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ATHENS INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
A World Association of Academics and Researchers
8 Valaoritou Str., Kolonaki, 10671 Athens, Greece.
Tel.: 210-36.34.210 Fax: 210-36.34.209
Email: info@atiner.gr URL: www.atiner.gr
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Mission

ATINER is a ***World Non-Profit Association*** of Academics and Researchers based in Athens. ATINER is an independent **Association** with a **Mission** to become a forum where Academics and Researchers from all over the world can meet in Athens, exchange ideas on their research and discuss future developments in their disciplines, **as well as engage with professionals from other fields**. Athens was chosen because of its long history of academic gatherings, which go back thousands of years to *Plato's Academy* and *Aristotle's Lyceum*. Both these historic places are within walking distance from ATINER's downtown offices. Since antiquity, Athens was an open city. In the words of Pericles, **Athens*"...is open to the world, we never expel a foreigner from learning or seeing".*** ("Pericles' Funeral Oration", in Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War).* It is ATINER's **mission** to revive the glory of Ancient Athens by inviting the World Academic Community to the city, to learn from each other in an environment of freedom and respect for other people's opinions and beliefs. After all, the free expression of one's opinion formed the basis for the development of democracy, and Athens was its cradle. As it turned out, the Golden Age of Athens was in fact, the Golden Age of the Western Civilization. *Education* and *(Re)searching* for the 'truth' are the pillars of any free (democratic) society. This is the reason why *Education* and *Research* are the two core words in ATINER's name.

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President's Message

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Before you submit, please make sure your paper meets some basic academic standards, which include proper English. Some articles will be selected from the numerous papers that have been presented at the various annual international academic conferences organized by the different divisions and units of the Athens Institute for Education and Research.

The plethora of papers presented every year will enable the editorial board of each journal to select the best ones, and in so doing, to produce a quality academic journal. In addition to papers presented, ATINER encourages the independent submission of papers to be evaluated for publication.

The current issue of the Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies (AJMS) is the third issue of the fifth volume (2019). The reader will notice some changes compared with the previous issues, which I hope is an improvement. An effort has been made to include papers which extent to different issues of Mediterranean studies. Two papers are related to history; one to economics and the other to architecture – urban planning.

Gregory T. Papanikos, President
Athens Institute for Education and Research

Athens Institute for Education and Research

A World Association of Academics and Researchers

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6-9 April 2020, Athens, Greece

The **Center for European & Mediterranean Affairs** organizes the **13th Annual International Conference on Mediterranean Studies, 6-9 April 2020, Athens, Greece** sponsored by the Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies. The aim of the conference is to bring together academics and researchers from all areas of Mediterranean Studies, such as history, arts, archaeology, philosophy, culture, sociology, politics, international relations, economics, business, sports, environment and ecology, etc.You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (https://www.atiner.gr/2020/FORM-MDT.doc).

Academic Members Responsible for the Conference

- **Dr. Yannis Stivachtis**, Director, Center for European & Mediterranean Affairs and Director & Professor, International Studies Program Virginia Tech – Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, USA.
- **Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos**, Honorary Professor, University of Stirling, UK.
- **Dr. David Philip Wick**, Professor of History, Gordon College, USA.

Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **31 August 2019**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **9 March 2020**

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- Athens Sightseeing: Old and New-An Educational Urban Walk
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Conference Fees

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Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **12 Noevember 2019**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **18 May 2020**

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference

- **Dr. Bettina Koch**, Head, Politics & International Affairs Unit, ATINER & Associate Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA.

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Singular Factors behind the Growth of Innovation in Israel

By Raphael Bar-El[*]*, Dafna Schwartz*[†]*, David Bentolila*[‡]

Israel is known as one of the leading countries in innovation, mostly in terms of Research and Development (R&D) activity. We describe the growth of innovation activity and focus on the question about the leading factors that explain the rapid growth of innovation activity. Against the theoretical background of the rule of comparative advantage, we find that the innovation trend in Israel was mostly stimulated by comparative disadvantages. The explanation of the growth of innovative activities is mostly attributed to the characteristics of the national innovation ecosystem, and to the ability to understand its functioning and to derive appropriate policy measures. Using the data of 127 countries as gathered in the Global Innovation Index (GII), we propose a model for the explanation of the relative growth of innovation in Israel, and support it through an in-depth survey of the main leaders of innovation in the last years, from the fields of academy, industry and government.

Keywords: *Israel, Innovation, Ecosystem.*

Introduction

The state of Israel is considered as one of the leading economies in innovation achievement. It is ranked 11 out of 127 economies by the Global Innovation Index (Dutta et al. 2018). However, this cannot be explained by the factors which are generally considered as strong contributors to innovation, as mostly explained by the "triple helix" concept, which was developed quite intensively by Etzkowitz (see for example Etzkowitz 2008) and empirically tested in a few cases (Jackson et al. 2018). Moreover, Israel has been subject since its establishment to a few problematic constraints that are generally considered as inhibitors of economic growth: a small and geographically isolated market, lack of natural resources, heavy security needs, massive immigration flows.

In this article, we focus on the influence of exogenous constraints upon the ability to achieve innovation advance, beyond the well know influences of the classic factors of the innovation ecosystem. We use the case of Israel to show that constraints that are generally considered as negative factors by economic growth theories, may have an inverse influence upon innovation development. We relate to three specific issues.

First, we relate to the constraint of a small market (about 600 thousand inhabitants at the establishment of the state in 1948, until about 9 million in 2019), which significantly imposes two important restrictions: the potential for

[*]Professor, Ben-Gurion University, Israel.
[†]Professor, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel.
[‡]Coordinator of Management Division, Zefat Academic College, Israel.

market-oriented innovation and the potential for venture capital availability. The response to this constraint was a governmental program of venture capital, YOZMA, with a strong orientation towards overseas linkages.

Second, we consider the extent to which the main factors of the innovation ecosystem have been influenced by the specific conditions of the state of Israel, and analyze the impact upon the relative role played by each factor. Given the extremely strong changes in the Israeli society as a result of various waves of enormous immigration flows, we focus mainly on the factor of culture and its implication upon innovation potential. In parallel, we evaluate the relative role of other main factors of the innovation ecosystem, as compared with their role in global literature.

Third, we relate to the exogenous negative factors of scarcity of natural resources (land, water, energy) and of the heavy defense needs, and show their positive influence upon an increasing motivation for innovation.

The Market Constraint, the Unavailability of Venture Capital and the Geographical Isolation: The Role of the YOZMA Program

As a consequence of an extremely small market at the establishment of the state in 1948 (about 600 thousand inhabitants, and of continuous economic and security tensions), for several decades Israel's economy was heavily dominated by the public sector and trade was greatly restricted. Since the late 1980s, the government has actively created policies to unleash the potential of the private sector and increase the business interaction with global markets. This policy was accelerated when the mass of immigrants came from the former Soviet Union, many of them with technological background.

Although the country enjoyed a relatively high level of R&D activities at the time with both civilian, military and government R&D support programs that were in place, the overall conditions were not ripe for venture investments. One of the perceived missing components was the unavailability of venture capital, as a result of the too limited potential of investors and of consumers.

As a public response to this perceived supply-side market failure, the Israeli government has set up a special program named YOZMA (which means "initiative" in Hebrew) - an equity co-investment program to channel equity finance to capital constrained but high potential, young enterprises, with a heavy orientation towards collaboration with overseas investors. The program was led by the Office of the Chief Scientist (today the Israel Innovation Authority), a central government agency responsible for fostering innovation in various industries. This led to the successful creation of the Venture Capital (VC) industry, which took place during the years of 1993 to 2000.

The Israeli Innovation Authority (at the time under the name of "Chief Scientist") allocated for that purpose $100 million. Under the YOZMA program, 10 VC funds were formed. Each of these funds was a private-government partnership of which the government's share was a maximum of 40% and the private investors' share 60%. The private sector, according to

YOZMA program, should be composed of partnership of leading Israeli financial institutions with leading foreign venture investors that have experience with startups (Schwartz 2009).

A major attraction of the YOZMA program was the private investors' option to buy out the government's share at a pre-determined price over a period of five years.

Thus the YOZMA program did not simply supply risk sharing to investors, it also provided an upside incentive – that private investors could leverage their profits through acquisition of the government shares. In addition, YOZMA was allowed to invest a certain portion of its capital directly in start-ups.

This program added the missing component to the ecosystem: risk capital as well as experienced private sector entities with local and global experience. These experienced investors provided "smart money" - beyond just funding: guidance on how to manage the startup, how to grow it, and how to market products to the world. While Israel had a long history of developing new technologies, the Israeli entrepreneurs lacked this kind of mentorship and the VC assisted in this area.

The YOZMA program immediately proved to be extremely successful and by 1999, Israel ranked second only to the United States in invested private-equity capital as a share of GDP (Wikipedia).

Yin (2017) considers it as "the most successful and original program in Israel's relatively long history of innovation policy". The share of the venture capital of GDP in Israel is like in the United States, is representing more than 0.35% of GDP. While in the other OECD countries the venture capital constitutes, a very small percentage of GDP, often less than 0.05% (OECD 2017: 124)

Under the YOZMA program ten VC funds were formed and fifteen direct investments were made by YOZMA itself, and major international venture investors were attracted from all around the world: the USA, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Singapore (see Table 1).

Nine of the ten funds exercised their option and bought out the government's share. Nine out of the fifteen investments (made by YOZMA directly) enjoyed successful exits, either through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) or through acquisition.

The YOZMA program was the catalyst for the development of the VC industry in Israel and for the development of the start-up sector as shown in the following figures. Prior to 1993, there was only one venture capital fund operating in Israel. In 2009, there were about 80 venture capital funds (IVC Research Center).

The capital raised by the VC funds grew from $40M in 1991 to 200 mil$ in 1993, and reached a peak of 2.7 billion dollars in year 2000. In the last two decades, the average amount of capital raised by Israeli VC funds fluctuated around an average of 750 million dollars a year, including years of world financial crisis, as can be seen in Figure 1 (IVC online).

Table 1. *The YOZMA Funds*

Fund	International Investors	Country Origin
Eurofund	Daimler-Benz, DEG (Germany)	Germany
Gemini	Advent (USA)	USA
Inventech	Van Leer Group (NL)	Netherlands
JPV	Oxton (US/Far East)	USA
Medica	MVP (USA)	USA
Nitzanim-Concord	AVX, Kyocera (Japan)	Japan
Polaris (Pitango)	CMS (USA)	USA
Star	TVM (Germany) & Singapore Tech	Germany
Vertex	Vertex International Funds (Singapore)	USA, Singapore
Walden	Walden (US)	USA
YOZMA – Direct Investments	None	Israel Government

Source: Erlich (2013). Available at https://www.slideshare.net/AlanLung/th-erlich.

Figure 1. *Capital Raised by Israeli VC Funds by Year (Billion Dollars)*



Source: IVC Research Center (Various Years).

The creation of the VC industry supported the establishment and the development of start-ups in Israel (Avnimelech and Schwartz 2008). From 51 before the YOZMA program, it grew constantly until reaching a peak of about 600 at the end of the century, as shown in the Figure 2. The creation of new start-ups stabilized around an average of about 500 every year in the following years and until present.

Figure 2. *Number of Start-Ups Created in the Years After the YOZMA Program Was Established*



Source: IVC Research Center (2010) .

Parallelly, the capital that was raised by the high-tech companies, most of them start-ups, from the VC investors rose dramatically, from less than $50M in 1991 to an annual average of $1.6 billion during the period 1999-2007 (see Figure 3). After the global financial crisis, this amount has been constantly growing, reaching an average of about 5 billion dollars a year.

Figure 3. *Capital Raised by Israeli High Tech Companies by Year (Billion Dollars)*



Source: IVC Research Center.

Even though the venture capital industry in Israel is very active, the role of the Innovation authority is still important. From 2014-2016, approximately 14% of start-up companies received a grant for R&D activity from the Innovation Authority. 1115 projects of 650 companies were supported by the Authority in 2016. A total of 493 million NIS was granted. (Israel Innovation Authority 2019).

Below is a snapshot of the fluctuations during recent years (Kirshberg and Enselman 2018):

- In the years 2011-2016, 4,029 start-up companies were opened in Israel. 1,509 of them (37%) were closed or delayed until 2016.
- In the years 2014-2016 there was an average annual decrease of 29% in the balance of openness and closing of start-up companies. This follows an average annual increase of 12% in the years 2011-2013.
- Total revenue of start-up companies in 2016 amounted to NIS 6 billion ($1.7 billion), an increase of 2% compared with 2015.
- In 2016 the amount of employees were approximately 27,500 employee jobs in start-up companies, up 7% compared to 2015.
- 64% of employee jobs are concentrated in software-based companies (applications for industries and businesses, medical information, Internet, mobile phone applications, security, e-commerce, and advertising).

Monthly wages per employee job (Kirshberg and Enselman 2018):

- The average monthly wage per employee post in start-up companies in the year 2016 was NIS 13,800 (about $3,680), an increase of 6% compared to 2015, and 1.5 times the average monthly wage for a wage job in the entire economy -NIS 9,200($2,453).
- In companies with a maximum of ten employee jobs, the average monthly wage per employee post in 2016 was NIS 12,300($3,280), and in companies with 21-21 employee jobs, the average monthly wage per employee post was NIS 20,500($5,467). In companies with more than 50 employee jobs, the average monthly wage is NIS 21,100 ($5,627), 2.3 times the average monthly wage in the economy.

Geographic distribution:

- In 2016, there were 1,836 companies in the Tel Aviv District, 268 companies opened and 159 closed.
- Most of the activity of start-up companies in Israel is concentrated in the Tel Aviv and Central Districts. 72% of start-up companies and 78% of employee jobs are concentrated in these districts.
- In the Tel Aviv District, the average monthly wage per employee post was the highest (NIS 14.6 thousand), and in the Jerusalem District and the South, the average monthly wage per employee post was lower (NIS 11,700 and NIS 11.2 thousand, respectively).

Funding

In the group of start-up companies, there was a continuation of the positive and consistent trend that began with the end of the global financial crisis. The large scope of funds raised by high-tech companies had a significant influence on this result. According to the IVC Research Center, approximately USD 4.8 billion flowed into the companies' cash reserves during 2016-2017, a figure that constitutes a new Israeli yearly record. This is while in the United States, venture capital investment actually declined for the first time after five consecutive years of growth.

Furthermore, the financing rounds themselves were larger than normal: the average round stood at approximately USD 7.2 million, some 20 percent more than the average between 2011-2016.

Quoting the director of the Authority of Innovation Aharon Aharon: “Israel is a technological innovation power, especially in the field of ICT (Information and Communication Technology). Technological Innovation is the key to economic prosperity, however the financial potential of Israeli innovation has yet to be fully realized… The Innovation Authority has formulated a strategy for preserving international competitive positioning and for increasing the economic-social yield from Israel's prospering technological innovation.”

Factors of the Innovation Ecosystem

Although a few basic factors may be generally identified as actors in the innovation ecosystem, their relative importance and role are not necessarily similar in each country. The specific conditions of the state of Israel could potentially inhibit an optimal functioning of some factors, leading to a decreased ability of innovation. The economic and social tensions resulting from the difficult conditions at the establishment of the state, the difficulties of integration between very different immigrants from European, Asian and African countries, constitute a problematic challenge for economic development and for innovation advancement.

An evaluation of the relative importance of major factors of the innovation ecosystem was made on the basis of in-depth interviews with 25 major leaders of the Israeli innovation ecosystem, and compared with the importance of such factors in the world as reflected by global literature (Turbiner et al. 2016). The Israeli leaders were selected from the three sectors of the triple-helix: government high level leaders of innovation (including most Chief Scientists), academic leaders in the field of innovation, and industrial leaders of major innovative firms. All interviewees had a deep involvement in the Israeli ecosystem, or/and were actually responsible for its practical implementation.

Five major factors were identified and their relative importance was quantified on a scale of 1 to 3. We present the results by order of importance, as ranked by the leaders (Turbiner et al. 2016).

Culture- Rank 1:

The factor which was ranked at the highest level by far in Israel is culture, much before all other important factors. Culture is certainly recognized in world literature as an important contributor to innovation (Saxenian 1996, Frenkel et al. 2011, Wadhwa 2013, Dashti et al. 2008, Feldman 2014). Cultural values such as tolerance of risk and failure, individualism, low power distance and lack of formality were found to have a positive impact on the emergence of innovation and also to explain the difference in the level of innovation between countries. Similarly, a tendency towards networking, pluralism, cultural openness, spirit of authenticity, engagement and common purpose were also found to be elements that explain the power of certain innovation ecologies and firms over others.

Another factor is the mass immigration along a few decades from a wide variety of continents and cultures. Besides the frictions that result from such mix of cultures, on the long run this has contributed to some extent to an increasing tolerance level.

