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Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies

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The current issue is the first of the tenth volume of the *Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies (AJMS)*, published by the Athens Institute for Education and Research.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
ATINER

Athens Institute for Education and Research
A World Association of Academics and Researchers

17th Annual International Conference on Mediterranean Studies
25-28 March 2024, Athens, Greece

The **Center for European & Mediterranean Affairs** organizes the **17th Annual International Conference on Mediterranean Studies, 25-28 March 2024, Athens, Greece** sponsored by the Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies. The aim of the conference is to bring together academics and researchers from all areas of Mediterranean Studies, such as history, arts, archaeology, philosophy, culture, sociology, politics, international relations, economics, business, sports, environment and ecology, etc.You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (https://www.atiner.gr/2024/FORM-MDT.doc).

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- **Dr. Yannis Stivachtis**, Director, Center for European & Mediterranean Affairs and Associate Professor, Jean Monnet Chair & Director of International Studies Program, Virginia Tech – Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, USA.

Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **13 February 2024**
- Submission of Paper: **26 February 2024**

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17-20 June 2024, Athens, Greece

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Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **27 February 2024**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **20 May 2024**

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference

- **Dr. Yannis Stivachtis**, Director, Center for European & Mediterranean Affairs and Associate Professor, Jean Monnet Chair & Director of International Studies Program, Virginia Tech – Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, USA.

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Myths, Falsehoods, Paradoxes, Errors and Virtual Water in Mediterranean Europe: The Case of the Iberian Peninsula

By José Manuel Castillo López[*]

The statement that everything remains the same in Mediterranean Europe in matters of continental waters following the course of the last three decades is untrue. In effect, following the drought of 1995 or perhaps coinciding with it, social movements and a high proportion of scientists and even numerous members of the administrations have dealt extensively with the issue. As a result of the many books, articles in scientific journals and conferences, etc., expression New Water Culture, demand management, water quality etc. are today highly promoted amongst academics and managers to such an extent that they considered themselves as fellow believers of these new tendencies in water policy or, at least, few dare to publically state their opposition to them. But, in reality, have the aforementioned changes and other developments substantially affected the principles that inspire current hydropolitics in Mediterranean Europe? Or, on the contrary, do "old ghosts" reappear whenever there are periods of less rainfall? This article discusses and differentiates some aspects of the water situation in Mediterranean Europe and, above all, the correlative management models that have been developed in recent decades with a particular analysis of the cases of Spain and Andalusia. It asks whether the previous diagnosis is still correct today or, on the contrary, the cultural and institutional changes that have already taken place have been appropriate and sufficient for the establishment of a New Water Culture in Southern Europe. Frequently used terms, expressions and concepts such as throwing water into the sea, hydraulic works are in the general interest, wet Europe and dry Europe, the water transfer will definitively solve the problem, water deficit, water must be distributed fairly, everyone has a right to water, water is a public asset etc. shall be reviewed from a scientific approach. The concept of water scarcity is normally unquestioningly assumed by people and the administrations that irrationally integrate it into public policy. This article discusses and differentiates the concepts of physical and economic scarcity, of the prices and effects these have on the efficiency and equity of water management and usage. As well as an analysis of the problem of the pollution of continental waters, there is also a brief examination of the pollution caused by their discharges into the Mediterranean Sea. There is a discussion of a number of general comments in regards to water transfers and provide a short overview of three of the most controversial of these works in Spain: The Ebro-Almería, Tajo-Segura and the Castril River Water Transfer. A new line of research is presented for the management of water, the virtual water approach that produces and confirms the results I already previously obtained through conventional procedures. The last section describes the economic effects on agriculture and tourism that climate change is causing in a number of Mediterranean regions. It is to be stated in advance that the conclusion is: The New Water Culture (NWC), from the South, demands the prior recognition that the biggest statements on the scarcity of water are not the result of climatic conditions, rather, they are due to the economic development and social model followed, misgovernment by competent institutions and, definitively, because the conflicts made evident between different users have solely been resolved with arguments of political and, ultimately, economic power.

Keywords: *Mediterranean, water, crops, tourism, prices, pollution, virtual water*

[*]Full Professor, Department of Applied Economics, University of Granada, Spain.

Presentation: Diagnosis

The European Water Framework Directive, along with supposing, of course, the homogenisation of legislations and policies in matters relating to continental waters of member states, is configured as a decidedly environmental regulation as it pays particular attention to the conservation of river ecosystems and other water masses, as regards both quantitative and qualitative aspects.

It is obvious, therefore, that at least formally speaking quite a number of detailed aspects of water policy have changed in some countries in Mediterranean Europe and in particular the Iberian Peninsula. Amongst others, the controversial Ebro-Jucar-Almería water transfer has not been constructed, and senior members of the Administration declare themselves in favour of the principles that inspire the New Water Culture (NWC), with others even being promoter members of the Foundation that uses this name.

But, in reality, have the aforementioned changes and other developments substantially affected the principles that inspire the water politics of European Mediterranean countries? Or, on the contrary, do "old ghosts" reappear whenever there are periods of less rainfall?

What ever happened to the former water managers, the members of the so-called "cement paradigm", and the professionals who referred to the members and supporters of the NWC at the very least as "amateur ecologists". Are reservoirs no longer being constructed for which there will never be water to fill and that even represent a danger for many people who live downstream? Have economic water accounts been integrated periodically and systematically into the National Accounts and, as a result, is water politics now socially rational and transparent?

I fear that, at the very least, there is no satisfactory answer to any of these questions and that, despite the undoubted changes that have occurred, perhaps too many aspects of the *hydropolitics* remain unaltered among us. Moreover, even worse, I observe that, taking the terminology from our most recent past, the symbols and discourse of the NWC have been almost automatically assumed, without the least ideological resistance coming from an influential proportion of "born and bred democrats" so that, in reality, few things substantially change.

It has been twenty three years now, in a different institutional context, since I had the opportunity to direct and coordinate the *1st Water Congress in Andalusia: The Water Debate from the South*, University of Granada, 2001, of which the presentations reviewed in the debates were published, and my thesis on the water situation was as follows:

> The New Water Culture, from the South, demands the prior recognition that the biggest manifestations of the scarcity of water are not the result of climatic conditions, rather, they are due to the economic development and social models followed, misgovernment by competent institutions and, definitively, because the conflicts made evident between the different users have solely been resolved with arguments of political and, ultimately, economic power (Castillo 2001, p. 79).

The lack of government that has presided over *hydropolitics* in Spain and Mediterranean Europe has been supported by the technical and human deficiencies of the Administration and the fact that both within it and in a considerable number of social sectors a large series of falsehoods and conceptual errors are accepted as being true.

A considerable number of texts, amongst which perhaps the most institutionally relevant was the Preamble of the previous partially repealed of the 2000 Law of the National Hydrological Plan of Spain, which contemplated the controversial water transfer from the river Ebro along the Mediterranean coast to the province of Almeria, clearly set out what the essence of the water problem in Spain was for the Administration of that legislature and, therefore, its *correlative and logical definitive solution*:

> In a country such as Spain, in which water is a scarce resource, marked by serious hydraulic imbalances due to its irregular distribution, the adequate planning of water policy is imposed as a necessity that cannot be remain separated from this reality and as an instrument for the overcoming of it (Castillo 2002, p. 14).

This paragraph clearly expresses the official diagnosis in regards to the only problem that occurs with water in Mediterranean Europe and, likewise, what the resulting appropriate policy is for solving it: In Mediterranean Europe nature has provided water in an *unbalanced* way; that is, unequally distributed, in particular in territorial and seasonal terms and, therefore, it must be *corrected* (BOE 2001).

The spatial-seasonal disparities of the official diagnosis have, as logical correlations, *deficits and surpluses or excesses*, with reservoirs being the attempted solution for the former, and water transfers for the latter. In other words, if water in Mediterranean Europe is poorly distributed or unbalanced, reasons of solidarity recommend rebalancing it through transfers from where there is a surplus to where there is a deficit. In this manner we obtain the desired *national hydraulic balance is obtained* (BOE 2001).

The lack of government that has presided over *hydropolitics* in Mediterranean Europe has been supported by the technical and human deficiencies of the member states and the fact that both within it and in a large number of social sectors a large series of conceptual falsehoods are accepted as being true:

- Hydraulic works are in the general interest.
- The transfer and other projected works will definitively solve the problems relating to water.
- Dry Europe and wet Europe.
- Water surplus or excess and deficit or lack.
- Pouring water into the sea.
- Seeing water flow by you and not using it is a waste.
- Water must be distributed fairly.
- Water is a public asset.
- Everyone has a right to water.
- Hydraulic works are in the social interest.

These *errors*, however, are not *innocent*, given that their logical correlative is the urgency in resolving an *unbearable* situation and, as a result of this, the correlative, imperative, *urgent and unavoidable convenience* of constructing one or more hydraulic works. A large proportion of those who exhibit these arguments are educated, and this does not mean simply to the level of baccalaureate (ESO) in Spain, rather, many of them boast master's degrees from renowned business schools in England and the United States and today hold important executive posts in large construction companies or the very administrations of Mediterranean Europe.

This attitude will, furthermore, be more politically profitable for their promoters and even economically for their direct service providers, than the truly rational measures from the social and collective perspective. Finally, people are unaware of the lack of government that presides over *hydropolitics* and who its true beneficiaries are, which deactivates or dampens their potential manifestations of non-conformity and social responses.

But, who is going to finance hydraulic works? What social profitability do they foresee, or is there even a simple, prior cost–benefit analysis? Will these works definitively solve the water problem in the region?

All social researchers know, and some have even personally experienced, that an essential requisite for a good professional reputation, in other words, to assure ourselves that our judgements are considered as sensible and are not overcome by *modern times*, consists in abstaining from sustaining those that imply inadmissible implications for public policy or determined influential sectors. The aberrant result is that all too often there is a proliferation of mediocrity and patronage amongst those with high profiles who, amongst us, normally take the form of *useless but successful* teachers and researchers.

Or, put another way, it is essential to *topple the myth to unmask the tricksters*.

Water *Scarcity* and Administration

The policies and regulations on complex, that is, real social matters, such as water, lack miracle-working power and cannot therefore be directly applied. Even in the event they are well constructed, they will not automatically provoke the positive effects they intend; rather, to do so they require an adequate, sometimes exhaustive regulatory development and, moreover, must be accompanied by sufficient quantity and technical capacity in the Administration to which the application thereof corresponds (Muñoz 2015).

The Economic Statistics of Water

Furthermore, although a number of differences are shown amongst researchers in its exact disposal, it is clear that nearly all water academics coincide on the fact that the many advantages that a transparent management of water would lead to are obvious. But, paradoxically and despite the strategic importance of this resource, it is noteworthy that in the southern regions of Europe there is a current lack of availability of basic statistics or, as a result, the economic accounts of water essential to bring it about (CEDEX 2000, EUROSTAT 2023).

In reality, the result is the misgovernment that presides over water matters in southern Europe and the majority of conflicts between potential users are resolved with power related arguments and clearly regressive and inefficient distributive consequences.

For this reason, researchers have been insisting for years that it is essential and urgent that the National Statistics Institute of Spain (INE), other European countries and Eurostat in Europe make the necessary efforts to implement a European, National and Regional Water Statistics System, which covers these unfortunate gaps and that, in this manner, contributes to satisfying the growing demand for basic data necessary for creating more complex indicators of a socio-economic nature. In this same regard, it would be convenient for experts and scientists, in particular those from the social sphere, to unrestrainedly employ analytical tools and methodologies are most certainly used appropriately in other objects of research, given that in reality the mistakes shown by the diagnoses of the situation are not innocent, and the resulting *hydropolitics* are tremendously detrimental to society in general.

In the majority of conventional texts on the management of water the term water policy does not appear, instead they mention hydropolitics (Costa 1911). This is not an honest mistake. Water policy, like any other sectoral policy, involves ordering available resources, establishing objectives and designing the means to achieve them, discussing prices, the protection of ecosystems, etc. In turn, hydropolitics means simply and precisely hydraulic works policy. In other words, the construction of works destined towards storing, transferring and distributing water.

Continental Water in Mediterranean Europe: Physical or Economic Scarcity?

The territorial structure of the hydraulic systems of Mediterranean Europe are faithful reflections, in terms of natural and available water resources, of their geographical locations in the inadequately named *Dry Europe* and, in terms of usage, of the characteristics of the socio-economic systems of southern Europe and the management that has been implemented in recent decades.

The 18 European regions considered as Mediterranean are found in Spain(2), France(3), Italy(5), Malta(1), Slovenia(1), Croatia(1), Greece(4), and Cyprus(1).

For example, the annual rainfall in Andalusia (Spain) reaches an average of 54,000 hm^3, that is, it is similar to some regions situated in *Wet Europe*. Nevertheless, the extreme seasonal irregularity, the frequently torrential regime, the high evaporation caused by high temperatures, soil infiltrations, etc. in reality reduce available water resources to 24% and collaborate in giving the Andalusian hydraulic system the typical characteristics of those that exist in the Mediterranean European regions (Castillo 2001).

But, in reality, the *scarcity* of water in Mediterranean Europe is not physical, but above all socio-economic and political. Firstly, there are no economic accounts on water and even less likely are they to be integrated into national accounts. However, some things are known “off the books” through studies by some regional administrations and individual researchers. As it can be seen in Figure 1, the regional water demand is distributed in the following manner: 80.6% to agricultural activities, 8.6% to industrial activities and services and, finally, 10.9% to domestic uses (European Environment Agency 2022).

Figure 1. *Water is a Strategic Resource for the Economy of Mediterranean Europe*



Source: European Environment Agency (2022) and own creation.

Agriculture in Mediterranean European countries accounts for the use of approximately 80% of available water, causing serious supply and pollution problems, with these countries furthermore being those that will be most affected by climate change, thus exacerbating the pre-existing situation

Given the weight of some sectors, in particular agriculture, followed by tourism, the assertion that water constitutes a strategic resource for Mediterranean Europe is widely shared.

A) THE PRICE OF WATER FOR URBAN USES.

In Table 1 you can see the price range in European countries ranges from the highest in Denmark (7.31 euros/m^3) to the lowest in Bulgaria (1.37 euros/m^3).

Table 1. *The Price of Water for Domestic and Urban uses in Selected European Countries (Euros/m^3)*

PRICE OF WATER FOR DOMESTIC USES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (Euros/m^3)

Countries	Supply	Sewage and treatment	VAT and other taxes	TOTAL
Denmark	2.66	3.19	1.46	7.31
Netherlands	1.49	3.62	0.1	5.21
Finland	1.6	1.95	0.85	4.4
United Kingdom	2.05	2.31	0	4.36
Sweden	1.29	2.01	0.83	4.13
Belgium	1.99	1.88	0.23	4.1
Austria	1.73	1.9	0.36	3.99
Cyprus	1.46	2.39	0.07	3.92
Norway	1.37	1.64	0.75	3.76
France	1.85	1.54	0.22	3.61
Spain	1.14	0.83	0.22	2.19
Portugal	1.14	0.91	0.1	2.15
Hungary	0.91	0.72	0.44	2.07
Poland	0.92	1.14	0	2.06
Romania	0.7	0.52	0.29	1.51
Bulgaria	0.88	0.26	0.23	1.37
Italy	0.42	0.58	0.1	1.1

Source: FUNCAS (2019) and own creation.

Observe the irrationality of water prices in Europe, that is, in those countries in Central and Northern Europe where greater quantities of available water exist (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands) the prices of water for domestic use are lower than in Mediterranean European countries where lower quantities of available water exist (Italy, Spain) (Funcas 2019).

According to the results produced by the recent AEAS-AGA in Rates Study (Asociación Española de Abastecimientos de Agua y Saneamiento 2022), the average price of water for domestic use in Spain stands at €1.97/m^3 (VAT not included). Of this amount, €1.09/m^3 (55%) corresponds to the supply service and €0.88/m^3 (45%) to the drainage service.

B) PRICE OF WATER IN AGRICULTURE

The average payment of irrigators for water services for this activity in the Iberian Peninsula has been estimated at €263/Ha per year, but the price interval by volume fluctuates between €0/m^3 up to €0.72 euros/m^3, and even higher, depending on the origin of the water: rivers, reservoirs, transfers, desalination plants, etc. and direct and indirect subsidies from administrations (Hispagua 2023).

The price dynamic clearly operates contrary to incentivising the saving and efficient use of water in Mediterranean Europe and, from this point, it is not difficult to deduce that the agricultural sector constitutes the framework in which policies aimed at saving and improving efficiency etc. find greater margins for manoeuvre, given that until now the payment system in force has made it difficult.

Moreover, water prices produce inequity because they cause transfers of income via public subsidies in water prices effectively paid from citizens to large landowners.

It should be borne in mind that irrigation by gravity or flooding consumes four times more water volume than the drip system for the same quantity of vegetable matter.

Keep in mind that gravity or flood irrigation consumes four times more volume of water than the drip irrigation system, for the same amount of plant matter and, as can be seen in Table 2, the volume of water used by the technique Gravity irrigation still represents 36.1% of the total volume of water used in agriculture.

