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Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts

Published by the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER)

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- Dr. Stephen Andrew Arbury, Head, [Arts & Culture Unit](#), ATINER, Professor of Art History & Director of the RU Art Museum, Radford University, USA.

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The *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts (AJHA)* is an Open Access quarterly double-blind peer reviewed journal and considers papers all areas of arts and humanities, including papers on history, philosophy, linguistics, language, literature, visual and performing arts. Many of the in this journal have been presented at the various conferences sponsored by the [Arts, Humanities and Education Division](#) of the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER). All papers are subject to ATINER's [Publication Ethical Policy and Statement](#).

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The current issue is the first of the tenth volume of the *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts (AJHA)*, published by the Arts, Humanities and Education Division of ATINER.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
ATINER



Athens Institute for Education and Research

A World Association of Academics and Researchers

14th Annual International Conference on Visual and Performing Arts **5-8 June 2023, Athens, Greece**

The [Arts & Culture Unit](#) of ATINER is organizing its **14th Annual International Conference on Visual and Performing Arts, 5-8 June 2023, Athens, Greece** sponsored by the [Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts](#). The aim of the conference is to bring together academics and researchers of visual and performing arts, and other related disciplines. You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair of a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (<https://www.atiner.gr/2023/FORM-ART.doc>).

Academic Members Responsible for the Conference

- **Dr. Stephen Andrew Arbury**, Head, [Arts & Culture Unit](#), ATINER and Professor of Art History, Radford University, USA.

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Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **7 March 2023**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **8 May 2023**

Social and Educational Program

The Social Program Emphasizes the Educational Aspect of the Academic Meetings of Atiner.

- Greek Night Entertainment (This is the official dinner of the conference)
- Athens Sightseeing: Old and New-An Educational Urban Walk
- Social Dinner
- Mycenae Visit
- Exploration of the Aegean Islands
- Delphi Visit
- Ancient Corinth and Cape Sounion

Conference Fees

Conference fees vary from 400€ to 2000€
Details can be found at: <https://www.atiner.gr/fees>



Athens Institute for Education and Research

A World Association of Academics and Researchers

8th Annual International Symposium on Religion & Theology **22-25 May 2023, Athens, Greece**

The [Humanities & Education Division](https://www.atiner.gr/2023/FORM-REL.doc) of ATINER is organizing its **8th Annual International Symposium on Religion & Theology, 22-25 May 2023, Athens, Greece**. The aim of the conference is to bring together academics and researchers of Religion, Theology and other related disciplines. You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair of a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (<https://www.atiner.gr/2023/FORM-REL.doc>).

Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **21 February 2023**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **24 April 2023**

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference

- **Dr. William O'Meara**, Academic Member, ATINER & Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University, USA.

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More information can be found here: <https://www.atiner.gr/social-program>

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Details can be found at: <https://www.atiner.gr/fees>

Idioms and the Directness of Language in Politics

By Marija Liudvika Drazdauskiene*

This is a functional study of the use of idioms in publications on politics, simultaneously deliberating on the question of how the directness of language forms its result and how it functions in the social context of native speakers. Idioms are shown to have been widely used in publications on politics and their expressive meaning has been exploited with a purpose in political contexts. Semantic and functional analysis of idioms has shown that, despite their direct and pointed meaning, idioms are favoured by journalists much to the satisfaction of their audience. An analysis of diplomatic language in one article indicated a contrast with the journalistic language without criticizing it. Both styles of language have been found to have their audience and appreciation. But the direct language of journalists appears to oblige the author to comply with a license of usage, which only a native speaker can satisfy.

Introduction

This paper asks whether the tone and attitude in political articles to which the use of idioms contributes is their appreciated feature. The fact is that idioms, although recommended in use, are not very frequent in modern conversation if we exclude phrasal verbs, nor are they very frequent in modern fiction, except in some novels which incorporate idioms stylistically (cf., quite frequent idioms on ten opening pages of the novel, *The Seven Sisters*, by Margaret Drabble). The material for this article has been collected in three years while listening to the BBC World Service and reading publications on their website, at www.bbcworldservice/news, reading quality papers in the British (*The Guardian*, *The Telegraph*, *The Spectator*), and American press (*The Washington post*, *The New Yorker*) online for three years (2018-2021). The material has been analysed by close reading and contextual methods. Semantic analysis of the idioms collected has also been used. But the approach has been and generalizations have been made within the framework of functional linguistics.

To detail on the methods used, close reading is a way of study-like reading focusing on facts and constituent details in the text to discover individual and striking features of the text and its composition together with the author's focus and the line and reason of his argument.¹ This analytical reading is based on inductive reasoning and was most widely used in the analysis of poetry.² In the

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1. Patricia Kain, *How to Do a Close Reading* (Writing Center, Harvard University, 1998).

2. A Short Guide to Close Reading for Literary Analysis. 2021. DOI=<https://writing.wisc.edu/handbook/assignments/closereading/>. [Accessed 14 July 2021].

present paper, close reading was the first step in the analysis of political articles to understand the author's focus, to draw parallels with the events as generally reported on, to find out the sense and point in his use of idioms. Simultaneously, the meaning of individual idioms was studied while differentiating whether the definitions were given in the Aristotelian or the functional model, especially that the standard dictionaries did not include all the idioms that were found current in political articles and such resources as www.google.com/search had to be used additionally. Differences in the kinds of definitions of the idioms were most prominent when rare (as for example, *canary in the coal mine* = an early warning of danger; *as vanilla as they come* = ordinary, with no extra features; etc.) or occasional idioms (for example, Bollocks to Brexit, conducted on the hoof, pig's in a trough moment, aware of bottleneck, rebottled under new name, Stockholm syndrome, etc.) were defined. In the latter case, the Aristotelian definition was rare because most of these idioms were defined on www.google.com/search specifically interpreting the meaning of the concrete idioms in concrete articles. These were obviously singular cases of the use of the idioms and only the model of the functional definition could be used. The meaning of idioms and semantic differences in their definitions were helpful in gathering proof of the author's argument and his line of reasoning while minding the author's possible individual preferences.

The contextual method, which means "'situating" the text within the milieu of its times and assessing the roles of author, readers (intended and actual)... in the perception of the text,"³ was the method which grounded the functional evaluation of the use of idioms and was the closing stage in the analysis. Technically, this stage was also the least detailed and a contrast to the close reading method, but it was a consecutive build-up on the previous analysis.

An Overview of Known Publications

The term 'idiom' is used in this paper to mean what is sometimes called idioms proper or "a group of (more or less) fixed words having a meaning not deducible from those of the individual words."⁴

This succinct definition does not elaborate on the meaning of idioms, which is not limited to the general concept which sums up their content. For instance, *to see the light*, which means 'to finally understand or accept sth, especially sth obvious', and *to jump the gun*, which means to do sth too soon, before the right time', are stylistically neutral. Except for the concrete word 'gun', which is suggestive, these idioms do not imply anything about the attitude of the speaker

3. Behrendt, *Using Contextual Analysis to Evaluate Texts* (2008) DOI=<http://English.unl.edu/sbehrendt/StudyQuestions/ContextualAnalysis.html>. [Accessed 14 July 2021].

4. Sylvia Chalker and Edmund Weiner, *The Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar* (Oxford University Press, 1994), 195.

when they are used. But most idioms are not stylistically neutral. For instance, apart from the meaning 'to do sth that upsets the situation and causes problems', the idiom, *to rock the boat*, is informal, which means that the speaker who uses it treats the situation and the participants casually, perhaps even negligently. Similarly, *the spoils of office*, which means 'the advantages or profit that somebody gets from being in a certain position', is not neutral either. It is formal or literary, and so the speaker who uses it covers somewhat the advantages implied and puts his meaning delicately. In the previous case of an informal idiom, the speaker may offend, and in the latter case of a formal idiom, the speaker may sound polite and reserved. Although these idioms are not included in the illustrative examples further in this article, they have been taken from articles on politics in which informal and bold idioms are many.

The stylistic and attitudinal meaning of idioms is latent in the dictionary definition of their meaning but becomes activated when idioms are used. That is why the latent meaning of idioms is referred to in this paper as their potential meaning. The potential meaning of a language is a substantial subject and spreads over verbal units of different kinds.⁵

Modern American authors⁶ have found drawbacks in the concise definition of idioms quoted above. They amplified on the definition and elaborated the interpretation of the meaning of idioms within the transformational framework.

Without taking a thorough overview, studies in English idioms have been mainly descriptive and pedagogical. Over one hundred years ago, Berlitz⁷ published *English Idioms and Grammar*, in which he proposed a way of teaching English through reading, retelling and discussing anecdotes, which are the shortest stories, and through memorizing the vocabulary in the stories. This method of learning a language through reproducing stories orally and in writing has been retained to this day, but back then, the recommended vocabulary was essentially idioms, plus individual words and a few chunks, in present-day terms. Except for *The Essentials of English Grammar* in the second part of this book, nothing more is said of idioms by Berlitz.

A little earlier, a study of English and German idioms⁸ based on the method of Gaspey-Otto-Sauer was published with a claim that a student who "wishes to acquire a thorough knowledge of a language" will find it "absolutely necessary ... to master its 'idiomatic' intricacies". This author clarified the distinction between a phrase and an idiom and found idioms arranged under certain

5. Marija L. Drazdauskiene-Rutkauskaite, *Language and Usage: Potentialities and Problems* (Wszechnica Polska Szkoła Wyższa w Warszawie, 2016), 26-27, 169-214.

6. Geoffrey Nunberg, Ivan A. Sag and Thomas Wasow, "Idioms," *Language* 70, no. 3 (1994): 491-538.

7. M. D. Berlitz, *English Idioms and Grammar* (New York, Paris, London: The Berlitz School, 1915).

8. Franz Lange, *Handbook of English and German Idioms* (Heidelberg: Julius Groos, 1893).

headings a preferred way of idiom presentation in his book to the alphabetical order of words which was more fitting in a work of reference. He further stated that thematically arranged idioms were to be “a book the contents of which should gradually be committed to memory” (p. iv). About 3000 English and German idioms were recorded in groups under the headings of Advantage, Age, Error, Escape, Harmony, Time and others. It is interesting that he included groups of idioms for prepositions, such as For, Within, Without and others. This publication witnessed the age of translation-grammar method based on reading rather than conversation practice.

Owing to their fixed structure, rich and literally non-deducible meaning often evaluative and informal, idioms proper and even idiomatic expressions or chunks always attracted the attention of teachers and insightful learners. This interest can be motivated even theoretically because their verbal and contextual (informal, formal, humorous, disapproving, literary, etc.) meaning make idioms a major lexical resource of the potential meaning of language in which the expository power of language resides. Learners were supposed to learn idioms as ready units, which were to improve their fluency in conversation. But idioms proper do not seem to be very frequent in daily conversation in the twenty-first century, mainly because of their sharp stylistic meaning. It seems wise to warn foreign learners of this meaning of idioms and to caution them not to be too relaxed in dropping idioms casually without having given them a thought and without having had a deep understanding of their meaning. It seems twice wise to remind learners of the difference between what is allowed to a native speaker and a foreigner. No foreigner would go far wrong if he minds the sharp meaning of idioms.

Focusing on native speakers, authors of recent studies of idioms have found that idioms in conversation “draw people together in a way that plain speech doesn’t.”⁹ This is credible because of the rich evaluating meaning of idioms in which individual listeners have a sharing.

Yet minding the stylistic meaning of idioms, it is only the person who owns the language that can pick and use idioms indiscriminately. Such a person is familiar with the subtle shades of meaning of every idiom, with their customary currency and can be bold. His reactions are instinctive and trustworthy. But a foreigner, who often knows the meaning of an idiom only approximately and has no familiarity with its currency, is quite likely to err. It would be disastrous if such a foreigner spoke with confidence and missed the right stress and emphasis on the idioms chosen, because errors in bold speech trigger irritation in the listening

9. Paul Drew and Elizabeth Holt, “Complainable Matters: The Use of Idiomatic Expressions in Making Complaints,” *Social Problems* 35, no. 4 (1988): 398-417.

native speakers.¹⁰ If hypercorrect pronunciation accompanied by faulty grammar triggers a native speaker's aggravation, semantic errors may be even more disastrous.

As grievances of the War receded, humanitarian studies amplified. A couple of decades after the Second World War, descriptive studies of idioms of different languages were abundant in the 1960s and 1970s in Eastern Europe, which was in line with descriptive linguistics of the century. The incentive to studies of idioms was again their rich, colorful and autonomous meaning.¹¹ Doctor Kameneckaite's name should be highlighted among these authors: her work was really essential because of her exceptional knowledge of the languages of which she wrote. Otherwise, like all descriptive studies, descriptive studies of idioms, ended with what they had started: it was the material analysed more or less deeply that won the day.

As with Charles Fries and, later, with L G Alexander, the learning of English was turning to activating structural patterns, idioms were commented on in textbooks in as much as the sense of the texts in them required. Idioms were not difficult to memorize because of their colorful meaning but learners were not always advised against too liberal use of idioms by foreigners. As every idiom or an idiomatic unit presents a little story in itself, which accounts for its meaning, idioms were also used as a resource in exercises to initiate learners to speak.

As dictionaries of idioms increased in number¹² and were practically more useful than their descriptive studies, the latter gradually diminished. Functional studies of idioms have not been widely known¹³ nor have been studies of the potential meaning of idioms. Modern books for teaching English idioms¹⁴ have

10. Karol Janicki, *The Foreigner's Language in a Sociolinguistic Perspective* (Poznan: UAM, 1982), 55-64.

11. N. Kameneckaite, *Sinonimi w anglijskiej frazeologii* (Moskva: Meždunarodnije Otnošenija, 1971); A. V. Kunin, *Anglijskaja frazeologija* (Moskva: Higher School, 1970); Kunin, *Frazeologija of Modern English Language. A Systemic Description* (Moskva: Meždunarodnije Otnošenija, 1972); N. A. Shekhtman, *A Handbook of English Idioms and Idiomatic Usage* (Leningrad: Prosveshchenije, 1971); I. Shishkina and R. Finkelstein, *Geflügelte Worte, Their Origin and Meaning* (Leningrad: Prosveshchenije, 1972); V. P. Felitsyna and Y. E. Prokhorov, *Russian Proverbs, Sayings and Winged Words. A Sociolinguistic Dictionary* (Moscow: The Russian Language, 1979); V. M. Ogoltsev, *Common Russian Similes. An Illustrated Dictionary for Speakers of English* (Moskva: The Russian Language, 1984).

12. Longman, *The Longman Dictionary of English Idioms* (Longman Group Limited, 1979); John Ayto, *The Oxford Dictionary of English Idioms* (Oxford University Press, 2010); "Something to Crow About". A Concise Collection of American English Idioms for Everyday Use (Washington, D.C.: The Materials Development and Review Branch, 1993).

13. I. A. Fedosov, *The Functional-Stylistic Differentiation of Russian Phraseology* (Rostov University Press, 1977).

14. Felicity O'Dell and Michael McCarthy, *English Idioms Advanced with Answers* (2010); Sandra Anderson and Cheryl Pelteret, *Work on Your Idioms* (HerperCollins Publishers, 2012).

been very well worked out and help learners to master English idioms. They are not limited only to colorful idioms, either, and include more mundane expressions such as *a grey area*, *to get the picture*, *up to speed*, *rack your brains* and other idioms of this kind. Other modern authors¹⁵ claim they supplement the existing sources with very modern idioms from current use because “most teaching and reference materials on English idioms are intuition based and include seldom used idioms and incorrect descriptions of their meaning”. This is almost true as numerous idioms which are used in the press appear not to be recorded in available dictionaries.

Thematic studies of idioms have been rare.¹⁶ In this book, the author discusses analytically components in the notion of work, such as professions of the persons in idioms, jobs and the measurement of work (pp. 35-47, 58-62), their qualifications, quality of work and its evaluations (pp. 58-75), man as worker and a worker as man and his inclination to work (pp. 76-98), interpersonal relations at work, professions of persons at work (pp. 20-21, 98-108) and relations at work (pp. 98-108), their qualifications and evaluations, quality and evaluations (pp. 76-84), and the semiotic symbolism of work (pp. 109-125). The book concludes on the worlds of work as collective memory of the speaking community, which reflects social and historical heritage (pp. 126-157), and which is summed up as national conceptual content. It is relevant to mention here that Fedosov (1977) mentioned above also states that culture and national character are reflected in connotative rather than denotative content of idioms. Dr Kameneckaite discussed these questions drawing on the meaning of English, French, German, Russian and Lithuanian idioms. Because of rich and inclusive meaning of idioms, the mentioned aspects of the notion of work were deducible and could be illustrated. The semiotic symbolism of work in idioms in this book deserves a highlight.

The author describes the semiotic symbolism of work in idioms of five languages. She finds that *the hand* is the common and typical symbol of the principal tool for work in all five languages. “The richest is the semiotic representation of work in Lithuanian phraseology” (p. 109). In the group of kinetic symbols of work in Lithuanian, she singles out *the feet* in different movements, accompanied by idioms which include other anatomical parts of the body: *the back*, *the hump*, *the navel*, mainly in verbal idioms. In contrast to *the hand*, *the foot* idiomatically expresses superficial performance at work. “Lithuanian is the only language which symbolises hard work by images of parts of the face” (pp. 110-112). Parts of the hand (finger(s), nail(s)) often symbolize the quality of work and measure the amount of work. While symbolising manual work, the nail seems to symbolize man’s very first tool, according to Lithuanian phraseology (p.113). Work is so

15. D. S. Liu, *The Most Frequently Used Spoken American English Idioms: A Corpus Analysis and its Implications* (Tesol Quarterly. Wiley Online Library, 2003).

16. Nedda Strazhas-Kamenckaite, *The World of Work* (Graz: Gazer Linguistische Monographien 6, 1990).

essentially symbolised in Lithuanian idioms that “death is deemed not as an end to life, but as an end to work” (p. 119).

“Like in Lithuanian, the French upper limb is represented by three images, *le bras, la main* and *le doigt*” (p. 119). But in contrast to Lithuanian idiomatic symbolism, where ‘the finger symbolizes a small amount of work, *le doigt* symbolises high quality craftsmanship” (p. 120). The peculiarly “French coherent semiotic set centers around the symbol of *breath*” and *the foot* (pp. 120-121). In contrast to Lithuanian, *the foot* is an efficient instrument in French idiomatic symbolism.

In English work phraseology, *arm, hand* and *finger* feature and carry symbolic meaning, but their “semantic domains and representations are quite different” (p. 121). The symbol of the tool is not as abstract as in Lithuanian. “The semantic domain of *the hand* in the function of tool is strictly limited” (p. 122). It indicates stages of work and duration process by concrete reference, supposedly in accord with analytic semantics of this language. *The finger*, which appears episodically in English work phraseology, indicates hard work like it does in Lithuanian phraseology.

Only one symbol of work, *ruka* – hand, appears in Russian phraseology. It appears most frequently as a symbol of tool, but “does not build as much as a semiotic set” (p. 122). Russian verbal phraseology with *hand* has analogies in Lithuanian. But “when the Russian idiom has an identical or close counterpart in Lithuanian, the latter phraseology has more synonyms to express the notion whereas in the Russian it is usually the only one” (p. 123). Like in Lithuanian, *the foot* is an “anti-instrument” in Russian phraseology.

The arm, the finger and *the nail* have different symbolic functions in German phraseology, but *the hand* takes a significant part among coherent images of work. Like in English, the German *hand* symbolises careless work but only when it is left. *The bone* is a specific symbol in German work phraseology where it indicates exhaustion and hard work (pp. 124-125). This overview indicates the volume of work phraseology and of the subject in the five languages.

The world of work generally, (Part IV of the book under review), is represented colourfully in idioms of the five languages while indicating the landscape of the country, the workers and their spirit. This is mainly the picture in Lithuanian phraseology, which is not devoid of humour and of essential respect for hard work. The world of work in French idioms indicates division between physical and mental work, different social classes at work, different institutions and people of all walks of life. In contrast to Lithuanian, peasants take only a small part in French phraseology. *The horse*, for instance, in French idioms is mainly a riding horse rather than a draft animal. Praise is rare and reserved in Lithuanian phraseology, while French idioms lavish praise and compliments. If the idle are urged directly to work in Lithuanian phraseology, French idioms express negative feelings, ranging from scorn to mockery, to overzealous exertion (p. 142).

Social stratification is also traced in German world of work. Farmers are represented even less than in French idioms, but industrial work and landscape is richer in German phraseology where even names of work and office places are included. Work idioms in German bypass familiarity through colloquial. Like French idioms, German idioms reflect the importance of and reverence to social groups at work. Elevated attitude to work also shows in German literary quotations from their classics, which have been assimilated in German idioms. The omniscient voice in German idioms is neutral or level in tone, while the commanding voice of the superior urging someone to do his duty is loud and clear (pp. 145-146). There is quite "a lot of praise of the skilled workman which, more like in Lithuanian than in French, is rather reserved and free of exaggeration" (p. 147).

The world of work in Russian phraseology is fragmentary. Russian idioms reflect the image of the street, different social voices of those at work and non-urban activities. Attitude to lazy and vigorous work is also reflected in Russian idioms. "The joy at well-done work is expressed with exhilaration verging on jubilation (as if anticipating a well-deserved celebration)" (p. 150).

