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Front Pages

Athens Journal of Philosophy

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Gregory T. Papanikos
President
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The Debate as a Mono-Dialogue – Comments on the Question of Philosophical Discourse

By Zoltán Gyenge[*]

It is almost a trite to say that in philosophy, questions matter most of all. Every question begets another question. Its questions are more essential than its answers as Jaspers say. Plato writes about a very important principle in his famous Seventh Letter, namely, the purpose of a debate. The idea of unwritten doctrine has been meaningful for centuries: The ceaseless work referred to here is nothing other than ceaseless discourse, or ceaseless debate. This debate has been interpreted in many ways in philosophy. This lecture analyses the forms of indirect and direct communication (based on the Sophists) and the essence of revelation (Schelling), and concludes that a new form of communication, which we might call mono-dialogue, emerged in the 19th century. Primarily found in the works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, it was not called this way by these authors.

Keywords: *dialogue, mono-dialogue, revelation, sophists, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard*

Introduction

I will start with a quote: "No, Socrates, I will not grudge it you; but shall I, as an old man speaking to his juniors, put my demonstration in the form of a fable, or of a regular exposition?" (Plato 1967, 320.c).

In fact, the great debate begins between the two most famous philosophers of the time, Protagoras and Socrates. The subject of the debate is the nature of virtue (ἀρετή) and its teachability. Although, the subject of the debate is irrelevant to our topic, its form is in the centre of our concern. In this paper, I am going to discuss three forms of expression: dialogue, mono-dialogue and revelation. In the first, at least two people are in opposition with each other, in the second, one person engages in a dialogue with himself, and in the third, one person declares himself to everyone else.

Dialogue

It has always been an evidence to me that Socrates' attitude towards philosophy is to consider it rather a *modus vivendi*, i.e., not incidentally a verbal one.

It is almost a trite to say that in philosophy, questions matter most than anything else. Every question begets another question. Expecting answers from philosophy is problematic. It is rather like expecting absolute poetry from a poet,

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absolute music from a composer, or absolute painting from a painter. This apparently contradicts Wittgenstein: "If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered." (Wittgenstein, 1922, 6.5). But only apparently. "What can be shown cannot be said." (4.1212.) Or when Wittgenstein wrote to Ficker: "The material will seem quite strange to you, but in fact my work has two parts, what I've written and what I haven't written, and the second part is the most important" (Ficker 1969, p. 35). Is the second part really the most important? Unsayable most important than sayable? Plato seems to be writing about exactly the same thing in his famous *Seventh Letter*. The idea of the *ἄγραφα δόγματα*, or unwritten doctrine, has been expressive for centuries: "There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith. For it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies, but, as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes itself" (Plato 1966, 341,c,d).

The uninterrupted work referred to here is nothing other than uninterrupted discourse. This continuous debate is also the essence of dialectics: to formulate questions that imply further questions. There is great power in knowing what you do not know. It's the beginning of practical wisdom. If we are satisfied with the starting point of knowledge, we do not move on. Søren Kierkegaard says that it is still a beginning. ("Men *Ironien* er *Begyndelsen* og dog heller ei mere end Begyndelsen") (SKS 1, p. 259). To be sure of knowing is not only a stumbling block, but an embarrassing folly. Socrates did not intend to impart knowledge (*quid*), but to teach us how (*quod*) to try to formulate a question. And the how is more important than the what. One possible form of the how is illustration (see the myth of Prometheus in Protagoras), while another one is reasoning (Socrates). Therefore, the question is: are there any other ways?

Philosophy is a form of verbalism. In essence, it is an attitude. Plato again. "Besides, I share the plight of the man who was bitten by the snake: you know it is related of one in such a plight that he refused to describe his sensations to any but persons who had been bitten themselves, since they alone would understand him and stand up for him if he should give way to wild words and actions in his agony. Now I have been bitten by a more painful creature, in the most painful way that one can be bitten: in my heart, or my soul, or whatever one is to call it, I am stricken and stung by his philosophic discourses, which adhere more fiercely than any adder when once they lay hold of a young and not ungifted soul, and force it to do or say whatever they will" (Plato 1925, 217.e, 218.a).

In the 19th century, some thinkers, such as Nietzsche or Kierkegaard, try to return to the original form of philosophy. According to G. Vattimo, Nietzsche, for example, carried out a "stylistic revolution" with his work *Zarathustra*. Vattimo also says that the "revolutionary" force of *Zarathustra* lies in the fact that "is not an essay, nor a tractate, nor a collection of aphorisms - that is, it is not the form Nietzsche had used before. Nor can it be called lyric in the strictest sense" (Vattimo 1992, p. 59). So, what is it? Vattimo tries to answer this as follows: "It is mostly a form of long prose poetry, the forerunner of which is presumably the New Testament. Therefore, it is composed in verses that express the didactic and

cultic purpose of the text" (Vattimo 1992, p. 59). This is this novelty that the George circle (George, Bertram, Hildebrandt, Gundolf) sees in Zarathustra, which makes Nietzsche an important player in the struggle against linguistic devaluation.

H.J. Schmidt observes in agreement with Vattimo's analysis that Kierkegaard is a "master of small forms" (Schmidt 1983, p. 203), and it is also true of Nietzsche. The small forms, of course, do not simply mean short analyses, but the preservation of the articulation of thought in speech. According to Karl Löwith: Nietzsche's philosophy is neither a uniformly closed system nor a multiplicity of aphorisms falling apart, but a "system of aphorisms" (Löwith 1986, p. 15). *Zarathustra* is composed of "small forms" in the same way as the monumental *Either-Or* by Kierkegaard. In both works, there is a need for transcending speculative (Hegelian) analysis. Both have the considerable merit of creating a new style, and breaking away from the highly exciting and precise, but austere language of German idealism. The importance of speech, or the importance of the verbal, is central even in the written text. We simply "hear" Zarathustra's parables, like the ecstatic perorations of Eremita by Kierkegaard, but each of them refers back to an ancient tradition and to the greatest masters of argument and persuasion, to whom we owe the creation of rhetoric: the sophist philosophers within Greek philosophy. In Sophist philosophy, as Werner Jaeger writes, the ability to speak is crucial in everyday life (Jaeger 1934, p. 369). It was not confined to the field of politics in the narrow sense but had a broader spectrum. The development of the Greek λόγος becomes a kind of inner necessity, in accordance with the meaning of the Greek word. Accordingly, Jaeger rightly observes that, before the Sophists, we cannot speak of grammar, rhetorics or even dialectics in the strict sense of the terms, that is why the Sophists can legitimately be considered to be the founders of these disciplines (Jaeger 1934, p. 398). Speech then becomes what would later become an evident requirement: the expression of the unity of words and thoughts. Rhetoric is not cool and measured, but passionate for the sake of debate, even as its logical structure becomes more conscious. Especially from Socrates onwards. Speech is a δισσοὶ λόγοι (contrasting arguments) which carries with it the dual function of speech (Zeller 1928, p. 96). Although little is known about its content (since both grammatical and rhetorical writings of the Sophists are lost), their essence can be reconstructed from other sources. What is certain is that the purpose of speech was persuasion seeking to present the argument from the side of the counterarguments. The prospective orators had to find their own counter-arguments and, building on them, refute their own claims. There were two forms of exposition: the long, extended exposition, and the short dialogue based on counter-arguments. Both are excellent examples of the dialogue of Protagoras. However, here, it is Socrates who uses it against the Sophist sage. (They tested all areas of persuasion, the simple explanation for this being that their activities were not theoretical but very practical. This practical aim is matched by the development of an increasing level of speech, of which linguistic reflection is an integral part. To take an example, Hesiod or Solon could not yet distinguish between a poet and an impostor, both of which were covered by the concept *ψεῦδος*).

Sophistical argumentation thus gives a very special role to the formal cultivation of discourse, which in debates becomes increasingly logical. Without this, the debate either strays into the formal maze of eristic, or becomes a monologue hidden in dialogue. One of these can be observed in the second generation of the Sophists, who also proclaimed with great enthusiasm that their art could transform a weaker argument into a stronger in the courts.

Dialogue becomes a monologue when the other participant only has a dramaturgical function, as it can be observed in their explicitly Platonic "dialogue", where, let us say, a Glaucon plays only a formal role. Here the dialogue ends. To put it more correctly, the dialogue is replaced by expository communication: dialogue, taken in its former sense, ceases, or it is at least transformed, when something new and not less interesting begins.

Mono-dialogue

I call this new form of communication mono-dialogue. Why? The dialogue remains formal, but the debate based on opposing arguments of at least two partners is transformed into a kind of internal debate. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are absolutely close to a formal system of non-real dialogue based on the Sophist tradition. In these non-real dialogues, however, the rhetorical elements are displayed in a different background. No one thinks seriously that Zarathustra's realistic interlocutors are the agora's stiffly awaiting the appearance of the tightrope walker (Nietzsche 2006, p. 7), or that Constantin Constantius (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 149, SKS 4, p. 7) has little interest in the nameless young with whom he is having his "dialogue". However, monologue is not a real designation, nor is it revelation. It is rather something that is neither a dialogue nor a monologue, but a transitional or intermediate form in between: let us call it "mono-dialogue". Zarathustra does not argue. His argument is a so-called apparent pseudo-argument. Nietzsche is, of course, arguing, but with himself. By creating an incognito, he creates a debating partner. For him, the power of the word lies in the poetic form while the power of persuasion does not lie in utterance, but in suggestion. In accordance with the Heraclitan form that he admires so much, he does not make a clear statement, but relates the interpretation to the interpreter, thus relativizing the content of the communication, in other words, extends the possibility of interpretation. Nietzsche says that no one understand fully his work Zarathustra.

Indeed, there is no interlocutor in this text. Neither does the "old saint" (Greis, der Heilige) we know, hiding in his forest, humming and singing praises to his god and doing nothing else (Nietzsche 2006, p. 12, Nietzsche 1980, p. 13). In no sense is he a partner of Zarathustra. At the same time, there is no need for an interlocutor, since the speech is not a simple account of a conversation that has taken place, as one might suspect in many Socratic dialogues, but the discursive unfolding of a train of thoughts, and one feels it is taking place before one's eyes. I have called this aforementioned non-real dialogue a "mono-dialogue". This means that even if the speech is sometimes embedded in the form of a dialogue, it is not in order to pretend that there is a real dialogue, but in order to play freely between the

diversity of points of view within a unity of thoughts, in order to clash arguments and give free rein to thoughts to the fullest extent. The aim is to show polysemy and multiple facets, it is not to fabricate a pseudo-dialogue. In addition to the use of an incognito, the use of irony is a method that runs through a mono-dialogue. Kierkegaard's Scholars studying his works get it wrong by focusing on the external incognito (who the author of the book is, what his name means, etc.) rather than on the internal incognito in the text (e.g., the young man in *The Repetition*). Kierkegaard engages in a dialogue with himself through numerous roles. To put it more precisely: he explores the same question from several angles. The pseudonym, along with the multiplicity of the characters, is a particular poetic schizophrenia. Philosophy itself is a particular form of schizophrenia. Or, as Schelling says: a form of madness (see Schelling 2016, pp. 468-477).

So, I think that a distinction should be made between external and internal incognitos. The first is more formal in the sense that it is not substantive, not tied to what is being said. The second, on the other hand, is substantive, closely tied to the idea that is being expressed. As far as I know, there is no example of the first in the case of Nietzsche, but the second occurs frequently and has a great importance. It is a truism that Zarathustra is Nietzsche, and like all truisms, this is only half true at best. It is a truism that Constantius is Kierkegaard, and this is also a half-truth. In the incognitos that appear, it is important to highlight the diversity of the perspectives. One speaks more freely when seeing things from several perspectives, without having to stick to one aspect, sometimes as Friedrich Nietzsche, sometimes as Zarathustra, or Søren Kierkegaard, Constantius, and even the young man. And so on.