Table 2. *Volume of Water Used by Irrigation Technique (Hm^3)*

Irrigation Type	Volume	%/ Total
Sprinkler	3.996	26.4
Drip	5.677	37.5
Gravity	5.454	36.1
Total	**15.129.132**	**100**

Source: INE (2020).

Given the existing system of water prices, there is a lack of relative importance relating to the cost of water for farmers in relation to the value of the final agricultural production and, as a result, scarce interest on the part of farmers in the installation of more efficient and water saving irrigation systems.

In other words, water constitutes a limiting factor for economic development models in Mediterranean Europe.

The most recent experience reveals that the subject of water is an adequate refuge for *the inefficient, tricksters and the successfully useless*. It is obvious that if we achieve water transfers for Andalusia or other regions of Mediterranean Europe, incorrectly referred to as *dry regions*, in the short term the situation will improve for a large proportion of farmers and their physical or intellectual promoters will gain social status, given that *they will have contributed to the definitive solution of the water problem*. sic!

If they are afforded, for example, the opportunity to analyse in-depth the available statistics on the inadequately named *water balances* in the basins that flow through Andalusia, they will at the very least become perplexed in the face of the seasonal series of the inadequately named estimated *deficits*. For example, in 1981 the Guadalquivir Basin had a deficit of 400 hm^3. The following twenty years saw the construction of 23 reservoirs, which supposed a 45% increase in the capacity of regulation. But, surprise, in the year 2000 the deficit continued to be the same as in 1981 and in 2001 it was even somewhat higher (489 hm^3) (Castillo 2001).

How can a balance be found between these apparently contradictory figures? Simply because in this area there was a spectacular increase in uses that were, furthermore, increasingly polluting, together with an almost non-existent or, where relevant, unrealistic planning and inefficient management. The result of traditional *hydropolitics* is that the requirements have been year after year, and increasingly, higher than available resources, in an institutional dynamic that appears to ignore or, rather, attempt to obscure the unsustainability of this development model and the resulting *hydropolitics* designed for the provision thereof. In short, the traditional *hydropolitics* implemented in Mediterranean Europe in recent decades has created problems for water users at a greater pace than the numerous and costly works that have served as a pretext have been constructed.

On the side of hydraulic resources, the presence of water has traditionally conditioned human settlement and the development of population nuclei, to the extent that they needed to guarantee not just water resources essential for human consumption, but also those necessary for the development of their productive activities. In Mediterranean Europe, however, disjointed industrial development, with decision-making centres in other locations, the growth of the tourism sector and the large population centres along the Mediterranean coast, the agricultural specialisation in irrigation crops and abandonment of dry farming, etc. has meant that the spatial distribution of water resources has stopped coinciding with that of its needs, to the extent that precisely in the places and periods of the year in which the natural provision of water is lower, the requirements have increased spectacularly, to which the greater relative scarcity of water resources in Mediterranean Europe has taken place, moreover, with enormous spatial and seasonal imbalances.

Water Pollution in Mediterranean Europe

Diverse characteristics of the typical socio-economic structure of Mediterranean European countries are significantly contributing to the deterioration of the quality of continental waters both on the surface and underground, situating the rivers and reservoirs of the lands closest to the Mediterranean amongst the most polluted in Europe.

The difficulties in Mediterranean Europe with continental waters are not just related to quantity, but also and ever increasingly to quality. In other words, a proportion of available water lacks the quality required for priority human uses due to pollution.

To put another way, in the greater part of Mediterranean Europe our water management model is environmentally unsustainable.

Pollution of Coastal Waters

The concentration of the population in a reduced number of cities, precisely where water run-off is lower (concentration effect) and the existence of highly polluting industrial sectors (petrochemical, oil, alcohol, sugar, etc.), the growing use in agriculture of phytosanitary products and chemical fertilisers, etc., all contribute to the fact that the coasts of Mediterranean Europe are highly polluted.

According to the study by the European Environment Agency European Environment Agency (2018), 60% of European waters failed to reach the minimum ecological state of “good” or “very good”, set in the EU Water Framework Directive, during the 2010-2015 monitoring period.

A proportion of the waters in poor ecological state or that are untreated originating from tourist populations end up in the Mediterranean.

90% of the waste floating in the European Mediterranean is plastic, which of course has a negative effect on tourism and provokes an enormous mortality in marine species that, in part, enter the human food chain (RTVE 2023).

One of the negative interactions between agriculture, agrochemical products and the Mediterranean Sea occurs in Spain in the Mar Menor, a coastal salt water lagoon in the region of Murcia, separated from the sea by a 22 km long sand barrier (Figure 2).

Figure 2. *The Pollution of the Mar Menor*



Source: National Geographic España (2023).

The scientific diagnoses of the situation and the causes that have provoked the growing deterioration of this ecosystem are practically unanimous: The expansion of farming, urban and mining activities that involve the intensive use of nitrates and phosphates that reach the Mar Menor via the basins that slope through the region of Campo de Cartagena are leading to episodes of advanced eutrophication

Many People who wish to Visit the Graves of their Parents would have to do so in a Diving Suit

The construction of reservoirs has a long tradition in Mediterranean Europe going back at least to the Roman times.

As of April 2023 in Spain there were 1,225 large dams and reservoirs, being the EU country with the highest number of these works, and the sixth in the world. The storage capacity is 56,069 hm^3 but the quantity of water effectively stored is 26,648 hm^3 (Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica y el Reto Demográfico 2023).

The majority of these hydraulic works were constructed in Mediterranean Europe from the 1940s onwards, at the end of the Second World War (1939-1945) or in Spain after the Civil War (1936-1939).

In Spain in recent times the very grandeur of the work itself constituted an end in itself. It is convenient to remember to these effects that a frequent *NODO* image in post-civil war Spanish cinemas was the figure of General Franco or the *Caudillo* (leader) or typical minister cutting the ribbon of the inauguration of a reservoir, a construction that of course lacked even a minimal cost–benefit analysis in social terms.

NO-DO was a propagandistic news service created by the Franco dictatorship that was compulsory viewing shown in cinemas before the main feature between 1942 and 1981).

Nevertheless, it must unreservedly be recognized that in the situation of autarchy of the 1940s or in the middle of the world economic crisis of the 1970s, the expansive politics of water had considerable justifications from the perspective of the general interest, despite the fact this was not precisely the objective sought by its promoters.

The poorly-named recurring *droughts* in Mediterranean Europe have shown added to the high monetary costs of the mass construction of reservoirs must be the damaging social costs to which they have given rise.

At present together with the questioning of the strictly economic profitability of many of the hydraulic works completed, which would not pass a simple cost-benefit analysis in monetary terms, there must be the institutional limitations of the European Water Framework Directive and above all the responses from the population from the social, cultural, environmental etc. perspective (human loss, flooding of valleys and towns, immersion of historical heritage, breaking up of regions, uprooting of inhabitants, destruction of natural heritage, etc.).

In Spain there is currently a proliferation of hoaxes (Newtral 2023) on some social networks on the mass destruction of reservoirs, undoubtedly for electoral reasons. The reality is different, with storage capacity even growing in recent years.

These statements and signatures are false and lack any foundation whatsoever: "Spain is now the country that is destroying the most dams in the whole of Europe"; "108 dams demolished in 2021; 148, in 2022; and 43 in the first four months of 2023"; "we're in the middle of the worst drought in memory, but the Government boasts about being a 'global example' in the demolition of dams", and "who is mainly responsible for hosepipe bans and drought in Spain? (Neutral 2023).

An objective repeatedly stated by European governments is to achieve the situation where healthy nature contributes to the physical and mental well-being of European citizens, and in order to collaborate towards it there is a plan to restore at least 25,000 Km of rivers returned to a free-flowing state. This measure is indicated as one of the key elements of the European Union Biodiversity Strategy for 2031, which is in turn a measure included in the Europe Green Deal 2019 (European Parliament 2023).

A 2020 study entailing an exhaustive analysis of the fragmentation of European rivers concludes that at least 1.2 million barriers exist that fragment the rivers in 36 European countries, of which 15% are considered obsolete (Belleti et al. 2002).

The fast pace of the elimination of river barriers in Europe is justified by the diverse impact they have on river ecosystems

Particular attention is drawn to a series of river barriers that had already come to the end of their life cycle, which lack economic function and that in reality now suppose a safety problem.

The main types of river barriers are dams but also diversion dams, overflow, channels, fords, sluices, ramps, etc.

The reality is that in Spain seven dams were demolished between 2007 and 2018, all for reasons of safety (cracks, silting, etc.) following the end of the concession as demanded by the Water Act.

In Spain in recent years a number of dams have been removed. Some examples are El Tranco, Robledo de Chavela, Anllarinos and Yecla de Yeltes. Furthermore, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) reported others such as Inturia and Retuerta. All of these constructions were demolished between 2007 and 2018 for safety reasons –cracks, silting, etc.– or due to disuse following the end of corresponding licences, as demanded by the Water Act. In percentage terms, around 0.3% of the dams present in Spain in this period of time would have been eliminated (Ministerio de Agricultura y Transición Ecológica 2023).

Project to Transfer the Patio of the Lions of the Alhambra in Granada to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York?

What would people think if one morning they woke up to the news in the local press of the city of Granada that the Spanish and American government had agreed for reasons of solidarity and differences in artistic sensitivity of the inhabitants of both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to proceed to transfer the Patio of the Lions in the Alhambra to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, of course after the compensation of a *fair fee*?

The official justifications for the need to carry out inter-basin water transfers are usually plagiarised from other projects, extremely deficient and plagued by contradictions, omissions and technical errors (Castillo 2001, 2002).

Perhaps the most important errors that are not innocent are *there is a zone where a water **surplus** is stated and another that suffers from a water **deficit** and if the planned transfer works are carried out the situation of the receiving zone will be **definitively** solved.*

My over 35 years of research experience in water politics in Spain, but also in other European, South American and African countries has taught me that innocent mistakes are not normally made, above all, by high-standing professionals with extensive experience, such as engineers and heads of planning in Spanish hydrographical confederations and their peers in other countries who have probably obtained master's degrees from renowned universities in the USA.

It is clear that the irrationality of the application of traditional water policy transferred to the current socio-political and climatic context finds its accomplice in needs that require short term satisfaction. In effect, in the face of a situation in which the quantity of water is inferior to the appetites communicated by users, traditional *hydropolitics* has responded with the construction of urgent works, reservoirs, transfers, etc. that will not provide a definitive solution to, rather amplify and prolong the problem, due to the consolidation and even creation of expectations of new uses.

In other words, if the intensity of the *last drought* is not the first time it has occurred amongst us and if, despite the enormous number of reservoirs and water transfers constructed in recent decades the repercussions and social perception thereof have been greater than no other occasions, is it not the developed *hydropolitics* that have been erroneous or, at the very least, insufficient...?

The mere use of the term *guaranteeing supply*, which is normally included in the justification of many hydraulic works, unintentionally reveals that the works were not and are not necessary and neither of course was there an urgent problem to solve. In many cases the hydraulic works are not normally carried out for example, as would correspond to situations of emergency, because the authorities in question foresee that the situation of scarce rainfall in the previous winter is going to mean that in the following summer people are not going to have enough water to satisfy basic domestic needs. It is obviously not about this, given that on those occasions when a works have not been constructed the population has not been subject to misfortune or irreparable disastrous events (Castillo 2013).

Furthermore, periods of scarce rainfall, considerable rainfall, powerful storms, etc. is the natural sequence of Mediterranean Europe and *domesticating* nature would imply an extremely high monetary cost as well as diverse natural catastrophic consequences, which the large majority of educated citizens and non-experts are not prepared to admit.

Errors in water accounts, in the event these instruments exist, which provide the basis for the official diagnosis of the water situation are not innocent, while they justify the irrational measures of *hydropolitics*, from the perspective of collective social wellbeing, which, in contrast, are beneficial for their instigators. Moreover, the latter avoid having to face the likely social response that would result from general knowledge of the social consequences of current *hydropolitics*.

In addition, with the researchers and public managers partially unshackled from the urgency of the short term, id a more appropriate atmosphere to freely, in the case of the former, express the results of our research and, in the case of the latter, adopt the policies and take the economically and socially rational measures in water related matters, although in many cases they will not be understood nor, as a result, applauded by wide sections of the population.

It must be taken into account that it will always be more popular, in other words, translated into the language of politics, it will provide more votes, above all those of farmers, for example to build hydraulic works (reservoirs, water transfers, etc.) and appear in the media in the inauguration act than, for example, to raise the price of water to farmers, sanction illegal irrigation or unauthorised dumping, or cut or reduce the water supply to inhabitants of a town at certain times, etc.

In short, the historical evolution of precipitation in Mediterranean European countries reveals the reality of a sequence of seasons with scarce rainfall followed by others that show torrential characteristics with this regime, furthermore, inserted into irregular pluriannual cycles.

For this reason, the construction of costly works both from the monetary and ecological perspective does not justify the fact that every time there is a season or period of low rainfall other additional works should be carried out with the aim of reducing the effects thereof. Amongst other reasons, because there would be a need for a constant building of numerous works throughout the entire region and when they became operational the most likely situation is that the precipitation conditions that justified them would have changed.

In brief, the true general interest demands the implementation of planning for the supply of water and its long term use in which, fortunately, European legislation places the quality of continental water and associated ecosystems in a preferential position.

The articulation of the study and monitoring of the last 50 years of *hydropolitics* developed in the Iberian Peninsula and other Mediterranean regions reveals that, in general, far from providing a definitive solution to the problems that they admittedly attempted to confront and that justified it, water transfers create false expectations, generate and incite social and environmental conflicts, encourage wastage of hydraulic resources and, in short, intensify and perpetuate difficulties.

In second place they create or exacerbate social conflicts for very long periods of time between those zones that transfer and those that receive water, pitting the populations of different places against each other, along with those institutions that find themselves immersed in extremely costly legal proceedings, even those on the same political or ideological sides.

The transfers of continental waters in the Iberian Peninsula are nothing new. The late Middle Ages saw the transfer of the Villena Lagoon (Villena, Alicante) to the Huerta de Elche (Elche, Alicante).

However, the first large works to transfer water from other basins came about in the 16th century with the Huescar Channel, in the Guadalquivir basin, where the Castril and Guardal rivers meet, to carry the waters to the River Almanzora basin, and thus irrigate the fields of Lorca and supply the arsenal in Cartagena (Castillo 2013).

There have, subsequently, been a high number of plans for water transfers of which some have entered into service and others have not, but a large proportion of them have been aimed at regions in the Mediterranean, particularly in the south eastern peninsular.

A) THE EBRO-MURCIA-ALMERIA WATER TRANSFER

In recent periods, save for the 1993 National Hydrological Plan of Spain, which designed a fantasy *homeland* of remote controls, satellites, pipelines, elevating stations, canals, tunnels and siphons crossing the geography of the Iberian Peninsula with the acknowledged plan of achieving a perfect *national water balance*, which fortunately was not applied, the 2000 National Hydrological Plan (Castillo 2001, 2002) contemplated the transfer of the Ebro from Tortosa (Tarragona) to Almería, 845 Km long and which would distribute 1,050 hm^3 along the Mediterranean coast.

This project received 96,000 allegations from individuals, ecologist collectives, and large unions. Of the 83 reports requested by the Government from experts, only one was not against this transfer.

The National Water Council passed the draft bill despite the votes of all of the scientists against it but, finally, the project was approved by the Congress of Deputies (Parliament) on 31/04/2001 and by the Senate on 20/06/2001; furthermore, despite lacking social consensus, being full of scientific and technical errors, lacking a water administration in accordance with the new necessities of water politics and the European Water Framework Directive, was definitively financially unfeasible due to the corresponding European funds being unavailable. But the biggest error was, in reality, that there was merely a technical project for a water transfer rather than the constitution of a true National Hydrological Plan.

Paradoxically, this water transfer project, which was not carried out, brought about the social mobilisations against it and the large number of documents drawn up by scientists from Spain and other European countries, who collaborated in creating a *New Water Culture* in the Spanish Mediterranean and, from this point, nothing has been the same between us in matters relating to water, above all in the intellectual plane but also to a lesser extent in practice.

The number of studies, books, scientific articles etc. that were created in relation to this transfer was immense. In fact, although solid research and dissemination works have been published since then, in reality the aforementioned studies comprised the intellectual foundation in regards to matters of Economics and Public Management which today is known in the south of Europe as the New Water Culture.

Finally, the Plenary Session of the Congress of Deputies passed the Draft Bill to Modify the law on the National Hydrological Plan (PHN) of 2001, and the repealing of the Ebro to Almería water transfer, with 188 votes in favour, 135 against from the PP and three abstentions.

The concept of general interest relating to a large hydraulic works such as the Ebro-Almería water transfer project was difficult to maintain when the same political persuasions in the regional governments paradoxically held contrary positions, be they in the transferring or receiving region. In this specific case, the regional authorities of Aragón (PSOE) and Murcia (PSOE) held opposing stances in regards to the convenience of constructing the water transfer.

In summary, this is the case of a transfer that in the face of the expectations of the arrival of new quantities of water to the peninsular south east, it brought with it expectations of business and corresponding investment and the exploitation of new irrigation that, had the transfer been built, it would not have been possible to satisfy; that is, the supposed water deficit of the peninsular south east shot up without it even having entered into service, causing with its mere announcement more problems than those it supposedly attempted to solve.