The English working world is "as stratified as French and German" (p. 151). Quite heavy images associate with farm work, and peasantry is related to the image of the horse. Craftsmen and servants also feature as images in English idioms. Employees and officials "do not at all enjoy the respect and certainly not the veneration of their German counterparts" (p. 151). Industrial labour is quite central in the world of work in English idioms. The attitude to the worker is low. He is reduced to a quality less than that of a human being. The atmosphere in the world of work is bleak and social differentiation is not marked. Hard work is "additionally referred to by ... phrasal verbs (which pithily disclose the essence of the activity)" (p. 153). More idioms than in other languages describe forced hard work in English phraseology, as they do "orders to start work, work better, faster" (p. 154). In topical contrast, "an impressive number of idioms ... denote an easy and/or lucrative job in different spheres" in English (p. 154). "Praise of good work is very scarce. The poetical *a son of toil* stands in complete isolation: ..." (p. 154). Criticism of hard work is as scarce. English idioms in the world of work indicate "two antagonistic classes – the employers and the employed" (p. 155). "There is no trace of the *joie de vivre* /in English idioms/ which emanates from the Lithuanian world in which people work no less but in different social conditions" (p. 155).

Dr Strazhas-Kameneckaite finds all five work phraseologies ... markedly individual. Similarities and differences "in the phraseological reflection of the concept of work are determined entirely by the *experiential* factor and not linguistic contact or absence thereof" (p. 156). Idioms are found to reflect the speaking community's cultural and historical heritage.

Dr Kameneckaite's systemic study of the world of work in idioms of the five languages shows how rich in content these units are. It is an exhaustive study but

neither its methodology nor its discoveries could be used as a model in the present study of idioms in politics. Her analysis of idioms and insights into their meaning, though, have been a guidance and resource for the present study. The present study generalises within the framework of functional linguistics as it focuses on idioms in use.

Analysis of the Material

Idioms in political articles online, in the press and on radio are frequent. They make a varied collection. Topically, idioms in political publications differ thematically and stylistically: they include those referring to endurance (*to stick it out*,), difficulties, stress and challenge (*to have cold feet*, *infml*, *to be in hot water*, *to be put on the hook*, *'cold turkey' jobless surge*), disregard (*throw caution to the wind*), drawing limits (*defending red lines*), respect, tolerance, help (*to give sb the benefit of the doubt*, *to bail sb out of sth*), changes (*to turn a corner*,), postponement, future (*to kick down the road*), influence and coercion (*to bring sb to heel*, *eating out of his hand*, *to take sb down*, *to take the wind out of their sails*, *infml*, *to pull the plug on sth*), liberation (*to let sb off the hook*,), neglect (*to throw into the long grass*,) to react, to find a way (*to think on your feet*, *to cut corners*, *disapproving*, *to fill their shoes*), evaluation (*too good to be true*, *not a whit*, *was completely bananas*), completing, performing (*may have done his dash*), to improve ameliorate (*to sugarcoat*), to criticise (*to throw cold water on sth.*). This list is endless.

Presenting an overview of the idioms descriptively, it has been found that idioms related to political processes make the largest group. E.g.:

1. High stakes Democrat debate has Sanders *in crosshairs* (A title. BBC News, 26 Feb 20)
2. Trump's State of the Union speech writers *have thrown in the towel* (*infml*) The Guardian, 5 Feb 20)
3. Democrats *begged to differ* with IO and RT ... staging a walkout... (The Guardian, Wed Briefing, 5 Feb 20)
4. The promise ... to "limit arbitrary tax advantages for the wealthiest in society" was *hot air* (*infml*, *disappr.*) (The Guardian, 12 March 20)
5. The government has made tweaks to the benefit system but it has not addressed *the elephant in the room*: the five-week delay for universal credit (The Times & Sun Times, 13 March 20)
6. It (*ie Teresa May's announced Office for Tracking Injustices*) doesn't exist – it is never going to exist"... "It *has been thrown into the long grass.* ..." (www.theguardian.com..., 22 March 20)
7. ... 2020 is going to be a *'make-or-beak' year* for Brasil, ... (bbc.com, 23 March 20)
8. ... that it's time *to cut the government some slack* (*infml*) (www.theguardian.com..., 8 May 20)

9. Boris Johnson was accused of *being out of his depth* by critics and even by some supporters... (The Spectator, 20 May 20)

Yet, except for the rather formal 'begged to differ', the meaning of most of these idioms is general and so they can be used intelligently in any context. There have also been recorded idioms which were closer bound to political contexts judging by their specific meaning or by the language in which they were used. E.g.:

10. Big UK firms have been accused of *dragging their feet* on diversity targets (The Guardian, Wed briefing, 5 February 20)
11. We devote three pages to... the victims... and the drugs that might one day *bring it to heel* (The Economist, 12 March 20)
12. If you want to understand why older people had to "*take it on the chin*", look to Boris Johnson's government (The Guardian, 8 May 20)
13. Miliband was *as vanilla as they come* and was still crucified (The Guardian, 5 Feb 20)
14. The FT *goes off piste* with UK admitting "German testing model offers route out of virus lockdown" (The Guardian briefing, 8 Apr 20)
15. Andrew Haywood, professor of infectious disease epidemiology at University College London, said that the country was "*on the cusp*" of being able to vaccinate older populations and it would be tragic "to throw away the gains made in suppressing coronavirus (The Telegraph, 19 Nov 20)
16. ... it was the second world war ... that national security, even national survival, required shared sacrifice, and that public support ... was necessary and appropriate *quid pro quo* (The Guardian, Mon briefing, 30 March 20)

Except for 'throw in the towel', 'hot air' and 'cut some slack', most of the idioms quoted above are neutral or technical and so appropriate in political contexts. But idioms of more general meaning which seem to be borrowed from routine are also used in articles on politics and add different evaluative senses to the contexts. E.g.:

17. On the other side, we have populists seeking *to fight* populism *tooth and nail*, even if this means playing into arguably not-so-democratic relations... (The Guardian, 14 Feb 20)
18. On Tuesday night, Biden tried *to take him* (ie Steyer) *down a peg*, by criticising Steyer's investment in a company that ran private prisons... (bbc.com/news..., 26 Feb 20)
19. ... Joe Biden expressed exasperation, sardonically saying, "I know you *cut me off* every time, but I'm not going to be quiet anymore" (bbc.com/news..., 26 Feb 20)

20. ... Japan has warned that the coronavirus outbreak could “*throw cold water*” on preparations for Tokyo 2021 (The Guardian, 5 Feb 20)
21. The Telegraph has “social media bosses face duty of care protection with heads of companies to be *put on the hook* for online harm)The Guardian, 6 Feb 20)
22. We asked three experts what the rules of social distancing are, and how to maintain them if you live with someone who’s *throwing caution to the wind* (The Guardian, Tue briefing, 17 March 20)
23. As the Prime Minister appears *to turn a corner*, fit 40-year-old Dani Schuchman tells how he never thought the virus would hand him in intensive care (The Telegraph, 8 Apr 20)

As the quoted examples show, the topically neutral idioms have been drawn from the contexts of sport and the pandemic, which are political only in as much as these matters happen to be politicized and as they are attended to by governments. When the contexts are not strictly political, the thematic character of the idioms seems to alter accordingly.

In contrast to idioms used in routine, authors writing on politics use idioms related to sports, games and contest. E.g.:

24. Donald Trump *has gained ground* on his probable challenge in November presidential election and is in a “*near tie*” with Joe Biden, ... (The Guardian, 29 March 20)
25. According to the realclearpolitics.com polling average, ..., Wisconsin *is a tie* (The Guardian, 29 March 20)
26. A Huawei executive and a Pentagon official *met toe to toe* in San Francisco this week,,, (The Telegraph, 28 Feb 20)
27. But unlike New York City, where Pabon lived previously and found people usually *hold their cards close to their chest*, residents here are “always willing to listen and provide sound advice” (bbc.com/news..., 23 March 20)
28. ... the PM has undertaken screeching U-turn on Brexit before, so an extension could very quickly *return to the cards* (The Guardian, 15 Apr 20)
29. Earlier this year, Boris Johnson described fighting coronavirus as being a bit like ‘*whack-a-mole*’. That game has only become more intense since then, with the UK death toll now passing 60,000 and a talk of a fourth tier of even tougher restriction for areas where the virus continues to spread. /.../ And none of these issues are short-term ones, either. It’s going to be a very long winter of *playing whack-a-mole* for the Prime Minister. (The Spectator, Evening blend, 27 Oct 20)

(**Whack-a-mole** is a game in an amusement arcade in which players use a mallet to hit toy moles, which appear at random, back in their holes (google.com/oxford -languages, 19 May 21)).

The use of sports terminology in politics is an international stereotype. It is unobtrusive in the politics of major countries but may be ludicrous in small countries, in which politicians are made to struggle in the grip of various minor and nasty wicked groups. So, politics in small countries becomes really like the game whack-a-mole and therefore the stereotypical sport-like reference is ludicrous or cynical.

Authors of articles on politics also use idiomatic expressions, quotations and allusions drawn from original contexts in which the quotations were initially used. The meaning of these units is no less colorful than that of idioms proper, while their use compares or suggests a comparison with earlier ways and actions of politicians to make the reader and even the politicians wiser. E.g.:

30. (*Politics ain't a beanbag*, as the old saying goes (bbc.com/news/world-us-canada..., 26 Feb 20)
31. ..., Biden was ready with his rejoinder, "*Where we come from, that's called Tommy come lately*", he quipped (bbc.com/news/world..., 26 Feb 20)

According to www.google.com/search?..., *politics ain't a beanbag* is one of the best known aphorisms Peter Dunne originated, referring to the rough side of political campaigns. This quote was a fitting choice by Joe Biden in earlier stages of the election campaign. *Tommy come lately* comes from the words of the same speaker and context. It means someone who has only recently started a job or activity and has suddenly become very successful. It was Joe Biden's rejoinder in his critical and ironical response to Steyer's statement, in the Democratic debate, in which Steyer claimed he had sold his stock in private prisons known for human-rights abuses and had helped fund a bank to support black-owned businesses. Drawn from a novel published in the nineteenth century, this quote was a precise and biting quip to the man who pretended to have elevated his moral stance.

Other quotations and allusions of this kind are too obvious to require a lengthy introduction. E.g.:

32. Barry Eichengreen says there is reason to hope that current crisis could *pound the last nail into the coffin* of the Thatcher-Reagan revolution (The Guardian, Tue briefing, 30 March 20)
33. As Fraser Nelson points out in his column, Cummings' brand of damn-the-rest, relentless focus and ruthlessness *bailed the Tories out of a very deep hole* last autumn (The Telegraph, 13 Nov 20)

As the idiom, *last nail in(to) the coffin of sb*, has an international currency and as Margaret Thatcher was a contemporary of the yet living generation of people, this idiom requires no comment, except that to write *to pound the last nail* instead of *to drive it* is to hyperbolise it by way of laying emphasis on the unwanted economic changes initiated by the then British PM Margaret Thatcher and the American President of that time. The second idiom (33) is limited to a concrete issue to which the criticised adviser to the PM contributed while rescuing the Conservatives from a difficult political situation a year before. The article states that, as the PM himself was not very consistent nor successful in his actions, the criticised adviser in his cabinet was helpful despite the latter's disagreeable tactics among other likewise weak members of the cabinet. It can be noticed that, however expressive and context-bound, most of the idioms quoted above are not limited in their use to exceptionally political contexts. Because of the wealth of the content of each individual idiom, most of the idioms quoted above can also be used in routine contexts. Cf: *What do you mean to drag your feet like the state companies in diversity targets?* Like all repeat references and allusions, this kind of back reference to a political context would make the idiom richer in meaning. Yet, some of the quoted idioms retain their neutral fixed idiomatic meaning whether in politics or fiction. Cf.:

34. Boris Johnson was accused of *being out of his depth* by critics and even by some supporters... (The Spectator, 20 March 20)
35. 'It won't be my fault if it (*ie a bridesmaid's dress*) doesn't. I told you to come home earlier to have it fitted. And as for sending your measurements in centimetres, Miss McCabe (*the dressmaker*) *was quite out of her depth*.' 'There aren't any inches in Paris.' (Margaret Drabble. *A Summer Bird-Cage*. Penguin, 1967, p.13).

To sum up at this point, it can be said that the language of authors and journalists writing on political questions or on questions in the news is colourful and emotion-marked rather than tentative. Neutral and informal idioms proper come in succession with colourful non-idiomatic phrases, emotive hyperboles, metaphors and context-bound humorous expressions. E.g.:

36. ...France's president Emmanuel Macron was among *the first out of the gate* when his government refused to give stimulus funds to airlines that would not take steps to dramatically reduce emissions (The Guardian, 10 Dec 20)
37. This recovery is a chance to undertake visionary, transformative investments that were previously deemed too risky or expensive and push *while the door is ajar*. The opportunity won't last forever (The Guardian, 10 Dec 20)

38. "Dishi Rishi the influencer *falls flat* in his big budget moment (A title – The Guardian Today, 4 March 21)
39. DUP leader Arlene Foster and Sinn Féin Vice President Michelle O'Neill *locked horns* (*infml*) over whether the Irish and British governments could be trusted to fix the Northern Ireland protocol (The Spectator, 4 March 21)
40. Labour will be holding a lunchtime event in Stevenage featuring Dawn Butler, the shadow minister for women and equalities, who announced last night she would be *throwing her hat into the ring* for the job of deputy Labour leader)The Guardian, 8 Nov 19)
41. Amid shutdowns and snowstorms, small businesses stretch to keep staff safe, dinners warm and inspectors *out of their hair* (The New Yorker, 22 Feb 21)
42. The Express amplifies the government's "blame the French" line with "What a cheek! EU blocks talks *at 11th hour*" (The Guardian, Fri briefing, 4 Dec 20)
43. Boris Johnson has made a "*cast iron*" *pledge* that he will not allow Scotland to hold a second independence referendum, regardless of the election result, ... (The Guardian, 8 Nov 19)
44. Senator Bernie Sanders said that Republican senators were "afraid *to stand up to* Trump, despite knowing he had lost. ...we should all be nervous about ... the degree to which Trump intimidates and scares *the hell out* (*infml*) of Republican members of Congress", he said (The Guardian, 12 Nov 20)
45. A Labour spokesperson said: "On the day the UK became the first country in Europe to report 50,000 coronavirus deaths and the public endure another lockdown, Boris Johnson's government is *fighting like rats in a sack over* who gets what job" (The Guardian, 12 Nov 20)
46. A book by an anonymous "senior official" at the White House has described Donald Trump as being *like a "12-year-old in an air traffic control tower"*, ... (The Guardian, 8 Nov 19)
47. Don't count on it (i.e., a 12 December general election), says James Forsyth, politics has never been more changeable, never harder to predict. In his diary, Nick Timothy says that the Tories are making a better fist of the strategy set for his old boss, Teresa May: he says she was on the right lines but '*folded faster than a Brompton bike*' in the face of EU intransigence (The Spectator. Weekly highlights, 31 Oct 19)
48. From the beginning of the Democrats impeachment inquiry in September to the end on Wednesday, the nation has been divided on whether Trump should be removed from office. And – surprise – Americans' opinions on impeachment are *baked into their political views* (The Washington Post, 6 Feb 20)

Idioms are also used paraphrased depending on the context and on the intended emphasis or point made. E.g.:

49. Boris Johnson says he wants *to have his cake and eat*, but the true master of *cakeism* is Orban. He simultaneously uses both the Brussels cake and lurid “stop Brussels” propaganda to consolidate his own power (The Guardian, 21 June 19)

The idiom, *to have your cake and eat it*, means to have the advantages of sth without its disadvantages or to have both things that are available. The reference to Boris Johnson here is, firstly, direct in the context of Brexit negotiations. But, secondly, the British PM is an allusion to bring out Victor Orban, the Hungarian counterpart's, brazen behaviour in Europe's political context. That is why, even a neologism ‘cakeism’ is used to strike the note about Victor Orban, which is backed by a further blunt interpretation of Hungary's role.

50. Neither she nor EU leaders want a hard no-deal Brexit. But probably the only way for her to avoid it is *to eat the humblest of humble pies* and jog back to the deal her departed Brexit secretary, David Davis, naively thought he had been mandated to negotiate – a more conventional free trade agreement based on Canada's deal with the UK (The Spectator, 21 Nov 18).

The idiom, *to eat one's humble pie*, means to admit that one is wrong or say that one is sorry for something that one has done or said. In the article quoted, the author, Robert Peston, is openly critical of the former British PM, which the periphrasis in the superlative shows and the informality of the idiom confirms. This is not a single case of open criticism in the political press. It again confirms the journalists' inclination to be emphatic and expressive in making a point.

An analysis of concrete articles while focusing on the use of idioms reveals a similar picture. The article, *For the populist right, free expression is everything – unless you're taking a knee*, (The Guardian, 10 December 20), Owen Jones argues that words and actions of representatives of the populist right show their biased or even dishonest and cynical tactic to avoid supporting “even a most basic expression of anti-racism”. The author's example is Nigel Farage's reaction to “Millwall fans booing their own team as they *took a knee*” in a gesture of anti-racist solidarity”. He quotes Mr Farage's appreciation of the booing company for having “sussed out BLM as a Marxist mob”. But Mr Farage's conclusion that “there must be no more taking knee” led the author of the article to repeat his argument that *taking a knee* “as a repudiation of racism” was not binding professionally and remained “an objective feature of modern western civilization”. He reasserted his claim by reiterating that “taking a knee isn't owned by any organization” and, “as an expression of solidarity”, it goes back to US civil rights

movement. Then the author laconically analyses how those representing the populist right become infuriated “by the mere mention” of the damage “to the life chances and experiences of black and brown people” made by “prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory practices”. He also remarks, ironically, that the same subjects “clothe their resentment in respectability” by pretending to have nothing against expression of anti-racism is general, just opposing one single particular act.

The author finds further the populist right guilty of political misconception in ignoring the disposition of “a Conservative government with an 80-seat majority” and casting the “woke left” as Britain’s real authoritarian rulers “guilty of the neglect of “white privilege”, which they themselves weaponize to extremes. The conclusion is that those who “denounce the left as easily offended “snowflakes” who revel in victimhood”, are themselves guilty of such behaviour.

It is the author’s argument and sarcasm that make this article sharply critical rather than idioms used. Idioms have been used sparingly in it. ‘Taking a knee’ has been used as the key reference without any connotation except for the expression of solidarity. The slang ‘snowflakes’ in the gist line and in conclusion is an insult of the political right to the political left and has been used to emphasise their disrespect. The “woke left” has been a term of late in political articles and has been used like a lamely applied name in this article. The informal, “sussed out BLM as a Marxist mob”, in the first paragraph emphasised the familiarity and perverse criticism of Nigel Farage.

‘Knee-jerk rage’ (*disapproving*, = produced automatically without any serious thought) in the first paragraph of the article described a mechanical rather than a thought-out attitude of the political right to any mention of “prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory practices” against black people. The idiom is descriptive rather than emotive but no less unfavourable. While emphasizing the pervert criticism of the populist right of ‘taking a knee’, the author compares their pretence to respectability with the attitude to same-sex attraction of some people. In this comparison, the attitude highlighted identifies with persistence rather than with the fact which the idiom ‘*shove it down our throats*’ describes.

“Expressing fealty” used about the prescribed sense to the footballers’ taking a knee is not an idiom proper, but, being an old use of an oath of loyalty, this collocation idiomatically expresses the overdone emphasis of the populist right on the sense of taking a knee.

“Pushing back against the demands of black people” (= refusing to accept or trying to prevent the demands) emphasizes the reactionary attitude of some to black people, which is ignored in the “inverted reality” made up by the populist right rather than criticizing the fictional regime of the “woke left”. This idiom is quite neutral and nominal.

“Graft and skill” (roughly meaning their own toil and ability), used as a defining notion in any interpretation of privilege, is not an idiom proper, but ‘hard work’ as an informal meaning of the word ‘graft’ in this collocation makes

the phrase idiomatic and aptly concise in describing the interpretation of privilege.

‘The market is king’ used as a descriptor of economy by evasive politicians is not an idiom proper, either. It is rather a quotation shared by journalists, which colorfully conveys the economic principle and an attitude. There is only one stylistically colored and ironic idiom which closes the article while explaining the reluctance of some people to discuss “culture-war tactics” because efforts in this direction “merely play(s) to those stirring the pot” (= that is, those, agitating the situation and causing trouble). This idiom gives a new name to the populist right in conclusion, which repeatedly shows their reactionary disposition, whether in their desire to “invert reality” or camouflage their own intentions.

Some idioms in this article are neutral but the slang ‘snowflakes’, the informal ‘shove down our throat’ and ‘those stirring the pot’ are crude and ironic. The tone of the article is sharp. The idioms have been used here to make points at certain turns in the author’s argument. This is in line with the typical way of using idioms in British political articles. Another trend in British journalists’ writing on politics is the use of idioms in the title or/and in conclusion for emphasis, one case of which has just been described.