Despite the features of the Israeli population as stated above, those specific characteristics have probably most heavily contributed to innovation. In their book, Start-up Nation, Senor and Singer (2009) describe Israeli culture as being devoid of hierarchies and formality, a culture that includes a willingness to work hard, dedication, mutual responsibility, willingness to take risks and a

unique approach to failure. According to the unique attitude towards failure found in Israel, it was found that Israeli culture is not averse to situations marked by uncertainty. In this context, a large number of the interviewees noted the contribution of military service in Israel as a factor that shapes and influences the perception of risk and ability to maneuver in conditions of uncertainty. It combines original thought with initiative and strong performance that later translate into a culture that supports innovation in the business arena. Other cultural aspects noted in the interviews as supporting innovation include the tendency to challenge conventions, thinking outside the box, strong improvisational skills and a strong tendency to network.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)- Rank 2:

It is described in the literature as having a substantial impact on increasing efficiency and productivity of innovation activities. In general, a strong correlation was found between the degree of development of ICT infrastructure and the country's level of innovation. As a result, many countries attribute a great deal of value to the development of technological infrastructure that supports innovation and to increasing its use. A developed ICT infrastructure significantly reduces the impact of geographic distance on the emergence of innovation and serves as a catalyst for its formation by reducing the costs associated with innovation activities and raising capital, making global platforms of knowledge and information accessible, and enhancing the ability to share, process, discuss and distribute information (Rogers 2003, World Economic Forum 2013, Chemmanur and Fulghieri 2014). The findings of the interviews of the main Israeli leaders are in line with those of literature.

Academia- Rank 3:

Research literature shows that Academia and Research Institutes have a marked impact on the emergence of innovation, which can be seen in the creation of two critical components of innovation - human capital and knowledge. These inputs form the foundation of applied research, product and process innovation in industry (Bercovitz and Feldmann 2006, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000).

The field study in Israel shows that Academia has a quite moderate influence on the advance of innovation. However, it should be noted that a low influence was attributed to Academia by leaders of the public and the private sector, while academic leaders evaluated a quite higher influence.

Venture Funding- Rank 4:

The importance of the financing bodies in the emergence of innovation can be seen, firstly and foremostly, through their being suppliers of capital and virtually the only source of financing for entrepreneurial and innovation activity which entails great risk. A lack of venture financing entities has been

found to be a barrier to innovation activity and economic growth (King and Levine 1993, World Economic Forum 2013). Furthermore, the contribution of these entities to the emergence of innovation is also manifest in other aspects that improve the odds of success for innovative ventures such as monitoring of venture development, assistance in building quality management teams, mentoring based on know-how and professional experience, connections to local and global networks, providing a strong reputation to the funded companies, and more (Chemmanur et al. 2011).

In Israel, as shown previously, the establishment of the YOZMA program was a key factor in the ignition of the innovation process. However, the importance of the access to venture capital was indicated by the leaders in the field study only as moderate, differently from the extremely high importance attributed to this factor in the world. This can be explained by the fact that the success of the YOZMA project has led to a continuous privatization of the venture capital funds, making them more accessible on a free market basis, and therefore regarded as less critical to the advance of innovation.

Government- Rank 5:

The research literature shows that Government and Public Agencies play a central role in leading innovation and that they are actually key and highly influential innovation agents in the innovation ecosystem. The contribution of these factors to the emergence of national innovation is described as being broader and more comprehensive than addressing market failures and includes a variety of interventions in different contexts and time intervals (Mazzucato 2011). The means for promoting innovation that are available to the Government and Public Agencies include both direct support of industrial R&D, deployment of physical infrastructures, financing of basic research, education and development of human resources as well as means that can stimulate innovation processes, which are not based on conventional expansionary fiscal policy such as tax incentives, enacting laws, regulations and agreements (for example, tax policy, copyright protection, international cooperation agreements, immigration policy, etc.).

The Israeli government has generally received international recognition for its economic policy, which relates to growth and innovation challenges. Furthermore, a positive correlation was found between government programs and actions in the field of innovation and various aspects of innovation, as seen in the Israeli economy. Two salient examples in this regard are the Technological Incubators Program and the YOZMA Program, which were successfully implemented by the government at the beginning of the 1990s (Schwartz et al. 2012, Frenkel et al. 2011, Schwartz and Bar-El 2007, Avnimelech et al. 2008).

Despite the evidence in the research literature regarding the importance of the contribution of Government and Public Agencies to the emergence of national innovation, the findings of the interviews show that currently, after the achievement of a substantive advance of the innovation ecosystem and an

increasing access to venture capital, on average, the interviewees in this study did not perceive the contribution of government as very strong. This finding is especially interesting given the fact that half of the interviewees who belong to the industrial sector received support from the government to finance their innovative activity. Again, we may conclude that Government was an extremely important player in the ignition of the innovation process in Israel, but the progress and the continuous privatization of the innovation process made the contribution of government as less critical.

Specific Exogenous Factors

The functioning of the national innovation ecosystem may be influenced by various exogenous factors, which are specific to each country or region. In the Israeli case, we identify three major factors that generally constitute an impediment to economic growth: the scarcity of land and water, the lack of energy sources and the heavy defense needs. Surprisingly, those three elements played a major role in the advance of innovation in Israel.

The scarcity of land and of water was a major constraint to the Jewish aspiration after the Holocaust for the establishment of a state and to the need of a quite massive migration. However, such scarcity led to the need for an extremely efficient use of land and water. Consequently, many efforts were done in the development of agricultural technology, of advanced production processes, of new agricultural products. The scarcity of water was a major stimulator in the research and development of water desalination and of the treatment of used water. It was also a major stimulator in the invention of new irrigation methods, mostly including the invention of drip irrigation.

The lack of energy resources in a country surrounded by countries with high reserves of oil led to the continuous search of energy resources (rewarded by the discovery of gas in the last few years), and to the major efforts in the use of solar energy.

The defense needs as a result of military tensions with a multitude of surrounding enemy countries, together with unstable political relations with other countries led to the investments of heavy efforts in the development of local military instruments, first focused on automatic arms and ammunitions, but later shifting to the development of heavy defense devices, usually with no economic viability in a small country. This includes the development of a tank that responds to specific Israeli needs, the Arrow project, and more. The creation of a special military airplane (“Lavi”) was even initiated but failed after a few years.

Conclusion

Israel would not be expected to be a leading country in the process of innovation, following the quite accepted theories that explain the advance of

innovation. It is quite a small country with no local significant market, it is geographically isolated, its infrastructures and its human capital are good but not at the level of many developed countries. Still it is ranked today as one of the leading countries of the world in innovation. Innovative activity covers many sectors, the numbers of new start-ups are high, external investments are impressive.

A few main factors probably are at the root of such results. First, an important factor in the creation of innovation was rapidly identified by Israeli policy: the critical contribution of venture capital. The establishment of the YOZMA program, with a quite high allocation of venture capital funds and the collaboration with the experienced local and global private sectors, was a major element in the ignition of the venture capital industry and of the innovation process.

Second, the special cultural or human characteristics of the Israeli population played an important role: the extreme diversity of the population (reinforced by the mass immigration coming from the ex-Soviet Union), the non-conformist behavior, the rejection of authority, all those characteristics that are generally considered as negative to economic success, played a positive role in the advance of innovation.

Third, surprisingly enough, exogenous factors that mostly impose heavy constraints on macro-economic development, made a major contribution to the stimulation of new fields of innovation in Israel: the lack of natural resources, the problematic political and defense situation made the need for innovative responses critical and led to innovation in fields generally dominated by big economies.

Fourth, innovation ecosystems are dynamic and should be adapted along the process of innovation. The role of the government in the provision of infrastructures and venture capital is vital at the first phases, leading to a fading out to private venture capital, and to the increasing relevance of cultural aspects of the local population.

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Financialization and Deindustrialization in the Southern European Periphery

By Francesca Gambarotto[*], Marco Rangone[†], Stefano Solari[‡]

Historically, Southern European countries have shared a 'semi-peripheral' model of capitalism which has been characterized by fundamental fragilities in the production system. The financialization induced by the EMU has rendered these economies more fragile and unstable. Liberalization and market reform policies have taken southern economies onto the path of a credit-based and passively-extroverted financialized economy that trap them into a low-cost-of-wages search of competitiveness. However, the lack of autonomy in macroeconomic policies has weakened Southern opportunity to react to the financial crisis. The 'internal devaluation' policies that followed have caused a deep and thorough process of de-industrialization. This has sped-up the centralization of the European economy that has its centre in a narrow space within Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin and Frankfurt.

Keywords: *Southern Europe, Financialization, Deindustrialisation, Peripheralization.*

Introduction: The Crisis of Latecomers

Southern Europe has been especially hard hit by de-industrialization since the 2008 crisis. That has been seen as the effect of an asymmetric shock, which the European Union was badly structured to absorb (Jäger and Springler 2015, Celi et al. 2017). The result is stagnating demand, difficulties with banks' credits, high unemployment rates and precarious employment. The point discussed here, is that as the European economy, particularly the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), is increasingly interconnected, this asymmetric impact of the crisis is to be seen as a regional problem and not as international.

We actually find different interpretations of this phenomenon. Post-Keynesian and institutionalist scholars relate it to deflationary policies and to the asymmetric form taken by EMU (Stockhammer 2011, Becker 2013). However, even Jonathan Hopkin (2015) points to mistaken policies and Peter Hall (2014) sees this phenomenon as a consequence of the macroeconomic shock due to the post-2008 financial crisis austerity policies. Here, we argue that there is a deeper causal effect related to the core-periphery dynamics ignited by the European unification process, which has in turn simply been accelerated by the financial crisis and deflationary policies.

This kind of argument has been highlighted in different ways by both Reinert (2013) and Magone et al (2016) as well as in a growing literature on peripheralization concerning the European regions. Peripheralization is defined as

[*]Associate Professor, University of Padua, Italy.
[†]Assistant Professor, University of Padua, Italy.
[‡]Associate Professor, University of Padua, Italy.

"the process of becoming disconnected from and dependent on the centre' (Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013: 9). From this perspective, we are witnessing an ongoing restructuring of Europe's economic geography, which is redefining its centres and its peripheries. Continental centres, principally Paris, Frankfurt, Berlin and Amsterdam are gaining importance, while centres of peripheral regions such as Milan, Lisbon and Athens are losing their capacity to attract economic activity. This transformation is propelled by policy weakness and *financialization*, due to the prevailing logic of increasing capital mobility (van der Zwan 2014). Unfortunately, this dynamic is pushing Mediterranean countries towards the *periphery* of Europe and back into the *semi-periphery* of the 'developed world' economic system, joining there the South-East periphery (Epstein 2014).

We take the concept of 'semi-periphery' from Wallerstein's (1979) argument that the world economy is structured according to centre-periphery relationships. Such relationships directly connect production and location processes along international commodity chains. Core activities are those that command a large share of total surplus, whilst peripheral activities only command a minor share. Furthermore, due to increasing returns, core activities tend to cluster in regions that are accordingly called 'central regions'. Institutional and political reasons as well as locational advantages like positive externalities and concentrated demand are responsible for clustering. On the other hand, semi-peripheral regions show a mixed picture and their success crucially depends on the support of well-conceived and well-developed institutions.

In Wallerstein's view, the development of a region is the result of a process of structural change, from an economic system characterised by low value-added activities to one with a high share of strongly connected high value-added activities. This change tends to affect wage levels positively. However, a positive development path is strictly related to the coherence of institutions, particularly those that facilitate the production and redistribution of value in the economy. Losing the coherence of economic institutions reduces their support role relative to global competition and may cause a process of peripheralization.

What distinguishes the Southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece) is that industrialisation has occurred relatively recently compared to Continental European capitalism. Their economies have been characterised by a process of 'late development' (Fuà 1980) that resulted in an idiosyncratic model of capitalism that has attracted little attention in the contemporary literature compared to coordinated or market-based liberal capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001, Amable 2003, Gambarotto and Solari 2015, Molina and Rhodes 2007, Nölke 2016). In this case, 'late development' has created a degree of inconsistency between the production system and the requisite institutions, which has been typically compensated in these countries by state intervention. Governments have played an important role in addressing development requirements, attempting to correct the inconsistencies between the production system and national institutions, while inadvertently enhancing them creating dependency (Molina and Rhodes 2007). They did so through direct intervention, regulation and the control of private economic activity. These countries also developed generous pension systems to help curb the high social costs of structural transformation (becoming

pensions-heavy welfare states) and diverged from the continental economies by also creating a universal health system, but investing little in unemployment support or vocational training (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000).

As for economic activity, Southern 'late development' countries saw the emergence of an industrial structure based on traditional sectors, with a dualism of economic organisation between large corporations, often state-owned, and certain dynamic clusters of small firms. The labour market was characterised by a fragmented corporate structure, dualism (between core and 'outsider' workers) in labour contracts and growing levels of precarious employment. The financial system was mainly based on bank credit, while stock exchanges have long remained underdeveloped and are still characterised in large part by speculative investment (see also Baumeister and Sala 2015).

'Late development' tends ultimately to evolve into 'semi-peripherality' (Arrighi and Drangel 1986). We believe that this has indeed been the case for Southern Europe. Unsurprisingly, the strategic behaviour of governments is critical in driving the evolutionary process of a latecomer country, as it is obliged to play a greater role than in continental European countries in overcoming lags and counterbalancing fragility – an important problem that is now confronting EU policies (Reinert 2013).

Historically, while some latecomers such as Japan, and a number of other Asian economies (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore) have succeeded in upgrading their economies over time, others – including the Southern European countries – have succeeded only partially, and have constantly been at risk of economic downgrading. The Southern European economies increased their levels of industrial production until the 1990s. They also benefitted from the decentralisation of production from Continental Europe. That induced a degree of industrial specialisation in ancillary production, medium-low technologies and consumer products. The low level of capitalisation of industry meant a high return on capital. But at the same time, it did not incentivise measures to improve low labour productivity. In spite of their direct roles, governments have been unable to alter this trajectory, creating instead a situation of dependency - on external aid (e.g. the European Structural Funds) as well as on credit (Lains 2019). The difficulty in building real competitive advantage for business led to policies - such as frequent currency depreciations - that actually maintained the low wage-low, productivity link, or bolstered profitability only via the weak enforcement of rules (Rangone and Solari 2012).

Regardless of state intervention, the pattern of growth in the Southern European economies was largely 'spontaneous' rather than planned or directed, with simple (non-technology driven) agglomeration effects in some urban areas, little labour mobility and an absence of regional convergence. In general, neither research and development (R&D), nor the intensity of human resources, especially in the important science and technology sectors, have ever been a central concern of governments, and are still relatively scarce. Gambarotto and Solari (2009: 34-35) note that the Mediterranean model of capitalism displays a highly unequal form of regional growth and an uneven distribution of the population. Per capita GDP and employability are spatially concentrated and low on average. R&D

investments are also low and barely differentiated geographically. Household income, employment opportunities and long-term unemployment differ greatly among regions even after redistribution via welfare state institutions.

These countries had to reform their institutions, sometimes forcibly, to adapt to the process of European integration. Their old institutions were ill-matched with the new principles underpinning the European common market and, eventually, the EMU. Nonetheless, the newer and reformed institutions that these countries developed also appear to be unfit for underpinning a stable process of growth and the achievement of full employment. We attribute this failure also to the process of financialisation that has disembedded production activities. EMU has played an important role in this respect, creating strong pressures for the reform of economic institutions in a more open and market-oriented direction favourable to the mobility of European and international finance (Barradas et al. 2018). Globalisation has further lowered the fences protecting the local environment from far-East industries, resulting in serious problems of competitiveness, due to the weak forms of industrial specialization in the European south. Even if EMU has been of some benefit to the Southern European countries through lower interest rates, a looser monetary environment also led in the period between 2000 and 2008 to an excessive increase in both private and public debt and subsequently to financial instability. Deindustrialisation and high unemployment is the final chapter of this story, leading these countries into difficulties similar to the Central and Eastern European countries and placing them directly into competition with them (Epstein 2014).

Monetary Union and Financialization

EMU has created a favourable environment for the process of financialization (Stockhammer 2008), defined as an increased role for financial activities in the economy and financial deepening (the ratio of debt to GDP). Financialization acquired a specific character in the Southern European economies, one in which neither a marked expansion of financial institutions nor an increase in the financial assets in companies' balance sheets has occurred (Orsi and Solari 2010). Predictably, financialisation in Southern Europe has taken a peripheral path.

There are many ways to disembed capital, depending on the different patterns of accumulation prevailing. Becker et al. (2010) and Becker and Jäger (2012) have identified a set of characteristics that help define an accumulation regime in the periphery. The first distinction is between productive and financialized accumulation, which accounts well for the substitution of real investment with financial assets to maintain capital profitability. Financialized accumulation can be further divided into accumulation based on different types of securities and accumulation based on interest-bearing credit. The latter is typical of peripheral financialization. The second distinction identifies extensive versus intensive accumulation regimes. The former, typical of peripheral regimes, is based on an increasing exploitation of production factors, while the latter achieves growth via productivity increases. The third characterization is between extroverted and

introverted accumulation. The former is based on enlarging markets, while the latter is based on an expansion of internal demand. An extroverted accumulation regime can also result in a passive form of import-orientation. In the last twenty years, the accumulation regime of Southern Europe's economies has become financialized through an expansion of public and private credit, involving a more extensive exploitation of production factors alongside a passively-extroverted trading system (Gambarotto and Solari 2015).