In comparison, the madman plays a special role in *Zarathustra*, as does the ecstatic performer in the *Either-Or*. The madman is the true figure of the mono-dialogue, as is the old saint. The madman, like the saint, "delivers" a concrete discourse to Zarathustra who also argues with him. His figure is real in a sense that he can speak in his own voice. He can speak where no one can speak from facelessness, with few exceptions. The madman is Nietzsche's real alter ego, or his interlocutor. He says: "Spit on the great city and turn back!" (Nietzsche 2006, p. 141, Nietzsche 1980, p. 224).

One of Kierkegaard's alter-egos, Constatius (SKS 4), speaks in a similar way when talking to the other, the young confidant (*Deres navnløse Ven)* (SKS 4, p. 67). In this case, the dialogue is different in that the narrative element is accompanied by a fictional dialogue. Constantin Constantius (the most steadfast, like a rock, Peter), i.e., Kierkegaard, wants to persuade his young friend, whom he calls only "the young man" ("devoted, nameless friend") (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 212), i.e., Kierkegaard, to complete a love story according to a preconceived plan. Meanwhile, one important question is raised by the possibility or impossibility of "repetition", whether it is the possibility of recollection or repetition that makes life worth living.

Kierkegaard writes of himself - in an unabashed reference to Diogenes: "In the excavation of Herculaneum and Pompeii, everything was found in its place just as the respective owners left it. If I had lived at that time, the archaeologists, perhaps to their amazement, would have come upon a man who walked with

measured pace up and down the floor" (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 318). In *The Repetition*, Constantius (an alter ego) descends to Earth from an aristocratic height, like Zarathustra from his mountain - and has a conversation with the "young man" (another alter ego). Constantius, or Kierkegaard, always felt himself at a certain spiritual height. We do not know to what extent Zarathustra (or Nietzsche) was serious about coming down from the mountain. It is very difficult to say. It is as difficult as defining the nature of the relationship between Constantius and the young man. What do we know factually about this duo? We know that they know each other and the young man both admires and hates the master. "You have demonic powers" (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 333), or you are "more silent than the grave." (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 333), etc., says the young. Like the relationship between the old saint and Zarathustra. The saint lives at the top of the mountain (not at the top, but not in the depths, either), and when Zarathustra meets him on his descent, the address reveals that this acquaintance has a history. "Back then you carried your ashes to the mountain: would you now carry your fire into the valley? Do you not fear the arsonist's punishment?" (Nietzsche 2006, p. 4.) An argument breaks out, but it ends peacefully. And Zarathustra does not want to take anything from the saint - indeed, he gives him nothing.

This is the end of the mono-dialogue, and the work ends with an apparent monologue.

Relevation

"When the Eleatics denied motion, Diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward as an opponent. He literally did come forward, because he did not say a word but merely paced back and forth a few times, thereby assuming that he had sufficiently refuted them" (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 243) – wrote Kierkegaard. This is a demonstration, so no further argumentation is needed. This is revelation.

The concept of revelation is very emphatically introduced into philosophical discourse by Schelling. For him, the connection between mythology and revelation is of particular importance. In my opinion, what can be highlighted from the point of view of the discourse is that mythology means the one who hides a secret (which is why the role of mysteries is so important in it), while revelation means the one who reveals a secret. Schelling himself puts it as follows: "The concept of revelation implies an inherent hiding. …" (Schelling 1990, p. 10.)

Therefore, mythology is characterised by symbolic expressions. In contrast, revelation is allegorical rather than symbolic, where the central point is not nature, but man, and the teacher becomes more and more prominent.

The period itself (the 18th and the 19th centuries) uses the concept of revelation in numerous senses, such as Jacobi's, or Herder's or Goethe's interpretation of the term. The concept plays a very important role in Lessing's thinking, who formulates it as follows: "Was die Erziehung bei dem einzeln Menschen ist, ist die Offenbarung bei dem ganzen Menschengeschlechte." (What education is to the individual, revelation is to the human race as a whole.) (Lessing 1858, p. 1). In other words, Lessing draws a parallel between revelation (Offenbarung) and

education (Erziehung), i.e., Lessing relates revelation as education to the whole human race. "Education is revelation that affects the individual; and revelation is education which has affected, and still affects, the human race" (Lessing 1858, p. 1).

Lessing sees revelation as a process in which humanity is becoming increasingly perfected. Revelation is therefore an act, an action, which everyone must go through and experience. Thus, the person of the teacher becomes more important than the action of teaching.

Zarathustra also teaches, in other words, he reveals. When he returns to the mountain, he gives again this final conclusion in a monologue: "I spoke my word, I break under my word: thus my eternal fate wills it – as proclaimer I perish! The hour has now come for the one who goes under to bless himself. Thus – ends Zarathustra's going under!" (Nietzsche 2006, p. 178).

We see that mono-dialogue is now replaced by revelation. Hence, there is a biblical language. In the second half of Kierkegaard's oeuvre, the incognito disappears, and so does the series of pseudonymous works. A martyr about to die has no need for an inner dialogue, and for a pseudonym, either. On the contrary: the martyr wants to fulfil his destiny under his own name. That is why he is a martyr. Thus, Kierkegaard publishes works under his own name. His last work, *The Moment* (SKS 13, Nr 1-10.), is an ecstatic revelation. He sends the last pages to the printing press from his deathbed. For him, it is finished. Nietzsche also abandons mono-dialogue and makes revelation. Like Zarathustra, he breaks down and weeps his pain in Turin, buried in the neck of a horse (Appel 2011, p. 224).

Zarathustra, the herald, and Constantius, the adviser, cannot convince anyone in this work. Both are apparently doomed to failure. Apparently, the magical power of words is worth nothing. No result. But one might ask: what exactly would the result be? What might we consider it to be? Would it be if, for example, the saint forgot to keep humming, or the young man sponged out his imaginary lover? Or would we march up the "hill" in massed ranks? Would that really be an achievement? And reassuring?

Conclusion

The point is made by Nietzsche in an unknown place in the work (as if he were speaking to Constantius): "Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally and we ourselves along with them, and that we have already been here times eternal and all things along with us" (Appel 2011, p. 224).

In other words, we have been here, and we are here to stay. In the deepest sense of the word, the breaking of the Word (*Wort*, *logos*), the falling away, the destruction, is true, as the one who descends can only "bless himself" (Nietzsche). Like Constantius, he believes in reconciliation, even though he knows well that it is as impossible in his life as it is in Zarathustra's.

Then what remains? Nothing, but the magic power of words, the never-ending test of persuasion. I wrote this once, and I can't write it any better today:

this is the beginning of the final descent of Zarathustra and Constantin Constantius - a descent that has continued to this day.

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Job: Servant of *Yahweh*/Prophet of *Allah*

By Barbara B. Pemberton[*]

Suffering is a universal human phenomenon. In a time when religious differences are evident and often fuel conflict, shared narratives may provide common ground in which true understanding may take root. This paper will consider the problem of suffering and address how adherents of the three great monotheistic traditions seek understanding, comfort, and the believer's appropriate response from the same story found within their respective sacred texts: the story of Job, the servant of Yahweh in the Tanakh/Old Testament of Judaism and Christianity—known as Ayyub, prophet of Allah, in the Qur'an. The story of Job addresses more than the distribution of evil problem. At stake in the story is Job's very relationship to his God. This paper will consider a few of the many Jewish, Christian, and Islamic insights from the ancient story, hopefully leading to mutual understanding and empathy.

Keywords: *suffering, Tanakh, Qur'an, Job, Ayyub*

Introduction

In a time when religious differences help fuel conflict worldwide, shared narratives often provide common ground in which true understanding may take root. This paper will consider the all too common problem of suffering and address how adherents of the three great monotheistic religions seek understanding and the believer's appropriate response from the same story found within their respective sacred texts. Most scholars from each of these three traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam— consider the writings of the *Tanakh*/Old Testament to at least contain divine revelation. While they may not agree on the extent of the revelation or the method of its delivery, they do share stories as well as a common desire to glean God's message for God's people from the pages of the text. One such shared story is that of Job, the servant of *Yahweh*—called *Ayyub*, prophet of *Allah*, in the *Qur'an*. Job is described as a pious, righteous man who loses everything—family, possessions, and health—when his faith is tested. In the biblical account, three friends come to console him. Through it all Job remains faithful to his God who rewards him by restoring all that was lost. All three hermeneutic communities consider Job to be an archetype of human response to suffering, regarding Job's response to his situation as exemplary. The story of Job addresses more than the distribution of evil problem. At stake in the story is Job's very relationship to his God. This paper will consider a few of the many Jewish, Christian, and Islamic insights from the ancient story, in hopes adherents within each tradition will use it to better understand the other faiths' approach to suffering.

Textual Considerations

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Some exegetes believe that Job was adapted into the Jewish milieu by a gifted redactor who used the original ancient tale as the "frame" for the biblical account (Job chapters 1, 2 and 4:7-17) and enlarged the story with the complex center section of poetic dialogues creating a complex work with numerous possible interpretations. Within the poetic center Job goes so far as to question God. Muslims only embrace the biblical Job of the narrative frame as further identified through the *Qur'an* and the prophetic traditions[1] considering the center section an errant human addition as it is not representative of a true prophet of Islam. The qur'anic injunction against questioning God also renders the center theologically suspect.[2] Christians also draw various responses from the story of Job. While many believers may agree with the Islamic perspective of God's ultimate sovereignty, others would join their Jewish neighbors in questioning God, not anticipating answers but rather an awareness of his presence—peace and hope becoming a reality experienced through the indwelling presence of God's Holy Spirit.

Islamic Story

In the Islamic traditional account Job[3] was a prophet, a descendant of Esau, a tall man with beautiful eyes and brittle hair. As a prophet, Job received special guidance and inspiration to preach monotheism to the people of his land in the north-east corner of Arabia. He led prayers in his mosque every night and was active in his community caring for widows, orphans, guests, and strangers. Even God acknowledged Job as a righteous Muslim and blessed him just as He rewarded other prophets including Noah, Solomon, Joseph, and Moses. His wealth included a large family, vast herds of animals, many servants, and a fine reputation in the community. By the time Job was seventy, *Iblis*, or Satan, had grown so envious of Job's piety that he asked God for the opportunity to put Job to a test.[4]

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[1]Here the prophetic traditions (*sunna*) refers to the *hadith* and consists of Muhammad's actions and sayings, forming a second trustworthy foundational source of Islam. This is not to be confused with "tradition" as reference to the whole of Islamic heritage. Job appears in three passages in the *Qur'an* with further identification included in the prophetic traditions. That he appears as a prophet at all out of the, according to some sources 20,000 prophets of Islam, is noteworthy, but he is by no means a major prophet. Islamic scholars believe the Old and New Testaments have retained some correct expressions of God's original guidance given through earlier prophets but consider the texts obscured by human additions and alterations. The *Qur'an* in its original revelatory Arabic is held as the corrective and verbatim final word from God preserved for all humanity.

[2]Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, interview by author, 24 June 1998. Dr. Haddad is a professor of history at the University of Massachusetts, Amhurst, and a prolific writer in the area of Islam in America.

[3]For this account I have blended the information from all available sources including: Ali 1983; the prophetic traditions as given on the prophet *Ayyub* in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1960; and Gibb and Kramers (1995). I tried to avoid the areas of disagreement in interpretation of the story such as the variance in the number of children restored to Job and how the new children were acquired, such as by the same wife made young again or by resurrection on his first children, etc.

[4]*Iblis* is the personal name of the devil also known from biblical accounts. The *Qur'an* identifies *Iblis* as an angel and as a *djinni* which is problematic for angels are said to always be obedient and the *djinni*, in exercising free will, are often disobedient. Until *Iblis* meets his ultimate end in hell-fire at the end of time, he works to lead humans astray.

Since Job had become prideful of his own piety God decided that it was time for a lesson [5] and so God allowed Satan to test Job first in the areas of his wealth and his family. When Job remained steadfast in his trust and obedience to God in spite of losing everything he had—including all of his children—God allowed Satan to strike Job physically with the exception of his tongue, heart, and intellect. Satan inflamed Job's body and filled it with worms by breathing into his nose. Job's diseased flesh became so foul that not even his wife could stand the smell, so Job moved out of town to live on the dunghill. Job cried out: "the Evil One has afflicted me with distress and suffering!" (*The Qur'an* Sad 38:41).

