(ATINER)

The Athens Journal of Social Sciences

(ATINER)

Volume 6, Issue 2, April 2019

Articles

Mission

ATINER is a ***World Non-Profit Association*** of Academics and Researchers based in Athens. ATINER is an independent **Association** with a **Mission** to become a forum where Academics and Researchers from all over the world can meet in Athens, exchange ideas on their research and discuss future developments in their disciplines, **as well as engage with professionals from other fields**. Athens was chosen because of its long history of academic gatherings, which go back thousands of years to *Plato's Academy* and *Aristotle's Lyceum*. Both these historic places are within walking distance from ATINER's downtown offices. Since antiquity, Athens was an open city. In the words of Pericles, **Athens*"...is open to the world, we never expel a foreigner from learning or seeing".*** (*"*Pericles' Funeral Oration", in Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War).* It is ATINER's **mission** to revive the glory of Ancient Athens by inviting the World Academic Community to the city, to learn from each other in an environment of freedom and respect for other people's opinions and beliefs. After all, the free expression of one's opinion formed the basis for the development of democracy, and Athens was its cradle. As it turned out, the Golden Age of Athens was in fact, the Golden Age of the Western Civilization. *Education* and *(Re)searching* for the 'truth' are the pillars of any free (democratic) society. This is the reason why *Education* and *Research* are the two core words in ATINER's name.

The Athens Journal of Social Sciences
ISSN NUMBER: 2241-7737- DOI: 10.30958/ajss
Volume 6, Issue 2, April 2019
Download the entire issue (PDF)

Athens Journal of Social Sciences
Editorial and Reviewers' Board

President's Message

All ATINER"s publications including the e-journals are open access without any costs (submission, processing, publishing, open access paid by authors, open access paid by readers etc) and are independent of the presentations made at any of the many small events (conferences, symposiums, forums, colloquiums, courses, roundtable discussions) organized by ATINER throughout the year. The intellectual property rights of the submitted papers remain with the author.

Before you submit, please make sure your paper meets some basic academic standards, which include proper English. Some articles will be selected from the numerous papers that have been presented at the various annual international academic conferences organized by the different divisions and units of the Athens Institute for Education and Research.

The plethora of papers presented every year will enable the editorial board of each journal to select the best ones, and in so doing, to produce a quality academic journal. In addition to papers presented, ATINER encourages the independent submission of papers to be evaluated for publication.

The current issue of the Athens Journal of Social Sciences (AJSS) is the second issue of the sixth volume (2019). The reader will notice some changes compared with previous volumes, which I hope is an improvement. An effort has been made to include papers which fall within in one of the broad disciplines of social sciences.

This volume includes papers which their common denominator is education from the perspective of sociology, anthropology, politics and culture. In total, five papers are included. The first is a sociology paper which deals with the controversial issue of gender, race and economic inequalities. The second paper examines the Greek diaspora in Australia from a cultural – anthropological perspective. The next two papers deal with the issue of democracy as is applied in the European education context and the USA elections. The last paper also deals with gender issues in a different context of students.

The AJSS is truly an international journal; this is also reflected in this issue. The five papers refer to different countries and regions of the world: Australia, China, Europe, Turkey, and USA. The nine authors of the papers are affiliated with institutions of Australia, Canada, Italy, Turkey and USA.

Gregory T. Papanikos, President
Athens Institute for Education and Research

13th Annual International Conference on Psychology

The Psychology Unit of ATINER organizes its **13th Annual International Conference on Psychology, 27-30 May 2019, Athens, Greece** sponsored by the Athens Journal of Social Sciences.The aim of the conference is to bring together scholars and students of psychology and other related disciplines. You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (https://www.atiner.gr/2019/FORM-PSY.doc).

Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **15 April 2019**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **29 April 2019**

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference

- **Dr. Thanos Patelis,** Head, Psychology Unit of ATINER & Research Scholar, Fordham University, USA.

Social and Educational Program

The Social Program Emphasizes the Educational Aspect of the Academic Meetings of Atiner.

- Greek Night Entertainment (This is the official dinner of the conference)
- Athens Sightseeing: Old and New-An Educational Urban Walk
- Social Dinner
- Mycenae Visit
- Exploration of the Aegean Islands
- Delphi Visit
- Ancient Corinth and Cape Sounion

More information can be found here: www.atiner.gr/social-program

Conference Fees

Conference fees vary from 400€ to 2000€
Details can be found at: https://www.atiner.gr/2019fees

13th Annual International Conference on Sociology

The Sociology Research Unit of the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER) organizes its **13th Annual International Conference on Sociology, 6-9 May 2019, Athens, Greece** sponsored by the Athens Journal of Social Sciences. The aim of the conference is to bring together academics and researchers from all areas of Sociology, Social Work and other related fields. Theoretical and empirical research papers will be considered. You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (https://www.atiner.gr/2019/FORM-SOC.doc).

Important Dates

- Abstract Submission: **25 March 2019**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **8 April 2019**

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference

- **Dr. Domenico Maddaloni,** Head, Sociology Research Unit, ATINER & Associate Professor, University of Salerno, Italy.
- **Dr. Yorgo Pasadeos,** Director Social Sciences Division, ATINER & Professor Emeritus, University of Alabama USA.
- **Dr. Sharon Claire Bolton**, Head, Management Research Unit, ATINER & Professor, The Management School, University of Stirling, Scotland.

Social and Educational Program

The Social Program Emphasizes the Educational Aspect of the Academic Meetings of Atiner.