The process whereby Southern Europe's economies embraced this form of financialization can be summarized as follows.

Firstly, the liquidity and mobility of capital was increased thanks to the euro. These countries attracted capital investment from the continental European economies in the early 2000s, seeking higher investment returns in the periphery. Inflation, which at that time was from one to three per cent higher in the South than in continental Europe, also provided an additional source of higher returns for investors from the same currency area, notably France and Germany. The real estate sector was the principal final target of financial investment.

Secondly, this flow of capital was facilitated by a shift in the business strategy of the southern banking systems, whose banks – also seeking higher returns – limited credit for the expansion of industrial production, lending more eagerly to building societies and consumers (including mortgages). That massive investment shift inflated a real estate and construction bubble (of dramatic proportions in Spain) that also inflated the collateral used for standard credit. Moreover, the bubble contributed to an increase in aggregate demand which sucked in higher imports, by simply creating a higher capacity for import absorption in a context of weakening local production.

Thirdly, many entrepreneurs facing globalization shifted their investments into public utilities (e.g. Benetton family controls Italian toll road operator "Autostrade") or to financial companies (the Pesenti family sold its cement industry to Heidelberg Cement and focused its capital in investment funds as Clessidra) rather than strengthening their industries through investment. Many sold their businesses to foreign enterprises (e.g. the Greek Maris Polymers was acquired by the French Saint-Gobain), while others relocated production (e.g. Greek SMEs to Bulgaria to reduce operational costs). This tendency weakened Southern 'family capitalism' and helped concentrate the control of industry in the hands of core EU financial centres and Continental European companies.

We argue that these effects of financial globalization have increased the fragilities of Southern capitalism depicted in the previous section, thereby weakening the structure of industry and initiating a process of de-industrialization that in the present context is difficult to reverse. Moreover, European stability policies in 2011-2012 magnified these tendencies. Those policies were primarily oriented towards cutting public deficits, but they were not particularly effective in achieving this objective because of their unexpectedly high impact in reducing GDP and, consequently, government tax revenue. These policies have been more effective in regard to 'internal devaluation', which was conceived as a substitute for actual currency devaluation to moderate the growth in these countries' international debt and excessive import levels. Therefore, internal demand

(absorption) had to be cut by means of selective measures. This involved reducing public expenditure (e.g. pensions) as well as wage cuts and a flexibilization of the labor market, which increased the proportion of precarious (i.e. largely unprotected) employment and drastically reduced the level of consumption. These policies led to a form of 'regional repression' of demand and certainly did not assist in industrial restructuring and consolidation. Finally, falling consumer expenditure, the specific form of industrial specialization and structure found in the Southern countries, as well as the absence of a coordinated European industrial policy, made national or regional responses to this process difficult to implement or even conceive. Therefore, the joint effects of market integration, the loss of control on monetary policy and globalization had important regional consequences for industry in the South.

Fragility and Inappropriate Policies

Passive and extroverted financialization has made Southern European economies more fragile and more vulnerable to both Central and Eastern European competition and macroeconomic shocks. At the end of the 2000s, the European Central Bank's restrictive monetary policy led to a euro/dollar exchange rate of around $1.30-1.40. This helped boost imports while placing pressure on export-oriented industries. From 2011, austerity policies have done little to help a periphery that has experienced a financialization-induced process of 'boom and bust'. These deflationary policies have had multiple effects.

- Because of euro appreciation, imports from non-euro areas became cheaper, and had an intense impact on Southern European manufacturing which is more directly exposed to low-cost, labour-intensive production than that of the economies of the North. Many firms relocated production to reduce costs and increase competiveness on international markets but that hardly hit the local supply chains made up of small firms.
- Due to badly-conceived financial stability reforms (at least with a bad timing), commercial banks had to increase their capital-assets ratio and did it by cutting lending, thereby inducing a serious credit crunch in these economies where production is mostly financed by credit.
- Banks became even more reluctant to finance industry exposed to Asian or European competitors or facing difficulties with domestic demand[4]. They cut all kind of lending, but particularly short-term lending which is vital for the solvency of small firms. Even when the BCE increased the money supply through 'quantitative easing', little by way of finance flowed from banks to small companies. At the same time, banks that were obliged to reduce lending, began to suffer from exploding non-performing-loans (NPLs) caused by the same credit crunch. First of all, reduced lending

[4]Banks had to increase their capital-assets ratio from an average of 4-5 per cent to 12-13 per cent. Many banks increased their risk capital, but the required capital ratios of Basel II and III and the criteria imposed by EBA and later ECB were difficult to meet and therefore they also cut lending.

interrupted the positive feed-back mechanism by which banks financed both producers and consumers via mortgages. That halted the real estate bubble causing prices fall. This reduced the capacity of building societies to repay loans, and the decreasing prices of unsold buildings further reduced the value of banks' guarantees. As regards industry, as small and medium-sized firms depend a great deal on short-term credit for funding, when banks reduced credit and requested that companies pay back former loans (at a time of narrowing margins), the number of companies falling into insolvency increased. Consequently, in a credit-based system of financing production, a credit crunch has insolvency effects that then induce a feed-back effect on the banks themselves.

- Instead of a patient policy of a long and prudent recovery from NPLs – which had been used in the past to deal with banks' experiencing difficulties with bad loans – the monetary and banking authorities demanded an instant devaluation and sell-off of NPLs, which caused a steep fall in NPL prices, allowing huge losses to emerge on the balance sheets of banks. In the case of Italian banks, bad credits that normally had a recovery rate of 70-80 per cent in some cases had to be rapidly sold at prices around 13-17 per cent.[5] That has led to the failure of many banks, large losses in the assets of middle-class families, and severe problems for production systems obliged to rapidly repay credits. On the other hand, the financial firms that purchased NPLs and patiently recovered credits are presently making huge profits.
- 'Internal devaluation' called for wage cuts, thereby decreasing aggregate demand. Households consequently reduced consumption while uncertainty further induced a contraction in consumer demand. That severely impacted local production systems.
- Aggregate demand also decreased because public expenditure was reduced while taxation was increased. Before 2008 the Southern European countries' stock of public debt was contained – even if deficits occurred – because a higher growth of GDP allowed the ratio of debt to GDP to remain under control. The recessionary impact of measures undertaken to deal with the financial crisis contributed to the expansion of both deficits and debt (see also Koutsoukis and Roukanas 2016).

These feed-backs had different intensities and specificities in each Southern country or region. For all, the deflationary shock had a serious impact on the industrial economy, simply because growing internal demand was a primary condition of the competitive equilibrium of many traditional sectors (food, cloths, furniture etc.). In fact, growing demand ensures productivity growth thanks to a better exploitation of production capacity without the need for major restructuring or technological change (the second of Kaldor's three laws of growth). The result has been a rapid process of de-industrialization. Services and non-traded goods

[5]The reason is twofold: firstly, a market for NPLs did not exist, secondly, banks were not ready in terms both of a complete documentation on these credits to securitize the demand of administrative personnel able to work on this process.

were also affected by internal devaluation, as fixed costs were reduced and the quality of services decreased accordingly. Many economists welcomed these policies in the hope that they would induce a concentration of production in larger units and a recapitalisation of companies. In fact, the crisis of smaller firms is inducing both a selection in favour of, and a process of aggregation into, larger units of production. However, this restructuring process is slow, costly and insufficient to counter-balance the huge economic and social costs of austerity. In other words, 'peripheralization', according to Arrighi and Piselli (1987: 687) is a process whereby local actors are progressively deprived of the benefits of participating in the global division of labour, to the advantage of other actors or regions. As a consequence, countries that had already entered the perimeter of the core - Italy in the 1970s and Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1990s – tend to be limited in their ability to remain in this position. Portugal and Greece are in an even worse situation than the others, having partially failed to strengthen and stabilize their production structures in the pre-crisis period.

On the one hand, these economies experienced great difficulty in following the growth pattern of continental economies, such as Germany and France, whose forms of production specialisation and the scale of their firms and service sectors are larger and stronger, incorporating higher technologies. This has been the case particularly of Italy, Portugal, and Greece once the introduction of the single currency prevented them from compensating for higher average inflation rates than in the European core.

According to Fischer-Tahir and Naumann (2013: 9) peripheries are "the outcome of complex processes of change in the economy, demography, political decision-making and socio-cultural norms and values". Certainly, the southern debt crisis of 2011 has reduced the political strength of Southern countries in shaping European policies, especially Italy. These countries have therefore lost credibility and have not been able to propose coherent stabilization policies compatible with the structure of their economies. This has contributed to the political marginalization of their economies.

Deindustrialization in the South of Europe

So far, we have seen that Southern European economies faced many difficulties in EMU due to structural asymmetries. At the beginning of the fixed-exchange rate period (euro adoption), they suffered from inflation differentials with Continental Europe which increased their labour costs in real terms. Then the appreciation of the euro caused their imports to boom while slowing down exports. The 2008 crisis and the consequent fall in demand led to a huge loss of employment, firms and production. Finally, debt-deflationary policies caused financial problems that induced a further fall in production and employment.

In Table 1 we have distinguished the two steps of the crisis: 2008-2012 and 2012-2016. We can clearly see the differential impact of the 2008-2012 crisis on industrial employment at the centre (Germany and France) and in periphery. The group of Southern de-industrialising countries clearly appears as suffering both a

loss of firms and jobs, though more jobs than firms in Spain, and more firms than jobs in Greece. If in the period before 2008 Southern European industry faced difficulties in keeping up with industrial growth in the rest of the Euro area – with the partial exception of Spain – after 2008 Southern Europe experienced a veritable collapse.

Table 1. *Deindustrialization: Employment and Firms, 2008-2012 and 2012-2016*

	Enterprises - Number		Employees in Full Time Equivalent Units - Number	
	2008-2012	2012-2018	2008-2012	2012-2018
Germany	4.2%	-0.9%	0.1%	2.3%
France	2.9%	-0.8%	-5.8%	-4.5%
Greece	-24.0%	-4.2%	-16.1%	-6.4%
Spain	-15.2%	-5.1%	-26.2%	3.5%
Italy	-9.2%	-7.1%	-13.3%	-6.2%
Portugal	-17.1%	-0.8%	-15.7%	6.5%

Source: Eurostat, NACE R2, INDIC SB.

Figure 1. *Manufacturing Value Added at Constant Prices*



Source: Eurostat, NACE R2, NA ITEM.

The second step of the crisis, 2012-2016, characterized by internal devaluation and debt deflation has particularly hit Greece and Italy, while Spain and Portugal have seen a certain recovery of unemployment (which remains at unacceptable levels). France also begins to suffer from the deflationary environment. The weaknesses of Southern industry are evident from data on value added in manufacturing (Figure 1 and Table 2).

Table 2. *Manufacturing Value Added as a Percentage of GDP*

	2001	2007	2012	2016
Euro area 12	17.1	15.8	14.5	15.3
Germany	20.5	21.1	20.4	20.6
France	13.7	11.4	10.2	10.2
Greece	9.9	8.5	8.0	8.6
Spain	15.8	13.5	12.1	12.9
Italy	17.1	15.9	13.8	14.6
Portugal	14.7	12.2	11.4	12.1

Source: Eurostat Gross value added and income by A*10 industry breakdowns [nama_10_a10]

The difficulties of the Southern economies is evident in Figure 2, which records the slowing down of GDP per hour worked that began at the end of the 1990s in Italy and Spain and just before the crisis in Greece. Portugal experiences no such decrease, but diverges nonetheless from the general European trajectory. Therefore, exposed to higher competition, people in Southern Europe work an increasing number of hours but produce less and less. The flexibilization of the labor market adopted to cope with the euro is probably no stranger to this tendency.

Figure 2. *Relative GDP per Hour Worked*



Source: OECD, Dataset: Productivity.

However, it would be wrong to imagine that Southern European industry is not responding to the crisis and to deflationary policies. A part of the production system is well integrated into the European economy. Exports to the European core countries, in fact, responded to internal devaluation and increased rapidly after 2008. The composition of exports also changed considerably. The export of

low-tech products fell and the share of high-technology products grew substantially, representing an important structural change in the Southern European economies during the euro period. But this restructuring is insufficient to compensate for absolute losses as the ratio between the gains of high tech exports and losses from declining low-tech exports is about one fifth.

These figures also show how Southern Europe's weak level of industrial specialization has been more exposed to international competition and been difficult to restructure. European adhesion to WTO agreements, such as the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA)[6], which, although leaving a lot of time – almost 30 years – for leading firms to adjust by relocating production and reinforcing their channels of distribution, left a huge number of small firms operating in the intermediate phases of production exposed to competition from low-cost labor countries. For the majority of these firms operating in mature sectors, production specialization resulted in a *cul-de-sac* in terms of opportunities for upgrading. This situation opened huge opportunities for leading fashion firms, disembedding themselves from local networks of production, but imposed high social costs on various parts of the South tied to the fall in the number of firms (see Table 1). These trajectories in the restructuring process led to an increased differentiation of income and impoverished certain sections of the middle class. Due to public externalities, this problem should have been dealt with by public policies – at different levels – as a regional problem affecting a large area of Europe and not simply as a private problem of adaptation to the market. Nonetheless, Southern European countries, as well as their institutional actors and the firms concerned have been unable to respond by developing an industrial policy appropriate to the tasks at hand.

The Evidence for European Industrial Polarization

Between 2009 and 2012, the industrial specialization of the countries covered here did not change much as a result of the crisis. Greece and Portugal have been unable to develop significant industrial activities beyond textiles, apparel and metal products. Spain and Italy have more diversified industrial structures, while the French and especially German industrial structures are more specialized in machinery, transport equipment and chemistry. The loss of competitiveness in the textiles and apparel sectors in all countries, likely due to the difficulties in adjusting to WTO agreements like the MFA, had a greater impact on South Europe, particularly Greece, Portugal and Italy (Simonazzi et al. 2013). Southern countries have been particularly hit in the textile and apparel sectors as well as in the sectors that benefit from housing investment (non-metallic minerals, metal constructions, furniture). The southern economies were specialized in household consumption goods. This industry was partly crowded out by both Central and Eastern European and Asian production and partly suffered from the reduction in

[6]The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) governed world trade in textiles and garments from 1974 to 2004, imposing quotas on the exports of developing countries to developed countries. It expired on 1 January 2005.

consumer demand and, above all, from the reduction of prices. The reduction of prices is the consequence of two main developments: increased competition from foreign suppliers, and a composition effect caused by a reduction in related demand due to the weakening of prosperity among the Southern middle classes and an increase in demand for low quality/price goods.

In some sectors – automobile and transport equipment, rubber and plastic, chemicals, and electric equipment industries the distribution of employment has moved from the periphery to the centre (see Table 6 below). The food industry is characterized by a particularly notable reduction of employment in the Iberian Peninsula, while the proportion of jobs has increased in Germany and France: this is an interesting case of the tendency towards concentration. The fact that after the crisis management and clerical employment declines in the South and increases considerably in the North is a clear sign of the centralization of management activities in the European core (see Table 5 below). The significant loss of skilled jobs is equally worrying for the South.

