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Front Pages

SHOGO HASHIMOTO

The Role of Geometrical Representations – Wittgenstein's Colour Octahedron and Kuki's Rectangular Prism of Taste

IVANILDE FRACALOSSI

The Role of Freedom in the Practical Philosophy of Kant and Reinhold

TENNYSON SAMRAJ

Epistemic Awareness of Doxastic Distinctions: Delineating Types of Beliefs in Belief-Formation

RANKO KOZIĆ

ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΕΝ ΔΟΞΗΙ ΤΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΣΑΙ: An Enigmatic Depiction of the Second Sophistic in Philostratus and Eunapius' Lives of the Sophists or What is Indeed the Mentioned Sophistic?

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Download the entire issue (PDF)

Front Pages i-viii

The Role of Geometrical Representations – Wittgenstein's Colour Octahedron and Kuki's Rectangular Prism of Taste 9

Shogo Hashimoto

The Role of Freedom in the Practical Philosophy of Kant and Reinhold 25

Ivanilde Fracalossi

Epistemic Awareness of Doxastic Distinctions: Delineating Types of Beliefs in Belief-Formation 37

Tennyson Samraj

ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΕΝ ΔΟΞΗΙ ΤΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΣΑΙ: An Enigmatic Depiction of the Second Sophistic in Philostratus and Eunapius' Lives of the Sophists or What is Indeed the Mentioned Sophistic? 51

Ranko Kozić

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Athens Journal of Philosophy - Volume 1, Issue 1, March 2022 – Pages 9-24

The Role of Geometrical Representations – Wittgenstein's Colour Octahedron and Kuki's Rectangular Prism of Taste

By Shogo Hashimoto[*]

In his writings Philosophical Remarks, the Austrian-British Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1989-1951) draws an octahedron with the words of pure colours such as "white", "red" and "blue" at the corners and argues: "The colour octahedron is grammar, since it says that you can speak of a reddish blue but not of a reddish green, etc" (Wittgenstein 1980, §39). He uses the word "grammar" in such a specific way that the grammar or grammatical rules describe the meanings of words/expressions, in other words, how we use them in our language. Accordingly, the colour octahedron can also be taken to represent grammatical rules about how we apply words of colour, e.g., that we can call a certain colour "reddish-blue", but not "reddish-green". In a different context, the Japanese philosopher Shūzō Kuki (1988-1941) explores in his work The Structure of Iki what the Japanese word "iki" means. This word is often translated as "chic" or "stylistic" in English, but Kuki holds that it is an aesthetic Japanese concept that cannot be translated one-to-one, instead encompassing three aspects: "coquetry", "pride and honour" and "resignation". To explain the meanings of the word "iki" and other related words all of which Kuki calls "tastes", he introduces a rectangular prism as a geometrical representation similar to Wittgenstein's colour octahedron. In this paper, I argue that the rectangular prism does not solely explain how the modes of Japanese tastes are related to each other, but also has a grammatical character. On this score, I suggest that one can regard this rectangular prism as a description of the grammatical rules of the Japanese language. By appeal to the arguments of both philosophers and in comparison with them, I will not only clarify what they claim by geometrical representations but also examine what role this kind of representation plays as an explanation of grammar in general.

Keywords: *grammar, colour octahedron, rectangular prism, Shūzō Kuki, Wittgenstein*

Introduction

We have several colour systems. The most common one is the so-called Natural Colour Model, which has three pairs of elementary colours (white-black, green-red and yellow-blue). Different languages have different words which are supposed to refer to the same colour – e.g., "blue" in English, "*blau*" in German, "*bleu*" in French, "青" ("*ao*") in Japanese. For several purposes like colour printing or the sensing display of images in electronic systems, we also employ different colour systems such as the CMY Colour Model, whose primary colours are cyan, magenta and yellow, and the RGB Colour Model, which is based on red,

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green and blue. Apart from these models, some ethnic groups employ their own colour systems that conform to their forms of life. The Eskimos use six different words referring to the word "grey" in the Natural Colour Model; the indigenous people of lowland Bolivia, the Tsimané, have fewer terms for colours than Bolivian-Spanish and English speakers. All these systems have different ways of applying colour words.

As is the case in colour systems, we can also imagine that there are different systems in different languages that describe the character, value, and taste of the people. Such descriptions can also be taken to correspond to their forms of life.

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Shūzō Kuki were philosophers who lived in the same time period – 1989-1951 and 1988-1941 respectively – in different countries, who conducted investigations into how we use words in our languages. Wittgenstein deals with the colour system familiar in the Western world whereas Kuki is concerned with the system of the Japanese "tastes", which is to be seen in the following discussion. In an attempt to clarify the use of words, both philosophers bring geometrical representations into play. To what extent can these representations, however, serve to make the use of words clear?

Goal and Method

This paper aims to shed light upon the role geometrical representations play in showing how language systems operate. For this purpose, I consider the investigations of Wittgenstein and Kuki and compare their explanations of geometrical representations. Interestingly enough, these explanations have certain commonalities, including shortcomings, although there seems to be no correspondence or link between the philosophers.

From a Wittgensteinian point of view, Yingjin Xu similarly analyses Kuki's aesthetics expressed in *The Structure of Iki*. He points out parallels in the two philosophers' works (Xu 2016). Sharing with Xu the basic idea that Kuki and Wittgenstein conduct linguistic conceptual analyses of the same kind, I will, independently from his attempt, interpret Kuki's "Wittgensteinian" investigations and discuss the role of "geometrical representations" in general.

This paper has the following structure. In the first part of the discussion, I explain what Wittgenstein says of the use of colour words in the Western colour system and the colour octahedron, which he introduces as a geometrical representation. His explanation also embraces some controversial remarks. I will have a short glance at some interpretations in the secondary literature although it is not my intention here to solve this problem or offer a new satisfactory interpretation. In the second part, I consider the rectangular prism, which Kuki also introduces as a geometrical representation of how one uses words standing for the "tastes" characteristic of the Japanese. Finally, I compare the explanations of both philosophers to point out their similarities and clarify to what extent geometrical representations can show how we use words in our language systems.

Discussion

Wittgenstein

What is the Colour Octahedron?

Especially in his so-called middle period, Wittgenstein discusses the colour octahedron in several places. According to Tina Wilde and Josef G.F. Rothhaupt, "Wittgenstein adapts the model of the colour-octahedron from Höfler" (Wilde 2002, p. 284). The person in question is the Austrian philosopher and educationalist, Alois Höfler, who attempts to explain coloured sight in relation to the psychological effect of colours. It is to note that although Wilde refers to the picture drawn in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Remarks*, it is actually not what he means by "colour octahedron". Now I give its three examples, which can be found in his other works (Figure 1).

Figure 1. *Pictures of the Colour Octahedron*



Wittgenstein's handwriting: Rothhaupt 1996, p. 243



Wittgenstein 2016, p. 16



Wittgenstein 1980, p. 8

As the editors of Wittgenstein's Cambridge lectures from 1930-1933, where the second picture stands, point out, and which one can clearly see from the third picture, what Wittgenstein means by "the colour octahedron" can be described as follows:

> The colour octahedron has one of the "pure colours" (red, blue, green, yellow, white, and black) at each corner, with white at the top and black at the bottom. (Wittgenstein 2016, p. 16, fn.13)

Hence, this colour octahedron can be said to represent a certain kind of relationship between some colour words shown in a geometrical figure. One can say, e.g., that the mixed colour "orange" stands between the pure colours red and yellow. What does Wittgenstein, however, aim at with this colour octahedron?

The Colour Octahedron as a Representation of the Nature of Colour

Let's see the following passages about Wittgenstein's notion of the colour octahedron. He writes:

> This [= the colour octahedron] is really a part of grammar, not of psychology. "People under these circumstances have red after-images" is psychology. (Wittgenstein 2016, pp. 16f., cf. Wittgenstein 1980, p. 8)

> An octahedron with the pure colours at the corner-points e.g., provides a *rough* representation of colour-space, and this is a grammatical representation, not a psychological one. On the other hand, to say that in such and such circumstances you can see a red after-image (say) is a matter of psychology. (This may, or may not, be the case--the other is *a priori*; we can establish the one by experiment but not the other.) (Wittgenstein 1975, §1, Wittgenstein 2005, p. 322)

Unlike Höfler, Wittgenstein argues that the representation of colour-space is not only *rough* but also not psychological. What seems especially relevant for the present discussion in the quote above lies in the following point: The representation via Wittgenstein's colour octahedron has an *a priori* character. In other words, one has not discovered this representation by *a posteriori* empirical investigations. Wittgenstein's colour octahedron is not a result of psychological experiments, e.g., of colour images people can have under certain circumstances.

Wittgenstein then refers to the investigations of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe about colour concepts to discuss differences between results of experimental investigations and "the *nature* of colour". In *Remarks of Colour*, he argues:

> Someone who agrees with Goethe believes that Goethe correctly recognized the *nature* of colour. And nature here is not what results from experiments, but it lies in the concept of colour. (Wittgenstein 1969, I, §71)

> And here "nature" does not mean a sum of experiences with respect to colours, but it is to be found in the concept of colour. (Wittgenstein 1969, III, §125)

With this, Wittgenstein also points out that the *nature* of colour is neither the result of experimentation nor a sum of experiences, and therefore has an *a priori* character. In this respect, it seems natural to think that Wittgenstein's colour octahedron is related to this "*nature* of colour". To put it simply, when it comes to the representation of the colour octahedron, he does not have experimental investigations in mind. Rather, he conducts "grammatical" investigations, similar to Goethe and William James (cf. Wittgenstein 1969, I, §70, Wittgenstein 1969, III, §125).

Octahedron and Grammar

As we see it in the passages quoted above, Wittgenstein stresses in several places that the colour octahedron has a "grammatical" character. In the following passage, he gives a reason for regarding it as "grammar":

> The colour-octahedron is grammar because it tells us that we can talk about a reddish blue, but not about a reddish green, etc. (Wittgenstein 2005, p.322, cf. Wittgenstein 1975, §39, Wittgenstein 1980, p. 8, Wittgenstein 2016, pp. 16f)

Wittgenstein uses the words "grammatical" and "grammar" in a somewhat specific manner in his later period. He explains the word "grammar" in the following way:

> Grammar explains the meaning of words to the extent that it can be explained. (Wittgenstein 2005, p. 32, cf. Glock H-J 1996, p. 152)

Wittgenstein also utilises the expression "the meaning of words" in a particular sense, which derives from the central idea in his later period:

> For a large class of cases of the employment of the word "meaning" – though not for all – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. (Wittgenstein 2009, §43)

When Wittgenstein says that the colour octahedron is grammar, it is obviously one of these cases where he also bears the notion of "meaning" as "use" in mind. Consequently, the colour octahedron as "grammar" is supposed to make clear how to use colour words in the colour system addressed by Wittgenstein. It is possible in this language, e.g., to talk about a reddish-blue, but not about a reddish-green. To repeat it again, however, this is not a result of experimental investigations, but rather a matter of how we use languages.

One can also see from Wittgenstein's explanations in what sense propositions about colour words are not empirical. He also regards the proposition about colour words, "The white cannot be darker than the blue or the red." (Wittgenstein 1969, III, §2), as grammatical and even as mathematical by saying "Here we have a sort of mathematics of colour" (Wittgenstein 1969, III, §3) and "We have a colour system as we have a number system" (Wittgenstein 1967, §357). The colour system has internal relations between colour words, just as our mathematical system has internal relations between numbers, formulas, etc. In other words, Wittgenstein takes these relations of colour words in the colour system to be analogous to the calculation of mathematics. In this sense, grammatical propositions about colour words can be considered just as little empirical as mathematical ones.

Different Grammars in Different Colour Systems

As there are different language systems, Wittgenstein also brings other colour systems than ours into play. He says:

> Imagine a *tribe* of colour-blind people, and there could easily be one. They would not have the same colour concepts as we do. For even assuming they speak, e.g., English, and thus have all the English colour words, they would still use them differently than we do and would *learn* their use differently.
> Or if they have a foreign language, it would be difficult for us to translate their colour words into ours. (Wittgenstein 1969, I, §13, cf. Wittgenstein 1969, III, §128)

This *tribe* would have another colour system than the colour system in the Western world and we could possibly not understand what they mean by their

words. What Wittgenstein thereby emphasises again is the difference in the use of language. The grammar of the Western colour system would then be also different from their grammar. Thus, the colour octahedron he takes as a geographical representation of grammar could not explain their grammar but would require a different geometrical form, unless their grammar could not have any appropriate geometrical representation.

The "Surveyability" of the Octahedron

How does the colour octahedron serve as a representation of grammar? Wittgenstein holds that it can make our grammar "*übersichtlich*". Unfortunately, one can find different translations of this German word in his different works. Above all, Peter Hacker levels criticism at this point: "The terms *Übersicht*, *Übersichtlichkeit*, and the related verb *übersehen* have given Wittgenstein's translators much trouble. They have chosen to translate it non-systematically in conformity with the demands of English style, thereby partially obscuring the significance and pervasiveness of the concept in Wittgenstein's work" (Hacker 2007, p. 151, fn.6). Hacker raises examples of expressions containing the translation of the term in question: "command a clear view", "perspicuous representation", "synoptic account", "Survey", "synoptic view", "perspicuity", "capable of being taken in", which records unsystematic and problematic translations.

Without discussing all these passages containing the word "*übersichtlich*" or the like, I address Wittgenstein's explanation about the relation between the colour octahedron and its "*Übersichtlichkeit*":

> The representation via the octahedron is a *surveyable* [*übersichtliche*] representation of the grammatical rules. (Wittgenstein 2005, p. 322)

> Using the octahedron as a representation gives us a *bird's-eye view* [*Übersichtlichkeit*] of the grammatical rules.
> The chief trouble with our grammar is that we don't have a *bird's-eye view* [*Übersichtlichkeit*] of it. (Wittgenstein 1975, §1)

For the sake of convenience, I adopt Hacker's translation of "surveyable" as "*übersichtlich*". This term is often discussed as fundamentally significant for Wittgenstein's philosophy in his later period, especially in the context of §122 of *Philosophical Investigations*, where this term also appears. However, instead of discussing interpretations of §122, I will instead concentrate on the necessity of the surveyability of the grammar, which is pointed out in the citations above, and also draw attention to the following aspect of the colour octahedron, which Wittgenstein formulates in another place:

> In fact, grammar can indeed sometimes be given through geometrical bodies, e.g., in the case of the colour octahedron. This is a perspicuous [*übersichtlich*] representation of rules of grammar, but it does not do away with the need for the rules. It only simplifies the rules and *makes them more perspicuous* [*übersichtlicher*]. (Wittgenstein 2003, p. 135, cf. Wittgenstein 2003, p. 141)

To encapsulate the ideas in all these passages, including this quote, one can say that geometrical representations such as the colour octahedron can make rules of grammar *more surveyable*, but these representations are not sufficient to thoroughly clarify them. Beyond such a geometrical representation, it is necessary to adequately grasp how the grammatical rules operate.

In Wittgenstein's other discussions, it is clearer to see this point, i.e., that the colour octahedron cannot explain enough how the grammatical rules of colour words look, even if it can simplify them. In *Remarks of Colour* part I §§16-33, he argues that white is not a transparent colour and in this sense unique and different from other colours such as green. In reference to several remarks (cf. Wittgenstein 1969, III, §197), Gieringer (2015) holds that Wittgenstein is ultimately unsatisfied with the idea of the colour octahedron as the representation of the grammar. If and to what extent he is not satisfied seems to me still discussable, but I at least agree that the colour octahedron alone – without further details – does not explicate that one cannot talk about "transparent white" in the system Wittgenstein bears in mind, therefore, not fully explain how to use the word "white" in this language system.

Does the Octahedron "Belong to Grammar"?

In the secondary literature, it is even controversial whether the colour octahedron after all serves as a representation of the grammar of colour words. Gordon Baker shows a negative reaction:

> In consequence, no verbal formulations of grammatical rules (and no assemblage of grammatical rules) can properly be called "a perspicuous representation of grammatical rules", and conversely the colour-octahedron cannot properly be viewed as a mere compendium of the combinatorial rules for colour words. (Baker 2004, p. 24)

According to Hacker, Baker claims that the colour octahedron is no more than a subordinate and supplementary representation:

> Baker held that the colour-octahedron is meant to be a second-order representation of the grammar of colour-words, i.e., not an expression of the rules for the use of colour words at all. Accordingly, the colour octahedron does not itself belong to grammar [...]. (Hacker 2007, p. 119, fn.23)

Hacker criticizes Baker's interpretation by appealing to Wittgenstein's remark, "The colour octahedron is grammar". Here it is not my aim to examine whether and to what extent it is really grammatical. Instead, I simply note that geometrical representations like the colour octahedron might accommodate this controversial point.

The Four Features of Wittgenstein's Colour Octahedron

In light of the considerations above, one can see the following features of the colour octahedron Wittgenstein takes to be a "grammatical representation". First, what he attempts to show with this representation is neither a sum of experiences nor the result of scientific experimentation; rather, it is a conceptual analysis which

has an a priori character. Second, the colour octahedron is supposed to make the rules about colour words such as "red" and "blue" *more surveyable* by representing how these words are related to each other. Third, the conceptual analysis with the colour octahedron is based on a kind of "linguistic pluralism". This means that different colour systems have different grammars, in contrast to the assumption that the colour system familiar to Europeans like Wittgenstein is the only correct one. Fourth, the colour octahedron is no more than a *rough* representation of the rules of colour words and this functional limitation may raise doubts about whether the octahedron can be regarded as "grammatical". With Wittgenstein's descriptions of "the geometrical representation" in mind, I will argue that Kuki's explanation about his "geometrical representation" also has these features.

Shūzō Kuki

Now I proceed to what Kuki says about the rectangular prism, which he raises as an example of geometrical representations. Of course, he neither deals with ways of applying colour words nor uses Wittgenstein's terms, such as "grammar"; rather, he examines certain words describing the Japanese character. Yet, Kuki's consideration shares considerable commonalities with Wittgenstein's investigations of language and it is worth calling attention to these commonalities to clarify the role geometrical representations play in the system of language.

In this regard, the reading I propose in this paper is different from what is often found in the secondary literature, especially in western studies of Kuki's philosophy. For *The Structure of Iki* tends to be understood as a kind of introduction to Japanese aesthetics. Graham Mayeda even says very specifically that its popularity outside Japan "is in part due to the subject matter – *geisha* culture and the relationship between a *geisha* and her lover – a theme that seems stereotypical as a representation of Japanese culture" (Mayeda 2020, p. 125). However, this understanding seems restricted. What Kuki achieves in his work is more than a mere exploration of a specific sort of aesthetics represented in Japanese culture. It is actually an attempt to "grammatically" analyse the Japanese language system, just as Wittgenstein does in his investigations.