B) THE TAJO SEGURA WATER TRANSFER

The Tajo-Segura water transfer is one of the hydraulic works to most capture the attention of water academics in the Iberian Peninsula, linking the Tajo and Segura river basins via a 292 km long canal. It commences next to the Bolarque reservoir, located between the provinces of Cuenca and Guadalajara, and ends following a number of phases and infrastructures in the Azud de Ojós reservoir in the province of Murcia.

It irrigates land in Alicante, Murcia and Almería, and the supervision of the exploitation regime of this water transfer is undertaken by the Central Commission for the Exploitation of the Tajo-Segura Aqueduct.

The works began in 1969 but the waters did not reach the River Segura until ten years later due to the complexity of the route, the numerous facilities required, errors in the design and execution, landslides and other unforeseen circumstances, etc. which, furthermore, meant that the initial budget for the works, 13.6 billion pesetas (approx. 82 million euros) tripled in size.

The predicted quantity of water to be transferred was 1,000 hm^3 annually whereas the true quantity of water transferred stands at 263 hm^3 annually; as a result, once more, far from solving the initial irrigation deficit in Murcia, it has increased it.

The new Tajo Hydrological Plan, 2022-2027 (BOE 2023), supported by over five Supreme Court judgments relating to ecological flows, would suppose a serious reduction in the water transferred by these works. In particular, via its passing through Aranjuez (Madrid) the ecological flow goes from the current six to seven cubic metres per second from 1 January 2023 to eight from 2026 and rises to 8.65 in 2027.

It goes without saying that tensions between the people and institutions of the transferring and receiving zone, both private entities and irrigator organisations and the regional administrations themselves, have risen.

However, allow me to make the following observation, with scientific support, that reveals a devastating corollary for traditional *hydropolitics*: If in the ten years that the project of this water transfer lasted the requirements of the users were reduced to half, it is possible that a moratorium on the construction of many of the planned hydraulic works would have reduced the urgent needs of water to the same extent.

The voraciousness of the plastic-covered irrigation in Murcia and Almeria enjoy great private profitability, to which they would need a practically infinite quantity of water; moreover, every time a water transfer is made or new contributions of water are made to these regions, there is a rise in profit expectations and as a result, new appetites for water.

Mention has already been made of the currently paralyzed Ebro-Almeria water transfer, the current, conflictive and recently reduced Tajo-Segura transfer, and the River Castril to Baza-Almería transfer and presently under construction is the Negraín-Almanzora transfer, all with significant social opposition, whereas in contrast there is a clamour for transfers from Rules-Almería and Minas de Alquife-Almería, The latter three transfers originating in the province of Granada.

C) THE FRAUD OF URGENT WORKS - THE RIVER CASTRIL TRANSFER[1]

One of the most used frauds to carry out large hydraulic works, thus avoiding the large majority of the environmental type controls is the so-called urgent proceedings, the use of which is justified to provide an *urgent solution to the water supply problem.*

The construction work for the River Castril Baza and Almería water transfer was projected in the year 2008 as *emergency works*. In any case, the dry phase of the last cycle ended. It was followed by four years considered even by the Administration as extremely wet, with the winter of 2012 and spring of 2013 seeing the most rainfall in the last 34 hydrological years. Put another way, if there was no longer really any urgency in 2008 to carry out the River Castril water transfer, today it would constitute a true public abomination.

[1]I have had the opportunity to act as a legal expert presenting numerous reports for various legal proceedings which have for the time being paralysed these works, the links of which I have included for further information.

A) WRITTEN AT REQUEST OF CASTRIL DE LA PEÑA COUNCIL.

https://altiplanogranada.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/ESTUDIO-Elementos-razonamientos-ecologicos-economicos-sociales-obras-ri%CC%81o-Castril.pdf

https://altiplanogranada.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/ESTUDIO-Reserva-embalse-del-Portillo

The construction of the River Castril to Baza and Almería water transfer was projected in 2008 as urgent works. In 2023 these works have still not been carried out.

B) WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF CORTES DE BAZA COUNCIL.

- "The Unsustainable Economics of the River Castril".
- The River Castril Water Transfer and the Water Politics of the Northern Zone of the Province of Granada. Document created for the European Union Parliament. 8 pages.
- Construction of Supply Flow to Baza from the Portillo Reservoir (The River Castril Water Transfer) (General draft document of the problem) 314 pages, 16 graphics, 12 figures and 9 tables.
- Monetary assessment of the different damages that will be occasioned in the River Castril valley as a result of the completion of the Project for the Transfer of Water from the Portillo Reservoir to Baza. 12 pages. 8 pages.
- Report on the problem of the River Castril for the lawyer José Jiménez Gasquet, with the purpose of studying and, where appropriate, taking the necessary legal action to paralyse it and, where necessary, prohibit the carrying out of emergency works approved by the Cabinet on 15/12/06. 7 pages.
- Summary Report on the State of the Matter of the River Castril Transfer for the newspaper El Mundo (Mr Cano). 8 pages.
- Study on the Environmental Impact of the Project for the Supply Flow to Baza from the Portillo Reservoir (River Castril Water Transfer) (Summary document). Document written for presentation before the National High Court. 87 pages, 12 figures, 3 graphics and 7 tables.
- Comments on the Technical-environmental report on the request for a precautionary measure for the suspension or paralysing of the emergency works to supply Baza. Document written for presentation before the National High Court. 17 pages.
- The River Castril Water Transfer (summary document). Is the River Castril water transfer urgent? Document created for presentation before Administrative Court No. 4 of Granade.

There is no evidence to suggest that the streets of Baza and Almería are the scene of public demonstrations demanding water for their basic needs, or that the economic activities in these towns have suffered a crash that has led to mass emigrations of the population. In summary, to catalogue these works as urgent was highly inappropriate, and did not in any way correspond to the general interest of the population.

The footnote attached contains a list of the large proportion of these studies and even two of the most important have a reading link available.

Amongst others, *Is the River Castril water transfer urgent?* describes the fallacy of the cataloguing of these hydraulic works as an emergency because, in reality, no decisive need exists for their execution; rather, the promoters are solely attempting to evade the environmental controls and other regulations that demand compliance from these types of construction.

"The Hydrological Plan for the Guadalquivir and the Portillo Reservoir Reserve for Supplying Baza, Caniles and Freila" reveals the deceit of the official diagnosis that justifies the water transfer, followed by the falsehood of the apparent objectivity of the project: There is an attempt to justify the works with a false need for water for the urban supply to the town of Baza, when it does not exist, and in reality the destination of the transfer would be the lands and greenhouses of Almería.

D) THE MINAS DE ALQUIFE-ALMERIA WATER TRANSFER

The former Minas de Alquife were an open cast iron ore mining exploitation, and there is currently a project funded by foreign capital to reopen the mines, which lie over an aquifer, to which in order to extract the iron ore it is necessary to proceed to permanently extract large quantities of water (Figure 3) that, of course, have candidates in Almería via a transfer.

Figure 3. *The Promised Minas De Alquife-Almeria Water Transfer*

Source: own creation.

I also have the opportunity of appearing in the corresponding legal proceedings against the water transfer, providing an expert legal report, which is available for reference (Castillo 2023).

Virtual Water Exports

The previous diagnosis was summarized in that the water deficiencies suffered by Mediterranean European countries in the recent past have mainly been due to developed economic models, which lack planning.

These models have been based on production specializing in economic activities that consume large quantities of water when, paradoxically, due to the natural conditions of these regions, which on the whole have less runoff and lower rainfall, the availability of this resource is lower than in their Northern European equivalents.

This nonsense means that water in Mediterranean Europe, being a strategic factor for its economy, has a greater relative scarcity that represents a limiting factor for its development and reveals, ultimately, the economic and environmental unsustainability of its management model.

Regardless, a recently initiated line of research comes to confirm the previous diagnosis but, most importantly, it opens new channels for cushioning the aforementioned difficulties, different of course to the traditional politics of supply, so costly in monetary and environmental terms; rather, they constitute a new perspective that was previously scarcely explored for the politics of demand. It involves the study of the business of the virtual water of countries and regions.

Virtual water is the quantity of this resource used to create a specific product (Table 3). It is attributed mainly to John Anthony Allan (1937-2021) (Allan 1997), a British geographer who was awarded the Stockholm Water Prize in 2008 for his scientific contribution of the concept of virtual water, as it seems he was the first to create and articulate it.

Table 3. *Virtual Water Content of Selected Products (m^3/Tm)*

Product	USA	India	Brazil	Mexico	Italy	Netherlands	Global average
Milk	695	1,369	1,001	2,382	861	641	990
Maize	489	1,937	1,18	1,744	530	408	909
Sugar cane	103	159	155	171			175
Coffee (roasted)	5,79	14,5		33,475			20,682
Coffee (green)	4,864	12,18		28,119			17,373
Leather (bovine)	14,19	17,71	18,222	40,482	22,724	12,572	16,656
Beef	13,193	16,482		37,762	21,167	11,681	15,497
Tea (made)		7,002					9,205
Cotton lint	5,733	18,694	6,281	4,812			8,242
Sheep meat	5,977	6,692		16,878	7,572	5,298	6,143
Cheese	3,457	6,793	4,969	11,805	4,278	3,19	4,914
Pork	3,946	4,397		6,559	6,377	3,79	4,856
Milk powder	3,234	6,368	4,654	11,077	4,005	2,982	4,602
Millet	2,143	3,269		4,534			4,596
Goat meat	3,082	5,187		10,252	4,18	2,791	4,043
Chicken meat	2,389	7,736		5,013	2,198	2,222	3,918
Cotton seed	2,535	8,264	2,777	2,127			3,644
Rice (broken)	1,903	4,254	4,6	3,257	2,506		3,419
Eggs	1,51	7,531		4,277	1,389	1,404	3,34
Rice (husked)	1,656	3,702	4,003	2,834	2,18		2,975
Sorghum	782	4,053		1,212	582		2,853

Coconuts		2,255		1,954			2,545
Rice	1,275	2,85	3,082	2,182	1,679		2,291
Soybeans	1,869	4,124	1,076	3,177	1,506		1,789
Barley	702	1,966	1,373	2,12	1,822	718	1,388
Wheat	849	1,654	1,616	1,066	2,421	619	1,334
Rice	1,275	2,85	3,082	2,182	1,679		2,291
Rice (husked)	1,656	3,702	4,003	2,834	2,18		2,975
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Sorghum	782	4,053		1,212	582		2,853
Coconuts		2,255		1,954			2,545
Millet	2,143	3,269		4,534			4,596
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Tea (made)		7,002					9,205
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Pork	3,946	4,397		6,559	6,377	3,79	4,856
Goat meat	3,082	5,187		10,252	4,18	2,791	4,043
Sheep meat	5,977	6,692		16,878	7,572	5,298	6,143
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Cheese	3,457	6,793	4,969	11,805	4,278	3,19	4,914
Leather (bovine)	14,19	17,71	18,222	40,482	22,724	12,572	16,656

Source: Allan 1997.

But in reality the first time this study perspective was disclosed in Spain thanks to Manuel Ramón Llamas Madurga, Senior Lecturer in Geology and academic member of the Royal Academy of Exact, Physical and Natural Sciences and the Royal Academy of Doctors of Spain.

Ramón Llamas made the Inaugural Speech of the academic year on 2 November 2005 on the topic *The colours of water, virtual water and hydraulic conflicts* (Llamas Madurga 2005). Professor Llamas estimated the quantities of water needed to produce specific quantities of agricultural, livestock and industrial products in Spain. Compare in the Table 4, for example, that to produce a slice of bread you need 40 litres of water, whereas one kg of beef consumes 15,000 litres.

Table 4. *Virtual Water in Selected Products in Andalusia*

QUANTITIES OF WATER USED IN THE PRODUCTION OF SELECTED PRODUCTS (litres)	
Bottle of beer (250ml)	75
Glass of milk (200ml)	200
Slice of bread (30gr)	40
Cotton t-shirt (500gr)	4100
Sheet of A4 paper	10
Hamburger (150gr)	2400
Pair of cow leather shoes	8000
Beef (1kg)	15000
Sheep meat (1kg)	1000
Chicken meat (1kg)	6000
Cereal (1kg)	15000
Palm oil (1kg)	2000
Citrus fruits (1kg)	1000

Source: Llamas Madurga (2005) and own creation.

It is easily deducible that there is a constant production of (virtual) water transfers from the exporting regions and countries to the importers of selected products and the logical correlation of this approach is, of course, that from this perspective those countries and regions with greater relative scarcity of water resources are interested in specialising in the production and exportation of goods that require reduced water consumption and, in contrast, in importing those products whose input requires large quantities of water.

Therefore, without taking other conditioning factors or objectives into consideration, a highly influential instrument for reducing the incorrectly named water deficit is to resort to the balance of virtual water imports and exports in a specific zone.

Table 5. *Virtual Water Imports and Exports via Selected Agricultural Products (Millions m^3)*

Product	Imported virtual water	Exported virtual water	Net virtual water
Cereal	1,960,370	2,905,434	905,064
Herbaceous	68,069	730,705	662,646
Fruits and citrus	80,151	32,207	47,994
Olive and vineyard	8,217	454	7,763
Potatoes and Veget	105,862	15,082	90,780

Source: Navarro and Madrid (2007), Madrid and Velazquez (2008), Velazquez (2008) and own creation.

If the average imports and exports of a number of agricultural products are analyzed it can be concluded that in Andalusia (Table 5) large quantities of water are being used for crop growing and subsequent sale outside the region of products that produce low economic returns but, above all, are large consumers of water. Therefore, large water savings could be obtained reducing exports of such products, where improvement in efficiency implies costs in regards to facilities that are probably intolerable for these productions.

In a first approximation, in the agricultural sector considerable costs could be favoured as regards water consumption in Andalusia by reducing, in this order, exports of wheat, peas, rice and some fruits, mainly those with low water use efficiency.

If "*There Were Few Of Us* Now…..": Climate Change

If a large number of the concepts used by traditional *hydropolitics*, indicated above, such as *excess water, water deficit, we'll definitively solve the problem with works, dry Spain and wet Spain, throwing water into the sea* etc. lack scientific rigour, these deficiencies are spurred on in the presence of the climate change that will be more evident in the zones of the Mediterranean regions (IPPC 2021, WWF 2023).

In fact, the two most important economic activities in the regions of the Mediterranean Sea, tourism and agriculture, will have to undergo substantial changes.

In the case of tourism, the pleasant temperatures that are today one of the main attractions will, following their predicted increase, begin to stop being so.

For their part, the increase in temperatures, greater water needs for plants and livestock, scarcer and torrential rainfall, that is, there are changes in the climatic conditions, water availability and needs for the plantations to which the majority of the hydraulic works carried out previously, without a cost-benefit analysis in social terms, are today clearly useless.

The last report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted a reduction in water provision in the Mediterranean basin by 2050 of between 4% and 8%, a risk that will be inevitable.

Therefore, in countries with Mediterranean climates, which include Spain, will be one of the agricultural zones of continental Europe most vulnerable to climate change: the reduction of rainfall, the increase in the intensity of droughts and heatwaves, the scarcity but torrential nature of rainfall, the low flow of rivers, etc. shall affect irrigation crops extremely negatively.

In short, agricultural productivity in the Mediterranean region could fall by 17% by the year 2050 due to climate change if a high level of CO_2 levels is maintained, and take into account that south east Spain is currently the main supplier of vegetables and pulses to the greater part of central and northern Europe (IPCC 2021).

Conclusions: The New Water Culture from the South or *Let the Water You Cannot Drink Flow by*

The majority of the numerous opinion surveys undertaken destined towards discovering the attitudes of southern Europeans reveal that an increasing percentage of the population is concerned about environmental problems and that there is at present a high level of awareness, which could result in greater monetary sacrifices, of course, with the opportune guarantees, but in reality the institutional changes that facilitate the transfer of attitudes to practical behaviours have not yet taken place.

Partial or insufficient measures can only serve to justify the appearance of an extremely recent and assigned ecologist vocation in a number of national and regional administrations, when it is not simply to formally comply with demands from other institutions but, in reality, will only collaborate in wasting the capital that supposes the real and positive social attitude in this regard.

The new Administration must be equipped with sufficient and appropriate legal, technical and human means to achieve the new general interest. In this case, in order for credibility to be given to the legislative changes that have occurred and others that are announced and the financial implications thereof. Otherwise, in all likelihood once again the goal will have been sacrificed due to the absence of means.

It must be strongly demanded of public powers that the real water needs of the population be harmonised with its conservation and that of the associated ecosystems (rivers, lakes, wetlands, etc.), seriously deteriorated by the lack of government that has presided over traditional *hydropolitics*. Not forgetting, of course, that the fact that the economic function now carried out by water is highly important, it and other natural resources form the basis of life and, paradoxically, also the basis of the financial system, whose future has been seriously affected by the deterioration caused to the former. In other words, if for some people the ethical and aesthetic arguments, among others, are insufficient to convince them of the need to conserve and improve the quality of natural resources, it is likely that the unsustainability of the economic profit of this development model will.