- Greek Night Entertainment (This is the official dinner of the conference)
- Athens Sightseeing: Old and New-An Educational Urban Walk
- Social Dinner
- Mycenae Visit
- Exploration of the Aegean Islands
- Delphi Visit
- Ancient Corinth and Cape Sounion

More information can be found here: https://www.atiner.gr/social-program

Conference Fees

Conference fees vary from 400€ to 2000€

Details can be found at: https://www.atiner.gr/2019fees

Athens Journal of Social Sciences *Volume 6, Issue 2 – Pages 89-98*

Gender, Race, and Male Privilege in Post- Modern Society

By Richard D. Christy[*]

The literature in sociology and the current discussions in the media, identify a growing crisis in modern masculinity. Various social indicators support this claim. At the same time, there is an enduring assumption that males in post-modern society live lives of privilege. In a social era increasingly based on achieved status some males succeed, others fail, and not all males are equal. What are the social and cultural changes in gender and race? Is it possible that the social script for boys, young men and men of all racial groups prevent them from succeeding in post-modern Canada and the United States? Have males inherited a "male code" inappropriate for the "information society"? Kaufman argues in Cracking the Armour that "the old rules of the game have broken down. A genuine profound crisis of masculinity is sweeping North America and Europe and is beginning to reach to the rest of the world"(Kaufman, 1993) What is the emerging picture of male privilege when you examine men and mortality rates, life expectancy, men and violence, unemployment rates and graduation rates and post-secondary education?

Keywords: *male domination, male privilege, men and violence, "whiteness", misandry.*

Introduction

Few topics in sociology are more controversial than gender, race and economic inequalities. Many researchers conclude that social and economic inequalities are the result of institutional patriarchy, capitalism, racism and globalism. Research on social injustice and economic inequality primarily focused on women, visible minorities, and indigenous people. What would be the sociological conclusions if males and male privilege were the focus of inequalities?

Sociologists have considered social inequality in gender and race at the societal level using structural functionalism, conflict theory and Marxist analysis. What would sociologists conclude focusing at micro and group level using Max Weber's interpretive perspective? While Weber never directly considered gender and race, stratification, status and power, each essential variables in understanding social inequality and privilege were at the heart of his work. Weber concluded from his broadly based historical analysis that societies were always coming together, falling apart, shifting and changing. Collins and Makowsky (2010) argue that for Weber "history shows nothing permanent but continual war, conflict, and change" (Collins and Makowsky 2010: 109).

According to Weber, groups of people who associate together are the basic unit of society. Since Weber, researchers have concluded that in "face-to-face groups that people acquire their identities, their values, and their world view" (Weber 1947: 109). Groups are very different and as Weber agued it is an error to

[*]Associate Professor of Sociology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada.

https://doi.org/10.30958/ajss.6-2-1 doi= 10.30958/ajss.6-2-1

suppose the values, the norms, the beliefs, reputation, status and reputation of one group sums up the position of the whole group. Mindful of this conclusion, can sociologists assume that all males are equal or that privileged, white males necessarily represent all white males? Not all males are equal and privileged just as we cannot assume that all women, blacks, or other minority groups do not have privileges. Weber it is not enough to identify social regularity but it is essential to understand the meaning behind social action. For Weber it is not enough to know the percentage of university students who smoke or the percentage of a population that vote. Sociologists must ask what is the social meaning of smoking or voting for an individual or a group? Weber (1947) reasoned that "action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual or individuals" (Weber 1947: 88). Weber argued that so much of action is routine, self-evident and spontaneous it necessitates "clarity and verifiable accuracy of insight and comprehension" (Weber 1947: 90). Therefore, do researchers must examine the subjective meaning of gender and race?

It appears that the public discourse and the rhetoric of advocate groups assume the realities of male social roles are one of dominance and privilege. It may be an irrefutable fact that in traditional societies, many male lived lives of status and privilege. However, was this true for all men? Is universal male privilege a historic fact and a modern reality? To "understand" social status, Weber defined ethnicity and race. He described ethnic groups as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent" (Morning 2016: 241). According to Morning, Weber considered it essential to define ethnicity and race in understanding group formation, status and behavior. I consider it equally essential to understand gender and race if we are to understand men, masculinities and male privilege in modern society.

Towards an Understanding of Gender and Race

Embodiment is a starting point for the subjective understanding of gender and race. Watson (2000) states that embodiment is how men experience everyday life. Watson argues that the issues of men and health but also "perhaps men's place in society, is crippled by the lack of attention paid to personal accounts and perception of maleness" (Watson 2000: 4). In *Male Bodies: Health, Culture, and Identity*, Watson recognizes embodiment because "within the parameters of professional understanding, male embodiment remains largely 'unproblematic', fixed and immutable" (Watson 2000: 5). He notes that researchers write as if men are an abstraction or an invisible entity, existing outside the concrete material world. His analysis of life expectancy by sex and country; suicide rates and gender; death rates by age and class; and causes of death by gender, indicate that embodiment and maleness is problematic and gender and race is neither fixed nor immutable.

In his analysis of masculinity, Morse (1996) writes that "stereotypes came into their own with the modern age as part of a general quest for symbols in order to make the abstract concrete within the bewildering changes of modernity"

(Morse 1996: 5). The idea of modern masculinity emerged "between the second half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth" (Morse 1996: 5). The human body took on a symbolic form and "modern masculinity was to define itself through an ideal manly beauty that symbolized virtues" (Morse 1996: 5). The criteria of the stereotypical male was wealth, social and political status, physical health and beauty. For Morse male beauty and privilege was and is an ideal, a social construct and open to change. Today according to Morse, "there (is) no longer much talk about fashioning a 'new man' who would guide the nation into a higher future" (Morse 1996: 4). There is little interest in honoring and celebrating men or masculinities. There does appear to be interest in marginalizing all men, White, Blacks, men of Color, Gentiles, Jews and Muslims. The extent to which this reluctance to celebrate men is true, there is a growing crisis in masculinity.