Table 3. *Relative Trade Balances, 2009-13 (in percentages)*

Relative trade balance	**2009**	**2013**	**2009**	**2013**	**2009**	**2013**	**2009**	**2013**	**2009**	**2013**
(exp-imp)/ (exp+imp)	Germany	Germany	Greece	Greece	Italy	Italy	Portugal	Portugal	Spain	Spain
Fresh food	-28	-26	-20	-10	-39	38	-58	-49	9	15
Processed food	7	10	-26	-7	3	9	-9	-5	-2	7
Wood products	14	10	-74	-61	-16	12	25	34	-6	4
Textiles	3	2	-23	-18	25	22	3	3	-3	1
Chemicals	16	17	-57	-43	-12	-6	-37	-22	-15	-5
Leather products	-27	-27	-75	-63	29	34	23	23	-5	-2
Basic manufactures	15	9	-17	6	18	17	-7	5	10	22
Non-electronic machinery	36	36	-66	-41	46	50	-31	-5	-11	8
IT & Consumer electronics	-20	-21	-77	-63	-52	47	-38	-27	-60	-64
Electronic components	13	14	-52	-34	6	11	-15	0	-20	-2
Transport equipment	29	39	-86	-76	-10	10	-22	1	17	24
Clothing	-29	-31	-43	-28	11	20	13	20	-26	-13
Miscellaneous manufacturing	16	16	-67	-43	20	27	-23	-1	-30	-20
Minerals	-57	-56	-64	-21	-65	60	-52	-33	-62	-53

Source: International Trade Center- *http://www.intracen.org.*

Table 4. *Exports per Capita, 2009-13 euro*

Per capita exports	**2009**	**2013**	**2009**	**2013**	**2009**	**2013**	**2009**	**2013**	**2009**	**2013**
	Germany	Germany	Greece	Greece	Italy	Italy	Portugal	Portugal	Spain	Spain
Fresh food	268.5	362.8	248.4	288.6	167.9	206.2	123.7	211.4	450.8	590.5
Processed food	561.8	738.9	246.7	344.2	406.3	524.6	350.1	491.5	360.6	489.6
Wood products	362.4	401.1	23.8	31.7	136.5	165.1	304.9	469.1	128.9	160.4
Textiles	147.6	176.8	54.2	43.0	195.9	220.7	144.9	201.7	78.2	93.6
Chemicals	2,225.1	2,843.2	264.2	312.3	805.4	1,118.2	380.9	670.1	721.5	990.1
Leather products	64.3	93.4	14.1	17.4	269.7	395.9	159.3	246.6	78.9	101.7
Basic manufactures	1,161.7	1,489.2	263.9	347.4	805.4	1,015.6	427.0	628.7	521.1	719.4
Non-electronic machinery	2,314.6	2,961.5	75.5	80.1	1,405.7	1,708.0	266.5	412.7	422.9	589.4
IT & Consumer electronics	421.8	516.0	35.1	37.1	97.6	106.5	146.7	150.7	80.9	63.4
Electronic components	1,005.3	1,326.7	60.0	79.9	344.4	388.3	209.4	308.2	187.9	266.1
Transport equipment	2,386.7	3,544.7	70.4	39.3	625.0	728.9	471.3	616.0	1,020.4	1,257.1
Clothing	201.3	232.2	97.6	85.9	325.9	389.2	252.6	322.0	166.4	248.5
Miscellaneous manufacturing	1,197.2	1,513.4	86.7	101.3	656.8	804.3	263.7	408.5	234.9	275.7
Minerals	385.7	659.2	202.5	1,344.4	271.5	419.4	275.7	730.2	269.4	560.7

Source: http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/trade-statistics/

Except for ITC and consumer electronics, clothing and minerals, the German trade balance is in surplus, while for Greece and the Iberian Peninsula, it is in deficit for nearly all sectors (Table 3). Italy has a stronger industrial base compared with the other Southern countries, but the trend is not positive. With internal devaluation, deficits tend to be reduced, but the intensity of this reduction is modest compared to the sacrifices made by these economies. This policy has been more effective in the case of Italy where a degree of diversified industrial supply still exists. This fact reveals that there is not only a clear problem of specialization for the South. The issue is rather a general weakness across all sectors.

Table 4 is even more impressive because it shows sectoral per-capita exports for 2009 and 2013. Remarkably, Germany shows higher values in all sectors. Even the German export of both fresh and processed food shows higher and faster growing values than for other countries (except Spain). No comparative advantages in the South emerge from this table. Rather, Germany seems to hold an absolute advantage in almost all sectors. The implications of absolute advantage have not yet been thoroughly investigated by economists (Camagni 2001). Nonetheless, they represent a problem in an integrated economic area as it means that no balanced, competitive equilibrium can be reached between different regions of the European economic space. Therefore, in this situation, even deflationary policies have only a short-run positive financial effect on the balance of payments, leading to little improvement in Southern industrial production.

Table 5. *Percentage Change in Manufacturing Employment 2008-2014*

2008-2014	Germany	France	SOUTH	Italy	Spain	Portugal	Greece
Total	**-3.7**	**-14.8**	**-19.7**	**-10.1**	**-28.3**	**-15.0**	**-41.9**
Managers, professionals, and technicians	9.1	5.3	-9.8	-2.0	-18.3	42.8	-55.2
Clerical, service and sales workers	17.4	-23.3	-15.2	-12.6	-3.6	-34.2	-23.0
Skilled agricultural and trades workers	-12.5	-9.8	-20.7	-7.2	-26.9	-38.3	-38.7
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	-18.5	-40.2	-29.8	-25.6	-43.6	25.3	-50.2
Elementary occupations	-9.2	12.2	-19.2	7.5	-35.0	-41.8	-21.5

Source: ILO, Employment by economic activity and occupation database

Actually, we suggest changing perspective and viewing this restructuring of industry as an effective reshaping of economic space in Europe. There are no more clearly-defined national economic systems but an entire integrating region in an uncertainly-defined political space. Such a process of unification tends to reinforce high value added activities in the polycentric space situated in the Paris-Amsterdam-Berlin-Frankfurt quadrangle. Lower value-added activities are moving to the periphery which, in order to retain its financial viability is obliged to keep its labour costs low.

This view is reinforced by the peculiar case of Italy, which was the most developed of the Southern economies. In fact, core European companies have purchased many leading industries in the South, although it is also the case that Italian companies in public utilities that expanded abroad. A significant part of the

Italian fashion trademarks has been bought up by French firms[7]. French capitalism, which with Germany already was dominant in large-scale retail trade, has also gone on an intensive shopping spree in services such as telecommunications, public utilities and in finance: between 2012 and 2017, French companies announced $41.8 in Italian takeovers – triggering something of a nationalist backlash from Italian financiers and industrialists (Mawad et al 2017). However, while these acquisitions could be a simple effect of economic integration (and of Italian financial disarray – small and medium-sized Italian firms find it difficult to access the capital require for consolidation in Italy), what is really highlighting the 'peripheralization effect' is the trend for successful Italian companies to move their headquarters to the European 'core': FCA (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles) has moved its administrative headquarters from Turin to Amsterdam (its fiscal residence is London), while the Italian Luxottica (one of the largest eyewear companies in the world with sales for 9,15 billions of euros and net profits for 970 million of euros)[8] is merging with Essilor and moving its headquarters to Paris – just one more example of the tendency to centralize managerial activities in Europe.

This situation poses a problem of cohesion and eventually of identity and hence a big uncertainty in the policies to be enacted to achieve an external equilibrium between the different regions. Sometimes, a solution is to concentrate all economic activities in the central regions and let the periphery specialize in tourism and agriculture. This was, for instance, the case of French peripheral regions. Yet this solution would be harder to implement at the European level as entire countries are concerned. Anyway, this is the natural restructuring direction taken by many regions in the South, where former national centres (Milan, Lisbon, Athens, Madrid) are losing ground compared to continental ones, becoming less important 'second order' centres.

[7]Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy (LVMH), the French luxury-goods group, owns Fendi, Cova, Loro Piana, Berluti and Bulgari, while Bottega Veneta and Gucci are owned by rival French company Kering, formerly Pinault-Printemps-Redoute. Georgio Armaniis controlled by the French L'Oréal Group. Other large Italian fashion companies – such as Tod's owned by Diego Della Valle (who is a core shareholder in Saks, the US luxury department store) have globalized themselves

[8]Luxottica owns many top brands like Ray-Ban, Oakley, Persol, Oliver Peoples, Alain Mikli, Arnette, Vogue Eyewear and many else.

Table 6. *Impact of the Crisis on Industrial Specialization Calculated by Employment - Eurostat*

2008-2012	**Germany**		**Greece**		**Spain**		**France**		**Italy**		**Portugal**	
NACE_R2/GEO	Var 2012/2008	share in total change	Var 2012/2008	share in total change	Var 2012/2008	share in total change	Var 2012/2008	share in total change	Var 2012/2008	share in total change	Var 2012/2008	share in total change
Manufacturing	**0.8%**	100.0%	**-16.8%**	100.0%	**-25.1%**	100.0%	**-4.8%**	100.0%	**-11.6%**	100.0%	**-16.9%**	100.0%
Manufacture of food products	5.5%	71.4%	7.0%	-8.4%	-6.9%	3.9%	11.7%	-37.6%	3.4%	-2.4%	-8.0%	6.0%
Manufacture of beverages	-6.5%	-8.4%	-2.2%	0.4%	-9.8%	0.9%	-		-		-5.3%	0.6%
Manufacture of tobacco products	0.4%	0.1%	-32.7%	1.4%	-21.5%	0.1%	-		-		-	
Manufacture of textiles	-10.8%	-16.2%	-39.7%	**9.6%**	-33.5%	3.2%	-24.2%	**8.8%**	-22.8%	**7.9%**	-27.7%	**11.7%**
Manufacture of wearing apparel	-13.2%	-11.2%	-27.3%	**9.8%**	-44.6%	5.9%	-25.8%	**9.6%**	-17.2%	**8.6%**	-26.1%	**22.3%**
Manufacture of leather and related products	-6.0%	-1.9%	-46.9%	2.7%	-24.1%	1.7%	3.1%	-0.5%	-6.8%	2.0%	0.5%	-0.2%
Manufacture of wood products	-1.8%	-3.9%	-6.5%	0.8%	-41.6%	5.8%	4.4%	-1.8%	-17.1%	4.1%	-25.5%	7.4%
Manufacture of paper and paper products	0.2%	0.6%	-15.7%	2.4%	-15.9%	1.5%	-5.3%	2.5%	-3.7%	0.6%	-9.8%	0.9%
Printing and reproduction of recorded media	-9.5%	-28.0%	-9.9%	1.7%	-29.6%	4.2%	-21.3%	**11.7%**	-18.6%	3.6%	-25.4%	4.2%
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum	-2.6%	-0.9%	-14.2%	1.2%	4.3%	-0.1%	-		-1.5%	0.1%	-	
Manufacture of chemicals and chemicals	2.5%	14.5%	-17.2%	4.1%	-13.6%	2.2%	-4.2%	4.4%	-6.2%	1.6%	-14.9%	1.7%
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals	-3.4%	-7.5%	0.9%	-0.1%	-9.0%	0.6%	-9.5%	5.4%	-9.0%	1.4%	-1.9%	0.1%

Manufacture of rubber and plastic products	2.9%	19.8%	-11.1%	2.9%	-22.9%	4.6%	-20.8%	**29.0%**	-7.2%	3.0%	-5.1%	1.0%
Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals	-0.3%	-1.3%	-31.0%	**13.2%**	-44.7%	**13.9%**	-10.2%	8.7%	-21.4%	**10.3%**	-25.9%	**11.0%**
Manufacture of basic metals	-3.6%	-17.2%	-13.0%	4.4%	-20.6%	2.7%	-21.8%	**15.0%**	-11.1%	3.4%	-18.5%	1.5%
Manufacture of fabricated metal products	1.4%	20.1%	-27.4%	**18.1%**	-36.9%	**22.0%**	-2.5%	5.4%	-17.4%	**21.4%**	-15.4%	**10.7%**
Manufacture of computer. electronic and optics	-2.8%	-15.6%	-39.6%	3.4%	-30.8%	2.1%	-6.3%	6.4%	-13.2%	3.6%	-13.1%	1.0%
Manufacture of electrical equipment	1.8%	15.4%	-16.9%	2.7%	-24.9%	3.6%	-15.0%	**13.8%**	-10.3%	4.1%	-7.3%	1.1%
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.	-1.5%	-28.2%	-26.6%	**8.2%**	-24.4%	5.5%	-16.0%	**22.8%**	-5.8%	6.0%	-17.2%	3.4%
Manufacture of motor vehicles. trailers	1.8%	25.6%	-34.8%	2.7%	-18.0%	5.1%	-6.2%	**10.8%**	-11.1%	4.6%	-17.2%	5.0%
Manufacture of other transport equipment	3.9%	7.9%	-41.1%	5.6%	-11.2%	1.0%	1.6%	-1.4%	-15.2%	3.4%	-52.5%	3.5%
Manufacture of furniture	-8.4%	-21.2%	-28.5%	**6.8%**	-45.6%	**8.3%**	-15.8%	6.1%	-21.4%	**7.5%**	-23.6%	**6.8%**
Other manufacturing	8.8%	33.6%	-27.0%	3.3%	-15.1%	1.0%	-1.7%	0.8%	-15.3%	3.4%	-10.0%	1.0%
Repair and installation of machinery and equip.	15.8%	52.6%	-17.1%	3.0%	-3.9%	0.4%	9.8%	-11.4%	-4.3%	1.2%	6.9%	-0.8%

Conclusion: Managing a Polarized Space

There is good news and bad news. The good news is that Europe is integrating economically as was hoped. The bad news is that this integration is not homogeneous and profitable for all, as many had expected (Eichengreen 1993, De Grauwe 1995, Krugman 1992). This uneven process is producing huge restructuring costs in the periphery without hopes for a reasonable medium-to-long term improvement of its economic systems and living standards. Southern European countries have prematurely abandoned industrial policy. On the other hand, the European Union still has no common political space for governing industrial change with coordinated policies and is suffering from a resurgence of industrial nationalism.

The centralization of the European economy was predicted by many economists in the 1990s (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993, Feldstein 1997). The story was that increasing returns to scale and trade would encourage firms to locate close to large markets, or firms would locate in core markets, so they could enjoy positive externalities such as lower demand uncertainty and experience steadier growth than in the periphery. These factors favor, therefore, the agglomeration of economic activities. Rising factor prices also induce migration, thereby furthering the agglomeration effects instead of balancing productivity levels. In fact, centralization is occurring in more complex ways than expected. It is not much a problem of declining competitiveness of peripheral firms as the fact that financial and managerial activities tend to move to the centre and peripheral production activities become subordinate to the former, exposed to tough competition and enjoying low profit margins.

Unexpectedly, finance has also contributed to this process of weakening the Southern economies. What until 2007 was a solid advantage of Southern Europe – the credit-based financial system – became a source of weakness within Banking Union where credit has been defined as the riskier activity in banks' assets and one subject to tough control by the authorities. That has contributed to a further decline of industry due to the drying-up of credit for many firms.

European free trade policy was conceived to help develop an open commercial space. However, the EU economic space is naturally polarized and the removal of institutional barriers to the movement of production factors tends to help the shift of high-value activity to the European core. This may indeed be a source of increased productivity, but it also produces high social costs in the periphery (Reinert 2013, Reinert and Kattel 2004). In our analysis, it does not only produce deindustrialization but a peripheralization of production activities. Therefore, the centre-periphery problem is a critical issue to be tackled now by European policies (Aiginger 2014).

The example of downsizing the food industry in the Iberian regions and its growth in France and Germany is relevant here. Continental regions are not expected to enjoy any real comparative advantage in producing food (with some exceptions), but apparently they do have an advantage in managing such activities. The actual situation is that the ownership and management of these industries is, as in fashion and transport equipment, moving steadily towards the central regions of

Europe, while peripheral regions are left with lower-value production activities, under the constant threat of relocation elsewhere. The analysis of comparative advantages in managerial activities would open up new and unexplored fields of research in political economy.

The real alternative that Europe faces now is therefore between developing a stronger coordination between centre and periphery, which means inducing a different and complementary form of specialisation of the different European regions through a certain amount of 'planning' (in other words, sacrificing some external free trade and introducing coordinated income policies at the European level); and allowing for a greater degree of policy autonomy for peripheral countries to pursue industrial policies, even if they conflict with European free competition policies.

If Europe's economic space is polarized, any general industrial policy would not benefit greatly the periphery. The latter option means allowing further European economic integration, triggering defensive nationalistic public expenditure, with unforeseeable consequences. The former option would imply a coordinated strategy of development between central regions and peripheral areas (Wade 2012), but there is no political consent for this option. Above all, this coordination would have to define what peripheral areas should specialize in. If no specific decision on European industrial policy is taken, the risk is that the European periphery will lose valuable activities. The only variable left to maintain economic balances would be to continue reducing the cost of labour, leading to a progressively impoverished economy.

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Albanian Diaspora across the World

By Joniada Barjaba[*]

The aim of this paper is to advance an understanding of the dynamics and features of the Albanian diaspora and its social, cultural and economic value in relation to Albania's development. The paper gives a fuller account of the Albanian migration and diaspora and shows diaspora's importance to the country's history, development and national affairs. Across the years, diaspora has given a valuable contribution to the protection of individual and social rights, the preservation of language and identity, the protection of the nationwide interests as well as the economic and social development of Albania. Despite its importance, a consensus over definitions of the Albanian diaspora is hardly evident in academic and policy discourses. Overall, the Albanian diaspora is divided into two subsets: the old diaspora and the new diaspora. The old and new diasporas differ in their countries of settlement and migration period. Nowadays, the Albanian diaspora is becoming more connected with the country of origin through permanent, temporary or virtual return. However, the paper suggests that not all diaspora members have the same contribution to the country's development. Looking at the involvement of the old and new diaspora in homeland, it can be argued that the old diaspora has a more important role in nation-building; meanwhile, the new diaspora has a higher willingness to explore entrepreneurial opportunities. That said, with the changing nature of the Albanian diaspora and the technological advancements, the new diaspora is becoming more connected with homeland, especially in business activities when compared to the old diaspora formed during pre-communist times. I conclude that diaspora engagement is an added value for Albania. The key contributions of the paper lie in extending discussions of value of diaspora and in providing a dynamic view of the multiplicity of factors behind diaspora engagement.