A short article, titled *Government in a pickle over contempt proceedings* (The Guardian, 5 Dec 18), dealt with the entanglement of the British government and members of Parliament. The government, who refused to publish a full legal advice on Theresa May’s Brexit deal, was subject of an emergency debate of MPs on whether ministers were in contempt of Parliament. The article called it “an ancient offence”. The government maintained that it was “against national interest to publish a document which lays out in technical detail every weakness the UK (had) ahead of the second half of the negotiations. The problem was that the majority of those calling for the document to be published did not want the UK to get to the second half of the negotiations if it meant backing that agreement.” This article was published before the vote and the entanglement was resolved positively for the government. The informal idiom in the title summed up the problem aptly but brazenly, as is usual in journalism. This short article of twenty lines was written by a sharp-witted author, Katy Balls. Even with only one more informal idiom in the text (*most likely ... kicked out of Parliament...- made go away for a limited time and miss the important vote for the government*), the article had a sharp critical tone and implied a disrespectful view of the government. The informal idiom, *in a pickle*, in the title named the difficult and unpleasant situation, to the people who understood the idiom, while adding common and familiar dislike and disrespect. The article concluded in a pacifying statement of the problem, “It’s going to be a long day, again”, which laid a becoming tone on government matters.

Another short article, which reported on how an Independent Group in the British Parliament formed and questioned whether this group could work together to get attention in Parliament or only be “a band of mates sitting together in a

corner of the Chamber", was titled, *Is the Independent Group a flash in the pan?* (The Spectator, Evening blend, 20 Feb 19). This idiom means success that lasts only a short time and is not likely to be repeated, which was an open and pointed indication of the view and opinion of the Group.

The article, which warned of Joe Biden's vulnerability in the face of Trump's effectiveness at "destroying establishment politicians", was titled, *Stop saying Biden is the 'most electable'. Trump will run rings round him* (The Guardian, 4 Jan 20), summed up the claim, pointedly and informally, again, by the use of the idiom in the title.

A short article of the classical structure on an argument about the necessity "to respect the experience and knowledge of the educators" in order to avoid further chaos in English schools in conditions of the pandemic, titled, *Mass Covid testing at the drop of a hat is the latest bad idea for England's schools* (The Guardian, 22 Dec 20), offered criticism of decision makers directly and informally by the idiom in the title. Again, the author followed a tradition of the democratic press to speak openly to the public when cutting respect to the subjects in focus.

Idioms in titles strike the point, attract attention and focus the reader. This makes the use of idioms effective.

To contrast the sharp-witted journalism, it is pleasant to refer to another article for comparison. It is a little longer article than the previously mentioned, titled, *Will Joe Biden be good for Britain? Here's what my time in Washington taught me* (www.theguardian.com..., 11 Nov 20). Written by Lord Darroch, the British ambassador to the US from 2016 to 2019, this article overviews the run of Trump's presidency with his dedicated campaign director in seven paragraphs and characterizes Joe Biden in four. There is no argument how one or the other did something and why bad or good it was. There is no argumentative proof of anything in it. The article is a personal narrative in which the author takes a view of the persons and the events from an elevated stance. The events are described in sentences made longer because of precise vivid verbs and homogeneous parts which reflect the dynamics of change and sum up the chaos of the result. There are no labels or biting idioms in it. There are descriptions of events in quick succession vivid to a touch while employing details and using an occasional metaphor. For example, the Trump presidency was described as "a rollercoaster drawn by Escher, composed solely of descents. In the British embassy, we experienced it daily. Wake one morning and..." These statements, clean from criticism, are covert. To understand how the "rollercoaster" was drawn, the reader has to know that Escher was a Dutch artist known for works which trick the eye. This is an informative and colorful statement without familiarity or sharp criticism because of the transferred sense. Very few neutral and informal idioms (*to spin out the meeting, presciently foreshadowed the wild ride, may be cool initially, that unhinged*) were also used impersonally.

Although the tone is impersonal and devoid of open criticism in the first part of the article, it is warm and elegant in the second. This should imply the persons

in focus. There is no direct praise of Joe Biden in the second part of the article but the description is elevated. Even a single personal idiom (*he likes to shoot the breeze*) is elegant. The presentation of the two presidents in this article is in no way biased, skewed or untrue. It is correct and real given by the person who learnt it first hand while serving in Washington. Both experience and subtle intelligence permeate the article. The verbal skill of the author makes it delightful reading.

Discussion

The material presented in this article has confirmed that idioms are frequent in articles on politics in the press, that they vary in meaning and style and convey direct criticism, much favoured by common readers with respect to politicians. The tone and attitude in the articles, which considerably depends on the use of idioms, contribute to the personal presentation of the news and enhance interest of the readers. Frequent idioms make the language and criticism direct and bold. This is also appreciated by common readers. Apart from directness and criticism, idioms also add a sense of humor quite frequently, which is relaxing. But rich potential meaning of idioms has its own effect: idioms measure the license of the writing author by indicating what is allowed to the author who is a native speaker and what may be trespassing for a foreigner. Idioms also indicate the taste and refinement of the author.

The tentative comparison of two styles (critical journalistic and cautious diplomatic) of writing on politics in the press requires a generalization. A majority of journalists and reporters employ a sharp-witted style of writing marked by the use of biting idioms, regular emphasis and a mixture of formal and informal. A major section of the material in this paper has shown precisely this way of presentation. The one article analysed in conclusion has been different in style and the mind behind it. Both ways of writing are acceptable to an educated intelligent reader, although the article in elevated style may exclude the common reader who is likely to pause and wonder at the indirect expression or metaphoric refinement.

The emphatic and critical attitude common in journalism is favoured by common readers because it speaks in their own manner. Idioms, too, are a common feature to the common reader, they echo their own choices, strike the note and ring the bell. But the bold style of journalists which does not bypass a strong idiom functions by a kind of a license. It requires a native journalist to choose words so boldly and to write so directly. A stranger or an alien would insult the audience if wrote in the style of British and American journalists. Language is a cultural idiom while verbal idioms refer to cultural heritage of the native speakers of the language. It is in this kind of communication that the potential of a language comes to be exploited to the full and its power has to be minded by the user. Authors experienced in political publications (Alistair Cooke) happened to notice that wit, (and the choice of idioms indicates wit), can

make “large audiences feel uncomfortable”. This had to have been said about public speaking. Idioms in the press have the same effect if one focuses on their meaning, which was highlighted by illustrative material in this paper. Generally, idiomatic wit is milder in reading, while politicians remain the permanent target of criticism. The opposition of the criticizing commentators has already been deplored to the favour of the criticised by Polly Toynbee, in an article, *As we lose respect for our politicians, democracy itself is taking a hit* (The Guardian, 29 June 2021). It has to be reiterated again that sensitive readers and listeners react to the meaning and implications of idioms used. This should additionally warn the users of what potential power they employ when they choose to use idioms.

Conclusions

To state the obvious, is to say that the language of journalists in articles on politics is direct and critical. The use of idioms contributes to this stylistic effect. Although critical idioms when frequent may jar occasionally, idioms are favoured both by journalists and common readers. Aware of a different style of writing, one can question the acceptability of the typical idiomatic use in journalism. Although conclusion of different readers may differ on this, an analyst who is aware of the meaning and substance of idioms in political articles tends to appreciate the direct, idiom-marked style of journalists. The style of journalists expresses vigor and liveliness which increases the appeal of their writing. The moment an analyst realizes this, he becomes aware of the other extreme to which elementary pretence and especially mannerisms may take the writer. In view of these two extremes, the analyst is compelled to favour the present style of journalists illustrated in this article. Articles on politics in the British and American press are lively without bypassing a strong word and idiom and the sense of humor. This is commonly engaging.

There can be no doubt as to the refinement of style and the mind in the closing article analysed in this paper. Yet, as has been mentioned earlier, it may leave common readers wondering at points. If English idioms in the world of work indicate social stratification, idioms used in articles on politics imply similar differences between authors and their audience. The conclusion, then, should be that the language of journalists in articles on politics is bold and direct because, the authors differ as does their language and their audience, which has been confirmed by the material. These authors exploit the most powerful potential of their native language to which they have an unwritten license. Although much one may appreciate the style of writing of Lord Darroch, one has to give credit to the field of his expertise and experience. The engagement determines the elegance of expression and defines the audience.

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After Euripides: Esotericism in Medea's English Literary Tradition

By Marta Villalba-Lázaro*

The Euripidean Medea remains a mystery to human understanding. The esotericism of her story has allowed for dramatically different representations. In tracing her English literary history, from classical to contemporary dramatists, this paper follows Medea's characters throughout the centuries. Drawing on Euripides, it provides a wide perspective on a long tradition, pointing out the distinctive intellectual and moral features of each historical period. In particular, it aims to show how this esoteric figure actually suits the writers' ideology, who recurrently use Medea as a symbol to serve their different political and moral purposes, proving the malleability and esotericism of myth.

It has all gone sour now, affection turned to hatred.
Jason has cast aside his children and my mistress,
and now goes to bed in a royal marriage
with the daughter of Creon who governs this land.
And Medea, in despair, rejected by her husband,
howls out "the oaths he swore" and calls upon the right hand. (Il.15-20)¹

Introduction

The idea of filicide escapes human understanding. Therefore, the claim that the retaliation carried out by the Euripidean Medea is her means to achieve justice, constitutes a highly esoteric, namely mysterious, statement. Tracing the history of how Euripides's *Medea* has been represented in the English literary tradition is a fascinating exercise to see how classical mythology can be understood and thus used, reused, misused, and even abused, depending on different ideological and discursive contexts. By departing from Euripides and his tragedy *Medea*, this article provides a wide perspective on a long tradition, pointing out the distinctive intellectual and moral features of each historical period, proving the long-lasting fascination with the myth and its versatility to address the specific social preoccupations throughout our ancient and modern history. In particular, it contributes to a better understanding of how Medea has been interpreted and rewritten in different historical periods: from the classical

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1. All references to Euripides's *Medea* have been taken from the 2006 translation by Cecelia A. E. Luschnig, *Euripides' Medea* (Diotima, 2006). <http://www.stoa.org/diotima/anthology/medea.trans.shtml>. [Accessed 11 May 2014]. Subsequent parenthetical references in the text will include line numbers only.

versions, which features a powerful, frightening and unpunished heroine, to the passive medieval figure and the evil early modern character, while noting the hesitant sympathy that Medea engenders in many eighteenth-century and Victorian approaches. Significantly, and beyond these modern renderings, many contemporary postmodern, feminist, and postcolonial rewritings of the myth represent Medea as a righteous woman, a symbol of female agency fighting against hegemonic powers.

In trying to shed light on the esoteric Medea's behaviour, one must reflect briefly on the rules operating in the mythical world, as conveyed in Euripides's classical tragedy. The last two lines of the epigraph that opens this article read: "And Medea, in despair, rejected by her husband, / howls out 'the oaths he swore' and calls upon the right hand" (19-20). According to the logics of divine justice found in classical mythology, Jason deserves his fate because he is an oath-breaker. As C.A.E Luschnig explains, "what happens to oath-breakers is that their family is wiped out. Medea will speed the gods' will by making Jason childless".² Euripides presents the infanticide as Jason's inescapable fate, as ordered by the gods. This is clearly indicated when Medea claims that she is determined not to falter in her decision or "give my children over to let a hand more hostile murder them" (1.238). The reasons for her murders, therefore, must be searched for in the divine world: as a semi-goddess Medea is always accompanied by the barbarian gory gods, like Taurus, Mars and the infanticidal Saturn, who exert the divine justice that rules that oath-breaker Jason must be punished and sentenced to live without descendance. Filicide is presented as the inevitable result of Jason's behaviour.

The Euripidean semi-goddess's actions are thus located in an esoteric realm, a world ruled by laws alien to the human world and beyond our mortal understanding. The murders must be seen in accord to this "out-of-this-world" logics, in the context of the Hellenic mythology where infanticide is commonplace. For example, evidence of this practice can be found in the Nymph's words in Robert Graves's *The Golden Fleece*: "Yet, when I bore my child, it was not a girl, to be preserved, but a boy; and in due course back he went, torn in pieces.[...] No male child of our family is permitted to live beyond the second sowing season".³ Also, filicide, as an offering to the gods, recurs in many western and oriental mythical and religious accounts, including the Bible, most notably in Abraham's offering of Isaac.⁴ Thus, when Medea's actions are relocated in our rational human world, they become inexplicable, unless we consider Medea either a madwoman, whose emotions lead her to utter irrationality, or we scrutinise the

2. Cecelia A. E. Luschnig, *Euripides' Medea* (Diotima, 2006), 38.

3. Robert Graves, *The Golden Fleece* (London: Penguin, 2011), 6.

4. *The Bible*, Authorized King James Version (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998); Genesis 22: 1-19.

significance of her actions in the esoteric context of the classical divine realm, in which she belongs.

Originally, the myth of Medea developed from a figure common in several Mediterranean cultures: “the reproductive demon, who persecuted pregnant women and young children”.⁵ These reproductive demons, whether found in ancient or modern times, are believed to be the souls of women who died as virgins or failing to give birth; as a result, and out of revenge, they kill children, pregnant women, or newly delivered mothers. This figure has also served as the popular explanation for rare illnesses related to childbirth such as “crib death, neonatal sepsis, puerperal fever and eclampsia.”⁶ Although in some cultures there are also male reproductive demons, most of them are female because women’s role in society is obviously more closely linked to giving birth and nurturing children. There are many variants of the myth, but what seems to be commonplace to folk belief is that only childless women become demons. For example, Sara Iles Johnston focuses on Southwest American and Mexican folklore and in particular on the figure of La Llorona⁷ (The Weeping Woman) who represents the ghost of a mother who, having murdered her children, spends eternity wandering around the world looking for other children to kill. These infanticidal women may have evolved out of an esoteric paradigm similar to Medea’s: women who in one way or another, do not successfully close their reproductive cycle.

The Euripidean Medea

Whether Euripides was the creator of Medea’s infanticidal story is uncertain. Before Euripides’s play, there were others with the same title—as for instance Epicharmus’s and Deinolocus’s Sicilian comedies—, yet their remaining fragments are so scanty that it is very difficult to determine their actual episodes.⁸ Regardless the originality of its contents, the authority of Euripides’s *Medea* is beyond question. In the decades following Euripides’s death, during the late fifth and the fourth centuries, his depiction of Medea’s filicide had a growing influence, and many comedies and tragedies similarly titled *Medea* continued to be written and performed.⁹ As Fritz Graf argues, Euripides’s *Medea* is but a single link “in a

5. Sara Iles Johnston, “Corinthian Medea and the Cult of Hera Akraia,” in *Medea: Essays on Medea in Myth, Literature, Philosophy, and Art* (eds.), James J. Cluss and S. I. Johnston (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 45.

6. Ibid, 57.

7. Ibid, 44-70.

8. Donald J. Mastronarde, *Euripides: Medea*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 64.

9. Ibid, 64

chain of narrative transmission: on either side of the version that is authoritative for us, there stands a long line of other versions,"¹⁰ which offer not only a communal biography of the mythical figure but might also account for a different development of the same episode. The Corinthian story, which is the basis of Euripides's plot, is preceded by the Colchian and Iolcan stories, and followed by the Athenian and Median stories. According to Graf, these five individual episodes, each of which is tied closely to a specific setting, construct a "horizontal tradition" of Medea.¹¹ These different events were written and rewritten by many ancient authors: Euripides and Pindar in the fifth century BC, Apollonius of Rhodes in the third century BC, and Ovid and Seneca in the first century of the common era, to mention a few.¹²

In Euripides's rendering there is a feature that is crucial to the development of the story. As Edith Hall suggests, Euripides probably chose to transform Medea from a Greek citizen into a barbarian Colchian to connect its particular antidemocratic barbarity to her appalling misdeeds:¹³ "Euripides' Colchian Medea is the paradigmatic 'transgressive' woman and her overbearing nature cannot be fully understood without reference to her barbarian provenance,"¹⁴ and her unfettered passions are strongly associated with her ethnicity. Yet, it will not be until the nineteenth century with Franz Grillparzer's *Medea*—included in his trilogy *The Golden Fleece* (1821)—and Ernest Legouvé's *Medea a Tragedy in Three Acts, in Verse* (1855) that the remakings of the mythical heroine rediscover the dramatic potential of her barbaric origins.¹⁵ Since the modern western world perceives itself as heir of the Greco-Roman, it naturally re-appropriates the ancient narrative and thus presents the barbarian woman as a natural threat to modern western civilization.

Euripides was a popular dramatist for several reasons: his easy style, his complex plots, his ability to deal with personal themes apart from the body politics, his skill to discard or ridicule the roles played by Fortune or the gods and, most especially, his tendency to "giv[e] voice to marginalised groups,"¹⁶ which was considered by some of his contemporaries as sheer heresy. Peter Burian explains that while in Euripides's times Athens was in the process of

10. Fritz Graf, "Medea, the Enchantress from Afar: Remarks on a Well-known Myth," in *Medea: Essays on Medea in Myth, Literature, Philosophy, and Art* (ed.), J. Clauss and S. I. Johnston (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 21.

11. Ibid, 22.

12. Johnston, "Introduction", in *Medea: Essays on Medea in Myth, Literature, Philosophy, and Art* (ed.) J. Clauss and S. I. Johnston (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3.

13. Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1989, 35.

14. Ibid, 203.

15. Duarte Mimoso-Ruiz, *Médée antique et moderne: aspects rituels et socio-politiques d'un mythe*, (Paris: Edition Ophrys, 1982), 698

16. Mastronarde, *Euripides: Medea*, 2002, 6.

perfecting the institutions of democracy and the consolidation of the Aegean empire, simultaneously there was an emergence of radical ideas taught by Sophists, philosophers, and teachers of rhetoric to whom Euripides was linked.¹⁷ This involvement allowed him to portray characters who engaged themselves in controversial epistemological, political, and anthropological speculations, thus illustrating the latest trends in philosophy and theology.¹⁸

The first production of Euripides's *Medea* was in 431 BC, a convulsed time after the Peloponnesian War, which might help explain the tensions displayed in his work. As Hall elaborates, although the presence of a Hellenic self-consciousness can be traced as far back as the archaic period, it was the fifth century that saw the development of the barbarian stereotype as opposed to the civilised Greek,¹⁹ and it is very likely that the Persian invasion was a major factor in the creation of such stereotype. As she notes, the key distinction in literature between Athenians and barbarians produced by the Greek in the fifth century was political: the Athenians saw themselves as democrats, whereas the barbarians were seen as tyrannical and supporting a strict hierarchical system, thus portraying "the polarity between democracy and despotism."²⁰ Moreover, Athens was viewed as the centre of democracy, and consequently, "since tragedy is an Athenian as well as a Greek mode of discourse, the tragic barbarian is perceived in anti-Athenian specifically, anti-democratic-terms, not just vaguely anti-Hellenic ones."²¹ In the late fifth century, shortly after the first production of Euripides's *Medea*, "artists began to emphasise Medea's role as a foreigner within Greek society by portraying her in oriental clothing,"²² thus becoming—even visually, as evident for example in old vases—the paradigmatic outsider.

Because Medea is a barbarian she does not endorse democratic egalitarian Athenian values and is presented as an irrational being, a mad woman. Yet, she also conforms, if only at the beginning of Euripides's play, to the gendered stereotype of the easily manipulated helper-maiden. When discussing women's status in ancient Athens, Donald Mastronarde notes that "the respectable women of citizen families were ideally imagined as confined indoors, silent, and subservient", although he acknowledges that "our evidence is largely deficient."²³ The Greeks held the view that females had little control over their lives and, as it happens with any social constructs, real women internalised these notions and

17. Peter Burian, "Euripides," in *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Ancient Greece and Rome* (ed.), M. Gagarin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

18. Ibid.

19. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*, 1989, 54.

20. Ibid.

21. Richard G. A. Buxton, "Review of *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* by Edith Hall," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 111 (1991): 217.

22. Johnston, "Introduction," 1997, 8.

23. Mastronarde, *Euripides: Medea*, 2002, 26.

saw themselves according to those stereotypes, which contributed to their manipulation.

Euripides's ground-breaking views dramatizing human anxieties and fears were innovative, daring and highly influential. The social and political upheavals of Athens in the later part of the fifth century explain, as Mastronarde argues, "the tensions and contradictions of classical Greek culture" which are especially reflected in Euripides's work.²⁴ One function of tragic performances in Athens was to provide cultural authorisation for its democracy which might explain the negative reception of Euripides's *Medea*. Considering that the tragedy was only awarded third prize in the typical theatrical competition of the Attic Festivals (organised for the tragedians of the highest rank), Mastronarde suggests that it might have "shocked or offended the Athenians"²⁵ that a barbarian woman challenged the civilised Greek world and escaped unpunished, with the help of gods. According to Nicolás Goc, Euripides's is the only known ancient tragedy that portrays the heroine sympathetically and, in her view, it might be "this combination of sympathy, power and repulsion that has seen Euripides's *Medea* endure down through the ages."²⁶ Despite the filicide's shock, the reader of Euripides's *Medea* experiences a strong attraction to the classical character. Her insights into human nature, particularly her speech about the predicaments of women, may have been written in 431 BC by a man, addressed to a masculine audience and intended to be performed by a male actor, but Medea's words might well have been spoken by a contemporary woman.