Job became quite disturbed and cursed the day of his birth. Friends came to Job but they provided no comfort at all and Job became more mentally imbalanced. At last Satan decided to test Job through his wife, *Rahma*, just as he had tested Adam through Eve. Job stood firm and vowed to beat his wife with a hundred blows for being an accomplice of the Evil One. Throughout even the worst of his suffering Job remained patient and steadfast in faith. God reminded Job of his mercy and Job regained his humility, proclaiming to God: "Truly distress has seized me, but Thou art the Most Merciful of those that are Merciful" (*The Qur'an* Hud 11:83). Job defeated evil with his virtues of humility, patience, and faith in God. He almost lost his mind, but never his faith. Satan declared defeat and God sent the angel *Djabra'il*, or Gabriel, to instruct Job to stomp the ground to receive restoration. Job obeyed and miraculously a spring of refreshing water bubbled up to provide healing along with physical and spiritual refreshment. God also returned to Job his friends and family, including brethren, seven sons, and three beautiful daughters, and all his wealth—double in number as a grace to be remembered by all believers. God asked Job to prove his gentleness and humility by fulfilling his vow concerning his wife with only a wisp of grass. Job lived to enjoy his descendants to the fourth generation. God says of Job: "Truly We found him full of patience and constancy. How excellent in Our service! Ever did he turn (to Us)!" (*The Qur'an* Sad 38:44). At the Final Judgment Job will stand as an example to all who would offer illness as an excuse for negligence in their religious obligations and will lead those who patiently endured to Paradise.

[5]This reason for God's allowing Satan to strike Job is not from the prophetic traditions but is rather the most widely held explanation from the exegetical tradition of Islam.

Jewish and Christian Story

The biblical narrative account of the story contains some details, but not to the extent of the Islamic traditions. Some scholars have concluded that Job was a wealthy, perhaps royal, Edomite known even to God as righteous. In this version, the satan, or "adversary," questioned God concerning the genuineness of human faith: "Does Job fear God for nothing?" (Job 1:9)– a question of selfless love and devotion. God allowed the satan afflict Job by taking away his wealth, servants, children, and ultimately his health, but through it all Job retained his integrity. "Shall we not accept good from God, and not trouble?" (Job 2:10) His wife, however, said to him, "Curse God and die." (Job 2:9) Three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, did a poor job of consolation and Job became increasingly more distraught. They offered a classical deuteronomic theology arguing that such suffering is a clear indication that Job must not be righteous, trying to get Job to admit he has sinned. When they failed, a young man, Elihu, entered into the argument defending God and insisting that Job's suffering was to discipline and teach him a lesson. While legitimate in many cases, all these arguments were moot because Job was declared innocent by God Himself. Job did reach a point when he questioned God's justice – why had God not defended him? (Job 14: 23). In the end, Job experienced God relationally saying "My ears had heard of you but now my eyes have seen you." (Job 42:5) God even validated Job's questioning (Job 42:7-8) and restored to Job double all that he had lost. Job 42:12 explains "The Lord blessed the latter part of Job's life more than the first." Job lived a hundred and forty years having seen his children and their children "to the fourth generation." (Job 42:16).

Issues

Throughout recorded history humankind has asked questions suggested by this story. A first reading of both the biblical narrative frame (excluding the dialogues of the center) and the Islamic traditional account delivers a model of patience and faithful endurance through suffering even without the complexities of the poetic dialogues. However, even the simple tale is problematic. The God of this story appears to have been duped by Satan into mistreating the innocent Job, an exposure that robs God of wisdom and goodness. In return, Job's obsequious response seems too naïve and unrealistic (Penchansky 1990, pp. 36-37). Can a realistic, satisfactory relationship between God and Job, and therefore God and anyone, be established taking these two actors into account?

The poetic center is also problematic. Bible scholar David Penchansky has noted the dissonance between the frame and the center that arises from contrast in the characterizations of both Job and God. The patient pious Job of the frame becomes the impatient blasphemous Job of the center who questions why God has treated him so wickedly; the insecure God of the frame becomes the majestic God of the center Penchansky 1990, p. 28). Current biblical scholarship emphasizes the

study of the center and tends to ignore the frame, while popular reading most often ignores the center and focuses on the frame (Penchansky 1990, p. 28).

Problem of Innocent Suffering – Perspectives from the Muslim Tradition

Traditionally the first question asked by Jews, Christians and Muslims alike is: why did God allow this innocent servant to be tested? Can God be trusted? Why Job? This is usually followed by the next question: how then should Job, the believing individual, respond?

The Muslim exegetical consensus gives God a reason for the test: Job's self-righteousness. Within the Islamic mind-set God has every right to do this and, furthermore, it should not be questioned.[6] This Islamic response is unmistakably informed by the identification of Job as a prophet which by definition designates his life as exemplary. As a prophet Job would have been totally submitted to the will of God and extraordinarily righteous and committed to his task. Job would have been exemplarily "Muslim" in relating to God.

Within the Islamic relational frame-work the Muslim understands one's creatureliness and dependence on God positionally as that of slave of God. The believer is "one with whom God does as He pleases because he belongs to Him, who is totally at His disposal and in a state of utter dependence and humility before Him." (Haneef 1996, p. 71)[7] This is reflected in the term "Islam" itself which means the attainment of inner and outer peace by the loving and total submission of one's conscious self to the will of God (Badawi 1988, p. 2). The Muslim accepts all of life as a test that naturally includes trouble and illness which are to be experienced with the "beautiful patience" exemplified by Job (*The Qur'an* The Ways of Ascent 70:5). Every experience is to be seen as ultimately for the good of the believer, a hopeful soul-making theodicy, and therefore a Muslim should not complain. The extraordinary submission that the prophet Job would have demonstrated is also reinforced by the later qur'anic injunction against questioning God or his actions.

Many contemporary Muslims say that recognition of God's complete control over all benefit and harm is a great source of peace and confidence for everything is in the Hands of God—the All-Wise, the Most-Merciful. Rather than reliance on what some people would call fate, the notion of a Muslim's trust and relationship with God does include personal effort; Muslims are encouraged to do their best in all they do because one's destiny has not been discovered until all possibilities have been explored. Muslims understand that God in some way allows humanity to make certain choices, including the opportunity to choose to follow God's guidance and thereby escape the control of random, chaotic desires (Haneef 1996, p. 13). Believers should strive to act according to God's guidance knowing that the

[6]Haddad.

[7]Twentieth century reformed Islamic thought, in an attempt to move the responsibility for actions onto humanity has shifted the focus from individual as slave to the notion of the human as God's *khalifah*, or vice-regent on earth, as a foundation for revolution. Therefore, if one experiences evil it is one's own fault for having misunderstood God's guidance or disobeyed. Haddad.

results are left to the sovereignty of God; and since an individual's nature and capacities are given by God, it can be understood that nothing happens outside of God's control. Ultimately, Muslims are exhorted to accept whatever is sent their way with patience and trust. This common contemporary understanding is often summed up in the phrase "Whatever God wills" or "if god wills" (*inshallah*).[8] Since God is all-wise and loving he can be trusted to have only good motives and purposes for all that happens. The prophets witness: "No reason have we why we should not put our trust on God. Indeed He has guided us to the Ways we (follow). We shall certainly bear with patience all the hurt you may cause us. For those who put their trust should put their trust on God" (*The Qur'an* Hud14:12).

In his work *Midaq Alley*, Egyptian Nobel laureate, Naguib Mahfouz (1911–2006) tells the story of a simple, pious man in Cairo preparing for pilgrimage to Mecca. Radwan Hussainy had lost a young son but not his faith, reasons for which he expresses passionately to his neighbors (Mahfouz in Kessler (2000, pp. 515–517):

> I love life in all its colors and sounds, its nights and days, joys and sorrows, beginnings and ends. I love all things living and moving and still. It is all pure goodness. Evil is no more than the inability of the sick to see the good concealed in the crevices.
>
> God does nothing that is not wise, and wisdom is good. My Lord wished well of both me and the child. A feeling of joy overcame me when I realized that His wisdom was greater than my sorrow. I told myself: O God, You have brought affliction upon me and put me to the test. I have come through the test with my faith still firm, certain of Your wisdom. Thank You, O God.
>
> It has since been my practice that whenever anything afflicts me, I express my joyful thanks from the bottom of my heart. Why should I not do so?

Jewish Perspectives

While there are people from many traditions who would agree with the Islamic interpretation, others may join Jewish thinkers in focusing on the relationship that is drawn out of the center—from a Job who not only questions but blasphemes, and from a God who responds not with answers but with a theophany and affirms Job's righteousness in seeking God. One may even conclude that the center goes so far as to put God on trial—actually risking the integrity of Yahweh himself. Through this picture of Job the reader is also invited to question God boldly in the midst of any circumstance—a freedom exercised only within the security of a close personal relationship.[9] Traditionally, ultimate suffering from the Jewish perspective is distance, separation, exile, from God. Wrestling with God is to again experience God, however God may be defined, individually, or better, corporately.

[8]Haddad.
[9]Randall O'Brien, lecture 23 June 1998.

In his work *I and Thou*, Jewish educator and philosopher, Martin Buber (1878-1965) combined the spiritual depth of Hasidism with existential philosophy. "Buber argued that open, nonmanipulative, personal, and mutually affirming dialogue not only improves relationships but also reveals God, the 'Eternal Thou.'" (Kessler 2000, p. 388). According to Buber, the very history of Judaism consists of a dialogue between God and humankind. Articulating this dialogical relationship in *On Judaism* he states: "The basic teaching that fills the Hebrew Bible is that our life is a dialogue between the above and the below." (Buber in Kessler 2000, p. 388). Buber continues (Buber in Kessler 2000, p. 392):

> How about Job himself? He not only laments, but he charges that the 'cruel' God (30:21) has 'removed his right' from him (27:2) and thus that the judge of all the earth acts against justice. And he receives an answer from God. But what God says to him does not answer the charge; it does not even touch upon it. The true answer that Job receives is God's appearance only, only this: that distance turns to nearness, that 'his eye sees Him' (42:5), that he knows Him again. Nothing is explained, nothing is adjusted; wrong has not become right, nor cruelty kindness. Nothing has happened but that man again hears God's address.
>
> . . . even now we contend, we too, with God, even with Him, the Lord of being, whom we once, we here, chose for our Lord. We do not put up with earthly being; we struggle for its redemption, and struggling we appeal to the help of our Lord, who is again and still a hiding one. In such a state we await His voice, whether it comes out of the storm or out of a stillness that follows it.

Elie Wiesel writes: . . .

> I was told that to be a Jew means to place the accent simultaneously and equally on verb and noun, on the secular and the eternal, to prevent the one from excluding the other or succeeding at the expense of the other. That it means to serve God by espousing man's cause, to plead from man while recognizing his need of God. And to opt for the Creator *and* his creation, refusing to pit one against the other. Of course, man must interrogate God, as did Abraham; articulate his anger, as did Moses; and shout his sorrow, as did Job. But only the Jew opts for Abraham—who questions—*and* for God—who is questioned. He claims every role and assumes every destiny; he is both sum and synthesis."
>
> I shall long, perhaps forever, remember my Master, the one with the yellowish beard, telling me, 'Only the Jew knows that he may oppose God as long as he does so in defense of His creation.' (Kessler 2000, p. 394)

Emil Fackenheim, following Buber, concludes that humans cannot comprehend, much less pass judgment on God—the relationship between finite humankind and the infinite God being the ultimate paradox. The ways of God remain mysteries to humans who must live with the tension between responsibility toward God on the one hand and safety in him on the other (Fackenheim 1968, p. 48). Fackenheim offers the rich Jewish tradition of Midrash[10] as a means of facing what he refers to

[10]An interpretation of scripture.

as "dialectical contradictions" such as divine transcendence vs. divine involvement in time, and divine power vs. human freedom. The Midrash depicts God and humankind as partners, leaving unsolved the problems of the divine-human relationship. He writes (Fackenheim 1978, p. 262):

> Philosophical reflection may find it necessary to chose between a God who is divine only if He is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, and a world which is truly world because it contains elements contradicting these divine elements, namely evil and human freedom. Midrash recognizes the tension yet refuses to choose.