The Crisis in Masculinity

Since the 1960s, there is a reluctance to ask questions about the inequality and discrimination facing men. Could all men, white, black and males of color be experiencing downward social and economic mobility?

In 1993 Farrell, twice elected to the Washington based National Organization of Women, challenged the existing assumptions of masculinities in *The Myth of Male Power*. Farrell questioned the universal assumptions of male privilege and power. By introducing statistical data on health, suicide rate, and life expectancy, Farrell's findings on men of all age groups, ethnicity, levels of educational levels and race challenged the existing public dialogue of gender inequality, dis crimination, and illustrated that men's lives are not necessarily privileged.

Corneau (1991) writes in his book, *Absent Father, Lost* Sons*: The Search for Masculine Identity*, that Dr. Hubert Wallot in his testimony before a Canadian parliamentary commission on mental health that the Canadian government establish a council on the status of men to deal with "the precarious condition of men's health" (Corneau 1991: 1). Wallot noted "four times as many men suffer from alcoholism and drug addiction as do women; they also outnumber women three to one in the area of suicide and high risk behavior" (Corneau 1991: 2). This data suggested to Wallot that men have medical, emotional and social problems that required attention. For Corneau Wallot's statistics, data indicates the males are facing an identity crisis and there is a need to understand the social, emotional and economic issues facing men. In *The Crisis in Masculinity*, Leanne Payne (1991) argues there are a "great number of men, who to one degree or another are insecure in their masculinity" (Payne 1991: 11). She "point out some of the causes-psychological, historical, and philosophical- of this growing cultural malady, already near epidemic in proportions, that I have called the crisis in masculinity" (Payne 1991: 11),

In a similar manner, Kaufman (1993) writes that there is a new confusion in the lives of men since the 1960's that "called into question men's assumption about power, and identity, about what it means to be men" (Kaufman 1993: 5). For

Kaufman the rules that guided gender relationships no longer exist and "a genuine and profound crisis in masculinity is North America and Europe and is beginning to reach out to the rest of the world. It is a crisis that touches the lives of every one of us" (Kaufman 1993: 6).

By contrast, Kahn (2009) takes the position that male privilege does exists. He concludes, "privilege can be thought of as an unearned social granting of a route to accessing cultural resources" (Kahn 2009: 26). For Kahn privilege is the positive advantages to an individual who belong s to specific group, community or society. Kahn is "primarily concerned with male privilege, which means that as a function of being or presenting as male, certain opportunities, activities and resources are made more accessible to you than to others" (Kahn 2009: 27). If privilege is a reality for all males, and particularly for white males, what is the essential nature of becoming and being white?

Is White a Color? Race and Constructing Social Norms

According to Morning (2016) "the race concept – people's belief about race, including their notions of which groups are races and who belongs to which race – has emerged in different forms at different times, or perhaps not at all" (Morning 2016: 246). Morning agues "there is nothing natural or inevitable about the way human beings have created racial categories; the conventions and classifications we come up with are reflections of the social, economic, and political worlds we live in" (Morning 2016: 247). For example, Frankenberg wrote in *The Social Construction of White Women, Whiteness Race Matters* that as a white feminist she found that "race, like gender, is 'real' in the sense that it has real though changing, effects in the world and real tangible, and complex impact on individuals' sense of self, experiences, and life chances" (Morning 2016: 11) Frankenberg argues that for her race is socially constructed. For both Frankenberg and Morning, "whiteness" is not always obvious. To understand "white" as racial category individual men and social groups of men must acquire a consciousness of their color.

In Perry's research on race among high school students in California her "working assumptions, mainly that all identities spring from social relations and that one needs to confront a 'racial other' for there to be a 'racial self'" (Perry 2015: 438). She assumed that white students attending an urban multiracial high school would reflect upon their whiteness more than whites at less diversified suburban schools. She observed that in the multiracial school, white youth stumbled to answer the question "What does it mean to be white?" Perry found "some felt victimized as whites, some felt privileged, and many felt both. Some felt 'racist' some felt 'nonracist', many felt both" (Perry 2015: 438). Perry found that in the multiracial high school and the suburban high school, white students found it difficult to describe white American culture and the "themes and characteristics of white culture that youth expressed included heterogeneous, middle-class, commercial/consumerist, American normal, and taken for granted" (Perry 2015: 451).

In Fordham and Ogbu's article *"Black Students' School Success, Coping With the "Burden of 'Acting White'"* they discuss the dynamic of blacks and whites culture in a high school population in Washington D.C. that is 90% black. If Black students pursue academic success, the student risk the loss of social identity for "being kind of white" as two Black students Sydney, a popular male underachieving student and Katrina, a popular female high-achieving student, learned. Each student developed strategies for not "acting too white" to reassure other students of their black loyalty and identity. Students achieve "this group loyalty by defining certain attitudes and behaviors as 'white' and therefore unacceptable" (Fordham and Ogbu 2015: 367). For those Black students personal achievement had to be balanced with such perceived unacceptable "white" activities as listening to classical music, reading or writing poetry, going to the opera, speaking correctly or studying at the library.

For Perry (2015), Fordham and Ogbu (2015) racial social identity, and racial distinctions is fluid and complex. Perry challenges the assumption "to see white identities and attitudes as fixed and stable" (Perry 2015: 340). Perry concludes there are "shades of white", and there must be "shades of white privilege males"?