The contents of the myth before Euripides's episode can be summarised as follows. It begins when Medea—daughter of Aeetes, King of Colchis—meets Jason in Colchis (now Caucasian Georgia) and falls madly in love with him. He had arrived with the Argonauts on an impossible mission, commanded by his uncle King Pelias, to obtain the golden fleece, a symbol of power. Medea, who is on good terms with the powerful guardians of the fleece, is conveniently infatuated and manipulated by Jason and helps him out in his quest. In the process, Medea betrays her father and kills her brother. Afterwards, she flees with Jason, leaving her family and homeland behind. Jason and Medea go to Iolcus, where the second episode of Medea's story takes place. There, she displays the arts of witchery and teaches Pelias's daughters the ritual of rejuvenation, thus provoking the death of their father, assisting again Jason, this time to take revenge on his uncle Pelias. Jason and Medea flee from Iolcus and arrive in Corinth. Euripides's account starts here. After the infanticide, mentioned below, Medea goes to Athens where King Aegeus had promised to shelter her and where she almost kills his

24. Ibid, 2.

25. Ibid, 6.

26. Nicolás E. Goc, "Medea in the Courtroom and on the Stage in Nineteenth-century London," *Australasian Journal of Victorian Studies* 14, no. 1 (2009): 30.

son Theseus. She goes off again, this time to what is now Iran and settles in the highlands amongst the Arioi, who would thenceforth be called "Medes."²⁷

Euripides's *Medea* follows Greek dramatic conventions, according to which intervals of action usually fall into five divisions: a prologue, the entrance of the chorus (*parados*), passages of dialogue (*epeisodions*) followed by choral odes (*stasimons*), and sometimes an *exodos*, or chorus recessional.²⁸ Euripides's prologue is a masterpiece of concise exposition in which the background of the story is briefly summarised by the nurse. The play itself begins in *medias res*. The couple had arrived in Corinth after their many adventures to obtain the golden fleece, and Jason, after meeting Princess Glauce (also known as Creusa) in Corinth, has decided to abandon Medea and marry the Greek princess, daughter of Creon, the King of Corinth. Due to the frightening threats Medea makes after her *agon* with Jason, Creon banishes her. Although Jason appears to be concerned, he is basically a practical man, looking out for his own interests and self-aggrandizement. For this reason, Jason's betrayal is not merely love treachery: he is an oath-breaker, perverted by his ambition. Medea is full of anger and cannot abide this mistreatment. She stalls for time and plans her revenge, prearranging a future with Aegeus the king of Athens, killing Glauce with poisoned presents (while her father dies when trying to protect her from the flaming robes) and murdering her own children with a sword. After these crimes, she prophesies Jason's death and escapes in a *deus ex machina*, a dragon-drawn chariot, to be protected by Aegeus, who had sought her to provide him with children and with whom Medea had previously made such an agreement, firmly sealed under oaths to the gods.

As a semi-goddess, Medea is always accompanied by the barbarian gory gods that exert the divine justice. Medea does not take direct revenge on Jason, yet she prophesies his death: "but you, a coward, you will die a coward's death as you deserve,/ struck on your head by a remnant of the wreck of the Argo/ seeing a bitter end to your marriage to me" (1385-87). Euripides's play tackles common human concerns and overtly engages in a discussion of female identity in connection with the esoteric key question that lingers at the end of the play: whether justice (divine or not) can arise out of this appalling revenge.

English Literary Tradition on Euripides's Medea

The magnitude of the classical ancient tragedy was so disturbing for the British audience that it would not be until the twentieth century that Euripides's *Medea* was performed on a British stage without alteration, thanks to the English

27. Graf, "Medea, the Enchantress from Afar: Remarks on a Well-known Myth," 1997, 22.

28. B. A. Bagby, *The Story of Medea in World Drama* (Boston: Boston University, 1947), 16.

translation rendered by Gilbert Murray in 1907.²⁹ When surveying the medieval and early modern English literary tradition associated with Medea, it is striking to notice how disparate and even contradictory stories were combined in the remaking of the quest for the golden fleece and the infanticidal episode. In tracing the complex interconnections of these works, Ruth Morse's work on the medieval Medea offers a portrait of the heroine as playing multiple roles marked by her gender: she is "not only a succession of characters recreated by poets, she became, by process of imitation, a kind of literary parthenogenesis."³⁰ While always emotionally gripping and essentially theatrical, Medea "can be witch-like and evil; passionate and sympathetic; the alien in our midst (the 'other'); the champion of the oppressed and betrayed."³¹ The enterprise of tracking how these medieval and Renaissance works may be connected is more difficult in Medea's case, for there is no single original source that can be considered a canonical referent; rather, there are multiple source texts which often present variations and contradictions in terms of themes, characters and events. As Johnston puts it "even within a single episode, such as the story of the death of Medea's children, an author had to make choices,"³² and thus whoever took up the story of the infanticidal Medea had to choose not only an ending but also the cause of the crime. In that regard, Johnston surmises that Euripides's version became canonical because he brilliantly linked motivation to "personality and showed how that personality developed—how Medea became Medea."³³

Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, *Heroides* and *Tristia*, along with Seneca's *Medea* (all produced in the first century AD), draw on Euripides's play to form the three basic classical authorial sources to Medea's infanticidal episode for medieval and early modern writers in English. Although Ovid and Seneca tend to stress both Medea's criminal will and her witchery arts as well as her escape thanks to the gods' help, they also refigured the story by altering to a great extent the Euripidean account. For example, Ovid emphasises Medea's devotion to Jason and her command of magic and control over the natural world with his detailed description of her concocting poisons. Ovid's depiction is used by Seneca who, at the same time, makes his heroine angrier and more capable of brutality than Euripides's. While the plots of the Euripidean tragedy and of the Senecan adaptation are broadly similar, the latter is generally seen as "cruder, and less

29. Hall, "Medea and Mid-Victorian Marriage Legislation," in *Greek Tragedy and the British Theatre, 1660-1914* (eds.), E. Hall and F. Macintosh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 391.

30. Ruth Morse, *The Medieval Medea* (Cambridge: Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 1996), 17.

31. Harry Love, *Introductions and Translations to the Plays of Sophocles and Euripides: Volume II. Volume 1* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 2.

32. Johnston, "Introduction," 1997, 11.

33. *Ibid.*, 11.

sympathetic” to the heroine.³⁴ Just as she was more and more alarmingly reimagined by subsequent classical authors, Medea also becomes more threatening in the Middle Ages; and, even more so in early modern English rewritings. One of the key differences between the medieval and early modern renditions is that the medieval writers saw Medea’s story as historical fact, whereas the early modern writers frequently saw it as mere literature, thus enabling them to exaggerate the story and manipulate it for their own purposes.³⁵

Seneca and Ovid’s accounts were the most translated and revisited source texts in the Middle Ages and the early modern periods, while Euripides’s *Medea* received little attention.³⁶ In medieval England, Medea appeared in English poems or prose tales by Geoffrey Chaucer, John Gower, John Lydgate and William Caxton, either in the form of allusions to the story or the character, as in the case of Chaucer’s *Legend of Good Women* (c. 1386), or in a full remaking of the story, as in the anonymous *Laud Troy Book* (c. 1400). Almost invariably, Medea was presented as a female demon and was used to discuss contemporary issues such as witchcraft and related religious matters. Misty Rae Urban argues that the appearances of Medea in Chaucer, Gower and Caxton’s translation of the *History of Jason* (1477) “discover the ways these narratives use female monstrosity—in literal and figurative form—to dramatize the anxieties arising in a patriarchal society that defines the female as a slightly aberrant category of human” while depending on her “for maintenance and reproduction of the social order,”³⁷ that is, although women are perceived as inferior beings, they hold the reproductive power, an idea that becomes one of the crucial issues of any Medea.

In all of its medieval retellings the focus is on Jason’s betrayal and Medea’s subsequent reaction. In approaching the power of Medea, the most common strategies followed by medieval English authors were either to explain it as romantic impulse, placing the emphasis on unrequited love—as in Gower’s *Confessio Amantis* (c. 1386)—or to explain her behaviour as female failure, carrying out a literary misogynistic attack that can be seen, for instance, in Lydgate’s *Troy Book* (c. 1430). Chaucer and Gower’s renderings of Medea followed the romanticised impulse by stressing her devotion to Jason; both are sympathetic to Medea, yet they differ in that Chaucer’s heroine is a helpless figure deprived of agency,³⁸ while Gower emphasises the dangers she poses to patriarchal institutions like marriage and monarchy—although his final picture of her is a remorseful,

34. Katherine Heavey, *The Early Modern Medea: Medea in English Literature, 1558-1688* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 4.

35. Heavey, “Translating Medea into the Sixteenth Century,” in *Appositions: Studies in Renaissance/Early Modern Literature & Culture*, 2008, n. 1.

36. Heavey, *The Early Modern Medea: Medea in English Literature, 1558-1688*, 2015, 51.

37. Misty Rae Urban, *Monstrous Women in Middle English Romance* Ph.D. (New York: Cornell University, 2008), 1.

38. Heavey, *The Early Modern Medea: Medea in English Literature, 1558-1688*, 2015, 32.

victimised “complaining subject.”³⁹ Lydgate’s misogynistic picture draws on Guido delle Collone’s *Historia Destructionis Troiae*, written in the early thirteenth century, which tends to portray Medea as sexually insatiable and to undermine her magical powers.⁴⁰ The general tendency of the medieval English authors is thus to limit Medea’s power, either by the strategy of ignoring it altogether or by describing it in clearly limited ways. Urban also highlights that Medea’s monstrosity is emphasised in these Medieval works to present her as “highly ambivalent, intriguing and yet repellent.”⁴¹ In the line of poststructuralist scholars, her thesis is that in these works the female monsters manage to create a new literary “thirdspace”⁴²—using Homi Bhabha’s terminology—, in which patriarchal constructs of gender and otherness are critically exposed and challenged. As Urban contends, medieval authors used Medea because she was a paradigm of the revengeful wronged woman, but some also tended to stress her role as a victim and justified her crimes as the response to Jason’s abandonment, thus engaging in wholesale rehabilitation of Medea instead of replicating her destructive nature in the tradition of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*.⁴³

In the Renaissance period, Euripides’s *Medea* was not published until the 1540s in a Latin translation by George Buchanan produced in Scotland, and it was not until the twentieth century that it was translated again for performance by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1904) in Germany and Gilbert Murray (1907) in England.⁴⁴ By contrast, Ovid and Seneca’s accounts of the filicidal Medea were the object of several translations into English during the period 1566-72, appearing in more than one English version by 1688 with Ovid’s *Heroides*, the most frequently translated.⁴⁵ The first record of a classical Medea on a British stage was Seneca’s *Medea* in the 1560’s at Cambridge University.⁴⁶

In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England the figure of Medea appeared frequently in a wide range of literary works: poems, plays, reference works and prose treatises, as well as in brief allusions, as for example, in William Shakespeare’s *Merchant of Venice*, when Jessica invokes Medea’s rejuvenation of Aeson, king of Iolcus: “In such a night/ Medea gathered the enchanted herbs/ That did renew old Æson.”⁴⁷ Typically, sixteenth-century authors and translators had their readership in mind, and that period’s societal mores obliged them to reject the idea that Medea could escape without punishment and thus they

39. Ibid, 38.

40. Ibid, 24.

41. Urban, *Monstrous Women in Middle English Romance Ph.D.*, 2008, 155.

42. Ibid, 158.

43. Ibid, 155.

44. Love, *Introductions and Translations to the Plays of Sophocles and Euripides: Volume II. Volume 1*, 2009, 2.

45. Heavey, *The Early Modern Medea: Medea in English Literature, 1558-1688*, 2015, 3.

46. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*, 1989, 391.

47. Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, 2008, act 5, ll.13-15.

tended to impose some kind of sanction on her. The early modern authors used the myth as a convenient admonitory tool to illustrate female wickedness and to deal with contemporary concerns such as witchcraft, the belief in the supernatural vs. the power of God, the security of government, as well as a warning of woman's conduct.⁴⁸ In sum, they use Medea as a cautionary tale to suit their didactic and religious ends stressing the idea that "the supernatural inclines toward the *unnatural*, with all that that implies."⁴⁹ Such concerns remain apparent in the works of William Shakespeare, Thomas Norton, and Thomas Sackville, which present female characters, like Videna or Lady Macbeth, frequently evoking the figure of the classical Medea.⁵⁰ Although in this period authors and translators were inclined to diminish Medea's magical powers and strength and to punish her actions, their literary strategy differed from medieval writers in that they bluntly embraced violence as one of the heroine's key features. In general, early modern authors highlighted the conflicts that the character of Medea engenders as an unwomanly woman, with no regard for patriarchal institutions, as a pagan and as a witch, a demonised figure that remains intensely alarming while challenging well-established dichotomies.

By the eighteenth century, according to Harry Love, Euripides was the most popular ancient model, somehow having been assimilated into the cult of sensibility. Medea's tragic misdeeds and pathetic situations made his the best theatrical version, and the passionate Medea "is transmogrified into an eighteenth-century heroine."⁵¹ Like in Samuel Richardson's *Pamela* (1740) and *Clarissa* (1748), the mythical heroine struggles to maintain her virtue as wife and mother while abandoned by Jason. Medea was regularly depicted as going mad, and the Euripidean character was adapted in ways that drastically diminished her criminal responsibility.⁵² The audience of the eighteenth century was predominantly middle class,⁵³ which required plays that suited their bourgeois views of marriage and femininity. Accordingly, the figure of the murderer mother was incompatible with eighteenth-century sentiment, which characterized her, as some contemporary critics put it: "as 'monsters of inhumanity', whose 'barbarous crime' was 'of the blackest dye'", or referred to the filicide "as one of the most

48. Heavey, *The Early Modern Medea: Medea in English Literature, 1558-1688*, 2015, 5.

49. Love, *Introductions and Translations to the Plays of Sophocles and Euripides: Volume II. Volume 1*, 2009, 4.

50. Heavey, *The Early Modern Medea: Medea in English Literature, 1558-1688*, 2015, n. 16.

51. Love, *Introductions and Translations to the Plays of Sophocles and Euripides: Volume II. Volume 1*, 2009, 3.

52. *Ibid.*, 3.

53. Hall, "Greek Tragedy and the British Stage 1566-1997," in *Productions of Ancient Greek Drama in Europe* (Athens: In Platon Mavromoustakos Athens UP, 1999), 55.

'unpitifully horrible things in drama', committed by 'such monsters that degrade the whole human system.'"⁵⁴

Richard Glover's adaptation (1767) was one of the most popular eighteenth-century English versions, with its focus on a deeply infatuated Medea on the verge of madness provoked by unrequited love.⁵⁵ This *Medea* offers a sentimental version of the old story adapted to the tastes of the audience. According to Hall, one of the keys of its success was "the terrifying sorcery scene of the type which they enjoyed in ballets and light entertainments."⁵⁶ The play was first performed at the Drury Lane in 1767 with Mrs. Yates, a well-known actress in the leading role.⁵⁷ As Bagby argues, Glover's version does not follow the key features of Euripides's play since "the outward structure is similar, but the body of the play bears little resemblance."⁵⁸ For Bagby, Glover's *Medea* is more similar to a Shakespearean tragedy than to a Greek one; for instance, the tragic foreboding of Greek tragedy is not present, the complex psychological driven of Euripides's characters is missing and the playwright emphasises action and surprise up to the point that the audience hoped for a happy ending.⁵⁹ The eighteenth-century neoclassical versions almost always removed the chorus and reduced the supernatural elements and, in order to suit the audience's sensitivity, they stressed love, increased the pathos of the scenes and pursued moral endings by reducing the criminal acts of their heroines' crimes, suggesting for example that Medea "never killed her children knowingly."⁶⁰

Whether produced in the fifth century BC or in Victorian times, there was an assumption that it was natural for wives to suffer and that it was natural for men to discard the old for the new. As Jennifer Jones puts it, what was unnatural for a Victorian woman was to strike back, since for them "only unnatural women would rise against a system that is so much stronger than she."⁶¹ In Euripides's play Medea does what no Greek woman would dare to do. The women's chorus sympathises with her abandonment but advises her not to fight back and to bear her burden with dignity. Medea breaches all possible rules: decorum, ethics and most particularly the patriarchal laws, which were especially relevant in the Victorian socio-political context.

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, there had been significant political achievements in Britain. The 1832 Great Reform Act was a major turning

54. Edith Hall, "Medea and British Legislation before the First World War," *Greece & Rome, Second Series* 46 (1999): 48.

55. Love, *Introductions and Translations to the Plays of Sophocles and Euripides: Volume II. Volume 1*, 2009, 4.

56. Hall, "Medea and British Legislation before the First World War," 1999, 49.

57. Bagby, *The Story of Medea in World Drama*, 1947, 70.

58. *Ibid*, 79.

59. *Ibid*, 80.

60. Hall, "Greek Tragedy and the British Stage 1566-1997," 1999, 57.

61. Jennifer Jones, *Medea's Daughters* (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 2003), xii.

point, since for the first-time suffrage was not an exclusive privilege of the aristocracy, but included some middle-class male landowners. As more men were enfranchised through the Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867, suffragists began to call for women to have the right to vote, which nevertheless would not arrive until 1918. New philosophical ideas like utilitarianism and Chartism were circulating, while older principles like those proposed by Thomas Malthus influenced the economy by dramatically cutting subsidies for the poor, as seen in the controversial 1834 Poor Laws Act, which strove to reduce the poverty rate by creating workhouses. One of the most controversial parts of the Act was the “Bastardy Clause”, which effectively made illegitimate children the sole responsibility of their mothers until they were 16 years old. If the mothers of such children were unable to support themselves and their offspring, they would have to enter the workhouse. Such a norm fuelled infanticide.

Partly because of this new context and the legislation and public debates surrounding family laws, Medea appears less as the monstrous infanticidal woman than as the wronged, abandoned wife left to her own devices. Nevertheless, she is not portrayed as a victim; on the contrary, she is experienced, cunning and resolute enough to break out of the traditional Victorian female mould, thus showing to Victorian audiences that such a reaction could become an alarming possibility in their society. Whilst in the eighteenth-century authors avoided presenting Medea as filicidal, Victorian authors engaged directly in the taboo subject of infanticidal women. In Victorian times babies’ murdering had become a pressing and unavoidable concern that, according to the press and parliamentary debates, had reached epidemic proportions, as reflected in later works like George Elliot’s *Adam Bede* (1859) or Thomas Hardy’s *Tess of the D’Urbervilles* (1891).

Industrialisation and incipient prosperity, along with a legal system that was not yet adapted to the new reality of the cities, created a growing gap between classes; prostitution, children’s exploitation, workhouses packed with poor people treated as criminals and infanticide and other murders permeate many history books and literary pieces. Since the Licensing Act of 1737 theatre was banned from explicit political criticism, therefore plays often had to discuss social reform indirectly and Medea was used to do so. Greek tragedy thus became a useful vehicle to address and discuss social change and to articulate political criticism. The classics were much admired by Victorian society, deemed to be a source of elevated knowledge, and thus became an inexhaustible source of discussion.

In the early nineteenth-century, the controversial Medea had remained virtually absent from stage, except for Giovanni Simone Mayr’s opera, *Medea in Corinto*, which opened in 1826 and was regularly revived until 1837. James Planché’s *The Golden Fleece; or, Jason in Colchis and Medea in Corinth* (Haymarket, 1845) inaugurated a tradition of burlesques based on the myth of Medea concluding with Addison and Howell’s *Jason and Medea: A Ramble after a Colchian*

in 1878.⁶² Planché's burlesque *The Golden Fleece* parodied the influential trilogy *The Golden Fleece* (1821) by Franz Grillparzer.⁶³ After Planché's parody, the theme of Medea was a recurrent object of burlesque, as seen in Robert Brough's burlesque, *Medea; or, The Best of Mothers with a Brute of a Husband* (1856) and Mark Lemon's *Medea; or, a Libel on the Lady of Colchis* at the Adelphi in July 1856, the last two parodying Legouvée's *Medea* tragedy produced in 1856 with enormous success.

The figure of Medea challenged the theatrical establishment, and in its various adaptations received sympathetic responses from the audience, as was the case of John Heraud's tragedy *Medea in Corinth* (1857) performed at Sadlers Wells with Edith Heraud as Medea, and which was to become one of a series of mid-Victorian tragic Medeas in English. In the case of Legouvée's (1855) and its Brough's *Medeas* the impact was greatly enhanced by magnificent performers, namely Adelaide Ristori and Frederick Robson, who helped stimulate the audience's imagination, thus favouring debates on women's social status.