Christian Perspectives

As with other traditions, various responses to suffering are drawn from the story of Job by Christians. And while some readers may agree with the Islamic perspective of God's sovereignty, many Christians would join their Jewish neighbors in questioning God, feeling that God desires to hear from his children. Many Christians would also agree that rather than answers concerning specific occurrences of suffering, God typically responds with an awareness of his presence—peace and hope becoming a reality experienced through the indwelling presence of God's Holy Spirit.

Why does God allow suffering? Christian responses are similar to those of other faiths. The "soul-building" model argues that God has a lesson in godliness to be learned through each situation. The eschatological argument suggests that all suffering, though a horrible mystery, is really small in light of eternity and that ultimately everything will be made clear and sorted out in the next life.

Another explanation offered is the "freewill" view which argues that God so desired fellowship with his creatures that, rather than create puppets, he created humankind with freewill so they could freely choose to love him. In creating freewill God also created the possibility of evil, which was actualized by humans. Not only humankind fell, but the world with it and from this fall has sprung all manner of suffering.

There has been a stir in contemporary Christian scholarship concerning the issue of God's sovereignty and human freewill. Gregory Boyd argues that in creating a free world God allowed the existence of powerful, but not omnipotent, opposition to his will. He writes in *God at War* that in Job "*Satan* is calling into question Yahweh's wisdom in the way he orders his creation. It is not Job who is on trial here, but God . . . Job is the unfortunate victim of the unjust 'accuser' who has raised his hand against the Almighty." Satan appears "semi-independent" of God and a source of evil. Yahweh's response is not to defend his right to "inflict evil on people indiscriminately." "The thrust of his speeches to Job is rather to drive home the point—the point of the entire epic poem—that neither Job nor his 'friends' are in a position to understand the goings-on of the vast cosmos Yahweh has created." Boyd continues that "Yahweh's character is set against evil" and the cosmic forces of destruction. He argues, "There are forces of chaos (to say nothing of the satan) to contend with." (Boyd 1997, pp. 147-148).

Boyd writes that the answer offered by the book of Job as to why evil happens "is decisively not that it is the will of God. Evil is a mystery, but it is not a mystery concerning Yahweh's character. It is rather the mystery of what goes on . . . in 'the great assembly' and in an incomprehensibly vast cosmos threatened by cosmic forces. In other words, the mystery of evil is located not in the heart of God but in the heart of humanity and in the hidden world between humans and God." (Boyd 1997, p. 149)[11]. Boyd (1997, pp. 164-166) continues:

> The central point of the entire epic is that neither Job's friends nor Job himself are correct in their explanations of his misfortunes. Job's sorry plight was neither punishment for his (supposed) sin nor part of some wise, righteous and judgmental divine plan, as his friends insisted. But it was also not the result of an arbitrary irrational streak in God, as Job (and contemporary 'demonic-in-Yahweh' theorists) suspected. Rather, the point of the book is to say that these are not the only two options . . . there is much more to this cosmos than just us and God. . . . [T]here is also an incredibly vast, magnificent, complex and often times warring and hostile 'world in between' that we must factor in. . . . It is because of our near total ignorance—not on the basis of his sheer divine authority—that Yahweh instructs Job and his friends to remain silent in the face of evil. It is, in the end, neither God's fault nor Job's fault.

He concludes that "One of the primary reasons why the problem of evil is so intellectually intractable for us is precisely that we have not learned the lesson of Job. . . .We have not moved beyond the false dichotomy of Job and his friends: evil in our culture is still generally seen as being either our fault or God's will, or both. We are yet caught in an Augustinian, classical-philosophical model of God's providence and an Enlightenment model of our aloneness in the cosmos." (Boyd 1997, p. 166). For Boyd, many questions remain but ". . . the Bible attributes the responsibility for evil to forces that are hostile to God—especially to Satan—not to God himself." (Boyd 1997, p. 166).

The Job of the center can also be read as offering another hope─hints of yet another type of relationship with the creator—a relationship with God made available through a mediator, a redeemer (*go'el* in Hebrew) to vindicate him. Job, the Gentile prophet, proclaims this veiled promise: "I know that my Redeemer lives, and that in the end he will stand upon the earth. And after my skin has been destroyed, yet in my flesh I will see God; I myself will see him with my own eyes—I, and not another. How my heart yearns within me!" (Job 19:25-7) Christians ultimately rely on Christ as redeemer. In the cross even, God acted to redeem creation—initiating a new and lasting relationship with humanity to whom free-will has been given so that individuals may respond in faith. To these

[11]Without undermining the sovereignty of God, the Bible generally portrays the cosmos as more like a divinely governed democracy than a divinely controlled dictatorship, and this democracy encompasses, but greatly transcends, free human beings. But the book of Job and the entire Bible also assume that we know next to nothing about the goings on of this "world in between."

believers, the cross settles forever, regardless of the circumstances, the question of God's love for all people.[12]

From a Christian perspective, God is understood, therefore, to respond to the questions of evil and suffering not by answering objections, or by exempting believers from pain, but through Christ's identification with creation, and His own redemptive suffering. God has proven to be trustworthy by defeating evil on the cross and thereby delivering humanity (and creation) forever from ultimate evil. In this life most Christians trust God to be an ever-present friend and not an enemy.

Conclusion

In summary, the traditional Islamic interpretation of the story affirms Job's response to God as an exemplarily obedient, submissive servant of God to whom no explanation is due. Contemporary Muslims find hope in a soul-making theodicy in light of sure judgment for all. Rejecting the "Job of the center," the believer may trust the all-compassionate God and needs not question.

Embracing the center, Jews find strength in an encounter with God through dialogue—even wrestling with God. Christians join with Jews embracing the center and talking honestly with God. Adding a hope firmly rooted in the Lord Jesus Christ, Christians ultimate rest in the ministering presence of God's indwelling Holy Spirit.

Other lessons can be drawn from the ancient story. Suffering can come unexpectedly to anyone. From the center poetic center we learn to be slow to judge another's actions. Matthew 7:1 say "Do not judge, or you too will be judged." Be careful not cause innocent suffering, but do what you can to help those who do. Mafouz (p. 517) offers: "Cannot a good man unknowingly be an accomplice of the devil by keeping to himself?"

While no faith community claims to have all the answers to the questions of evil and suffering in this life, each of the three great monotheistic traditions finds within the ancient story of Job a model for a believer's relationship with God. The challenge for each tradition is the test of that faith in the crucible of human experience.

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[12]While Christians include in the description of this new relationship the role of the slave: "you are not your own; you were bought at a price" (I Corinthians 6:19-20), other passages indicate a family relationship: being adopted into God's family, becoming part of the body of Christ, being born again.

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Metalinguistic "Troubles" with Kripkean Proper Names

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Proper names interpreted as rigid designators do not allow us to formulate metalinguistic statements of the form 'NN might not have been named "NN"'. All we can do is to show what we are trying to say. But we cannot properly formulate such a metalinguistic statement about a rigid name. The rigidity of the name establishes a relationship with its bearer that is much stronger than the contingent relationship that is supposed to exist in the natural languages between the name and its bearer. The sentence is intuitively true as expressed in natural languages, but once we translate it, if possible, into Kripkean formal semantics it is false because once the individual is rigidly named, she cannot have been named otherwise; or even worse, as I suspect, the whole sentence is untranslatable, because in Kripkean formal semantics there is no possible world in which she would not have had the name she rigidly has. This problem in Kripkean semantics could well be termed, as Wittgenstein would say, an ineffability. Kripkean semantics makes the actual contingent property anyone has of bearing a proper name ineffable, notwithstanding it is effable in natural languages.

Keywords: *rigid names, metalinguistic statements, rigid quoted names, ineffability*

Introduction

Proper names seem to present a straightforward example of how language relates to the world. However, philosophers and linguists disagree about many issues surrounding them. An important one is this: What is the role of proper names in a formal theory of language? That question has received at least two answers[1]. Proper names are either formalized as constants or as a special kind of predicate.[2]

Kripkean modal semantics is a paradigm of the constant view because proper names are taken to be rigid designators that relate straightforwardly to those individuals they designate in the actual world and in any possible world in which the individual exists.[3] A rigid designator is an excellent device to refer always to

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[1]Schoubye (2016) opens up a third possibility, proper names are type-ambiguous. However, his proposal aims to develop a formal theory for natural language in which metaphysical modality is not at all the relevant topic in his discussion as it is Kripke's semantic theory.

[2]For instance, Burge (1973, p. 430) notes that names as predicates have a mild self-referential element in their application conditions that is absent in most common predicates. For instance, an object could not be a Jones unless someone used "Jones" as a name, but an animal could be a dog, even if the word "dog" were never used as a symbol.

[3]According to Salmon (1981, pp. 32–41) a name is obstinately rigid if it refers to the same individual in all possible worlds including those worlds where the individual does not exist, and a name is persistently rigid if it refers to the same individual in all worlds where the individual exists but fails to refer in worlds where the individual does not exist. However, nothing in my discussion hangs on the choice between these two notions of rigidity.

one and the same particular allowing us to state contingent and necessary truths of the referred object. We can say for example of Saul Kripke that he is necessarily identical to himself or that it is contingently true of him that he wrote *Naming and Necessity*, and so forth.

Many papers have been dedicated to support or oppose Kripke's views on proper names but there is one important issue that has not been appreciated: the ineffability of his semantics, since there is at least one central kind of statement that cannot be formulated within his theory, namely, a type of statement about a rigid designator and its bearer. I claim that if proper names are rigid designators, then they are not suitable for formulating metalinguistic statements of the form 'NN might not have been named "NN"' in the formal system itself. All we can do is to show something that cannot be said. Stipulating that proper names are rigid designators preserves both the unicity of reference in Kripkean modal semantics and guarantees that any true de re identity statement is necessary.

Kripke's Theory of Proper Names

We can briefly characterize Kripke's theory of proper names as follows: a proper name is a singular term and its semantic contribution to propositional content is its referent; the relation between the name and its bearer is direct, that is to say, it is not mediated by any other propositional content; the reference of a name is modally stable, the name refers to the same individual in any possible world where the individual exists; and finally, names are individuated by their bearers. There are three salient features for my argument: (1) the rigidity or the modal stability of the name, (2) the rigidity of the quoted name,[4] and (3) the claim that names differ among themselves whenever their bearers differ.[5] This characterization helps us state a rigidity rule in Kripke's semantics:

> (RR) Any counterfactual circumstance in which the individual is located, must be stated in terms of possible worlds and with the use of rigid designators.

Let us address the metalinguistic problem[6] by discussing the following central text in his celebrated Naming and Necessity:

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[4]Gómez Torrente (2013, pp. 353–390) holds that any quoted name is rigid, unstructured and context insensitive. I section 3 I discuss and endorse his theory.

[5]Kripke (1980, p. 8, footnote 9) says: "distinctness of bearers will be a sufficient condition for distinctness of the names." Therefore, Kripke distinguishes one name from another not because they are tokens of the *same type of name*, but because they have different bearers.

[6]The problem is metalinguistic because there is no way to structure a statement in a language employing Kripkean modal semantics for depicting the possibility of detaching a name from its bearer. This problem reveals a deeper one: Kripkean semantics makes the actual contingent property anyone has of bearing a proper name ineffable. I suspect that the latter arises because Kripke assumes that every entity is necessarily identical to itself and that to state such a metaphysical claim he argues that rigid designators should flank the identity sign. Therefore, the rigidity of the term and the metaphysical necessity of identity seem together to make ineffable what in natural languages is effable. Philosophical and terminological constraints are at the bottom of this problem. However, exploring this issue is a task beyond the scope of this paper.