As stated above, like Xu, I suggest reading *The Structure of Iki* from a Wittgensteinian point of view. However, our focal points are different. Xu rejects the two kinds of interpretations found in the secondary literature: that Kuki's philosophy is a sequel of Heideggerian "phenomenological-hermeneutic" thoughts, and that his conception of *iki* is so "nationalistic" that non-Japanese people cannot understand it[1]. Xu argues that like Wittgenstein, Kuki also sees the importance of "samples" such as geometrical representations and that the "samples" could reveal the "general meaning"[2] of *iki*, which goes beyond

[1]As the main advocates of these two kinds of interpretations, Xu raises Mayeda (cf. Mayeda 2006) and Leslie Pincus (cf. Pincus 1996) respectively.

[2]Unfortunately, the expression "general meaning" ("普遍的意味" in Japanese) is misleading and seems unsuitable to the Wittgensteinian reading of Kuki because Wittgenstein dismisses a "craving

Japanese culture (Xu 2016, p. 117) and it is, therefore, intelligible to all nations. My paper focuses on the considerations of the two philosophers on the role of geometrical representations, as well as their shortcomings. I neither deny the influence of continental philosophy on Kuki's thought nor question whether *The Structure of Iki* represents "nationalism". Regardless of these discussions, I attempt to grasp the concept of *iki* as encapsulated in Japanese language and culture. This is not a matter of nationalism, but just a matter of the variety/diversity of language systems, as is the case with colour systems and mathematical systems.

In the following sections, I first examine Kuki's investigations. Then I will show that Kuki's "geometrical representation" also has the four features distinctive of the "grammatical representation" discussed by Wittgenstein. As a result, Kuki's geometrical representation is also not immune to the problems of the geometrical representation Wittgenstein introduces for the explanation of grammar.

Kuki's Analysis of Iki as a "Phenomenon of Consciousness"

Kuki's investigations aim at clarifying the structure of *iki*, which is characteristic of the Japanese. Similar to Wittgenstein's contention, he also points out differences in the meanings of words between languages. Concerning the word "*iki*", Kuki says:

> If words describing natural phenomena already differ in this way [e.g., in the case of "sky" in English, "*ciel*" in French, "*Himmel*" in German] among languages, we cannot hope to find precise counterparts in one language for words describing specific social phenomena in other languages (Nara 2004, p. 14)

These specific social phenomena include the phenomenon represented by the word "*iki*", whose translation into other languages is also difficult and seems even impossible. Then Kuki continues:

> For a word to have a consistent meaning and value to a people, a linguistic path must be always open there. The fact that the West has no word corresponding to *iki* is itself evidence that the phenomenon of consciousness that is *iki* has no place in Western culture as a certain meaning in its ethnic being. (Nara 2004, p. 59)

Kuki stresses the importance of "a linguistic path" where words have consistent meanings and value to a people, when he speaks of "phenomena of consciousness", which he later on explains in more detail. I understand the expression "linguistic path" to mean that the meanings of words and expressions can be clear only inside of the language to which they belong. In my opinion, the word "meaning" in Kuki's sense is also concerned with the use of words or expressions, as Wittgenstein holds. In other words, both philosophers struggle to clarify language frameworks in which words and expressions can have their meanings. In this sense, I agree with Mayeda's reading of "a phenomenon of consciousness" as "a sort of representational framework or an attitude", although his reading traces back to

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for generality" that is supposed to be valid *absolutely*, i.e., independently of any system of language (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 17).

what the late Martin Heidegger calls "frame" ("*Gestell*"). This is "an idea or set of ideas through which we filter or interpret our experience" (Mayeda 2019, p. 525 and ibid, Fn. 4 & 5, cf. Mayeda 2020, p. 130)[3]. Such a "framework" reading is well compatible with Kuki's "linguistic pluralism" that there are several language systems such as German, French, etc. whose words and expressions have specific meanings that can be lost in translation.

What do Kuki's philosophical investigations of the notion of "*iki*" in his linguistic sense look like? He claims it is necessary first to make clear two kinds of the features of the "phenomenon of consciousness" of *iki*. He writes:

> To comprehend *iki*, which manifests itself as meaning as a phenomenon of consciousness, we must first recognize the **intensional features** constituting the meaning of *iki* and clarify their semantic content. We will then explicate **extensionally** the distinction between the meaning of *iki* and the meaning of related words in order to **differentiate** the meaning of *iki*. (Nara 2004, p. 18, emphases in original)

Kuki's analysis proceeds on the assumption that the "meaning as a phenomenon of consciousness" of a word can come to light by explicating the intentional and extensional features. Hence, these two kinds of explication are also needed for the "comprehension" of the phenomenon of consciousness of *iki*. The word "comprehend" generally has a specific meaning in Kuki's writings, according to Hiroshi Nara, the editor of his book *The Structure of Iki*:

> This usage [of "comprehend"] is based on the fact that, in other published writings, Kuki was quite strict about the distinction between ordinary understanding, including the sort of knowledge possible in the natural sciences, and the sort of comprehension that makes it possible to understand historical and cultural phenomena, including ideas, intentions, and feelings. (Nara 2004, p. 62, fn.14)

[3]However, I doubt if the Heideggerian – whether early or late – philosophy is relevant for the "framework" reading of *The Structure of Iki*. I think that not only Mayeda's Heiderggerian reading of *The Structure of Iki* in general, but also his allusion to the late Heidegger in the quote above are related to Kuki's manifestation that "a study of *iki* cannot be 'eidetic'; it should be 'hermeneutic'" (Nara 2004, p. 18, see also Mayeda 2020, p. 130), where Kuki also refers to Heidegger. Nevertheless, Kuki's mention to Heidegger especially addresses the work *Sein und Zeit*, which was written by the early Heidegger in 1927, while the late Heidegger introduced the term "*Gestell*" in the lecture first presented in 1949. It is therefore much later than 1930 when *The Structure of Iki* was published. In addition, as Masakatsu Fujita states (Fujita 2003, pp. 29f.), Kuki does not seem to use the term "hermeneutic" exactly in the same sense as in the context of *Sein und Zeit*. With this term, he rather intends to contrast the "eidetic" study that attempts to gain abstract general concepts with his method with which to grasp the living form of *iki*, "as it is, without altering its actual concreteness" (Nara 2004, p. 17). From this criticism of Mayeda's reading, it does not follow that, as Xu construes, there are essential differences between the thoughts of Kuki and Heidegger (Xu 2016, p. 119). I rather acknowledge Heidegger's substantial influence on Kuki in a nod to Takako Saitō's claim "Kuki's respect and impression for the direction of Heidegger's phenomenology is evident", especially when he uses the Heideggerian terms such as "essence" (Saitō 2016, p. 135, fn.9). Here, I just want to point out that the "framework" reading of *The Structure of Iki* does not require any reference to Heidegger and can be conducted independently from his thoughts.

Accordingly, the comprehension in Kuki's sense is different from the sort of knowledge possible in natural sciences and cannot thus, as I understand, be reached through experimental or empirical investigations. Rather, Kuki's analysis is directed towards the other kind of comprehension in the quote. This is the historical and cultural analysis of how several words including "*iki"* are used by Japanese people in many phrases in some Japanese novels, some Japanese theatres, their ordinary lives, etc. In this regard, I think his investigations are actually just as little experimental and empirical and just as much grammatical as Wittgenstein's ones.

Kuki finds it necessary to comprehend *iki* as a "phenomenon of consciousness" and the "objective expressions" of *iki*, claiming that the understanding of the former is a prerequisite for that of the latter. This approach is distinguished by its uniqueness because most of the studies on *iki* are inclined to begin with the latter or only deal with the latter (Nara 2004, p. 18, Fujita 2003, p. 36). For this reason, I first examine *iki* as a "phenomenon of consciousness".

Intensional Features of *Iki*

Let's look into the intensional features constituting the meaning of *iki*. Kuki explains its "semantic content", as he calls it (Nara 2004, p. 18), briefly and succinctly:

> *Iki* stands in an inseparable internal relationship to the idealism of bushido ["the way of the samurai"] and the unrealism of Buddhism. *Iki* means that *bitai* "coquetry" that has acquired *akirame* "resignation" lives in the freedom of *ikiji* "pride and honor". (Nara 2004, p. 60)

One might well say that the Japanese character of *iki* lies exactly in its Buddhist properties and the concept of bushido, which represent Japanese culture. Then, one can also see a difference between *iki* and the colours Wittgenstein addresses: unlike pure colours such as "red", "white", *iki* is not a pure property; rather, it is a composite of three distinguishing features: "coquetry", "resignation" and "pride and honour".

External Features and the Rectangular Prism of Taste

Now we consider the external features of *iki*. These features concern the internal relation of different words. Kuki says "we will clarify the extensional meaning of *iki* by examining and distinguishing other terms related to it" (Nara 2004, p. 24). He calls *iki* and these other related terms "tastes". I think he uses this term in the sense of "aesthetic judgments", similar to Immanuel Kant, who also uses it in the *Critique of Judgment*[4]. To explain the internal relation, Kuki introduces a rectangular prism as a geometrical representation of the meanings of the words of taste:

[4]In the original, Kuki uses the Japanese word "趣味" (*shumi*) and Nara translates it as "taste". Note that the German word "*Geschmack*" in the *Critique of Judgment* is not uncommonly translated as "taste" and "趣味" and it is also the case in the time Kuki lived in.

Figure 2. *The Rectangular Prism of Taste*



Source: Nara 2004, p. 32.

Furthermore, Kuki goes into detail:

> […] the two squares at the top and the bottom, corresponding to the determinants for the various modes of taste […] represent the two domains of the public. (Nara 2004, p. 32)

In this text, Kuki explains what each of the two different domains is like. Yet, it is important in the present context to note that tastes belonging to two different domains cannot stand together. It is also in the same domain that the words of taste connected by diagonal lines in the figure oppose each other: One cannot have *johin* and *gehin* at the same time and in this sense one can formulate: *jōhin* ↔ *gehin*; *hade* ↔ *jimi*; *iki* ↔ *yabo*. Yet, he adds that only *shibumi* lacks an obvious opposite (cf. Nara 2004, p. 24).

Through the rectangular prism, Kuki describes the character of the use of the words concerning *iki* as follows:

> It is thought that *jōhin* belongs to the domain of the public of general human being and, as such, does not interact with coquetry. (Nara 2004, p. 25)

> […] since *iki* encompasses aspects of *ikiji* "pride and honor" and *akirame* "resignation", *iki* is understood as a superior form of taste. When we look into the relation between *iki* and *jōhin*, we find they have superior taste and positive value in common, even as they differ with respect to coquetry. (Nara 2004, p. 26)

Consequently, Kuki doesn't simply claim that *iki* is by itself incompatible with *jōhin* ("elegant"), *jimi* ("quiet") and *hade* ("flashy"), but rather encompasses three different aspects that are incompatible with these tastes. Due to such internal relations of words of tastes the rectangular prism represents, I think one can also call the taste system "mathematics of taste", as Wittgenstein does in the case of the colour system.

The "Objective Expressions" of *Iki* and its Relation to Grammar

Now I turn to the analysis of objective expressions of *iki*. As already seen, Kuki places importance and priority on the analysis of *iki* as a phenomenon of consciousness and even says that one will not grasp the ethnic specificity of *iki* in the area of objective expression if one focuses on separately from the viewpoint of the phenomenon of consciousness (Nara 2004, p. 18). The goal of *The Structure of Iki* is nothing but to "understand the being of *iki* and elucidate its structure" and for this purpose, Kuki claims, "[we] were forced to approach the subject by way of conceptual analysis" (Nara 2004, p. 54). Due to his goal-setting at the beginning of this work, this "conceptual analysis" can be understood as the analysis of *iki* as a phenomenon of consciousness, i.e., the explication of the intensional and extensional features of *iki* (Nara 2004, p. 18, cf. Fujita 2003, p. 165). As a result, he, however, admits that "the particularized, lived experience cannot be described by means of conceptual analysis alone. Even if such experience is assigned a certain meaning, some part of it will elude analysis" (Nara 2004, p. 54). In other words, it requires more than the conceptual analysis including geometrical representations to fully grasp the lived experience of the meaning of *iki*, which is "rich in the concrete" (Nara 2004, p. 54). Here, I do not discuss what is concretely needed to understand this experience of the meaning of *iki*. Yet, it can at least be said that the analysis of the objective expressions is undoubtedly concerned with the use of the word "*iki*". I think this analysis is also necessary for the clarification of its grammar and sheds more light upon it.

At this stage, Kuki explains how *iki* is expressed in our daily lives, e.g., in certain ways of talking, posture, gestures, designs – e.g., parallel lines –, in certain colours – grey, brown and blue – (cf. Nara 2004, pp. 35, 41, 47). This aspect of *iki* also characterises the use of the word "*iki*". In my opinion, it is doubtful that the rectangular prism of taste alone represents these objective expressions, and it is, therefore, doubtful that the prism fully explains how to use the word "*iki*".

Also, I hold that the same kind of controversy between Baker and Hacker applies to the rectangular prism of taste. In other words, one can ask if this geometrical representation really represents grammar or it is nothing but a subordinate and supplementary representation. For Kuki's rectangular prism of taste can also be regarded as a "verbal formulation" of grammar, similar to Wittgenstein's colour octahedron, and thus can't be viewed as a "surveyable representation" of grammar either, if Baker is right.

Conclusion

So far we have seen several features common to the philosophical investigations of Wittgenstein and Kuki, both of whom use geometrical representations for their linguistic conceptual analyses. In summary, one can state the four following points. First, it can be said from Wittgenstein's point of view that, like Goethe and James, Kuki also does grammatical investigations of the words of taste, including "*iki*", and uses the rectangular prism for his analysis in a similar way to Wittgenstein's use of the colour octahedron. Second, one can conduct grammatical investigations in the system of colour as well as other systems, such as the system of taste. Third, different cultures can have different systems of taste and different geometrical representations depicting them, as is the case with the system of colour.

The fourth point is the most essential point in this paper. Indeed, geometrical representations such as Wittgenstein's octahedron and Kuki's rectangular prism can make the grammar of a given language *more surveyable* and simplify it. Nevertheless, it is still questionable if such a geometrical representation really represents grammar. With Wittgenstein's expression, it can be said that a geometrical representation is no more than "a *rough* representation" (Wittgenstein 1975, §1, Wittgenstein 2005, p. 322). In other words, grammatical rules are too complex to be geometrically represented regardless of the discussion as to whether geometrical representations are grammatical or not.

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The Role of Freedom in the Practical Philosophy of Kant and Reinhold

By Ivanilde Fracalossi[*]

It is a question of ascertaining, at first, the difficulties that prevented Reinhold from carrying out the long-sought deduction of a free and absolute cause for freedom of will within the framework of elementary philosophy, or in the plan of the faculty of representation in general. In a second moment, I briefly analyze the author's new strategy when trying to carrying out, or at least to deepen, his foundational approach through practical philosophy. These two movements have Kantian philosophy as a background. In fact, Reinhold takes this starting point after analyzing Kant's work and considering it problematic in some points, mainly the foundation of the effectiveness of freedom in the fact of reason.

Keywords: *Reinhold, Kant, freedom, representation, foundation*

Introduction

This paper brings as its central issue the problem of the relationship between the unique foundation of philosophy, sought by Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823) throughout his philosophical journey, and the deduction of a free and absolute cause for the freedom of the will, remembering that he also prioritizes practical philosophy in relation to the theoretical. I will highlight, first, the difficulties that prevented him from realizing the deduction of the moral law based on the faculty of representation in general, laboriously worked mainly on the 1789 text entitled: *Essay on a new theory of the human faculty of representation*[1]. Secondly, I verify how these difficulties are evidenced, above all, by Carl Schmid's[2] objections to his project. Schmid's criticism is important, because it is from there that Reinhold gives new impetus to his philosophy[3]. And, finally, I try to assess the changes that Reinhold, in response to Schmid, imprints on his philosophy from the texts of 1792, especially in second edition of the *Letters on Kantian philosophy*, where he does not seek longer to prove the non-impossibility of freedom departing from the faculty of representation in general, but he proposes the concept of freedom of the will (*Freiheit des Willens*) as the foundation of the moral law, based on the relationship between sane understanding and philosophical reason. The general hypothesis of this investigation is that in this entire journey, Reinhold, far from abandoning the old project of a fundamental doctrine of

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[1]*Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens*. Henceforth, *Essay*.

[2]*Empirical psychology* (*Empirische Psychologie*).

[3]Reinhold's letter to Baggesen of March 28, 1792 shows the conceptual change in his philosophical journey and the departure from Kantian philosophy.

philosophy, deepens it, taking as a point of support the concept of freedom of the will as the foundation of moral law.

Elementary Philosophy of Reinhold and the Primacy of Practical Philosophy

One cannot understand the scope of the central problem and the hypothesis that guide him without showing, albeit very quickly, some moments of Reinhold's philosophical trajectory. The real beginning of the development of his foundational theory takes place in *Essay*, a text already mentioned, with two related objectives. The most immediate is, with the theory of representation, to ground philosophically the unity between the theoretical and practical domains of reason starting from a single and first principle[4]. This goal, in turn, serves a broader one, that of constituting a philosophy as an apodictic science that could thus put an end to the philosophical quarrels of its time. The principle of representation would be in these terms the single root of the three superior faculties of the mind: sensitivity, understanding and reason. The philosophical gain intended by Reinhold, with the single principle of representation, would be above all systematic. From the same principle, representation in general, it would be possible to enunciate the properties of all species of representation, since the concept of representation would encompass "what has in common the sensation, the thought, the intuition, the concept and the idea" (Reinhold 2013, § X)[5]. Naturally, it is already possible to realize that Reinhold starts from Kant's *Critique of pure reason*, although that, according to him, could only be the starting point for solving philosophical problems, but not the answer itself.

Reinhold's criticism to Kant leads him to a philosophical project that aims to be more radical than the Kantian. It would not be up to *Elementary philosophy*[6], as Kant would have done, to restrict its scope to the problem of metaphysics as a science of intelligible objects, nor to take formal logic as the foundation of the investigation. In other words, *true Elementary philosophy* cannot and absolutely must not be founded on formal logic, on the contrary, logic must be founded on it. Not being able to establish itself in any knowledge given beforehand, not even on general logic, Reinhold has to seek the most fundamental ground elsewhere, namely, in theory of representation, the general principle of all particular species

[4]This first principle that is neither analyzable nor determinable is the fact of consciousness or faculty of representation in general.

[5]My translation.