Times may have been changing, but not fully so for women. Many influential authors reinforced patriarchal views. It is little wonder that the notion of being a woman was still profoundly debased, given that men of the weight of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Ruskin, whose influence is beyond question, were repeatedly shaping men and women's mind-sets in this fashion. However, in Victorian times the traditional notion of the woman devoted to her husband and tightly bound to the domestic sphere was being timidly challenged, as women gradually entered the public realm. To counteract the Victorian paradigm of femininity, some women writers were eager to rehabilitate Medea as a proto-feminist icon. As Josephine McDonagh notes, in the late 1860s Medea started to become a theme for emergent women writers.⁶⁴ Likewise, Lorna Hardwick argues that "Medea became a catalyst for female writers' rejection of the domination of the male voice and for awareness of the conjunction of the oppressions of gender and race."⁶⁵ Medea, as the archetypal figure of female alienation and disenfranchisement, became a force for social progress, appearing as "a complex character through which to explore women's position in society, from which they seem fated always to be estranged."⁶⁶ T. D. Olverson notes that "the best-selling novels of Ellen Wood and Elizabeth Braddon, for instance, feature unconventional and assertive heroines, who bear an uncanny resemblance

62. Hall, "Medea and Mid-Victorian Marriage Legislation," 2005, 395.

63. Franz Grillparzer, *The Golden Fleece* (trans.), A. Burkhard (1956) (Yarmouth Port MA: Register Press, 1821).

64. Josephine McDonagh, *Child Murder & British Culture 1720-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 164.

65. Lorna Hardwick, "Theatres of the Mind: Greek Tragedy in Women's Writing in England in the Nineteenth Century," 1999, n.p.

66. McDonagh, *Child Murder & British Culture 1720-1900*, 2003, 165.

to Euripides' ancient antagonist."⁶⁷ In the case of Medea, the myth not only did offer the authority of classical drama to a contemporary cause, but also can be seen as the inspiration of the prolific genre of suffragette plays.⁶⁸

The decade of 1880s characterised by the revival of British socialism, the birth of Unionism and the creation of empirical sociology, produced a generation of the new women who "imagined for a time, lived out the possibility of social and economic independence"⁶⁹ and dramatic depictions of Medea were not limited to the stage. Published within collections of verse both Augusta Webster's dramatic monologue "Medea in Athens" (1870) and Amy Levy's short play *Medea (a Fragment in Drama Form After Euripides)* (1884) fall within the category of "closet drama", dramatic works that are written to be read or recited before private audiences.⁷⁰ Both Webster and Levy worked with Euripides's myth to relate Medea's character to the cultural changes they were experiencing during their lifetimes and used Medea to explore the ways in which rigid cultural expectations of a woman's role in society, marriage and motherhood can potentially (and actually) destroy a woman's sense of self. They both read the original myth of Medea as the dilemma of a powerful woman trapped in a society that did not accept powerful women. Though their commitment was seemingly the same, Webster portrays Medea as a character who becomes an active subject struggling against both masculine domination and her own self, while Levy's Medea represents an Anglo-Jewish young woman victim of patriarchy and racism, struggling to be accepted by a bigoted society.⁷¹

In his essay "The Womanly Woman" (1891), George Bernard Shaw discusses the opposition between women's domestic sphere and the public one, comparing the childbed with a battlefield. In his feminist view, motherhood does not entail being a good wife, confined at home: maternity does not mean that "child-bearing would endow the mother with domestic aptitudes and capacities as it endows her with milk."⁷² Shaw reinforces his idea by insisting that women can only emancipate themselves if they repudiate their womanliness, which includes, by definition, their duties to husbands, to children, to society and to law: "she has to

67. T. D. Olverson, *Daughters of Dionysus: Women Writers and the Dark Side of Late-Victorian Hellenism Ph.D.* (Newcastle: Newcastle University, 2007), 51.

68. Fiona Macintosh, "The Shavian Euripides and the Euripidean Shaw: Greek Tragedy and the New Drama," in *The Oxford History of Classical Reception in English Literature* (eds.), D. Hopkins and C. Martindale (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 514.

69. D. E. Nord, "Neither Pairs nor Odd: Female Community in Late Nineteenth-Century London," *Signs* 15, no. 4 (1990): 733.

70. Amy Levy, "Medea (A Fragment in Drama Form, After Euripides)," in *A Minor Poet and Other Verse* (London: Blackmask Online, 1884 (2002)), 12-24.

71. Augusta Webster, *Portraits* (London: London: Macmillan and Co., 1890 (1870)).

72. Bernard Shaw, "The Unwomanly Woman," in *The Quintessence of Ibsenism* (New York: Brentano, 1891), 44-45.

repudiate duty altogether. In that repudiation lies her freedom."⁷³ This was not a new issue. More than twenty-four centuries earlier, Euripides's Greek tragedy also highlighted this tension, discussing the division between the domestic and public sphere and women's right to develop fully. When Shaw compared the childbed with a battlefield, he was echoing Euripides's similar thoughts in Medea's speech:

They say that we live a life free of danger
at home while they face battle with the spear.
How wrong they are. I would rather stand three times
in the line of battle than once bear a child. (247-250)

Murray's translation of Euripides's *Medea* (1907) became emblematic of the suffragettes revolutionary shift at the beginning of the twentieth century. Considered as a politically radical, feminist, pacifist, and anti-imperialist play, it was recited at their meetings. In *Euripides and his Age* Murray writes of Euripides: "To us he seems an aggressive champion of women; more aggressive, and certainly far more appreciative, than Plato. Songs and speeches from the *Medea* are recited today at suffragist meetings."⁷⁴

In contemporary times, *Medea* is one of the Greek tragedies that has inspired more literary rewritings, operas, films, and visual representations. From feminist and postcolonial perspectives, the crimes may be seen as a vindication of the wronged barbarian woman, doubly colonised, who has succeeded in escaping Greek and masculine bonds. In this respect, Medea personifies the resolute and empowered subaltern. For instance, Medea fights extreme forms of patriarchal domination in Cherríe Moraga's *The Hungry Woman* (2001), racism in Apartheid South Africa in Guy Butler's *Demea* (1990), and alcoholism and gender violence in Wesley Enoch's *Black Medea* (2007), which focuses on the situation of Australia's indigenous peoples. These contemporary Medeas are often reconfigured as victims to different hegemonic power structures who react fiercely to their subaltern positions, with infanticide frequently used to channel their rebellion against those abuses. It is in her ability to destabilise the system that we can think today of Medea as a symbol against oppressive structures of power. She becomes an apocalyptic destroyer capable of disrupting the hegemonic society which has oppressed her, while escaping unpunished.

Conclusion

The above overview of some medieval, early modern, modern, and contemporary literary rewritings of Euripides's *Medea* reinforces the idea that

73. Ibid, 47.

74. Gilbert Murray, *Euripides and his Age* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1918), 32.

classical figures and mythologies can enact and comprehend meaningful symbolic messages, constructing icons whose final significance may fluctuate in response to different interests. As explained by Claude Lévi-Strauss⁷⁵ they grow into “floating signifiers” whose ultimate meaning depends on the context or ideology where they develop. Myth contained, and still contains, the ordinary (and extraordinary) experiences and traditions of peoples, ultimately moulded by what can be called collective memories. This unsteady human source might be one of the main reasons for the myth’s ideological malleability. As seen in Medea’s rewritings along the centuries, the paradoxical essence of myth facilitates its political ambivalence, it is used, reused, misused, and even abused to enact dramatically different values, depending on the changing socio-political contexts and, obviously, on the writers’ personal perception of the world. Still, the powerful character of the Euripidean Medea remains a mystery to all of us.

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⁷⁵. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Introduction à l'œuvre de Marcel Mauss* (trans.), F. Baker (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1987), 62.

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Artemisia: An Admirable Admiral

[7.99.1–3, 8.68.1–8.69.2, 8.87.1–4, 8.88.1–3, 8.93.2, and 8.101.1–8.103]

By Oliver R. Baker*

Claims that Herodotus reveals himself as a proto-biographer, let alone as a proto-feminist, are not yet widely accepted. To help advance these claims, I have selected one remarkable woman—Queen Artemisia of Halicarnassus—whose exploits during the second Greco-Persian War are recounted in his Histories. It is to Heraclitus—a near contemporary—to whom we attribute the maxim êthos anthropôî daimôn (ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων)—character is human destiny—and it is the truth of this maxim—implying effective human agency—that makes Herodotus’ creation of historical narrative possible. From his many vignettes, which, without advancing the narrative, Herodotus is able to color-in the character of some of the more notable individuals he depicts in his Histories. Although never the cradle to grave accounts typical of Plutarch, by leap-frogging through two of the nine books, we can assemble a partially continuous narrative, and thus gauge Artemisia’s character. Arguably this permits us to attribute both credit and moral responsibility. And this implied causation demonstrates that Herodotus’ writings include not only proto-biography but in several instances—one of which is given here—proto-feminism.

Introduction

Bar Aeschylus’ topical tragedy the *Persei*, first performed in 472 in which Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, is not mentioned at all, our only other early extant accounts of the contributions of individual commanders who participate in the naval battle off Salamis in the late summer of 480 are given by Herodotus in his *Histories*.¹ And here, Artemisia, a trusted ally of Xerxes during his punitive expedition against mainland Greece, is given, in six long excerpts spread over two books, almost as much attention as Mardonios, a close royal relative, and Xerxes’ overall battlefield commander.² Curiously, our next earliest mention of

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1. Aeschylus, a veteran of Marathon in the summer of 490, may also have been a participant in the naval battle off Salamis—an oarsman or a marine—not just a distant hillside spectator. His tragedy, the *Persians* (Πέρσες, *Persai*), with the Ghost of Darius incidentally criticizing Xerxes for hubris (ὕβρις) focuses on the Persian losses at Salamis and predicts further losses come the following year (Plataea). His play is our earliest account of any of the East versus West military/naval encounters during the Greco-Persian Wars. See Aeschylus, *Aeschylus I: The Persians, Seven Against Thebes, The Suppliant Women, Prometheus Bound* (eds.) David Grene and Richmond Lattimore (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2013): 11-59.

2. All quotations from the *Histories* are from the Andrea Purvis translation presented in Robert Strassler (Ed.), *The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories* (New York, NY: Ransom

the queen of Halicarnassus is given in Aristophanes' exceedingly bawdy but topical, anti-war comedy *Lysistrata*, first performed in 411, where Artemisia gets honorable mention on a par with the Amazons.³ But just as nature abhors a vacuum and rushes to fill it, story-tellers are happy to exploit any glaring lacunae in the historical record. And we can surely blame Herodotus for these glaring lacunae about Artemisia. She is, after all, his own countrywoman, from an aristocratic ruling family. Should he so wish, he of all contemporary individuals is exceedingly well-placed to provide an exhaustive cradle to grave account of her impact on the Dorian colony on the Anatolian coast that her family governed. Why he does not write more about his near contemporary countrywoman is difficult to gauge, although we can speculate that the Athenians in particular are still seething over her impact and their humiliation. Generally, whether of noble birth or not, women are given virtually no role beyond the purely domestic sphere. Nonetheless, one Herodotean scholar has noted fifty-three instances in the *Histories* where women or femininity play a decisive role in the outcome of a particular event.⁴ As Rosaria Vignolo Munson comments, "the conspicuous feature of her feminine gender and masculine role, which in all likelihood sparked Herodotus' interest in this extraordinary character, already relates her to the history of the war between the Greeks and Barbarians."⁵ But these skills violate every tenet of Athenian patriarchy—the proper and only sphere for women is the domestic, where they—like Victorian children—should be seldom seen or ever heard—a near-invisible non-presence.

Perhaps, as Munson points out, what really distinguishes Artemisia from all of Xerxes' subordinate commanders is that she is the only one serving under no

House, 2007). Herodotus is unable to give us anything that we would recognize as dates. The Julian-Gregorian dates given in the margins of Strassler's edition of the *Histories* are based on other evidence, but unless noted otherwise are those generally agreed by classicists.

3. One modern historian writes: "Ruling queens were not unheard of in the ancient Near East, but fighting queens were exceptional. There were 150,000 men in the Persian fleet at Phaleron, and Artemisia was the only woman. She was rare not only in Persia; she is one of the few female naval commanders in all history," Barry Strauss, *The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece—And Western Civilization* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2004): 95.

4. In an appendix to his article "La Femme et le Pouvoir chez Herodote" Alexandre Tourraix lists the passages from all nine books of the *Histories*: Hdt. 1.1–5, 1.7–14, 1.34, 1.60. 1.73–74, 1.84, 1.91, 1.93, 1.105, 1.107–120, 1.184, 1.185, 1.201; Hdt. 2.1, 2.35, 2.54.2.104, 2.111, 2.121, 2.151; Hdt. 3.1, 3.31–32, 3.50, 3.68–69, 3.84–88, 3.118–119, 3.124, 3.133–134, 3.150–159; Hdt. 4.1, 4.60, 4.145, 4.154–155; Hdt. 5.12–15, 5.20, 5.39–42, 5.92, 5.126; Hdt. 6.43, 6.51–52, 6.61, 6.107, 6.137–140; Hdt. 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.5, 7.75, 7.61–62, 7.205; Hdt. 8.137, Hdt. 9.108–102, 9.122. Tourraix, *Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne* 2 (1976): 385–386.

5. Rosaria Vignolo Munson, "Artemisia in Herodotus," *Classical Antiquity* 7, no. 1 (1988): 92.

compulsion whatsoever.⁶ Halicarnassus may have been obliged to supply a number of fully crewed triremes, but Artemisia is in no way obliged to command this contingent.⁷ Yet, she does so with aplomb and alacrity. Although aristocratic birth presents some measure of opportunity frequently denied those of more modest lineage, Artemisia exercises authority, agency, and autonomy—and in the process proves her destiny as an able leader of men—a remarkable and rare character trait well-befitting an admiral.⁸ In so doing she also vastly expands her fulfillment horizon.

Legendary Heroine

The legendary Artemisia who emerges from centuries of these fascinating but totally unfounded accretions is often inconsistent with Herodotus' account.⁹ In the second century, alas some six-hundred years later, even Plutarch gets into the act, as does Polyaeus of Macedonia; but neither give reliable sources for their plausible accretions.¹⁰ Artemisia is a widow, but in all likelihood does not seduce Themistocles during a secret assignation just before the battle off Salamis. But she likely directs her marines to festoon the drowning Kalyndian king's corpse with spears and arrows—just to make sure it floats.¹¹ However, is it also most unlikely that when spurned by a youthful Persian lover she throws herself off a cliff into the Aegean Sea—she likely had no use whatsoever for a boy toy in the first place. Herodotus makes no mention of her either before or after the two naval battles of 480. In four short paragraphs, Herodotus gives us a few biographic details in his

6. Ibid, 95.

7. Her contingent amounts to only five ships—an otherwise trivial less than half of one percent of a combined Persian fleet of over one thousand.

8. We do not know when Artemisia, the governor or queen of Halicarnassus, is born—but when first mentioned by Herodotus she is a widow and is serving as regent for her underage son. Nor does Herodotus mention when her forever-unnamed late spouse—the tyrant of Halicarnassus—died. Whether ever an able ruler or not, he has served his primary purpose—ensuring the succession.

9. If her son was aged at least eighteen in 480 and Artemisia was married in Spartan fashion when in her late teens, a good guess is that she was born no later than 516.

10. Over two millennia later, in his description of the fourth queen in his 1609 *Masque of Queens*, Ben Jonson conflates Herodotus' Artemisia I [c. 515–460] with her eponymous descendant Artemisia II [c. 395–351] (Jonson 324). Many others have made the same erroneous conflation.

11. Phoenician design triremes likely carried the same number of oarsmen in three banks (ἐρέται, *eretai*) as the Greek—170—but were constructed with a full width upper deck permitting them to carry up to 40 marines and archers (ἐπιβάται, *epibatai*) in addition to the deck crew; whereas Greek triremes with only a partial upper deck could only carry 10 to 20 marines and a few archers, see Peter Green, *The Greco-Persian Wars* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 190.

first entry, followed by three anecdotes; the first of the three concerning her interactions with Xerxes after the three-day long but indecisive naval engagement off Artemision which takes place before the battle off Salamis; then an account of an incident during the battle; and, closing with her personal and strategic interactions with Xerxes after their disastrous naval defeat.

Destiny Defined

The significance of Artemisia's boldly theophoric name cannot be overlooked and at the very least constitutes an interesting challenge to divine Greek myth for the child on the part of her noble parents.¹² Artemis, the goddess of chastity, virginity, archery, the hunt, the forests, the wilderness, and the moon, is only a secondary Olympian deity.¹³ Nevertheless, she is widely worshipped throughout mainland Greece and in the various Dorian and Ionian settlements in the Aegean and on the Anatolian mainland. A number of major festivals are held to honor her including one held every four years at Brauron, north of Athens in eastern Attica, and others at her temples in Ephesus and in Sparta.¹⁴ According to Homer,

12. There are only three virgin goddesses among the Olympian pantheon—Artemis, Athena, and Hestia—and although all three have many ardent suitors they certainly have no offspring. They are honored as virgin goddesses partly because they remain chaste and celibate with absolutely no wish to marry; but principally because, bar heeding their father, Zeus, they pursue their own interests independent of any male influence or subservience. Artemis and her twin brother Apollo are the irregular offspring of Zeus and the Titanide Leto. Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth and Esther Edinow (Eds.), *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), 176-177, 194, 679.

13. Except when being shown as the moon goddess, Artemis is always depicted wearing a skimpy, off-shoulder, mid-thigh length, slit-skirted Dorian *peplos*—similar to the short tunic, the *chiton exomis*, favored by young Spartan women— in stark contrast to the voluminous, heavily folded, ground-length Ionian *chiton* favored by Athenian women and, of course, the style Athena is invariably depicted as wearing, Sarah Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975): 36. A young Spartan woman wearing the *peplos* is often referred to as a thigh flasher *μηρό φώτων* (*miró fóton*) a form of dress eschewed by Athenian women, Pomeroy, *Spartan Women* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 25. Wonder Woman notwithstanding, the skimpy clothing for athletic and fit, Spartan women was likely flattering, whereas from Pomeroy's remarks, far too polite to say as much, that since Athenian women's exercise is limited to housework indoors or in an adjacent courtyard, we might well surmise that their thighs and buttocks are far better not flashed Pomeroy, *Ibid*, 31.

14. See Hdt 6.138.1 for an account of the abduction of young Athenian women when attending the festival held at Brauronia; and, Hdt. 1.26.2 for mention of Artemis' major temple in Ionian Anatolia rebuilt by Croesus in the mid sixth-century. Rebuilt again in the fourth century, eventually becoming three or four times larger than the Parthenon, the temple is ranked among the seven wonders of the ancient world.

Artemis is one of the Olympian goddesses who support the Trojans in their war with Greece; Athena, of course, supports the Argives. The unanswered conundrum remains that when the Greek goddesses, one way or another, and Athena in particular, are just as powerful as any of the male gods in the pantheon, and just as widely worshipped, why is the status of Greek women generally kept so low and restricted?¹⁵

One way to effectively side-line an individual right out of history is to very deliberately write as little about that person as possible.¹⁶ The first few sentences below are the extent of the strictly biographical information that Herodotus gives about his countrywoman, the queen of Halicarnassus. He must have known much more about the ruling family than he gives in book 7 of his *Histories*, and we can only speculate on the reasons for his brevity.¹⁷ Part of this may be Herodotus' belief that to be truly Greek one has to be free; and the Dorian and Ionian island colonies in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Anatolian coast are anything but free; and as a Persian-appointed ruler she and her family are more than complicit in their continued subjugation. Very little is known of Herodotus' early life, but most scholars believe that he leaves Halicarnassus voluntarily, or is indeed exiled moving first to Samos and eventually to Thurii in Italy, but is never free to return home.¹⁸ Herodotus writes:

Although I am not mentioning the other subordinate commanders because I am not compelled to do so, I shall mention Artemisia. I find it absolutely amazing that she, as a woman, should join the expedition against Hellas. After her husband died, she held the tyranny, and then, though her son was a young man of military age and she

15. Recall that Poseidon, the god of the Seas, and Athena, the goddess of Wisdom and Skill compete to be the patron deity of the city-state founded and ruled by its first king, Cecrops—they almost go to war over the honor, but Athena's gift of an olive tree beats Poseidon's brackish spring water supply hands down. She gives her name to the city.

16. In the *Lysistrata*, the Old Men's Chorus Leader laments the women's bold audacity, offering a cautionary reminder of Artemisia's fighting prowess which he also compares with that of the Amazons fighting at Troy against the Argives (Ar. *Lys.* 707–712) [Greek 672 ff.]. See Aristophanes, *Four Plays: Clouds, Birds, Lysistrata, Women of the Assembly* (trans.) Aaron Pochigian. (New York, NY: Norton, 2021), 209–294. Much of the rest comes from the fertile minds of Hollywood's blatantly ahistorical script-writers who in former years felt obliged to meet some mandated steamy seduction scene quota: their 2014 feature film *300: Rise of an Empire* is particularly misleading.

17. From sources other than Herodotus, we know that her father, king Lygdamus, was Greek-Carian and that Artemisia was likely born circa 515–520, see Strauss, *The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece—And Western Civilization*, 2004, 96–97.