> In these lectures I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been *called* 'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that "transworld identifications" are unproblematic in such cases. (Kripke 1980, p. 49)

Let me make two remarks before turning to my argument for the claim that Kripke's semantics does not allow us to formulate metalinguistic statements of the form "NN might not have been called 'NN'". The point of Kripke's sentence is to distinguish Nixon's name as a rigid designator from non-rigid terms expressing properties (e.g., becoming President) or what he might have been called, e.g., "Tricky Dick". Names are rigid. What someone is *called* is not.

My second remark is about the naming/calling distinction (Katz 2001, p. 142). It is reasonable to think that Kripke can say, truthfully, that Nixon might not have been called Nixon, because calling someone X does make X a name, X could be a nickname or a pejorative expression neither of which are rigid designators. We can say "Nixon might not have been called 'Tricky Dick'". What Kripke cannot say is that Nixon might not have been named "Nixon", which I assume is the intended reading of Nixon might have had another name. Perhaps the reason that he cannot meaningfully say the sentence "NN might not have been called 'NN'" has not been recognized before is that the difference between calling and naming has not been appreciated.

In order to remedy that, let us now turn to an examination of Kripke's theory of names. Rigidity is a relation between the name and its bearer in every possible world including ours, whenever the referent exists.[7] Thus, this account of rigid designation captures Kripke's (2011, p. 2) metaphysical assumption that ((x) □(x=x)). For example, if "Tully" and "Cicero" are both rigid designators for the same person, any statement of the forms "a=a" or "a=b", in which those names are replaced by the constants, if true, is a necessary *de re* identity statement. It is crucial to note that two theses are affirmed here, one about language and the other about the metaphysical modality. About language, Kripke clearly acknowledges that: "This terminology certainly does not agree with the most common usage." (Kripke 1980, p. 8) and as I will argue, this terminology strengthens the relation between a name and its bearer, contrary to our common use of proper names.

[7]Later in this section I will examine a proposed way to deal with the problem of ineffability that is much more complex and show that it, too, does not work.

The Metalinguistic Trouble Points to Ineffability

How well does stipulating proper names as rigid designators allow us to express metalinguistic modal claims? Consider the following example used by Kripke in the above quotation:

(1) Nixon might not have been *called* "Nixon".

Kripke when using (1) presupposes that Nixon bears "Nixon" as his proper name and also asserts that it is contingent of Nixon to bear that proper name, because he might not have been called "Nixon". There is no kind of necessity involved in the name-bearer relation, because even if to be the bearer of a proper name were a property, it would be a contingent one. All there is to the name-bearer relation is a mild self-referential element in the application conditions of proper names because an object could not be a 'Jones' unless someone uses "Jones" as a name. As Burge (1973, p. 430) said, the sentences: "Jones is necessarily a Jones" and "this entity called 'Jones' is necessarily an entity called 'Jones'" come out false in any occasion of use. Notice that Burge doesn't distinguish between 'called' and 'named'. By parity of reasons, we could say that "this entity named 'Nixon' is necessarily an entity named 'Nixon'" is false, while "Nixon might not have been named 'Nixon'" is true.

Let us read (1) using Kripke's rigid designators. I will show that (1) cannot be literally said in Kripkean semantics as Wittgenstein suggests (1983: §6.522), we can only show but not say the statement that we aim to state. I will use the subscript "R" to emphasize that the name is a rigid designator, or as Salmon (2012, p. 430) puts it, "Nixon" is a "specific name" that cannot name anything else other than its bearer[8]. Properly stated (1) should say:

(1*) Nixon_R might not have been named "Nixon_R"

In the intended reading of (1*) the first occurrence of "Nixon_R" is used to rigidly refer to Nixon. "Nixon_R" is a specific name. The second occurrence merely quotes that specific name. Kripke's point is that "Nixon_R" rigidly designates the person that in our natural language was baptized as "Nixon". The rigid designator "Nixon_R" helps us to state counterfactual scenarios where Nixon himself, might not have been the President of the United States, or might have been lefthanded, or a bachelor, or whatever else might have happened to him. We can state any of those scenarios by applying (RR). We use the rigid designator "Nixon_R", which is a specific name that cannot name anything else other than its bearer, and thus, we need no criteria of transworld identification of the bearer.

Regarding the quoted name in (1*) Soames (2002, p. 251) says that an intuitive test of the claim that the term "Nixon" is a rigid designator is that: "A singular

[8]Salmon says: "A distinction must be drawn between a *generic* expression, which is an expression-form in abstraction from any particular use, and what I call a *specific* expression, which is use-loaded and good to go. The terminology is meant to suggest the distinction between *genus* and *species*." (Salmon 2012, p. 430)

term t (of English) is a rigid designator of an object if **the individual that is (was) t could not have existed without being t (and no other than that individual could have been t)** expresses a truth."[9] Therefore the object that is "Nixon" is such that it could not have existed and failed to be "Nixon" (and no other object could have been "Nixon") is intuitively true.[10]

The crucial question to consider now is this one: is there a counterfactual scenario or possible world, where that specific man might not have been named "Nixon"? Can we properly state (1*) without violating (RR)? Let's elaborate this a bit more. There are at least two tangentially related issues, that might mistakenly seem to be relevant here: on the one hand, the same concatenation of letters could make up a name for someone other than our Nixon; on the other hand, our Nixon may have another name besides the name "Nixon", let's say "Kripxon". In the first case, Kripke would say that the names are homonymous but different in that they name different people.[11] For example, given that "Nixon" is a family name, let us assume that there are at least two family members bearing it, thus we have two different specific names, "Nixon_1", "Nixon_2", and the problem I am discussing depends only in considering any of these particular specific names because regardless of your choice the problem arises. In answering whether Nixon might have had a name other than "Nixon", if someone else happens to have a name made up with the very same characters, that name will be a different name just because its bearer is a different person. Homonymous names are not at issue when we ask about whether Nixon might have had another name than the name he has, we are concerned about the specific man who was the USA President and whose specific name happens to be "Nixon" and we are wondering about him if there is a possible world where he himself is not named "Nixon".

The second case, the case of coreference, happens when there is more than one name for a person, for instance, as in the "Tully/Cicero" example, each name is a specific name for the same person. However, co-reference is not at issue, because the question is not whether one individual has more than one name, rather it is if she has some name, it might not have been that very name. In other words, if the famous orator has "Cicero" and "Tully" as his names, the point is whether he might not have had either of these two specific names. We can always pose the question for every name a person has. That is, we could also ask if that person might not have been named 'NN' and so forth, no matter how many names the person has.

To correctly state the answer to the question of whether Nixon might have not been named "Nixon", according to (RR), we must use rigid designators to move around Kripkean possible words in order to attempt to find at least one world where that specific person is otherwise named. But how can we map that specific

[9]Soames (2002, p. 251, footnote 11) says that bold italics indicate corner quotes.

[10]Soames calls this expedient the "linguistic test" for rigidity of noun phrases. Gómez-Torrente (2013, p. 371) says that it is thought that all other standard tests would deliver the same verdict.

[11]Kripke says: "For language as we have it, we could speak of names as having a unique referent if we adopted a terminology, analogous to the practice of calling homonyms distinct 'words', according to which uses of phonetically the same sounds to name distinct objects count as distinct names (Kripke 1980, pp. 7–8).

person into possible worlds? It is obvious that in order to say of Nixon that he could have been named otherwise, he has to be named "Nixon" in the first place.

Therefore, I ask again, can we adequately satisfy (RR) and say that there is a possible world where: (1*) "$Nixon_R$ might not have been named '$Nixon_R$'" is true of Nixon? Strictly speaking (1*) shows what Kripke cannot say if we comply with (RR). Once we use a rigid designator to specifically refer to a person in whatever possible world that person exists, we can neither deprive that person of her rigid designator, nor we can say anything counterfactually about her without the use of her rigid designator. True, if we did not know that in Kripke's semantics proper names are rigid, it would not seem to be necessary of the self-same Nixon to bear the proper name "Nixon". It would seem to be a contingent fact about him, but how could we state such a contingent fact about him without using his rigid designator? According to (RR) we cannot. Sentence (1*) seems to be the straight way to do it, but (RR) imposes the use of rigid designators while the predicate "might not have been named '$Nixon_R$'" seems to indicate its elimination. To make my point clearer, we could read the predicate as saying "… might not have been rigidly named 'Nixon'". But once again, he has to be rigidly named in the first place in order to say anything counterfactual of him. Again, according to (RR) naming has to be a rigid naming.

Maybe another interpretation for (1*), contrary to the rigidity test for quoted names considered above, is that the used occurrence of the name is rigid while the mentioning of the rigid name is not a rigid designator, because it does not rigidly refer to the bearer of the name, it only mentions the name, and if so, there is no tension between (RR) and the indication of "…not have been named 'Nixon'". However, obvious questions arise: what is the relation between the two occurrences of the name in sentence (1*)? Do quoted names refer at all? And do they, thereby, contribute to the truth value of a statement in which they occur? In general, how are we to account for the role of quoted names in a Kripkean modal semantics?

It is well known that Davidson (1984, pp. 79–92) observed that quotations, unlike typical names, must be interpreted in a way that exploits the salient pre-referential relation between a quotation and the expression between its quotation marks. In "How Quotations Refer?" (2013) Gómez-Torrente discusses recent theories of quotation and provides a well-argued proposal that accommodates Kripke's semantics by making the quoted expression an unstructured, rigid, context insensitive term. He holds that quotations can be understood as being much closer to typical names (Gómez-Torrente 2013, p. 368); and yet get their referents fixed wholesale with the help of a general rule that he calls "The Interiority Principle":

> (Interiority) A quotation refers to the expression within its quotation marks.
> Interiority […] assigns a referent to a quotation as a function of the identity of one of its morphological components, the quoted expression, hence exploiting the salient pre-referential relation between a quotation and its intended referent … Interiority assigns a reference to each quotation type, independently of any sensitivity to contextual factors. (Gómez-Torrente 2013, p. 340)

According to Gómez-Torrente's theory it is only on the basis of linguistic knowledge that a competent user could associate any quotation with one or more particular reference-fixing descriptions for that quotation, but the quotation is not equivalent to the (unquoted) corresponding reference-fixing descriptions.

Therefore, the pre-referential relation between the used and the quoted name in (1*) is preserved under Gómez-Torrente's theory. Thus, according to the theory, the used name refers to Nixon while the quoted expression "$Nixon_R$" refers to the rigid name of Nixon.

Is there a criterion to establish whether these two occurrences are of the one and the same name? Interiority helps us in answering: A quotation refers to the expression within its quotation marks. Therefore, a proper name is individuated by its bearer while a quoted name is individuated by Interiority. Isn't it a good support for Interiority that in (1*) we are not saying something like "$Nixon_R$ might not have been named '$Kripxon_R$'"? If the answer is "yes", then why isn't it obvious that when saying "… might not have been named '$Nixon_R$'"? We have to be referring to Nixon's name and no one else's name.[12]

Although I have given enough reasons to argue that (1*) cannot be formulated in Kripkean semantics, I will now consider two final possible ways out of the problem of ineffability that I have discussed. Kripke could try to say what he appears to want to be truly saying: there is a possible world where Nixon is not named "Nixon". If that were the case, (1*) would be true. But we have already seen that if we use Nixon's rigid designator, namely the name he has, to place him in a possible world and predicate of him that he does not bear his name, we will be back to the problems discussed above. For those reasons, perhaps a first desperate alternative would be to recognize that although in this world the person is named "Nixon", in another possible world he is not named that way. If that were to happen, then it would be true of Nixon that he might not have been named "Nixon". So let us move from natural language to formal language and use a name that is different from the name the subject bears in this world in order to say that in a possible world he is not named as he is in the actual world, and therefore it is true of Nixon that he might not have been named "Nixon". But do we satisfy the assumption that he, Nixon, is not named "Nixon" by stipulating in our formal language that he is named differently? I do not think we do, because by formulating a statement that uses a different name than the one Nixon has in our world, in the formal language we say nothing more than something like "NN_R might not have been named 'NN_R'" and we have returned to the starting point.