[6]Reinhold puts the fact and not the definition at the base of his philosophy, something hitherto unheard of in the foundation of any philosophical system (even for critical philosophy), where the only principle determined by himself is given by the very formulation of this fact and, by through it, it is also given "the first and highest definition from where must start philosophy in general and, in particular, elementary philosophy as the science of the faculty of representation" (Reinhold, 2011, p. 94). Reinhold thus wants to avoid the circularity that exists in every definition. Trying to give a real definition of simple representation is to re-establish a concept of representation, which would not itself again be a representation. In other words, the name *Elementary philosophy* comprises Reinhold's entire foundational project, which encompasses both practical (moral) and theoretical philosophy.

of representation, which it relies on only in the fact of consciousness (*Tatsache des Bewusstseins*)[7].

The justification for this is that the concept of representation, being *immediately* extracted from consciousness, is absolutely *simple*. As such, it cannot be analyzed in other elements that precede it, nor can it be explained by another concept or principle (otherwise there would be a vicious circle, which would prevent it from being the first). Hence it is also self-evident, a property which makes it entirely adequate to provide the ultimate foundation of all explanation. In these terms, mere representation constitutes the propaedeutic to found not a particular knowledge of objects, but the sciences of the faculty of knowing and desiring. For this reason, although it is also propaedeutic, *Elementary philosophy* of Reinhold does not have a restricted scope like Kantian propaedeutic, for it is propaedeutic not to metaphysics, but to all philosophy, both theoretical and practical: "the science of the faculty of representation cannot remove the characters from the *concept of representation [only] from a part of philosophy*" (Reinhold 2011b, p. 76), as the author of the *Critiques* wanted.

However, it is difficult to understand the primacy of practical reason that Reinhold confers to the *Elementary philosophy*, object of controversy among some of his readers. The difficulty is that *Elementary philosophy* turned more sharply to the theoretical domain of philosophy, without denying, however, the primacy of practice. This was already present in the first and third books of the *Essay*, whose theory of reason presents, in a quick but intense way, a theory of the faculty of desire[8]. There, representation is seen unfolding in a direct relationship with freedom. Despite being asserted, the effective primacy of practical philosophy is not fully developed or consolidated, since Reinhold always emphasizes speculative reason. So much so that many interpreters see Reinhold's philosophy of this period as just a theoretical philosophy.

Notwithstanding, in my point of view the problem in this period of Reinhold's philosophy is neither in the scope of his work nor in the practical primacy he claims, but in the way to establish them. The method of deriving the fact of consciousness (Reinhold 2003, III, §)[9], then proposed by Reinhold, became so

[7]Reinhold states in first book of the *Essay* that every concept of knowledge presupposes the concept of representation, since all that is knowable must be representable. In this way, only representation can say what is representable or not. That is why Reinhold starts from the theory of representation to build his philosophical project, because the concept of representation, being something that everyone agrees on, would reach universally accepted validity, although its concept is not the same for everyone because until now it had not been well investigated, not even by Kant. On the other hand, a definition of it would lead to the circularity, but this does not mean an obstacle to the configuration of a theory of the faculty of representation, because independently of an explanation, the mere representation remains possible, in which the attributes by which it is conceived can be specified. Without them, representation cannot be conceived. In this explanation of the concept of representation, a dissection or total exhaustion of the concept must appear, that is, everything that is representable in this concept must be given and everything that is representable while it is representable (see Lazzari 2004, p. 69).

[8]*Fundamental lines of the theory of the faculty of desiring* (*Grundlinien der Theorie des Begehrungsvermögens*) (in third book of the *Essay*, pp. 560f).

[9]In this chapter Reinhold says that there is no priority between consciousness in general and representation in general. But at the beginning of the third book of the *Essay* he states that one is

enigmatic that it generated a fierce debate in its time, as well as the similar debate about the "fact of reason" in Kant's moral theory, which so much troubled the author of the *Essay*.

Probably, one of the difficulties arising from *Elementary philosophy* can be attributed to Reinhold's choice for a "shorter path" (*kürzer Weg*) than that explored by Kant in critical philosophy. In place of transcendental scheme, Reinhold elaborates degrees of spontaneity (or representation), having sensitivity as the first degree, where affection occurs; the third and highest is task of reason and consists in the production of the idea[10]. As in Kant, it is the understanding that make the mediation between sensibility and reason, providing, from concepts, the second degree of spontaneity. Reinhold makes the transition to the third degree of representation through an indirect judgment, or syllogism. Thus,

> he shows that the categories determined *a priori* by the understanding, depending on the form to which they are related, are capable of completely opposite determinations: if related to the form of sensibility, insofar as they belong to the understanding as mere forms of judgment, they are neither conditioned nor unconditioned; as they are determined in the schema by time, they belong to the understanding and are conditioned. But when they are finally determined *a priori* in the form of the syllogism, they belong to reason and are unconditioned. Thus, the representation of the unconditioned unit that is determined *a priori* in the form of the syllogism is idea in the strictest sense and, in fact, the highest and most general idea, and the attributes of the object of this idea determined in nature in reason, or pure unconditioned unity represented are universality, infinity, comprehensiveness and absolute necessity (Reinhold 2013, p. 511)[11].

In this process, Reinhold reverses the Kantian transcendental deduction, making it progress linearly from the presupposed foundation, which is an immediate principle[12], to the other faculties, and places the idea of freedom or absolute cause at the top of the theory of degrees of spontaneity. Thus, on this third

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different from the other, since consciousness in general is broader, as it comprises representation, where subject and object are distinct from it.

[10]See Onnasch (2005). In this text Onnash says that although Kant has made an important innovation with the close connection between intuition and category, because without intuition, the category is mere "form of thought" (KrV B 309), Reinhold is the first to try to prove the completeness of the tables of judgments and categories. His text is important to understand the action of judgment in the passage from one degree of representation to another, since in it two actions always occur: through one, the objective unity is produced from intuition and, through the other, it is again connected to intuition.

[11]My translation.

[12]In distinguishing Kant from Leibniz, Reinhold shows that is very aware of the importance of the notion of synthetic unification of representations, a notion that, notably, plays a key role in deduction. Therefore, Reinhold intends to deduce, "from the faculty of representation in general, *a priori*, all the formal components of representation, without never noticing the essentially derivative and particular character, contingent on the human faculty of representation" (Chenet 1989, p. 39). This means that Reinhold, although in favor of the synthetic unity of representations, does not approve of the Kantian deduction of categories, because it proves synthetic knowledge *a priori* according to the principle of possibility of experience, which for Reinhold is contingent. His transcendental deduction starts from the fact of consciousness, an autonomous and self-evident proposition, and not from the possibility of experience.

level, spontaneity would incorporate an *absolute self-activity*, and the unity produced by it would be *absolute*. According to Reinhold, the action of reason is the only action of the representing subject that can be thought of *as* both *uncoerced* and *unrelated* to anything, that is, as free, since it is not linked to any strange form in the production of the idea, and so it is also the only passage that leads to the realm of practice. In this sense, Reinhold claims that the unconditioned unity is, then, an *indirect* attribute of knowable objects, of phenomena and of experience; "an attribute that refers to the objects through the concepts that occur in themselves and belong to their form, concepts that, through reason, receive an unity that the understanding connected with intuitions cannot give them: the *unity of reason*" (Reinhold 2013, pp. 514–515).

Indeed, in this third degree, the subject of the faculty of representation is immediately representable only by reason, through an idea, not by understanding, and it must be conceived "as a free cause insofar as it is conceived as an absolute cause, and it must be conceived as an absolute cause insofar as it is the subject of reason" (Reinhold 2013, p. 537). Absolute cause does not need the connection between objective matter and the schema to acquire objective reality, but only the immediate relationship with the representing subject in an absolutely formal third-degree spontaneity.

This is the place where Reinhold finds himself at the end of *Essay*, believing has escaped of the difficulties that the Kantian concept of freedom presented. The author criticizes the Kantian postulates; he does not accept the causal series that goes to infinity nor the sovereign good as well as a supersensible foundation that constitutes the morality. But it is from here that the difficulty of the Reinholdian enterprise can be seen more clearly.

The Difficulty of *Elementary Philosophy*: The Primacy of Practical Reason and the Problem of Method

The main difficulty of *Elementary philosophy* is not in the unilaterality of the analysis of theoretical knowledge, but in the way of demonstrating the primacy of practice. Indeed, the difficulty arises when considering what is at stake in the third level of spontaneity. The ideas of absolute cause, absolute subject and absolute community (this is an attribute of the absolute subject) - three activities of the rational unit exposed by Reinhold, do not hold themselves on the theory of the faculty of reason contained in *Essay*. There were many objections, such as that in the third level, Reinhold cannot meet the requirement that in every representation there has to be form and matter, because there is only the form in these level (Lazzari 2004, pp. 161–162).

There is, however, another objection that will be more devastating, that which concerns to the justification of a freedom that provides the basis for pure and empirical will alike. In these terms, the problem reaches the core of Reinhold's proposal to provide a single philosophical foundation for the two realms of reason (theoretical and practical). The difficulty that the objection points out is evident in the theory of the faculty of will in the face of Reinhold's attempts to deduce a pure

and an empirical will from the same ground. In this text, pure will in general is called the faculty that consists of self-determination for an action and, from it, actions of reason are derived according to its objective, be it empirical (when the action of reason is subordinated as means of satisfying the drive towards happiness) or moral (mode of action of reason is according to no other law than that which it gives itself when it realizes the mere form of reason, a form determined according to its possibility, through its self-activity).

The problem that then presents itself in this attempt is that the will is considered equally free in all its statements, but it maintains, however, a difference in the degree of activity of spontaneity, or in the mode of action of a free being. The will in general is free, but it can act *comparatively* or *absolutely free*, that is, if the action of the human will submits itself to the laws of the interested drive and is compelled by an affection foreign to it, it *acts* only in a *comparatively* freeway, but insofar as it follows the law of disinterested drive, which receives its sanction as effective law only through the mere self-activity of practical reason, by which it submits itself, it *acts* and *is absolutely free.*

In Reinhold's text the point at which he relativizes the will is obscure. It is strange to accept that the same will is absolute and also comparatively free. In fact, the author seeks to dwell on both, and this is also what makes his theory embarrassing. On the one hand, the freedom of the representing subject must be understood as freedom of choice to be able to decide for or against the moral law, because that is the only way to prevent moral actions from being random, which would lead to suppression (*Aufhebung*) of all morality. Furthermore, such freedom of choice must also be compatible with the will in general, which must be in the decision for or against the moral law. On the other hand, only the decision in favor of the moral law can be understood as a self-determination of reason, which then faces a power to determine itself (*Sich-Bestimmen-Lassen*) through the objects of sensibility (Reinhold 2013, p. 90).

Everything indicates that the problem arises due to the Kantian identification of freedom and autonomy, regardless of whether it is possible to reconstruct the Kantian model of determination of will by means of the Reinholdian philosophy. The *Essay's* statements are a theorem taken by Reinhold from the Kantian equation of freedom and autonomy in the *Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals*[13] and in *Critique of practical reason*. That is, freedom and the legislation proper to a pure practical reason are the same thing, since the empirical (or *a posteriori*) will is never self-determination and free like the pure will (Lazzari 2004, p. 146). In second section of the *Grundwork*, Kant says that the will is a faculty of choosing only what reason, regardless of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good[14].

[13]See mainly Kant's (1968) argument at the beginning of the third part of the *Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals* (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*). Henceforth *Grundwork.*

[14]*Grundwork,* 36. Everything in nature acts according to laws. Only a rational being has the power to act according to the representation of laws, that is, according to principles, or a will. Since reason is required to derive actions from laws, will is nothing more than practical reason. If reason determines the will infallibly, then the actions of such a being, which are known to be objectively necessary, are also subjectively necessary, that is, the will is a faculty of choosing only what reason, regardless of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good.

However, the maintenance of this identity seems to be understandable in Kantianism, because only this way can one hope to deduce, from the concept of freedom of will, the concept of a moral law that is valid for all actions.

The texts show that this is also the expectation of Reinhold, who assumes, from this foundation of Kant, not only the thought of a freedom of will common to the moral and non-moral actions, but also that of a freedom that is identical to autonomy. It is quite likely that the author's difficulties in deducing general and empirical will from the same foundation are a consequence of this grounding in Kant's texts. Once it is assumed that reason only as pure, in a pure will, is practical, or rather, that practical reason and a pure will are identical, then only pure (and not empirical) will is the possible expression of will. This means, on the one hand, the lack of a conceptualization to describe the will as such distinct from a pure will. On the other hand, this brings as a consequence the transformation of the non-pure will into desire. After all, since the *a priori* determination of the faculty of desire leads only by reason to a *pure* will, the activity of reason in empirical will can be only *a posteriori* determination of the faculty of desire. Although, such a determination accomplishes absolutely no will, but only the nature of a desire[15].

Since Reinhold did not present explicit and unequivocally determinations of his absolutely free cause and of a will that expresses itself either as pure or as empirical, it is probably because he does not simply want the deduction of an absolutely free idea of cause, he wants it in the intended framework of the theory of the faculty of representation. This is precisely the possibility: either the idea of an absolutely free cause that fits in this framework, or that it expresses itself with the form and matter conceptualization of the theory of the faculty of representation, which, for Reinhold, constitutes the deduction of this idea and at the same time the justification of its logical possibility. However, by this framework, the wished deduction is very far from being achieved, on the contrary, it prevents its definitive realization to the extent that the Reinhold's representation "never effectuate itself only by the self-activity of the representing subject but, for this, it is also always necessary a given matter, to which this self-activity is connected and which can only be treated according to certain rules originally laid down" (Lazzari 2004, p. 153)[16].

However, it should be noted that Reinhold realizes the central problem contained in *Essay* only after reading Carl Schmid's criticism presented in

[15]For Reinhold, unlike Kant or Leibniz, desire is not will. Desire is just the demand of the interested drive. Will is freedom, the faculty of the person to determine himself for the effective satisfaction or dissatisfaction of a demand of the interested or disinterested drive. A will that has autonomy of free will (not the free will that Kant reserves exclusively the power to choose the law according to the maximum), which has the power to act for or against moral law.

[16]My translation. In every representation there must be form and matter, hence if Reinhold aspires an absolutely free cause, or a free activity of the representing subject within the framework of the theory of representation, the activity of this subject will never be independent of the form and matter relation. That is, the action of a free representing subject would escape the requirement of not being coerced and not linked to anything foreign to it, for there will always be a matter given from outside. In other words: within the framework of the theory of representation, a free and absolute action is impossible, because either it falls into formalism (which would mischaracterize the original rules that in every representation there must be form and matter), or the action would be linked to a matter, which prevents it from being absolute.

paragraph LIX (59) of his work *Empirical psychology*, edited in Jena in 1791. According to Schmid (1791), "the internal foundation of determining an activity, whereby only one representation in general is effected, once represented, cannot be sought again and found in a representation, therefore, nor also in any purpose that represent itself"[17].

This means that the original creation of representations, the activity in which a representation takes effect, is not correctly defined in its determination if one uses an already existing representation, because that would end up in a regress. We are dealing here, then, with a definition of the activity in which only one representation in general is effective, the true representation in the strict sense. Among the faculties the author rigorously differentiates those in which representations are possible (the faculty of representation with its representing force) and those that are possible only through representation (the faculty of the mind with its capacity for feeling, and the faculty of desire with your capacity to desire). Therefore, the faculty of representation is not, according to Schmid, an absolutely fundamental faculty in the sense that the other faculties were given by it or were already contained in it (Schmid 1791, p. 173).

Approaching his explanation succinctly, Schmid meant by this that the division of the powers of the mind becomes wavering when considering all efforts, every drive or instinct for the faculty of desire or even for will. Thus, it is assumed that the mind (*Gemüt*) acts blindly in the representation of certain objects (of the senses, understanding or reason) before a conscious effort originates. "Hence, necessarily, there have to be actions of the mind before desire and will, but they have been confused with expressions of will, thus impairing the accuracy of the method". He states that when Reinhold admits that drives do not all belong to the faculty of desire, these definitions must now appear to him as insufficient, for with this the being determined by the drive is also realized in other faculties, so that this characteristic mark no longer is enough to differentiate the faculty of desire from other faculties[18].

Schmid does not explicitly mention Reinhold's name in his review, but Reinhold recognizes himself in it. In his letter to Baggesen in early 1792, Reinhold admits the fact that not all drives can be thought of as forms of desire. He ends up acknowledging, by Schmid's objection, that the being determined by the drive to create a representation cannot be understood as desire, because then the necessary presupposition of the representation would be the already constituted desire, not

[17]My translation.

[18]In *Essay*, the drive (*Trieb*) of the representing subject is the link between the representing force and the faculty of representation. The first is the real foundation of representation, the second is the foundation of its mere possibility. The relationship between them, present in every representing subject, determines the effectiveness of the representation, because together they provide spontaneity and receptivity, that is, the form and the matter of representation. Therefore, "to be determined by the drive for the production of a representation means *desire*, and the faculty to be determined by the drive, in a broader sense, means the *faculty of desire* (*Essay*, 560-1). The faculty of desire is determined by the drive for real sensations, for sensation is the representation that is related to the *subject* as simple modifications of the mind that arise from the way of being affected. These modifications refer either to the form of receptivity or to the form of spontaneity determined in the faculty, and from them it is defined whether the drive is sensitive or intellectual.

the drive. He realizes that the more original the faculty of desire and representation tend to be, the more difficult will be to classify them together under a superior and comprehensive faculty of representation, falling apart the attempt to deduce a free and absolute cause.

There were several objections to the theory of the faculty of representation contained in *Essay*, but the one that most touched the author, causing him to decline some concepts, was Schmid's criticism against the determination of drive and desire in the theory of the faculty of desire. Reinhold realizes that in this theory, the power which is attributed to the reason, mainly in the deduction of absolute freedom, cannot be provided by one and the same faculty. As a result, he changes his interest to a uniform rational concept to describe the actual creation of the idea as creating a representation of reason in the mind. On the one hand, the reason to establish rules and limits, on the other hand, the will, as autonomous, no longer allows the faculty of desiring to be derived from reason.

The New Method of Proof of Moral Philosophy: The Deepening of Philosophy of Reinhold

We have seen that Reinhold's answer to the question in *Essay* is unsatisfactory: in what does consist the possibility of freedom? From the texts of 1792, mainly in *Letters on Kantian philosophy* (*Briefe* II), the author turns to the difficulty that prevented him from satisfactorily carrying out his fundamental task within the framework of the theory of the faculty of representation.