Kwan- Lafond (2012) advocates for a critical examination of white privilege and states, "not all white people are equally privileged and not all people of color are oppressed in the same way" (Kwan- Lafond 2012: 227). According to Bell Hooks (2004) "many men in our society have no status, no privilege, they receive no freely given compensation, no perks, with capitalist patriarchy. …… These men suffer. Their anguish and despair has no limit or boundaries. They suffer in a society that does not want men to change" (Hooks 2004: 138). Hooks argues that many men are unable to speak of their suffering for fear that their exposed weakness will challenge their manhood and their weakness will be used against them by other males and by radical feminists who are "so enraged by male domination that they cannot acknowledge the possibility of male suffering or forgive" (Hooks 2004: 139).

Nathanson and Young warn that since the 1980's there is a pervasive misandry in popular and argues that "many would be shocked to realize how profoundly their own thinking has been influenced by ideology, the influences being so subtle that it would hardly seem possible" (Nathanson and Young 2001: 237). Greig and Martino grasp this trend and describe men and masculinity as the "new disadvantage". They dismiss comments of a "backlash and result of changing structural and institutional relations of inequality that have arisen in response to the impact of globalization and deindustrialization" (Greig and Martino 2012: 1) or "antagonistic to feminism and pro-feminist perspectives" (Greig and Martino 2012: 2). They draw attention to the necessity of discussing the new disadvantaged "despite the current debate over men and boys, white, affluent, heterosexual males [remaining] relatively privilege, economically, socially, and politically, compared to their female counterparts"? (Greig and Martino 2012: 2). Knuttila (2016) in Paying *for Masculinity* uses the title of the 1966 movie *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly* to describe "how men and boys behave, how we are perceived and how we are represented…..yet men also often suffer loneliness, feelings of isolation and the lack of intimacy and close

friendships" (Knuttila 2016: 1). While Knuttila (2016) identifies the contradictions in the public and private lives of men, he declares without qualification on the cover of his book that men commit crimes, men are violent, men start wars and men have power. While many men have power and privilege that is not the entire story. Do some men have more power and privilege as others do? What are the indicators of male privilege?

The High Cost of Gender and Race in Men's Lives

What can we conclude about men and male privilege from an examination of mortality rates, health and wellness, death by violence, education and unemployment? According to Kaufman, the former rules in gender relations have broken down and men have had to adjust to new reality and to "all the joy and pain of manhood are now joined by a new confusion" (Kaufman 1993: 5). Could it be possible that indicators of this confusion are identified in the statistical findings of the social and economic data in men's lives? Is there a disconnection between the assumptions of privilege in men's lives and data on gender differences?

Mortality Rates: Gender Gap

According to Perls and Fretts (2002) in 1990 life expectancy in the United States 79 years for women and 72 years for men. Over the years, life expectancy for men and women has changed "the average national life increase in life expectancy in developed countries has been 71% for women and 66% for men" (Perls and Fretts 2002: 105). Researchers expect some decline in women's gain in life expectancies in that "more women have taken on behaviors and stresses that were confined to men – smoking, drinking, and working outside the home" (Perls and Fretts 2002: 105).

Lindsey's (2011) comparison of mortality rates (number of deaths X1000) to morbidity rates (amount of disease and illness). In a given year in the United States "women have higher morbidity rates but live longer than men, men have lower morbidity rates but do not live longer than women" (Lindsey 2011: 39). Lindsey also observed in the United States that of the top 15 causes of death, males have a higher rate with the greatest differences in non-disease deaths, suicide at 4.1X, homicide at 3.8X, and accidents at 2.2 X. The mortality rate between men and women is narrowing but "the age-adjusted rate for men is still about 40% greater than for that of women" (Lindsey 2011: 40). The life expectancy in term of gender and race indicate that white females at birth have the highest life expectancy, followed by African-American females. "White males are gaining, and they reached parity with African-American females in 2000 …..the gap reappeared within two years and is again widening" (Lindsey 2011: 40).

Life expectancy of Black males at birth is the lowest life and in 1970 at age, 65 white and Black males had the same life expectancy. By the mid 1980's a gap began to appear between White and Black males at the age of 65. The life

expectancy for 2010 and 2050 from the United States Census Bureau, predicts that white male expected to live until 81.2 and Black males 79.1 years. By contrast, life expectancy for White and Black females will be 85.5 and 84.3 respectively.

According to Statistics Canada (2015), life expectancy rates from 1920 to1922 were 59 years for males compared to 61 years for females virtually the same. The gap widened to 5 years in 1980-1982 with life expectancies for males at 72 years and females at 79 years and in 2007-2008, the gap was 4 years with life expectancy for males was 79 years for males and 83 years for females. On provincial bases, the lowest life expectancy for males is 77 years in Newfoundland Labrador, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan and the highest life expectancy for woman at 84 years in the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia. If longevity life is a privilege that in the United States White and Black women have higher prestige than White and Black males and in Canada woman have higher status than males since the 1920s.

Men and Violence

Any topic of men and masculinity eventually turns to hegemonic males characterized by violence, aggression, stoicism, sexism and racism. Knuttila (2016) argues "in so-called common sense narratives and discourse, is that men are violent, just plain violent, likely as a result of their biology or genes" (Knuttila 2016: 127). For Knuttila the issue is more perplexing and complicated but for obvious reason the public discourse on gender violent comes to this conclusion since "80% of the victims of intimate partner violence were women, as were 81% of spousal violence victims" (Knuttila 2016: 130). By contrast "males on the other hand are more often than women in the categories non-intimate partner, friends, casual acquaintances, close friends, and criminal associates, authority figures and strangers" (Knuttila 2016: 130). For example, Knuttila notes that in terms of physical assault, men are 8% more likely to be victims than females and from 2004 to 2008 "adult males were more likely than females to be homicide victims accounting for 74% of victims" (Knuttila 2016: 131). Without minimizing violence against women by other women and men, a deeply rooted reality for men of all races is their fear of violence, physical assault and violent death.