Particularly, from the Administration, there is an attempt by economic interest groups and other subjects with media impact to provide a semantic solution, rather mask, the manifested conflict between conventional growth and quality of natural water resources, simply through the use of expressions such as sustainable and solid growth and development, etc., with which the appearance is given of restoring social harmony and, therefore, everyone is satisfied, but in reality the main conflict is avoided, such are the limits of growth, above all those associated with the current economic model.

The inclusion of environmental factors such as water in social analyses means that the terms sustainable, solid, applied to growth, development etc. remain theoretical. This is because either it means true progress, that is, human and not just private business improvements, or reveals that we are not moving in quicksand or, in this case, in dry and polluted rivers, aquifers, lakes and wetlands.

The traditional *hydropolitics* developed in the large majority of the European countries that border the Mediterranean Sea is supported by a mistaken diagnosis and a series of correlative conceptual falsehoods used by the administration and even by the people who protect it.

But these errors are not innocent. It logically corresponds that is necessary to build a hydraulic works, with which for the moment the social discontent diminishes but in reality it will not solve the problem, rather surely make it bigger, for it is not explained who is going to pay for this construction and the only thing for sure is that the politician who is promoting the works and the construction company will profit in the short term. *Will the last one to leave please turn out the light and lock the door.*

In the majority of the countries in the Mediterranean there are no economic and social water accounts, despite constituting the main production factor for all economies and, above all, being an essential element for life.

The absence of a price of water that reflects on the one hand production costs (supply) and on the other the availability upon payment by users (demand) makes it difficult to manage the concept of water economic scarcity, but not physical scarcity because in reality everything is limited.

The prices effectively paid by domestic water users, with small subsidies in some countries, approximately reflect the public cost of supply, but this is not the case for the prices paid by farmers who enjoy in some cases subsidies close to 90% of supply costs. There is thus in this way a regressive effect due to the transfers of income between the majority of citizens and powerful landowners.

Inland, the lack of a realistic price of water is the reason for its inefficient usage and even the mere existence of crops that are not socially profitable.

The pollution of continental water due to urban uses increases the problem of water scarcity as it does not provide the qualities necessary for different uses and, furthermore, causes enormous ecological problems in the Mediterranean, above all due to plastic, as it is a sea that is practically enclosed.

Water transfers are some of the most controversial hydraulic works, being the cause of important and prolonged social conflicts. The construction of these works is normally based on erroneous diagnoses such as being *urgent* because the situation is critical, there is a zone where there is a water surplus and another where there is a deficit, and if the transfer is built and finished the problem will be definitively solved.

The virtual water approach reveals a permanent (virtual) water transfer from exporting regions and countries to importers of goods. Therefore, when planning water policy this circumstance must be taken into account and attention be drawn to the incoherence of certain *dry* regions claiming quantities of surface water arguing the existence of a *deficit* to then export products created with the water in question that generally lack added value.

The European countries with Mediterranean climates will comprise the agricultural zones of continental Europe that are most vulnerable to climate change: the transfer of the population from the north to the south, the reduction of precipitation, the increase in the intensity of droughts, the scarcity but torrential nature of rainfall, the reduction of river flow, etc. will have a very negative affect on irrigation crops in favour of regions in the north that previously had colder climates.

To summarise, *let the water you cannot drink flow by*.

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On Growth and Democracy

By Mehmet Cevat Yıldırım[*]

This paper examines the impact of economic growth on democracy. It argues that modern democracies and the capitalist economy are not compatible and that this is due to their dependence on growth. Following degrowth theory, it focuses on three dimensions of growth: First, the relationship between ecological damage and democracy is addressed. Second, it examines growth-related inequalities and their impact on democracy. Thirdly, the weakening of the social ties necessary for democratic deliberation due to growth. This will be followed by a fourth title on the critique of degrowth theory. In short, it will be argued that growth causes and/or exacerbates ecological damage and inequalities and weakens social ties. All these three factors have an impact on the deterioration of modern democracy.

Keywords: *growth, degrowth, democracy*

Introduction

On the 1st November 2011, George Papandreou, then prime minister of Greece announced his proposal to put the European bailout program with austerity measures on referendum. European leaders reacted severely to this proposal that "many could scarcely believe their ears". As a response to Angela Merkel's "ultimatum", Papandreou said "Let the people speak" and called the referendum "a supreme act of democracy". While Nicolas Sarkozy qualified the referendum attempt as an "error", Greek opposition preferred to call it "absolutely insane" (The Guardian 2011). Consequently, the referendum has not been put into practice and Greek people could not vote on an economic program that directly affected their lives.

Yet, in many countries, including Greece, fiscal issues cannot be put into referendum. But, even after many years, one needs to ask how an act of democracy could become so inconceivable. Would the reactions be the same if the proposed referendum was on another issue, or do the economic and fiscal issues have a particular immunity against democracy? In that case, this experience shows an obvious divergence between the ways of democracy and economic policies. The reactions to Papandreou's referendum attempt were only an example of confrontations between the needs of capitalism and democracy among many others... One can remember just simultaneous uprisings following the 2008 global financial crisis in Spain, in the US, in Brazil, in Thailand, and in many other countries… People wanted to make their voices heard all around the world, particularly on economic issues. But austerity measures were still implemented. Even though political science taught us that capitalism and democracy are going

[*]Associate Professor, Gaziantep University, Turkey.

hand in hand; the evidence does not confirm it. The people's opinion is not asked on the economy if it is intended to say "no".

Constitutional obstacles against referendums on some subjects, such as minority rights aim to protect basic rights for everyone. However, this does not explain the immunity of economic policy issues against referendums.

This study aims to find out how and why the ways of democracy and capitalism are not in the same direction and it will argue that the "growth" dependency of capitalism is responsible for this. It is well known that capitalism and modern democracy are both rooted in liberal ideology; therefore, they can be seen as brothers. Before becoming opponents, in the good old days, two brothers were living together in peace in the family house. This house was the writings at the dawn of the liberal ideology.

John Locke puts the basis of both modern liberal democracies and liberal capitalist economies in his work dated back to 1690 (Locke 1690). In his famous metaphor on the state of nature; Locke gives Adam the liberty to realize his potential to obtain prosperity and organizes the political structure in a way that guarantees economic liberty. In the following decades and centuries, on the one hand, a liberal economy was developed by the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, on the other hand, liberal democracy became widespread in the Western world following the age of revolutions. However, in its initial state, modern democracy was far from being inclusive for all. Firstly, Eve was overlooked in Locke's metaphor. She gained her political rights much later, thanks to the feminist movement[2]. However, in the beginning, women's right to vote was accorded only with a restriction of wealth threshold. This was an early example of the limitation of modern democracy in favor of a liberal capitalist economy. This oversight was not a coincidence: There was a tie between economic activity and the right to political power in modern liberal democracies from the beginning. Another example was that workers also have been overlooked; they gained their political rights only after the socialist movement's rise in the mid-19th century. Neither, the expansion of the right to vote did remedy the weaknesses of modern democracy. As said Winston Churchill a long time ago, democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried.[3] Still, there is a huge gap between today's democracies and an ideal democracy.[4] Certes, given that

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[2]This does not mean that the feminist movement should be seen as opposed to liberalism. Instead, two of its forerunners were Harriet Taylor Mill and her husband, liberal thinker John Stuart Mill in the 19th century.

[3]For a similar conclusion, see Papanikos (2022a).

[4]Papanikos cites five criteria for an ideal democracy in Papanikos (2022b). These five criteria (i.e., isogeria, isonomy, isocracy, isoteleia, and isopoliteia) can be seen as a perfect checklist for measuring the differences between modern democracies and an ideal democracy. In this work, Papanikos's five criteria will be further referred to. Papanikos's list overlaps mostly with the five categories of the Economist's Democracy Index (EDI). EDI's categories are electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. See The Economist (2022, p. 3).

In an earlier work, Papanikos cites four criteria, with the lack of isopoliteia. See Papanikos (2017). Papanikos pursues this subject in Papanikos (2021).

there is no example of a "perfect" democracy, this gap cannot be measured in quantity. Although, a qualitative evaluation can be made.

Capitalism and modern liberal democracies were not getting on with each other in their early days. As far as the two brothers were grown, they fell out with each other even more. Literally, the main problem between them was "growth". More accurately, it is the dependency on economic growth that lies at the heart of capitalism. From the very beginning, tangible outcomes of economic growth, if not restricted, were destined to undermine the basic political and social conditions for democracy.

The "degrowth" theories put growth in question with all of its aspects. Degrowth theorists focus their critics of growth on three pillars: Ecological damages of the growth, inequalities that it causes, and its role in weakening social ties (Bonaiuti 2012). All of these three aspects have also a negative impact on today's democracies. In the following titles, we will examine the sufferings of democracy due to the growth; respectively in its ecological, inequality, and social aspects. A fourth title on the critique of the degrowth theories will follow.

Ecological Damage

On November 26th, 2016, people living near Lake Oahe, US gathered to protest against the Dakota Access Pipeline project which would prevent their access to water. Following a brutal police intervention, many protesters were severely injured, yet the events were represented in media as a "riot" (The Guardian 2016). The company nonetheless decided to implement the project without any change. The decision to seize the natural water source and to make it a commodity was not taken based on democratic deliberation with the participation of local people. However, according to Papanikos one condition of democracy should be *isegoria*; the right to speak for everyone before the political organ and equipped with the right to vote. This criterion is not satisfied here. When the economy needs to grow, it has to find an external resource and to this end, nature often is seen as a free commodity, and *isegoria* is ignored. Maybe, one should not expect all the people to be able to speak in the parliament, but if we consider *isegoria* in broad terms; all these people should have a way to express their will. The fact that they run the risk of being subjected to violence proves that all other ways to make them heard were closed.

Jason Hickel notes that the discovery of the American continent in the 1600s has changed the way of seeing nature, he says "This new worldview allowed capitalists to objectify nature and pull it into circuits of accumulation. But it also did something else. It allowed them to think of nature as 'external' to the economy" (Hickel 2021, p. 74). Gold and silver, soil, coal, forests, and oil have been seized for the glory of economic growth, despite the will of local people. In this process, two concepts played a pivotal role: Violence and private property. The former served as a tool particularly in the colonization experiences, beginning from the South American campaign of Spain in search for gold. The latter is used more in Europe, beginning with the Enclosure Act in Britain in 1773. This process led on the one hand making nature a commodity and depriving people of their daily earnings on the other. Both allowed capital accumulation required for growth.

In some cases, not only the will of local people is ignored but also larger parts of the society. In 2003 the US Senate voted in favor of the second Iraq war, which was seen as related to the oil sources there, despite massive public demonstrations against war all around the world. Public opposition in different countries is from time to time expressed against deforestation in Brazil or overfishing in the South Sea or harmful mining in Africa, even if they are ignored. People's voice is often muted to making decisions in favor of a couple of big company's growth ambitions. They are deprived of *isegoria*, while decision-makers are escaping from democratic deliberation. In case the people were equipped with *isegoria*, which is not impossible with the present state of communication technology, they would not be even in the need to make protestations.

The ecological cost of exploiting the nature becomes more visible each day. Air, sea, and land pollution, decrease in energy supply, and more importantly scarcity of food and water have a larger place in the agenda of the governments. Frequently, economic activities exhume natural sources to such an extent that the cost of externalities overtakes the benefits of this activity. Destructive investments of this kind cannot derive long-run profit neither because of fast exhaustion of its sources.

Inequality

The second focus of the degrowth theory is about the inequalities related to growth. However, as puts Papanikos, *isoteleia* was among the principles of Athenian democracy. This term was a kind of insurance against the influence of economic inequalities on the equalitarian nature of democratic participation. Regarding *isoteleia*, all citizens should contribute to public spending in proportionality to their wealth. Rich should give more, the poor should give less, or even take a subsidy for participating in democratic deliberation. Overaccumulation of the wealth was restricted with a particular tax in the name of *the liturgy*. This reminds one of the graduated rate income tax (or progressive tax) proposals that emerged after the 2008 global financial crisis. This proposal, which is backed by the degrowth theorists among others did not come into effect. Relative (not absolute, of course) equality should be sought including when it comes to bearing the burden of the ecological damage. Multinational corporations and northern countries which are more responsible for ecological damage owe a compensation to the rest of the world. Max Ajl mentions an “adaptation debt” of richer countries related to the impacts of the climate change on developing countries as a part of a broader “debt to Mother Earth” (Ajl 2021, p. 40). This was proposed by the Bolivian parliament in 2010, but not adopted by the international community.

Being deprived of mechanisms to prevent it, today's societies suffer from enormous economic inequalities.[5] The yearly income of the richest only one percent of the world population exceeds the budgets of many states, including the richest ones. The CEO's salary of the world's largest fast food chain is 1.200 times more than its workers.

One may expect growth to remedy these inequalities by empowering the middle class. Yet, the growth is far from helping overcome these inequalities. As Schumpeter observed already in 1942, an average of 2.7 percent of yearly growth calculated for 50 years did not have a recovering impact on income inequalities nor purchasing power, neither this can be expected for the next 50 years (Schumpeter 1984). He notes also that the big success of the bourgeoisie lies in obtaining the legal context required to sustain growth and inequalities by influencing political mechanisms (Schumpeter 1984, p. 65). Having seen the years ahead of Schumpeter, we can say that inequalities became much worse.[6] Economic inequalities affect also political inequalities. The case of China can be given as an example that growth and democracy are not going hand in hand: China's economy saw an outstanding average growth rate of 6.78[7] percent between 2010-2023, but its average democracy index score for the same period was very weak; only 2,82[8], and it ranks within authoritarian regimes.

In old times when Locke, Smith, and Ricardo defended the right of free entrance to the market, production was organized on relatively small scales. But in the present day, Locke's Adam could hardly start a new enterprise; due to higher entry costs as a result of growth. Small companies can not enjoy the benefit of the growth anymore. Instead, competing with the big ones became harder. Small ones often go bankrupt or they are bought by others. Growth serves to raise the walls around the bigger companies with an oligopolistic tendency. This tendency was bolstered in the age of colonialism, strengthened under the fordist mode of production, and spread all around the world with globalization and delocalization.

The technology gap is another factor to be added to the oligopolistic tendency. Like the inequality in capitals, the inequality in technological capacities is also hard to overcome for smaller enterprises. Big companies make a profit related to technological innovations and thus they become more capable of investing in newer technologies while others don't. We can conclude that growth is not for *all*, but it is for *some*, and the benefit of some does not always lead to the benefit for all, as in the Smithian logic. Scientists tend to explain the environmental impact of the growth using on the so-called "Environmental Kuznets Curve". This inverted U-shaped curve claims that the environmental impact of growth rises and then falls. Although the first part of the theory is based on evidence, the second half of the curve is based on wishful thinking (Stern 2018).

What wise Athenians knew is that growth-driven inequalities, if not prevented, could not remain limited only within the economic sphere. Multinational

[5]On the relation between inequality and democracy see also Parziale and Vatrella (2019).
[6]For a detailed analysis and data on the increase in inequalities, see Stiglitz (2012).
[7]Calculated based on data from Macro trends (2023).
[8]Calculated based on data from The Economist (2022, p. 16).

business groups have the opportunity to invest in lobbying activities, sometimes with big amounts, to influence political decisions. It is rare to see a political decision taken upon the democratic will of the people which is against the interests of multinational oil, technology, or finance corporations. Even in the case that the decision to be taken needs democratic public support, multinational companies have a big card to play: Media manipulation and advertorials.

Weakening Social Ties

Ivan Illich, one of the forerunners of the degrowth theory argues that an institution needs to grow to the extent that it reaches the point where the benefits falls behind its marginal costs. Major institutions emerged in the nineteenth century, transport, industry and communication among others, already reached this point in the first quarter of the twentieth century. But the need to carry on overwhelmed their *raison d'être* and they began to incite the demand for their goods and services (Illich 2009). The behavior of modern society's consumers is not defined anymore only by their physical needs but by social interaction in the search for meaning. Consumer buys something not because he/she needs it, but because it makes him/her seem richer, smarter, more good-looking, etc. Removing the physical limits of the consumption and replacing them with psychological motivations makes way for both the overconsumption and an unhappy society in a constant search of satisfaction. This way, "needs" are also produced like any other products, not in factories but in the media.

The consumption society is deprived of traditional human interactions and from old style "meaning". But it is rich in fake news, advertorials, and messages. Meaning is something that can be formed only within social relations with others, it cannot be produced in a ready-to-use form like a t-shirt. Yet, today's consumers do not have the patience to show their own "new images", because the new kind of social network asks them to catch the day. The advertorial sector (the first sector that degrowth supporters want to be abolished) requires and produces a more individualist society with fewer face-to-face interactions.[9] However, these traditional social ties are needed for the construction of a common political sphere in which democratic debate can occur. Moreover, media and advertorials are easy to be directed according to the expectations of big multinational corporations rather than the general benefit of society. Big media groups have tight relations with big capital groups (Marchetti 2020).

This is not a new phenomenon either; Papanikos argues that fake news existed also in ancient Athens and refers to Theophrastus's character spreading them. That reminds the old Greek term δημἄγωγός (demagogue) which consists of δῆμος (people) and ἄγωγός (leading, guiding).