18. One suggestion is that Herodotus' family—or perhaps just a brother—fell afoul of the ruling Lygdamid family and were essentially deemed *persona non grata*—sometimes constructive criticism of an autocratic regime is taken as dissent with a whiff of irreparable disloyalty bordering on treason.

was not forced to do so at all, she went to war, roused by her own determination and courage. [2] Now the name of this woman was Artemisia; she was the daughter of Lygdamus by race part Halicarnassian on her father's side, and part Cretan on her mother's side. She led the men of Halicarnassus, Kos, Nisyros, and Kalymna, and provided five ships for the expedition. [3] Of the entire navy, the ships she furnished were the most highly esteemed after those of the Sidonians, and of all the counsel offered to the king by the allies, hers was the best. I can prove that all the cities under her leadership which I have just mentioned were Dorian, since the Halicarnassians came from the Troizen and all the rest from Epidaurus (Hdt. 7.99).¹⁹

A matter Herodotus' text does not make clear is that late in the sixth century Artemisia's father—king Lygdamus I—is appointed by the Persians as ruler of Halicarnassus, so like Gorgo of Sparta, she too is the daughter, queen-consort, and mother of a king. Artemisia's husband, succeeds to her father's satrapy—a succession doubtless enhanced by this marriage.²⁰ He dies, possibly never ruling, before their son Pisiadelis reaches the age of majority; and so, quite unusually, Artemisia, his mother, is appointed by the Persians to serve as her son's regent.²¹

No Persian Puppet

Artemisia is married but soon widowed to her father's successor as the tyrant of Halicarnassus. And just as the role of many Greek women—with a few notable Spartan exceptions—is limited to the domestic sphere, it is ironic that Artemisia's husband disappears from all record having fulfilled the barnyard function of ensuring the possibility of succession. That Artemisia is deemed an acceptable regent by Darius and later by Xerxes is notable; and not just because the status of widows who decline to remarry is often problematic in many societies.²² Just as

19. Troizen and Epidaurus are both Dorian city-states in the eastern Peloponnese. When Athens is evacuated after the battle of Thermopylae the non-combatants: mothers and children are taken to Aegina, Salamis, and Troizen.

20. This suggests strongly that Artemisia is an only child (or an only surviving child) and as an heiress attractive to those aristocratic Carians/Halicarnassians with ambitions for royal appointment to the local governorship. Her family is Dorian rather than Ionian and so they may adopt the more liberal Spartan *patrouchoi* precedents rather than those for Athenian *epikloroi*. Either way, her husband's line is terminated. Although the throne is infinitely less exalted than that for Sparta, let alone Persia, this is another of many similarities she shares with Gorgo, and Atossa and perhaps even Helen of Sparta.

21. That her spouse remains nameless is priceless. Athenians never name their womenfolk and dismiss their genetic contribution as incubators—Artemisia's spouse is a nameless inseminator.

22. In this respect, as widows, Gorgo, Atossa, and Artemisia face the same challenge—except that we know that for internal dynastic reasons Atossa is compelled to re-marry twice, whereas Gorgo and Artemisia are at liberty to decline and indeed do so.

significant, five sailing masters and their deck and below deck crews accept Artemisia as their admiral—this is not an empty honorific, they are granting her real agency as their flotilla commander. By so doing they are putting their well-being, opportunities for glory, battle-honors, and survival in her hands. Herodotus tells us in book 6 that in the aftermath of the Ionian revolt Mardonios commands a large land army and a fleet which he leads down to Cilicia and then sweeps up the Anatolian coasts toward the Hellespont (Hdt. 6.43.1–4).²³ From Herodotus' account Mardonios deposes all the tyrants of the Ionians and establishes democracies in their cities. This is possibly an exaggeration; all Darius wants is for these city-states to continue paying annual tribute and to respond to his requests for levees for military expeditions.

We know that Darius divides his empire into some twenty large provinces or satrapies and each province is governed by a satrap appointed by the king and to serve at his pleasure. Herodotus does not name these provinces but he does number them and the first province includes much of the Anatolian coast (Hdt. 3.89–90).²⁴ We also know that in the middle of the sixth century the Dorian city-states, including three on Rhodes, form a loose alliance and hold an annual festival which they celebrate at the Triopian sanctuary. Herodotus writes:

In the same way the five cities of the Dorians (formerly known as the six cities of the Dorians) refuse to admit any neighboring Dorians to their Triopian sanctuary. Moreover, they bar all those who break any of the rules of the sanctuary from participating in the rites and activities there (Hdt. 1.144.1).

Although Herodotus gives us few details, the Carians are involved in the Ionian revolt, but he does not specifically say that the Halicarnassians join in and one inference is that they do not. Again, we resort to the argument from silence, where in this instance it is inconceivable that Herodotus does not know or is misinformed. Either way, it appears from his commentary that the ruling family or the aristocracy in general, are regarded as loyal and reliable. We know that Artemisia is permitted to serve as regent for her then underage son, so even if she is not personally known to the Persian monarchs, she is deemed an acceptable place holder. Likely she earns this esteem long before supporting Xerxes' invasion with five manned triremes and is thus admitted to such military councils as Xerxes chooses to hold from time to time.

23. Mardonios is not just a Persian general. He is Darius' nephew, brother-in-law, and son-in-law. His mother is Darius' sister, his sister is one of Darius' wives, and he is married to one of Darius' daughters, Artazostre.

24. See Hdt. 3.90.1—for the first provincial district: the Ionians, the Magnesians of Asia, the Aeolians, Carians, Lycians, Milyans, and Pamphylians, all of whom were assessed as a single unit for payment of tribute, some 400 talents of silver.

An Admirable Admiral

Sometime after the inconclusive naval battle off Artemision, but just before Xerxes' disastrous engagement off Salamis, Herodotus recounts: ²⁵

So Mardonios made his way around and questioned them, beginning with the Sidonian. They all expressed the same opinion, urging him to initiate a battle at sea, except for Artemisia who said:²⁶

"Speak to the King for me, Mardonios, and tell him what I say, since I have not proven to be the worst fighter in his naval battles off Euboea, nor have I performed the least significant of feats.²⁷ Tell him, 'My Lord, it is right and just that I express my opinion, and what I think is best regarding your interests. Here is what I think you should do: spare your fleet; do not wage a battle at sea. For their men surpass yours in strength at sea to the same degree that men surpass women. [2] And why is it necessary for you to risk another sea battle? Do you not already hold Athens, the very reason for which you set out on this campaign? And do you not have the rest of Hellas too? No one is standing in your way; those who have stood against you have ended up as they deserved.

"Let me tell you what I think your foes will end up doing. If you do not rush into waging a sea battle, but instead wait and keep your ships near land, or even if you advance to the Peloponnese, then, my lord, you will easily achieve what you intended by coming here. [2] The Hellenes are incapable of holding out against you for very long; you will scatter them, and each one will flee to his own city. For I hear that they have no food with them on this island, and if you lead your army to the Peloponnese, it is unlikely that those who came from there will remain where they are now and concern themselves with fighting at sea for the Athenians.

"But if you rush into a sea battle immediately, I fear that your fleet will be badly mauled, which would cause the ruin of your land army as well. And there is one more thing that you should think about, sire, and keep in mind: bad slaves tend to belong to good people, while good slaves belong to bad people. And you, the best of all men, have the worst slaves, who are said to be included among your allies, namely, the Egyptians, Cyprians, Cilician, and Pamphylians; they are absolutely worthless."

25. Much ink has been expended by scholars interpreting Herodotus while attempting to come up with acceptable dates for the three-days of naval battles off Artemis, Leonidas' three-day battle at Thermopylae, and the one-day naval battle off Salamis. The best surmises are mid-September for the first two, and late September for the latter: see James Allen Stuart Evans, "Notes on Thermopylae and Artemision," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* Bd. 18, H. 4 (1969): 392 and 401; and, Kenneth S. Sacks, "Herodotus and the Dating of the Battle of Thermopylae," *Classical Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (1976): 245-246.

26. At this time Sidon along with Tyre are the two most powerful Phoenician city-states.

27. See Hdt. 8.9-10, this is the first we learn of Artemisia's participation in the inconclusive naval battles off Artemision ten days or so earlier during the late summer of 480.

As Artemisia was speaking to Mardonios, all those who were well-disposed toward her thought her words most unfortunate, since they believed she would suffer some punishment from the King for telling him not to wage a battle at sea. On the other hand, those who were envious and jealous of her, because she was honored as one of the most prominent of the allies, were delighted by her response to the question, thinking that she would perish for it. [2] When these opinions were reported to Xerxes, however, he was quite pleased with Artemisia's answer. Even prior to this, he had considered her worthy of his serious attention, but now he held her in even higher regard. Nevertheless, his orders were to obey the majority; he strongly suspected that off Euboea they had behaved like cowards because he was not present, but now he was fully prepared to watch them fight at sea (Hdt. 8.68–69).²⁸

Just as the three virgin goddesses, Artemis, Athena and Hestia, who never marry; and, except to their father Zeus, remain accountable for their own actions and are never answerable to any of the other Olympian deities, Artemisia of Halicarnassus keeps her own counsel.²⁹ Having listened to the advice of his commanders, with only Artemisia dissenting, Xerxes commits to an immediate naval engagement. Perhaps Xerxes surrounds himself with too many sycophants who will ultimately serve him poorly—he needs independent minded councilors who are not afraid to tell him when he is in error—but we can infer that rightly or wrongly he has already decided on a course of action, and any meeting of commanders is just for a show of unity. Doubtless Artemisia perceives a closed mind, which is why she asks Mardonios to speak for her—if only to speak for the record. She has the courage to voice her convictions, but the loyalty and discipline to obey her emperor's orders without further dissent.

I cannot speak with certainty about the rest of them, how each specific group of barbarians and Hellenes performed in the fighting, but this is what happened to Artemisia, which resulted in her winning still higher esteem from the King. [2] The King's fleet had reached a state of mass confusion, and it was during this crisis that Artemisia's ship was pursued by one from Attica. She was unable to escape it because there were so many other friendly ships in front of her, and since her own ship was closest to those of the enemy, she made a decision which turned out to be very much to her advantage. While she was still being chased by the Attic ship, she rammed at full speed, a friendly ship manned by Kalyndians and the king of the Kalyndians himself, Damasithymos. [3] Now I cannot say if there was some quarrel she had with him that had arisen while they were still near the Hellespont, or even whether, when she ran into the Kalyndian ship, the deed was premeditated or accidental. [4] But when she rammed it, the good she accomplished for herself was twofold. For when the trierarch of the Attic ship saw that she was ramming a ship of

28. Herodotus does not record Artemisia's reaction to Xerxes' rejection of her advice. She may well have thought, "You incredible fool" but kept this to herself.

29. Nor, quite unlike Hestia, the least anthropomorphic of all female figures among the Olympic pantheon, does she become a respected but somewhat colorless mature spinster.

the barbarians, he assumed that Artemisia's vessel was either a Greek ship or one that was deserting from the barbarians and now fighting for the Hellenes, so he turned away from her ship to attack others (Hdt. 8.87.1–4).

Surely Herodotus is disingenuous here rather than just diplomatic. He claims that he does not know whether or not there was some cause of a quarrel between Artemisia and Damasithymos, and then proceeds to name the time and place; his audience will be suspicious that this is an allusion for insiders only.³⁰ We can argue from his silence. If the incident at the Abydos crossing of the Straits is sufficiently salacious—such as Xerxes being concealed in a rolled-up carpet and frequently smuggled by his bodyguards into her sleeping quarters—Herodotus could not have resisted including it.³¹ Perhaps there is a well-known, but not very interesting, long-standing enmity between the two city-states, Halicarnassus and Kalynda, or between their ruling families? More likely, Damasithymos is simply envious of her renown and sufficiently boorish to cast insulting, misogynistic aspersions at her expense behind her back, figuring that he would get away with them.³²

That was one result to her advantage: she escaped and was not destroyed. But another outcome was that, even though she was doing harm to her own side, she won the highest possible praise from Xerxes. [2] For it is said that as the King was watching, he noticed one ship ramming the other, and one of the men with him said, "My lord, do you see how well Artemisia is fighting, and how she has sunk an enemy ship?" Xerxes inquired if it was truly Artemisia who had accomplished this feat, and they confirmed that it was, clearly recognizing the ensign of her vessel, and believing that the one she had destroyed belonged to the enemy. [3] So all that, as I have explained, brought her good fortune. And in addition, no one from the Kalyndian ship survived to become her accuser. In response to what he had heard, Xerxes is reported to have said, "My men have become women, and my women, men!" (Hdt. 8.88.1–3).

30. From Herodotus we know that Artemisia also commanded the contingents from the nearby island kingdoms of Kos, Nisyros, and Kalymna (Hdt.7.99), the latter not to be confused with the nearby city-state to the south-west, Kalyndos (Κάλυνδος) governed by king Damasithymos.

31. In addition to Artemisia not being truly Greek, despite her Dorian ethnicity, Herodotus may be suggesting that culturally some of the *royal barbaric power* has rubbed off on her and that as a Persian-appointed governor she readily adopts any degree of ruthlessness necessary to get the job done. If a *bête noir's* vessel happens to get in her way, of course, she will plough straight through it. She might even ask her marines to give its former commander a few spears to aid his corpse's flotation.

32. Happenstance perhaps, but fully in character with her Olympian eponym, Artemis, who has a habit of emptying her quiver into anyone arrogant enough to make an unsolicited lecherous advance. Artemis even dispatches her boon hunting companion Orion, Poseidon's mortal son by Euryale, in this manner—perhaps in error.

A Double Standard, even for Medizing

Although we can infer that it is the Athenians, Herodotus does not say precisely which party among the League offers the reward for the capture of Artemisia. But the reasons he gives are unconvincing—and one suspects, but cannot prove, that there was much more to it than just her gender.³³ Nor does he indicate whether the commanders of the many other Ionian and Dorian naval contingents allied to Xerxes are similarly proscribed. But we can argue from his silence that they were not. We might also observe a strange paradox; Alexander I of Macedon goes out of his way to be accepted as Greek and the Peloponnesian League turn a forgiving blind eye to the accommodations he makes over the years with both Darius and Xerxes to remain in power. In contrast, Artemisia is accepted as Greek, evidently to her great disadvantage, as the League does not grant her the same leniency over the same politically and militarily necessary realities.³⁴ Possibly in land battles it is easier to disguise indifference to vigorous engagement, whereas in fleet action—at that time, an archery, ramming, and boarding contest at sea performed at a leisurely five or six knots—such action avoidance is harder to conceal whether Xerxes is actually watching or not.

Of the Hellenes who fought in this naval battle at Salamis, praise for the greatest valor went to the Aeginetans, and after them to the Athenians; of individual men, to Polykritos of Aegina and the Athenians Eumenes of Anagyrous and Ameinias of Pallene. It was Ameinias who had pursued Artemisia; if he had realized that she was sailing on that ship, he would not have stopped before capturing her or being taken himself, [2] for orders to capture her has been given to the Athenian trierarchs, and a prize of 10,000 drachmas has been offered to whoever captured her alive, since they considered it a disgrace that a woman should wage war on Athens. But as I described earlier, she managed to escape, and there were others whose ships had survived also who were all now at Phaleron (Hdt. 8.93).

This promised Athenian bounty—ninety-five pounds of silver—needs some explanation beyond perceived disgrace by the Athenians and the gender discrimination later voiced by Xerxes equating female gender with cowardice. None of the other Ionian commanders attracted bounties for their capture—

33. We know that her five ships fight well at Artemision, Herodotus lets her tell us so (Hdt. 8.68.1). Perhaps she comes to Athenian notice then. But she too ignores the messages left by Themistocles urging the Ionians to detach themselves from the Barbarian forces, or if that is not possible to be neutral, or at the very least fight very poorly (Hdt. 8.19 and 8.22.1–3). Actually, Themistocles likely hopes that Xerxes will hear of these messages and not trust his Carian allies.

34. Lynette Mitchell makes the point that from a purely Athenocentric perspective anyone from a city on the fringes of the Greek world, particularly a woman, would be regarded with both suspicion and fascination; see Lynette G. Mitchell, “The Women of Ruling Families,” *Classical Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (2012): 12, 16, 20–21.

whether dead or alive Herodotus does not say. Herodotus' final entry directly concerning Artemisia takes place in Xerxes' campaign headquarters, presumably near Phaleron, shortly following the disastrous naval battle off Salamis and comprises three paragraphs:

Xerxes felt as much joy and pleasure in hearing this as he could, considering his adversities. He told Mardonios that he would first consult with others about the two courses before giving him an answer. And while he was deliberating with his specially chosen counselors, he decided to summon Artemisia to join the consultation, because she had obviously been the only one before who had correctly perceived what should be done. [2] When Artemisia arrived, Xerxes sent away all of the others, his counselors as well as his bodyguards, and said to her, "Mardonios bids me to stay and make an attempt on the Peloponnese, claiming that the Persians—the land army, that is—are not to blame for the disaster, and that they want to display proof of that. [3] In any case, he bids me to do that, or if not, he wants to pick out 300,000 troops from the army and completely enslave Hellas, and bids me lead the rest of the army back to my homeland. [4] Well, then, since you counseled me well by trying to prevent me from waging the naval battle that has taken place, please tell me now how I can prosper through your good advice."

Thus he requested her advice, and this is what she told him: "Sire, it is difficult for me to give the best advice to you, as you are seeking the best possible course of action, but in view of the present situation, it seems to me that you should go back home, and if Mardonios wants and promises to do what he has suggested, leave him behind here with the men of his choice. For if he does subjugate this land as he claims he would like to do and thus succeeds in this plan, the success will be yours, my lord, since the conquest will be performed by your slaves. On the other hand, if the outcome is the opposite of what Mardonios thinks will happen, it will be no great misfortune, since you will survive and so will your power in Asia as far as your house is concerned. [3] And if you and your house survive, the Hellenes will have to run many races for their lives. Besides, if something happens to Mardonios, it is of no great consequence. And if the Hellenes win, they will not win anything substantial by destroying your slave, while you will march home after you have burned Athens, and thus will have achieved the goal of your expedition (Hdt. 8.101–8.102).

Strangely, Artemisia's strategic advice very closely matches that given to Xerxes by Artabanos four years earlier, long before the Persians muster their army and embark on their punitive expedition (Hdt. 7.10.Θ.1–3).

Xerxes was delighted with this advice, for she had succeeded in telling him exactly what he was thinking himself. But I suppose that even if all the men and women in the world had advised him to stay, he would not have done so, such was his state of utter terror. After praising Artemisia, he sent her off to take his sons to Ephesus, for some of his illegitimate sons had accompanied him (Hdt. 8.103).

Surrounded by Yes-Men

Evidently all Xerxes is waiting for is for one of his more credible and selfless commanders to openly recommend the course of action he was going to adopt anyway. Entrusting her with the safe return to Susa of his offspring demonstrates that he has no doubts about either her loyalty or seamanship. Herodotus' narrative about the conclusion of the second Greco-Persian war continues in book 9 of his *Histories* with the land battle at Plataea and what might have been a naval engagement off Samos, but which becomes a land battle at Mycale on the Anatolian mainland. Herodotus does not say whether or not Artemisia's ships are involved in the campaign during the summer of 479, although he mentions that the Phoenicians are sent away (Hdt. 9.96). Perhaps Artemisia's fleet are sent away, too? He cannot leave the whole coast unprotected.

When the Hellenes had destroyed the majority of the barbarians, both those fighting and those fleeing, they set fire to the enemy ships and to the entire wall. But before they did that, they collected and removed all the spoils to the beach, and there discovered that among the items they had seized were some treasure chests full of riches. After setting fire to the wall they sailed away in their ships.

[2] When they arrived at Samos, the Hellenes held a conference to discuss the evacuation of the Ionians and in which part of Hellas under Greek control they might be settled, because they were considering the abandonment of Ionia to the barbarians. On the one hand, it seemed impossible for them to protect the Ionians by guarding their land forever, but on the other, they knew that if they did not somehow protect the Ionians, the latter would have no hope of escaping punishment at the hands of the Persians. [3] In view of these considerations, the Peloponnesians in office at the time thought it best to depopulate the trading centers of those Greek peoples who had medized and to allow the Ionians to inhabit those lands.³⁵

But the Athenians believed that Ionia should not be evacuated at all, and that the Peloponnesians should not determine what would happen to Athenian colonists. In the face of their vehement opposition, the Peloponnesians yielded to them. [4] And so it was in this way that the Hellenes admitted into their alliance the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and the other islanders who had joined the Greek side in the fight, and they obliged them with pledges and oaths to remain faithful to the alliance and not to desert it. After binding them to the alliance with sworn oaths, they sailed off to break up the bridges, which they thought would still be intact (Hdt. 9.106.1–4).³⁶

35. This primarily naval force is under the overall command of the Spartan king, Leotychidas. The command of the Athenian contingent fell to Xanthippos (Hdt. 8.130.1–3).

36. After the battle off Salamis in the late summer of 480, Xerxes retreats with part of his army through Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace to the Chersonese. Here he discovers that autumn storms have already destroyed his floating bridges across the Dardanelles to the Hellespont. The remnants of the trireme fleet that fought at Salamis and supporting transport vessels ferry the king and his troops to Abydos on the Asian side (Hdt. 8.130).