A second more complex option would be to suppose that sentence (1*) aims to say something like: (1**) There is a possible world at which no inhabitant of that world uses the name "Nixon" to name Nixon. Under this interpretation we

[12]This issue is related to the objection that for non-structured quotations there would be no rule of interpreting them, that the relation between a quotation and the thing x that it quotes cannot be the relationship between a semantically unstructured expression and what it refers to, because any semantically unstructured expression could have been used to refer to x, but no quotation other than the one quoting x could have been used to quote x; that is it in the absence of structure we could get "$Nixon_R$ may not have been named '$Kripke_R$'". Gómez-Torrente provides Interiority as an interpreting rule to prevent it from happening. Therefore, he secures the relation between the name and its quotation while maintaining them both to be rigid.

will assume that the name "Nixon" in our language is an obstinate designator, that is, that "Nixon" designates Nixon in all possible worlds whether or not Nixon exists in that world. Thus, on those possible worlds where Nixon does not exist, by stipulation, its inhabitants would not use the name "Nixon" to denote Nixon. We use the name *in the actual* world to refer to him in discourse about that other world. For instance, we can truly say of Aristotle that "Aristotle was born centuries before Nathan Salmon was born". This interpretation of sentence (1*) leaves two questions open: Would statement (1**) be on par with "Aristotle was born centuries before Nathan Salmon was born? They are only on par in the sense that the names 'Aristotle' and 'Nixon' are obstinate designators because in both cases their referents are no longer in our actual world. We talk about Aristotle and Nixon from our world to refer to them in discourse about the other possible world. However, the great difference between both statements is important for our purposes. The predicate 'being born centuries after' differs widely from the predicate 'not using the name 'Nixon'". The difference is crucial, because as I said in previous sections, the latter predicate denies the application of the name that we need to use to build contrafactual scenarios, as established by rule (RR) and the Interiority Principle for the quoted name. We encounter again the same problem because although it is true that no inhabitant in that other possible world uses the name "Nixon", statement (1**) fails to capture the intuition that we try to express, when using our natural language by saying that Nixon might not have been named 'Nixon', rather than the name "Nixon" is not used by anybody. The point is clear: We use the name and then we predicate whatever might have happen to the named person. And that is precisely the issue at stake.

Let me summarize these desperate solutions. On the one hand, when we translate the sentence to our formal language, we used another name for Nixon to capture the idea that Nixon might not have been named "Nixon", but this led us to the case "Kripxon might not have been named 'Kripxon'". On the other hand, we pursued the idea that nobody uses the name "Nixon". We found two ways of accomplishing it. The first one is simply the case of coreference, in the actual world Nixon is named "Nixon" but in another possible world he is named "Kripxon". This did not give any solution to the ineffability problem, as I said in my remarks, co-reference is not the issue. For example, in one possible world they use "Tully" and in another world "Cicero" to refer to the same person, but each specific name may be instantiated in the scheme: "NN might not have been named 'NN'". The second option that deals with the idea that nobody uses the name as (1**) says, was to consider the name as an obstinate designator, which by definition the inhabitants of the possible world do not use the name where the individual does not exist. But the stipulation imposed on the inhabitants of that other possible world, does not eliminate the possibility of stating "NN might not have been named 'NN'". These desperate attempts to state what is ineffable, given Kripkean semantics, make more salient the incoherence of formally maintaining that the rigid name is not or cannot be a rigid name, that is, we do not stick to the rule (RR) that establishes the semantics proposed by Kripke. We would be violating (RR) and rejecting the fundamental basis for Kripkean modal semantics.

Concluding my Argument

Kripke is right in that the self-same Nixon, who might not have been the President, could not but be Nixon. However, intuitively speaking, if "Nixon" is a specific name and we state any counterfactual claim about the relation between the bearer of the name and his name, it is also true that in Kripke's formal semantics Nixon could not but bear his name. The mild self-referential element in the application conditions of the name is reinforced by the definition of rigid designation. Therefore, contrary to our intuitions and to Burges' argument, if we could structure this kind of statements, it would seem that in our formal semantics "the entity named 'Nixon' is necessarily named 'Nixon'" is true, and "Nixon might not have been named 'Nixon'" is false. But if my argument is correct what cannot be said in Kripkean metalanguage is "Nixon might not have been named 'Nixon'". Kripkean semantics makes the actual contingent property anyone has of bearing a proper name ineffable.

As I said in section 2, there were two remarks to be made in order to frame my argument for the claim that Kripkean semantics does not allow us to formulate metalinguistic statements of the form "NN might not have been named 'NN'". On the one hand, the point of Kripke's sentence is to distinguish Nixon's rigid name as a rigid designator from non-rigid terms expressing properties; on the other, there is the naming/calling issue. I have concluded my comments about the former. And I now want to expand my comments about the latter.

Notice that "naming" imposes a restriction on the syntax of the sentence (1*) by not allowing to occur within it, right after "naming", any other expression but a quoted proper name. Therefore, we need to explain more fully the role of quoted names in Kripkean modal semantics. Gómez-Torrente's theory provides a suitable account: quoted names are rigid designators and they are also unstructured, context insensitive terms and, therefore, modally stable. The modal stability of the used and quoted name in (1*) strengthens the relation of the name to its bearer to such an extent that "Kripke_R is necessarily named 'Kripke_R'" can be structured in Kripkean semantics and seems to be true in Kripkean modal semantics. However, if it is necessary for the bearer to bear his/her name and if my argument is correct, "Nixon_R might not have been named 'Nixon_R'" seems to be false, logically impossible or ill-formed.

Another way to put what one would like to say is something like the following: Nixon, who is the bearer of a specific name in any possible world in which Nixon exists, might not have borne the specific name he bears. But it seems that we would have to say of Nixon that the rigid name we need to use to place him in some possible world is not really a rigid name after all.

In order to express that the referent of a rigid name might not have to bear the specific rigid name he bears, we must quote precisely that name and no other specific name in the predicate of the sentence. By quoting the specific name and saying that it might not have been the specific name that it is, we seem to be stating an impossibility: we are using the name as a rigid designator in the subject part of the sentence, establishing that it is necessary to use that name in every possible world in which the bearer of the name exists but then, when it appears

quoted in the predicative part of the sentence, we predicate that it is not necessary to use the name in every possible world. But that is to say nothing other than the used name is not rigid.

To summarize my argument: I suspect that "Nixon_R might not have been named 'Nixon_R'" cannot even be properly formulated as an indicative proposition and, therefore, the question about its truth-value cannot even arise. Further, even if it could arise, what seems intuitively plausible, namely that Nixon might have been named something other than "Nixon", would be false. For, if it were true, it would contradict the claim that the very name "Nixon_R" must only refer to Nixon_R in order to state any contrafactual claim about him and no one else.

Kripke is right to acknowledge that: "This terminology certainly does not agree with the most common usage." The common usage of a name has only a mild self-referential element in its application conditions, but proper names as rigid designators strengthen it to the point of making it a necessary truth.

Rigid designation is an appropriate tool to capture Kripke's metaphysical assumptions, but if proper names are rigid designators, we cannot make metalinguistic claims about rigid designators as in (1*). Kripke thought that a proper name, properly used, simply was a rigid designator that allows us to speak of whatever might have happened to its bearer. However, there is one thing that cannot happen to its bearer: once her name is rigid, she cannot but bear her name.

At the end of the day, Kripkean rigid designators guarantee the logical role of a proper name to univocally refer to one and the same object but do not allow us to make this kind of metalinguistic claim about them. Proper names are rigid designators, while quoted proper names rigidly designate their quoted name. There are no metalinguistic claims of the form "NN might not have been named 'NN'." Kripke's "troubles" are being unable to formulate such metalinguistic statements about proper names as rigid designators.

My argument illustrates the fact that as philosophers, we face a tension between creating artificial languages and theorizing about metaphysical underpinnings of natural languages. The main issue is what adequacy conditions should be imposed on philosophically motivated semantics. These conditions differ widely. In the case discussed, the main motivation for designing rigid designators is to capture the metaphysical claim underpinning the intuition that self-identity is a necessary relation. But in doing so Kripke is unable to correctly portray the contingency between the bearer of the name and his/her name.

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Solidarity, Knowledge and Social Hope

By Anupam Yadav[*]

The paper investigates the ideas of solidarity and social hope textured in critiquing western epistemology and politics of knowledge production. Richard Rorty's anti-foundationalist, anti-representationalist critique argues for the de-hierarchization of knowledge-claims. The cultural-conversational turn to knowledge and social hope in the creation of democratic community finds its rationale in the conception of human solidarity, in the most praiseworthy human abilities of trust and cooperation. The idea of social hope, a critical engagement of the knower with knowledge production in the feminist discourse, however, is another anti-essentialist stance that illuminates the various axes of domination, which the pragmatization of knowledge and methods does not account for. It is in this context, that the paper examines the politics of solidarity vis-à-vis knowledge construction in Donna Haraway, Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Marnia Lazreg and argues that solidarity as dissent provides the knower a chance to articulate hope in the transformative goals of knowledge and education.

Keywords: *critique of epistemology, Rorty, politics of knowledge, politics of solidarity, social hope*

Introduction

The Western epistemology situates knowledge-claims on a vertical plane either as rational, transcendental essences or as true representations in the Glassy essence of the knower's incorrigibility. The Cartesian epistemology has dominated the orthodox conception of philosophy as a "mirror of nature". This conception of knowledge as a perfect representation of reality is undergirded by a modernist prejudice of absolute truth, wedded to the absolute conception of reality. Richard Rorty's anti-foundational, anti-representational polemic against philosophy-as-epistemology, a seventeenth century disciplinary emergence, particularly in the writings of Descartes, condemns it as a *demarcative* project, an unnatural desire for certainty. In opposition to the verticality of the cognitive/non-cognitive, epistemology/hermeneutics, hard/soft sciences divide, Rorty argues for the horizontal figure of epistemology. The horizontal configuration of epistemology appreciates many perspectives and points of view emanating from the diversity and heterogeneity of human culture as bona fide determinants of knowledge. Rorty's abiding faith in the universality of hermeneutic praxis rather licenses everyone to construct her own little whole, her own little language-game and crawl into it. Nonetheless, hermeneutics is also a hope for conversation, finding new skills, new virtues to learn and grow in confronting other cultures/domains in the most praiseworthy human abilities of trust and cooperation. Rorty charges the

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Platonic-Aristotelian conception of rationality *to penetrate appearance into reality* as weakening of social fabric, divisive of society into the lovers and deniers of truth. If the hierarchy of knowledge-claims refrains us from doing interesting things with methods, the idea of solidarity as moral expansion, in being tolerant to even the wildest differences/cultures is a democratic hope for equal chance and opportunity of happiness for all. The utopia of liberal democracy sought in de-hierarchization and pragmatization of knowledge is, however, an expression of a deep-seated faith in human solidarity. Bernstein accuses Rorty of "deep humanism" that "there is nothing that we can rely on but ourselves and our fellow human beings" (Bernstein 2008, p. 22). The myth of solidarity, according to him, gives us only the idea of personalized progress, and does not radicalize the conception of a democratic life. Rorty's critique of knowledge hierarchy replacing epistemology with social hope, however, does not address the exclusionary logic of subjugation in the production of knowledge. Seeing from the *below*, from the historical, embodied and agential accounts of experiences/meanings is a critical engagement with underlying patterns and structures of domination in the creations of meanings and bodies. Haraway, Mohanty and, Lazreg in problematizing the questions of identity and difference, entangled in the production of knowledge and meanings, theorize feminist solidarity as an analytic space to articulate alternative insurgent knowledges and pedagogies. The politics of solidarity vis-à-vis the politics of knowledge, in building connections *contra* the logic of "us vs. them", and in articulating oppositional practices, offers a new metaphor of *vision*. Conceptualization of knowledge in and through solidarity, as an ethical-political stance, provides the knower a chance to articulate hope in the transforming ideals of knowledge and education. In the following sections, the paper examines Rorty's post-philosophical social hope and the feminist praxis of solidarity. From the feminist perspective of solidarity that accentuates the cultural-conversational account of knowledge, and offers an active dissent to the approriationist logic of objectification we can rearticulate the idea of social hope.