This text shows an evolution in Reinhold's argument when dealing with the problems of the Kantian system. His interest is no longer only in first *Critique*, but also in *Critique of practical reason*, and he is concerned with misunderstandings not only of critical philosophy but also with complex problems involving morality, natural right and the freedom of the will. The approach to conceptual determination in the theoretical and practical ambit is transformed. There is an emphasis on the idea of law and rules that indicate the priority reference of the interested drive and its satisfaction, as well as the thought of a complete subject that includes the representing subject. Reinhold (2004) expresses the differences took place in the conception of will and practical reason, as well as the interest in the theoretical recovery of the concept of person (*Person*):

> *Will* means the person's faculty to determine himself for the satisfaction or not of a demand of the interested drive. I say the person's faculty and not reason. This is the faculty to give prescriptions (to produce rules). It belongs to the will only insofar as the person can determine himself by means of a prescription that he himself gives for the satisfaction or not of the interested drive. Only it is not the will itself. An action of the will is also not, in any way, every prescription that is given and carried out by the rational subject, but only the one through which this subject is determined for the satisfaction or not of a demand of the interested drive. Consequently, we made mistakes about the concept of will when we look for it both in the mere faculty of reason and in the mere interested drives (Reinhold 2004, pp. 111–113).

Now the part of activity that formerly belonged to reason is attributed to the will, which can no longer be identical with the freedom of practical reason, since it comes into being as a characteristic of the faculty that the will accomplishes (Bondeli 2008, pp. LXX–LXXI)[19].

Mainly in the sixth, seventh and eighth letters, after a renewed analysis of Kant's moral texts, the concept of freedom of the will appears as the foundation of practical elementary philosophy. The free will is no longer found as a moment of the moral law, but the moral law as a moment of the self-activity of the free will, which is capable of deciding for or against the law. The seventh letter shows that the concept of will must determine the relationship between the interested and the disinterested drive. It becomes the middle term, or articulation, between the two drives and has the same position as the concept of representation in the structure of consciousness, which also mediates the relationship and difference between the representing subject and the represented object. Although, the will has a different function from representation, its work consists not only in differentiating itself for or against each individual drive, but also between the two drives: the interested and the disinterested. The will does not correspond to the relating and differentiating from the possible representation, but to the representing subject and its action of relating and differentiating (Reinhold 2008, p. 207). In other words, the drive is no longer the foundation of the will as it was in the *Essay*, but the will decides on it.

Also, the need to adapt common understanding to the appreciation of philosophical reason no longer exists in the *Letters* (*Briefe II)*. Now it is this that must adapt to the infallible sentence of common understanding, since the conviction of this is the justification of the concept of freedom of will and, in this conviction, there is no contradiction that can discredit it before the judgment of philosophical reason. Both are precisely linked to the *same fundamental faculties* of the human spirit,

> and they announce themselves in common understanding by irresistible and infallible *feelings* (*Gefühle*) and, through them, provoke convictions on which the philosophical reason, which seeks the *foundations* of these feelings, must remain at odds with itself as long as it fails to establish certain and distinct concepts of the fundamental faculties. The common understanding conceives the *soul* as an appearance of the inner sense, which it knows through the inner feeling as facts of consciousness and from whose reality it infers its possibility. For him, *freedom* is *real* according to the testimony of self-awareness and, *consequently*, also possible (Reinhold 2008, p. 207).

Therefore, for common understanding according to the testimony of self-consciousness, freedom "is also possible, *effective* and *consequential*" (Reinhold 2008, p. 309). But the philosophical reason, although it conceives the soul as the bearer subject of the causes of the appearances of the internal sense, may hence not be content with knowing these appearances through mere feelings and, therefore, pursues searching for concepts of the foundations of these feelings. Unlike the sane understanding, which infers of reality the possibility of facts of consciousness, philosophical reason only accepts reality if it is convinced of the possibility and it

[19]Reinhold refers here to the formula of consciousness expressed in *Essay*: "In consciousness, representation is differentiated from subject and object, but related to both by the subject".

will only be satisfied with itself about this reality, when it can answer the question: "what does it consist of the possibility of freedom? In other words, when it has reached a *definite and distinct concept of freedom as a faculty of the mind*" (Reinhold 2008, p. 208).

Nevertheless, philosophical reason, precisely because it cannot provide any justification for the possibility of freedom, must be satisfied with the results of the common and sane understanding in relation to reality and the possibility of freedom of will, because the starting point of such a "justification" would be the self-consciousness of freedom itself, assumed as infallible and absolutely certain, which, by itself, excludes the possibility of a refutation of the convictions of sane and common understanding by philosophical reason. This means that the philosophical reason, through its concepts, brings only the insight (*Einsicht*) of the sane understanding to the concepts and, together, it brings the justification of freedom. Thus, by assuming the freedom of the will as a fact of consciousness, the convictions of the common and sane understanding never contradict the philosophical reason according to itself, and the freedom of the will, rooted in the faculty of the mind, or soul, becomes both a feeling and a determinate and distinct concept.

Conclusion

What Reinhold has in mind here is to reject Kant's statement in the preface of *Critique of practical reason* according to which the reality of freedom is proved through an apodictic law of reason, that is, it reveals itself through the moral law (Kant 2003, A 4). His annoyance is because nowhere does Kant refer to a condition that should be fulfilled along with the conscience of the moral law for the adoption of the reality of the freedom of the will. His remarks greatly reinforce the interpretation that sees in the conscience of the moral law the only sufficient condition of our conscience of freedom. This rejection refers to the Kantian thesis of the fact of reason. The moral law, says Reinhold, is not given to us in an immediate consciousness as a fact of reason, because we are directly conscious only of two drives, one interested and another disinterested, and a faculty to decide for or against one or the other. To us is allowed to know only our freedom of will, which is only originally given to us as a disinterested drive, as a manifestation of practical reason. In this sense, he directly says that "the reality of freedom depends on the awareness of the demand of both the interested and the disinterested drive, and not on the awareness of the interested drive and practical reason" (Reinhold 2008, p. 256). Therefore, the concept of freedom does not maintain its reality just by the awareness of the moral law, as Kant wanted, since it is not quite the awareness of the moral law as such that originally accompanies our self-consciousness of freedom, but only the conscience of the disinterested drive (although not independent of the conscience of the interested one). In other words, Reinhold does not understand will in its essence as the causality of reason. Freedom is free, but reason no. Only awareness of the demand of the two drives forms the sufficient condition for the freedom of the will. And only self-consciousness of the freedom of the will makes it possible to understand the

disinterested drive or our moral feeling as an expression of practical reason. Therefore, Reinhold assures, moral action cannot be autonomous in the Kantian sense, in which the thought of legislation itself, according to which the instance that establishes the law is the same that receives and fulfills it, and the thought of a direct determination of the will for the moral law, two central marks of the autonomous will, leave pure practical reason only as a possible instance of action, but from which a decision against the moral law is not expected.

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Epistemic Awareness of Doxastic Distinctions: Delineating Types of Beliefs in Belief-Formation

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Doxastic distinctions help us define the basis and biases in belief–formation. Empirical and extra-empirical justification play an important role in determining doxastic distinctions. When we distinguish the different types of beliefs, we understand (1) that there are basically three kinds of beliefs, namely, verifiable, falsifiable, and unfalsifiable beliefs. Empirical justification provides the basis for establishing the veracity of verifiable and falsifiable beliefs. Extra-empirical justification provides the basis for establishing the veracity of unfalsifiable or irrefutable beliefs. (2) Verifiable or falsifiable beliefs that are reductive require the mandatory acceptance of their truth. However, unfalsifiable beliefs which are non-reductive require the volitional acceptance of their truth. Because there is both empirical and extra-empirical justification in belief-formation, we can accept beliefs with or without, against, or regardless of empirical evidence. Unfalsifiable beliefs do not mean that these beliefs are unjustifiable; it simply means that these beliefs are not empirically justifiable. Understanding the basis and biases of belief-formation is to be aware of how we come to know what we believe. As empirical basis allows us to hold beliefs based on either the principle of confirmation or falsification. Extra-empirical basis, namely phenomenological conjectures, allows us to hold beliefs founded on existential assertions. The intent of this paper is to present doxastic distinctions to help us understand the basis and biases associated with belief-formation. As long as epistemic claims are accepted, and their content is considered believable, the means used to arrive at those beliefs must also be respected. Every doxastic distinction not only provides the basis for belief-formation but also defines the role and limits of both empirical and extra-empirical justification in belief-formation. When we recognize the different types and different ways of justifying beliefs: we understand (1) why we can accept beliefs with or without evidence; against or regardless of empirical justification, and (2) know when to define beliefs as Plato argued as justified true belief and when to define beliefs as justified belief-decisions.

Keywords: *beliefs, justified true belief; justified belief-decisions, empirical and extra-empirical*

Introduction

Doxastic distinctions provide us an understanding of the basis and biases in belief-formation. While reality can be understood as either being mind-dependent or mind-independent, beliefs about reality are defined as either being physical or metaphysical. Justification of beliefs can be either empirical or extra-empirical. Empirical justification provides the basis for verifiable or falsifiable beliefs that are

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reductive in nature. The acceptance of reductive beliefs is non-volitional. Extra-empirical justification provides the basis for unfalsifiable or irrefutable beliefs that are non-reductive in nature. Belief in the cognitive self (sentience), rational self (sapience), volitional self (freedom), moral self (morals), and the divine self (God) are considered non-reductive in nature (Kierkegaard 1987). Acceptance of non-reductive beliefs is volitional. 'Unfalsifiable' beliefs do not mean they are unjustifiable beliefs; it simply means that they cannot be empirically falsified[1]. This, however, does not give us the liberty to believe in what is impossible (Wilkinson 2016). What it means is that beliefs can be justified for reasons other than what is empirically justifiable. Beliefs based on extra-empirical justification are believable as phenomenological conjectures. Phenomenological conjectures provide the basis for the veracity of metaphysical beliefs. From Plato's time, epistemology has tried to define the different types of beliefs without defining the role empirical or non-empirical justification play in defining the types of beliefs in belief-formation. In this paper, an attempt is made to show how belief-distinctions explain belief-formation, keeping in mind the end-goal of belief is "believing" in both physical and metaphysical truths (Engel 2004). While beliefs can be rational or empirical, verifiable or unverifiable, falsifiable or unfalsifiable, all beliefs are mental states. As mental or cognitive states, they can be defined, defended, and believed with or without, against, and regardless of empirical evidence because the empirical proof is evidence only for reductive beliefs and not the basis for non-reductive beliefs.

Plato argued both in Theaetetus and Meno that knowledge can be defined as justified true belief. This was challenged by Gettier, who argued that the tripartite analysis–namely, the truth condition, the epistemic condition, and the justification condition can only prevent lucky guessing but cannot prevent lucky truth (Gettier 1993). Hume and Kant's distinguished knowledge being either *a priori* or *a posterior* based on how we come to know what we know. Hume argued that beliefs are either sense-evident or self-evident, as such beliefs are either synthetic or analytic. Kant argued beliefs are either contingent or necessary—'true' in a given world or 'true' in all possible worlds. Pojman argued that beliefs are either caused or chosen, as such beliefs are either volitional or non-volitional. Popper and Russel argued that beliefs depending on how beliefs are ascertained are either confirmable or falsifiable. In medieval times due to the question of the ambiguity of sentences, beliefs were considered either as *de dicto* or *de re*. Tarski's argued that when beliefs are defined as true or false, beliefs are considered either '*closed'* or '*open*' (Tarski 1993). Kierkegaard (1987, p. 16) argued that while empirical beliefs can be considered as being either true or false, extra-empirical beliefs or phenomenological conjectures are an either/or matter. Foundationlists and coherentists argue that beliefs are basic or non-basic, depending on whether other beliefs support beliefs or not.

When we recognize the nature of different types of beliefs: we (1) understand why we can accept beliefs with or without; against or regardless of empirical evidence, (2) understand when the acceptance of beliefs are mandatory or non-volitional and when the acceptance of beliefs are non-mandatory or volitional. (3)

[1]In scientific terms falsifiability can be considered synonymous with testability.

understand when to define beliefs as *justified true belief* and when to define beliefs as *justified belief-decision*.[2] What we believe is either believable or unbelievable, falsifiable or unfalsifiable, verifiable or unverifiable, and what exists is either reducible or irreducible (Maudlin 2020). What is reducible is an empirical given and constitutes empirical knowledge; what is irreducible cannot be an empirical given, as such constitutes metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysical conjectures require a decision for or against what is known, hence called "justified belief-decision." Both empirical and extra-empirical justification are used to establish the veracity of beliefs to avoid erroneous beliefs, for there are falsifiable and unfalsifiable beliefs. Empirical justification can take care of establishing the veracity of falsifiable beliefs, and extra-empirical justification can take care of the veracity of unfalsifiable beliefs, such as existential assertions as "I am free" and phenomenological conjectures such as "there is God" (Northcott 2019). What must be noted is that empirical evidence is one way but not the only way belief claims are justified.

State Consciousness, Access Consciousness and Belief Distinctions

State consciousness as defined by Rosenthal (2002, p. 208) and Access consciousness as defined by Block (2002, p. 407) allows us to know both what we know and how we know what we know in belief-formation. Access consciousness allows us not only to be aware of whether what we know is true or false but also allows us to classify doxastic distinctions (Conee 1988, p. 394). Belief distinction can be classified into three categories. (1) Epistemological distinction *or a priori/ a posteriori* distinction allows us to distinguish *how we come to know what we know*. What we know is either sense-evident or self-evident. (2) Semantic distinction or synthetic/analytical distinction allows us to hold beliefs either by virtue of experience or held as true by definition. Here, the distinction is based on whether the predicate is contained in the subject or not. (3) Metaphysical distinction or contingent/necessary distinction allows us to define beliefs as true in a given world or true in all possible worlds. Contingency and necessity or two metaphysical concepts that are indivisible. For instance, Newton's discovery of the contingency of gravity to a given mass and his projection of gravity as a fundamental part of the universe is a metaphysical claim. We can make metaphysical claims about what is true in all possible worlds based on what is true in a given world, even though we have not been to all possible worlds.

A Priori /A Posterior Distinction—Epistemic Distinction

Based on how beliefs are formulated**,** beliefs are either based on the data of one's senses or the dictates of one's reason. Beliefs are either sense–evident or self-evident. Beliefs are based on either experience or independent of experience. What

[2]I developed this idea in my book (Samraj 2007).

is interesting about beliefs based on experience is that we do not have a choice in accepting or rejecting such beliefs. Belief in empirical truths is mandatory and non-volitional. We have to accept beliefs that are formulated by one's senses. Beliefs that are based on empirical or rational evidence, like in physical sciences or in mathematics, we have to believe. Sugar is sweet, or that 2+2= 4 are examples of beliefs that we have to accept. Thus there are two types of knowledge—namely empirical knowledge and rational knowledge, based on two types of justification —*a priori* justification and *a posterior* justification. Both *a posteriori* necessity and *a priori* necessity provide the basis for the content of belief-formation.

Synthetic/Analytical Distinction—Semantic Distinction

Based on whether the predicate is contained in the subject or not, we can further distinguish beliefs based on whether beliefs are held as true by definition or held as true by or because of experience. Kant argued that the synthetic/analytical distinction was strictly based on whether the predicate is part of the subject or not (Kant 1991). Some beliefs are held as true by definition, and some beliefs are held as true by and because of experience. Beliefs that are true by definition entails that the predicate is contained in the subject. Beliefs that are held as true because of experience entail that the predicate is not contained in the subject. Triangle has three sides is an example where the predicate is contained in the subject—the triangle. Whereas sugar is sweet is such that the predicate is not contained in the subject. The predicate is either contained in the subject or the predicate is made known by experience. God is a good example of something that is true by definition. According to Epicurus, immortality is the only thing that we can be sure about God. Immortality defines who God is (Sher 2001, p. 616). The essence of God is based on the ideality of God—namely immortality and not the identity of God. We can comprehend the ideality of God without having any information about the identity of God.

C**ontingent/Necessity Distinction—Metaphysical Distinction**

Based on whether a belief is true in a given world or true in all possible worlds, we can say that some beliefs are true in a given world, and some beliefs are true in all possible worlds, like 2+2=4. The truths of such beliefs cannot be created, cannot cease to be, and cannot have a beginning. Such truths are true in all possible worlds. That is why it is necessary to assume both the necessity of the mind and the necessity for an eternal mind. Without having a mind, we cannot understand such eternal realities. So, there is by extension, and conjecture the need for an infinite and eternal mind in which these eternal truths reside. Does having a finite mind imply the possibility of an infinite or an immortal mind, as Socrates argued for in Phaedo? If we can understand eternal truths like mathematics but have a mind that has a beginning then, there must be an eternal mind in whose mind such realities consist and exist. We cannot understand the concept of contingency

independent of understanding the concept of necessity. What is physical or empirical is true in a given world. But what is rational and metaphysical is true in all possible worlds.

What Counts as Justification in Belief-Formation

While empirical justification provides the basis for what is reducible, extra-empirical justification provides the basis for what is irreducible. What counts or discounts as evidence? To argue that only empirical evidence counts as evidence is to discount the diverse ways of how beliefs are formulated. Empirical justification is crucial in holding inductive and reducible beliefs; as such, verifiability, falsifiability, demonstrability, repeatability, and predictability are considered essential to scientific investigation (Conee 1988, p. 389). However, irreducible beliefs related to metaphysical beliefs require an extra-empirical basis for an understanding of what is comprehended. As such, the relevance of questions, conjectures, and paradigms are considered essential in holding 'irreducible' beliefs. While empirical evidence can be the basis for reducible reality, we cannot provide empirical evidence for non-reducible realities, such as the self, freedom, and God. God is definable and believable when we become aware of *de dicto* and *de re* essence of God, even though the *de re* essence of God is inexplicable and the *de re* existence of God is unidentifiable (Swinburne 2004). We understand the *de dicto* necessity for God and the *de re* necessity of God when we define God as the creator and that God is a necessary being. However, both the *de dicto* essence and the de re essence of God cannot be verified or falsified by empirical evidence. Hence, the reality of God can be justified only by extra-empirical justification based on metaphysical or factual necessity (Swinburne n.d.). Similarly, the self and freedom can be held only as phenomenological conjectures. We are conscious of the self and the nature of intentionality, which is the basis for freedom, because of which, we can choose what to think, believe, and act (Brentano 2002).

When we have empirical evidence, belief is mandatory; however, when we have extra-empirical evidence, belief is not mandatory but volitional. While empirical verification is the basis for sense-evident beliefs and comprehension is the basis for self-evident beliefs, volition is the basis for the acceptance or rejection of phenomenological conjectures. What is phenomenological or existential is an either/or matter (Kierkegaard 1987). While the end process of empirical justification is the birth of verifiable, predictable, or practical knowledge, the end process of extra-empirical justification is the birth of existential and metaphysical conjectures. The phenomenological method allows us to use the physical, rational, and metaphysical *eye* to define what exists. The mind, as such is aware of what exists both in terms of what is reducible and what is irreducible. And at some point, what exits becomes irreducible either at the existential level like the self and freedom or at the quantum level —call it fields, energy, strings, or waves (Chalmers 2016, Greene 2019).