To summarize; the need for growth urged the industry to incite its own demand and this led to a new kind of society based on consumption but unable to produce genuine democratic deliberation. As Serge Latouche another forerunner

[9]On the relation between individualism and democracy, see also Coulter and Herman (2020).

of degrowth theory notes: "Consumer democracies are dependent on growth, for without the prospect of mass consumption, the inequalities would be unbearable" (Latouche 2006).

Can Degrowth Offer a Solution?

If degrowth theory can identify "growth" as the main factor underlying the weaknesses of today's ecological, economic, and political problems, what is its proposal to solve them? Can we simply reverse the growth in the opposite direction?

Giorgos Kallis defines degrowth as "an ecological–economic perspective as a socially sustainable and equitable reduction (and eventually stabilisation) of society's throughput" and he warns that it is not simply the opposite of the growth: "Sustainable degrowth is not equivalent to negative GDP growth in a growth economy. This has its own name: recession, or if prolonged, depression" (Kallis 2011, p. 874).

Degrowth requires the downsizing of economic activities on an economic and geographical scale, and therefore "relocalization". Relocalization in social and political spheres shall accompany also this economic relocalization. At first instance, relocalization sounds fit for empowering democracy. But at this point, an important question emerges: In the presence of strong "center(s)" in terms of economic and political gathering spots of power and capacity, how will the localization begin? Will the states, multinational corporations, and international organizations begin to give up their power? How a change to this extent can be realized without the leading role of a supreme political power, clearly that of the state? How the states will be willing to shift into degrowth societies in a context where they are surrounded by many actors whose interests lie in growth? Will a "glorious" revolution urge them to build a new "modest" world, which sounds already paradoxical?

Degrowth requires also social change, as argues Latouche (2020). Once again, could a shift towards a decentralized and small lifestyle be possible without the leading role of a strong center? In the absence of the state or the multinational corporations, it would have a chance. But struggling against "grown" (or overgrown) social, economic, and political bodies without similar power does not seem to have one. Latouche emphasizes the role of the imaginary, the only card that we have.

Even the fairer political decision-making system in the imaginary of the degrowth theory is hard to reach at the local level. In the Middle Ages, the feudal lordships were small in terms of scale and their economies were fit for them; but they were far from being democratic. In a degrowth society, can be democracy ensured at least at the local level, or will we face a group of small tyrannies?

Growth is not the only one responsible for the present state of the democracy, not its change can offer the solution on its own. Today's Western democracies suffer already democracy fatigue (Appadurai 2017). Participation rates in elections reach barely fifty percent in Western countries and there is also a decline in extra-parliamentary political activity (Carrera 2022, Fruncillo 2017, Reid 2019).

Moreover, in many countries, electors tend to support authoritarian figures such as Le Pen, Orban, Erdogan, Modi, Meloni, Strache, and many others. The evidence shows that concerns about preserving wealth overcomes a democratic attitude, not only for multinational corporations but also for ordinary people.

Conclusion

This work argues that there is a strong connection between the negative outcomes of the growth and the shortcomings of modern democracy. This relation has ecological, economic, and social aspects. As puts the degrowth theory, growth causes and/or amplifies ecological damage, and inequalities and weakens social ties. All of these three factors have an impact on the deterioration of the modern democracy.

Although degrowth theory identifies the ways that growth damages democracy, it fails to propose a holistic solution. Some measures named in this work such as graduated rate income tax, abolishing the advisory sector, reducing economic output, and relocalization are remedies for the symptoms, not for the illness itself. It becomes hard to keep a realistic view when we try to go further toward a systemic change saving democracy. Maybe one of the best solutions could be embarking into a time machine and going back to 5th century BC Athens.

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Delinquent Youths Sociodemographic Characteristics: A Study of 2068 Official Data

By Ayse Ozada Nazim[*] *& Mualla Koseoglu*[±]

Juvenile delinquency is a critical social problem around the globe. As vulnerable beings, it is critical to understand the reasons behind children's involvement in crime. The aim of the present study is to determine the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of juvenile delinquents in North Cyprus. The population of this research is formed by juvenile delinquent cases which are taken from the archival records of the General Directorate of Police spanning 2008-2018 in Northern Cyprus. In this direction, 2068 official police records are examined by quantitative research methods, frequency analysis and Pearson chi-square tests were applied to the data. The findings contribute to understanding the dimensions of juvenile delinquency in the country. Northern Cyprus is not recognised as an independent republic, and compared to other European countries Cyprus still has low crime rates for both adult and juvenile offenders. We determined that most delinquent youths in the 16–17 age group, attending school and mostly involved in property crime. The highest rate of involvement in crime is in the biggest three cities in which both social and physical disorders are highly ranked, while social control is low. Identifying the factors behind juvenile delinquency is vital to contributing to social policies and psychosocial support mechanisms on this issue.

Keywords: *juvenile delinquency, official record, crime*

Introduction

Criminality is one of the main social problems in almost all countries around the world. Crime has become a more visible social problem with the modernisation that started with industrialisation and the globalisation that developed afterwards. Crime is a social but also a universal phenomenon. Acts that qualify as offenses are not the same everywhere; but everywhere and always there were people who acted in a way that brought criminal pressure on them" (Durkheim 1986). As Durkheim states, crime is diverse and can occur anywhere, in any form. Apart from individual will, crime occurs depending on many economic, social and cultural factors. This is also true for children. A child is neither inherently good nor bad. S/he is an individual who changes, develops and interacts with their environment, like every living being. It is their education and experiences that are shaped as a result of these interactions and developments that determine their drive to crime. This is an indication that the origin of juvenile delinquency is psychological and sociological.

[*]Assistant Professor, Cyprus International University, Cyprus.
[±]Researcher, UK.

Since a child is defined as an individual who has not reached full maturity in terms of mental, physical and spiritual aspects, and who is still learning about their roles and duties in society, who needs care and education (Wood et al. 2018, Hacıoğlu 1998), it is accepted that a child's ability to plan criminal acts and to reason about the consequences thereof has not yet developed. The concept of the child being dragged or pushed into crime is used (Polat 2004). Similarly, Yavuzer (2006) states that children are more likely to exhibit antisocial behaviours during childhood because they are still at the beginning of their socialisation process and cannot fully grasp social norms and moral values. It is normal for children, who cannot internalise these norms and values, to exhibit antisocial behaviours, and such behaviours gradually fade with the socialisation process.

For decades, research on juvenile delinquency has been carried out by professional fields such as criminology, sociology, psychology and social work from different points such as investigating the factors that cause juvenile delinquency, examining the rehabilitation and reintegration processes of children and realising the reintegration of children into society with support groups. In present research, we aim to eliminate the lack of data recording juvenile delinquency in Northern Cyprus and to create a profile of children driven into crime in this country, thus understanding the psychosocial factors that push children into crime.

Sociodemographic Characteristics of Juvenile Youth

Sociodemographic characteristics of juvenile youth gives a wider and more complete picture of the criminal process. A Turkish study conducted with the aim of creating a profile on children driven to commit crimes was conducted in 2016 by Fırat et al. (2016) and carried out by Adana. The prominent findings of the study are that 228 out of 258 delinquent children were boys, 20% of the children lived in a single parent family structure, 38% of them did not commit the criminal act alone and 52% of their mothers are illiterate. In addition, it is seen that the vast majority of children (45%) are pushed to commit crimes against property.

In the research conducted by the Istanbul Courthouse, the records of 668 juvenile delinquents, determine in which regions of Istanbul juvenile delinquency is most common. In this context, Fatih (27.5%), Şişli (19.3%) and Beyoğlu (15.3%) districts were determined to be the highest ranked. In this sample group, similarly to previous studies, we observed that the majority of the sample (62%) were dragged into crime against property (Gülüm et al. 2017, p. 157).

There are also many publications in the international literature on the prevalence of juvenile delinquency and the profiles of juvenile delinquents. First, the records of 210,599 delinquent children aged 12-17 residing in the United States of America (USA) between 2003 and 2014 were examined. In this study, children who used drugs and were driven to crime constituted the sample. When the findings were examined, it was revealed that there is a 49% decrease in substance use and a 34% decrease in delinquency (Grucza et al. 2017, p. 1499). As stated in the purpose and importance of the research, such periodic reviews provide important findings about how social problems are progressing; these are also effective in forming future policies. For example, in the aforementioned study, it was concluded that awareness activities surrounding children's substance use were effective and it was necessary to continue in this direction. If there is a decrease in the course of social problems, the policies implemented should be continued, and if there is a contrasting increase, the notion of the revision of existing policies or the creation of new ones can only be put forward with subsequent research.

In another study conducted in the USA in 2017, the records of children under the age of 18 who committed a sexual offence under the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice between 2007 and 2015 were examined. Records of 89,045 delinquent children, including 19,910 girls and 69,135 boys, were investigated. As a result of these examinations, information such as age distribution, ethnic origins, whether they have been in conflict with the law before, whether there is a history of violence in their families and whether the children have special needs are presented in various tables (Levenson et al. 2017, p. 321).

When the studies on juvenile delinquency in Northern Cyprus are examined, only two master theses were found. In her research, Görkem (2008) tried to determine the prevalence and causes of juvenile delinquency by examining the case files of children who lived in Northern Cyprus between 2001 and 2005 and were driven to crime. Additionally, a similar study was conducted by Paşa-Baskın (2011), examining the file records of children under the age of 18 whose cases were tried between 2000 and 2010. Although the aforementioned studies provided information on the profiles of children driven to crime in Northern Cyprus, it is seen that the date range is quite limited and is not based on any theoretical framework. In research, since the date range will be between 2008 and 2018, quite comprehensive data will be obtained.

Method

In this study, the goal was to form a profile of juvenile delinquents in Northern Cyprus in order to understand the tendencies and sociodemographic risk factors surrounding juvenile delinquency. In order to carry out this study, firstly a confirmation by the Ethics Committee of the European University of Lefke was received approving that the study is ethical. After this, official police data were received in an electronic format. Then, quantitative research methods, frequency analysis and Pearson chi-square tests were applied to the data.

Research Questions

As indicated above, sociodemographic features are important on the issue of juvenile delinquency. Thus, sex, age, nationality, occupation are such variables in this research. In context of social disorganization and social control theories, living area is also an important factor, given the relationship with disorder which is a key parameter for both theories. Therefore, the current study focuses on three research questions:

1. Is there a significant statistical relationship between the social and demographic factors proposed by the current study?
2. What is the relationship between living area and juvenile delinquency?
3. How does crime area relate to social disorganization and social control theories?

Data Collection

The population of this research is formed by juvenile delinquent cases (children’s age, sex, family structure, education, residence, nationality, criminal activity) which are taken from the archival records of the General Directorate of Police spanning 2008-2018 in Northern Cyprus. The researchers did not select any particular sample and instead received all records within the period 2008-2018. Because the written records about juvenile delinquents in Northern Cyprus start from 2008, the research is limited by this specified period. As a data collection tool, a questionnaire is formed by researchers. In this questionnaire, there are questions such as children’s sociodemographic information, economic characteristics, family structure, educational status, criminal activity and penalty received. Through this data collection tool, secondary data of juvenile delinquents were retrospectively scanned. In total, 2528 records were examined. However, 460 data sets were excluded in the study due to insufficient information.

Data Analysis

The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 22.0 was used for the statistical analyses of the data in order to form frequency tables according to age, sex, nationality, residence, occupation and education. Thereafter, Pearson chi-square tests were used in order to compare sociodemographic features with crime types.

Limitations of the Research

The main limitation of the present research is its lack of information concerning written records. While examining the records of juvenile delinquents, we realised that there was only limited information available about their families, education, penalty, addiction, prior victimisation and prior delinquency.

Another limitation is the data timespan, which began in 2008. The researchers could not obtain older data; thus the present study remains limited.

Results

According to Table 1, the majority of the sample (90.8%) was male. More than half of the sample was aged between 16-17 years old. The two largest segments of participant nationality were Turkish Cypriot (42.55%), whilst 42.5% were Turkish. The juvenile delinquents were mostly from Nicosia (34.82%), Kyrenia (22.92%) and Famagusta (22.73%), the biggest cities in Northern Cyprus. The majority of the sample (49.08%) were students, whereas 29.3% of them were unemployed.

Table 1. *Distribution of Juvenile Delinquents' Sociodemographic Information*

	n	%
Sex		
Female	189	9.14
Male	1879	90.86
Age		
13 years old and under	216	10.44
14 years old	228	11.03
15 years old	355	17.17
16 years old	593	28.68
17 years old	676	32.69
Nationality		
Turkish Cypriot	880	42.55
Turkish	879	42.50
Other	309	14.94
City		
Nicosia	720	34.82
Famagusta	470	22.73
Kyrenia	474	22.92
Morphou	199	9.62
Iskele	156	7.54
Southern Cyprus/Abroad	49	2.37
Occupation		
Unemployed	606	29.30
Employed	447	21.62
Student	1015	49.08

The major crime type (53.7%) was determined to be robbery, followed by physical assault (26.98%). The highest rate of criminal juvenile delinquency was seen in 2008 (12%). With 32.7%, Nicosia, the capital of Northern Cyprus, was the city with the highest crime rates, while Iskele is the lowest (7.79%).

Table 2. *Distribution of Juvenile Delinquents' Type of Crime, Year of Crime and Crime Area*

	n	%
Crime Type		
Robbery	1111	53.72
Assault/Physical Injury	558	26.98
Fraud	51	2.47
Sexual Assault/Rape/Sex Work	69	3.34
Insult/Intentional Harm	200	9.67
Narcotic/Gambling	79	3.82
Year of Crime		
2008	248	11.99
2009	236	11.41
2010	147	7.11
2011	202	9.77
2012	172	8.32
2013	182	8.80
2014	188	9.09
2015	212	10.25
2016	160	7.74
2017	160	7.74
2018	161	7.79
Crime Area		
Nicosia	677	32.74
Famagusta	500	24.18
Kyrenia	522	25.24
Morphou	208	10.06
Iskele	161	7.79

Figure 1. *Distribution of Crime Types According to Years*



In Figure 1, it is clear that fraud is the highest in 2008, narcotic/gambling the highest in 2013 and insult/intentional harm the highest in 2008 and 2015. The data shows sexual assault and rape to be the highest figure in 2009 and 2015. In addition, the data clearly indicates a significant decrease in incidents of fraud between 2008 and 2009.

Figure 2. *Distribution of Crime Rates According to Sex*



According to Figure 2, the male juvenile delinquents are involved in crime 2008, 2009 and 2015 at the highest level, whereas female juvenile delinquents get involved in crime 2008, 2011 and 2017 at the highest level.

Figure 3. *Distribution of Crime Rates According to Nationality*



According to Figure 3, the highest rate of Turkish Cypriot juvenile delinquents was found in 2008, whilst the highest rate of Turkish juvenile delinquents was found in 2009; the highest rate of juvenile delinquents from other nationalities was seen in 2012.

Figure 4. *Distribution of Crime Rates According to Area*



When Figure 4 is examined, it is observed that juvenile crimes rates were highest in Nicosia 2008, in Famagusta in 2011, Kyrenia in 2015, in Morphou in 2009 and in Iskele in 2008.

Table 3 illustrates Pearson chi-square test results regarding a comparison of crime types and juvenile delinquents' sociodemographic characteristics. This table determines that there is a statistically significant difference between crime types and the sex of juvenile delinquents ($p<0.05$). Male juvenile delinquents' rate of robbery is higher than their female counterparts, whereas the female juvenile delinquents' rate of physical assault is higher than their male counterparts.

A statistically significant difference is found between the age of juvenile delinquents and crime types ($p<0.05$). The rate of robbery within juvenile delinquents aged 13 or younger is higher compared to those aged 16-17 years, while the rate of physical assault is low.

We found that there is a statistically significant difference between the nationality of juvenile delinquents and crime types ($p<0.05$). The rate of robbery of Turkish juvenile delinquents is higher than Turkish Cypriot juvenile delinquents, while the rate of physical assault is low.

There is a statistically significant difference between the residence of juvenile delinquents and crime types ($p<0.05$). The rate of criminal involvement within juvenile delinquents from Iskele is the lowest. However, the rate of physical assault in Nicosia is lower than Iskele.

It is determined that there is a statistically significant difference between the occupation of juvenile delinquents and crime types ($p<0.05$). The highest rate of robbery is realised within the unemployed juvenile delinquents, whereas the rate of physical assault within students is higher than unemployed juvenile delinquents.