Rorty's Post-philosophy and Solidarity

Rorty's anti-foundationalist, anti-representationalist critique of western epistemology is anti-Platonic. More precisely, it is anti-dualist and anti-essentialist. Drawing out appearance/reality, inside/outside, essence/accident, found/made binaries, according to him, is not a useful vocabulary now for the present finitist, experimentalist age that cares for a global, cosmopolitan, classless and a casteless society. Rorty (1999) charges the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of rationality in humankind's most distinctive and praiseworthy ability *to penetrate appearance into reality* as weakening of the social fabric, divisive of society into the lovers and deniers of truth. The Platonic belief in the Really Real, soul's immateriality and co-naturality with the outside reality, a divinely, non-human affiliation to some antecedent grounding is an escape from the human finitude, from our engagement with the contingent world. Platonism, to him, is an obstacle to social hope when what we are and what we should do is decisive upon some eternal, absolute truths.

In quite an un-Platonic manner, Rorty defends his idea of rationality in humankind's most praiseworthy ability of trust and cooperation. Following his academic hero Dewey, he considers that abandoning the worn out Platonic vocabulary of dualisms "will help bring us together, by enabling us to realize that trust, social cooperation and social hope are where our humanity begins and ends" (Rorty 1999, p. xv).

The idea of solidarity, a sense of community in making our institutions more just and less cruel, for Rorty, has no foundations in human nature; it rather stakes its claim in the human condition that "we all feel pain and humiliation in the same manner" (Rorty 1989). This imaginative sensitivity is thus thought of encompassing even the wildest differences. The articulation of human rationality as moral expansion in the ability of trust and cooperation envisages a democratic hope of equal opportunity and equal chance for happiness, a goal that Rorty says "is not written in the stars" (Rorty 1999, p. xxix). The modern professionalized disciplinary privilege of philosophy as a "mirror of nature" that dichotomizes serious/non-serious, hard/soft sciences, epistemology/hermeneutics is of no hope in this regard. Against this divisive representationalist language that disconnects 'will to truth' from 'will to happiness', the hermeneutic turn, the universality of communicative praxis, learning and growing in confronting alien cultures and discourses, to him, is a vocabulary of solidarity, increasing our abilities to cope well with our contingent needs and purposes. This conversational vocabulary of evolving consensus repudiates epistemology's desire for an ideal terminus, cracking the Code of all codes. Contrary to the desire for methodologically securing that our future is in the right direction of getting at the essences – human and non-human, the goal of inquiry, Rorty stresses, is to build our self-image of doing interesting things with methods, use them to reweave our beliefs, increase our chances of a better satisfactory future over the less satisfactory present.

Rorty's de-professionalization of philosophy aims to regain its cultural position and accentuate the cultural-conversational character of all inquiries. According to him, "…philosophy is one of the techniques for reweaving our vocabulary of moral deliberation in order to accommodate new beliefs" (Rorty 1989, p. 196). Rorty (2007) emphasizes that philosophy has always been a transitional genre. Changing the discourse from the love of God to the more workable idea of truth, for example, is how philosophy has been insightful for humanity. Reweaving our beliefs and practices, changing the course of conversation, persuading new roles, and new social practices is the cultural value of philosophy that makes it *optional*. That is, one can choose it like a literary text or a novel, or poetry in meeting some needs. This takes away philosophy's justificatory preeminence and authority in matters of truth, reality, god etc. that are believed to occur to us naturally.[25] And, this utilitarian ethic also does not make philosophy an expert giving a grand theory of risk management. "Cultural politics is the least norm-governed human activity", states Rorty (2007, p. 21).

[25]Rejecting philosophy's claim of epistemic authority, *pace* Brandom, Rorty argues that the question of authority, particularly epistemic authority, belongs to social practices and any belief in the ideas of truth, reality, objectivity other than the society are the "disguised moves" (Rorty 2007, p. 7).

Rorty's idea of philosophy as cultural politics aims to repudiate not only philosophy's justificatory pre-eminence but also that of any other discourse that upholds a universalist, essentialist position. At the same time, it accentuates the cultural-conversational nature of inquiry that can be appreciated as the idea of tolerant epistemology and hope for a democratic future. Rorty's "redescription" of philosophy, striking off the age-old disciplinary antagonisms between philosophy, poetry and sophistry, indicates this position. To him, both philosophy and poetry in claiming ineluctable truths, and in confronting the ineffable respectively are unpragmatic and unreliable, *the public relation gimmicks*. The metaphors of grandeur and profundity, the absolute conception of reality and encountering the ineffable in the depth of one's soul, liberating philosophy and poetry from any conceptual mutation, assign privilege to rationalism and romanticism respectively.[26] Alluding to Isaiah Berlin, Rorty concedes that both universalism and romanticism, in exalting reason-passion divide, are the expressions of "the infinite" (of the ontotheological tradition). The idea of infinite in universalism or rationalism is that of an over-arching framework something against which nothing else has any power and romanticism's idea of infinity abandons all constraints "in particular all the limitations imposed by the human past… It is the idea of perfect freedom decoupled from that of perfect knowledge and of affiliation with the invulnerable" (Rorty 2007, p. 83). Rorty's argument is that universalism (including Habermasian metaphysical proclivity to universal validity in his defense of communicative rationality) dramatizes the need for intersubjective agreement and romanticism dramatizes the need for novelty, need to be imaginative in finding newer solutions to our contingent problems. Philosophy, according to him, balances both these needs. Without invoking the promise of universal validity and evading from responsibility, cultural politics of new, imaginative ideas, new prophesies negotiates a space that aligns philosophy with poetry and sophistry. Neo-sophistry, the cultural role of philosophy, and inquiry in general, has been looked at as hope envisaging the democratization of knowledge and creation of democratic community.

Democratic hope, Rorty argues, requires experimental tinkerings with liberal institutions and not any philosophical foundation. Although the articulation of the political does not entail from the common human essence, a philosophical *back up*, Rorty's idea of democratic hope in trusting human abilities to cooperate and find newer solutions to contingent needs and desires is a deep faith in human solidarity. His idea of solidarity, a non-methodic account of rationality, is that of civic virtues of "tolerance, respect for the opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force" (Rorty 1991, p. 37). On this account of rationality, more like the differences of "sane" and "reasonable" than the rational/irrational, cognitive/non-cognitive divide, Rorty has argued, that science (differentiating science as a "community of solidarity" from science as "community of objectivity") is a moral exemplar, an exemplar of increasing intersubjective agreement about what truth is, "a commendatory term for well-

[26]The latest variant of this divisive and less useful vocabulary, according to Rorty, is C. P. Snow's "two-cultures" syndrome, i.e., whether human beings can attain their fullest potentiality by using rational or imaginative faculties (Rorty 2007, p. 74).

justified beliefs" (Rorty 1991, p. 24). He also emphasizes, "these are the virtues which members of a civilized society must possess if the society is to endure" (Rorty 1991, p. 37). The shift in the conception of human rationality as accurately mirroring reality to the vocabulary of edification, hermeneutic openness, a moral expansion of a "free and open encounter" across exotic cultures/discourses thus suffices to weave the political utopia of a liberal society.

Rorty's post-philosophical utopia of a democratic community seems a natural corollary to his anti-Platonism. The political entails, as if, from abandoning the divisive rationality, the language of binarisms. This presupposes deep human solidarity. Richard J. Bernstein accuses Rorty of going against his own grains and presupposing deep humanism replacing the "epistemological myth of the given". The "historical myth" of solidarity, deep fellow feeling in envisaging a democratic community, Bernstein argues, also does not align with Dewey whom Rorty considers his academic hero. Deplete with any resistance, any political discourse, conflicting and incompatible, the radicalization of the democratic life that Dewey emphasized, in Rorty's pragmatism, is only an "aestheticized pragmatism" of tolerant celebration of self-making, self-creation toward one's own progress. Solidarity or "we-identity", in the naturality of our shared habits, cultural consensus is only a benign phenomenon having "no genuine resistance, no otherness" (Bernstein 1987, p. 554). Bernstein's criticism of the naivety of solidarity for a political program of liberal democracy is insightful in examining the discourse of knowledge and solidarity from an ethical-political angle. Inasmuch as knowledge-construction is power-nexused, the *givenness* of solidarity provides no critical stance. The naivety of methodological solidarity in replacing epistemology with social hope falls short of this goal when the ethical-political underpinnings of the exclusionary logic of western epistemology and science are not being taken into account.

The discourse of knowledge is political through and through insofar as our identities, meanings and bodies are constructed/erased in the creation of knowledge. The language of trust and cooperation cultivates the idea of tolerant epistemology in the naivety of moral expansion, but it fails to analyze the power structures anchored in the making of knowledge. In fact, solidarity too is hegemonic; plays the politics of existential-epistemic erasure inasmuch as it essentializes the other. The Western/Eurocentric academic feminism in voicing for the Third World women rather solidifies the third world difference in the normative ordering of the western, Eurocentric knowledge as *the* form of knowledge. Nevertheless, the feminist discourse also theorizes solidarity as a dissenting voice against the dominant power-nexused western epistemology and science, and equally against the western feminist scholarship about the Third World women. In what follows, the paper examines the theorization of feminist solidarity in the conceptualization of radical knowledges and pedagogies toward the emancipatory and transformative goals of knowledge and education. In surveying 25 years of the feminist epistemology project at *Hypatia*, Longino (2010) stresses moving beyond our borders and absorbing multiculturalism in reshaping the epistemological project. Theorization of trans-national solidarity as a decolonizing stance resonates this spirit to learn/unlearn the feminist position in

reshaping knowledge and education. To the transforming ideals of knowledge and education, feminist trans-national solidarity works as both a means and an end.

Feminist Solidarity: A Praxis

The language of hope, utopia with uncompromising accounts of rationality and objectivity is the vision that the feminist successor science aspires for. When Haraway says, "science has been utopian and visionary from the start; that is one reason "we" need it", she envisions hope in science, in knowledge (Haraway 1988, p. 585). However, when objectivity symbolizes transcendence, she emphatically argues that omnipotence and transcendence are not our goals; we rather want a better livable, partially shared world and not a faithful 'real' account of the world. Haraway aims to unmask the totalitarian narrative of science, the verbose of the representationalist epistemology of truth, the codified canonical cognitive laws, and science academia and research controlled by the few male, white elitist knowers in mustering the language of objectivity and transcendence. Taking the dominant metaphor of "vision", she calls the science rhetoric a god's trick, an "unregulated gluttony", a devouring unrestricted vision "to see and not to be seen, to represent while escaping representation" (Haraway 1988, p. 581). This is equally true for the rhetoric of "truth" in the relativist and social constructivist positions.

Haraway claims that unmasking the elusive, unmarked, unembodied, unaccountable positon is important because it threatens the sense of collective historical subjectivity in which the idea of feminist objectivity can be articulated. The politics of "they vs. us", the one who can see infinitely and remain elusive, the privilege of the few elitist knowers, and the one who are not allowed not to have bodies, she argues, can be unmasked from our positioning along the various axes of race, class, gender etc. A reflective practice of understanding how our meanings, bodies get made is critical positioning, an attempt to see the making of situated agency from *below*.[27] Against both the totalitarian, reductionist logic of single vision and the relativistic positions of being nowhere and everywhere, Haraway sees a promise of objectivity in the knowledge from *below*, from the subjugated accounts of repression and denial. The promise of objectivity is the possibility of sustained critical and interpretive inquiry from these standpoints. Interpretation, translation, deconstruction, webbed connections, and 'hope for transformation of systems of knowledge and ways of seeing' is a chance for change and transformation (Haraway 1988, p. 588). Haraway makes it clear that feminism loves livable objectivity, "…another science: the sciences and politics of interpretation, translation, stuttering, and the partly understood" (Haraway 1988, p. 589). Critical positioning promises objectivity in partial connections, in a *stitchable* vision of a larger and objective grasp of things. She explains,

[27]Talking about the marginalized communities of women in the global south and north in analyzing systematically the broader patterns of domination and exploitation, Chandra Talpade Mohanty also emphasizes attention to historical and cultural specifities in order to understand their "complex agency as situated subjects" (Mohanty 2013, p. 967).