Unemployment and Gender

The economics debate as it relates to gender and race has focused on women and such themes as pay equity, barriers to non-traditional employment, combat roles in the military, underemployment and access to education. However, the recession of 2008 brought into focus the unemployment of underemployment of males. Hennessy and Yalnizyan (2009) argue that commentators in the United States are "calling the recession, there a 'he- recession' because 80% of American workers whose jobs have been wiped out are men" (Hennessy and Yalnizyan 2009: 1) also in Canada "we’re experiencing a he-recession of our own: 71% of

Canada's unemployment victims in the recession thus far are men" (Hennessy and Yalnizyan 2009: 1). More specifically, 63% of male workers age 25 to 54 have lost their jobs and as the recession deepened more women over age, 55 are working and 70% of their jobs were full-time jobs. Lindsey (2011) notes that the American Bureau of Labor Statistics found that as "the recession moved in the end year in 2009, men's unemployment rose at a faster rate (2.8%) than the rate for women (1.6%); over two-thirds of rise in unemployment has been among men" (Lindsey 2011: 285). Ferber (2004) uses this economic data to argue, "woman's inroads into the workplace, increased political and economic autonomy and the questioning of male domination have historically been perceived as threats to male privilege" (Ferber 2004: 228). Ferber goes on to argue, "in both academic and mainstream circles, the idea that masculinity, especially white masculinity is in crisis is widespread" (Ferber 2004: 228). Ferber writes that "declining positions and wages of all Americans means that white men are correct when they perceive themselves to be losing ground" (Ferber 2004: 228).

Education and Gender

In the United States Lindsey (2011) notes that "for whites, African American, and Latino, gender gaps favoring males in high school and college graduation rates largely disappeared by the 1990s; today the gender gap in both favor females" (Lindsey 2011: 313). In 1981, the percentage of white male and white female who completed high school was 89.7% to 89.9% respectively. By 1991, the gap between white males and white females begins to widen with 92.7% of white males and 94.2% females. At the college level, in 1991 BA went to 26.5% white males and 26.9% white females. By 2007 the gap between white male graduates and white female graduates was be 31.9% compared to 39.2 % representing a 7.3% gap.

In Canada, Wotherspoon writes, "proportionately more men than women were enrolled in post-secondary programs until the mid-1980s, after which time the number of women has exceeded the number of men" (Wotherspoon 2014: 250). He notes that the ratio of female to male full-time undergraduates university students has risen in the mid -1970s until "women now constitute about 55% of all students in master's programs and just under half (47%) of students in doctoral programs" (Wotherspoon 2014: 250). In a knowledge based society this can only mean that the unemployment rate for men without education or marketable skills may can continue to increase. Sweet and Meiksins (2017) question the assumption of a knowledge - based economy dependent on "highly educated technically sophisticated employees, rather than the low-skill workers needed by mass production industry" (Sweet and Meiksins 2017: 38). For Blau and Ferber (1992) historic trends, indicate economic cycles in which white, as well a black, males experience higher rates of unemployment. As they note "the blue-collar jobs and durable-goods manufacturing industries, which have a larger proportion of male workers are subject to greater cyclical variations in employment. Thus, men's employment tends to decline more in downturns" (Blau and Ferber 1992: 251).The

central social and economic conclusion of the recession of 2008 is that males in post-modern society are becoming as Greig and Martino argue the "new disadvantaged".

Conclusions

Discussions of male privilege and power are often angry, hostile, blaming, and challenging to the self-esteem, pride and well-being of boys and men. For many, patriarchy, capitalism, socialism, communism, and racism are the social forces perpetuating male privilege and power and creating gender and racial inequality and discrimination. These social forces cannot be ignored, but should we ignore the values that individual and groups create to perpetuate inequality and discrimination? Nor can we ignore that the cultural and social changes in post-modern are encouraging men to challenge male instrumental roles and their resultant stoicisms rationalism and inexpressiveness. For example, Balswick (1988) argues, "men need to be liberated from the emotional hang ups that prevent them from becoming intimate in human relationships" (Balswick 1988: 9).

Many of the harshest critics of the inequalities in gender and race fail to acknowledge that all men, including white male, struggle to make sense of their failures, successes, disappointments, broken dreams, grief, accomplishments, pains, aging and disabilities. When sociologists examine such variable as life expectancy, violence, unemployment, and education, there is no clear and simple narrative about men and male privilege. Many sociologists are reluctant to examine the complexity of statistical data and public discourse concerning male status, power and privilege. Knuttila (2016) concludes his analysis of patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity by stating that "not all, or even most, males endorse or attempt to practice hegemonic masculinity. Many men, for example, may find themselves in economically subservient positions under the control of other men and without opportunities to express power, control, or domination" (Knuttila (2016: 161). Post-modernity is not an ideal social era and many academics, legislators, individuals and social activists advocate for greater gender and racial fairness, and equality. However, there are numerous historic examples in which dramatic cultural and social changes have resulted in the creation of "new" elites rather than the elimination of existing prejudices and discrimination. Today we may be witnessing, covert and overt signs, of a new form of prejudices and discriminations emerging against males. Is there a growing danger that the blaming and shaming by social critics of boys and men is contributing to "new" patterns of gender and racial discrimination and misandry?

References

Blau FD, Ferber MA (1992) *The Economics of Women, Men, And Work.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Balswick J (1988) *The Inexpressive Male.* Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.

Collins R, Makowsky M (2010 *The Discovery of Society.* New York: McGraw Hill.

Corneau G (1991) *Absent Fathers, Lost Sons, The search for masculine identity*. Boston: Shanbhala Publishing.

Farrell W (1993) *The Myth of Male Power.* New York: Berkley Books.