Keywords: *Albanian Diaspora, Old Diaspora, New Diaspora, Development.*

Introduction

According to the United Nations, there were about 1.2 million Albanians living abroad at the end of 2015, which is equivalent to almost half of the population currently living in Albania (United Nations 2015). Nowadays, with the technological advancements, the Albanian diaspora is becoming more connected with the country of origin through permanent, temporary or virtual return. I examine the Albanian diaspora because of its unique factors such as high migration flows, highly educated professionals, and effective cooperation with diaspora. Scholars confirm that the majority of the Albanian diaspora members are well-educated and overqualified (Barjaba 2015). Diaspora is playing an important role in the economic, social and cultural development of Albania. It has given a valuable contribution to the protection of individual and social rights, the preservation of language and identity, the protection of the

[*] Diaspora Expert, National Agency of Diaspora, Albania.

nationwide interests as well as the economic and social development of Albania. The Albanian communities in the United States, Europe and elsewhere have had a key role in national affairs. Despite its importance and impact, little is known about the Albanian diaspora. To my knowledge there is a lack of literature that would analyze the Albanian diaspora in details and in specific countries. This paper contributes to the literature of the Albanian diaspora by giving a full account of the path of the Albanian diaspora, its active role in the destination countries, and its contribution to the homeland.

The paper is organized into five sections. Section 1 is introductory, setting out the importance of exploring Albanian migration and diaspora. Section 2 proceeds with an overview of the Albanian migration, Albanian diaspora, and diaspora's countries of settlement and migration period. Section 3 presents my study methodology. Section 4 explores the nexus between diaspora and development through distinguishing between old and new diaspora. The final section lays out a set of conclusions and policy recommendations.

Literature Review

This section revisits two bodies of literature. I provide a synthesis of knowledge in each field and this combined literature review contributes to building up the theoretical foundation of my study. I begin with a brief discussion on Albanian migration, then, I explore two particular subsets of the Albanian diaspora for a better understanding of diaspora's contribution to the country's development.

Overview of Albanian Migration

Albania is a country with substantial levels of both internal and international migration. However, this paper focuses solely on international migration, as this is the aspect most relevant to my paper. The Albanian migration is best described in three major phases: before 1944, between 1945 and 1990, and mass emigration after the 1990s. There is relatively little information on migration outflows before 1944. Two of the main publications reviewing migration waves during this period are by Barjaba et al. (1992) and Tirta (1999). More specifically, the first flow of Albanian migration took place after 1468, with the death of the Albanian national hero Skanderbeg (see Barjaba et al. 1992, Tirta 1999). The second phase of migration took place during the communist regime. Although Albania's borders were tightly sealed, a small number of citizens managed to cross the borders during this period (Barjaba et al. 1992, Barjaba 2002, 2003). The third migration phase includes the migration flows that occurred with the breakdown of the communist regime that had been in place since 1944. Hundreds of thousands of Albanian citizens left the country to seek more opportunities across the borders. Nowadays, Albanian migration flows continue, but at diminishing rates compared to the past.

Albanian migration has always been present due to a combination of push and pull factors. The primary push factors for migration during the pre-communist period were mainly political and economic (Carletto et al. 2004, Tirta 1999). Meanwhile, during the communist rule, main factors causing migration flows were primarily political (Barjaba 2004). Lastly, the factors causing the post-communist migrations have varied from economic factors to dissatisfaction with the corrupted political system, political violence, and difficult living conditions in Albania (King 2003, Albanian Government 2015).

Old vs. New Diaspora

The increase of international migration of Albania has contributed to the formation of Albanian diaspora communities all over the world. When talking about the Albanian diaspora, it is important to highlight some of its key aspects. A consensus over definitions of Albanian diaspora is hardly evident in academic and policy discourses. Overall, the Albanian diaspora consists of i) students; ii) economic migrants; iii) family members of economic migrants; iv) asylum seekers and refugees; and v) unaccompanied minors (Albanian Government, 2015). As mentioned earlier, recently, asylum seekers are a group of increasing size too, even if the reasons for this are somewhat perplexing. Furthermore, the Albanian diaspora is generally seen as divided into two subsets: the old diaspora and the new diaspora. These two groups differ in their countries of settlement and migration period. The following section proceeds with an overview of the diaspora subsets.

Old Diaspora

The old diaspora was formed by the Albanian population groups migrating from Albanian territories to build a better life in various destination countries, to escape the oppression of invaders and later the oppression of the communist regime. The old diaspora consists of three subgroups that migrated at three different periods of time: the old migration flows that took place during the Middle Ages to the mid-nineteenth century; newer migration flows that date from the second half of the nineteenth century to the end of the World War II; and the migration flows during the communist regime. The old diaspora is mainly settled in the United States, Canada, Latin America, Australia, a few countries in Western Europe, and some Eastern European countries, such as Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Turkey, Egypt, and Syria. Below, I give a brief overview of the old Albanian diaspora, more specifically, the destination countries and diasporas' involvement in homeland.

Diaspora in Italy (Arbëresh community) – The Arbëresh community is an important subset of the Albanian diaspora. They have settled in Italy in the XIV-XV centuries and emigrated mainly due to political and military issues. Their migration flows followed two directions, North and South of Italy. The community that settled in the Northern Italy assimilated; meanwhile, the

Arbëresh community that settled in Southern Italy managed to preserve the Albanian origin, language, culture and traditions. At the same time, the Arbëresh community has played an important role and has substantially contributed to Italy's history, culture and social life. There are many well-known personalities from the Arbëresh community in Albania and Italy. In Italy, this community is one of the largest ethno-linguistic minorities. Since 1999, the "Arbëresh" language is recognized by the Italian government as the language of the "ethnic and linguistic minority" of the Arbëresh community.

Diaspora in Croatia – The Albanian diaspora moved to Croatia mainly from Kelmendi and Kraja, and settled in Zadar. The resettlement of the people came as a result of the Ottoman oppression and was supported by Pope Clement XI. Albanians who migrated in the early 1750s settled in Hrtkovc and Nikinc. Another group of Albanians from Kosovo and other Albanian lands settled in Croatia during the years of the former Yugoslavia for employment, education or political reasons. In Croatia, Albanians together with four other ethnic minorities have the right to elect a member of parliament.

Diaspora in Bulgaria – The Albanian diaspora in Bulgaria has been present since the 15th century. The migration flows were mainly from Korça, Ohrid, Elbasan, Çermenika, Golloborda, Dibra, and Mati and were a result of persecution from the Ottoman Empire and seasonal employment. Later on, some of these migrants settled in Ukraine and in southern Thrace. Another wave of migration occurred in the XIX-XX centuries and settled in Sofia and other major cities of Bulgaria. Some of the Albanians who settled in Mandritsa were highly involved in the bilateral agreement on minority protection.

Diaspora in Turkey - The largest community of the Albanian diaspora lives in Turkey. Albanians have migrated to Turkey at all times, starting from the 16th century, when Albanian lands were part of the Ottoman Empire. Most of them migrated during the Renaissance and settled in Istanbul and in several cities of Asiatic Turkey. Massive migration flows from Kosovo and other Albanian lands to Turkey occurred in four periods. The first wave occurred after the Lausanne Treaty in 1923; the second wave after the Ataturk-Stojadinović agreement in 1938; the third wave after Tito-Kyprili secret agreement in 1953; and the fourth wave occurred in the early 1970s. As a result of the above agreements, hundreds of thousands of Albanians were forced to move out of the Albanian territories and settled in Turkey.

Diaspora in Romania - Albanian migration to Romania occurred in the 17th-20th centuries; Albanians settled in this country moved mainly from Southern Albania. The Albanian community in Romania is well-organized and has had a significant contribution to Albania's independence. They are considered an ethnic minority and are represented by a deputy in the Chamber of Deputies of Romania.

Diaspora in Egypt - The diaspora of Egypt consists of two main groups. The first group consists of Albanians that migrated in the early 18th century, after the establishment of Mehmet Ali Pasha as the ruler of Egypt, and settled mainly in Cairo. The second group is the cultural-patriotic diaspora that migrated in the second half of the 19th century and settled in Alexandria (Misir). Most of the Albanians that moved to Egypt pursued military careers. Meanwhile, the diaspora

in Misir had an influence on the development and spread of the Albanian culture and maintained strong ties with homeland.

Diaspora in Ukraine - Albanians began to migrate to Ukraine in the early 18th century, but the major migration flows occurred in the early 19th century as a way to escape the riots and dangers of the Russian-Turkish wars. Currently, there are more than four thousand people with Albanian origin living in Ukraine. The majority of these people live in the Odessa region.

Diaspora in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina - The majority of Albanians that left for Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are from northern Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. Initially, Albanians moved to these countries during the Ottoman rule for economic reasons. Other migration flows occurred after the Balkan wars as a way to escape the dangerous riots. The number of Albanians in these countries increased during the first decades of the twentieth century. After the Second World War, Albanians of Kosovo settled in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the movements within the former Yugoslavia.

Diaspora in the United States of America - The Albanian diaspora in the United States has given an important contribution to Albania. The earliest group of Albanians arriving in the States is the Arbëresh community and then the economic migrants between the First World War and the Second World War. The third group consists of political migrants that emigrated after the Second World War and the establishment of communist regime in Albania. The fourth flow consists of Kosovar migrants and other parts of the former Yugoslavia who migrated after 1971. The fifth migration movement consists of the Albanian economic migrants who settled in the US after 1990, through the American Lottery and family reunion. Albanian associations in the United States helped in uniting Albanian migrants in the destination country, preserving national identity, opening Albanian schools, publishing and distributing Albanian books, supporting the struggle for freedom and independence and contributing to the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Albania. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Albanian diaspora of the US had Fan S. Noli as a representative in the parliament of Albania.

Diaspora in Argentina - The Albanian diaspora in Argentina is formed by the Arbëresh community. The major migration flow to Argentina took place in the early 20th century and most of them settled in Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires is also the place where the Orthodox Church of Albanians is located.

Diaspora in Syria - Albanians migrated to Syria in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, in the late 19th and early 20th century, a period during which efforts for Albania's independence were growing. Another migration flow occurred during 1912-1913 when Albanians migrated in order to escape Serbian repression. Albanians are predominantly located in Damascus and in some other major cities of the country. Various Albanian scholars in Syria are known for being highly engaged with different economic, cultural, and political activities.

Diaspora in Russia - Albanians migrated to Russia in the late 19th century by using other transition territories of the former Ottoman Empire. These

migration flows came as a result of the needs for manpower in various sectors of the economy such as industry, construction, and railways. The majority of the Albanians settled in Caucasus, Irkutsk and Vladivostok. Part of the Albanian diaspora in Russia consists of families created by international marriages. Some Albanians studied and worked in the former Soviet Union and left Albania after the collapse of relations between the two countries.

Diaspora in Australia - The first migration waves of Albanians towards Australia date at the end of the 19th century and expanded in the early decades of the 20th century, after the declaration of Albania's independence. Albanians in Australia have successfully integrated into local labour markets, as well as in social, cultural and sports activities. Additionally, they have given a special contribution in supporting independence of Kosovo.

New Diaspora

The new diaspora is composed of individuals who migrated after the communist regime in Albania. In addition to the migration period, the old and new diasporas differ in their countries of settlement. As discussed earlier, the old diaspora is mainly settled in the United States, Canada, Latin America, Australia, a few countries in Western Europe, and some Eastern European countries. Whereas the greatest concentrations of the new diaspora are in Italy, Greece, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria and France. Also, a small part of the new diaspora is settled in the countries of the old diaspora.

Diaspora in Italy and Greece - In the early 1990s, Albanians migrated massively to Italy and Greece. The geographic, linguistic, and cultural proximity, and the consumption of Italian television during communism have played an important role in attracting Albanians to this country (Mai 2004). Additionally, many Albanians in the south of the country spoke Greek as there is a Greek minority group living in this area. These factors influenced Albanians' decisions about migration and the destination selection. Over the last three decades, Albanian migrants have successfully integrated into the host countries by being part of the labor market and society and some of them have received citizenship. Among the Albanian migrants there is a large number of individuals who are active participants in the fields of art, culture and sports of the destination countries and homeland. They maintain strong ties with Albania and contribute to the economic, social and political development of the country. These two countries host the largest number of Albanians. By 2015, Greece and Italy both hosted around 450,000 Albanian migrants (United Nations 2015). Besides the neighboring countries, more and more Albanians are now traveling longer distances and settling in various countries such as the USA, Canada, Germany, the UK, and other Western European countries (Albanian Government 2015).

Diaspora in Germany - Albanians from Kosovo and other ethnic-Albanian territories migrated to Germany after 1971, with the abolition of exit visas from the former Yugoslavia. In addition, after 1990, tens of thousands of Albanians migrated from Albania to Germany. Germany is one of the countries where the "embassy" migrants were exiled. Also, Germany was one of the countries which

gave asylum to many Kosovars during the Kosovo refugee crisis (see Vullnetari 2012, Albanian Government 2015). With the intensification of efforts for Kosovo's independence, these migrants became a community of political migrants that supported the struggle for Kosovo's independence. A survey conducted by King and Gedeshi (2018) on potential migration in Albania confirms Germany as one of the top preferred destination countries. Albanians in this country are well-integrated and continuously preserve Albanian culture and language, promote economic cooperation as well as cultural and educational exchanges between Germany and Albania.

Diaspora in the United Kingdom - The UK is one of the other recently emerging destination countries where the Albanian diaspora is settled. After the establishment of the communist regime in Albania, a small group of former leaders of anti-communist organizations moved to London, but they did not have impactful activities in the host country or Albania. Also, most of the migrants did not arrive in the UK until in the late 1990s, with the collapse of the pyramid savings schemes in 1997 and the Kosovo war in 1999. Some Albanian migrants moved onward from Greece and Italy to the UK to seek better work opportunities (King and Mai 2009). The UK was one of the refugee-hosting countries during the war in Kosovo. Some Albanian citizens claiming to flee the war settled in the UK. The majority of Albanians are concentrated in London and its region (see Vathi and King 2012).

Diaspora in the United States and Canada - The first flow of Albanian immigrants to the United States dates as early as the mid-1880s and to Canada in the early 20th century. However, the scale of migration intensity in these countries became significantly higher in the late 1990s, due to their immigration policies favoring high-skilled and educated migrants. In 2015, the USA hosted around 82,000 and Canada around 13,000 Albanian migrants (United Nations 2015). Albanian diaspora in the United States has a powerful lobby group in the US government in favor of improving development and democracy in Albania and Kosovo. Diaspora in this country preserves and develops cultural traditions and participates in numerous national artistic activities in Albania. Similarly, many talented Albanians have left the country and successfully integrated into the labor market and society in Canada.

Diaspora in Scandinavian countries - The Albanian diaspora in Denmark, Norway and Sweden consists of three main groups: Albanians of Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia, who migrated during 1971-1990 as economic migrants; Albanians who migrated from Albania after 1990 as economic migrants; and Albanians who migrated from Kosovo after 1990 to escape Serbian repression. Albanians in Scandinavian countries have integrated into the economic and social life of host countries. They have an active community life and have established cultural, artistic, youth and student associations, radio and television channels, and engage in numerous activities to promote ties and cooperation between the host countries and homeland.

Diaspora in Austria and France - The majority of Albanian migrants settled in these countries after 1990s. Meanwhile, after the establishment of the communist regime in Albania, a small number of former leaders of anti-

communist organizations had migrated to France. There is a considerable number of Albanian personalities that have worked closely with local universities and academic institutions in the host countries and who have integrated into the countries' economic and social life. The Albanian communities in these two destination countries have established various cultural, artistic and sports associations.

Diaspora in Switzerland - The Albanian diaspora in Switzerland consists of two groups: Albanians from Kosovo and other Albanian territories of the former Yugoslavia who migrated to Germany after 1971 and Albanians from Albania who migrated after 1990. The first group of Albanian diaspora is known for supporting Kosovo's independence. Albanians are currently the fourth largest population in Switzerland. The Albanian diaspora in this country has always been involved in important national and entrepreneurial initiatives.

Diaspora in Belgium - The Albanian diaspora in Belgium was formed mainly after the end of World War II and the establishment of communist regime in Albania. Part of the representatives of anti-communist organizations settled in Belgium and worked against the communist regime in Albania. Following the abolition of visas in 1971 in the former Yugoslavia, Albanians from Kosovo and other republics of the former Yugoslavia, moved to Belgium as economic migrants. The influx of Kosovar migrants increased during the 1990s, as a result of the rise of Serbian repression. There are many Albanian personalities, entrepreneurs, and associations in this country.

Methods of Data Collection

For this paper both qualitative and quantitative data were used. For gathering qualitative data, I used document review and analysis that involved examination of a variety of papers in order to develop the theoretical framework of the paper. In addition, I conducted several face-to-face interviews with Albanian scholars who helped me verify part of the information related to the old Albanian diaspora. Although my research was mainly based on qualitative approach, quantitative data were also used. With the quantitative data, I was able to get country-specific information related to the Albanian migration and diaspora communities. The data mainly come from census and immigration sources available online. It is important to highlight that papers and data on the Albanian diaspora and its contribution are limited.