So, how do we acquire and justify beliefs in belief-formation? For the purpose of this study, there are four ways we can justify beliefs. We can justify beliefs by

(1) the principle of confirmation (2) the principle of falsification, (3) the predictability principle, and (4) by phenomenological conjectures. Empirical justification can confirm or falsify epistemic claims. We can also confirm or falsify epistemic claims by the predictability principle. We can predict that the sun will rise tomorrow by past observation, or we can make a prediction based on possible future observation like Newton did-when he argued that the gravitational force on the moon would be 1/3 to that of the earth. We can make a prediction based on past observation, but we can also make predictions based on future observation, which can confirm or disconfirm one's belief (Popper 2016). The first three justification can be done by empirical justification. However, the last justification, namely phenomenological conjectures, can be done without empirical justification. The basis for belief rests with the analysis of the conscious phenomena itself, such as intuitive conjunctures in mathematics and morals.

There are two types of evidence, empirical evidence, and extra-empirical evidence. Since there are extra-empirical justification for beliefs, we can hold beliefs with or without, against or regardless of empirical evidence. Evidence or justification for beliefs is not limited to only empirical evidence. To be able to verify, falsify, or predict reductive claims can be based on empirical justification. However, to accept unfalsifiable or irrefutable and non-reductive beliefs such as existential assertions, mathematical (Fibonacci) sequence[3], ratios, infinity, and numbers can be possible only by phenomenological or rational justification. Why unfalsifiable or irrefutable beliefs require phenomenological or rational justification is because empirical justification cannot be the basis for its veracity—no empirical evidence to confirm, disconfirm or refute non-reductive claims. Existential assertions and metaphysical truths cannot be subjected to empirical testing methods because they are phenomenological conjectures based on the dictates of conscience or reason. Moral conjectures such as it is "better to be just than unjust"; "it is better to good than evil," or it is better not to do certain things than to do certain things cannot be falsified because they are lived truths. Morals are true because we discern right from wrong and choose to do right or wrong. Similarly, historical facts are not repeatable (Walls 2014); we cannot refute or go back to see things as they were. Creativity is a non-reductive reality, as such, cannot be reduced to a brain state. Creativity along with non-reductive beliefs, such as self, freedom, and the concept of God, can be accepted only as phenomenological conjectures.

Empirical evidence is one way but not the only way we can know about reality. There are two kinds of reality—reality that is dependent on the mind and reality that is not dependent on the mind. Physical reality is a reality that is mind-independent; mathematics and morals are two kinds of reality that are mind-dependent. However, while we cannot have mathematical truths without the mind, mathematics is not of our own making (Goodman and Snyder 1993). And if mathematical truth seems to be timeless, then there must be an eternal mind in whose mind such realities exist. The reality of mathematics and morals has no particular place or location, as such, referred to as logical or abstract space

[3]Mathematics—Fibonacci sequence and the Golden Ratio. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVO2dcuR7P0.

(Herrick 1994). The mathematical reality, like moral reality, is non-spatial, non-physical, and non-temporal. However, unlike math, morals entail action to do what is right –which is mind-dependent. The conscious self must 'will' to act. So there is reality and what we know of reality. But while what is real is mind-independent, what we know of what 'is' is mind-dependent.

Types of Beliefs

Beliefs as mental states can be defined, defended, and believed. Beliefs are referred to as proportional attitudes—(believing, hoping, or willing) because of the content of the propositions (Chisholm 2002, Engel 2004). However, the content of consciousness or propositions is such that it can be reductive or non-reductive. What we are cognitive *of* can be reducible or irreducible. If it is reducible, then it can be verified objectively, but if it is irreducible, then it would remain subjective and known only subjectively. So the mind is aware of beliefs that are reducible and beliefs that are irreducible. Both empirical evidence (reductive) and extra-empirical evidence (non-reductive) evidence play an important role in belief formation. When we realize that at one level of our inquiry, what is known is irreducible, and at that level, there is no empirical evidence for a non-reductive given. So the types of beliefs define what role empirical or extra-empirical evidence provides for beliefs. All beliefs are subjective, but because of the nature of reality, beliefs that are reductive are objective, beliefs that are non-reductive remain subjective. We shall now see how and what role empirical or extra-empirical justification play in distinguishing different types of beliefs.

Depending on whether beliefs are supported by other beliefs or not, beliefs are either basic or non-basic. Basic beliefs are beliefs that are not supported by other beliefs, and non-basic beliefs are beliefs supported by other beliefs. Foundationlists argue that there are basic beliefs and that these beliefs support other beliefs, but themselves are held unsupported. Coherentists argue that there are no basic beliefs and that all beliefs are supported by other beliefs (Conee 1988, p. 395). The basis for basic- beliefs is that it is immediate, non-inferential, and direct (Alston 1993, p. 42). The basis for non-basic beliefs is mediatory, inferential, and indirect (Alston 1993, p. 44). Either inductive/reductive justification or deductive/non-reductive justification can establish basic beliefs. Both empirical and non-empirical justification can provide the basis for basic beliefs, which would justify non-basic beliefs. However, while basic beliefs are considered indubitable, incorrigible, and infallible, non-basic beliefs are considered as coherent conjectures (Alston 1993, p. 45).

Depending on whether beliefs are caused or willed, beliefs are either volitional or non-volitional. Non-volitional beliefs are mandatory. We do not choose to believe in such beliefs—we have to believe in such beliefs. "Seeing is believing" (Pojman 1985, p. 40). On the other hand, volitional beliefs, such as belief in God ((Pojman 1985, p. 41), freedom, and the self, are such that we must choose to believe in such beliefs. For no empirical evidence can be proof or guarantee for such beliefs. For instance, seeing God is not proof of establishing the essence of God. Belief in the essence of God can be held as 'true' independent of proof for

the existence of God (Pojman 1985, p. 39). Seeing the existence of God is not proof for the truth of the essence of God. That is why God does not and cannot create theists or atheists. We must choose to believe or disbelieve the essence of God. Volitional beliefs are beliefs that we must choose to believe independent of any evidence presented. Adam, who saw God, would have had to choose to believe or disbelieve that who he saw was God. Non-volitional beliefs are called causal beliefs because they can be traced to empirical or inductive justification. Volitional beliefs are considered existential beliefs because they can be traced to extra-empirical or deductive conjectures. We cannot verify or falsify non-volitional beliefs (Hume 2004); we can only deny or affirm volitional beliefs.

Depending on whether beliefs are self-evident or sense-evident, beliefs are considered being either a *priori* or *a posteriori.* Beliefs are either empirical or rational. How beliefs are obtained divides beliefs into two types. Experience is the basis for empirical truths. Rationality is the basis for rational truths. Empiricists argue for inductive reasoning in that inductive justification provides the basis the verifiability and the basis for prediction (Carnap 1946, Williams 2001). Rationalists argue for deductive conjectures in by accepting premises, postulates, and paradigms that provide the basis for rational truth. Empiricists argue that what is not sensed is nonsense, while the rationalists argue for the three laws of thought—namely the law of identity, the law of contradiction, and the law of excluded middle, as the basis for truth. Strict positivists argue that only sense verifiable beliefs should be considered as justifiable. However, rationalists argue that non-empirical justification or conjectures can and do provide justification for rational truths.

Depending on whether the predicate is contained in the subject or not, beliefs are considered as being either synthetic or analytical. Beliefs are either true because of experience or beliefs are true by definition, independent of experience (Williams 2001). That is why rejecting *a priori* truth involves a contradiction while rejecting a *posterior* truth does not. To say that sugar is not sweet is possible because one could be sick when one's transducers might not be functioning well. But to say a triangle does not have three angles is involves a contradiction for a triangle without three angles in no triangle at all. Synthetic knowledge –i.e., sugar is sweet is true only because of experience (Hume 2004, p. 81). On the other hand, triangles have three sides is true by definition alone. Here extra-empirical justification is the basis for analytical conjectures, while synthetic beliefs require some sought of empirical justification.

Depending on whether beliefs are true in a given world or true in all possible worlds, beliefs are considered as being either contingent or necessary. Contingent truths are true in a given world, and necessary truths are true in all possible worlds. Until the 1970s, it was held that only a priori necessity could be held as true is true in all possible worlds. After Kripke, we now know that we can also hold *a posteriori* necessity as true in all possible worlds; once we know that water is H20, only what is H20 can be water is true in all possible worlds (Kripke 1980). However, *a posterior* necessity is established only because of empirical justification. However, metaphysical necessity can be established independent of empirical justification. Today most scientists would accept that scientific fact as probable or contingent in a given world. Here we can see the need for empirical justification to establish

contingent truths and non-empirical analysis and conjectures to establish necessary truths.

Depending on whether beliefs are verifiable, beliefs are accepted or rejected as scientific or not scientific. Beliefs that can be observed and shared are accepted as scientific beliefs. Observation and experimentation produce positive sense data[4]. What does verifiability mean? If we say there is a black sheep, the positivists will only say that the visible part of the sheep is black[5]. Only sense experience shared with others is scientific knowledge[6]. Ideas related to God, freedom, or immortality of the soul is not observable hence not explicable and definitely not verifiable. The positivists will confirm what they can confirm—nothing more or nothing less. The positivists argue that observational justification is the basis for the correspondence theory of truth, as such would reject all forms of non-empirical justification as the basis for truth (Hempel 1935, p. 50). Here we notice that verifiable beliefs require empirical justification and non-verifiable beliefs require extra-empirical justification because non-verifiable beliefs deal with non-reductive truths.

Depending on whether beliefs are falsifiable, beliefs are considered as science or non-science—pseudoscience. If the emphasis is on the confirmation principle, then it is pseudoscience (Grattan-Guinness 2004); if the emphasis is on the falsification principle, then it is science (Popper 2016)—refutable in practice and in principle (Ayer 1946, p. 32). If a belief is not falsifiable, then it is not a matter related to science. Falsifiability means that it is inherently testable (Ajayi 2017). Falsifiable beliefs are beliefs that can be refuted or disproved. Falsifiable and verifiable are two different things[7]. "There is a unicorn" is verifiable but not falsifiable. All unicorns are white is falsifiable but not verifiable.[8] Falsifiable means testability and implies refutability/predictability. We can predict a theory to be false in the future (Wigmore 2017). While we can verify or falsify empirical truth (Gezelter n.d.), Popper argued that it is impossible to know that a theory is true based on observation. Only 'falsification 'is deductively valid (Gezelter n.d.). If T, then O; Not O; Not-T. On the other hand, If T, then O; O; T, is deductively invalid. Falsifiability[9] can disconfirm that all swans are white, but no amount of verifiability can establish the veracity that all swans are white. While we can either verify or falsify a claim, Popper argued that verification could not affirm as much as what falsification can assert. As such, Popper argued that falsification should be the line of demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Science has to be verifiable in practice and in principle.

Consider the statement—All crows are black. Are we talking about all crows that exist now, and does it include all crows in the past and future? For it is not possible to verify past crows. Verifying that crows are black cannot confirm that

[4]What is positivism. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9yCpTe9e-MI.
[5]What is positivism. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9yCpTe9e-MI.
[6]What is positivism. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9yCpTe9e-MI.
[7]What are the value of unfalsifiable beliefs. Available at: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/51397/what-is-the-value-of-unfalsifiable-beliefs.
[8]What are the value of unfalsifiable beliefs. Available at: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/51397/what-is-the-value-of-unfalsifiable-beliefs.
[9]Theory or hypothesis to be contradicted by evidence.--"All swans are white" is falsifiable because we can observe that black swans exist.

all crows are black. One instance of disconfirmation that crows are not black does not negate that crows are not black, only that all crows are not black. Smoking causes cancer does not mean it will cause cancer. We can establish by instance confirmation that smoking causes cancer, but no amount of confirmation can establish that smoking will cause cancer. We cannot prove a hypothesis (that all crows are black) by confirmation but we can disprove it by disconfirmation or falsification— showing one instance of a non-black crow) (Olszewski and Alvaro Sandroni 2011, p. 788). Falsifiability could be an ideal basis for scientific theories, but verifiability is a sufficient basis for scientific investigation. Testability or predictability/repeatability rather than falsifiability is a minimal requirement for science (McNaughton 1999).

Depending on when and why beliefs are considered as unfalsifiable, beliefs are either phenomenological conjectures or existential assertions. Are there unfalsifiable beliefs—such as conjectures for non-spatial entities, non-temporal beings, and the self? "I am conscious," "there is God' "I am free" are unfalsifiable beliefs that are justifiable only by the phenomenological investigation. "Free will is not a testable hypothesis." The reality of freedom is neither verifiable nor falsifiable (McNaughton 1999); belief in liberty is unfalsifiable. Unfalsifiable beliefs are like axioms that cannot be proven wrong. Empirical justification cannot establish nor negate existential assertions and phenomenological conjectures. These do not come under sciences, according to Popper, because it cannot be verified or falsified by empirical means, as such, requires phenomenological investigation. That is why it is argued that we do not have freedom from metaphysics, but we do have the liberty to engage in metaphysics. Unfalsifiable beliefs are metaphysical conjectures. Metaphysical conjectures can be held as true with or without, against, or regardless of empirical evidence.

Depending on whether beliefs include the truth condition—truth or falsity/ right or wrong, beliefs are considered as being either 'open' or 'closed'. Open beliefs are beliefs that are not accompanied with the assertions of truth or falsity as part of the claims, such as "Snow is white". Closed beliefs or sentences that are accompanied with truth assertions as part of the claim, such as "It is true that snow is white." Adding the word truth or falsity to a statement does not make the statement true or false. While empirical justification is the basis for the veracity of an account, empirical evidence cannot be the basis for moral and religious views. Abortion is right or wrong cannot be reduced to an empirical given.

Depending on whether beliefs are ambiguous or not, beliefs are considered as being either *de dicto* or *de re.* If the pronoun is ambiguous (*John* knows that *he* is tall) or the noun is not replaceable, then it is considered as *de dicto.* On the other hand and if the pronoun is clear and the noun is replaceable (Superman is Kent Clark) then it is considered as *de re.* Here again, if the ambiguity is *de dicto,* then it involves empirical justification; on the other hand, if the ambiguity is *de re,* then extra-empirical or phenomenological conjecture is required.

Depending on whether beliefs are sense-assertive or self-assertive truths, the established truth is either empirically true or metaphysically true. Sense assertive truths can be an empirical given. However, self-assertive truths cannot be an empirical given. As such, while sense assertive truth can be verified, self-assertive

truths cannot be verified. Someone's like or dislikes cannot be empirically verified. As such, existential and metaphysical assertions such as "I like chocolate, ""I am free," or "I believe in God "do not require anything more or less than their claim. Existential or metaphysical beliefs can be held with or without, against, or regardless of empirical evidence because phenomenological justification or conjectures is the only basis for holding such beliefs. Humans do not choose to be conscious, have a conscience, or be free; humans are conscious, have a conscience, and are free. To be conscious, have a conscience and be free is an existential given. Empirical justification cannot establish nor negate these metaphysical claims. When we accept the cognitive self, the volitional self, the moral self, and the divine self, metaphysics is a given. We are born to be metaphysicians either in the acceptance or the rejection of metaphysical truths. That is why while we have the freedom to accept or reject metaphysical truths, we do not have the freedom to escape from metaphysical truths. As such, metaphysical beliefs are belief decisions for or against what his known, as such in the words of Kierkegaard, an either/or matter (Kierkegaard 1987, p. 176).

Depending on whether beliefs are considered as a paradigm or a principle[10], beliefs can be either a factual given or a phenomenological given. While what is considered as a factual given can have an empirical basis, what is considered as a phenomenological given does not need an empirical basis. For instance, belief in the cosmic inflation theory or the creation and expansion of the present universe by repulsive gravity is a demonstrable hypothesis[11]. However, belief in the self as a phenomenological given is not an empirically demonstrable given. Though MRI imaging can detect whether one's brain is dead or alive, it cannot tell whose brain is alive or dead. The conscious self is undetectable. The assertion that the creation and the expansion of the universe happened in less than a second, resulting in a flat universe,[12] is again demonstrable. However, there is no empirical evidence as to how and when insentient matter becomes sentient. Empirical evidence is one way but not the only way we can demonstrate truth. What is reductive (water is H2O) is a factual or an empirical given. Dissimilarly, what is non-reductive (the self and freedom) is a phenomenological given without an empirical basis. Only phenomenology can allow us to understand the reality of the self and freedom.

[10]Axiomatic.

[11]Alan Guth explains inflation theory. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEXD gpttmyc.

[12]Alan Guth explains inflation theory. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEXD gpttmyc. (It appears flat because the north/south circumference is smaller than the east/west circumference}. It appears that the empirical evidence that the creation and expansion of the universe was accomplished faster than the speed of light.is the basis for the reality of the universe.

Conclusion

Beliefs can be held with or without, against, or regardless of empirical evidence because empirical evidence is one way but not the only way of knowing reality. Beliefs as mental states can be defined either as being *a priori* or *a posteriori*; basic or non-basic, contingent or necessary, volitional or non-volitional, verifiable or not verifiable, falsifiable or unfalsifiable, *de dicto* or *de re*, closed or open. Depending on whether beliefs are sense-evident or self-evident, beliefs are either synthetic or analytic. Depending on whether beliefs are supported by other beliefs or not, beliefs are either *basic* or *non-basic*. Depending on whether beliefs are true in a given world or true in all possible worlds, beliefs are either contingent or necessary. Depending on whether what we know is caused or chosen, beliefs are either volitional or non-volitional. Depending on how beliefs are ascertained, beliefs are either confirmable or falsifiable. Depending on whether beliefs we hold are mind-dependent or mind-independent, beliefs are justified empirically or non-empirically. Depending on the ambiguity of a sentence, beliefs are either *de dicto* or *de re*. Depending on whether beliefs are considered as a paradigm or model, beliefs can be either empirically demonstrated or phenomenally acknowledged. Depending on whether beliefs are defined as true or false, beliefs are considered either '*closed*' or '*open*.' Depending on whether beliefs are understood as a paradigm or a principle, beliefs can be either a factual given or a phenomenological given. Acceptance of reductive or empirical beliefs is mandatory as such non-volitional. Acceptance of beliefs that are non-reductive or metaphysical is not mandatory as such volitional. We are born to either accept or reject metaphysical truths. Whether you affirm or deny metaphysical truths, we are all metaphysicians. Existential assertions and phenomenological conjectures can be accepted with or without, against, or regardless of empirical evidence.