Ferber AL (2004) Racial warriors and Week-end warriors; The construction of masculinity in mythopoetic and white supremacist discourse. In PF Murphy (ed), *Feminism & Masculinities*, 228-243. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fordhman S, Ogbu JU (2015) Black students' success: coping with the burden of acting white'. In R Arum, IR Beattie, K Ford (eds) *The Structure of Schooling, Readings in the Sociology of Education.* Los Angles: Sage.

Greig CJ, Martino WJ (2012) *Canadian men and masculinities: historical and contemporary perspectives.* Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc.

Hennessy T, Yalnizyan A (2009) Canada's 'he-cession': Men bearing the brunt of rising unemployment. *Canadian Centre for Policy Alternative* 19(4).

Hooks B (2004) *The will to change; men, masculinity, and love. New* York: ATRIA Books.

Kaufman M (1993) *Cracking the armour: power, pain, and the lives of men.* Toronto: Viking.

Kahn JS (2009) *An Introduction to masculinities.* Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Knuttila M (2016*) Paying for* masculinity*; Boys and Men Patriarchal Dividend.* Halifax & Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.

Kwan-Lanford D (2012) Racialized Masculinities in Canada. In JA Laker (ed) *Canadian Perspectives on masculinities on men and masculinities, an interdisciplinary reader*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.

Lindsey LL (2011) *Gender roles: a sociological perspective.* Boston: Prentice Hall.

Morning A (2016) Race and ethnicity. In J Mange, R Arum, L Haney (eds) *The Sociology Project 2.0: Introducing the Sociological Imagination* New York: Pearson.

Morse GL (1996) *The image of man: The creation of modern masculinity.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Nathanson P, Young KK (2001) *Spreading misandry: the teaching of contempt for men in popular culture*. Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press.

Payne L (1991) *Crisis in masculinity.* Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books.

Perls TT, Fretts RC (2002) Why women live longer than men. In Frank Trovato *Population and society: essential readings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Perry P (2015) Shades of white, white kids and racial identity in high schools. In R Arum, IR Beatrie, K Ford (eds) *The structure of schooling, readings in the sociology of education.* Los Angeles: Sage.

Statistics Canada (2015) *Life expectancy at birth, by sex, by province*, Table 102-0512 and Catalogue 84-537-XIE.

Sweet S, Meiksins P (2017) *Changing contours of work: jobs and opportunities in the new economy.* Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publication.

Watson J (2000) *Male bodies: health, culture, and identity.* Buckingham: Open University Press.

Weber M (1947) *The theory of social and economic organization.* New York: The Free Press.

Wotherspoon T (2014) *The sociology of education in Canada.* Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Athens Journal of Social Sciences *Volume 6, Issue 2 – Pages 99-112*

The Symbolic Meaning of Greek Dancing in Diaspora

By Maria-Irini Avgoulas[*] & Rebecca Fanany[†]

Maintenance of cultural practices in diaspora communities is a significant element of heritage. Such practices may also contribute to health and well-being, especially if they offer an opportunity for physical activity and social interaction health and wellbeing. For the Greek community of Melbourne, Australia, the maintenance of their cultural heritage continues to be central to the experience of the community and is manifested in a number of ways, including in the form of Greek dancing which has become a popular leisure activity. This study investigates the role Greek dancing plays in cultural maintenance and heritage identity among people of Greek background in Melbourne as well as its potential contribution to health and wellbeing. The symbolic meaning of dances well as its potential to motivate participation in physical activity are discussed. These findings of this study suggest that there is an important cultural dimension of dancing as a health promoting activity. For the participants in this study, the heritage aspect of this activity was of the greatest importance, while the physical benefits remained secondary although desirable. Dancing was associated with the idea of being Greek and the happiness a Greek environment provided. This highlights the emotional benefits of an activity that is culturally consonant and that contributes to the physical and emotional aspects of wellbeing.

Keywords: *Culture, cultural identity, Greek dancing and music, Greek diaspora, health, wellbeing*

Introduction and Background

Melbourne, Australia is the home to a large and well established Greek diaspora that dates to 1827. The community expanded rapidly from 1945-1982 as new migrants arrived and began to settle in Melbourne (for a detailed discussion see Damanakis et al. 2014, Danousi 2015 among others). The current economic problems in Greece have resulted in another wave of migration that is made up of young people with the same hopes and aspirations as the earlier migrants that Australia would indeed be the 'lucky country' and 'a second homeland' for people of Greek origin (for a detailed discussion see Avgoulas, 2013). From the beginning, cultural maintenance and a Greek lifestyle, adapted to the Australian context has been important, and the community continues to support a number of Greek-oriented institutions, including churches, schools, cultural and sporting groups, and community organizations. These institutions and the activities they sponsor reflect the importance placed on cultural maintenance by the original

[*]Associate Lecturer, La Trobe University, Australia.
[†]Senior Lecturer, School of Health, Medical and Applied Sciences, Central Queensland University, Australia.

https://doi.org/10.30958/ajss.6-2-2 doi= 10.30958/ajss.6-2-2

immigrant generation and the continued significance of heritage and cultural identity to younger members of the community who were born in Australia. Heritage, in this context, refers to a specific historical and cultural experience shared by members of the community. The presence of new migrants reinforces the community's link to Greece, but these newcomers are not numerous enough to alter the patterns of the established diaspora community or to cause a change in the perception of shared heritage.