Diaspora and Development Nexus

The impact of migration on development in the origin countries continues to be an open debate. Migration pessimists consider migration as a negative phenomenon undermining the processes of sustained development of migrant sending societies (Frank 1969, Wallerstein 1974, Papademetriou 1985). According to these scholars, migration drains origin countries of their scarce human

capital. While some scholars and policymakers see the departure of Albanians abroad as a loss, it is important to understand that the engagement of Albanian diaspora can become an added value for Albania as well as for the receiving countries. More specifically, the optimistic perspective treats diaspora as a potential actor in the economic and social development of origin countries (Portes et al. 2002, Saxenian 2002, Zhao 2005, Barjaba and Malaj 2017). In the context of Albania, some studies have examined this topic and have acknowledged that the Albanian diaspora is increasingly important when it comes to the country's development (see Korovilas 1998, Nikas and King 2005, King et al. 2013, Barjaba 2002, 2003, 2011, 2013, 2015, Barjaba and Malaj 2017).

In this paper, I explore the argument that Albanian diaspora has the potential to assist in the development of Albania. However, when talking about diaspora and its contributions, it is important to take into account that not all diaspora members have the same contribution to the country's development. Looking at the involvement of the old and new diaspora in the homeland, it can be argued that the old Albanian diaspora has a more important role in nation-building; meanwhile, the new Albanian diaspora has a higher willingness to explore entrepreneurial opportunities and hence has the capacity to contribute to private sector development in Albania. The old diaspora has had a significant contribution to supporting Albania's and Kosovo's independence, preserving national sentiment while abroad, opening schools for learning the Albanian language, publishing and distributing Albanian books, and establishing religious institutions in the destination countries.

Meanwhile, the new diaspora, besides preserving the Albanian language and identity, is highly engaged with entrepreneurial activities too. That said, with the changing nature of the Albanian diaspora and the technological advancements, the new, post-1990s diaspora is becoming more active and connected with the homeland, especially in business activities when compared to the old diaspora formed during pre-communist times. This argument is also aligned with other existing studies that argue that older generations of migrants play a more important role in nation-building and the younger generation has a higher willingness to explore entrepreneurial opportunities and hence have the capacity to contribute to private sector development (Ammassari 2004). Beyond being senders of remittances, Albanian diaspora has the potential to promote entrepreneurship and foreign direct investment. Many of the diaspora members maintain ties with their families and communities in Albania by developing entrepreneurial activities. Some of the Albanian migrant entrepreneurs already have their business in the host country and at the same time are eager to build an economic connection between their new country of acquired residence and their home country.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

This paper has aspired to provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics and features of the Albanian diaspora and its social, cultural and economic

value in relation to Albania's development. The Albanian migration flows show that Albanian migrants are continuously looking for opportunities to improve their life and employment prospects since the early 1990s. The Albanian diaspora is portrayed as divided into two subsets, the old diaspora and the new diaspora. Nowadays, the Albanian diaspora is becoming more connected with the country of origin. Although the impact of the Albanian diaspora, to some degree, is difficult to assess, I conclude that the engagement of diaspora is an added value for Albania. Diaspora has given a valuable contribution to the protection of individual and social rights, the preservation of language and identity, the protection of the nationwide interests as well as the economic and social development of Albania. However, the old diaspora has a more important role in nation-building; meanwhile, the new diaspora has a higher willingness to explore entrepreneurial opportunities and hence has the capacity to contribute to private sector development in Albania.

My suggested recommendations for the Albanian government are designed to make conditions in Albania more favorable for diaspora members to engage and invest in the country's development. A key priority is to improve the entrepreneurial environment in Albania, with a special focus on increasing the engagement and participation of the Albanian diaspora in the home country. The new diaspora has received more attention by the Albanian government when compared to the old diaspora. Almost all the policies related to Albanian migration have their focus on the new diaspora, neglecting engagement of the old diaspora. In support of the recent diaspora's entrepreneurial initiatives, the Albanian Government has established the Albanian Fund for the Development of Diaspora, which aims to attract investment from the Albanian diaspora in their homeland.

However, the Albanian government can certainly do more to lower the number of existing barriers in the country and create more opportunities for diaspora members to engage in social, economic, and cultural development. The Albanian government and other related actors must have a plan that features a clear approach to diaspora engagement. For instance, the government should consider building and implementing mechanisms to strengthen the country's ties with Albanians abroad, specifically Albanians coming from academia and business communities. In addition, the Albanian government could also take a closer look at the diaspora experiences and policies of countries like Ireland, China, and India in reference to their diasporas and development.

The key contributions of the paper lie in extending discussions of value of diaspora members and organizations and in providing a dynamic view of the multiplicity of factors behind the diaspora engagement with the purpose of making better policies.

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The Evacuation of the Idomeni Refugee Camp: A Case of Discursive and Iconographical Representation on Digital Media

By Andrea Pelliccia[*]

By using the Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis, this paper focuses on the visual and textual representation of refugees in the online version of two influential newspapers in Greece. The analysis examines the particularities and significance of news coverage of a critical event in Greece and Europe during 2016 that is the evacuation of the Idomeni refugee camp. The results show that in the media representation of refugees and asylum seekers, cultural clichés and the perpetuation of an essentialist discourse emerge systematically in a vicious circle. Through their representational frames, both newspapers reveal a tendency to more a homogenization of views and explanations than to provide a plurality of opinions. Using an institutional and generalist approach based on monodimensional formats, they thus contribute to perpetuating a dispositive suitable for pre-existing social representations and stereotypes.

Keywords: *Idomeni refugee camp, migrants' representation, online newspapers, refugee crisis.*

Introduction: Research Objective and Methodological Approach

The choice of online media is due to the fact that they are now part of the social, economic and cultural life of many societies, and are accessible to public, and are different from print-based newspapers, while reaching a younger audience (Newman et al. 2016). On the one hand, online newspapers tend to reproduce journalism culture of printed newspapers with their approach to storytelling, in values and relationship with readers. On the other hand, technological features of online platform – hypertext, interactivity, multimedia – have implications for the entire media production process (Deuze 2003): electronic consultation – due to the variety of textual typologies, consultation modes, and contextual elements – configures a new and specific system compared to paper-based newspapers. Furthermore, journalism has always been influenced by technology (Pavlik 2001). Online newspapers are publishing products often parallel and complementary to printed products. In addition to the fixed texts – which usually are a minority – they include a variety of modal texts ranging from images to videos and photo galleries linked by various hyperlinks and which reproduce traces of ancient orality (Ong 1982). Just think of the polyphonic dimension that allows for a great fluidity in communicative interaction and non-fixity of the content. Not always, in fact, it is possible to trace a hierarchy of content similar to the one found on the

[*]Researcher, Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies, National Research Council of Italy, Italy.

homepages of the newspapers, not only for frequent changes to the homepages but also for the "horizontal" transmission via social networks by readers (Kopper et al. 2000). It is true that online journalism has been defined as a "fourth" type of journalism, alongside printed newspapers, radio and television (Deuze 2003).

In the last few years, studies on the representation of refugees and asylum seekers on digital media have provided data especially on North America and some European countries (e.g. Esses et al. 2013, Gabrielatos and Baker 2008, Ibrahim and Howarth 2016, Tudisca et al. 2017, Van Gorp 2005, Vieira 2016). Other recent research has also focused on print-based newspapers analysis about migrants (Berry et al. 2015, Binotto et al. 2016, Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017, Maneri 2011, Silveira 2016, Steimel 2010), including analysis within journalism (Barretta and Milazzo 2016, European Journalism Observatory 2015), which attests to the attention paid by journalists themselves to the way in which such a subject is being dealt with.

The aim of this paper is to understand and analyze the image of refugees represented by the online versions of two Greek newspapers, *I Kathimerini* and *I Efimerida ton Syntakton*. Given that the issue of immigration is not only built up by the accumulation of long-term news, but also by individual key events within a more intense public comparison, this paper does not refer to a long-term analysis as other recent studies have done (e.g. Barretta and Milazzo 2016, Berry et al. 2015, Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017), but to media coverage of one of the most significant events in the crisis of the refugees and asylum seekers[1] in Greece and Europe during 2016, that is the evacuation of the Idomeni refugee camp, on 24 May 2016.

With respect to the selection of the two online newspapers, the main criteria were quantitative, namely, broad dissemination; and qualitative, namely, political orientation. Both newspapers have high circulation in the national context, both in printed and online versions, and may be considered opinion leaders (Boukala and Dimitrakopoulou 2017: 7, Triandafyllidou 2009: 39). As far as political orientation is concerned, *I Kathimerini* is a moderate and center-right newspaper, while *I*

[1]According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" (UNHCR 2010). States are under international obligation to consider claims for asylum and not to immediately return asylum seekers to the countries they have fled from. The refugee convention states that they must be given access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and measures to ensure they live in dignity and safety while their claims are processed. As regards the term "migrant", a uniform legal definition does not exist at the international level. However, "migration" is often understood to imply a voluntary process, for example, someone who crosses a border in search of better economic opportunities. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, migrants can return home if they wish. This distinction is important for governments, since countries handle migrants under their own immigration laws and processes. In this paper I use the term "refugees", "asylum seekers", and "migrants" at the same time since people who lived in Idomeni camp included mainly refugees escaping from Syria's civil war but also migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Middle Eastern countries who moved because of a direct threat/persecution, or to improve their lives finding work or reuniting with family.

Efimerida ton Syntakton is of the left orientation. Thus, this choice reflects the major trends and political orientation in Greece from different ideological backgrounds. Another criterion was that the newspapers had to be equipped with a freely available online archive. The search was done using a set of keywords related to the selected event: *Ειδομένη* (Idomeni), *Εκκένωση* (Evacuation), *Καταυλισμός* (Camp), *Μετανάστες* (Immigrants), *Πρόσφυγες* (Refugees), *Αιτούντες άσυλο* **(**Asylum seekers). The analysis time span covered three days: the day before, the day of the event, and the day after.

In the analysis of the two Greek online newspapers, the Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis was used (e.g. Jones 2012, Machin and Mayr 2012, Royce and Bowcher 2007, Silveira 2016). Born as an extension of Critical Discourse Analysis, this approach recognizes the correlated importance of visual and textual modes in the discourse analysis. Indeed, it has allowed examining every form of communication in the social construction process, from written language to (audio) visual communication. According to Silveira, the textual and iconographical/ iconological analysis includes "actor and viewer, representation of different participants, representation of agency and action, and the 'grammar' of colour and visual design" (2016: 2). Using Machin and Mayr's words, this type of analysis allows exploring "the way that individual elements in images, such as objects and settings are able to signify discourses in ways that might not be obvious at an initial viewing" (2012: 31).

In order to collect all data, analytical inquiry forms were used. During the preliminary stage to forms processing, documentary units have been defined, taking into account the richness of multimedia components, such as photo galleries, live articles, and videos. As a result, three different documentary units – text, image and video that may be present in different combinations within a single article on the web – have been chosen, developing an inquiry form for each of them. The inquiry forms were designed to explore, in relation to the key-event of the evacuation of the Idomeni refugee camp, the following aspects and questions:

a. What were the main macro themes of the key-event? In the inquiry forms, the articles have been grouped according to the following macro themes: "Reception management", both at European level (e.g. refugee camp management, resettlement and relocation of refugees, European cooperation and missions, causes and solutions to the refugee crisis), and at national level (e.g. local management capacity, new legislation to regulate immigration, internal political conflict, governmental and institutional interventions); "Migrants' journey" (e.g. travel, border crossing, staying in the refugee camp); "Security and conflict" (e.g. threat to public security, threat to culture, identity and religion, social and economic costs, local protests against migrants, incidents/clashes among migrants, incidents/clashes between migrants and police, protests by migrants, racism and discrimination, anti-Islam fear rhetoric, health risk and spread of infectious diseases); "Integration" (e.g. social and cultural integration, recognition of refugee status/humanitarian protection, naturalization and acquisition of citizenship, family reunification, social

services and welfare system, access to and use of health services, immigrant success stories, demonstrations in support of immigrants). In addition, values to immigrants have been examined, by recording the attitude – positive, negative, or neutral – toward immigrants/immigration in headlines and texts, meaning attitude as "the general orientation towards the object of social representation" (Moscovici 1988). Finally, the explicit or implicit perspectives underlying the text – "moral acceptance" or "problem" – have been analyzed.

b. What actors (e.g. political institutions, journalists, migrants and citizens, law enforcement agencies, NGOs, research bodies) have been mainly involved in news coverage of this particular event? What sources and authors of images and videos have been used, given that the sources are a key component in the construction of discursive frames (Berry et al. 2015, Binotto et al. 2016)?

c. Imagery related to the representation of migrants, by observing the use of lexical indices in the text – as rhetorical figures, having an important role in the construction of discursive frames, as shown by other studies on paper-based newspapers (Barisione 2009, Bruno 2014, Esses et al. 2013) – and the subjects most represented in the images in terms of people, places, objects, and finally the presence of symbols. In particular – with respect to the composition of images of migrants – contexts, moods, space given to the individual or group of individuals were taken into consideration. In the latter case, it was useful also to consider the frame in which migrants were eventually represented as an anonymous de-humanized group, which is often included in the literature on media coverage of refugees and asylum seekers (Esses et al. 2013). More importantly, these elements were also related to gender and age in order to detect the presence of stereotyped representations.

d. What actions and emotions do news articles trigger in the readers? This occurred by observing the relationship between the type and the style of the text, and by analyzing the presence of the topics of suffering in the images. Regarding the first case, the style of the text has been classified in four categories: "informative" (neutral style characterized by describing notions and illustrating concepts); "persuasive" (style characterized by assertive messages, opinions, and sometimes moralistic tones); "propositive" (style in which solutions are proposed); "participative" (style that encourages the reader's involvement). As for the topics of suffering, the images have been classified according to the three topics proposed by the sociologist Luc Boltanski in the early 1990s (1993) to describe how an image can produce moods and actions: the topic of denunciation, where the image induces the spectator to be indignant against a "persecutor"; the topic of sentiment, where the image induces the spectator to sympathize with a "benefactor" to whom the unfortunate would be grateful; the aesthetic topic, where the spectator views suffering as "sublime". Two new topics were also included: neutral topic and topic of joy, for images not related to suffering.

Humanitarian Crisis and Idomeni Refugee Camp

As for refugees and asylum seekers, the international framework has been constantly changing and has its roots in the persistence (for decades) of conflict situations in Afghanistan and Somalia; in the civil war in Syria, where half of the population has been uprooted by the country; in new conflicts exploded in Ukraine, Yemen, the African Republic, and Burundi. In 2016 the main migratory routes to the EU were four: Central Mediterranean route, which originated from Northern Africa, particularly from Libya, travelled by people fleeing from sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East; Eastern Mediterranean route, ranging from Turkey to Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus; Western Mediterranean route, from Northern Africa to Spain; Balkan route, used by migrants to enter Europe from the countries of ex-Yugoslavia (Cagiano De Azevedo and Paparusso 2016: 63)[2].

According to UNHCR data (2016a), in 2015 Greece witnessed a massive increase in the number of sea arrivals, via the Eastern Mediterranean route: 385.069 people, from the beginning of the year to the end of September. The increase began in August, with 107.843 arrivals, and peaked in October, with the highest number of arrivals recorded during the year (211.663). In 2016 there was a sharp decline: from 67.415 arrivals in January to just over 2.000 in March, bringing the total to 165.750 units; a 57% drop compared to 385.069 arrivals recorded in Greece in the first nine months of 2015. The drastic reduction continued in the following months, especially after the agreement between the EU and Turkey to manage the arrival of migrants, by which, from 20 March 2016, all new irregular migrants from Turkey to the Greek Islands will be returned to Turkey. Undoubtedly, this agreement changed the map of the Mediterranean crossings, by creating an insurmountable "wall" on the Aegean sea. According to EUROSTAT data (2016), in 2016 Greece was one of the first EU countries for number of first time applicants with 49.875 first time asylum seekers (4% of all first time applicants in the EU Member States), after Germany, Italy and France, recording a change of +339% compared to 2015. Compared with the population of each Member State, Greece registered the highest number of first time applicants (4.625 first time applicants per million inhabitants) after Germany, and followed by Austria, Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus. In 2016 the main nationalities were: Syria, 53%; Iraq, 10%; Pakistan, 9%.

