ferber's village (*Steinbach*) and so on. To understand this "evolution" of place dwelling, let us briefly discuss Heidegger's *gathering* process. We gather a place around us when we find ourselves "having to do with something, producing something, attempting to do something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering,

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39. Dreyfus, 1991, 90.

40. Quoted in Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2008), 227.

41. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 146.

42. Thomas Sheehan, "Dasein," in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005), 193-213, 202.

discussing, determining….. all these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being".[43] And so, boundaries point to where we stop taking care of things; it is a mental phenomenon that reflects our practical dealings with the world. As we care for them, these places become, a "container of experiences that contributes to *its intrinsic memorability"[44]. That is, the world we meet is in fact a situation, a limited time-place event. This place becomes more and more "designated" when we are able to gather things inside it and when we are "unable" to gather more things and humans outside it*. But what is the meaning of this gathering process? What constitutes gathering is linking things together. In this linking we expose these things, that is, we reveal a new meaning and thus they become more than just a presence. Let us observe the way Heidegger discusses this act of gathering with the following geographical example:

> The bridge swings over the stream "with ease and power." It does not just connect banks that are already there. The **banks emerge as banks** only as the bridge crosses the stream…. It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood. The bridge *gathers* the earth as landscape around the stream.[45]

The 'banks emerge' not physically of course —but as they acquire their meaning in relation to the bridge; they are released from their mere and silent presence. Their "functionality", and thus meaning, is revealed through the "act" of "bridging".

What makes this gathering and act of belonging is the Event (*Ereignis*). Heidegger pictures the Event as a certain happening where things are gathered together, as before, but though the event is a down-to-earth one, it is also accompanied by a kind of magic: "[t]he event is not an event among other events", "it is something in which we are 'taken up' and "transformed".[46] It is an original moment of *being-belonged*. It discloses our self in relation with a certain place and surrounding; it is the gathering of self and things, which at the same time prevents the self from belonging-gathering in other environments. As a reader you can find this embedded in any of the stories, probably the best illustration of his are many of the pictures scattered in the books, pictures that catch a moment when suddenly certain scenery is gathered around some human character and thus creates an event of place and not just a site. There are many examples of this but I chose the picture where Bereyter's pupils are gathered together, the only physical object one can discern is a high turret standing behind them, thus

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43. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 80; cf. Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, 52-55.

44. Casey, *Remembering*, 186.

45. Martin Heidegger,"Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell (New-York: Harper & Row, 1977), 330, bold emphasis is mine.

46. Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, 218.

converting it from a picture of a bunch of children to that of a place.[47] But, not just any place, but a human one, as it gathers those children along with that turret. To summarize this, there is no way of separating our sense of selfhood from our sense of our *place*. There is no sense for the dichotomy subject/object; Dasein should be perceived as an embedded subject-object entity. As that place is said to be mine, but one can also say the opposite, or the complementary, I belong to this place.

Place and Memory

This puzzle of self and place is still short of one piece: memory. What attaches memory with self and place? There are two reasons for the way place and self are interrelated. First, places are *memory-holders*, they aid in remembering.[48] But then – what makes places such suitable candidates for being memory-holders? First, and foremost we remember in pictures, and pictures are mainly places, one can hardly imagine what is not a place – if it is someone's face, a street or a mountain. And despite the fact that out of this detailed concreteness we might perceive a kind of "abstract" feeling – longing, pain, blame, happiness - what comes first is a certain picture[49]. The visual detailed richness of places serves as a hanger for our emotional memories. Thus, places are a kind of technical cognitive tool for accessing events and people in our past. That is why we say that we go back again and again to our memories; it is a way of restoring an event, as memories provide the conditions of stability and persistency.[50] Secondly, and probably more important, when we speak of the memories we find in *The Emigrants*, we actually refer to what is popularly called "defining moments". But in order to be considered as a defining moment - of the self - that moment has to be itself defined, it has to have the character of a moment. That is, it has to have boundaries of place and time, and be discernible from other moments. And not only that, through recollection, through "walking" in them, we can purify and explicate these memories more and more. All these limitations and characteristics go hand in hand with the way we have discussed place. As we remember, we emulate the phenomenological feature of walking in place as we actually dwell –mentally- in memory. And just like the way in which places shape selfhood as they introduce themselves as 'our places', so do memories.

However, we all have our memories of the past, even of home, so what is different about Sebald's emigrants? What makes them so painful up to traumatic? It must be said that these emigrants simply fail to blend into their new

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47. Sebald, *The Emigrants,* 39.
48. Casey, *Remembering,* 182-187.
49. Casey, *Remembering,* 189.
50. Casey, *Remembering,* 186-187.

environments, their existence increasingly becoming a living within a ruin. This is allegorically featured in the picture of Selwyn's house, in which Sebald anchors a mental picture of memory through exposing the reader to the labyrinths and locking mechanisms inside the house.[51] As readers, we can clearly discern that the house, with its two big dark windows, remarkably simulates an owl, that common metaphor for a deep, gloomy, sunken, dark memory, one that is looking back at us (As a reader I found no way to avoid imagining it to be a staring owl, when looking at it). This homology of house, memory and ruin goes on: notice the way Sebald describes Dr. Selwyn's garden, where you can find at least three features for this *ruin* metaphor: "But now the court has fallen into *[1]disrepair*, like so much else around here. It's not only the kitchen garden, he continued, indicating the tumble-down Victorian greenhouses and overgrown espaliers, that's on its last legs after years of *[2]neglect*. More and more, he said, he sensed that Nature itself was groaning and *[3]collapsing* beneath the burden we placed upon it".[52] This disrepair, neglect and collapsing describe not only his house but his memories as well. Thus, when Selwyn continually counts blades of grass, these are actually his memories, as alluded to by the narrator: "It's a sort of *pastime* of mine",[53] leading to Selwyn telling the narrator that he is "merely a dweller in the garden, a kind of ornamental hermit".[54] That is, it is a time where he loses his selfhood, and becomes what Freud termed: *The shadow of an object*:

> An object choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular person [place], had at one time existed; then, **owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from this loved person, the object-relationship was shattered**. The result was not the normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this object and a replacement of it on to new one, but something different, for whose coming about various conditions seem to be necessary. The object cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an end. **But the free libido was not replaced onto another object; it was withdrawn into the ego**. There, however it was not employed in an unspecified way, but served to establish **an identification of the ego with the abandoned object**. Thus the shadow of an object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency as though it were an object, the forsaken object.[55]

The Reason for this is not stated explicitly by Sebald. However, we can try interpreting this using Heidegger's thought. As we have already noted, every Dasein is thrown into a place, into some cultural tradition, into a public sphere.