One element of the cultural activities of the diaspora community is traditional Greek dancing that is an increasingly popular pastime for some members of the community. A number of groups are in existence and give members a chance to perform at various occasions associated with Australia's multicultural context. Many of these groups are associated with a dance school or provide some form of lessons or training to those interested. In this way, Greek dancing in Melbourne parallels similar activities in other cultural communities, and dance is seen as one element of culture that is compatible with the mainstream, English culture of the nation (see Bennett and Carter, 2001, for discussion of this). The value of folk dancing for various population subgroups in Australian society has been established (see, for example, Connor 2000, Gardner et al. 2008), but little consideration has been given to the link between dance, heritage and cultural maintenance and well-being. Instead, the focus on existing work has largely been the contribution of dance to fitness and social interaction.

Literature Review

Culture and Wellbeing

The existence of a relationship between culture and well-being has been noted by a number of authors (see, for example Diener and Diener 1995, Diener et al. 1995, Ariiendell et al. 1997). In the case of diaspora communities such as the Greeks in Melbourne, acculturation to the local cultural context is an important aspect of well-being that relates to an individual's feeling of belonging to a cultural group (Phinney 1990). For this reason, a number of scholars view acculturation as having two dimensions, the maintenance of heritage culture and adaptation to the local context (see Berry 1997, Liebkind 2001). The Greek community of Melbourne has largely established what Phinney et al. (2001) refer to as a bicultural identity where individuals of Greek background identify strongly with their heritage culture but are also integrated into the cultural mainstream.

The literature suggests that this type of successful acculturation is most conducive to well-being (Berry 1997, Howard 1998, Phinney et al. 2001). At the same time, the maintenance of strong links to the heritage culture has been shown to enhance well-being and represents the most adaptive strategy in accommodating to a new culture (LaFramboise et al. 1993). For adolescents in particular, it has been suggested that an awareness of ethnic heritage is integral to the formation of a personal identity (Wakefield and Hudley 2007). These concepts of personal, collective and cultural identity have been suggested to be central to well-being

(Usborne and Taylor 2010) with cultural identity being one of the most important factors in collective identity (Schwartz et al. 2008). For many younger members of the Melbourne Greek diaspora, participation in Greek dancing is a way of expressing their cultural identity and associating themselves with the larger community of people of Greek background in Australia, Greece and elsewhere in the world.

Well-Being, Dance and Health

Dance has long been viewed as being closely related to health (Ritter and Lowe 1996, Hanna 2006, Murcia et al. 2010), and the potential value of in addressing health and illness has received some attention (Hackney et al. 2007, Belardinelli et al. 2008). It has also been found that dance can support increased well-being (Murcia et al. 2010), although this relates to more to direct participation than to spectator attendance. In general, participation in the arts in general, and dance specifically, has been observed to be becoming less active, with fewer people participating directly than in the past (Bailey and Davidson 2005).

Despite this, the role physical activity can play in both health and well-being is increasingly accepted by scholars and researchers as well as by the general public. There is a large literature on the beneficial role of exercise in the management of chronic disease and also as a factor in quality of life (see Warburton et al. 2006, Haskell et al. 2007). Music is also strongly linked to emotional well-being (see Laucka 2006) and dance combines music with physical activity in the form of patterned motions and meaningful gestures. Music in a range of contexts has been shown to improve mood and encourage movement (Large 2000), while dance itself may facilitate social interaction occurring through participation in a group activity that requires coordinated activity and cooperation (McNeil 1995).

At present, work on individual motivation for participation in dance of any kind, including folk dance, remains limited. In a study conducted in Finland, Nieminen (1998) found that developing a social network, physical fitness, and a desire to perform were the main motivations for individuals to take part in dance classes and groups. Kreutz (2008), whose work concerns ballroom dancing, noted that was widely seen as a form of exercise, as providing an opportunity to socialize, and offering an emotional benefit. Murcia et al. (2010) also found that the physical benefits of dance to be the most significant aspect of the activity to many participants, alongside emotional well-being and personal satisfaction. They also found that their participants had multidimensional perceptions of the benefit of dance and that more female participants in their study reported more positive benefits than did the male participants. The present study contributes to this area of study and extends it to include the question of cultural identity and heritage in the context of well-being, specifically as understood by members of the Greek diaspora in Melbourne.

Methodology

In depth semi – structured interviews were carried out with 19 individuals who were currently enrolled at a local Greek dance school in metropolitan Melbourne, Australia. Of the 19 participants, four were male and 15 were female. Their ages ranged from 18 to 58, with the majority (13 individuals) born in Australia. In addition, all participants had completed some form of formal education, some at the high school level, with the majority having completed or currently enrolled in a University degree. Interviews were held at the dance school with the consent of the management and conformed to the requirements of the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research. Interviews were recorded digitally and later transcribed for analysis.

The interview texts were subsequently analysed thematically and a number of themes identified. These themes related to several experiential domains, including the participants motivation for participating in Greek dancing; the meaning of Greek dancing to them in terms of their cultural heritage; the connection between dancing and the participants' conceptualization of identity; and the participants interest in pursuing health and fitness through participation in Greek dancing.

Findings and Discussion

The participants in this study had a number of motivations for taking part in Greek dancing classes as well as the opportunities for performance as part of the dance school. Three specific motivations were relevant to the majority of participants. These were the connection to Greece and their heritage that dancing represented; a desire to engage in exercise and improve their fitness, including weight management; and an outlet for stress and source of relaxation. Some of the participants expressed these views as follows:

> *"Greek dancing is about developing your social relations with fellow Greeks, exposing yourself to your culture to your background, upbringing, holding traditions. Very fun, very dynamic, very active so you get a good workout out of it. It's both culture and very good form of exercise as well."* [18 year old, Australian born male]

> *"Dancing is my culture and what defines me as a Greek – it's also a type of exercise – see the gym I don't like. It's not the same, it's the friendships as well, and, for me, friendships as very important and being part of something and learning, and it's exercise. Dancing works out so many muscles you feel it."* [18 year old, Greek born male]