Beliefs as mental states are about what is physical or about what is phenomenological. Beliefs related to the physical are reductive; beliefs related to what is phenomenological are non-reductive. Both empirical and extra-empirical justification play an important role in belief-formation in science and metaphysics alike. While 'reality' is either mind-independent or mind-dependent, beliefs about reality are either empirically justified or extra-empirically justified. Beliefs related to mind-independent realities like that of matter or what is physical are inductive and reductive. Beliefs related to mind-dependent realities are either like mathematics, deductive, non-reductive, non-physical, non-spatial, and non-temporal, having an abstract location, or like morals, non-reductive, intentional, and irrefutable, having an abstract location in one's mind. As such, beliefs about reality are either verifiable, falsifiable or unfalsifiable. Verifiable and falsifiable beliefs (related to the physical or material world), are inductive and reductive and can be verified or falsified by empirical methods. However, unfalsifiable or irrefutable beliefs (related to the psychical or mental world), which are deductive and non-reductive, cannot be ascertained by empirical justification. Evidence or justification for beliefs are not limited to empirical evidence alone; it can involve extra-empirical justification. As such, questions, postulates and paradigms, and phenomenological conjectures provide justification for non-empirical beliefs. There can be no need

for empirical justification for non-reductive existential assertions or phenomenological conjectures--such as belief in the self, freedom, and belief in God. The phenomenal self and freedom are non-reductive realities similar to what is at the quantum level. Empirical justification cannot establish nor negate existential assertions and phenomenological conjectures. When we recognize the nature of different types of beliefs: we (1) understand why we can accept beliefs with or without; against or regardless of empirical evidence, (2) understand when the acceptance of beliefs is mandatory or non-volitional and when the acceptance of beliefs is non-mandatory or volitional. (3) Understand when to define beliefs as *justified true belief* and when to define beliefs as *justified belief-decision*. For all phenomenological beliefs are accompanied by a decision for or against what is comprehended.

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ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΕΝ ΔΟΞΗΙ ΤΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΣΑΙ: An Enigmatic Depiction of the Second Sophistic in Philostratus and Eunapius' *Lives of the Sophists* or What is Indeed the Mentioned Sophistic?

By Ranko Kozić[*]

On the basis of evidence obtained by unravelling enigmas in Philostratus and Eunapius' Lives of the Sophists *and lifting the veil of mystery surrounding some of the crucial, sophistic-related passages from Isocrates and Dio Chrysostom's writings, we were able to arrive to a conclusion that, contrary to all expectations, the Second Sophistic is closely connected not so much with rhetoric as with philosophy itself, no matter what the so-called sophists say of the phenomenon in their attempts to disguise the essence of things. Paradoxically enough, it turned out that the enigma in Eunapius and, above all, Philostratus' work played almost the same role as did myth in Herodotus' historical work in so far as only the skillful use of the mentioned stylistic device might confer an aura of magic to the scarce material being at the disposal of the authors.*

Keywords: *Second Sophistic, Philostratus, Eunapius, legend of Socrates, Xenophon's Memorabilia, Isocrates, Platonism, enigma, symbolism*

Introduction

The phenomenon of the Second Sophistic, as presented by Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists*, can best be symbolized by the centaur's painted figure as described in his *Imagines*[1], a figure whose human and equine constituent parts are so fused to each other that the human eye is not at all capable of discerning where one of the mentioned parts begins and where the other ends and what might be considered genuinely human in the centaur's hybrid form. Curiously enough, it is the mentioned author's brief characterization of the exponents of philosophy, commonly regarded as sophists, as *tous philosophésantas en dóxei tou sophisteûsai*[2], that reminds us of the aforesaid hybrid form, a formulation that assumed characteristics of winged words in the following time periods and thus caused the phenomenon of the Second Sophistic to remain still shrouded in mystery.

Paradoxically enough, even more enigmatic than the above-mentioned characterization is Philostratus' clarification (*VS.*, 484) that he applies the name σοφιστής (*sophistés*) not only to orators whose surpassing eloquence won them a

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[1] 2, 2 (Education of Achilles).

[2] *Lives of the Sophists* (hereinafter referred to as *VS.* = *Vitae sophistarum*), 479: toÝj filosof»santaj ™n dÒxV toà sofisteàsai kaˆ toÝj oÛtw kur…wj prosrhqšntaj sofist¦j ™j dÚo bibl…a ¢nšgray£ soi, or in the English version by Wilmer Cave Wright: "I have written for you in two books an account of certain men who, though they pursued philosophy, ranked as sophists, and also of the sophists properly so called."

brilliant reputation, but also to philosophers who expounded their theories with ease and fluency, with the mentioned term thus including, implicitly, the exponents of the ancient sophistic and thereby indicating difficulty in the enigma itself in so far as an equals-sign was set between the rival spiritual currents such as sophistic, philosophy and rhetoric, believed to have waged with each other one of the most bitter struggles in the history of ideas in the course of the last four centuries BC[3]. The fact that the above-mentioned characterization is the least difficult of all the others we encounter in the opening passages from Philostratus' *Lives* speaks to the problem the researcher confronts in attempting to determine the nature of the new sophistic.

Now we focus our attention on other enigmas so as to be in a position to conclude what their function in Philostratus' work is, and will begin by saying that it is closely associated with the author's poetics, which means that unravelling enigmas is a necessary prerequisite for understanding the key message of not only Philostratus but also Eunapius' biographies of the sophists, without which it is hardly possible to adequately evaluate not only the works by the two mentioned authors but also post-classical Greek literature in its entirety.

In the opening passages from Philostratus' biographies of the sophists we come across, except for the mentioned one, three other enigmatic formulations laden with meaning and yet highly deceptive, as shown, among other things, by the fact that they play a game of hide-and-seek with the researcher – something that gains in importance all the more so as the mentioned game represents the key element of the author's poetics, as we shall shortly see. It is Philostratus' most deceptive formulation that we will start from, and when we say "the most deceptive" we mean by this, above all, the fact that it contributed the most to the mystification of the Second Sophistic as a phenomenon, with the research on the Greek renaissance of the first century thus getting caught time and again in a vicious circle ever since von Arnim's time. In the key passage from the prologue to his *Lives of the Sophists* Philostratus holds the view that the sophistic of his own time must not be called "new", but rather "second"[4], because it is old, just due to

[3]Hans Friedrich August von Arnim advocated the view that the content of the notions filÒsofoj (*philósophos*), sofist»j (*sophistés*) and ·»twr (*rhétor*) had not considerably changed over time, as a result of which it ended up being basically the same in the period of the late Greek renaissance as it was in the Athens of Socrates and Plato, as can be inferred from the introductory chapter of his work *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampf um die Jugendbildung* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1898), 4 ff. In an attempt to prove his thesis, he points to the fact (*Das Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, 77–84) that an almost parallel turning to rhetoric occurred in both the Peripatos and the Academy when headed in the third century BC by Lycon and Arcesilaus respectively, with this kind of innovation in the teaching process being regarded by the author as a decline in the case of Peripatos and a rise, as far as the Academy is concerned. He, moreover, considered Ariston's living word resembling the song of the Sirens to be the culmination of the mentioned process, a song which was, instead of with Socrates, erroneously associated with the sophistic and yet regarded as a convincing proof of its victory over philosophy.

[4]*VS*., 481. To tell the truth, the term "second sophistic" was itself in a certain measure disputable to none other than the authors of the two extensive and model monographs on history of Greek literature such as Schmid and Stählin (1981, p. 688) and Lesky (1971, p. 1139), in so far as the mentioned term, according to the latter, leads us astray and, in the view of the former, represents a certain kind of legend with an all too evident tendency concerning Aeschines as the creator of the new sophistic.

the fact that it represents the same phenomenon as the ancient[5]. Contrary to all expectation, Philostratus will outdo himself in clarifying this paradoxical attitude of his and saying that the new sophistic, unlike the ancient which used to discuss philosophical themes at length discoursing on courage, on justice, on the heroes and gods, on shape of the universe, called philosophy down from heaven and placed it, so to speak, in cities by sketching the "types of the poor man and the rich, of princes and tyrants[6] and handling the arguments that are concerned" with the historical and civilizational legacy bequeathed to the world by the great personalities[7]. What immediately springs to mind after casting a cursory glance at this short list of themes is the fact that the favourite topics of the new sophistic are also Socrates' themes of choice, discussed and elaborated at length, above all, in Plato's *Republic*. The last-mentioned theme, i.e. a lasting historical and civilizational legacy left to the mankind by great personalities, is also laden with meaning in so far as this in itself indicates, though in a remote way, that a peculiar legend has left an indelible mark on the Second Sophistic, as will be seen shortly.

The second of Philostratus' enigmatic formulations appearing in the prologue to his *Lives* is, as it seems, of even greater importance to us in so far as it points to the problem of the method widely applied by the exponents of the new sophistic in both their public appearances and their literary works. Philostratus (*VS*., 481), despite maintaining in categorical terms that there is no noteworthy difference between the exponents of the ancient and the new sophistic, contradicts himself when pointing to the essential difference in the methods used by the founders of the old and the new sophistic, Gorgias and Aeschines respectively, a difference expressing itself in the fact that, unlike the followers of Gorgias who handled their themes as they pleased, i.e. trusting in both the inspiration of the moment and the improvisation, those of Aeschines handled them according to the rules of the art of rhetoric. In another passage from the mentioned prologue, Philostratus will attempt in an enigmatic way to eliminate this contradiction, when comparing the method of the philosophers to that of the sophists and saying that both are reminiscent of the art of divination, with the only difference between them consisting in the fact that the philosophical method resembles the prophetic art which is controlled by

[5]It was this very formulation that influenced Gerth's (1962, col. 725) understanding of the Second Sophistic, as testified by his article "Die Zweite oder Neue Sophistik,", otherwise essentially based on Paul Graindor's (1930, p. ix) attitude, according to which there are no substantial differences between the ancient and the new sophistic, in so far as both of them were essentially characterized by the purely formal element such as rhetoric. The same is true for Kroll (1940, col. 1039 ff).

[6]It would be better to use, instead of the wording "the types of the poor man and the rich, of princes and tyrants" we encounter in Wilmer Cave Wright's translation, what seems to be a more accurate formulation, such as "social classes of the poor and the rich and the mindset of the princes and the tyrants". The English version of this and all other passages from Philostratus and Eunapius is borrowed from Wilmer Cave Wright's edition of the mentioned biographies (LCL 134).

[7]*VS*., 481. It is noteworthy to remark that the expression t¦j ™mj Ônoma Øpoqšseij was, as it seems, erroneously translated by Wilmer Cave Wright as "arguments that are concerned with the definite and special themes for which history shows the way." See Montanari (2004) sv. Ônoma (*ónoma*), where we encounter the meaning of *persona*, i.e., *personality*, fitting in this context.

man[8], i.e. – if we may say so – by *logos*, as distinguished from the sophistic one reminding him of the style used by oracles and soothsayers, who, to paraphrase the emblematic image of poet and rhapsode in Plato's *Ion* (533d), give an impression of being *automata*, or rather *channels* through which a deity utters expressions and sentences in a flood of words[9]. That interpreting the above-mentioned context in Philostratus' *Lives* through a prism of both the emblematic image in *Ion* and the term *logos*, as expressed in another emblematic image of Platonic philosophy, such as that of the winged chariot in the *Phaedrus*[10], was not off the point is shown below.

We come across the third enigmatic formulation at the very end of the prologue to the biographies of the sophists, where magical power is ascribed to the art of the sophistic, as evidenced by the fact that the Athenians shut the sophists out of the law-courts because of their great cleverness and that the two greatest exponents of the forensic oratory, Demosthenes and Aeschines, pitilessly "branded each other with the title sophistes" (*VS.*, 483) so as to discredit altogether the opposing side in the eyes of the jury. When again in the same context we encounter the fact that in their private life the two great men of the forensic oratory "claimed consideration and applause on the very ground that they were sophists," as testified by Aeschines' account of Demosthenes boasting to his friends that he had "won over the votes of the jury to his own views" (*VS.*, 484) by using a magical power, we cannot shake off the feeling that what it is all about is yet another among many instances of dichotomy in the opening passages from Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*. What makes this case particularly interesting is the fact that the core of the problem is not so much the mentioned dichotomy concerning the use of the term *sophistes* by both Demosthenes and Aeschines as what is omitted by the author, which is to be regarded as the greatest enigma. Philostratus himself seems to have consciously tried to avoid adducing another, even more important testimony of Aeschines (1, 173) according to which Socrates was considered the sophist par excellence by the Athenian public opinion of his own time. It's just what can lead us to the quintessence of the problem, such as unravelling the key message of Philostratus' *Lives*, which can only be achieved through the decipherment of symbols, or rather enigmas wrapped in the riddle of the arrangement of biographical material in the opening passages from the mentioned work – something that can help us have a clear insight into whose attitude towards the sophistic was adopted by Philostratus.

[8]*VS.*, 481. As a result of Philostratus' attempt to disguise the essence of things, the method of the philosophers is closely associated with the one already applied "by the Egyptians and Chaldeans and, before them, by the Indians, who used to conjecture the truth by the aid of countless stars."

[9]*VS.*, 481. But when it comes to the lacking presence of rhetoric in this comparison, we ought to bear in mind that the terms *sophistic* and *rhetoric* are often used interchangeably by Philostratus.

[10]244a–257b. On the interrelatedness of lÒgoj (*lógos*) and man…a (*manía*) in Plato's philosophy see attitudes taken by Reale (2000, 231, n. 132): "L'ispirazione e la divina mania sono insufficenti, perché potrebbero al massimo essere portate al livello dei poeti e lasciare privi di scienza e di consapevolezza, le quali derivano dal logos. Occorre una mediazione sintetica di queste due forze, che è appunto quello che Platone cerca di fare con la sua filosofia."

The Symbolism in the Arrangement of the Biographical Material in the Opening Passages from Philostratus' *Lives*

While conceiving his *Lives* Philostratus seems to have been faced with an almost extremely difficult, if not impossible, task which consisted in providing quite a common catalogue reminiscent of a brief summary with characteristics of an interesting, exciting reading matter possessing, if we read it attentively, truly magical power in some of its passages. What he says in the very preface with hidden aim to justify a concise narrative in his *Lives*, namely that he will not add the fathers' names in all cases, but only for those sophists who were the sons of illustrious men (*VS.*, 479), speaks clearly about how enigmatic every remark of Philostratus is, which was, as it seems, dictated by the fact that he hadn't at his disposal enough material so as to be in a position to faithfully describe all the phases of an intellectual current which has left an indelible mark on the entire body of post-classical Greek literature – a fact which can sufficiently explain his relentless drive and passion for disguising the very essence of things.

The only relatively ample material into possession of which he may have come seems to have covered the time period overlapping with his own age, a period marked by the outstanding figure of Herodes Atticus with his manifold activity being, unlike that of all the other exponents of the intellectual current, presented in more detail (*VS.*, 546–566), which is of additional importance to us, in so far as this detail in the composition of the *Lives* clearly indicates that a section dedicated to Herodes contains one of the crucial messages hidden in it. We shall see somewhat later what this massage is since it essentially depends on the symbolism in the arrangement of biographical and not only biographical material in the opening passages from Philostratus' *Lives*, namely on what is either omitted or suggested through barely detectable allusions.

The catalogue of both the properly and so-called sophists, as presented in the opening passages from Philostratus' writing, is divided into two almost equal parts in which the arrangement plays a very important role. The first part, or rather group is made up of the names of the philosophers who expounded their theories with ease and fluency of a rhetorician, whereas the second one is mainly composed of the exponents of the ancient sophistic. The catalogue of the philosopher (*VS.*, 484–492) opens with Eudoxus of Cnidus, followed by Leo of Byzantium, Dias of Ephesus, Carneades, Philostratus the Egyptian and Theomnestus of Naucratis[11], with this brief survey ending in a section about Dio of Prusa and Favorinus of Arelate as the seventh and the eighth exponent of the group respectively, to which they should not at all belong, given the epoch of their activity as well as their personal attitudes. The fact that Favorinus was given a place of honour at the very end[12] of the list seems to have been motivated by the

[11]*VS.*, 486. According to Wright (1952, p. 16, n. 2) he is in all likelihood the academician mentioned by Plutarch, *Brutus* 24, as a teacher at Athens.

[12]This can be explained only by the fact that Favorinus' life was full of paradoxes so cherished by the authors of the Second Sophistic, as testified by what he himself said about his life in an ambiguous and paradoxical manner of an oracle: "Though he was a Gaul he led a life of the

author's covert intention to mystify the very essence of things. To tell the truth, there might have been external reasons for putting Dio's name into this group, in so far as the activity of all of the group's exponents is, with only one exception[13], associated with the Academy which also had a strong influence on the teachings of Dio. We'll be in a position to ascertain what the real reason is for placing Dio's name almost at the very end of the mentioned brief catalogue only after taking a closer look at the names of the authors classed among sophists in the other catalogue appearing in the opening passages from Philostratus' *Lives*.

The last mentioned catalogue (*VS.,* 492–510), unlike the former, seems at first sight to be more consistent, in so far as it is made up of the names whose relation to the sophistic could be regarded as indisputable, but, on the other hand, what is, as in the previous case, still enigmatic is their arrangement within the group. Thus, the list opens with the exponents of the ancient sophistic who play an essential role in Plato's dialogues and, no less important, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, such as Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Hippias of Elis, Prodicus of Ceos, Polus of Sicily, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Antiphon of Rhamnus, Critias of Athens, with this summary representation of facts ending, as in the previous case, in somewhat extensive passages dedicated to both Isocrates and Aeschines and their literary and rhetorical activity. At first sight, we would be tempted to say that this brief register is a true reflection of Philostratus' theses presented in the prologue to the work, in so far as the names of the founders of the ancient and the new sophistic, or, in keeping with the author's favourite terms, the first and the second one, namely those of Gorgias and Aeschines, appear at the register's beginning and end. But we have already become accustomed to the fact that in Philostratus nothing is what it seems at first sight to be and that all he says is associated with an enigma or a higher sense. Thus, the mention of Aeschines' name at the very end of the second catalogue seems to represent a curious optical illusion aimed at shrouding the essence of things in magic and mystery. This affords a welcome occasion for raising the question – on what do we base this assertion?

The parallelism of special places Dio and Isocrates occupy in the two brief catalogue referred to above points more than anything else to Philostratus' favourite method of suggesting the essence of things by using hardly perceptible allusions. It is by this parallelism that Philostratus seemed to have admitted in a very subtle way that throughout its history the Second Sophistic had not always been the same phenomenon, as advocated by him in the opening passages from the *Lives* – something that was already announced by his classing one of the major exponents of the mentioned intellectual current, none other than Dio Chrysostom, among the philosophers. If we then add to this the fact that the names of key figures in both catalogues, such as those of Dio and Isocrates, are presented in reverse chronological order, we have the impression that Philostratus sought to disguise the very essence of the phenomenon and thus make it possible for it to

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Hellene; a eunuch, he had been tried for adultery; he had quarrelled with an emperor and was still alive."