Table 3. *Comparison of Juvenile Delinquents' Sociodemographic Features and Crime Types*

	Rob bery	Physical Assault	Fra ud	Sexual Assault/ Rape/ Sex Work	Insult/Inte ntional Harm	Narcotics/G ambling	X^2	p
Sex Female	20.6	50.8	5.8	2.1	12.7	7.9	107.713	0.000*
Male	57.1	24.6	2.1	3.5	9.4	3.4		
Age								
13 years old and under	78.7	13.0	0.5	0.9	6.5	0.5	171.942	0.000*
14 years old	66.2	15.8	2.2	5.7	8.3	1.8		
15 years old	60.3	22.5	4.5	2.8	7.6	2.3		
16 years old	53.0	30.5	1.5	3.5	7.8	3.7		
17 years old	38.8	34.5	3.0	3.4	13.9	6.5		
Nationality	40.1	36.1	3.6	3.6	13.5	3.0	150.276	0.000*
Turkish	66.7	18.4	1.0	3.0	6.7	4.2		
Other	55.7	25.2	3.2	3.6	7.1	5.2		
City Nicosia	58.6	19.7	2.6	3.8	10.0	5.3	85.628	0.000*
Famagusta	50.6	32.3	4.3	2.1	7.7	3.0		
Kyrenia	54.2	28.3	0.6	4.0	8.4	4.4		
Morphou	55.8	25.6	3.0	2.5	11.6	1.5		
Iskele	37.2	41.0	0.6	4.5	16.0	0.6		
Southern Cyprus/Abroad	51.0	30.6	4.1	2.0	8.2	4.1		
Occupation								
Unemployed	66.5	15.5	1.2	2.3	9.9	4.6	111.655	0.000*
Employed	53.2	23.3	5.1	4.0	9.8	4.5		
Student	46.3	35.5	2.1	3.6	9.5	3.1		

**p<0.05*

Discussion and Conclusions

The present study provides information about the prevalence of juvenile delinquency and sociodemographic characteristics associated with delinquency in Northern Cyprus. As the third largest island in the Mediterranean, Cyprus is divided into north and south. North island nation population that estimated to be about 350 thousand has suffered through war and famine through the period 1963-1974, followed by political and geographical isolation (Volkan and Volkan 2020). The country is isolated from the world therefore, interventions on social problems are very limited.

The findings contribute to understanding the dimensions of juvenile delinquency in the country. In this research, arrest patterns of juveniles vary by sex, age, crime type, nationality and occupation. According to the crime data between 2008 and 2018, delinquency is a substantial problem. Worldwide, criminal behaviour is more common among boys (Vaske et al. 2011, p. 376, Agnew and Brezina 2018, Barak et al. 2018). Not surprisingly, this study also reveals that boys were more likely to be engaged in criminal behaviour than girls (90.8%). In the general census, the population aged 13-18 was estimated at 20573 (General Census TRNC 2011). There are 10055 female and 10518 male among them. The prevalence of delinquent acts is 18% among males and 2% among females; this equals a male–female risk ratio of 9.0 (18 ÷ 2%), and a risk difference between males and females of 16% (18 − 2%). This result provided insight into the gender disparity in crime. According to a research comparing 11 European countries, females have a lower delinquency rate than males (Junger-Tas et al. 2004). This can be thought of as a result of the fact that there is more control over girls in society and more effort to protect girls than boys. According to Huebner and Betts (2002), the attachment bond variables of social control theory provide such an overall protective function for females regarding delinquency and academic achievement. Several studies also imply that "males are more likely to possess lower levels of self-control than females" and "females are more likely than males to be subjected to greater levels of parental and social control" over criminality (Zavala et al. 2019, p. 66, Chappel and Johnson 2007, p. 230, Menasco 2017). At this point, the results of present study are coherent with many existing research studies.

Considering the age distribution of the delinquents in this study, the rates of those aged 16-17 comprise more than half of the total sample. The data on the relationship between age and delinquency generally suggests that delinquency is most common in middle and late adolescence (Balkaya and Ceyhan 2007, McGee and Farrington 2010, Brook et al. 2011, Hullova 2015, Roberson and Azaola 2021). One of the explanations of the attraction of young people to violent behaviour in this period is adventurism.

This study found the most common type of crime to be property crime. This result is consistent with global trends. For instance, a study conducted in Cyprus among 2385 students between 12-16-year-old found the prevalence of property crime to be higher than violent crime (Kapardis 2013). This research also identified incidences of assault/physical injury (17.5%), damage to others' property (17%), carrying a knife (8%), selling illegal drugs (5%) and stealing or attempting to steal from a shop without paying (21%). Akbaba's (2011) study in Istanbul revealed that 50.5% of the cases were property crime. Furthermore, a greater portion of all male arrests are for more serious crimes than their female counterparts (Eitle and Turner 2002). Interpreting victimisation data in the USA, property crimes are more common than violent crimes and minor crimes are more common than serious crimes (Truman and Morgan 2015). Although there is no direct information about the socio-economic status of young people in this research, it is determined that the highest rate of robbery is realised within unemployed juvenile delinquents. Many studies have also confirmed that delinquency is higher among those individuals who experience severe economic problems (Agnew et al. 2008, Bartollas and Schmalleger 2018, World Youth Report 2003).

Geographical analysis suggests that countries with more urbanised populations have higher registered crime rates than those countries with strong rural lifestyles (World Youth Report 2003). Even so, Northern Cyprus is not recognised as an independent republic, and compared to other European countries Cyprus still has low crime rates for both adult and juvenile offenders (Kaparadis 2013). In a research conducted in Slovakia, Hullova (2015) analysed the official police records of juvenile delinquents between the years of 2001-2014 and stated that from 2001 to 2004, there was a sharp increase in the number of all types of crimes among juveniles. In 2004, the highest number of crimes (in total) was recorded by the police (131,244 crimes), and since that time the crimes have been steadily decreasing. On the other hand, the total fourteen-year rate of juvenile crimes seemed to be constant, but in the analysed period of time an enormous decrease has been recorded (more than 50 %). The local minimum was recorded in 2013, i.e., 4,563 criminal cases, and a local maximum was reached in 2001, i.e., 9,806 criminal cases. From this point, rural lifestyles and low population densities can be thought of as protective factors related to delinquency. In addition, social control theorists state that if the bond between individuals and the community is strong, the individual will not turn to criminal acts (Hirschi 1969). Therefore, there are still strong social bonds in Northern Cyprus that are a protective factor for juvenile delinquency.

In this research, when the distribution of crime rates by region is examined, juveniles are involved in offences in areas with larger populations; the offences ratio changes between 32.74% in Nicosia, 25.24% in Kyrenia, 24.18% in Famagusta, 10.6% in Morphou and 7.79% in Iskele. This result supports social disorganisation theory and shows that urban conditions increase crime rates (Siegel 2010a, b). Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta are the three largest cities in Northern Cyprus where social and physical disorder factors are higher. Both social and physical disorder factors such as night clubs, casinos, drug trafficking, high crime rates, a heterogeneous population and so on exist in these cities, as support by many studies investigating the relation between delinquency and social disorganisation (Bellair 2017, Przeszlowski and Crichlow 2018, p. 568, Jones and Pridemore 2019). In consideration of the literature, the results of the present study are consistent with the characteristics of social disorganisation theory.

Annual police statistics pertaining to juveniles involved in offences show a significant decrease between 2008 and 2009 but no consistent trend over the last 9 years: 2010 (147), 2011 (202), 2012 (172), 2013 (182), 2014 (188), 2015 (212), 2016 (160), 2017 (160) and 2018 (161). It can only be said that female delinquency has sharper rises and falls over the years compared to male delinquency.

Another important variable in this study is nationality. It can be seen that foreign youths have lower rates of delinquent acts (14.94%) compared to youths who have Turkish Cypriot nationality (42.55%) and Turkish nationality (42.50%). However, there was no significant difference in the prevalence of delinquency between youths with Turkish Cypriot born parents and youths with foreign-born parents. Similarly, a study conducted in 2006 among 60,900 students in Canada determined that the prevalence of delinquent behaviour reported by foreign youths was lower than it was for their Canadian-born peers (Savoie 2007).

Juvenile delinquency is an important problem in many countries, as in Northern Cyprus. The present study aims to form a profile of juvenile delinquents in Northern Cyprus in order to understand related tendencies. It is crucial to reveal the sociodemographic features of juvenile delinquents to create social policies to tackle this issue. Besides the penalties given to children involved in a crime, educational and psychosocial support should also be provided. Unfortunately, the official records of juvenile delinquents are limited in Northern Cyprus, so the researchers do not have access to information such as family type, prior victimisation, prior criminality, ex-conviction of parents, addiction, etc. Such information may make this analysis much more effective; however, these limited results are beneficial for Northern Cyprus in order to observe the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency.

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The National Identity of Ancient and Modern Greeks

By Gregory T. Papanikos[*]

The issue of national identity in ancient Greece played an important role during periods of war due to the absence of a unifying political authority. Ancient Greece was organized along the lines of independent city-states with different political systems. However, in two wars, they were able to unite to combat a common enemy of Greece. In the Greek-Trojan War, the Greeks were the aggressors, and many Greek city-states responded to the call for joint action. In the Greek-Persian War, the Greeks defended their homeland. Once again, the Greek city-states, primarily Athens and Sparta, joined forces to repel the Persian invasion of mainland Greece. Homer, in his Iliad, and Herodotus, in his Histories, provide definitions of what Greek national identity was all about. By the time of the civil war, i.e., the Peloponnesian War, there appears to be a paradigm shift in what constitutes Greek national identity. The best definition within the context of this paradigm is given by Isocrates. This paper examines the national identity of Greeks as proposed mainly in the works of Homer, Herodotus, and Isocrates. It also explores the 19th-century controversy regarding whether modern Greeks have the same national identity as their ancient counterparts.

Keywords: *national identity, education, Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus, Isocrates, virtue, ancient Greeks, modern Greeks.*

Introduction

The Trojan War, which took place in the late part of the 2nd millennium BCE, was fought between Hellenes and non-Hellenes, as eloquently depicted in Homer's *Iliad*. This epic poem, dated 8th century BCE, is the first written source that defines a Hellenic national identity, using the common Greek language as the primary criterion.[1]

It was left to Herodotus (484-425 BCE), though three centuries after Homer, to provide a precise definition of what it means to have a common national identity in his book *Histories*. His definition has survived to modern times, but in ancient times, it was challenged by Isocrates (436-338 BCE), a well-known Athenian rhetorician who was influenced by Socrates, Plato, and one of the leaders of the

[*]President, Athens Institute for Education and Research, Greece.

[1]In this paper, I will be using the words 'Greeks' and 'Hellenes' interchangeably, as they have exactly the same meaning, i.e., a common national identity. Both terms coexist today. 'Greeks' is used by the Western (English-speaking) world, 'Hellenes' by Greeks themselves, and 'Ionians' by Persians, Turks and Arabs.

Sophist school, Gorgias. Isocrates emphasized a common pedagogy, defined as education with virtue, as the criterion that distinguishes Greeks from non-Greeks.[2]

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the ancient debate about what determines a national identity by examining various ancient contributors, such as Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus, Socrates, Xenophon, and finally Isocrates. This analysis takes into consideration the historical conditions shaped by the Greek-Trojan War, the Greek-Persian War, and finally the war between Athens and Sparta. These historical battles have been remarkably preserved for eternity by Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides respectively.

Of course, aside from the wars where national identity became very clear, another significant event in ancient Greece was the Olympic Games, which were held every four years in Olympia, an area in central-western Peloponnesus. According to Herodotus, only Greeks were allowed to participate in the games, as we will discuss further below. This serves as another source of information to illuminate the Greek national identity.

This paper is divided into six sections, beginning with this brief introduction. The next section examines Homer's Iliad, the earliest known source to use the term "Hellenes" to describe a distinct national identity, with the primary criterion being a common language. The third section of the paper briefly explores Hesiod's initial use of the term "Greek" (Γραικός) as well as the word "Hellenas." The fourth section discusses the four criteria proposed by Herodotus for determining a common national identity. The fifth section delves into the definition provided by Isocrates, placing emphasis on education as the criterion for a common national identity. The final section concludes by discussing common characteristics of national identity in modern times.

Barbarians and Hellenes

The *Iliad* is an epic poem that describes a war between the ancient Greeks and the Trojans. The expedition to Troy began with the gathering of various Greek tribes (φύλα) in central Greece, specifically at Aulis, not far from Athens. In total, 29 contingents were assembled from all over Greece, including Crete, Cyprus, and Asia Minor.

Homer used different names to refer to all Greek tribes. The terms Achaeans, Danaans, and Argives were used interchangeably many times in the *Iliad*. All of these represented distinct Greek tribes (φυλές).

The Achaeans were the most prominent Greek tribe, and their members could be found throughout Greece. According to *Homeric Lexicon* (Pantazidou, 1888), Achaean members were present in various regions, including Thessaly, Crete (as mentioned in the Odyssey, τ175), and Ithaca (as mentioned in the Odyssey, α90), but they were primarily concentrated in all areas of the Peloponnesus.

[2]It is not clear whether this is an additional criterion or the sole criterion. For example, if a Greek, as defined by Isocrates, does not possess pedagogy, can he be considered a Greek or a barbarian? This question remains unanswered.

According to Greek mythology, Achaios was the son of Xuthus and the grandson of Hellenas. Consequently, the Achaeans were a tribal group that descended from the Hellenes. Hellenas had two more sons: Dorus and Aeolus. From Dorus, the Greek tribe of the Dorians emerged, and from Aeolus, the Greek tribe of the Aeolians was formed.

Thus, all Achaeans were Hellenes, but not all Hellenes were Achaeans. Most likely, Homer was aware of this, which is why he used the term 'PanHellenes' to refer to all Greeks (Iliad, B530). He also used the term 'PanAchaeans' (Iliad, B404, Ψ236, and Odyssey, α239, ξ369).[3] As mentioned earlier, the Achaeans were likely the most populous Greek tribe.

What did all these Greeks have in common to be considered part of the same race called Hellenes? It's not entirely clear what Homer had in mind when he used the words 'Hellenes' and 'PanHellenes.' Presumably, they shared the same language because Homer explicitly mentioned that some of the individuals fighting on the side of the Trojans did not speak Greek. In Iliad (B 867), Homer states that,

> Nastis was the leader of the barbarian speaking Carians
> [Νάστης αὖ Καρῶν ἡγήσατο βαρβαροφώνων]

It is assumed that the Carians were not Greek because they didn't speak Greek; instead, they spoke a 'barbarian' language, making them 'barbarophone.' Homer did not specify that they were speaking Carian but rather a 'barbarian' language.

On the other hand, he made no reference to the language spoken by the Trojans. Most likely, the Trojans spoke Greek, either as their mother tongue or due to trade and other interactions with the Greeks. This is evident from the many conversations between the Greeks and the Trojans throughout the entire *Iliad*. On the Trojan side, there were various tribes with languages different from the Trojans', which posed a disadvantage in their battle against the Greeks, who shared a common language. Orders likely had to be translated into multiple languages.

In concluding this section, it is evident that Homer considered all the different tribes who fought outside the walls of Troy for ten years to be Greek, with language being the criterion he used. While they also shared a common religion, so did the Trojans. Reading the entire *Iliad*, it becomes clear that Greeks and Trojans shared many common customs to such an extent that they could be considered part of the same race. The only evidence provided by Homer's *Iliad* is in the line where he regards the Carians as speaking a different language. Homer uses the term 'barbarian' not with the negative connotation it carries today, but simply to emphasize that they spoke a non-Greek language.

[3]The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are two distinct epic poems. The first celebrates heroic actions in times of war, while the second extols the virtues of peace, family, and effective management of both the household and the city. My interpretation and reading of Homer and Hesiod have been elucidated in Papanikos (2021b). The decision-making process in the *Odyssey* is detailed in Papanikos (2021a).

Graikos became Greek in English

In his two works, *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, Hesiod does not make any reference to Hellenes.[4] In the first work, he emphasizes cosmogony (the creation of the world) and theogony (the creation of gods). In the second work, Hesiod explains economic, ethical, political, and social relations, while also providing some useful meteorological information and advice.

Hesiod wrote other works of which only fragments have survived, and many scholars doubt whether they belonged to the same author as Theogony and Works and Days. In one such work, The Catalogue of Women (Ἠοῖαι), which appears to be a continuation of Theogony, Hesiod discusses the creation of mortals resulting from the coupling of male immortals with mortal women.

In the first fragment of this work, Hesiod explains the reason for such couplings. At this early stage, gods and mortals lived together, sharing common dinners and living spaces. According to Hesiod, love was easily found. The first such birth mentioned in fragment 2 (5) is someone named Graiko (Γραικό), the son of the father of the gods, Zeus (Δίας), and the daughter of Deucalion (Δευκαλίων), Pandora (Πανδώρα).

It is this name, Graiko, that the Latins used to refer to all Hellenes, which later became the name used by the Western world for Greeks today.[5] Greek was another name for Hellenes. In fact, Aristotle (*Meteorology*, A 352b) writes that the name Graikoi was the initial name for the Hellenes:

> … they were called then Graikoi and now Hellenes
> […οἱ καλούμενοι τότε μὲν Γραικοὶ νῦν δ' Ἕλληνες]

Homer and Hesiod do not provide a clear criterion to distinguish between Greeks and non-Greeks. Although Homer appears to use language as a criterion, if Trojans spoke Greek, as it seems to be the case, then Homer's term 'PanHellenes' does not include all Greeks because Trojans were excluded. In any case, it is Herodotus who provides a concise definition of Greek national identity. The Herodotean approach will be examined in the next section.

Herodotus' Four Criteria of National Identity

The most comprehensive definition of national identity was articulated by Herodotus, and this is no mere coincidence. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43), the Roman philosopher, and statesman, hailed Herodotus as the Father of History. However, he could equally be acknowledged as the Father of Anthropology, particularly in the realms of social, political, and cultural anthropology. Having

[4]I have thoroughly examined Hesiod's *Works and Days*; refer to Papanikos (2022a, 2022b, 2022c, and 2022d).