The Spartan proposal involving mass relocations is perhaps grossly impractical, but their point about the impossibility, not to mention the cost, of garrisoning every Ionian colony on the Anatolian coast in perpetuity (and presumably every Dorian settlement, too) is strictly pragmatic. The settlements in the Cyclades Islands can deter invasion with their own naval forces and resist any attempts at siege until aid arrives from the mainland, but strong, fully-manned, naval squadrons on constant patrol, except for the winter months, are needed to protect the more distant islands such as Rhodes, Samos, Chios, and Cos.

Critically this is Herodotus' first mention of an alliance headed up by Athenians, soon known as the Delian League. Up until this time the forces opposing Xerxes have been under the umbrella of the Sparta-led Peloponnesian League, with a handful of city-states outside of the Peloponnese including Athens, admitted as ad hoc members for the duration of the hostilities (Hdt. 9.106.4). Once again Artemisia proves to be prescient, even with a crushing League victory the Spartans are still either isolationist or preoccupied with threats nearer home—or both—they do not have their own navy and their hoplite army seldom ventures beyond the Peloponnese—the ghost of Cleomenes could have told anyone that much without recourse to Delphi.

Anyone familiar with the sixth-century territorial ambitions of Cyrus the Great—and we can include Queen Artemisia—would be aware that in 546 the Ionians sent messengers to Sparta asking for help in their struggle against Cyrus (Hdt. 1.141.4 and 1.151.1). Herodotus writes:

The Lacedaemonians, however, refused to heed this plea and decided against helping the Ionians against Cyrus, so the messengers departed. However, in spite of having turned the Ionians away, the Lacedaemonians dispatched some men in a penteconter—I presume in order to spy on the affairs of Cyrus and the Ionians. And when they arrived in Phocaea, they sent the most distinguished man with them, named Lakrines, to Sardis to declare to Cyrus in the name of the Lacedaemonians that he must not inflict reckless damage on any city in Hellenic territory, since the Lacedaemonians would not tolerate it (Hdt. 1.152.2).

Cyrus' response to this threatened *line in the sand* from Sparta is a succinct *middle or Median finger*, and a gentle reminder for Spartans to mind their own business:

They say that when the herald had delivered this message, Cyrus questioned the Hellenes who were with him, asking them who were these Lacedaemonians who would send such a command to him, and how many of them were there? When he heard their response, he said to the Spartan herald, "I have never feared any men who have a place in the center of the city set aside for meeting together, swearing false oaths, and cheating one another, and if I live long enough, Lacedaemonians will have troubles of their own about which to converse, rather than those of the Ionians" (Hdt. 153.1).

From what Herodotus tells us, Cleomenes, his forefathers and his successors do not need to hear Cyrus' threat—even the scantiest knowledge of Eastern Mediterranean geography informs the Spartan kings that the Anatolian coast, let alone Susa, is too far away. The Persians might come at him in force, but that is different—and for that, blame the Athenians for foolishly starting a fight that they would need help to finish.

Conclusions: A Dorian Amazon?

What can we deduce about Artemisia's character from the four extended anecdotes that Herodotus provides? He goes to considerable lengths to give her genealogy as more Dorian than Carian, let alone Ionian; and it is fair to ask why. When describing the battle off Salamis Herodotus appears to be comparing her role as a trusted military/naval advisor to Xerxes to the parallel strategic discussions where Themistocles is having with other members of the Hellenic Alliance. Xerxes' treatment of her is gender neutral—she is one of his more trusted and able commanders and that is all there is to it.³⁷ Neither fish nor fowl—Artemisia, unlike Atossa is not the consort to a Persian emperor. But to her credit she has earned agency, autonomy, and authority: moreover, she is prepared to accept the cost—accountability.³⁸ Nor has she been obliged to become androgynous-like Artemis or Athena to achieve this—she takes a spouse and is a child-bearer. Unlike Gorgo she is not the consort of a Spartan king. But when presented with an opportunity to expand her scope of personal fulfillment well beyond the domestic—an opportunity she likely did not seek—she does not demur. She is an effective ruler in her own right, and it is this effectiveness that Herodotus admires, but one his contemporary audience will find disturbing with an ambivalence fluctuating between admiration and revulsion.

On a personal and domestic level, the Greek commanders have no difficulty seeing themselves fulfilling three roles for their wives: father for their children, but companion, and lover for their children's mother; but they are blind to the notion that their spouses might well see themselves fulfilling three similar roles for their husbands—namely *hetairai*, but not just *pornai*, *pallakai*, and *gynaikai*. Just as the men have temporarily suspended their domestic responsibilities to go to

37. Richard Stoneman argues that Xerxes is dominated by strong women; initially by his mother (obviously), then by his principal (and only wife), and that perhaps he was similarly impressed by Artemisia, see Richard Stoneman, *Xerxes: A Persian Life* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2015), 9, 30, 123. But unless Xenophon or Strabo have given scholars independent evidence, then this is just a Stoneman interpretation of Herodotus, perhaps overly influenced by modern popular novelists.

38. These three essential elements—the three A's— are always present in whichever wave of feminist theory you scrutinize let alone adopt.

war, Artemisia, albeit a widow, has done much the same thing.³⁹ The Athenian playwright's jest about her being an Amazon is dangerously telling, and that is not just because the Amazons, like Artemis, fought on the Trojan's side against the Hellenes.⁴⁰

Furthermore, do diplomatic events in Anatolia all within living memory have any bearing on her style of governance?⁴¹ Artemisia will doubtless have heard of the very similar rebuff given by the Spartan king Cleomenes in 500 when Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, comes to Sparta soliciting his interest in a self-financing raid on the Persian capital Susa (Hdt. 5.49.1–4, 7–9). All Spartan interest vanishes, if there ever was any, when Cleomenes learns that the Persian capital is a three-month long journey inland from the coast (Hdt. 5.50.2). That Aristagoras is successful in obtaining Athenian interest is the cause of Darius' crushing of the Ionian Revolt early in the fifth century, and one of the reasons behind several Persian punitive expeditions to mainland Greece and the two Greco-Persian wars. In short, as the ruler of Halicarnassus Artemisia knows that causing trouble for Xerxes and then relying on Athens, let alone Sparta, for military protection forever afterwards is naïve if not downright foolhardy. This puts her in a similar position to that of Alexander of Macedon. She best serves her subjects, let alone her own family, by keeping Xerxes' garrison troops well out of her domain and by giving Xerxes no cause to dismiss her and appoint a Persian aristocrat to her governorship—in short, pay the agreed tribute on time, respond promptly to troop levies, and do not knowingly harbor malcontents.⁴²

From a biographical viewpoint, Herodotus only gives us six entries for Artemisia, but from these it is evident that she becomes not only an admirable admiral—one of the very few sea-going female flotilla commanders in all of history—but in Halicarnassus where already an able admired administrator and

39. One of the more famous dictums of Demosthenes comes to mind, "Mistresses we keep for the sake of pleasure, concubines for the daily care of our persons, but wives to bear us legitimate children and to be faithful guardians of our households" (Demosthenes, Orations 59.122).

40. The Amazons, who Herodotus tells us come from a region in northern Anatolia and who perhaps inveigle young Scythian warriors to come ashore solely for breeding purposes—copulation on demand for procreation—are always depicted dressed very much like Artemis, wearing the short Spartan peplos with right shoulder bare (Hdt. 4.111.2–4.113.1). From post Homeric sources we know that the Amazons are skilled mounted archers and fought against the Greeks during the Trojan War. There are also mythical stories of Theseus and the Amazons attacking Athens.

41. As Michel Austin comments that whatever happened in Ionia after the revolt, it did not affect other dynastic regimes elsewhere, including Caria, but that Xerxes inherited his father's Greek connections, see Michel Mervyn Austin, "Greek Tyrants and the Persians," *Classical Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (1990): 306.

42. As hinted at by several scholars, appearances are sometimes not deceptive at all and this may be why Herodotus and possibly his family become *personae non gratae* in Halicarnassus.

regent—exceptional achievements and dazzling personal fulfillment far beyond those expected let alone permitted of a royal incubator. But we only get a glimpse of a very short period of her life—a few months—hardly cradle to grave, although surely enough to gauge her character—hence the claim for Herodotus as a proto-biographer. Herodotus reveals his personal reaction to her exploits, through those of her Persian allies and her Greek opponents. Bar the latter, these are very positive appraisals.

We can only speculate about the reasoning behind the fifth-century Athenian anathema. The simplest explanation is not just that she shows them up at Artemision.⁴³ I believe that the Athenian patriarchy cannot accept the notion that a Dorian woman can be such an accomplished military leader. Hence the conclusion that she must be some sort of Amazon—not just *other*, and not just a *barbarian*, but something quite *monstrous*—a throwback to myth beyond the dark ages. Ancient Greek legend has it that Athens experienced trouble previously with Amazons, and genocide is deemed quite appropriate. Herodotus' depiction of Artemisia in his *Histories* rejects extermination, but offers recognition—she's marvelous, praiseworthy, not monstrous. Wary of audience hostility, he resists telling us as much as he likely knows. Without reservation, Herodotus is happy to give credit where he believes it is due. Concepts exist long before creating any underlying theory and any attribution or identification with some signifier. Artemisia is an admirable admiral, and hence the modest claim that despite writing from a pre-feminist perspective Herodotus breaks rank to reveal himself as a proto-feminist, two and a half millennia before there were words for such alternative perspectives.

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⁴³. Remember the bounty for her live capture is posted before the battle off Salamis. Precisely what the Athenians had in mind for her, Herodotus does not say—possibly a show trial at noon, grandstanding the verdict, a ceremonial bounty award, followed by execution before sundown? Several different methods, or perhaps a combination of methods, were practiced in fifth-century Athens: a form of crucifixion by strangulation—*apotumpanismos* (ἀποτυμπανισμός); or the victim being tossed either alive or dead into the *barathron* (βάραθρον)—a deep cleft in the rock face behind the Acropolis, see Louis Gernet, "Capital Punishment," in Peter John Rhodes (ed.), *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 137.

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Mary & Detectivism

By Farhan Lakhany*

*Frank Jackson's knowledge argument has done much heavy lifting for those who are wary of a physicalist worldview. Since its publication in *Epiphenomenal Qualia*, it has spawned a plethora of responses and this article is yet another response but, instead of accepting the argument on its own grounds, it pushes back against it at more of a meta-level. This article begins by closely analyzing the argument and providing different ways in which one might avoid its conclusion. Next, it isolates certain presuppositions about the mechanisms by which the data of conscious experience is acquired by examining the role of mental ostension in Jackson's analysis. After articulating a particular model of how the ostension might work, I then provide a late-Wittgensteinian analysis of the model and critique its applicability to the knowledge argument. I argue that the philosophical difficulties that the knowledge argument supposedly uncovers come about by a reliance on certain grammatical expectations and those grammatical expectations come about because of our reliance on a particular model. I go on to claim that Jackson is taken in by a certain way of speaking (which comes about by reliance on a certain model) and this leads to many of the puzzling difficulties associated with the knowledge argument. Once this error is noticed, we can make progress towards dissolving some of the philosophical problems associated with qualia by attempting to find a different way to model our epistemic relation to the contents of our mental states.*

Introduction

"...And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something – and that is all that can be said. But "has" and "something" also belong to our common language. -- So in the end, when one is doing philosophy, one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. But such a sound is an expression only in a particular language-game, which now has to be described."¹

This paper can be summed up as another response to Frank Jackson's knowledge argument that has, for many philosophers of mind, presented a lucid articulation of why integrating qualia into our understanding of a physical world has proven to be so difficult. With over thirty years passed since its formulation in Jackson's famous, *Epiphenomenal Qualia*, the landscape of responses appears to be relatively set with individuals roughly finding kinship in one response or

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1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 261.

another.² In the face of this division, one might, instead of searching again for a solution, attempt a dissolution by instead further investigating some of the presuppositions that allow for the articulation of the problem in the first place. I will explore this latter approach by laying out the knowledge argument and noting how, on one plausible understanding of it, it seems to rely on a particular method by which we come to understand “qualities” and will closely analyze this method by employing certain insights found in Wittgenstein’s later work. I will proceed in the following way: first, I provide an overview of the knowledge argument; second, I discuss the different types of responses that one might give to it; third, I argue that a plausible understanding of how we relate to our conscious states relies on a certain model and provide a Wittgenstein-inspired³ critique of those methodological presuppositions by analyzing the assumptions made; fourth, I focus more on the differences between objects and qualities; and fifth, end by integrating my response into the larger set of responses I articulate in the first section.

Jackson’s Mary

The knowledge argument was constructed to point out the difficulties in reconciling the data of conscious experience with a physicalist world view. Frank Jackson explores one permutation of the physicalist picture which states that there will be nothing left to explain once the sciences have succeeded in providing a comprehensive account of the physical world; minds will, as it were, come along for the ride in the same way that an understanding of chairs come along for the ride. This account plays well with our growing scientific understanding of the world and leaves nothing mysterious.

Aware of the appeal of the physicalist account, Jackson nevertheless thinks that it fails to fully account for what needs explaining. As he says in *Epiphenomenal Qualia*:

2. Interestingly, Jackson himself has since abandoned the conclusion that he thought to follow from the argument in favor of a representationalist account (Frank Jackson, “Postscript on Qualia,” in *There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 417–442 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 419.

3. I say “Wittgenstein-inspired” to avoid taking a stance on whether my claims are what Wittgenstein *actually* intended as what he actually meant is highly contested and is still an area filled with debate and controversy: see Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela (Eds.), *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) for discussions on different ways to interpret Wittgenstein. In this paper, I will also say “Wittgensteinian” and it is supposed to be understood as synonymous with “Wittgenstein-inspired”.

"Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won't have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky."⁴

As Jackson notes, it seems that, given all the physical information, the most puzzling thing about the mind – its qualitative aspects – are not touched upon. To illustrate this point further, Jackson brings up the example of Mary the color scientist. Imagine an individual Mary, an extremely gifted color scientist, who has been trapped in a black and white room her whole life and learns about the world through a black and white color television. She knows everything that there is to know about the neurophysiology of color discrimination and how all the processes interact with one another. Now, Jackson asks, what should be said about Mary when she is released from her room or sees the world through a colored monitor? He asks and answers, "Will she learn anything or not? It just seems obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it."⁵ How should this learning be understood? Jackson claims it is the acquisition of a new fact about "...the special quality of...experience."⁶

The upshot of accepting that Mary acquires a new fact is, according to Jackson, an argument for the failure of physicalism. He believes this because he thinks that, if the physicalist metaphysical picture of the world were correct, then our having all the physical information should entail our being able to deduce complete knowledge of the world.⁷ For the sake of this discussion, I will assume that Jackson's move from a lack of epistemic access to some fact about our mental states to the falsity of physicalism to be correct; where I will disagree is in the method he employs to establish the acquisition of a new fact. But before I get to that point, I will provide an outline of multiple responses that one can take to Jackson's argument to better home in on where my discussion fits.

Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar organize the responses to the knowledge argument into six different types: (1) questioning whether Mary does indeed learn anything new; (2) questioning whether, if she does learn something new whether it is factual or non-factual and, if it is the latter, what type of non-factual learning is acquired; (3) questioning whether she does come to know in a new way but it isn't some further information; (4) questioning whether, if she does come to learn some new information, whether it is a *new* fact or a different

4. Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," in *There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 39–50 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 39.

5. Ibid, 42.

6. Ibid, 45.

7. Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," 2004, 42-43.

way of learning some old fact; (5) questioning whether she, in fact, learned all the physical facts before she was released; or (6) questioning whether the upshot of the knowledge argument is, in fact, the conclusion that physicalism is false.⁸ As I previously admitted, for the sake of this discussion, I assume that the upshot of the knowledge argument (assuming it is successful) is the falsity of physicalism, and thus I will not discuss (6). I will proceed and briefly explicate responses (1)-(5).

Responding to the Knowledge Argument

Daniel Dennett and Frank Jackson himself,⁹ after changing his mind on knowledge argument, can be seen as advocating the first approach: questioning whether Mary, in fact, learns something new. Dennett, in *"Epiphenomenal" Qualia?*, argues that, in the articulation of the knowledge argument, we are led into believing that Mary learns something new but this conclusion only follows based off an incomplete understanding of the thought experiment. He claims that if we really took the time to imagine what, in *detail*, Mary knows when she has a complete understanding of *all* the physical information related to color vision, we will be much less confident in claiming that Mary learns something new when she leaves the room.¹⁰ Later Jackson is also skeptical that we learn something new; he argues that in coming to learn via experience, we make a mistake in thinking we have come into epistemic contact with some intrinsic, non-physical properties that serve as the basis for some new fact. He argues that what is actually occurring is that we are learning certain functional and relational facts via a sensorial episode that is ultimately *representational* in nature.¹¹

A second way of responding to the knowledge argument is by claiming that Mary *does* learn something new but what she learns is not a fact based on some phenomenal information.¹² What Mary learns, when she leaves the room, is not some propositional knowledge (know *that* such-and-such is the case) but knowledge *how* to do certain things. The know-how in question is the ability to

8. Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar (Eds.), *There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 16-20.

9. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to this as "Later Jackson".

10. Daniel C. Dennett, "'Epiphenomenal' Qualia?," in *There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 59-73 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 59-62.

11. Jackson, "Postscript on Qualia," 2004, 412.

12. David Lewis, "What Experience Teaches Us," in *There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 77-103 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 100-101.

“...remember, imagine, and recognize” some experience and other, similar experiences.¹³ In taking this route, one need not commit themselves to the position that there are some non-physical facts any more than one who claims that the only way to learn how to ride a bike is by experience is committing themselves to some non-physical facts. No amount of propositional information will teach one how to ride a bike: one needs experience attempting to ride but the knowledge they gain is knowledge they gain is not non-physical.¹⁴

A third approach argues that what Mary gains when she leaves the room is a certain type of knowledge: not know-that or know-how but knowledge by acquaintance.¹⁵ Earl Conee, in *Phenomenal Knowledge*, argues that one way that we can come to know in a new way that does not involve any new *information*, is by coming to know some property directly. The way in which we come to know that property is by experiencing the quality itself¹⁶. The learning in question is “...unproblematically classified as a relation of a person to a phenomenal quality, just as the acquaintance approach would have it.”¹⁷ What Mary is missing when she is in the room is a certain cognitive relation, not some new information.¹⁸

Where the second and third approaches argued that Mary does not learn any new *information* but does, nevertheless learn something new (in a non-factual way), the fourth approach pushes that Mary *does* learn some new information (that is nevertheless physical). Terence Horgan in *Jackson on Physical Information*

13. Ibid, 98-101.

14. See Philip Pettit, “Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument,” in *There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 105–142 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004) for another take on how Mary learns something new that differs from Lewis’s know-how response. See Michael Tye, “Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument,” in *There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 143–160 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004) for an attempt to blend know-how and know-that is supposed to do justice to the physicalist position.

15. See Paul M. Churchland, “Knowing Quaila: A Reply to Jackson (with Postscript: 1997),” in *There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 163–178 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004) and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, “Acquaintance with Quaila,” in *There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 179–196 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004) for responses in a similar vein.

16. Earl Conee, “Phenomenal Knowledge,” in *There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 197–215 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 202-203.

17. Ibid, 204.

18. Ibid, 212.

and Qualia argues that the way we should understand Mary's acquisition of new information is as learning about some old physical fact in a *new* way.¹⁹ This move may seem similar to Conee but differs insofar as Conee claims that Mary does *not* acquire any new information though she does come to learn in a new way.

Finally, a fifth way of responding to the knowledge argument is to disagree with one of the presuppositions of the argument: that Mary, before leaving the room, *could* know all the physical facts in question. Robert Van Gulick in *So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary* argues that, *if* one understands the subjective fact (i.e., that red looks like *this*) as a *physical* fact, and the only way for Mary to acquire that subjective fact is by experiencing it, then Mary *could not* in access all the physical facts when she is in the black and white room.²⁰ As a result, physicalism is not refuted because there are some physical facts that are only accessible from a subjective perspective.²¹ With a rough outline of the responses in hand, I will now move onto providing a brief discussion on how conscious states are often modeled and move onto discussing how this model is predicated on a *detectivist* picture. After doing this, I critique the modeling of our understanding of conscious states (and our knowledge of them) on the detectivist view by providing a Wittgensteinian analysis of the differences between knowing our conscious states and coming to learn about the world through reliance on perceptual faculties. After this, I will relate my response within the broader set of responses to the knowledge argument.

Conscious States

At this point, a further and, often ignored question, can be asked: *how* does Mary come to learn something about the world and our visual experience of it? Presumably, she learns about the world because she has an *experience* with a certain content and in having that experience, she can introspectively notice that the content has a specific character and picks out that character via mental ostension. There are multiple, plausible ways one might understand how the specific character is picked out; one way, and it is the way that I will be pushing

19. Terence Horgan, "Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia," in *There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 301–308 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 306.

20. Robert Van Gulick, "So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary," in *There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 365–405 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 390–391.

21. See Daniel Stoljar, "Two Conceptions of the Physical," in *There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument* (ed.) Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, 309–332 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004) for another take in a similar vein.

back against in this article, is via some process that allows us to find out about it. One natural thing to think is that, in mentally ostending, Mary, as it were, discovers some fact about what her mental life is like; she finds out that red looks like *this*.