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51. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 11.
52. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 7.
53. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 5.
54. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 5.
55. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia", 248-258.

Albeit, this Heideggerian metaphor misleads, as it is more reasonable to say that every person *just finds* himself in some place. And using 'find' is not like 'thrown', find is like waking up to some facticity, there is no past in it, it is from zero point to existence, it is accepted naturally, without any potentiality for remorse, guilt, resentment and the like since there is no burden there. Yet, when using the metaphor of 'thrown' one speaks now of a violent movement from one dwelled place to a new one. For Sebald's protagonist's accepting the expectation of dwelling in their new environment, and forgetting their old one, is like betraying their old one, betraying their original self and their commitments to people and places they cherish in these memories.

However, when people are not able to dwell, they actually expose themselves to the "inescapable – that is, "existential" – feature of the human condition", they are unable to fly away from the basic existential situation of *homelessness*,[56] or as Heidegger termed it "not-being-at-homeness [das Nichtzuhause-sein]". They lose their ability to hide their *homelessness* in the inauthentic "they" of their lives. What brings to life this deep understanding, and anxiety, is death. Paradoxically, and tragically though, that home does not exist, culturally or historically anymore. However, through memory it still exists as a *ruin - a* signifier of death - and as *home* at the same time. Thus, the memory of *being-at-home* is at the same time *being-in-death.* And so the past presents no relation—other than a casual one—with the present. The past becomes true life while the present through remembrance becomes an ongoing death. Thus, living obsessively within memory becomes *being-dead*. They carry with them a consciousness of life (since home unavoidably signifies this) and death at the same time, reflecting a type of malfunction in existence.[57] The present is trying to communicate with the past, for the purpose of establishing a stable interpretation of the self that can serve the future, but is unable to do so. Though memory (as a mechanism) reaches memory (as content), it paradoxically captures it as someone else's memory. As Casey comments "[w]e witness the othering of mind into something other than itself. Remembering is in effect a progressive voyage into the othering of memory as traditionally conceived".[58] Memories, as ruins, become forces that take control of consciousness, they haunt. As Ricoeur points out, memory is not only an entity, but an *"activity and a passion in search of a narrative*".[59] As a memory it carries the function, maybe ethical commitment, for transforming the many memories into one, the incidents of life into a story, a group into an 'I'.[60] However, sometimes this grouping becomes to be only a formal procedure, a proper name ('Henry', 'Paul', 'Max',

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56. Young, Julian. "What is Dwelling? The Homelessness of Modernity," in *Heidegger, Authenticity, And Modernity (*Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 187-204, 188-190.

57. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 95-107.

58. Casey, *Remembering*, xi.

59. Paul Ricoeur, "Life in Quest of a Narrative," in *On Paul Ricoeu*r, ed. David Wood (London: Routledge, 1992), 20-33, 29.

60. Ricoeur, "Life in Quest of a Narrative", 21.

'Ambrose') and no more than that; it becomes an identity that is no more than an archive; even when it refers to an 'I', it is one that is broken and dismantled. This sums up to Freud's final conclusion, the object [home-place] has not actually died as it was never there; it is a lost object of love,[61] *home* never really existed! This is the moment when Sebald's protagonists tell themselves: we "experience ourselves as a kind of bare, existential projecting [past memories] without any existential projects to project ourselves into [future]".[62] This is the "possibility of impossibility", the impossibility of "being-at-home".[63]

This can be seen, clearly and radically, In "Paul Bereyter". This is perhaps the only place in *The Emigrants* where the narrator crosses his documentarian role and explicitly expresses his feeling toward Bereyter's community, as silent witnesses and thus as participants, in what was done to him and his family:

> [T]he systematic thoroughness with which these people kept silent in the years after the war, kept their secrets, and even, I sometimes think, really did forget, is nothing more than the other side of perfidious way in which Schoferle, who ran a coffee house in S, informs Paul's mother Thekla, who had been on stage for some time in Nuremberg, that the presence of a lady who was married to a half Jew might be embarrassing to his respectable clientele, and begged to request her, with respect of course, not to take her afternoon coffee at his house any more. I do not find it surprising, said Mme Landau, not in the slightest, that you were aware of the meanness and treachery that a family like the Bereyters were exposed to in a miserable hole such as S then was, and such as it still is in despite of all the so-called progress.[64]

And still, as Bereyter finishes his service as a soldier in the German army, he decides to return to his home-village as follows:

> [h]e was a German to the marrow, profoundly attached to his native land in the foothills of the Alps, and even to that miserable place called S as well, which in fact he loathed and, deep within myself, of what I am quite sure, said Mme Landau, would have been pleased to see destroyed and obliterated, together with the townspeople, whom he found utterly repugnant.[65]

We can see here the way Bereyter, irrationally and rationally at the same time, had to recover his sense of home-dwelling and thus returned to his home-

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61. Freud, *Mourning and Melancholia*, 245; see also Kaufmann, "Angels Visit the Scene of Disgrace," in *Cultural Critique* 70(2008): 94-119, 102.
62. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 269.
63. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 270.
64. *The Emigrants*, 50.
65. *The Emigrants*, 57.

village, which betrayed him. He still goes back to that village. Not because he desires it, but because his memories compel him to it, and because he is unable to free himself of regarding it as his home. However, as Freud recognized, it became a lost object of love, it became an object of hate, though still definitely it is home. This might explain the fact that Sebald's emigrants are not able to create a new sense of home. As they have lost all sense of trust as to the ontic meaning of *home*, memory becomes a place that haunts. As Wylie, following Derrida, claims:

> The self, …, is in actuality constituted by the attempted exorcism of specters who, as it were in the nature of things, incessantly return to haunt both its 'being' and its 'thereness'. The 'I am' announced in the placing of being-in-the-word is, always and necessarily, 'I am haunted'.[66]