> "Subjectivity is multidimensional; so, therefore, is vision. The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and *therefore* able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another. Here is the promise of objectivity: a scientific knower seeks the subject position, not of identity, but of objectivity, that is, partial connection" (Haraway 1988, p. 586).

The incompleteness of the partial connections not only promises objectivity; it also defies closure, a full grasp, a complete vision in solidifying one's identity. Against the politics of the fullest vision, splitting of mind and body, subject and object, the epistemology of partial connections, Haraway claims, gives us visual clues, the knowledge centres/nodes to learn how meanings, bodies and our identities are created. This is to play solidarity in politics, in making webbed connections, in joining power-sensitive conversations to disrupt the politics of knowledge making, and asserting our position in it. Contrary to the politics of immediate vision, a discursive creation of isomorphic identities, the optics of webbed connections allows us to see the complex multiple inequalities ingrained in the historical and cultural materialities.[28] The larger, stitchable vision at once coalesces solidarity with objectivity.[29] Solidarity in the collective subject position, engaged in the politics of webbed connection, deconstruction, and interpretation is a dynamic critical agency subverting the totalitarian vision in the making of knowledge, meanings, and identities. Moreover, solidarity as a new metaphor of knowledge is illuminating of the power structures in the fabric of epistemology.

The theorization of solidarity as a complex, active oppositional agency or "we-identity" has also been exploited for articulating alternative insurgent knowledges and pedagogies. Solidarity is vacuous, benign without the inner dissent. The idea of feminist solidarity created in opposing all kinds of oppressions in the male/female androcentric power binary, Mohanty argues, is a vacuous conception of womanhood or universal sisterhood. Women's identity as oppressed and exploited, devoid of an active resistance to understanding the structures of domination and power is benign. In the same vein, effacing the categories of race, class, nation and abstracting gender from its complex locatable socio-cultural, political history is benign. The creation of an isomorphic, homogenous, coherent conception of women's identity like the third world women/women of color, devoid of active resistance is a hegemonic assertion of power. Endowing solidarity to such a homogeneous construct is a denial of agency, struggles of resistance, and a chance for transformation. Assaulting the Western/European feminism, especially the American feminist scholarship about the Third World women,

[28]Against the monocular vision, Catharine A. MacKinnon similarly talks about intersectionality as a method, a distinctive stance of tracing social dynamism. She says, "intersectionality focuses awareness on people and experiences—hence, on social forces and dynamics—that, in monocular vision, are overlooked. Intersectionality fills out the Venn diagrams at points of overlap where convergence has been neglected, training its sights where vectors of inequality intersect at crossroads that have previously been at best sped through" (MacKinnon 2013, p. 1020).

[29]Rorty also talks about objectivity in terms of intersubjectivity or community of solidarity, but his idea pertains to the context of repudiating the mind or language-independent intrinsic reality. In Haraway, solidarity coalesces with objectivity, with critical, situated knowledges.

Mohanty argues that the discursive homogenous creation of the third world women (rather the characterization of third world difference by the same token) as historically inert, socio-politically and economically dependent, oppressed, marginal category is an essentialist identity politics, a power move. It is rather a reflexive stance of projecting the superiority of western women as secular, progressive and transforming.

In her anti-racist, anti-capitalist critique of western academia and scholarship, Mohanty theorizes solidarity as an active struggle "to construct the universal on the basis of particulars/differences" (Mohanty 2006, p. 7). In revisiting "under Western Eyes" (1986), she emphasizes that the idea of difference allows us "to explain the connections and border crossings better and more accurately, how specifying difference allows us to theorize universal concerns more fully" (Mohanty 2006, p. 226). A dialectic engagement of differences and commonalities, pluralities and universality that makes the "common differences" visible provides an analytic space for articulating methodologies of dissent, and strategizing action to combat oppressions. The idea of solidarity in the relationality of identity and difference not only subverts the modern totalizing vision of power and domination; it also subverts the politics of coopting heterogeneity, differences, and the politics of multiculturalism.

As benign variations of cultural diversity, the notion of difference serves the politics of internationalization, accommodation and commodification of education, according to Mohanty. The idea of "harmony in diversity" bypasses power, conflicts, and the threats of disruption. On the other hand, difference defined in hierarchization and domination, is not accommodative of the incommensurables. The need, therefore, is a strategic analysis of diversity and power, disrupting empty cultural pluralism as well as the vocabulary of domination. In the context of the globalized academia, particularly the U.S. academia and its higher education restructuring that sees an upsurge of various courses and programs including cooptation of black studies/ feminist studies/ ethnic studies, Mohanty criticizes the internationalization and commodification of education and stresses the need to democratize the university space for dialogue, dissent and transformation. A comparative feminist study program, for example, which is based on "add and stir" method, adding the examples of non-western or third world/south cultures, she argues, is a clear politics of flattening distance and difference. The dichotomous "us vs. them" leaves the power relations and hierarchies untouched in the way the local (the western) is connected with the global (the other non-western world). Internationalization of the feminist studies program and other programs through depoliticizing, flattening of differences makes them consumable commodities in the logic of globalism.

To combat the dominant global normative ordering of knowledge, Mohanty theorizes solidarity as "the active creation of oppositional analytic and cultural spaces" (Mohanty 2006, p. 196). Taking Jodi Dean's idea of "reflective solidarity", "I ask you to stand by me over and against a third", she articulates insurgent knowledges and pedagogies of dissent in the creation of third voice/solidarity to decolonize knowledge and practice (Mohanty 2006, p. 7). As our "ideas are always communally wrought, not privately owned", she argues the need for

"systematic politicized practices of teaching and learning" (Mohanty 2006, pp. 1, 196). Haraway holds the same view when she argues that situated knowledes are "about communities, not about isolated individuals" (Haraway 1988, p. 590). Since our experiences in any coercive hierarchy co-imply the dominator and the dominated, politicizing and developing strategies of dissent in the public/ communal sphere prevents them getting frozen into one's personal, psychological space. Rather, engaging the opposite ideologies makes the power dynamics visible.

Talking about the comparative feminist studies/feminist solidarity model, Mohanty insists on engaging marginalized experiences, stories of struggles and resistances located in different histories of colonization in a classroom teaching practice. A relational, cross-cultural classroom environment that authorizes the third world/marginalized students' experiences/narratives as the legitimate "objects" of knowledge is not about being sensitive and accommodative of their voices. It is to create a public, cross-cultural discourse emphasizing that our experiences are not personal; instead, they are deeply historical, colonized. This is illuminating of hierarchies of power in which the first and third worlds are co-implied. Similarly, engaging with the experiences of race as shared experiences of certain ideologies, certain histories that define both white and black at the same time, is to prevent the social collapsing into frozen binaries of personal positions. Mohanty reinvigorates the feminist stand – "personal is political" so that an effective public discourse is created about transforming knowledges. An active public culture of dissent in the forms of pedagogies and institutional practices is important to politicize knowledge, power and experiences enabling us understand where we stand in the public realm of knowledge and education.

In a similar context of the essentialist, reductionist practices, rooted in the global politics of the central/peripheral, superior/inferior, which the feminist project itself questions, Marnia Lazreg criticizes the U.S. and Eurocentric academic feminism as conceptually and methodologically flawed; rather, there is an unwillingness to explore other than the colonized social sciences. Euro-American feminist writings about the North African and Middle Eastern women taking the 'religious' paradigm as the explanatory model, and representing them as the traditionalist and why they are not transformative is "a reductive, ahistorical conception of women" (Lazreg, 1988, p. 85). Lazreg argues that the concept of difference has always been a stumbling block for the Western social sciences. It is used more to understand their own institutions better than understanding the different world-view. Specifically taking the case of the western feminist writings about the Algerian women, she points out that there is an inherent contradiction in voicing for them (of course from an outsider's perspective) and "disowning" them as entirely "different", and hence making learning and teaching about them an impossibility. That "they are so different" from us, unprogressive, un-transforming, dominated and oppressed is a coercive optics of the dichotomous "us vs. them". This deprives the Algerian women of their self-presence, of being, of their lived-reality, having ability to think, resist and grow. Lazreg argues, "… difference is seen as mere division. The danger of this undeveloped view lies in its verging on *indifference.* In this sense, *anything* can be said about women from other cultures as long as it appears to document their differentness from 'us'. This bespeaks a

lack of concern for the complexity of difference as well as a simplification of difference to mean 'particularity', that is to say, unmediated singularity" (Lazreg 1988, p. 100).

This divisionary stance of an indifferent, unmediated singularity undermines the underlying phenomenon of intersubjectivity. That is, perceiving the "otherhood" not just as *different*, but also as having their own world like ours, according to Lazreg. Intersubjectivity, a shared consciousness in this sense provides an epistemic lens to recognize the otherhood as a distinct historical reality combating the logic of objectifying otherness. About the Algerian women, Lazreg writes, "Women's daily activities, the rituals they performed, the games they played, their joys and sorrows constitute the foundation on which families and their reproduction were and still are based. While the contents of these acts may be different, families in other human societies have similar foundations" (1994, p. 17). Their world-view, and even their silences circumstantial, structural as well as strategic amidst the colonial conditions, are eloquent, she concedes. Providing an epistemic stance to their lives, struggles, resentment is to prevent them from being objectified. The methodology of intersubjectivity, in making sense of their concrete historical subjectivity, serves as a dehegemonizing tool against the logic of appropriation, essentializing differences that makes any comparison, any cross-cultural understanding an impossibility. Lazreg argues,

> "To take intersubjectivity into consideration when studying Algerian women or other Third World women means seeing their lives as meaningful, coherent, and understandable instead of being infused 'by us' with doom and sorrow. It means that their lives like 'ours' are structured by economic, political, and cultural factors. It means that these women, like 'us', are engaged in the process of adjusting, often shaping, at times resisting and even transforming their environment. It means that they have their own individuality; they are 'for themselves' instead of being 'for us'. An appropriation of their singular individuality to fit the generalizing categories of 'our' analyses is an assault on their integrity and on their identity" (Lazreg 1988, p. 98).

Differences erased by either essentializing otherness or domesticating them in homogenizing multiplicities is a coercive logic of appropriation. Intersubjectivity or intersubjective consciousness, an affirmation of cultures not being too strange, allows us to recognize otherness, which otherwise would succumb to the hegemonic binaries of first/third, north/south worlds. Differences, if not frozen, can be brought into critical perspectives through cross-cultural readings of the marginalized experiences, locations and histories. Like Mohanty, Lazreg too emphasizes engaging the local with the global, particularities with commonalities so that it is illuminative of the universal concerns such as transcultural values of freedom and social justice though not neglecting the distinct singular cultural individualities. The dialectical engagement of differences in asserting feminist solidarity is a critical stance *contra* the flattening of the differences in the coercive logic of "us vs. them". Theorizations of solidarity in the ideas of critical positioning, common differences, and intersubjectivity in Haraway, Mohanty and Lazreg respectively radicalize the notions of the knower and knowledge in relation

to articulating social hope. The naivety of solidarity, in Rorty, as moral expansion of heterogeneity and differences, is inadequate to deal with the politics of exclusion in the project of epistemology.

Conclusion

In changing the metaphor of "mirror" to "redescription", Rorty's vision of democratic society, a hope to repair social fabric damaged by the divisive foundationalist, representationalist epistemology derives from a deep trust in human solidarity. De-hierarchization and pragmatization of knowledge sought in methodological solidarity, however, is unilluminating of the ethical-political underpinnings of the production of knowledge. The idea of feminist solidarity, in crossing boundaries, in building connections provides a new metaphor of *vision* to critically engage with the questions of existential-epistemic erasure in the politics of knowledge construction. In the feminist discourse of the interwovenness of solidarity and knowledge, which overcomes the postmodern skepticism about identity and a threshold of disappearance of difference, the knower gets a chance to engage herself critically and reshape the landscape of knowledge and education.

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