To make better sense of this way in which Mary comes to know what it is like to see red, we can turn to work done by David Finkelstein in *Expression and the Inner*. In his book, Finkelstein asks how it is that we seem to be able to speak so easily, accurately and authoritatively about the states of our own minds.²² In answering, he considers a view that he calls “detectivism”; to be a detectivist is to claim that “...a person’s ability to speak about her own states of mind as easily, accurately, and authoritatively as she does may be explained by appeal to a process by which she *finds out* about them.”²³ The way in which we find out about them is by a cognitive process which somehow detects the presence of certain thoughts and feelings.²⁴

Detectivism comes in two flavors: old detectivism and new detectivism. Old detectivism is the view that individuals come to know about their minds via a perceptual process but, crucially, it is one that is *unlike* our sense of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling or feeling. It is akin to those processes insofar as it is a kind of “inner” ability that allows an agent to sense their mental states, but it is radically different insofar as it provides that agent with a complete, infallible access to what is being sensed: we can call this ability an “inner sense”. One of the hallmarks of our normal perceptual systems is that it provides an indirect access to what is being sensed and is liable to break down;²⁵ for the old detectivist, this is not possible for our “inner sense” as it is immune to such error.²⁶ Finkelstein notes two issues with this view that might lead one to doubt it: (1) it seems to make the mind into something of an immaterial organ that appears too supernatural for many and (2) it seems to associate too closely with dualism and leads to skepticism about the external world and other minds.²⁷ In response to these worries, Finkelstein argues that one might adopt a *new* detectivist position which understands the perception of inner sense as akin to other, normal types of perception. It is a view that embraces the indirectness found in normal perceptual mechanisms in order to naturalize inner sense. This entails that our perceptual mechanism that allow us to find out about our inner states is not infallible and can be in error in the same way our perception of taste might be in error.

As mentioned above, a natural reading of the knowledge argument has Mary coming to discover what it’s like to see red and this way of thinking about it

22. David H. Finkelstein, *Expression and the Inner* (Harvard University Press, 2008), 9.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. Ingesting a hallucinogenic substance is an easy way to prove this claim.

26. Finkelstein, *Expression and the Inner*, 2008, 13.

27. *Ibid.*, 13-14.

fits the detectivist model. For this discussion, it will not matter whether it is old detectivism or new detectivism; the points that will be made are applicable to both. I will proceed then with the claim that a plausible reading of the knowledge argument has Mary coming to learn a new fact about a special quality of her own experience and the *way* she does this is accurately modeled on the detectivist view (new or old) with my comments being in response to this reading.

To more clearly understand how detectivism fits with this discussion, it is helpful to think about how many philosophers of mind often pick out their conscious experience. If one were to ask a philosopher what the referent of a conscious experience is, it will often lead to a response in which the individual mentally ostends for a few seconds, as if to fully immerse themselves in the referent, and confidently reporting that it is 'this' while perhaps pointing to their head or where he takes the referent to be located in the external world. If we look confused in response or ask further questions, the individual might attempt to recreate the experience in us by moving the object such that we "see" it in the way that they "see" it. They might attempt to describe it in a way that connects it up with objects that they have seen in the past, "it is sort of like...". If we turn to the individual and say, "I understand, when you refer to your conscious experience, you mean to refer to objects in the external world", they will likely say that the conscious experience is not the object *per se*, it is perhaps a picture of the object; a kind of middleman that works to recreate objects in the external world but recreate it in a way that is analogous to a private show.

After further prodding and pushing, the individual might finally say that what they mean to denote when ostending to their mental states is a "quality". But what has been accomplished by saying this? For this answer to *be* an answer,²⁸ the notion of a quality and what it is needs to be understood. As Wittgenstein notes early in the *Philosophical Investigations (PI)*, a word acquires its use by having the linguistic ground prepared in a manner that is analogous to how an explanation of a king in chess only serves as an explanation when the surrounding concepts²⁹ of the other chess pieces are explained.³⁰ Simply calling it a "quality" appears to leave it undefined and what I want to propose with this article is that, in our language, the notion of a quality often plays a similar grammatical role³¹ to the notion of an object because we think that we come to find out about our mental states in the way we find out about parts of the

28. I am assuming a sense of answer that would largely be at play in most philosophical conversations.

29. If not, I could have accomplished the same explanatory success by making up a word and exclaiming, it is a "blan".

30. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 2009, 31.

31. By a "grammatical role", I mean to highlight the idea that certain words (and possibly expressions) have certain functions that they play in discourse. They allow for certain questions to be asked of them and play an active role in the attribution of meaning and significance.

physical world. This similarity in the *grammatical* structure between how we speak of an “object” and how we speak of a “quality” leads us into our difficulties³² as we assume certain further grammatical affordances and when those affordances are not forthcoming, we feel as if we have uncovered certain philosophical problems. The reason this occurs is *because* we are assuming that we can understand qualities in the same way that we understand objects in the physical world and, consequently, that we can come to *know* about them in the same way. To substantiate this point on grammar, I will now discuss how it is that Jackson runs together the ways in which we might come to learn about qualities and how we might come to learn about qualities.

When Jackson speaks about what Mary learns when she leaves the black and white room, he speaks of it in terms of acquisition. Specifically, he talks about the acquisition of a fact, but it is a fact about some quality. For example, he talks about knowing, “...the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy...”³³ When Jackson speaks about knowing the “hurtfulness of pains”, he is picking out a truth-maker for the “hurtfulness” and using it to motivate the statement. But how is *it* the basis for my statement? We can begin by considering what we do when we speak of cars, trees, cats, dogs, etc., and how they serve as the basis for my statements about them. When I say, “that cat is moody”, I have an object of which I am predicating: the cat. I can point to the object in the external world, (the cat), speak about how it behaves (in such a manner indicative of moodiness) and in this way, the cat and a description of its actions serves as the basis of my statement. If we consider the “hurtfulness of pains”, it appears that we can give a similar analysis. We have an object, the pain, and we can describe the object as “hurtful”, and this may seem quite innocuous. Indeed, Jackson seems to reinforce this understanding of qualities as he speaks of qualities as being captured by facts about the qualities in a similar sense to which objects are captured by facts about objects. Specifically, he notes that Mary “...discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords...” and it is only when she leaves the room that “...she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it.”³⁴ In the previous sentence, Jackson seems to appeal to the idea of learning about aspects of the physical world and learning about a “quality” in such a way that makes them seem analogous.

32. I am understanding grammatical structure being the totality of grammatical affordances that the idea allows. By grammatical affordances, I mean the integration that the notion has with other aspects of language and the further moves that can be made with the notion; for example, if I tell you that I have a blanket, the notion a blanket affords you asking, (in this case correctly) “where is the blanket?”

33. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” 2004, 39-40.

34. Ibid, 42-43.

This leads to a similarity in the grammatical structure of an object and the grammatical structure of a quality and seems to assimilate the two but to do so would be to overlook an important difference between them. The moment we do overlook this difference, we get an understanding of a quality as being a kind quasi-object that is *hidden away*. Indeed, it very easy to do this and in remark 400 of the *PI*, Wittgenstein makes a similar comment when he notes how our grammar leads us to assume that our visual experience is analogous to a “visual room” that we can explore.³⁵ It is when we similarly model how we come to learn about objects and how we come to learn about qualities that our problems start to occur as we have formed certain expectations about what grammatical affordances the notion of a quality *should* allow.

When these expectations are broken, things start to appear slightly odd, and we feel as if we have stumbled upon some philosophical problem. As Wittgenstein notes in remark 401, “The visual room seemed like a discovery, as it were; but what its discoverer really found was a new way of speaking, a new comparison, and one could even say, a new experience.”³⁶ But when we think of it as a discovery without realizing the crossing of the language-game of qualities with the language-game of objects that we start falling into philosophical puzzlement and start asking questions like: “How do I come to learn about these conscious states? Are they new facts related to these states? It seems like I can only discover them *by experience*.” Before we have said go, the philosophical race has already started, and bewilderments creep up in all different forms. But perhaps, instead of puzzling over these seemingly intractable issues, we might slow down and ask questions about the model we are employing that gave rise to the issues in the first place. In the next section, I will attempt to more explicitly point out the difference between objects and qualities and use this to more vividly highlight where the issues arise. Once I have done this, I will revisit Jackson’s knowledge argument.

Grammatical Differences

One response to all I have said is to argue that the detectivist model *is* appropriate; that my claim is correct, but the correctness of the claim does not actually speak against the knowledge argument. For this section, I will discuss why making sense of our pains in the way we might make sense of physical objects is problematic by discussing the difficulties that arise when we try to treat them similarly. In the *PI*, Wittgenstein indicates how we are forced into particularly odd linguistic contortions when we run together the grammar of objects and qualities. More specifically, there are certain grammatical moves that

35. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 2009, 400.

36. *Ibid*, 401.

we can make with objects; we can talk about how we see them, have them, and manipulate them that we might try to apply to qualities. Wittgenstein gives voice to these grammatical moves in remark 398 when he speaks for his interlocutor and says, "But when I imagine something, or actually see objects, surely I have got something which my neighbor has not" and Wittgenstein responds by saying,

"...I understand you. You want to look about you and say: "At any rate only I have got THIS." — What are these words for? They serve no purpose. — Indeed, can't one add: "There is here no question of a 'seeing' — and therefore none of a 'having' — nor of a subject, nor therefore of the I either"? Couldn't I ask: In what sense have you got what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even see it."³⁷

To see the full force of this passage, we have to notice how easily we are led from a superficial similarity to absurdity. Consider how easy it is to say, "I have my book" and "I have my sensations". Both appear like legitimate uses of language, and all seems in order until we start to apply the grammatical model of our understanding of objects, like the book, to understand the grammar of the sensations that we run into issues and ask questions like, "I can locate my book in the world but where are my sensations!?" But to ask this question is to misapply a model and not appreciate the rich differences between objects and sensations. Consider the circumstances in which I talk about having my book.³⁸ You may ask me, "do you have your book?" To this, I can reply with yes or no. I might search my bag, look around me and say "I'm not sure. I think I have it, but I cannot find it" or "I had my book, but I do not now" or "I'm looking...I have it — I found it at the bottom of my bag". We can now apply this to the notion of a quality: I may ask, "do you have your pain?" Immediately, this type of question strikes us as odd. This almost seems like an ill-formed question and in response, I might understandably say, "Of course I have my pain. It is mine after all". But what does that statement mean to convey?

One possibility that is that I am telling you something analogous to my having my book, but it is not clear that my experience of pain is something that I could misplace or need to find. My pain is, as it were, attached to my psyche; if I am in a pain, then I am in a pain state.³⁹ I cannot have my pain the *same way* I can

37. Ibid, 398.

38. The structure of this remark is largely in line with Wittgenstein's remark in 411 but instead, I am appealing more to the notion of "having" as opposed to idea of "my".

39. One anonymous reviewer helpfully points out that it *does* seem like I might not have my pain in the same way that I might not have my book. But the claim being made here is not that pain does not come and go, it is rather that when it comes to the book, we can *figure out* whether we have it by investigating our immediate person and environment; pains do not seem to work this way. I do not need to investigate to determine whether I am in pain.

be said to have my book. Another instance in which a superficial grammatical similarity leads us astray is to consider the idea of “inspecting” in “he inspected his feelings” and “he inspected his book”. Both sentences seem well formed and in order but again, this overlooks the differences between them. To see this, consider what it means to inspect an object like my book.

When I inspect my book, I turn it over and look it from all different angles, count the pages, note the cover, mull over its contents; this all seems to be in good order. Suppose that I apply the same type of understanding to how I inspect my pains. How would this go? Well, I might focus my attention on my feelings to amplify them but what does it mean to amplify my feelings? One way to think about it is to consider how I might turn up the volume on my music to hear it more clearly. But consider what I am doing when I turn up the music to hear it more clearly; I am attempting to hear more of the details and thereby gather more information about the music (I might be attempting to pick out the cello or hear more clearly how it is that the violin harmonizes with the other instruments). Now, can something similar be said of an inspection of my pains? Well, what is being assumed here if I *am* able to do this? One thing that seems to be assumed is that it would be possible to learn more about my pains if they were amplified in the same way and that I would be able to learn more about the music when the volume is turned up. If this is true, then it is also true to say that, in my everyday experience of having a pain, I have an, at best, partial understanding of my pain.⁴⁰ While this sounds a little odd, this may accepted, but consider what else would have to be let in to get this conclusion. To be able to learn more about my pain, I have to be able to understand what it would *mean* to learn more about my pains; otherwise, I might *think* that I am learning about them without actually learning about them.

To see the difficulties associated with this point, consider, for example, if I were to turn up the music and then proceed to hear a slight fuzz or static. One thing I can say here is that “I have learned more about the music by amplifying it, namely I have learned that there has been a slight fuzz or static present the whole time, but I just never heard it!” But, of course, this is false. The slight fuzz or static is a byproduct of the device being unable to maintain a certain level of fidelity at high volumes. In normal circumstances, I understand this and, as it were, cut out the fuzz and attempt to focus on the music. This shows that “learning more about the music” is bounded by criteria and merely *thinking* that I am learning more is not sufficient to be learning more. How does this apply to my pains?

Are there certain criteria here as well that inspecting my pain is bounded by? What exactly are these criteria for learning more about my pain? Could I flaunt

40. Unless of course one wants to say that I somehow inspect my pains, gain a full understanding and now I walk through life with this complete understanding. I take this to not be what an individual would say in this context but if they do, I think that there are responses, but they would be largely tangential to this paper.

these criteria and, in inspecting my pains more closely by amplifying them be *wrong* about my pains? Could I think that I am learning⁴¹ more about my pain without actually learning more about my pain?

In response, it appears likely that one would not so much as answer my questions as they would say that they are fundamentally the *wrong* questions to be asking. Wittgenstein notes as much in remark 288 of the *PI*:

“...I turn to stone, and my pain goes on. — What if I were mistaken, and it was no longer pain? — But surely I can’t be mistaken here; it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain — that is, if someone said “I don’t know if what I have is a pain or something else”, we would think, perhaps, that he does not know what the English word “pain” means; and we’d explain it to him...If he now said, for example, “Oh, I know what ‘pain’ means; what I don’t know is whether this, that I have now is pain” — we’d merely shake our heads and have to regard his words as a strange reaction which we can’t make anything of...”⁴²

The reason an individual would so much as entertain the remarks given to him by Wittgenstein is because he is taken in by a similarity in the grammatical structure of qualities and objects (again, I do often talk about “my pain” without as much of a hiccup in the conversation) and “going on” with the grammatical model of objects when talking about sensations. Again, when individuals do this, they start to form expectations about what grammatical affordances they *should* have when speaking about my qualities and when these are flaunted, philosophical issues arise.

To bring our discussion back to Jackson, what I claim is that Jackson is making a similar error in running together the grammatical structure of “knowing about objects” and “knowing about qualities”. Consider the two statements, “I know about my book”, and “I know about my qualities”. I know what it is to learn facts about the external world and if I say “know” when it comes to my qualities, it seems like there must be some facts about *it* that I need to be aware of in order to *know*. But this overlooks the differences between “knowing” qualities of my experience and “knowing” about objects. For example, to refer back to the music example, it makes perfect sense to talk about how I may *think* I know about the music but be wrong about it, “I thought I knew that the fuzz was part of the song, but I was wrong” but it seems nonsensical to say this of my pains: “I thought I knew about my pains, but I was wrong”.

41. An anonymous reviewer pushed back here and claimed that we *can* learn about our pains, and this is how we might, for example, compare it with other pains. The effectiveness of this critique depends on what it is meant by “learning”; if the claim being advanced here is one models learning on how we learn about the external world, the critique needs to respond to the larger argument being made which is precisely pushing back on this claim.

42. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 2009, 288.

In remark 290 of the *PI*, we get Wittgenstein diagnosing why this might happen⁴³ when he talks how we might be said to “describe” our mental states:

“It is not, of course, that I identify my sensation by means of criteria; it is, rather, that I use the same expression. But it is not as if the language game ends with this; it begins with it. But doesn’t it begin with the sensation – which I describe? – Perhaps the word “describe” tricks us here. I say “I describe my state of mind” and “I describe my room”. One needs to call to mind the differences between the language-games.”⁴⁴

The point I have been pushing is that the difference between the language games is a difference that comes about *because* of an implicit commitment to the detectivist view. If we noticed the commitment and the issues it leads to, we might be *less* tempted to adopt the detectivist view and thus less tempted to think we are in the presence of some special quality of our experience that is exemplified by some new fact.

Back to Jackson

Given what I have said, we can understand it as a response to the knowledge argument that stands on its own, or we can think of it as adding argumentative weight to one of the earlier responses I articulated. The way it would add to one of the earlier responses is as serving as an independent argument against a specific articulation of the knowledge argument that can hold its own weight if the response fails and if the response is successful, adds further reason to push back against the argument. If one wants to craft a robust response to the knowledge argument, the latter approach appears more advisable. That said, integrating my argument is not going to be compatible with each type of response and to see which it can synergize with, I will go through each response and discuss its compatibility.

43. Finkelstein also understands Wittgenstein in this passage as highlighting the differences between the language games. Specifically, he says: “Imagine that, upon entering the kitchen of a house whose purchase you are considering, you say; “This room is a problem to. It does get a lot of light though.” Such a description might be characterized as the last move in a little language-game. Before you can describe the room, you need to look it over. Only after you have looked around—observed things—are you entitled to talk about what you have seen. So, the moves in this language-game are (1) observe and (2) describe (or, if you prefer, (1) observe, (2) judge, and (3) describe.” The describing comes at the *end* of the game—after observing. Wittgenstein’s point in 290 is that we need to distinguish *this* sort of language-game from the sort in which you’re engaged when you describe one of your own sensations. You are entitled to say, “I have a sharp pain in my wrist,” without ending to do any observing (or judging) first. In the language-game of describing your own sensation, the first thing that you do—the first move you make—Is the describing” (Finkelstein, *Expression and the Inner*, 2008, 133).

44. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 2009, 290.

Starting with the first view – questioning whether she indeed learns something new – the argument I have articulated is compatible with this response because we might argue that the only way we might be justified in thinking she learns something new *is* via detectivism and detectivism is incorrect and thus she does not learn something new. The second view – questioning whether, if she does learn something new, whether it is factual or non-factual, and if it is the latter, what type of non-factual learning is acquired – also appears compatible if non-factual learning does not rely on a detectivist model (which it, *prima facie*, does not appear to). The third view – questioning whether she does come to learn in a new way, but it isn't some further information – gets a bit difficult; the representative for the type of response that I picked is Earl Conee and his view relies on the epistemological relation of acquaintance. Acquaintance can be understood in multiple ways but one of the most famous advocates of the view was Bertrand Russell and Russellian acquaintance view serves, for Finkelstein, as a paradigmatic instance of the detectivist view (both old and new.)⁴⁵ If Conee is understanding it *pace* Russell, and the third type of response is typified by Conee's contribution, then the third response to the knowledge argument would not be compatible with the arguments put forward here. Similarly, the fourth response – questioning whether, if Mary does come to learn some new information, whether it is a *new* fact or a different way of learning some old fact – is also difficult; I picked Terence Horgan to represent the view and he seems to also be relying on being acquainted with some property. The same worry raised in relation to Conee would apply here as well. Finally, the fifth view – questioning whether she, in fact, learned all the physical facts before she was released – is also a bit unclear; if Van Gulick's claim that subjective facts are physical facts and physical facts are gathered in a detectivist manner (where we rely on some perceptual process to discover some fact), then this would also be disqualified. That said, Van Gulick need not saddle himself with this claim and if he takes this route, his view *would* be compatible with this type of response.⁴⁶

45. Finkelstein, *Expression and the Inner*, 2008, 11-18.

46. An anonymous commenter seemed to interpret the previous arguments as an argument against experience altogether. My response is that this is not the claim I am putting forward; what is being argued against here is a certain model of how we come to know what are termed "phenomenal qualities". As I read it, "phenomenal qualities" are not synonymous with experience; it is a technical term that picks out a certain conception of what our mental life is like (i.e., if we follow early Jackson, they are epiphenomenal). One might run with the argument put forward here to push back against belief in phenomenal qualities (though they may be justified in ways that are different than what is articulated here) but they would not be arguing against experience simpliciter *unless* they make the further assumption that experience simply *is* phenomenal qualities.

Conclusion

With this article, I have offered a Wittgensteinian critique of one, plausible, way of understanding the knowledge argument. Modeling how to come to learn about our mental states in a way that is similar to how we come to learn about the external world might appear innocuous, but I argue that it is not. The reason why it is not is because when individuals appeal to the detectivist model, they start creating grammatical affordances based on theoretical expectations and flaunting those expectations leads to metaphysical issues. This path should be resisted because modeling of sensations in a similar way to modeling physical objects is *itself* problematic and overlooks the differences between the two. There is a simple way that Jackson (or rather those who champion the argument in his stead after he changed his mind), might respond here: he might claim that there is a way in which we might understand the Mary argument that does *not* presuppose the detectivist position. However, if they take this route, Jackson (or those in his stead) need to offer us a more robust account of the epistemic relation that they hold with their mental states and, until that time, the knowledge argument should be treated with suspicion.

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