While Freud refers to a person, Sebald shows literarily the way this melancholy can be attached to places, while Husserl, Heidegger et al base this phenomenologically. We can see, through phenomenologically, the way memory/ place functions as some kind of an Other for us. And thus these memories keep defining the present of selfhood—we might call them "*existing past memories*", as it is expressed, in one of Sebald's cryptic remarks: "For, like death itself, the cemeteries of Constantinople are in the midst of life".[67]

Conclusion

If we must put it simplistically, then this paper discusses the way some places are not just places. For Selwyn, Bereyter, Adelwarth and Ferber, it relates to certain defining moments in their life that revealed these places not only as a lost-home, but as a false home, while other moments are able to magically define their home. That is, a place that signifies calmness, belonging, origin, authenticity and selfhood. There are many examples for this in the novel but I believe the best illustration for this is Adelwarth's journey to the Holy Land. As a reader when you read this part of the story you absorb a feeling of desolation, distress, ruin, filth and sickness,[68] however suddenly when they arrive at Ain-Jedi, and the Sea of Death (paradoxically), a feeling of home-belonging engulfs Adelwarth, up to a magical event, or Event in Heidegger's language, when:

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66. Wylie, "The Spectral Geographies of W.G. Sebald," in *Cultural Geographies* 14 (2007): 171-188, 172.

67. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 131.

68. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 136-142.

> Suddenly a quail, perhaps frightened by the storm on the sea, took refuge in his lap and remained there, calm now, as if it were its rightful place.[69]

Like that quail, Adelwarth suddenly, and for the only time in the novel, feels he is at home, he is calm. Albeit, this moment is a rare one, mostly in *The Emigrants* the places we meet, through memory, are places of ruins, they function as a shadow of an object for them. And though we usually regard pain as something that we try to avoid or get rid of, here the picture is much more ambivalent. It is so because **memory is not only pain but *being-at-home* as well. And so pain is at the same time embraced and loathed.** All this leads up to the moment when they are faced with their freedom. And so they ask themselves, to put it in Milan Kundera's famous question: "What then shall we choose? Weight or lightness?".[70] They choose lightness: death, forgetting.

Acknowledgment

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69. Sebald, *The Emigrants*, 144.
70. Quoted in Casey, *Remembering*, 4.

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The Tyranny that Was the Greek Statue

By Michael Arvanitopoulos[*]

The Greek statue was once an irresistible academic problem that drove some of our greatest minds literally crazy, while the scholarly attempts to understand it were spilling into society and fertilizing Western education. Our postmodernist, nonchalant attitude towards this strange object has it locked in the museums, where nowdays it is no more than a casual tourist attraction. This is not because the question that was the Greek statue was ever really answered; rather that we gave up on it, perhaps because we believed our own excuses not to deal with it. Heidegger's questioning our relationship, as humans, with the Greek statue, allows a revisiting of the question of the ontological status of this hitherto unaccountable object, by shedding assumptions and introducing new evidence in the form of better-informed questions.

The Forgotten Question

In 1935 Elisa Marian Butler published *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany*, where she made some observations on what transpired when the German Romantics cast their eyes on Greek statuary art. Her launching motive was that she wasn't interested in what the Germans had made of the Greeks, but in what the Greeks had made of the Germans. The picture she painted was at the same time lofty and grim. She saw that in their interpretations the Germans tended to ignore logical obstacles, that they appeared unaware of the dangers involved in the discussion of ideas and ideals, and this is how they drove themselves crazy over the Greek statue. Hölderlin, Heine, and Nietzsche did lose their mind after all. "In what other country would the discovery of serenity, simplicity and nobility in art have brought about such dire results?," wondered Butler.[1] And it wasn't just the German Romantics. John Boardman, the meat-and-potatoes British art historian who educated the generations of Oxfordians with his canonical works *Greek Sculpture – The Archaic Period*, and *The Classical Period* (1985), also tried to wrangle with the Greek tyranny. After two volumes of trying to justify the inexplicable, mainly through deterministic historical accounts where he attributed the "progress" of Greek statuary art to democracy and the Persian Wars,[2] he had to admit: "Staring at these works, in picture, cast or original, does not explain them; indeed their familiarity to some degree deadens perception."[3]

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1. Elisa Marian Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1958), 335.

2. John Boardman, *Greek Sculpture - The Classical Period* (Thames & Hudson Ltd, London, 1985), 20, 168.

3. *Ibid.*, 240.

This "deadening of perception" did not only affect the British and the Germans, amongst other Europeans, but it is seen by contemporary scholarship to have tyrannized the Greeks themselves since antiquity. In her book *Images in Mind – Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought* (2001), Deborah Tarn Steiner observes that: "[L]ate archaic and classical sculptors seem to have responded by depicting their gods with bodies that simultaneously declared their proximity to men and reminded the viewer of the breach between a familiar surface appearance and an ineffable, invisible reality that could be neither directly 'imaged' nor reproduced."[4]

The breach of the borderline seen to separate what is human and innerworldly from what is invisible and godly, lies behind all the problems that have driven crazy the people who took issue with these mysterious objects which look so much like us and dwell in our world, yet without really belonging to it. The unanswered question why the beings of the world are reified into tangible, objective "things," while what is subjective and closer to man remains a mystery, was addressed by Martin Heidegger in the concluding lines of *Being and Time* (1927), where we read of this distinction: "Where does it arise from? Why is being 'initially' 'conceived' in terms of what is objectively present, and not in terms of things at hand that do, after all lie still nearer to us? Why does this reification come to dominate again and again?"[5] The Greek statue is the pivotal locus where the distinct entities of the thing-like and the human-like converge, since the statue itself surfaces as this very problem of whether it is a chiseled stone, or rather a god. Those of us who have the quick answer, that the statue can only be a chiseled stone, may be surprised to hear that this view belongs only to our own age of matter-of-fact, where the statues are locked in the museums and the question that they once were is now forgotten. But this was not always the case.