[5]Not all nations use the name Greeks, including the Greeks themselves. Even today, Greeks refer to themselves as Hellenes. In contrast, countries like Turkey and Arab countries call the Greeks Ions, a name first used by ancient Persia.

traversed extensively across the then-known world, Herodotus documented his observations from diverse lands and gleaned insights from conversations with influential figures of his time, all chronicled in his historical works. Against this rich tapestry of knowledge and experiences, it is unsurprising that he offers a precise definition of what constitutes national identity.

Herodotus is renowned for his account of the Greek-Persian world, providing compelling reasons for the decade-long war. From the renowned Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE to the naval engagement at Salamis in 480 BCE and the conclusive Battle of Plataies in 479 BCE, the Greek-Persian war presented an occasion for Greeks to unite, reminiscent of the Trojan War. However, unlike the cohesive Greek front in the Trojan War, this time there were divisions, with regions like Boeotia and Macedonia siding with the Persians.

It was at a crucial juncture in the war with Persia when Xerxes, the ruler of Persia, sent Alexander,[6] the King of Macedonia, to propose to the Athenians on behalf of the King of Persia that they surrender, promising to respect their independent government and their land. Alexander addressed the general assembly of Athenian citizens, who had also invited Spartans to hear Xerxes' proposals. The Spartan delegation, fearing the peril to their city-state if Persia and Athens reached a peace agreement, spoke out. They urged the Athenian citizens not to surrender to the barbarian and jeopardize Hellada (Greece) (*Histories*, 8.142). It's noteworthy that Spartans referred to the Persian King as a barbarian and considered themselves, along with Athens and many other city-states, part of Hellada (Greece). Importantly, Spartans did not label Alexander a barbarian but rather a tyrant. They argued that it was only logical and expected for a tyrant like Alexander of Macedonia to befriend the Persian tyrant Xerxes. They questioned why Athens shouldn't become friends with Xerxes. The Spartans provided a response that remains unchanged through time (*Histories,* 8.142):

> barbarians are not trustful and do not respect the truth
> [βαρβάροισι ἐστὶ οὔτε πιστὸν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν]

The Athenians then responded to both Alexander and the Spartans. They warned Alexander not to come to Athens with such a proposal, suggesting he might encounter an unfortunate incident. To the Spartans, among other points, they replied as follows (Herodotus, Histories, 8.144.3):

> …and then Hellenism, a world that has the same blood in its veins and that speaks the same language and has in common the worship centers of the gods and sacrifices and customs the same and unchanging—the betrayal of all these would be a disgrace to the Athenians. [αὖτις δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐὸν ὅμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἤθεά τε ὁμότροπα, τῶν προδότας γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους οὐκ ἂν εὖ ἔχοι]

[6]This Alexander belonged to the same generation as Alexander the Great, who ascended to the throne of Macedonia 150 years later in 336 BCE. We will discuss him later in this section.

In addition to what was previously mentioned (αὖτις), it is affirmed that we are Greek (Ἑλληνικὸν ἐὸν) for the following four reasons:

1. We share the same blood (ὅμαιμόν)
2. We speak the same language (ὁμόγλωσσον)
3. We worship the same gods in common temples (θεῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινὰ)
4. We have a common way of life (ὁμότροπα)

The final sentence of the above citation states that Athenians would never betray all these. The phrase "the same blood," of course, implies belonging to the same race—the Greek race. This was deemed more crucial than anything else, as many 'barbarians' could speak Greek, making language an unreliable distinguishing factor. As mentioned earlier, the Trojans likely spoke Greek proficiently, but Homer does not clarify whether it was their first language or not. Similarly, the shared religion is not a robust criterion, as it is not today. Trojans also adhered to the same religion, evident in their affinity for the so -called Trojan horse, which led to their demise. Presently, Greeks and Russians, despite both being Christian Orthodox, cannot be argued to share a common national identity.

It is true that the ancient Greeks had a unique common way of living. One manifestation of this shared culture was their love for theaters and sports. They also enjoyed listening to stories from rhapsodists like Homer and Hesiod, and participating in symposiums and other festivities. The best example of this common way of living is, of course, the Olympic Games, which were also a religious festivity devoted to Olympian Zeus.

As mentioned in the introduction, only Greeks were allowed to participate in the Olympic Games. Herodotus further enlightens us on this issue. Alexander I[7], King of Macedonia, expressed a desire to participate in the Olympic Games, but some questioned whether he was Greek or not. In an excellent quotation, Herodotus tells us that he was judged to belong to the Greek race because all his ancestors were Greek (Histories, 5.22.1-5.22.2):

> How Greek these descendants of Perdiccas[8] are, as they themselves claim—I am in a position to confirm it. In the subsequent part of my narrative, I will demonstrate not only their Greek lineage but also highlight a decision by the organizers of the Greek games in Olympia that affirms this. When Alexander decided to participate in the games and descended [to Olympia] for that purpose, his Greek competitors in a road race attempted to disqualify him, arguing that the race was intended for Greek athletes, not barbarians. Alexander, by proving his Argive origin, persuaded the judges of his Greek heritage. Consequently, he participated in the one-stadium foot race and finished simultaneously with the leading athlete. That's the account of how it transpired.
> [Ἕλληνας δὲ εἶναι τούτους τοὺς ἀπὸ Περδίκκεω γεγονότας, κατά περ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, αὐτός τε οὕτω τυγχάνω ἐπιστάμενος καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖσι ὄπισθε λόγοισι ἀποδέξω ὡς εἰσὶ Ἕλληνες, πρὸς δὲ καὶ οἱ τὸν ἐν Ὀλυμπίῃ διέποντες ἀγῶνα Ἑλληνοδίκαι οὕτω ἔγνωσαν εἶναι. Ἀλεξάνδρου γὰρ ἀεθλεύειν ἑλομένου καὶ καταβάντος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ

[7]This is the Alexander I, an ancestor of Alexander III, also known as the Alexander the Great.
[8]This is Perdiccas I, the founder of the Macedonian dynasty in the 7th century BCE.

> τοῦτο, οἱ ἀντιθευσόμενοι Ἑλλήνων ἐξεῖργόν μιν, φάμενοι οὐ βαρβάρων ἀγωνιστέων εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀλλὰ Ἑλλήνων: Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀπέδεξε ὡς εἴη Ἀργεῖος, ἐκρίθη τε εἶναι Ἕλλην καὶ ἀγωνιζόμενος στάδιον συνεξέπιπτε τῷ πρώτῳ.]

The criterion questioned by others was the shared blood, as the issue revolved not around language, religion, or way of living, but common ancestors. As argued in Papanikos (2018), Macedonia was and is a geographical area that does not determine national identity. Many in ancient and modern Macedonia may speak Greek, share the same religion, and have similar ways of living, but they do not necessarily share the same blood. This was the crux of the matter concerning Alexander I's participation in the Olympic Games.

To prove his eligibility, Alexander I had to establish that he was of Greek blood, a determination made by a jury known as the Ἑλληνοδίκαι. The etymology of the term is intriguing; it signifies the jury (δίκαι) of Greek (Ἑλληνο). Their role was to assess the Greekness of an individual. In the case of Alexander I, they concluded that he was Greek because he belonged to the Greek race of Argives, as mentioned in the second section of this paper.

Herodotus also recounts another incident involving Alexander I just before the Battle of Plataea in 479 BCE when he urged the Athenians to surrender to Persians. Before the battle, he approached the Athenian army and conveyed to them the following (*Histories*, 9.45.2):

> Being of Greek descent myself, I do not want to witness Greece go from being free to becoming enslaved.
> [αὐτός τε γὰρ Ἕλλην γένος εἰμὶ τὠρχαῖον καὶ ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθέρης δεδουλωμένην οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιμι ὁρᾶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα]

This is an important sentence because it reveals not only the objective criteria of being considered Greek but also the subjective aspect—how individuals regarded themselves as part of the same race. The quoted passage explains why Alexander I, the King of Macedon, betrayed Persians by providing crucial information to the Athenians just before the pivotal Battle of Plataea.

One should interpret this definition of national identity within the context of the historical times and the significant threat posed to all Greek states by Xerxes, the King of Persia. These were illustrious years not only for the Greek race but also for democracy and freedom[9], as portrayed by the Athenian Politeia. However, changes occurred in the second half of the 5th century BCE, which will be examined next.

[9]Democracy relates very much to the national identity of Athenians, as is discussed later in this paper. I have examined this important issue elsewhere; refer to Papanikos (2020b, 2022e, 2022f, and 2022g) and the comments by Petratos (2022) and Meydani (2022).

A Paradigm Shift and Isocrates' Definition of Greekness

Isocrates (436-338 BCE) was an Athenian orator influenced by Socrates, Plato, and Gorgias. By the mid-5th century BCE, the political, moral, and social environment in Athens had changed dramatically compared to the one that existed during the glorious years of Herodotus, marked by victorious battles against Persia. Now, Athens emerged as the new and undisputed leader of the Hellenic world. It became the center of the known world, and under Pericles, the city reached what is now known as the golden age of Athens.

As Thucydides powerfully explained in his masterpiece on the Peloponnesian War, following the Greek-Persian wars, the Greek city-states were divided between Athens and Sparta, and civil war seemed imminent. The two great ancient Greek powers were trapped in an irreversible process that made war inevitable. Graham Allison (2017) coined this situation as 'Thucydides' Trap.

This required a new (ideological) explanation, and a paradigm shift emerged. The noble Greeks fighting the barbarian Persians were justified in terms of the Herodotean national identity definition of Greekness. However, how could one justify this civil war? I believe the best explanation can be found in Pericles' Funeral Oration during the first year of the Peloponnesian War, honoring the first casualties of the conflict.

Pericles' speech is cited in Thucydides (*The Peloponnesian War*, B.35-B.46). Athens is now at war with another Greek city, and Pericles praises Athens, providing several reasons for its superiority. I have included a few citations from Pericles' Funeral Oration, demonstrating that although Athens shares Greek origins, its city-state is superior to all others, including its Greek adversaries.

1. We have a system of governance, and our laws are exemplary, with nothing to envy in comparison to others. Instead of imitating others, we serve as examples for them. [Χρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτείᾳ οὐ ζηλούσῃ τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους, παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους] (B37).
2. However, we also differ from our opponents in the way we handle matters of war. Our city is open to the world; we never expel foreigners from learning or seeing. [Διαφέρομεν δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖσδε. τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ξενηλασίαις ἀπείργομέν τινα ἢ μαθήματος ἢ θεάματος] (B39)
3. We love beauty while remaining simple. We love to philosophize without weakening ourselves. [Φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας] (40)
4. In summary, I say that our city as a whole serves as a school for Greece. [Ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν (41)
5. That is precisely why I spoke more thoroughly about the city, to help you understand that we are not fighting for the same things as those who lack what we have here. [Δι' ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐμήκυνα τὰ περὶ τῆς πόλεως, διδασκαλίαν τε ποιούμενος μὴ περὶ ἴσου ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ οἷς τῶνδε μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ὁμοίως] (42)

Pericles is clear: Athenians are Greeks, but they differ from all other Greeks in several ways. Firstly, Athens boasts a superior system of governance known as democracy, a feature lacking among the Spartans and their allies. Athens has nothing to envy in comparison to others; on the contrary, others strive to imitate Athens.

Secondly, Athens is open to the world, welcoming all foreigners to come and learn, in stark contrast to the Spartans who practice expulsion of foreigners (*ξενηλασία)*. Sparta feared that outsiders would introduce customs that might corrupt their frugal way of living. Additionally, there was concern that foreigners could spy on Spartan military training and strength.

Thirdly, Athens has a distinct appreciation for aesthetics. During the years of Pericles' reign, numerous monuments were created, including the iconic Parthenon. Moreover, Athenians had a passion for philosophy, with symposiums and various artistic and sports competitions making Athens the place to be for those who cherished wisdom.

Fourthly, Athens was the educational center of the world. Pericles rightly claimed that Athens was instructing the rest of the world. It was during his era that figures like Socrates shone, attracting numerous scholars to teach in Athens. Notable examples include Herodotus and Protagoras. Plutarch informs us that Pericles himself had great teachers such as Zeno and Anaxagoras.

Fifthly, Pericles makes it clear that the Peloponnesian War is being fought for all the advantages that Athens possesses relative to its Greek opponents.

There is a paradigm shift in the utilization of the idea of a common national identity. Greekness no longer served the purpose of winning a civil war. Something else had to be invented. This paradigm shift does not emphasize the four criteria of national identity in Herodotus but rather focuses on other criteria, including freedom, democracy, philosophy, education, virtue, etc.

Many prominent Greeks began to have second thoughts about the advantage of a Greek national identity. Isocrates, who was only five years old when the two great cities of Athens and Sparta, along with their allies, started a long civil war from 431 to 404 BCE. He was likely very skeptical. He believed that merely being Greek was not sufficient. Athenians were the teachers of the known world, and if others learned from them, the distinction between Greeks and barbarians would disappear, or more accurately, it would not be the decisive factor in determining civilized from non-civilized people. This marks a paradigm shift. In Homer's time, a barbarian was someone who did not speak Greek. In Isocrates' time, Greekness meant someone who was superior in terms of intellect and virtue. However, not all Greeks who share the same blood possessed such superiority. It was not acquired by birth but through hard work in obtaining paideia.

A work appeared in 420 BCE, when Isocrates was 16 years old, explaining the difference. In a book entitled 'The Athenian Constitution' (circa 420 BCE), attributed to Xenophon, the following was stated (see Pseudo-Xenophon, *The Athenian Constitution*, 2.8):

> ...and the other Greeks share similar dialects, lifestyles, and dressing styles, while the Athenians have an amalgamation of influences from both Greeks and barbarians.
> […καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἰδίᾳ μᾶλλον καὶ φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι χρῶνται, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων]
> (underlying added)

It is important to note, first, that pseudo-Xenophon does not question the Greekness of the Athenian citizens. However, there has been a change. Athenians now presumably possess a superior culture because they are able to blend (κεκραμένῃ) Greek and barbarian cultures.[10]

It is not stated whether this is better or worse relative to the other Greeks. However, taking into consideration the entire work, Pseudo-Xenophon's approach is from an oligarchic point of view, and most probably this was considered as something that marks the beginning of the end of Athenian democracy and superiority. The reader is left with a mixed feeling about what the author really wants to say about the Athenian constitution. I am sure that around this period, Isocrates was participating in the symposia and the general assemblies of the city of Athens where these issues were discussed and most probably fiercely debated.

In one of these symposiums, Isocrates might have heard Socrates arguing that he does not accept the idea of national identities based on heredity. This quotation is preserved for us by Plutarch, lived in the first and second century AD, in his work *On Exile*. It presents a strong argument against any kind of racism, and I dare to say against the entire idea of a national identity, whether considered as an ontological or deontological concept. Using sources from the late 5th and 4th centuries BCE, which corresponds to Isocrates' dates, Plutarch states the following (*On Exile*, 555-556):

> The homeland does not exist from nature, just as there is no house, farm, coppersmith or doctor's office from nature, as Ariston said. On the contrary, each of them becomes, or rather is named, in relation to the one who lives there and uses them. Since man, as Plato also says, "is not an earthly or immobile plant, but a heavenly one, with the head holding the body towards the sky". Therefore, Hercules rightly said that he is not an Argive or Theban, but every Greek city is to him a homeland - and Socrates even more correctly said "I am neither an Athenian nor a Greek, but a citizen of the world", because he did not confine himself to Sounio, Tainaro[11] or Kereunia Mountains.[12] "Do you see the boundless ether above, Holding the earth in its soft embrace"?
> These are the borders of our homeland, and here no one is an exile, a stranger, or a foreigner. Here is fire, water and air itself. The same are the rulers and the governors

[10]Most probably, this marks the beginning of eclecticism in political practice, but it was preceded by theoretical thought (philosophy). It may not be a coincidence that a pioneer in adopting this approach was Zeno, as mentioned above, who happened to be Pericles' teacher.
[11]This is Cape Tenaro, situated at the southernmost point of mainland Greece in the region of Peloponnesus.
[12]In today's southwest Albania.

and the prefects, the Sun, the Moon and the Augerinus.[13] The laws are the same for all, and come from the same precept and principle, the solstices, the equinoxes, the Pleiades, Arcturus, the seasons of sowing and planting. And one is the king and lord, God, who holds the beginning and the middle and the end of all things. He is followed by Justice, who is the punisher of those who fall short of divine law. This Justice is our nature to observe by all men towards all men as if they were our fellow-citizens.