Since 2014, refugees escaping from Syria's civil war - but also from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Middle Eastern countries - began to move towards Idomeni, a small village in Central Macedonia, in order to cross the Greek border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). FYROM, along with Serbia, was one of the countries belonging to the "Balkan route" that

[2]It should be noted that the Balkan route is a more recent development whilst the Central Mediterranean route is a longer-term route. The Balkan route was officially closed in March 2016 when the EU and Turkey struck a deal after thousands used the route to get from Greece through the Balkan countries and on to Western Europe. However, a growing number of migrants and refugees are using the new Balkan route through Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and partly Serbia to reach the EU raising concerns of a humanitarian and security crisis.

migrants crossed with a view to reaching Germany and the countries of Northern Europe. This route was favored by migrants because it crossed countries that were not part of the Schengen area and therefore, in the event of an arrest by the Serbian authorities, the refugees were sent to the Croatian or Hungarian borders (which were closer to the desired destination countries), rather than to Greece, which was much further south. In 2015, FYROM decided to close its southern borders with the aim of preventing migrants from entering, except for a few hundred Syrians. This decision was taken following similar border-control measures by the Serbian government. This political initiative caused a humanitarian crisis in Greece, and Idomeni became a large refugee camp that increasingly housed people wishing to cross the border towards the north. In March 2016 the migration crisis reached an unsustainable situation: the refugee camp had a number of migrants equivalent to ten times the maximum capacity of accommodation. About 10.000-12.000 people, of which around 4.000 were children, lived in disastrous conditions in an informal settlement near the border, around a railway station (UNHCR 2016b). Most were families, many of them with small children. Hygiene condition was one of the major worries because of the negative impact it could have on people's health. Immigrants burned plastic and rubbish to keep warm. This resulted in intervention measures by EU Member States, UNHCR and humanitarian organizations (such as Doctors Without Borders) aimed at improving reception capacities, by providing family tents for up to 2.400 people and portable latrine services, and by collecting waste from the camp. On 24 May 2016, the Hellenic police began the evacuation of the Idomeni refugee camp. Police operations began at dawn and were conducted without the use of force by more than a thousand Greek police officers. The evacuation, which lasted about a week, was initially focused on small tents scattered in the informal settlement and then on those around the railway station. Refugees were transferred by bus to reception facilities in the north of the country by means of EU financial support. Only by accepting such a transfer could the refugees obtain a one-month extension of the temporary residence permit. However, some new refugee sites were far below minimal humanitarian standards. Some refugees and migrants were moved to abandoned warehouses and factories, where tents were set up very close to each other. The air circulation was poor, and the availability of food, water, sanitation, showers, and electricity was inadequate. Refugees transferred from Idomeni received little information on the conditions in the new settlements and on the expected length of their stay in these places. UNHCR reported spontaneous arrivals of refugee families, some of whom left Idomeni on foot, at several settlements, which were already overcrowded. The difficult conditions in these sites aggravated the already high level of suffering among refugee families, fueling tensions within refugee population and complicating efforts to provide necessary assistance and protection.

Results: Textual and Visual Analysis

The analysis has led to the identification of 71 total documentary units: 19 texts (9 for *I Kathimerini* and 10 for *I Efimerida ton Syntakton*), 48 images (19 for *I Kathimerini* and 29 for *I Efimerida ton Syntakton*), and 4 videos (1 for *I Kathimerini* and 3 for *I Efimerida ton Syntakton*).

A. Textual Analysis

With regard to the general characteristics of the texts, there is a certain balance between signed and unsigned articles, both with 9 units, while only 1 article was taken by a news agency (ANA-MPA, Athens News Agency - Macedonian Press Agency). Over half (10 articles) appeared on the web the day after the key-event, 7 articles were written the same day and 2 the day before. The length, measured as a number of words, varies considerably. Each newspaper has published articles of varying length, with an average number of words per article of 519 units. This result can be read as an indicator of the level of depth and relevance given to the event, especially by *I Efimerida ton Syntakton*, which has a maximum length of 1.735 words for one article.

The prevalent macro theme is "Reception management" (19 cases), followed by "Migrants' journey" (12 cases), "Security and conflict" (5 cases) and "Integration" (4 cases). *I Kathimerini* emphasizes "Security and conflict", more than *I Efimerida ton Syntakton*, referring to problems of public order and protests by local authorities against settling immigrants from the camp into new reception facilities. The main macro theme "Reception management" develops on two levels: the supranational (European) and the local levels that intersects and overlaps with reality and communication. The Greek newspapers tell of a Europe divided internally and unable to provide common and effective responses to the migration crisis. At the same time, the newspapers take into account the complexity of the issue and the central role of the EU. In fact, the refugee crisis is a political issue before it is social. And it is politics that is the mainstay of the media narrative of the migratory phenomenon. In addition to the fences of the Idomeni refugee camp, there is also discussion on political issues and different perspectives on reception. It is a communication of political and institutional confrontation, at European, national and even local levels, in the background of images and stories of the refugee camp. As Marcello Maneri suggests, it is a political confrontation around this news that facilitates their stay in the foreground of national information: "Without political legitimacy and diagnosis and solutions, media emergencies would be extinguished pretty quickly" (Maneri 2009: 71).

Regarding the sources used in the texts, there is a predominance of official and institutional information: national political institutions and journalists/media, followed by other sources such as European political institutions, NGOs and law enforcement/military personnel. Undoubtedly, using institutional sources gives information a semblance of truthfulness and validity, by reinforcing its credibility (Binotto et al. 2016: 86). The choice of institutional sources is based on their direct access to the "facts", their reliability, and their ability to provide the media with

continuous inputs presented in an easily recoverable format. Despite the huge media attention to the key-event of the Idomeni camp clearance, migrant voices are largely absent from narratives. Although they are the real protagonists, they appear instead as the object of communication and an indistinct mass. This practice of describing an event without using migrants' voices, replaced here by those of politicians, journalists and law enforcement, emphasizes the focus on debate by subverting it to the subjective experience of migrating. As in other studies on the refugee crisis (Barretta and Milazzo 2016), there is no detail on the origin and life before the migrants' experience, thus individuality is sacrificed to the tale of the mass phenomenon. Migrants' voices, therefore, do not appear in the construction of the narrative of the evacuation, even in the presence of polyphony. Even nationalities are not mentioned, reiterating the first fundamental negation of foreigners: the possibility of calling them with their name and identifying them not only as immigrants but also as emigrants. Thus, linguistic censorship is one of the most common forms of making people invisible, and individuals become part of an identical migration flow. On the level of discursive practices, it corresponds to the social invisibility of certain categories of human beings treated as "non-persons" (Dal Lago 1999). By "neutralizing" information, thousands of people are eliminated or removed as if they were a purely theoretical problem. Moreover, the results show that, on both newspapers, we are almost always in the presence of a monodimensionality, as there is no reflection on the macro-phenomena and structural causes of migratory phenomena such as the conflict in Syria, international crises and economic globalization. This de-humanization of refugees and asylum seekers may be useful to justify their status quo, reinforcing the boundaries between in-group and out-group, justifying the control of the status of immigrants and the protection of available resources (Esses et al. 2013, Haslam 2006, Leyens et al. 2000). It should be noted, however, that the choice of not using migrants as a source can be determined by the difficulty of accessibility: reluctance of migrants to speak, fear of repression, and fear for the outcome of the asylum application, linguistic barriers and so on. In our case, for example, media coverage within the refugee camp during the evacuation was only granted to some media and journalists (Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation and ANA-MPA) and this may have represented an obstacle to approaching migrants.

Another interesting aspect is definitely a significant use of numbers and figures in the newspapers' text. This deals with immigrants' presence in the camp, and the relocation of people to other reception centers after the evacuation, and the police officers who took part in the camp clearance operation. As a result, the description in numbers leads to a representation of refugees as an undifferentiated mass rather than as individual human beings, and may lead the reader to feel less empathy for the migrants themselves.

As for the type of article, for both newspapers, the prevalent is the news section (16 units), followed by only 2 editorials and 1 press review. For both newspapers, the most frequent style is the informative one (16 cases), better suited to the news section, while the persuasive (7 cases) and the participative styles (1 case) are less frequent. No texts show the propositive style. The newspapers include mostly news reports, at the expense of deepening through journalistic

inquiry. The main attitude towards immigrants and immigration in headlines and texts is neutral for both newspapers (15 cases, while positive and negative are, respectively, 3 and 1 case). It is important to note that, in considering the attitude, it not only referred to the author of the article, but also to quotes of sources and actors mentioned in the articles. These results show how both newspapers reveal a tendency toward homogeneity and privilege and aseptic and impersonal language. Greek newspapers use an institutional approach characterized by factual orientation to the news and criteria of completeness and impartiality that are typical of the generalist newspapers with an institutional approach. What Sorrentino (2006: 12) calls "temperate differentiation", namely when a newspaper tries to distinguish its approach and editorial line, rarely appears, with the only exception of *I Kathimerini* when giving more emphasis to the macro theme "Security and conflict". Both newspapers often use the same style of exposition, narrative and language, and provide the same explanations. In many articles no judgment is given, positive or negative. Both newspapers produce continuous formats marked by repetition, conformity and predictability. We are faced with what Michel Foucault calls "dispositive" (1975), with a set of highly repetitive and recognizable content: a dispositive connecting collective feelings and media representation with a range of public policies and institutional practices geared to disciplining and controlling. Despite the different political orientation, they appear to be "twin newspapers" designed more to create a homogenization of views and explanations than to provide a plurality of opinions. In this sense, the tendency of information to confirm pre-existing social representations (Sorrentino 2002: 24), and to reiterate stereotypes (Caniglia 2009) is dominant. The information machine is increasingly less able to grasp the novelties, intent on preserving and reiterating its routines (Tuchman 1978). The use of similar formulations and metaphors can only accentuate the feeling of being faced with a film always locked on the same frame. An example are the interchangeable headlines (for example, *Το σχέδιο εκκένωσης της Ειδομένης* [Idomeni evacuation plan] on *I Kathimerini*, and *Επιχείρηση εκκένωσης της Ειδομένης* [Idomeni evacuation operation] on *I Efimerida ton Syntakton*), not only because referring to similar facts, but also because of a similar way of providing explanations, describing a pernicious danger, or offering solutions. Despite the otherness of refugees from the nation is implicitly introduced by terms defining a boundary line, such as *μπαίνουν στην Ελλάδα* (they enter Greece), *πέρασαν τα σύνορα* (they crossed the borders), *εδώ/εκεί* (here/there), *επικράτεια μας* (our territory), it should be noted that Greek newspapers do not give in to the temptation, in sensationalist terms and tones, to spectacularize the key-event in order to increase their readers numerically. This may be observed in the absence of terms such as *λαθρομετανάστης* (illegal migrant), *παράνομος* (irregular) and *ξένος* (foreigner), all replaced by *πρόσφυγας* (refugee). However, it is also true that this narrative neutrality can be incorporated into a standardization framework on immigration issue. In fact, beyond ideological and political differences, the refugee crisis is increasingly becoming a "commonplace" of our daily information, as a sign of "normality". And it is true that, in online newsmaking process, information systems are attuned to the media needs of cost-effectiveness and speed. Thus, these needs regulate the production of

news under the constant pressure of instantaneous communication resorting to typing or stereotyping, in order to reduce the time of both news production and news reception. The need for instantaneous communication leads, according to Sbriscia (2001), information systems to resort to commonplace favoring discourse reproduction of beliefs.

On digital media, the issue of immigration is addressed and outlined also, and above all, through specific rhetorical figures within the discursive frames portraying manifest and latent content, in order to deal with the subject more incisively. As interpretive principles, narrative frames are manifested in discourse through symbolic dispositives like metaphors, examples, visual images and slogans, important for organizing information concerning broader cultural ideas. Both Greek newspapers do not make excessive use of rhetorical figures and when they appear they are mostly in the headlines of the articles. In most cases, these are allegories and metaphors (e.g. *Οι μπουλντόζες ισοπέδωσαν το όνειρο* [The bulldozers demolished the dream], *Ειδομένη ώρα μηδέν* [Idomeni time zero], *Η μικρη "πόλη" της Ειδομένης* [The small "city" of Idomeni]). In the text, *I Kathimerini* also makes sporadic use of the rhetorical figure of irony to express dissent to the national policy of the Greek government, claiming the ideological/ political identity of the newspaper (e.g. *Οι πρόσφυγες και οι μετανάστες έχουν όλα τα νόμιμα δικαιώματα, αλλά όπως και οι γηγενείς δεν έχουν το δικαίωμα ελεύθερης εγκατάστασης όπου θέλουν, αλλιώς θα είχαμε κάμπινγκ στην Ακρόπολη, στην οποία– σημειωτέον– υπάρχει και ωραία θέα* [Refugees and immigrants have all legal rights, but, as the locals, they do not have the freedom to settle where they want, otherwise we would camp at the Acropolis where there is also a nice view]).

Finally, with regard to the implicit or explicit perspective, the results of this analysis show a perfect balance. Both newspapers have, to the same extent, a perspective on the migratory phenomenon between "problem" and "moral acceptance". This contrasts with the findings of a previous study on media coverage of the migrant crisis on the same two paper-based newspapers (Papadopoulou 2015), where a more humanitarian approach was emphasized by *I Efimerida ton Syntakton* compared to *I Kathimerini*. Indeed, the latter focused its articles on the negative impact of the migration phenomenon on Greek society, on health risks and the spread of infectious epidemics, and on the frustration of local communities. It is important to note that also here, we refer not only to the author of the article but also to very frequent quotes of sources and actors mentioned in the articles. This means that institutional actors "replace" authors, especially when Greek newspapers want to highlight immigration as a problem. We are faced with the effect of a discursive strategy in which many quotes are selected in order to provide the reader with a comfortable version of what happened.

As in other studies on the refugee crisis (e.g. Gemi et al. 2013; Horsti 2008, Klocker and Dunn 2003, Van Gorp 2005), the media coverage of the analyzed Greek newspapers polarizes around two representative frames: a) alarm/ emergency frame, that is fairly negative towards the presence of refugees and asylum seekers, and b) pietism/victimization frame, characterized by a compassionate and paternalistic attitude towards immigrants.

As far as the alarm/emergency frame is concerned, Greek newspapers

represent immigration as a problem to be solved and immigrants appear almost always as passive victims. Immigration is a problem in itself, first and foremost as a social problem, not so much in terms of invasion but rather in relation to difficulties in managing refugee crisis and public order. This kind of narration also confirms issues of public securitization by urging European and national politicians to "do something". Despite the neutrality of narrative, it allows to objectify fear, build opinions, promote particular perspectives on public security, legitimize actors on the scene of public debate, and support restrictive access policies. The language is defined in terms of a particular set of features, from the obsessive repetition of the emergency label and stereotypes to a very broad spectrum of crisis moments, such as the economic crisis that Greece has been going through over recent years. The emergency is no longer just the wave of migrants, but the crisis of an economic and social system. Moreover, it may be related also to the economization frame (Hier and Greenberg 2002, Quinsaat 2014), in terms of social and economic costs for Greek society. On the other hand, the pietism/victimization frame calls attention to moral acceptance and a humanitarian approach to asylum policy and to legal and moral obligations (Harrell-Bond 1999). However, the very concept of moral acceptance is not about action aimed at accommodating and helping people in difficulty. It is in terms of bureaucratic and practical organization to manage and settle people who illegally reside in the refugee camp, by describing a strongly critical and emergency situation. It is to be said that this frame is equally stereotyped in labels and representations, drawing largely from collections of stereotypical images on the otherness, that deal with paternalism. The approach of the alarm/emergency frame (perspective on immigration as a "problem") as opposed to the speculative pietism/victimization frame (perspective on immigration as "moral acceptance") demonstrates the effectiveness of this conceptual couple. It is a bipolar and agonistic perspective, perfect for the media gaze.

B. Visual Analysis

In this analysis, 48 photographs and 4 videos have been analyzed both in relation to articles text and as independent content, to testify their relevance in online information, not just as complementary elements to texts. Regarding the source of the photographs, 29 photos were made by an author (mostly press agencies), while in 19 photos the source does not appear. In this respect, an interesting point deals with the fact that the photographs in which the author does not appear are all belonging to *I Kathimerini*. In reference to the videos, the only source is the Hellenic police.

With respect to the composition of images of migrants, age, gender, contexts, moods, space given to the individual or group of individuals are taken into consideration, also in order to detected the presence of stereotyped representations. Furthermore, the images have been classified according to the topics proposed by Luc Boltanski (1993) which are extremely useful to understand an iconographical language including people, places, and symbols. Indeed, an iconographical language is able to spread knowledge more effectively than almost any other

means of communication, because it gives the illusion of being universal, by not (apparently) presenting language restrictions. Photography and video are used to witness or give emotions, but above all they point to the reality: they serve to document, illustrate and support a story (Altheide 2000). The role of media images in the process of "social construction of reality" (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and the negotiation (Hall 1980) of the meanings and opinions on the world by the public is evident. Indeed, the public, interacting with the media, builds social representations of reality (Farr and Moscovici 1984) or social representations of the otherness, by redefining the boundaries of acquired knowledge through a specific context of representation (Meyers 2002).

While in the articles' texts the two Greek newspapers put lives of the camp's refugees in the background, the images instead make them come out strongly, while showing their anxieties and their dreams. Their silenced words in almost all of the texts burst into the semantics of images representing conflictual dialectics. The two newspapers show images with a strong emotional impact. In particular, the articles frame the key-event within an interpretive framework, relying on an iconography aimed at carrying out a function of denunciation of refugees' treatment.