The Question Persists

We can coarsely distinguish at least three historical phases in Western thought where Greek statues have been either experienced, addressed, or understood as "gods" of some sort. The first phase was pre-reflective and thus agnostic, the second was reflective but conceptually vacuous, and the third reflective and conceptually potent, but premised poorly enough to be deemed incomprehensible. The pre-reflective stage refers to Archaic Greece. The conceptually vacuous phase culminated with eighteenth and nineteenth century European romanticism, not only from the Germans, but as Athena Leoussi

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4. Deborah Steiner Tarn, *Images in Mind - Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 90.

5. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Joan Stambaugh (State University of New York Press, 1996), 397.

reports in her *Nationalism and Classicism* (1998), also from the British, the French, and smaller European countries that followed suit to the Continent's ideological superpowers.[6] The third hermeneutical phase was prompted in the last century by Heidegger's radical metaphysics, which was based in his theory of art, itself found incomprehensible if read literally.

In our days the mysterious presence of the Greek statue has been brought down to, and its presence justified in our world, from its reification to the marble stone being configured by variant modes of predication. The canonical interpretations of the Greek statue have seen it either as a verisimilitudinal or generic representation of the human form (Rhys Carpenter, Gisela Richter),[7] as an idealization of the perfect human body from a collection of beautiful parts (J.J Winckelmann, G.E. Lessing),[8] as a historical accident (John Boardman, Ernst Buschor),[9] or as a climatological consequence (Polybius, Montesquieu).[10] Yet, as I have argued elsewhere,[11] the being of the Greek statue, what we mean and commit to when we say that "the statue *is* …," cannot be established from these predicates, so that the Greek statue "is" neither of these modes of configuration. So the question persists: what *is* the Greek statue?

For one thing, God and the statue do share one foundational attribute, namely that they both violate the copula "is" in their syntactic appropriation for the understanding. Just like it is with the statue which cannot hold on to its worldly predicates, "God's" essential predicating attributes (God's being omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, the *summum bonum*, etc.) are not met with in nature. As Kant showed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the thatness and the whatness of God in the elementary proposition "God *is*," do not derive from the copula. Nor do any other attributes people have given to God derive from nature. This evidence was enough for Kant to reject the possibility of the existence of "God."[12] And yet God is an entity encountered in many of the world's native

6. Athena Leoussi, *Nationalism and Classicism* (Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1998), 45, 47.

7. Rhys Carpenter, *The Esthetic Basis of Greek Art, of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1959), 92, 93; Gisela Richter, *Archaic Greek Youths* (London Phaidon, 1960), 148.

8. Johann J. Winckelmann, *The History of Ancient Art* (Tennessee: General Books LLC, 2009), 21; Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laokoön*, transl. Ellen Frothingham (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1887), 58.

9. John Boardman, *Greek Sculpture - The Classical Period* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 1985), 20, 168; Ernst Buschor, *On the Meaning of Greek Statues* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 8.

10. See reference in David Irwin (ed.), *Winckelmann Writings on Art* (Cromwell Place, London Phaidon Press Limited, 1972), 5.

11. Michael Arvanitopoulos, "Ectoplasm in the Museum," *Mouseion, Journal of the Classical Association of Canada*, 2021.

12. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith, unabridged edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 29.

understandings independently of culture, although still dependent on the way that we in the West understand the notion of "God" as we try to interpret otherwise discrete and perhaps inscrutable perceptual cultures. If the idea of "God" persists despite the lack of objective evidence, this is another way to say that, just like in the case of the Greek statue, God can only be what it is not. In view of this essential affinity, could it be then that the unpredicated entity in question, the Greek statue, is *the* God or at least *a* god, the possibility of the existence of which Kant never examined as did his Romantic compatriots?

In what follows I will attempt to rekindle the question that has been forgotten after we locked the statue in the museum and forgot the inconvenient question that it stand for. To agitate the question of the ontological status of the statue is to revisit the seemingly naive question Heidegger asked in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, and which nevertheless, Western thought has failed to answer, namely: "On the usual view, the work arises out of and by means of the activity of the artist. But by what and whence is the artist what his is?"[13]

When Does God Enter the Statue?

Homeric Greece is said to have experienced culturally indigenous entities the kind of *Blonde Youth*, as "gods." Steiner notices a paradigmatic section in the *Iliad*, where the statue of Athena stands in the temple as the Trojan suppliant women arrive to ask for help, and "Pallas Athena turns her head away" from them. "At no point in the episode does the poet distinguish between the deity and the statue standing in the temple," writes Steiner, adding that theophanies and *agalmatophanies* are hard to tell apart, not only because the term *theos* and his "representation" are interchangeable, but also because the behavior of the Olympians "spills over" into the world.[14]

We note here that in the so-called realm of reason where Steiner belongs and addresses the issue, the statue she discusses is already assumed to be a "representation." The tacit transference of value imposed here destabilizes the Homeric experience of the entity in question in favor of justifying it exclusively from our own, rational standpoint, although as I have argued elsewhere the currently predominant canonical interpretation of the Greek statue as a representation or an idealization are only irrational pseudo-explanations. This transference of value from the realm of mythos to the realm of logos is not new. It clearly appears in Plato and is sustained throughout neoclassicism. We will see it in more detail reintroduced for modernity by Winckelmann and Lessing, where

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13. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell, (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 143.

14. Deborah Steiner Tarn, *Images in Mind - Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 135.

the idea of the statue as representation is imbedded in the title of Lessing's classic work *How the Ancients Represented Death*, of 1769.

The realm of mythos ended axiomatically with the inauguration of the realm of reason by the Socratic elenchus. Landmark critiques by Xenophanes, Plato, and Minucius Felix sharply distinguished between statue and god, at the expense of either or both. At the threshold between Archaic and Classical Greece, Xenophanes of Colophon brought the Olympian deities crumbling down to earth with his irreverent remark that mortals of different nations deem their gods in their own image and so would animals if they had gods, so that evidently it is not the gods that create mortals and animals, but the other way around.[15] The world's various mythological cosmologies, including that of Christianity, which understand "God" as the unilateral and at the same time universal provenance of world, are thus shunned with Xenophanes' relativistic observation. The statue cannot be god as a metaphysical, exocosmic being, because there isn't such a thing as "god" to begin with. God is a human invention, and the statue is a simulacrum of man's idea.