[13]Philostratus the Egyptian. There is no hint as to his affiliation in Philostratus' cursory remark on his way of living.

assume characteristics of both magic and mystic. In order to gain insight into what the mentioned magic and mystic look like, we must adhere to chronological order and first focus our attention on Isocrates so as to be in a position to obtain an answer to the question such as: "whose concept of the sophistic was adopted by the author of the *Lives*?"

Isocrates and Dio's Understanding of the Sophistic and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*

What we encountered in Isocrates seemed to have made things even worse for us, in so far as it turned out that the mentioned author, like Philostratus himself, applied almost the same tactics of carefully disguising the very essence of things, which is also true for his method, being, though different in form, intrinsically the same as the one successfully used by the author of the biographies of the sophists. Instead of allusions, omissions and enigmatical arrangement of facts, we are now dealing with something reminiscent of Socrates' own approach as described in Plato's early dialogues and graphically characterized by its author as both *drunkenness of speech* [μεθύω (*methýo*)][14] and *dizziness* [ἰλιγγιῶ (*ilingiô*)][15], blurring his eyes and, to put it with Krumbacher (1897, p. 764–65)[16], beating a devil's tattoo in both his own and his audience's ears at the very moment when a certain ethical notion is being equated with the very opposite as a result of his (i.e. Socrates') striving to give the universally applicable definition of it, as testified by one of his five attempts made in the *Lysis* with the aim to determine the nature of love in which the mentioned phenomenon ended up being paradoxically identified with hate itself[17]. We feel the same kind of both dizziness in the head and devil's tattoo in our ears when we ascertain that the terms 'philosophy' and 'sophistic', otherwise denoting opposite, contrasting phenomena, were alternately used by Isocrates in the self-same meaning[18], even in one and the same context in his main work *Antidosis*[19], where his own judicial procedure was, moreover, insistently

[14]Plat., *Lys.*, 222b: boÚlesq' oân, ™peid¾ ésper meqÚomen ØpÕ toà lÒgou, sugcwr»swmen kaˆ fîmen ›terÒn ti eἶnai tÕ o„ke‹on toà Ðmo…ou.

[15]Ibid., 216c: oÙk oἶda, ¢ll¦ tù Ônti aÙtÕj „liggiî ØpÕ tÁj toà lÒgou ¢por…aj ...

[16]With reference to Makrembolites' novel: "Die Darstellung des Eustathios gehört zu dem Wunderlichsten, was Byzanz aufzuweisen hat; das ist kein style précieux und kein englischer euphuism mehr, sondern in nervösen Windungen aufgeführter stilistischer Eiertanz, bei dem uns vor Augen und Ohren schwindelt ... "

[17](Hereinafter referred to as *Ant.*), 213a: pollo‹ ¥ra ØpÕ tîn ™cqrîn filoàntai, ØpÕ dὲ tîn f…lwn misoàntai kaˆ to‹j mὲn ™cqro‹j f…loi e„s…n, to‹j dὲ f…loij ™cqro…, e„ tÕ filoàmenon f…lon ™st…n, ¢ll¦ m¾ tÕ filoàn ...

[18] *Ant.*, 209 (e„kÍ katafrone‹n tÁj filosof…aj); 215 (toÝj oÙ katafronoàntaj mὲn tÁj filosof…aj, polÝ dὲ pikrÒteron kathgoroàntaj aÙtÁj); 220 (Óti sofistÍ misqÕj k£llistÒj ™sti kaˆ mšgistoj); 243 (dieyeusmšnoi tÁj filosof…aj).

[19]*Ant.*, 168 (tÁj koinÁj tÁj perˆ toÝj sofist¦j diabolÁj ¢polaÚsw); 170 (t»n te filosof…an ™k pollîn œnomizon ™pide…xein ¢d…kwj diabeblhmšnhn); 206 (tÍ to…nun filosof…v fan»setai kaˆ toàto sumbebhkÒj); 209 (e„kÒtwj ¨n ¤pantej t¾n ¥gnoian qaum£seian tîn tolmèntwn oÛtwj e„kÍ katafrone‹n tÁj filosof…aj). The fact that in the *Antidosis* Isocrates' art is more often referred to as philosophy than sophistic speaks for itself.

identified with that of Socrates[20], as a result of which it appears at first sight not to be possible to discern where philosophy ends and where sophistic begins and what can be regarded as genuinely philosophical in a purely sophistical subject matter, as in the case of the already mentioned pictorial representation of the centaur's dual natures in Philostratus' *Imagines*.

The fact that the mentioned term, i.e. sophistic, was even used in the *Antidosis* to denote the teachings of the Ionian philosophers[21] as well as those of the Seven Sages (235) and Solon himself[22], graphically illustrates a deliberate effort to mystify the phenomenon of sophistic, which further complicated every attempt at drawing any meaningful line of demarcation between philosophy and sophistic as expressed in Isocrates' oeuvre. It turned out that the only possible answer to this curious game of hide-and-seek should be based on the assumption that every author, even against his will, reveals the elements of self-interpretation. It was this that actually happened to Isocrates despite the fact that he was desperately trying to remove all traces leading to the basic postulates of his poetics, his worldview and his political course of action. After doing a close reading of the *Antidosis* we got the impression that he "betrayed" himself against his will not only once but all three times, thus providing a precious opportunity for us to have an insight as to what his understanding of the sophistic actually was and how much it differed from that of Dio so as to be able to see a controversial phenomenon of the late Greek renaissance in a new light.

Now it can be said with certainty that Philostratus' enigmatic formulation appearing in the prologue to his *Lives of the Sophists*, namely τοὺς φιλοσοφήσαντας ἐν δόξῃ τοῦ σοφιστεῦσαι (*tous philosophésantas en dóxei tou sophsteûsai*), comes from the *Antidosis* or, to be more precise, from the mentioned passages in which philosophy and sophistic were equated with each other more and more insistently. If we take into account Dio's disparaging attitudes towards the exponents of the ancient sophistic in confrontation with whom he used a whole series of mocking expressions, we are driven to the conclusion that there is, at least on a superficial level, a breach of continuity on a line starting from Isocrates, leading further to Philostratus and ending with Eunapius. What we encounter in Dio'swork, namely an interplay between reality and illusion expressing itself, unlike the play we face in Isocrates and Philostratus, in the enigmatic form of at first glance irreconcilable dichotomies, seems to have made things even worse in our attempt to decipher poetics of the major exponents of the Second Sophistic, but, despite all this, it will turn out that key postulates of Dio's poetics essentially fit with the trend referred to above, as we shall shortly see.

Before examining more closely the question of the ontological aspect of Dio's poetics essentially characterized by the above-mentioned dichotomies, we have to go back yet again to the three mentioned instances in which Isocrates, against his

[20]*Ant.*, 15: " … although he alleges that I am able to make the weaker case appear the stronger …" (Cf. Plat., *Ap.*, 19b); *Ant.*, 27: "… for he sees that you are over-ready to accept slanders, while I, because of my age and my lack of experience in contests of this kind, shall not be able to reply to them in a manner worthy of my reputation …" (Cf. Plat., *Ap.*, 17d).

[21]Cf. *Ant.*, 268 where Empedocles, Ion, Alcmeon, Parmenides and Melissus were characterized as "ancient sophists."

[22]*Ant.*, 313: "… who was the first of the Athenians to receive the title of sophist … "

will, betrayed elements of his poetics. The instances are all the more important as they reveal the prime mover of all the spiritual aspirations over the entire time period of the late Greek renaissance. Even more importantly, the mentioned prime mover will turn out to be behind the entire strategic, nation- and state-building project based on a legend launched with the aim to put it into practice much more effectively, as we shall shortly see.

In one and the same narrow context in the *Antidosis* (209–211), we come across three key instances of self-interpretation which help us understand not only Isocrates' view of his own art, but also the relationship between his art and the kindred spiritual phenomena such as the ancient sophistic and forensic oratory. What immediately springs to mind is the fact that Isocrates, just like Philostratus himself, looks upon the ancient and the new, i.e. his own sophistic as the same phenomena, with the only differences between them being in his view reduced to levels and methods, which, unlike what was advocated by Dio, can be regarded as an attempt aimed at mitigating the dichotomies. In the context already mentioned we encounter three key expressions such as *pains and industry* [μελέται καὶ φιλοπονίαι (*melétai kai philoponíai*)], *suitable training* [ἐπιμέλεια (*epiméleia*)] and *noble character traits* [καλοκἀγαθία (*kalokagathía*)] used by Isocrates to determine both the nature and the aim of his method being now compared to the extremely painful training of the intellect[23] conducted by him with the purpose of making would-be adepts of rhetoric acquire full awareness of what is called *epiméleia*[24] and thus creating favourable conditions for implanting as easily as possible noble character traits, now equated with *kalokagathía*[25] in their souls, with the method itself, in line of the above mentioned evidences concerning Isocrates' understanding of sophistic, being first characterized as philosophical (*Ant.*, 209: *philoponíai*) and almost immediately thereafter as sophistical (*Ant.*, 220: *kalokagathía*) .

We have thus come into possession of three key coordinates which can easily be complemented by other ones having great associative potential and, due to that, being capable of additionally clarifying both Isocrates' understanding of the sophistic and the profound, philosophical dimension of his own method, which can explain why the term *philosophy* is so frequently used in his characterizations of his art.

The fact that we encounter the other three coordinates scattered in both the opening and final pasasges from the *Antidosis* speaks to the importance of the above-mentioned narrow context in achieving our objectives. The formulation appearing in the opening passages from the mentioned work where Isocrates

[23]*Ant*., 209: "For, in the first place, they know that pains and industry give proficiency in all other activities and arts [ta‹j melštaij kaˆ filopon…aij ¡liskomšnaj (sc. t¦j tšcnaj)], yet deny that they have any such power in the training of the intellect (prÕj t¾n tÁj fron»sewj ¥skhsin)."

[24]*Ant.*, 210–211: "… secondly, they admit that no physical weakness is so hopeless that it cannot be improved by exercise and effort, but they do not believe that our minds … can be made more serviceable through education and suitable training [paideuqe…saj kaˆ tucoÚsaj tÁj proshkoÚshj ™pimele…aj (sc. t¦j yuc¦j)]…" What it is all about is a concept borrowed from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (4, 4, 5) as a legend of Socrates.

[25]*Ant.*, 220. To tell the truth, instead of the mentioned nominal form, the adjectives *kaloí kai agathoí*, are used by Isocrates.

draws a clear-cut line of demarcation between his art and that of his rivals – with the former handling lofty topics (*Ant.*, 3), and glorifying the power of philosophy (*Ant.*, 10), unlike the latter equated with an all too easy "mental juggling" [τερατολογίαι (*teratologíai*)][26] and closely associated with soft living[27] and pleasures of all kinds[28] – can be justifiably regarded as a coordinate.

The remaining two formulations, in which Isocrates compares his own method and style with both gymnastics and music, can also rightfully be regarded as coordinates in so far as they give answer to the question concerning the profound philosophy underlying his poetical principles. The first of them can be seen as a clear reflection of the famous passage from Plato's *Gorgias* (464b; 465b), with the analogy being therein drawn between cookery and rhetoric on one side, and gymnastics and legislature on the other, as fake and genuine disciplines associated with the body and mind respectively, so that, in retrospect, Isocrates' identification of his own art with gymnastics can be seen not only as a sign of his faithfulness to the principles of Plato's philosophy, but also as his express ambition to confer nation- and state-building characteristics on his own art (legislature). This gains in importance all the more so as we take into account the fact that the above-mentioned analogy, in which an all too easy mental juggling as a method of Isocrates' rivals was equated with a way of living characterized by pleasures of all kinds[29], is essentially based on Socrates' famous characterization of the sophistical rhetoric in the *Gorgias* as a certain habitude producing a kind of gratification and pleasure[30].

The other coordinate belonging to this additional group, namely *music*[31], moves us even closer to our goal such as an accurate description of Isocrates' art, if we take into account the fact that it is in the prologue to the *Phaedo* (61a) that Socrates himself identifies his own way of living with music[32], a prologue in which he is represented as having recourse to both the poetic paraphrase of a comical prose model, such as Aesop's fables, and the composition of the sublime lyrics such as a hymn to Apollo with the aim to make an indelible and, so to speak,

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[26]*Ant.*, 284–285: ... toÝj dὲ tîn mὲn ¢nagka…wn ¢meloàntaj, t¦j dὲ tîn palaiîn sofistîn teratolog…aj ¢gapîntaj filosofe‹n fasin, ¢ll' oÙ toÝj t¦ toiaàta manq£nontaj kaˆ meletîntaj ™x ïn kaˆ tîn ‡dion oἶkon kaˆ t¦ koin¦ t¦ tÁj pÒlewj kalῖj dioik»sousi. This proves the fact that in Isocrates' time sophistic and philosophy were identified with each other and that Isocrates' understanding of the sophistic was essentialy determined by the legend of Socrates as depicted in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, 2, 7, 1; 2, 7, 7– 10; 3, 1, 1– 5.

[27]*Ant.*, 286: ... ™n sunous…aij kaˆ ·vqum…aij kaˆ paid…aij ...

[28]*Ant.*, 287: especially chilling the wine at the "Nine-fountains" by the Athenian youth.

[29]*Ant.*, 280. Cf. n. 27.

[30]462c: c£ritÒj tinoj kaˆ ¹donÁj ¢pergas…aj.

[31]*Ant.*, 47–48: ... oÞj (sc. Isocratis orationes) ¤pantej ¨n f»saien Đmoiotšrouj eἶnai to‹j met¦ mousikÁj kaˆ ·uqmîn pepoihmšnouj. See among other passages from Eunapius' *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists* the following one (501–502): ésper oân t¦ k£llista kaˆ glukÚtera tîn melîn prÕj p©san ¢ko¾n ¹mšrwj kaˆ pr®wj katarre‹ (sc. Chrysanthius' speech) ... kaˆ ... p©sin Ãn ™narmÒnioj, kaˆ tosaÚtaij diafora‹j ºqîn ™nšprepe kaˆ kaqhrmÒzeto, modelled on the *Phaedrus*, 271d.

[32]Cf. *Lach.*, 188d where Socrates is characterized as a perfect musician just due to the fact that he "tuned himself with the fairest harmony" by making "a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds," a quality that recommended him for the role of both educationalist and teacher not only of children but also adults.

daemonic impression upon the minds of his followers while fusing the sublime and the comical on the last day of his life. It is in the aforementioned passage that both philosophy and a paraphrase are characterized as a music, with the former being identified with the sublime one unlike the latter regarded as its popular counterpart. We must use yet again one of the coordinates from the first group, namely ἐπιμέλεια (*epiméleia*) so as to be able to ascertain the importance of Isocrates' identification of his art with music to his literary activity.

Epiméleia ("industry" or "suitable training"), along with *sophía* ("wisdom"), represents a key word of Socrates' political testament given in bare outline in the *Alcibiades* where both of them assume characteristics of the daemonic power capable of guaranteeing the victory in any future clashes between the Greek world and its barbarian surrounding, so that it is quite reasonable to say that what Isocrates had in mind was, among other things, such a nation-, state-building and strategic potential of *epiméleia.* This assumption seems to be well founded all the more as *epiméleia* acquires characteristics of a key word in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* as well, with *sophía* now yielding place to a more specific term, such as ἐγκράτεια (*enkráteia* –"continence"), around which as a central axis all other principles of Socrates' philosophy are presented as revolving in the work already mentioned.

It could be said that *enkráteia* became the quintessence of wisdom in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (4, 5, 11–12) since it alone leads to contemplating the intelligible world and what is Good in things themselves, as well as to classifying the latter into both genera and groups and the possibility closely connected with it, such as constantly choosing Good and avoiding Evil in one's own activity. All of this gains in importance if we take into account that *Memorabilia* could be regarded as a peculiar legend of Socrates, as shown by the fact that the celebrated philosopher is represented in it not only as a true connoisseur of the intelligible world of ideas[33] but also as an expert in almost all practical disciplines such as military art (3, 1, 1–5), home economics (2, 7), house-keeping (2, 9), doing sustainable business and account-keeping (2, 8), with his solidarity with all the members of the community standing out from the rest for its importance and going so far as to induce him to not only help others with his advice, but also to carry like an athlete their own burden on his back[34].

With this we gained a deeper perspective on Isocrates' poetics in so far as it turned out that it adapted almost perfectly to the spirit of both Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*[35] and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* as a legend of Socrates launched at the most suitable moment for putting the mentioned testament's key

[33]In this context, it deserves to be mentioned that Socrates is also represented by Xenophon as an expert in an entire field of fine and plastic arts in his conversations with Parrhasius the painter (3, 10, 2) and Cleiton the sculptor (3, 10, 5) – something that, along with the principles of the new rhetoric given in a bare outline in the *Phaedrus* (266b), might have served as an initial basis for developing a theory of literary concept and, consequently, an enhanced ability to achieve creativity in one's own writings, as practiced in later times such as those of the Second Sophistic.

[34]*Mem.*, 2, 7, 1: cr¾ dè toà b£rouj metadidÒnai to‹j f…loij.

[35]123c–124b: kaˆ oἷmai ¨n aÙt¾n (sc. Xerxis uxorem) e„pe‹n Óti oÙk œsq' ÓtJ ¥llJ pisteÚwn oátoj Ð ¢n¾r (sc. Alcibiades) ™piceire‹ pl¾n ™pimele…v te kaˆ sof…v: taàta g¦r mÒna ¥xia lÒgou ™n "Ellhsin ... ïn (sc. ¢ntip£lwn) ¥llJ mèn oÙd' ¨n ˜nˆ perigeno…meqa, e„ m» per ™pimele…v te ¨n kaˆ tšcnV.

ideas into practice. Thus, we can see the stylistic and ideational timeline starting from Isocrates and leading to Philostratus essentially extended in both directions, forwards and backwards, with both Socrates' political testament and Xenophon's legend of Socrates standing at its beginning, a legend that ended up becoming manifest in a later time period covered by Eunapius' *Lives*, whose protagonists were striving to imitate Socrates' life down to the last detail[36] with the aim to surpass, among other things, their master's legendary achievement during his military episode in ice-cold Potideia[37]. Thus, what was carefully shrouded in mystery over the time period of nearly seven centuries and only ambiguously suggested was made known to the world almost at the very end of Greek intellectual history or, to be more precise, in Eunapius' *Lives*, and the reason therefore was not so much the apparent external threat posed by the barbarian invasion but a very dangerous, universalistic-oriented enemy force such as Christian faith[38] which forced dying paganism into assigning the role of the last bulwark of defence to Socratic, or rather Platonic philosophy in its bitter struggle for preserving its dearly beloved exclusiveness.