In all analyzed videos, the focus is the clearance operation of the Idomeni refugee camp. These are videos (without audio) by the Hellenic police, in which the evacuation of the camp is taken from above, aboard a helicopter or through a drone's eye. Police operations began at dawn and were initially focused on small tents scattered in the informal settlement and then on those around the railway station. Refugees were transferred by bus to reception facilities in the north of the country. Only by accepting such a transfer could the refugees obtain a one-month extension of the temporary residence permit. The interesting aspect of these videos is the low presence of the individual dimension and the high presence of an undifferentiated mass. Neither age nor genders are recognizable. As suggested by other studies (Bleiker et al. 2013; Silveira 2016), this visual framing, and in particular the absence of video images that depict individual asylum seekers with recognizable facial features, could associate refugees with threats to sovereignty and security. In addition, clustering refugees into one single undifferentiated mass deprives them of their biographical specificity as historical beings (Nyers 1999), while defining them in terms of their corporeal vulnerability alone degrades them to the status of "sub-citizens" – their physical destitution lacks the legitimacy to articulate political will or rational argument (Hyndman 2000).

In certain respects, the situation concerning the photographic representation is similar to the video representation. A similarity is a low presence of the individual dimension: in 33 photos, migrants are represented in groups, compared to 15 cases in which they appear individually. Images show adult and children (17 cases), only adults (17 cases), only children (8 cases), and in 6 photos age cannot be identified. However, *I Kathimerini*, unlike *I Efimerida ton Syntakton*, tends to represent, in half of the cases, only adult migrants. Regarding gender, in 16 photos, there is a mixed composition (male and female), while in 18 cases migrants are male, compared to a low percentage of females (8 cases). In 6 images, gender cannot be identified. These data seem to deny a trend in the media to associate refugees with

the image of women and children (Baines 2004, Johnson 2011, Rajaram 2002, Silveira 2016), recognizing that the analysis of iconographical/iconological components is of utmost interest in understanding stereotyped representations of refugees in the social construction process of reality by the media. In Foucault's view, such a discourse on stereotyping can be read in a biopolitical way, meaning biopolitics as the symbolic arena in which the power of managing and representing the body is expressed. That is, a field of forces where the body becomes "social" and "cultural" in a collective imagery where the media insist on vulnerability, fragility, and the need for protection emanating from the image of a mother with her children.

Photographs can contribute to how viewers imagine refugees with implicit and explicit aims of triggering compassion, fear or empathy (Haaken and O'Neill 2014, Johnson 2011), since visual depictions of refugee situations are assumed to convey a certain reality, an assumption that such things exist (Szörényi 2006). Immigrants' moods emerging from photos in this analysis are, in over half of total cases, of "seriousness" (26 cases), followed by "hope" (12 cases) and "fear" (5 cases), mainly expressed by the gaze as well as posture. From the analysis of the topics, the one of denunciation is especially noticeable (30 cases), particularly when children are depicted, followed by the aesthetic topic (10 cases). The topic of sentiment and the neutral topic are very less frequent, while the topic of joy is completely absent. They are almost all images depicting the evacuation of the Idomeni refugee camp: actions and interventions of law enforcement officers, migrants leaving their own tents and collecting/packing their stuff in poor suitcases and garbage bags, protest signs calling for human rights; other images illustrate long lines of migrants leaving the camp walking to the buses that will take them to other reception centers, and tired and serious faces of migrants hoping for a better life. They are images belonging to the topic of denunciation, which appeal to a sense of justice and generate indignation. What characterizes this topic is a search for responsibility. Attention is directed to a culprit and not to a victim. Thus, anger leading to the denunciation is moved by "sympathizing" (in the sense of suffering together, sharing a particular emotion) with the resentment of the victim (migrant) against the persecutor (police, government, EU). As regards the aesthetic topic, images represent suffering as "sublime" (for example, fine art photographs). These images are limited to representing the problem without indulging in pity, and are intended for an interiorized and individual perception, without any ambition to arouse concrete effects in terms of collective action. In reference to two Greek newspapers, examples are migrants posing and looking at the photographer's camera, as in a hand-painted family portrait; or static and serious faces of two migrants in front of the dilapidated railway station of Idomeni. The fundamental feature of the aesthetic topic is the refusal of feeling, "doing nothing", by looking at what is being seen, and avoiding too many emotions and feelings. They are images where a sublimation of the gaze transforms an object into a fine piece of art without any moralization.

The angle of an image is of particular importance for iconographical analysis. In some photos refugees are shown from behind, making it harder for the viewer to identify with them. In this sense, they represent the unknown and anonymity. As

Silveira suggests:

> "The distance from the camera, and the fact that the subjects have their backs turned as if they do not know they are being watched, aligns the image with the aesthetic of security surveillance footage. As the employment of security cameras is associated with keeping order, or in other words, to help prevent and prove criminal behaviour, this brings about associations with illegality" (2016: 9).

On the contrary, for other photos, even when migrants have been represented as large groups,

The faces of portrayed people are clearly shown. This makes it easier for the viewer to identify with them. When subjects are positioned in the center of the frame and the camera lens is focused at a short range, for the viewer it is more likely to capture the emotions of migrants. In this case, they are described also as "human beings" who arouse pity. They are images that produce suffering and compassion rather than xenophobic reactions. The Idomeni camp refugees do not appear to be criminals. They may represent, if anything, a threat to European security. Because they emphasize the global instability of our time. The image is no longer a neutral historical document, but a mosaic of faces that meets the viewer's eye. Biographies of migrants, omitted from the texts of the articles, resurface in these portraits making their existence visible. They are faces on the scene, crossing the symbolic threshold of invisibility, to be placed on a "stage" in which they are real actors, through a process of re-humanization, whereby migrants cease to be numbers and become human beings again. At the same time, other images imply an objectification of refugees when they portray them in moments of intimacy and privacy, in front of their tents or gathered around a bonfire, especially during the days before the evacuation. Their personal spaces are violated and they become objects of an intrusive gaze creating an aesthetic of violence, as well as the understanding of the refugee body as a non-sacred entity. Such a discourse can be placed into a broader debate that deals with what Ortner (2016: 47) calls "dark anthropology," that is, "anthropology that focuses on the harsh dimensions of social life (power, domination, inequality, and oppression)" and can also be extended to the methods and ethical protocols of journalistic practice in these situations. Indeed, these violation and objectification of refugees as "suffering subjects" (Robbins 2013) through an intrusive gaze of the photographer's camera lead us to the question posed by Kelly (2013: 213): "at what point does ethnography of suffering turn into a voyeuristic quasi-pornography?"

The topic of denunciation takes place in the presence of strong recurring symbols that characterize the images: barbed wire and chain-link fence encircling the camp, protest signs, bulldozers, and garbage bags used as luggage and wheelchairs for the disabled. The chain-link fence limits migrants to a physical space until, presumably, someone with a higher authority allows them to get out. The visual representation of the barbed wire recalls internment camp memory and the tragedy of people deported and expelled by nationalistic policies and regimes.

This idea of imprisonment may be related to both the perceived "illegality" of migrants entering Europe, and their victimhood, since they are detained within a global regime characterized by humanitarian practices and particularly restrictive control measures. "Bulldozers demolishing the dream" do not only act in a pragmatic universe but are also actors of a show destined for representation. The image of the camp's demolition by the bulldozers gives a sense of a physical, symbolic, political and social exclusion. The bulldozers' action is not only a historical evidence of such an event, but also the profoundly symbolic extract of the government's actions. Tents, clothes drying in the sun, food, blankets, garbage bags used as luggage, and protest signs become significant as they are inhabited, used, consumed, as inanimate objects but also as symbolic extensions of the lives they belonged to. In this sense, the lives of immigrants become increasingly tangible through these objects, showing to the viewer how their passive resistance becomes voice.

Both in photographic and video representations of the demolition of Idomeni camp, although we do not perceive tension, conflict is semantically emphasized by police performance and suggests a coercive attitude by public security forces. The images and their captions describe the conflict-negotiation process that opposes migrants to law enforcement. It is an iconographical language connecting the Schengen Fortress ideology to an immediate and direct image of the "human surplus" that legitimates the existence of an internment camp (Rahola 2003). The crumbling Idomeni camp represents a non-place of humanity in excess where, using Sayad's expression (1999), the refugee is *atopos* and exists only by default in the sending community and by excess in the receiving society. Refugees, stripped of any sense of belonging, must disappear from sight and must fade from memory, and the physical traces of their presence must be dispersed quickly. We are in the presence of an ideological and operational device for which migrants are subjects to expulsion and protection, to settle in a marginal separated and monitored area. Their transfer, albeit temporary, to other reception centers seems to be an "exemplum" of this mechanism of exclusion, and represent the only possible re-territorialization within a political and social system in crisis. They are all images of a European Union that has reduced citizenship to an exclusive paradigm, a tool to select temporary (sovra) national belonging, in addition to the protection afforded by law. Another interesting point to note is the paradox inherent in the narration of the evacuation operation of the refugee camp: what remains "clandestine" for police forces is perfectly identifiable for media observation. Immigration becomes visible when it is legally invisible. In fact, it is the police operation to transform a silent event into a media show, when, for example, authorities posted helicopter footage of the camp clearance on the Internet. The entire information apparatus brought to play confirms this metaphorical reading key, from the images portraying police officers restoring order in the name of legality, to the barbed wire symbolizing a border, a trench, to be protected. It is equally obvious that this metaphor not only recalls some specific illustrative choices, but also a recurring language that corresponds to many political-administrative solutions (Maneri 2009: 83-85).

Discussion and Conclusion

Refugees are at the center of a conflict between international obligations and nation-states. In a world still politically based on nation-states, they have lost the protection of their country of origin but do not enjoy citizenship rights in the receiving country. Hanna Arendt's reflections (1951) on the link among national belonging, citizenship, and rights are reminiscent of the fact that the lack of citizenship, by national definition, makes refugees stateless persons. The issue of refugees is therefore probably the highest point of tension between the interests of national states and the protection of human rights. The absence of effective European policy solutions in these years contributes to maintaining a reduced protection regime for refugees, from suspended rights to subordinated inclusion. Media and political system work to build an image of public intervention to contain the emergency and to solve problems. They are political options and strategies through which media representations define an image of public action as well as a collective imagery.

The demolition of the Idomeni camp was a central theme not only for the Greek media, but also for the European ones. It was a spectacular media event through which the Greek authorities reaffirmed their control over the national space. Characterized by humanitarian practices and particularly restrictive control measures, the Idomeni camp, as well as all other camps where asylum seekers are held, has represented a "symbolic place of the social construction of the refugee" in contemporary times (Van Aken 2005: 7). As a primary policy measure for administering and controlling asylum migration, the camp is, first of all, a site characterized by humanitarian practices with techniques of power experienced by asylum seekers as acts of overwhelming violence. In the last decade, the system of camps as a political form of governing and controlling refugees and asylum seekers is increasingly being used in the various European states, while making the current historical moment "a time marked by the pervasive presence of the camps" (Rahola 2005: 69). Similarly, refugee camps are zones of exception outside national borders, administratively and legally separate from political space. Therefore, the Idomeni camp was not a historical anomaly. Rather, it is the symbol of a "new biopolitical *nomos* of the planet" (Agamben 2000: 45), through which fundamental human rights are suspended or denied (Frost 2013).

The anthropologist Michel Agier emphasizes that the global humanitarian system has adopted a principle that he calls "care, cure and control" that makes camps "police, food and medical devices", where refugees "are kept below minimum humanitarian standards and they are nourished within norms of mere survival" (2005: 50). These practices denote the control obsession that drives host countries to settle asylum seekers in camps rather than letting them disperse around the country. Therefore, camps, although defined as protection structures for asylum seekers, have the function of ensuring the safety of those outside (citizens) from the subjects (not citizens) living within them (Diken and Lausten 2006). More concretely, the camp, as a management and reception strategy for asylum migrations, has been in line with a depoliticization of the refugee figure and with recognition of forms of assistance, from time to time, by State agencies and

international programs. The figure of the refugee/asylum seeker becomes increasingly "humanitarian", from a historical and political subjectivity to an object of "care and control". In other words, it is recognized as humanity in excess, needing to be rescued with categories related to aid and reception (Malkki 1996; Van Aken 2005). As Agier writes, although the camp solution should be "the exception", it actually becomes an "ordinary" political rule (Agier 2009: 35), and the agencies themselves, that should protect refugees and integrate them socially, lock them up in prison-like conditions.

By using the Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis, this paper focuses on the visual and textual representation of refugees in the online version of two influential newspapers in Greece. The analysis examines the particularities and significance of news coverage of a particular and critical event. The detailed analysis of news texts and photos associated with this event informs the discussion and proposes a critical understanding of the narrow representational frames within which refugees are constructed in the media. The textual and visual analysis of the media coverage of the Idomeni camp evacuation has allowed to identify many elements related to the representation of migrants. The results show that the construction of the imagery of migrants and migration is based on a discursive/visual representation of migrants and components with strong symbolic values which have now become part of our imagery.

The first and main observation from this analysis is that, despite the different political orientation, both newspapers are very similar in their coverage, revealing a tendency to more a homogenization of views and explanations than to providing a plurality of opinions. Using an institutional and generalist approach based on monodimensional formats, they thus contribute to perpetuating a dispositive suitable for pre-existing social representations and stereotypes.

In line with other works on refugees and asylum seekers (Gemi et al. 2013, Horsti 2008, Klocker and Dunn 2003, Van Gorp 2005), in the text, both Greek newspapers focus on two representative frames, alarm/emergency frame and pietism/victimization frame, that are equally stereotyped in labels and representations. These frames revolve, in a particular way, around the macro theme of reception management that develops on the European and the local level through a political and institutional debate.

In the text, the online newspapers leave no space for the voices, origin and living condition of migrants. Even in the presence of polyphony, their life stories do not contribute to the construction of the narrative of the evacuation of the Idomeni refugee camp, and individuality is sacrificed to the tale of the mass phenomenon. Also the description in numbers plays an important role in representing refugees as an indistinct mass rather as individuals, making them socially invisible. Undoubtedly, in accordance with other literature findings (Esses et al. 2013, Haslam 2006, Leyens et al. 2000), this institutionalized practice of de-humanization constitutes an effective mean to justify the control of the status of immigrants, reinforcing the boundaries between in-group and out-group.

Another important point is that, unlike the articles' texts, both *I Kathimerini* and *I Efimerida ton Syntakton* show images making biographies of migrants visible. As we have seen, images often cross the symbolic threshold of invisibility,

to be placed on a "stage" in which they are real actors, through a process of re-humanization, whereby migrants cease to be numbers and become human beings again. These images mainly belong to an iconography that recreate the singularity of suffering and is directed to a denunciation of refugees' treatment, whereby viewers are expected to take sides with the migrants and sympathize with them, above all when the faces of portrayed people are clearly shown.

The above results indicate that in the media representation of refugees and asylum seekers, cultural clichés, on which discursive and iconographical choices are based, tend to re-emerge systematically in a vicious circle. The neutral and homogeneous language of Greek newspapers, the two frames representing problem/alarm/emergency and moral acceptance/pietism/victimization, the absence of migrant voices from narratives, the images of the Idomeni refugee camp, seem to confirm this vicious circle as a consequence of the framework of relations among actors, mediators, and representations: a field of forces dominated by the paradoxically stabilizing stereotype persistence. Most importantly, the representation of refugees in the frame of victimization, along with ritual manifestations of compassion on the media and the European political scene, might have a counterproductive effect on refugees. Because involuntarily – and falsely – they reduce the status of refugees to a state of inactivity and passivity. But having said that, stories of suffering are not a fiction but a reality for those millions of people who have fled wars and tragic situations, and deserve to be told. However, in continuing to insist on "essentialist" refugee-victim narratives, this communication is paradoxically an obstacle to the language of empowerment of humanitarian agencies. In addition, in line with Kapur's argumentation (2002), attitudes and practices such as paternalism or overprotectiveness may affect European political decisions regulating the resettlement of refugees, so as to deprive them of their agency and obstruct their empowerment. The short-term benefits of the proliferation of such images with their metaphorical power must therefore be critically evaluated, by reflecting the potentially negative repercussions on public beliefs and attitudes towards (forced) migrants. The almost ritualized images of "victimhood" of refugees serve more to demonstrate the EU's compassion and self-assertion than to stimulate a significant change in public attitudes or politics. People who have lost homes, jobs, relatives, their daily lives, must be taken seriously, not as people reduced completely to "naked life" – as supported by the philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998) – but as active members within a global political community, in order to avoid the perpetuation of an essentialist discourse. However, the fact that, unlike previous studies by other scholars on visual representation of refugees (Baines 2004, Johnson 2011, Rajaram 2002, Silveira 2016), images of adult and male migrants were prevalent in this online newspapers analysis could suggest a reduction of cultural essentialism based on feminization/infantilization in the representation of refugees. On the other hand, it could also be traced back to a general tendency, always in biopolitical terms, to underestimate the female presence in the migration process or it could also be related to more "securitized" representations of refugees depicted as threat. Nevertheless, such a change in the representation of refugees does not necessarily mean that we are no longer in the presence of new

stereotyped representation; but undoubtedly it is not a reduction of the complexity of the refugee figure as usually portrayed by the monolithic media image.

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