In Plato's metaphysics the statue was further demoted to an *eidolon* of an *eidolon* (the copy of a copy), since no mortal chiseling can perfectly duplicate the essential, eternal ideality of the human figure. The fleeting human reality only faintly mirrors perfect eternal truths. Here the statue cannot be an immortal god because at the very best it could only be a copy of mortal man. At this point it is also clear that the statue was already seen as the work of the artist. As paradoxical as this may seem to us, in Archaic Greece the artists had remained unknown and the statues were believed to have fallen from the sky.[16] Given this newfangled admission, that there is no world-making god in the statue, Plato had nothing better to offer regarding the origin of the world, other than his concept in *Timaeus* of God the *demiourgos* as poet and father.[17]

Be that as it may, the then new but persisting to our days conventional assumption that the statue is made by the artist, an assumption that, as we will see, was challenged by Heidegger, opened up the possibility to doubt now the installation of the divine in the manmade object. "When does the god come into being?" asked the early apologist of Christianity Marcus Minucius Felix in the third century. "The image is cast, hammered, or sculpted; it is not yet a god. It is soldered, put together, and erected; it is still not a god. It is adorned, consecrated, prayed to – and now, finally it is a god once man has willed it so and dedicated it. When does the god come into being?"[18]

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15. Xenophanes, Diels-Kranz, fragments 14, 15, 16.
16. David Irwin, (ed.) *Winckelmann Writings on Art* (London: Phaidon Press Limited, 5 Cromwell Place, 1972), 115.
17. Plato, *Timaeus*, 28, a-c.
18. *Octavius*, 22.5.

Does the Statue *Represent* God?

The Germans, all of whom had either tacitly or explicitly accepted that the statue is the work of the artist, did not address Minucius Felix' logical concerns. They remained spellbound to Winckelmann's trance, basking under his epiphenomenal presumption that art is about beauty and unable to see or escape his aforementioned contradictions. God is merely *represented*, that is, installed onto the stone in a reductive chiseling away of what does not belong to the essence of a deity, and done so by means of the genius of the sculptor who, as Lessing observed, makes sure that the essence of the god is universalized by being made abstract: "The gods … represented by the artist are not precisely the same as those introduced by the poet. To the artist they are personified abstractions which must always be characterized in the same way, or we fail to recognize them."[19]

Minucius Felix's incredulity was thusly sidestepped by romantic historicism through the abstractification of the statue through universal concepts. The more recondite and adjective the German *description* of the essence of divinity in the statue, the more Greek paganism would be compatible to monotheism and thus less exposed to Christian critique. Winckelmann, whom Butler describes as "in trance … uttering truths which did not apply to the object before him, but were associated with it in his mind,"[20] trailblazed this abstractification by employing theoretical concepts such as clarity, nobility, simplicity, serenity, greatness, depth, and composure, in order to explain to his compatriots the "divine attributes of the human form" in the Greek statue.[21] We see this in the often-quoted passage from his *History of the Art of Antiquity*:

> The universal, dominant characteristic of Greek masterpieces, finally, is *noble simplicity* and *serene greatness* in the pose as well as in the expression. The depths of the sea are always calm, however wild and stormy the surface; and in the same way the expression in Greek figures reveals greatness and composure of soul in the throes of whatever passions.[22]

Ultimately what drove the Germans crazy was that what they saw – just like the pre-Socratics did – to be real and true, i.e., that the statue is a god, was simply impossible. Thinking about it defied logic, since here the premises were true but the conclusion false. Winckelmann first drafted the maddening argument, speaking of "incorporeal forms," of "divine attributes from the human form,"

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19. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laokoön*, tr. by Ellen Frothingham (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1887), 58.

20. Elisa Marian Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 47.

21. *Ibid.*, 108.

22. *Ibid.*, 46.

about the "more than human proportions of a deity."[23] The Wincelmannites only swarmed in like moths to the flame to further add such premises, in pronouncements which found in Greek statuary "god-like and youthful forms full of truth in illusion" (Herder),[24] seeing there "heroes and gods take[ing] part in the action" (Lessing),[25] opening up a dialogue with the statue, "Gods of Hellas, gods of Hellas/Can ye listen in your silence?" (Schiller);[26] they saw "snow-white images of the gods" (Goethe),[27] where "I became what I saw, and what I saw was god-like" (Hölderlin).[28]

A prime example of the deeply rooted confusions romantic historicism had sustained all along, is Lessing's translation of Pausanias' references to the term ἄγαλμα ἀρχαίον (*agalma archaēon*). Lessing naively translates this reference to the statue as "ancient idol."[29] Yet the adjective ἀρχαίον does not at all mean "ancient," but literally "grounding" as it derives from the noun ἀρχή (*archē*) (*Grund* in German). For the Greeks ἀρχή meant both "beginning" and "measure," a measure that enacts a beginning. Likewise, ἄγαλμα did not mean "idol" for the pre-Socratics, but "glorification," or "shining" "of the gods," a cognate to the verb ἀγλαΐζω (*aglaizo*) and the adjective ἀγλαός (*aglaos*); it has nothing to do with Plato's *eidolon* as copy and cognate of "idol." Similarly, the stone over which both the Christian apologist and the German neoclassicist troubled over of how the god could be installed into, was not as simple a thing as a "marble," that is, oryctologically speaking, the chemical element Calcium Carbonate, ($CaCo_3$). The stone was understood from the noun μάρμαρον (*marmaron*), derived from the verb μαρμαίρειν (*marmairein*) which means to "irradiate," to "shine through," referring to the grounding, founding, and bestowing of the possibility of world as a mode of knowledge installed by the statue; or at least this is how Heidegger interpreted the meaning, out of his correct translation of the word.

I stated earlier that the Germans addressed the Greek statue with an approach that was abstract and reflective but conceptually vacuous. Our cursory historical account through Butler's panoramic view of the "tyranny" clarifies that this conceptual vacuity is the abortive outcome from a conclusion that denies its own premises. Lessing's misinterpretation transmogrified into an abstract

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23. David Irwin, (ed.), *Winckelmann Writings on Art* (London: Phaidon Press Limited, 5 Cromwell Place, 1972), 133, 76; Elisa Marian Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Boston: Beacon Press, , 1958), 108.