Dichotomies within Dio's Oeuvre and the Siren Singing on the Tomb of Isocrates

We are now going back to the issue of Dio's attitudes towards the sophistic which at first sight don't fit with the mentioned trend as expressed in the writings of the intellectual current's three major exponents such as Isocrates, Philostratus and Eunapius. Paradoxically enough, the harsh tone of Dio's polemics directed against the sophists and their activity seems to speak in support of the above, a polemics in which Dio spares no effort and, so to speak, no word to label the exponents of the mentioned intellectual current in his fourth discourse on kingship as "ignorant" (4, 28), "tricky fellows" (4, 32), "men attracting only simpletons", "lecherous eunuchs" (4, 35) and "miserable creatures" (4, 38) so as to discredit them altogether by presenting them as a dangerous, unruly and subversive element. Not even such a tone of disparagement was quite sufficient for Dio to express contempt for the exponents of such educational aspirations, so that he felt the need to adopt Socrates' favourite method of drawing analogies with the mythical and animal world, with the sophist now being associated not only with the hybrid race of the centaurs (4, 131) as a monstrous brood sprung from Ixion's embrace of a dark and dismal cloud, but also with the young, untrained and unruly dogs misleading others more experienced in hunting by both barking at random and behaving as if they knew the scent and saw the prey and thus ending up deceiving the hunters and becoming, like their human "analogon," the very symbol of ignorance and inexperience (4, 34).

Now a key question is being raised: which of the two sophistic movements is a controversial subject of his invective, the ancient or the new, i.e. that of Isocrates? If

[36]482 (Aedesius), 492 (Prohaeresius), 500 (Chrysanthius).
[37]Plat., *Symp.*, 220b: ¢nupÒdhtoj dὲ di¦ krust£llou ·´on ™poreÚeto À o*f* ¥lloi Øpodedemšnoi.
[38]Demolition of the temple of Serapis at Canobus in the Nile Delta, as depicted by Eunapius in his *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists*, 472 can be cited as an instance of this.

we start from the fact that in Dio's two fairly brief "essays" on Homer and Socrates (or. 54 and 55), which are of the greatest importance in understanding his literary-aesthetical principles, it was the exponents of the ancient sophistic that were placed in a negative light, and then, in keeping with this, assume that they themselves were the subject of criticism, in that case his aspiration to cross swords with the exponents of the intellectual current whose legacy had a long time ago lost its relevance, so much so that almost no fire was smouldering under ashes would have seemed a little bit anachronistic. But if, on the other hand, we assume that the fire slowly burning under the ashes could flare up yet again in the first century AD and thus pose a challenge for Dio's conception of rhetoric, then his tirades against sophists can be regarded only as a consequence of his disagreement with Isocrates' concept of the sophistic which was elastic enough to also include, aside from purely philosophical legacy, that of the ancient sophistic, something that was unacceptable to him, at least as far as the latter is concerned[39]. Thus, we arrive to a conclusion that Dio's tirades were directed against his contemporaries who – most likely under the influence of Isocrates – continued to strive to apply the concepts of the old sophistic to their writings despite the fact that they were not well grounded in philosophy, which can rightfully be regarded as calling into question Isocrates and, by the same token, Philostratus' conception of the sophistic, which is why Dio was, as already seen, classed among philosophers[40] in Philostratus' *Lives*.

In the preceding section we expressed the view that, despite all this, Dio's attitudes fitted into the new concept of sophistic as advocated by Isocrates, and now we shall see the reason therefore. The answer will be given by Dio's two already mentioned fairly brief "essays" (or. 54 and 55) extolling Socrates' style (or. 54) and highlighting close affinities between Homer and Socrates (or. 55). The former culminates in the curious paradox that "the words of Socrates, for some strange reason, still endure and will endure for all time, though he himself did not write or leave behind him either a treatise or a will"[41] unlike the writings of the sophists, nothing of which had remained but their name alone, despite the fact that they won such admiration and were carefully written down, which can, in Dio's view, be explained by their authors' base motives to make money and please simpletons and fools (or. 54, 1–2). In the latter in which close affinities between Homer and

[39]Dio's contemporary Plutarch took similar attitudes towards the sophists of his own time in his writing *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* (*De audiendis poetis*: 43f; 48d) where the exponents of the mentioned intellectual current are identified with the popular lecturers and superficial persons bent on acquiring mere information respectively, which allows us to conclude that what Dio had in mind was just this kind of knowledge.

[40]This can also be explained by the lack of enigma in the writings of Dio's maturity, which is also true for Lucian, who was not even mentioned in Philostratus' register of the sophists, most likely owing to the fact that, aside from *The Dead Come to Life or the Fisherman* (*Piscator*), *The Hall* (*De domo*) and *To One who Said 'You're Prometheus in Words*' (*Prometheus es in verbis*), he made publicly known key elements of his poetics in his literary canons appearing in *The Dance* (*De saltatione*), *Lexiphanes* and *Essays in Portraiture* (*Imagines*).

[41]*Or*., 54, 4. The English version of this and all of the following passages is borrowed from H. Lamar Crosby's edition of Dio's discourses (LCL).

Socrates are advocated[42], we come across a magic formula which was destined to be most carefully hidden during the whole time period in which the Second Sophistic existed as an intellectual current, and what it is all about is a fusion of Homeric imagery and Socratic or Platonic concept, which can be described as a two-way process, be it that the Platonic concept ended up being condensed and reduced to the form of Homeric image, or be it that the latter was additionally elaborated so as to assume characteristics of the former.

In the second-mentioned "essay" Dio himself disproves the arguments first set forth by both Philostratus and Synesius and subsequently used by the scholars in an attempt to justify setting up dichotomies within his oeuvre – something that went largely unnoticed in previous research on the subject. A striking similarity between Homer and Socrates is, in Dio's view, well explained by the seemingly trivial analogies with starlings, daws, locusts, a firebrand, ashes, beans and chickpeas, being, just due to their educational function, at least of the same, if not even greater, importance in Homer's work as the similes with the almighty creatures of both wild life and myth, such as lions and eagles or Scyllas and Cyclopes (or. 55, 10), and this is, aside from the fusing of myth, history and fable[43] with each other, also true for Socrates' living word characterized by an amazing mixture of the serious and the laughable (or. 55, 11). We can rightly assume that these two brief "essays" on Homer and Socrates represent the author's self-interpretation in so far as Dio, following the example already set by Socrates, says things concerning his poetics in a roundabout way while expounding his views on the mentioned authors' stylistic features[44]. Synesius himself seems to have deliberately overlooked these two instances of Dio's self-interpretation so as to be in a position to fabricate the thesis according to which Dio was a sophist in his early period[45], only to recant these youthful beliefs and become a philosopher in the years of his maturity by handling what was usually classed among purely rhetorical subjects no longer as a rhetorician but rather like a statesman[46]. In line of the above mentioned evidences, we can rightly assume that Dio handled even the trivial topics such as encomia on gnat, parrot[47] and hair like a statesman, as can be inferred from the fact that the last mentioned one, otherwise preserved in Synesius' own encomion on baldness, might be characterized as a brief "essay" on the cultural phenomenon, such as wearing long hair by Spartan youth, rather than a sophistical writing, at least judging by the deep impression it made on Synesius while he was reading it over and over again. What Synesius seems to have been attracted to was much rather Dio's writings dealing with the minor topics than his state-building discourses just due to the former's allusion- and enigma-related

[42]*Or*., 55, 9 where the author points to striking similarities between Socrates and Homer, as testified by the fact that "they both were devoted to the same ends and spoke about the same things" through different media such as those of verse and prose.

[43]The fable (*fabula*) is, as it seems, implicitly, present in Dio's formulation.

[44]Brancacci (1992, p. 3316) uses the term *lógos Sokratikós* in order to prove his theory of Dio's being inspired by the reflection which Socrates' living word found in Antisthenes.

[45]Synesius, *Dio* in *Testimony regarding Dio's Life and Writings* [re-edited in the fifth volume of H. Lamar Crosby's edition of Dio's discourses (LCL)], p. 368.

[46]*Testimony regarding Dio's Life and Writings*, 372.

[47]Ibid.: … fhs… (sc. Philostratus) ... sofistoà g¦r eἶnai mhdὲ toÚtwn Øperide‹n.

features. All this points to the fact that in the period of the Second Sophistic both the enigmatic and the allusive were of the same, if not greater, importance as the serious in the writings characterized as nation- and state-building. The absence of "enigma" in the writings of Dio's maturity as well as his irreconcilable attitudes towards the ancient sophistic was, as already seen, the main reason for which Dio was classed among philosophers in Philostratus' *Lives*.

The symbol laden with meaning we encounter at the very beginning of Philostratus' brief account of Isocrates' style and literary activity speaks, as it seems, volumes about the nature of the Second Sophistic. What is referred to here is the sculpture of the Siren standing on the tomb of Isocrates with her pose being that of one singing. To sum up, the fact itself that the Siren is associated with Isocrates seems at first sight to be a little bit odd if we take into account the emblematic scenes in the opening passages from Alcibiades' discourse in the *Symposium* (215e) where Socrates' speech is compared not only to the song of the Sirens but also to the rhythms of the corybantic élan[48], with Alcibiades being by his own admission unable to hold back his tears gushing forth at the sound of Socrates' speech more profusely than is the case for Corybants when in a state of wild fanaticism. If we take into account another fact as well, such as the one we encounter in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (3, 11, 16–17), where Socrates' art of speaking was compared to the potions (φίλτρα – *phíltra*), spells (ἐπῳδαί – *epodaí*) and magical wheels, i.e. ἴυγγες (*iynges*) as well as, though implicitly, to the song of the Sirens (2, 6, 16), we might be tempted to think of Isocrates' attempt to identify with Socrates and make the latter's emblematic stylistic features his own as utterly uninventive. But yet again appearances are deceptive.

In order to be able to ascertain what exactly the Siren singing on the tomb of Isocrates symbolizes, we must yet again take into consideration the enigmatic arrangement of biographical material in the opening passages from Philostratus' *Lives*, passages that are, as already seen, characterized by telling ellipses, omissions and, so to speak, disguise of every sort. The mutual substitution of the places occupied by Isocrates and Aeschines within the brief catalogue of the sophists of an earlier period could be regarded as the most illustrative example of disguise as a device in his narrative, a substitution that seems to have been created with the aim to give the false impression of Aeschines as being the founder of the intellectual current known as the Second Sophistic. The fact itself that Philostratus (*VS.*, 503) links Isocrates' art closely to the dance by using the term κρότος (*krótos*) for his eloquence, previously almost exclusively applied to Socrates' living and breathing word, helps us get closer to the solution to the enigma. It is now quite clear that what it is all about is the initial stage in an undertaking aimed at putting key ideas of Socrates' political testament into practice, a stage in which both Xenophon, as Socrates' disciple, and Isocrates, as the rhetorician on whom Socrates' hopes were pinned in the *Phaedrus* (279a–b), had been given a leading role when it comes to the transformation of rhetoric from a counterfeit art and beguiling habitude to the discipline of nation- and state-building importance, with both launching the legend

[48]Socrates himself uses the terms sugkorubantiîn (*synkorybantión*) and sumbakceÚwn (*symbakcheúon*) in *Phaedr.*, 228b and 234d respectively to describe his passion for the discourses on love and friendship.

of Socrates (Xenophon) and using stylistic devices in one's own narrative with the aim to make it resemble, at least from afar, the song of the Sirens (Isocrates), being a necessary prerequisite for such a curious undertaking.

The sculpture of the Siren singing on the tomb of Isocrates turned out to be a specific symbol of the new sophistic which has been thus far, first of all due to Philostratus' cunningly constructed phraseology, erroneously associated with the old one – something that was, among many other works, reflected in Erwin Rohde's classical monograph (1914^3) with far-reaching negative consequences as far as subsequent research phases are concerned[49]. Thus, we are in a position to rectify Philostratus' basically correct statement according to which the new sophistic does not bring something new, in so far as we now know almost for certain that its mission was to propagate not sophistical but rather Socratic legacy, including that of style and method, and, above all, to imitate his living and breathing word.

The Beauty of the Enigma in Eunapius

Enigma as a stylistic device points to the interrelatedness of Philostratus and Eunapius' *Lives*, so much so that any attempt at disregarding the testimonies appearing in anyone of the above mentioned works had to end up being fatal, as in the case of Rohde (1914^3, p. 386)[50] who, due to his methodological shortcomings, ignored Eunapius' writing because of its alleged barbarian nature. As distinguished from Philostratus in whose *Lives* we come across enigma applied to a broader plan, as expressed in the general composition of his work, arrangement of biographical material and ellipses, the mentioned stylistic feature becomes even more intriguing in Eunapius, since it is essentially based on the additional elaboration of detail borrowed from his models. To tell the truth, Eunapius was obliged by circumstances to adopt this kind of approach just due to the fact that the shroud of mysteries surrounding the Second Sophistic as an intellectual current from its very inception had to be unwrapped under pressure of events, such as the irrepressible penetration of the Christian faith into the Greek living space, so that he was left with the only path to follow consisting in elaborating the detail in the pattern so as to make it possible for it to assume characteristics of both magic and mystic. Two episodes from Iamblichus' life as depicted by Eunapius (458–459) speak volumes about the author's use of enigma acquiring truly magical powers, as exemplified below.

What is referred to here is Iamblichus' divinatory power, which can be regarded as a clear reflection of attitudes taken by Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (1, 4, 17–18) where he is represented as constantly advocating the importance of divination in the life of both the individual and the society. Both episodes from Iamblichus' life, as narrated by Eunapius, are, moreover, closely

[49]Especially the famous chapter "Die griechische Sophistik der Kaiserzeit" wrongly believed to be the only part of his monograph having stood the test of time. None other than Reardon (1971) can be adduced as a telling example of just how fatal relying on the representation of the phenomenon in Rohde was.

[50]"Gewiß ist, daß die sophistischen Studien in Athen ... eine Art von letzter Nachblüte erlebten, welche ... in den Sophistenbiographien des Eunapius auch ihrem äußeren, schon stark barbarisierten Wesen nach klar erkenntlich sich darstellt".

connected with Socrates himself so that it appears to be justified to say that Iamblichus and, by the same token, Eunapius follows after Socrates and walks in his footsteps as if he were a god in full accordance with his famous formulation in the *Phaedrus*[51] essentially based on a Homeric line (*Od*., 5, 193).

The first-mentioned episode conveys the impression of Iamblichus' striving to resemble Socrates, since he is represented as suddenly being lost in thought with his voice cut off and his eyes steadily fixed on the ground in the midst of conversations with his disciples returning to the city after the sacrificial rites had been duly performed in one of his suburban villas – something that was followed by his immediate suggestion to his friends to go by another road because the dead body had lately been carried along that way, which most of his disciples were unwilling to believe in and continued to go by the same road, only to be afterwards convinced of the truthfulness of his words by inquiring of those whom they encountered coming back from the funeral. Transposition of the motif of Socrates' going into ecstasy and becoming immovable[52] immediately before his arrival at the banquet already unfolding in Agathon's house to a diametrically opposed context such as a funeral, a motif we often come across in Greek literature[53], speaks volumes about elaborating the details borrowed from the pattern. Paradoxically enough, what closely connects both episodes in Eunapius' life of Iamblichus is none other than Agathon himself. We shall now see the reason therefore.

In the second episode Iamblichus' theurgical powers are depicted in the milieu of warm baths in Gadara comprising, among other things, two hot springs from the depth of which he called forth one after another two boys named Eros and Anteros by uttering a brief summons, with the former being represented as a white-skinned lad with golden locks and shining breast, unlike the latter, whose "hair was darker and fell loose in the sun". We can rightly assume that the breast of Anteros was of the same nuance as his hair, i.e. dark, as a consequence of his long exposure to the sun – a fact which Eunapius left unsaid. What we are dealing with here is a barely perceptible visualization of the key message of Agathon's discourse in the *Symposium* (196a) – in which Eros is represented as a being of fit proportion and, like water, pliant of form and therefore able to fold himself about every man in every way, as a result of which he steals in and out of every soul so secretly, after previously enchanting it – as well as a carefully controlled interweaving of concepts of Eros' dual natures, as expressed in Pausanias' (180c–e) and, above all, Socrates' discourse in the *Symposium* (203b–e). The episode itself ends in an amazing way with both Eros and Anteros embracing Iamblichus and clinging to him as though he were their real father, and this, though in a

[51]266b–c: ™£n te tin' ¥llon ¹g»swmai dunatÕn e„j ἓn kaˆ ™pˆ poll¦ pefukÒq' Ðr©n, toàton dièkw katÒpisqe met' ‡cnion éste qeo‹o.

[52]Plat., *Symp*., 174d–175c. In comparison, it is worth mentioning that W. C. Wright regards it as an echo of the *Phaedo* 64b.

[53]See among other works Philostratus' *Imagines* 2, 10 (Kassandra), modelled on *Odyssey*, 11, 472 ff, the opening scene of Heliodorus' novel, Lucian's satirical writing *The Carousal or the Lapiths* (*Symposium*) as well as the frequent turning of what is called the symposium of happiness into that of misfortune in Prodromus ' novel *Rhodanthe and Dosikles* 8, 232–241; 8, 391–396; 8, 470–479; 9, 390–394.

roundabout way, says it all about the so-called sophists' strong, lifelong attachment to the legend of Socrates.

Concluding Thoughts

On the basis of evidence found, except Philostratus and Eunapius' *Lives*, in Xenophon, Isocrates and Dio Chrysostom, we can see that, contrary to all expectations, the Second Sophistic is closely connected not so much with rhetoric as with philosophy itself, i.e. with the legend of Socrates, no matter what its exponents say of the phenomenon in their attempts to disguise the essence of things. We can also see how the legend of Socrates gradually developed from the central principles of the political testament in the *Alcibiades* by first expressing itself in a hidden, enigmatic manner in the initial period of the Second Sophistic roughly coinciding with the two first centuries AD, with the entire shroud of mysteries surrounding it for centuries being finally unwrapped under pressure of events, such as the irrepressible penetration of the Christian faith into the Greek living space in the last period of the Second Sophistic covered by Eunapius' *Lives*. In the biographies of the sophists enigma had, apart from a purely political, strategic function, a poetic one as well, consisting in helping the historical and biographical narrative assume characteristics of magic and mystic. It could be said that the enigma in Eunapius and, above all, Philostratus' writing plays almost the same role as does myth in Herodotus' historical work, in so far as only the skillful use of the mentioned stylistic device might confer an aura of magic to the scarce material being at the disposal of the authors. What Philostratus (564) says about the style of Herodes Atticus comparing it to "the gold dust shining beneath the waters of a silvery eddying river" speaks volumes about the method used by the biographers.

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