[…Φύσει γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι πατρίς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἶκος οὐδὲ ἀγρὸς οὐδὲ χαλκεῖον, ὡς Ἀρίστων ἔλεγεν, οὐδὲ ἰατρεῖον· ἀλλὰ γίνεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὀνομάζεται καὶ καλεῖται, τούτων ἕκαστον ἐαὶ πρὸς τὸν οἰκοῦντα καὶ χρώμενον. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, ᾗ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, "φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον" οὐδὲ ἀκίνητον, "ἀλλ᾿ οὐρανιόν" ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ ῥίζης τὸ σῶμα τῆς κεφαλῆς ὀρθὸν ἱστώσης, πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνεστραμμένον. ὅθεν εὖ μὲν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς εἶπεν «Ἀργεῖος ἢ Θηβαῖος· οὐ γὰρ εὔχομαι μιᾶς· ἅπας μοι πύργος Ἑλλήνων πατρίς», ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης βέλτιον, οὐκ Ἀθηναῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, ἀλλὰ "Κόσμιος" εἶναι φήσας, ὡς ἄν τις "Ῥόδιος" εἶπεν ἢ "Κορίνθιος," ὅτι μηδὲ Σουνίῳ μηδὲ Ταινάρῳ μηδὲ τοῖς Κεραυνίοις ἐνέκλεισεν ἑαυτόν. «Ὁρᾷς τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ᾿ ἄπειρον αἰθέρα, καὶ γῆν πέριξ ἔχονθ᾿ ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις;».

οὗτοι τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν ὅροι, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὔτε φυγὰς ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ξένος οὔτε ἀλλοδαπός, ὅπου τὸ αὐτὸ πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ, ἄρχοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ διοικηταὶ καὶ πρυτάνεις· ἥλιος, σελήνη, φωσφόρος· οἱ αὐτοὶ νόμοι πᾶσιν, ὑφ᾿ ἑνὸς προστάγματος καὶ μιᾶς ἡγεμονίας· τροπαὶ βόρειοι, τροπαὶ νότιοι, ἰσημερία, Πλειάς, Ἀρκτοῦρος, ὧραι σπόρων, ὧραι φυτειῶν· εἷς δὲ βασιλεὺς καὶ ἄρχων, "θεός, ἀρχήν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχων τοῦ παντός, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δὲ ἕπεται Δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός," ᾗ χρώμεθα πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ πολίτας.]

In the above quote, Socrates says, "I am neither Greek nor Athenian, but a citizen of the cosmos (world)" [..οὐκ Ἀθηναῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, ἀλλὰ Κόσμιος], a message conveyed to Isocrates at an age less than forty.

When Socrates was sentenced to death by the Athenians, Isocrates was 37 years old. If he had heard Socrates' Apology and/or read it and/or heard it from Plato, then it's not surprising that he began to think that sharing the same blood may not be so important after all. Something else must be more crucial, and for Isocrates, that was pedagogy. While Athens was considered superior to other Greek and non-Greek (barbarian) cities, Isocrates believed that this difference could be explained only by the distinction of Athenian paideia. Athens has now surpassed all other cities, and the reason is its paideia. In Isocrates' own words (*Panegyricus*, 50):

> Our city has surpassed all others in intellectual development and the art of speech to such an extent that its students have become teachers to others. And the name 'Hellenes' no longer merely symbolizes a common race but, rather, the intellect. Those who embrace our method of education, learning and virtue are now more appropriately called Hellenes than those who share our same origin (nature).

[13] The name of the planet Venus (Aphrodite) is used when it appears in the sky in the morning, a phase referred to as the 'morning star.' Venus played an important role in Greek mythology because it is the third brightest object in the sky, following the sun and the moon.

> [τοσοῦτον δ᾽ ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ᾽ οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκεν μηκέτι τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας.]

The criterion that distinguishes Greeks from non-Greeks is no longer a common origin. The Greek term for this criterion is 'φύσεως,' meaning nature. So, what is the criterion now? The Greek term is 'διανοίας,' which encompasses the concepts of perception, intellect, genius, and intelligence. How does one acquire intellect? According to Isocrates, it is a matter of education and virtue. The original Greek term is 'παιδεύσεως,' the outcome of a process known as paideia. This outcome comprises education, learning, and virtue. This is the interpretation that Plato assigns to the term, and it specifically pertains to the upbringing of the youth.

Today, the use of the word "education" usually implies the acquisition of skills that help someone to practice a profession, and virtue is often left aside. The problem is whether virtue can be taught to someone or is something that is possessed by his/her nature, and education cannot do much in this regard. This debate is best demonstrated in Plato's dialogue *Protagoras*, which took place one or two years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (433-432 BCE). In this dialogue, Socrates argues that virtue cannot be taught. In Socrates' own words (*Protagoras*, 319e-320c):

> … the wisest and most worthy citizens this virtue they possess cannot transmit it to others; behold, the father of these youngsters here, Pericles, gave them a good and solid education above what they could take from their teachers; but over that which he himself is wise, he neither educates them himself, nor trusts them to anyone else, but wanders hither and thither by themselves and grazes like the absolute beasts—lest somewhere by chance they meet virtue. And a second example: this same man, Pericles, undertook to raise Cleinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades. Well, fearing that Alcibiades—we know him—would lead him into corruption, he cut him off from him, put him as a boarder in the house of Ariphron, and tried to educate him. Six months did not pass and Ariphron brought him back to him, because he did not know what to do with him. I can tell you a bunch of others who were worthy of them themselves, but they never made anyone better, neither their relative nor a stranger. These things therefore I observe, Protagoras, and I conclude that virtue is not taught; but when I hear you say the contrary, I am shaken, and believe that your words conceal some truth; for I have formed the opinion that you have learned many things by experience, many from the teachers, and others you discovered yourself. Well, if it is easy for you to prove to us more clearly that virtue can be taught, do not deny, but prove it.
> [οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι· ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν, ἃ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῳ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ περιιόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τουτουῒ νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῇ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν

ἓξ μῆνας γεγονέναι, ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ. καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηυρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίδειξον]

On the other hand, Protagoras argues that he can teach someone how to be a useful citizen. It seems that the debate ended in a draw, but now we know better: education does not guarantee that the recipient will become a virtuous citizen.

Since antiquity, many crimes have been justified by asserting the superiority of one national identity over another. Wars rooted in religious, racial, and social or political differences have been fought, resulting in the loss of millions of lives. The next section briefly discusses the idea of national identity, using the case of Greece as a point of reference. Similar arguments can be applied to other races as well.

The Greek National Identity Today

This section examines the idea of national identity in light of the Herodotean and Isocratic approaches. The current discussion, much like in ancient Greece, carries significant political repercussions and is, of course, relevant to groups of people who believe that something unites them, thereby granting them the right to self-determination. The issue of national identity is intricately connected to concepts such as nationalism, ethnicism, patriotism, etc. as summarized by Miscevic (2023).

What is the Greek national identity today? Are modern Greeks descendants of ancient Greeks? Do they share the same national identity as their ancient counterparts? We address these questions by first applying the four criteria suggested by Herodotus.

The Greek language has evolved over this extended period of 2500 years. Naturally, the meanings of words have changed, making it very difficult to understand what Homer and Hesiod were writing if you have learned 21st-century Greek. Although different, both are forms of the Greek language. Consequently, one may conclude that modern Greeks share the same language as their ancient counterparts. This can be contrasted with Latin and Italian, which are similar but not identical. Newton (1960, p. 124) summarizes the language difference as follows:

> Perhaps the most amazing thing about Greek is that in the period over which our written records extend-in over three millennia, since the decipherment of Linear B-it has changed so little. Whereas a student of Latin would be ill-equipped to read a modern Italian newspaper, a person with a good working knowledge of classical Greek would not only find an Athenian newspaper intelligible for the most part, but would be amazed at the remarkable likenesses between the ancient and the modern languages. For the vocabulary of a Greek newspaper is probably 99 per cent of classical origin and modern Greek has retained much of the cumbersome grammar of the ancient language-and ancient Greek has got a cumbersome grammar, when we

consider that its verb has over four hundred forms as compared to sixty or so in French and two in Afrikaans.

The next criterion suggested by Herodotus is the same way of living, customs, and culture. Do modern Greeks have the same way of living as ancient Greeks? When I read Hesiod, Homer, and especially Aristophanes, I cannot distinguish the modern Greek way of living from that of ancient Greece. I propose an Aristophanic explanation for the similarity between ancient and modern Greeks in terms of their culture. According to my Aristophanic hypothesis, a civilization spanning three millennia may lose its virtues but never its vices, as the latter tend to persist. This is evident in both formal and informal cultural institutions. Alesina & Giuliano (2015) have argued that institutions and cultural traits tend to persist for hundreds of years. Modern Greeks have retained all the vices of ancient Greeks. Reading Hesiod's monumental work on *Works and Days,* where the corruption of archons is stigmatized and work is praised, one can draw parallels to what happens in modern Greece.

On the issue of religion, Greeks have adopted Christianity, but their adaptation is closely aligned with what existed in ancient Greece. Christianity was blended with ancient Greek philosophy, resulting in the Christian Orthodox Church. A prime example of the connection between ancient Greek religion and Greek Christian Orthodoxy lies in the concept of polytheism. In ancient Greek religion, numerous Gods and Goddesses were worshipped. In the Greek Orthodox religion, this polytheistic aspect has persisted in the form of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, the Greek Orthodox Church venerates a multitude of saints, including the Holy Mother.

Technically, all saints and the Holy Mother are believed to perform the same functions as the Father God and the Son. They protect devoted Christians and are believed to perform miracles, mirroring the roles of ancient Greek Gods. However, a significant distinction exists. In the Greek Orthodox religion, all Gods and Saints collaborate to safeguard devoted Christians, without conflicts between saints and, of course, no conflict of interest between the God, His Son, the Holy Mother, the Holy Spirit, and the Saints. This was not the case in ancient times. In the works of Homer, Gods are portrayed as possessing virtues and vices similar to those found in mortals, and conflicts among the Gods were common.

Oberhelman (2020) compares ancient Greek religion with Christianity, noting, "There are similarities, however, between Asklepios and Panagia. First, both can help when doctors cannot" (p. 32) and "Another point of similarity between Asklepios and Panagia is that illness is not the only reason why they are petitioned. Lost items can be recovered; lost people can be found" (p. 34).

The last criterion suggested by Herodotus is a common origin or a shared common blood. This is very difficult to verify because, as Miscevic (2023) has stated, "…the commonality of origin has become mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups have been mixing for millennia." In the Greek case, this has been a subject of debate among historians since the 19th century, particularly after the Greeks achieved their liberation from the Ottoman yoke. One notable figure in this debate was the German historian Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer, who in 1835 argued that the Greeks had disappeared from Peloponnesus and were replaced by Slavs who were later Hellenized. The book was translated into Greek in 1984.

Fortunately, today we can test the theory proposed by Fallmerayer using genetic tests. A study to assess this hypothesis was conducted by Stamatoyannopoulos et al. (2017). They found that their results "...are incompatible with the theory of the extinction of the medieval Peloponneseans and their replacement by Slavic and Asia Minor settlers" (p. 642). Furthermore, their evidence shows that "...Peloponneseans are genetically placed very close to the Sicilians and Italians" (p. 641). This can be, of course, explained by the significant Greek migration to southern Italy, to the extent that the area is called Magna Grecia. This was also confirmed by Tofanelli et al. (2016). They concluded (p. 436) that, "Despite the multiple alternative explanations for historical gene flow, it is relevant to stress here that a signature specifically related to the Euboea Island in East Sicily was consistently found at different levels of analysis, in line with the historical and archaeological evidence, attesting to an extended and numerically important Greek presence in this region. It is interesting to note that in Calabria, Italy, there are Greeks who have preserved a Greek dialect called Greco, as demonstrated by Sarno et al. (2021).

It seems that Herodotus' criteria are applied even today to determine national identities. Share of common blood, language, religion, and culture (way of living) are used to define race and ethnicity. If viewed from a different perspective, what I would term the natural or Socratic perspective, all these criteria appear as excuses to divide people. Historically, these criteria often led to conflicts, such as the religious wars in Europe, the Crusades, Islamification (jihad), and the Nazi ideology promoting the superiority of the Aryan race.

On the other hand, Isocrates' criterion has been completely ignored. Education and virtue are not used to separate people. This is best demonstrated in the political process. As I have argued in a series of articles, education is the pillar of democracy. Only people who have reached a certain level of knowledge should be eligible to vote. The world should be divided between educated and non-educated people. If non-educated people cannot obtain education due to objective reasons, then it is the 'race' of educated people who should finance the education of the non-educated.

Education is the easy part in Isocrates' definition of 'national identity.' The second criterion was virtue. The Greek word for that is arete (αρετή), and in Plato’s dialogue of Protagoras, it was linked to a good (virtuous) citizen who can serve his/her city-state. It did not mean morality and ethical behavior in the abstract. It had a practical application in the political process. Those who, in the Athenian Politeia, were elected or selected through a draw to serve the city-state were questioned for their arete, as stated in Aristotle’s Athenian Politeia (55.3-55.4):

> When the judgment is made, they ask: "Who is your father and what municipality (demos) do you belong to and who is your grandfather, who is your mother and who is your mother's father and from which municipalities?" Then they ask him if he participates in the worship of Patrous Apollo and Herkeius Zeus and where their

> sanctuaries are located. Then if he has family graves and where they are, then if he takes care of his parents and if he pays his taxes and if he has served his military service After he (the president) addresses these questions to him, he says to him: "Now call witnesses for what you have said." And when he presents his witnesses, they ask, "Has anyone any charge against him?" And if there is an accuser, the court gives him the floor and then the accused apologizes. Then the parliament decides by a show of hands and in the court by a vote. If no accuser is presented, the vote is taken immediately.
> [ἐπερωτῶσιν δ’, ὅταν δοκιμάζωσιν, πρῶτον μὲν «τίς σοι πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων, καὶ τίς πατρὸς πατήρ, καὶ τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς μητρὸς πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων;» μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος καὶ Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος, καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά ἐστιν, εἶτα ἠρία εἰ ἔστιν καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα, ἔπειτα γονέας εἰ εὖ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὰ τέλη <εἰ> τελεῖ, καὶ τὰς στρατείας εἰ ἐστράτευται. ταῦτα δ’ ἀνερωτήσας, «κάλει», φησίν, «τούτων τοὺς μάρτυρας». ἐπειδὰν δὲ παράσχηται τοὺς μάρτυρας, ἐπερωτᾷ «τούτου βούλεταί τις κατηγορεῖν;» κἂν μὲν ᾖ τις κατήγορος, δοὺς κατηγορίαν καὶ ἀπολογίαν οὕτω δίδωσιν ἐν μὲν τῇ βουλῇ τὴν ἐπιχειροτονίαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τὴν ψῆφον· ἐὰν δὲ μηδεὶς βούληται κατηγορεῖν, εὐθὺς δίδωσι τὴν ψῆφον.]

This "interrogation" served the purpose of revealing the virtue of the candidate for political office. In ancient Athens, parents had a moral obligation to raise their children according to their means, and when the children grew up, they had an obligation to take care of their elderly parents. It is also important to note that the judgment was based on whether the candidate paid his taxes and served his country as a soldier. This 'interview' served the purpose of determining the virtuousness of the citizen who would be chosen to serve in political office. This is consistent with Isocrates' definition of pedagogy. Only Athenians had such a process of choosing their rulers.

In modern Greece, there was a notable Greek scholar who lived in the 18th-19th century and is considered by many as the best representative of Greek enlightenment. Adamantios Korais was a strong believer in education and virtue. In Papanikos (2021c, p. 10), I concluded that, "Adamantios Korais rightly connected the liberation of a people with his education. An uneducated people cannot be free. Additionally, an uneducated people cannot prosper either materially or morally." In the case of Greece, he was totally vindicated. Greece was liberated from the Ottoman yoke but found another master, as predicted by Korais. It goes beyond the scope of this paper, but a quick look at Greek history after its liberation in 1821 will show that the role of education was fundamental in promoting political and economic flourishing. As for virtue, this has to wait.

Conclusions

Ancient Greeks developed certain criteria to determine who belongs to the Greek race. Awareness of the Greek identity was considered important in times of war. The most famous wars of ancient Greece were, of course, the Greek-Trojan War, the Greek-Persian War, and the Peloponnesian War. The latter was a civil war between Athens and Sparta.

Homer used the language criterion to distinguish between Greeks and barbarians in the book of Iliad. Herodotus, in his book Histories, employed four criteria (common blood, language, religion, and way of living) to differentiate between Greeks and "the barbarians." By the time of the Peloponnesian War, many began to have second thoughts about the importance of the four Herodotean criteria. Education and virtue (arete) were emphasized as distinguishing factors between barbarians and non-barbarians. Isocrates is credited with providing a precise definition of Greekness using the criteria of education and virtue. However, during the second half of the 5th century BCE, many politicians and philosophers used these two criteria to distinguish between advanced (civilized) and non-advanced (barbarian) people.

This discussion unavoidably leads to the debate that emerged in the early 19th century when some historians claimed that the recently liberated Greece from the Ottoman yoke was no longer inhabited by Greeks but by Hellenized Slavs. Despite the fact that language, religion, and way of living were pretty much similar between the ancient Greeks and the 19th-century Greeks, the argument was that they did not share the same blood. For whatever value this has, biology in the 21st century can test this hypothesis. Studies have shown that the Peloponnesians have very little genetic relation with Slavs. It seems that they share many commonalities with South Italians, the so-called Magna Grecia.

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