24. Elisa Marian Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 77.

25. *Ibid.*, 57.

26. J.C.F. Schiller, *The Gods of Greece*, 1-2.

27. Elisa Marian Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 98.

28. *Ibid.*, 216.

29. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laokoön*, tr. Ellen Frothingham (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1887), 174.

concept what the pre-Socratic Greeks themselves had understood as a grounding of their own world experience. And Winckelmann's abstractification proved too weak to shake off the Christian apologist's question of exactly when the god comes into being in the stone. This would require a rigorous shakedown of the foundational presumptions of German romanticism; it would take the analytical-phenomenological return to the Greek phenomenon that would come only with Heidegger.

Is it the Mood of the Statue that Makes It God?

Heidegger radically parted with the German romantics, from a tradition sustained by Judeo-Greek metaphysics as a whole since the neoclassical *interpretation* of the Greeks. He did this mainly on three fundamental-ontological thrusts: First in arguing successfully contra Plato, Aristotle, and Christian theology, that God cannot be yet another being; secondly by showing that art is not about beauty but about truth; and thirdly in deconstructing realism and historicism by giving a brand new, critical meaning to the previously static concept of "world." The combination of these radical elucidations volatized the Greeks and led Heidegger to a quasi-archaic Gnosticism: the conviction that the Greek statue can be nothing but the presenting of god into a world of its own making as a mode of knowledge. This conviction somehow returned to and vindicated the Homeric experience of the statue, but *now from thoroughly rational grounds* not anymore liable to the accusation of mythological superstition.

Heidegger's theory of art cannot be accounted for here, far less his metaphysical superstructure upon which this theory is based and reciprocally justified. But a slice of his edifice can still illustrate his case. Heidegger escaped the romantic schizophrenia by now *accepting* the conclusion of its premising, namely that the statue is, or at least was, indeed as the premises established, a god. He did so by building up the arguments piecemeal throughout his extensive and labyrinthine works to conclude in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, one of his most impenetrable works, that it is be-"*cause*" of the Greek statue that world and its constituency is enacted as a perceptual contingency. We have his conclusion condensed in the following passage from *Origin*:

> The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves. … It is the same with the sculpture of the god … It is not a portrait whose purpose is to make it easier to realize how the god looks; rather, it is a work that lets the god himself be present and thus *is* the god himself.[30]

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30. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, ed. David (HarperCollins: Farrell Krell, 1993), 168.

Since the statue is claimed to be "god" because it *first* gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves, Heidegger would have to demonstrate that the statue, as *a statue*, not only meets the conditions for the possibility of appearing in the world it determines, but far more so, that the statue is itself *the condition* for the possibility of human perception. So far we have seen that the entity in question does not even meet the first requirement, for it has defied the presumed conditions for the possibility of a canonical appearance in our world, as a representation, as an idealization, or as a historical accident. And now we are about to conclude that neither is it god. The failure to meet the first condition does not necessarily preclude the statue's meeting the second condition; in fact it may make it more likely, since for Heidegger god cannot be yet another world being. The dismantling of Western metaphysics begun from this core argument, which Heidegger postulated in *Being and Time*, namely that "The being of beings 'is' itself not a being."[31] So far this is exactly what *Blonde Youth* is showing to "be," a non-being. But we are still far from having established that the statue is a god.

To prove that the statue is "god" at least on his own terms, Heidegger would have to show how human perception is absolutely determined by the statue, and done so without falling into the infinite regress which condemns the realism that hides behind the statue's interpretations as a representation, an idealization, or a historical accident. Indeed, Heidegger has compellingly moved away from the infinitism which always attributes one phenomenon as a causal result of another phenomenon, by having thoroughly replaced the concept of *causality* with the concept of *grounding*, notably the very same concept that truly defines the statue as ἀρχαίον in the Greek language. With equal success he has also substituted the empiricist *paratactic* appearance of world objects to experience, with the *structural* integration of beings through the phenomenological concept of intentionality. But even after these, as radical as serviceable replacements, it still has to be shown how the non-causal, now structural relation between mortals and the marble god, is established in order to warrant perception of world as a mode of knowledge.

This would be viable if Heidegger could demonstrate that the structures of the understanding through which the modes of perception of mortals is possible, structures themselves grounded in the intentionality of a consciousness that is aware of its own impending demise (whence the identity of the "mortals"), are somehow related if not outright *identical to and indistinguishable from* the essential structures which constitute the statue. Arguably this interpretive endeavor is viable through the phenomenological reduction of the statue, where after the removal of all the knowledge that *we* bring and impose to the statue, i.e., the knowledge promulgated by realism and historicism, there would be nothing left

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31. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 5.

to constitute and define the decontaminated object under the reduction, except these residual, essential structures.

The reduction, or bracketing of the object in question in an "*epoché*," is a standard phenomenological practice, trailblazed by Brentano and Husserl. Basically it is an analytical method of a privileged theory of perception, because unlike the theories which preceded it, this one begins from acknowledging the perceptual biases of the perceiver-investigator and accepting that every perceptual event is only an interpretation. In its existentialist projections the reduction reaches out to cancel our alienation from "the" world as this alienation is disseminated by realism; it confirms that world is of our own, human making, while at the same time we are the making of this world which for Heidegger is disclosed as a possibility by the metaphysical provenance of the Greek statue.

Since contra realism Heidegger does not arrive to art having started out from the object of perception that is the artwork, but the other way around, the reduction would not start from the human body in order to check the verisimilitudinal fidelity of the statue to the human body as the theorists of "Greek naturalism" saw it, since for them: "The human body in sculptural representation differs from its prototype, the living body, by calling attention to certain qualities which otherwise tend to pass unnoticed," to use the words of renown art historian Rhys Carpenter.[32] Heidegger's interpretation would start instead from the phenomenologically reduced statue in order to check whether and how the residual world-disclosive determinants that constitute the essence of the statue are somehow related to and determine the intentional structures of human understanding.

Heidegger, however, did not produce a phenomenological reduction of the statue. The theory of embodiment implied from his *fundamental* ontology is notably still missing, although several attempts, including Maurice Merleau-Ponty's in *Phenomenology of Perception*, have advanced always mere ontological and ontic appropriations of body to world.[33] Instead Heidegger diverted his attention from the statue to poetry and architecture, where the primordial equipmentalization of intentionality that would embody the residual essences at large, are even more inscrutable.

Heidegger knew that the most primitive structure operative at the interface between what is human and what is world, is *mood*. For phenomenology moods are the most primitive world structures, preceding and determining the *how* and *only thus* the *that* of the phenomenal manifestation of beings in perception. Had Heidegger pursued the phenomenological reduction of the statue, and more so, the right statue, he may have noticed that a particular mood, the human mood of

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32. Rhys Carpenter, *The Esthetic Basis of Greek Art, of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press), 1959, 92, 93.

33. See also Kevin Aho, *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body*; Francisco J. Verela, *The Embodied Mind*; Shaun Gallagher, *How the Body Shapes the Mind*, etc.

anxiety for the loss of world, argued by Heidegger as the *most primordial of all moods,* is precisely the residual essence that constitutes the non-being of the statue that exemplifies our case, the *Blonde Youth.*

In *Being and Time* Heidegger discusses this mood as a world-enacting mood: "In Angst [the human being] … finds itself *faced* with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence."[34] What Heidegger understands as the primordial, world-disclosive mood, I have argued elsewhere that it assembles what is otherwise canonically understood as the statue of the *Blonde Youth.*[35] This is the primary reason why I myself have noticed this particular Greek "statue" and distinguished it out of some 400 surviving specimens that lie on either side of Archaic and Classical Greece.

Had Heidegger given a chance to prove that *Blonde Youth* is god, for Heidegger did visit in Athens these statues,[36] the terms of his own fundamental ontology should have led him to the demonstration that the mood which constitutes the essence of this mysterious entity is, indeed, primordially determining human perception. For unlike any other world object, where the phenomenological reduction distills the *human* experience of the object reduced, the reduction of this statue could have yielded *no less than the conditions for the possibility of human experience together with its object, the material thingliness of the statue.* Such a world-forging yield could, indeed, at least begin to qualify, or increase the plausibility, that the entity in question as a god.

Nonetheless, in the absence of the phenomenological reduction of the statue Heidegger has left us with a *non sequitur* argument. Despite his accepting the conclusion his Romantic compatriots had rejected from seeing the statue only as *a representation* of the god, Heidegger's claim leaves his art theory still within the tradition of the assumptions that undermined the neoclassic movement. As a result, his claims in *Origin* that the statue *is the god himself* and that the statue discloses a world *for the very first time*, could not be taken seriously. Even Heideggerian phenomenologists like Julian Young resorted into saying that

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34. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York State University of New York Press, 1996), 245.

35. Michael Arvanitopoulos, *The Statue that Houses the Temple – A Phenomenological Investigation of Western Embodiment Making the Missing Connection between Heidegger and the Greeks*, diss., University of South Florida, 2016.

36. Heidegger may have come face to face with *Blonde Youth* at his visiting the National Archaeological Museum in Athens, in 1967, as he wrote after that he had "… a view that halted the will to understand as it constituted something purely strange. However, this kind of strangeness was not frightening. It led to a world, which had been determined as the inception of a great destiny." In Martin Heidegger, *Sojourns*, State University of New York Press, 2005, p. 45.

Heidegger could not have *really* meant what he claimed in *Origin*; that he was there only being "poetic."[37]

The *Blonde Youth* Is Seer Mood

We recall that Heidegger wrecked the superstructure of Western ontotheology on the single call that god cannot be yet another being. Thus if god cannot be yet another being, and the statue is a being, then the statue cannot be god. Conversely, if Heidegger held that the statue is a god, he must have also seen, without being explicit about it, that the statue is not a being. Thus, much of what remains to be decided, depends on our figuring out whether *Blonde Youth* is a being. The path through which Heidegger may have pursued such proof, i.e., the phenomenological reduction, could have decided this issue, but as we saw Heidegger did not take this path. Nonetheless, while in several of his works Heidegger investigated the relation between art and being, art and the artwork, art, the thing, and equipment; he still never claimed that the statue is not a being and how this would be possible.

Perhaps we could take this path and progress in this direction of establishing this particular "statue's" non-being-ness, by considering that since any other ontological predicates are *derivatives* of mood because mood is the most primordial structure that determines perception, then *the one and only* predicate that the entity in question may retain for itself, is its mood, where moods are not beings. Then, after we may have refreshed our understanding of what is a being, and whether mood is one of them, we could finally determine whether the entity in question is a being.

It is arguable, though we cannot commit to produce such proof here, that the phenomenological reduction of the Greek statue in general, and of *Blonde Youth* in particular, could distill its fundamental ontological essence as nothing but a certain mood. Mood in itself is not what we call a "world being;" it can only be reified as something else than itself, primarily and originally into *human* face and only secondarily into world objects in manufacture and architecture. The initial proof that to some degree moods in general, but more so this mood in particular that we perceive as *Blonde Youth*, are not of this world, is the fact and the reason why the planet's other animals, the ants, the snakes, the birds and the primates do have heads, but they have no face. The head is a kind of an extant being, or part of the world being that we call "body," but mood is not. By not constituting an extant being in itself, mood is coming from without to use the head and make face out of it in a way that the head cannot use mood. Thus by means of its being

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37. Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge University Press, U.K., 2001), 31.

a mood and that alone, the only predicate it can hold on to, *Blonde Youth* is not an innerworldly being.

Phenomenology, Heidegger's predominantly included, has advanced our understanding of reality beyond empiricism and idealism from accepting that there are only two kinds of beings in the world: *extant* beings that *are*, and *intentional* beings that *exist*. The distinction between the two is sharp, although the ontological standing of the beings which merely *are* absolutely depends on the beings that *exist*. Thus when people say that a coffee mug, a primate, a talking computer, or god "exists," they are unwittingly abusing language and fool themselves into an inauthentic relation with the world by transgressing reality with category mistakes from either side of the two kinds of beings. It is a basic principle of phenomenology to recognize the particular meaning the Greeks gave to "existence," from the preposition εκ- (*ek-*) and the verb ἵστημι (*ēstēmi*), meaning something like: "to stand out," "to be open towards what one can be." From the original Greek understanding of "existence" we accept that only an intentional, that is, *finite* consciousness, a being that is *human*, can "exist," because in the *ecstasis* only a human being can step out of itself to be what is yet to be. The thing, on the other hand, "is" only as a *res extensa*, and the gods, being immortal, cannot be ecstatic; at the very best they only *are* just in case they are also found to be extant beings.

If *Blonde Youth* is to belong to our world, that is, if it is a being, it must qualify and be confined within either one of the two ontological qualifications of beings. If not, then it "is" not of this world. In order to "exist" the entity in question must be conscious, with a type of consciousness unlike that of mere living beings which can only die, or as Heidegger puts it, "perish." Existence, on the other hand, requires a consciousness which *understands* that it dies.

Blonde Youth Is Not a Being

As we saw earlier with Steiner, the Homeric Greeks seem to have experienced statues as beings of this type, as beings which exist, since they were indistinguishable from mortals because their *agalmatophany* spilled over into the world of the mortals. But this held only because the realm of mythos could not afford rational questions. Standing out open towards what one can be, is only one, but the *fundamental* ontological condition of existing beings. Besides this, there also apply the *ontic* or factical conditions of existence, now as a living being within the seamless network of life forms within a life-world. Living in the realm of logos is meeting the three biological conditions which determine all living organisms: to use and transform energy, to procreate, and to produce detritus. Arguably the entity in question meets none of these three conditions, therefore it is not alive and thus it does not exist. This checks out the first of just two possibilities for *Blonde Youth* to be a being of this world.

The other possibility would require that this "statue" could retain for itself as subject some ontological predicates in order to justify the copula that it *is* as a *res extensa*. We have already determined that *Blonde Youth* is nothing of what it has uncritically been thought of being (a representation, an idealization, or a historical accident), and thus the copula in proposition that "Blonde Youth *is* a statue," cannot afford predicates of its own in order to define itself. The three possibilities that we excluded may not be exhaustive, for someone may eventually come up with a new, better idea to explain this entity. But for now the entity in question fails the qualification not only of a "statue," but more so even of a *res extensa*, since none of our assumptions which could qualify *Blonde Youth* as a statue are defensible, and since art by itself and independently of the artwork as object does not extend in space.

The entity in question *is* a "statue" only if it is predicated as a representation, or an idealization, a historical accident, or a god. If it is neither of these attributions that predicate a "statue," then it cannot *be* as "statue." But then, what *is* it? Whether it is an ἀγαλμα, that is, a god shining through in Heidegger's understanding in grounding, founding, and bestowing world to its preservers as a mode of knowledge, this is an altogether separate question we have left behind with Greek mythology, German schizophrenia, and Heidegger's alleged poetry. To insist in credulity and granting it ontological status as it were by mere convention under the name "statue" is as a moot point if not altogether nonsensical as if we had agreed to call it a bathroom urinal or a spring vegetable. The ectoplasm is not a statue, for the same reason it is not a urinal or a vegetable: it cannot hold any predicates of its own or of any other object in order to establish its suchness as an eidos, a short of thing, into a legitimate object of perception.

From phenomenological grounds alone, where as Heidegger argued, the reification of the object of perception is *itinerant* within the existential, temporal horizon of the disclosure of beings, one may want to argue that mere convention can indeed legitimatize the object of perception. But even in this "subjective" horizon of interpretation that advances our understanding of reality beyond the shortcomings of empiricism and idealism, even there nothing can survive ontologically that is entirely arbitrary. Heidegger sharply outlined just two conditions under which the object of perception can be reified into a world appearance in the *as*-structure of interpretation: Extant beings *are* either as *present-at-hand*, or as *ready-to-hand*. Beings present-at-hand are those manifesting their eidetic suchness prior to explicit human intervention, but still within the holdings of human interpretation: natural objects such as galaxies, rivers, subatomic particles, milk, etc. On the other hand, beings which appear as ready-to-hand are those which have already undergone explicit human manipulation; they are objects like screwdrivers, submarines, vaccines, ice cream etc. In *either* of these two modes of appearance, objects of perception are reified strictly in terms of

their service*ability*, us*ability*, or detrimenta*lity*, exclusively for a consciousness aware of and resisting its own finitude.[38]

The epistemological scandal that we casually understand as *Blonde Youth* satisfies neither of these two qualifications of appearance in the temporal horizon of disclosure of beings. It is not an object present-at-hand, because it is not a natural object; for some reason we cannot understand it other than as man-made. And it is not a ready-to-hand object, because it is not *instrumental* to the kind of world-dwelling consciousness that has a vested interest to enact the *as*-structure of interpretation in its temporal horizon of disclosure.

In terms of *usability* the entity in question is utterly useless, and the Greek peasants who in Christian times reportedly smashed and furnaced the ancient marbles reducing them to asbestolithic lime in order to plaster with it the walls of their houses, must have had a good old pragmatic grasp of this truism. The statue may have been thought of as useful if it did indeed represent or idealize something other than itself, useful as a means for a certain human community to reflect on itself; but as I have established by reference to another study of mine, this entity is neither a representation or an idealization.

In terms of *serviceability*, the entity in question is completely out of whack from the world-constitutive interrelations and interdependencies that serve the integration of the world's parts to the whole and vice versa. *Blonde Youth* affects no working order in the causal machinations of nature, nor is it affected by them. Since we eliminated the possibilities that it can be either a historical or hermeneutic accident, *Blonde Youth* is not part of the historical process and of natural law. Since Plato people have somehow accepted that the statue was made by an artist. But this assumption is only part of the cover up, since nobody has been able to answer Heidegger's seemingly naïve question by which we began our inquiry: "On the usual view, the work arises out of and by means of the activity of the artist. But by what and whence is the artist what his is?"

As for the third and last possibility, that *Blonde Youth* may have reified to appear in perception because of its *detrimental* effects to beings that exist in their resisting what resists their will to live, this ectoplasm seems pretty innocuous. It has not threatened or harmed anyone yet, save perhaps a handful of Germans with weak knees for serenity and simplicity. The tyranny that is *Blonde Youth* is nothing that we can think of, except maybe this very tyranny.

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38. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 135.

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