> *"Fitness and getting healthy and losing weight, and I can see these result, and the benefits and I feel better – the emotional side, I'm happy. There are the psychological benefits after a long day coming here I feel better emotionally, and this is something that I don't get when I go to the gym."* 42 year old,

Australian born female]

"Dancing is my sanity, my escape, my de-stress, my time - dancing is my time as a mum. If I'm upset, I go to dancing and I'm a new person. It's refreshing, it's a support – my time for me." [40 year old, Australian born female]

"That connection to Greece, and I love to learn. I feel that release." [29 year old, Greek born female]

For all of the participants, their identity as a member of the Greek community was of great importance as was maintaining their heritage in the Australian context. The majority of the participants was born in Australia and was fully integrated into the mainstream culture. Nonetheless, they had been exposed to certain aspects of Greek culture for their whole life through parents or grandparents who were part of the early immigrant community. In this, the approval of these older relatives was an important consideration as was ensuring that the cultural heritage they inherited continued into the next generation through their own children. A sample of their comments includes:

"Being part of something Greek and learning about it is very important to me. It's like I get a tick from my grandparents, a tick from my parents and one for myself." [18 year old, Australian born male]

"My Greek culture and heritage brought me here, and I looked it up and found it, and it's afterhours so it's great for the older ones. I really look forward to dancing classes. It's my highlight of the week and mentally is good for me." [51 year old, Australian born male]

"Being Greek and dancing just makes you feel good, happy and healthy. I can't explain it. It's just very important to me." [29 year old, Greek born female]

"I don't want to lose our culture . . . the maintenance of our culture. It's important and our responsibility, and for them [children] to keep and maintain and hand down to their kids." [40 year old, Australian born female]

Each of the participants in this study felt a strong Greek identity, alongside their feelings of being Australian. For the participants who recently emigrated to Australia, their Greekness represented the main component of their individual and group identity. The Australian born participants, however, were generally fully integrated in Australian society, were primarily English speakers, and shared many of the attitudes and activities that represent Australian norms. For them, being Greek tended to be relevant in a limited range of social context, mostly focusing on the home and family. Their participation in Greek dancing fit into their self-conception of Greek identity and served to link them to the Greek community in Australia and elsewhere and also to distinguish them from other Australians. All of

the participants were concerned about potentially losing this Greek identity and saw their participation in Greek dancing as a way of reducing that risk. Some of the participants commented:

> *"Dancing helps a lot it [Greek identity], reinforces it on a daily basis. You don't think, 'how can I keep my Greekness?' But coming here, it's a routine and it reinforces it, and, as a migrant, the reminder that I'm Greek and doing something Greek is very important."* [18 year old, Greek born female]

> *"My γιαγιά comes to grandparents' day. She feels very proud and [says,] 'my grandchildren are keeping my Greek culture, ethnicity alive – μπράβο Παιδί μου"* [20 year old, Australian born female]

> *"It's a very emotional experience for family. Like my γιαγιά would cry in the crowd when she would see me perform –as it would remind her of my παππού and even Greece. It's of great emotional benefit for her."* [23 year old, Australian born female]

> *"I've told my friends in Greece that I do Greek dancing here, and they said it's great and they were happy that I'm doing something Greek here. See, in Greece, they do make fun of you when you dance Greek. It's because they don't have to do it there. Even if they don't do it, they are Greek and they won't lose it. They live in Greece. It's like any celebration, if they miss a celebration like Christmas, it will come again, but, here, we can lose it, and I don't want to lose it. See I have lost it in a way, as I have left Greece and I'm trying to keep it here. Hold onto it. It's like they say, you never know what you have until you lose it. But here, it's effort, and we have to do it. So, my friends from Greece are happy and say 'bravo' that I'm keeping the Greek here."* [19 year old, Greek born female]

Separate from the role Greek dancing might play in maintaining physical fitness and providing exercise, a number of participants made an explicit connection between the activity and well-being, both for themselves as well as generally. In particular, several participants noted the contribution their performances make to the well-being of the older members of the community and also positive impact on their own mood and mental state. Some of their comments included:

> *"When older people see us dance, it is so good for their health as they see us carrying the traditions. Their psychological health – older people want to see our performances and even cry, and they don't even know us."* [23 year old, Australian born female]

> *"At many performances, we grab older people and dance with them, and they like it, and it reminds them of being in Greece"* [23 year old, Australian born female]

> *"And for my health, it's great. You feel fit and health, and that you have done something good for yourself. And there is the socializing. Everyone is Greek here. You feel you have done a good workout but, at the same time, you learn something."* [40 year old, Australian born female*]*

> *"It's great for the mind, the connection to my culture, and heritage – and there is the physical too, and, with other forms of exercise, I only get the physical. I haven't experienced the emotional benefits I get here."* [56 year old, Australian born male]

The participants in this study all placed great importance on their Greek heritage and were anxious, not just to maintain it, but to demonstrate it. In other words, they wished to be acknowledged as members of the Greek community and part of the diaspora in Australia. While Australian multicultural policy encourages citizens to participate in activities related to their cultural heritage and provides for the teaching and maintenance of languages other than English that are spoken in the community, it has not always been the case that members of distinct diaspora groups felt able to demonstrate this aspect of their identity openly (see, for example, Tsolidis and Pollard 2009). Over time, however, it has become more acceptable to display a non-English cultural identity in Australia, and the participants in this study, like many members of the Greek community in Melbourne, are proud of their heritage and wish to be seen as "Greek" at least in the Australian context.

The concept of Greek identity in Australia has a number of components that derive from the experience and actions of the migrant generation whose members now constitute the oldest part of the diaspora community. This concept of Greekness has in the past centered on use of the Greek language, religious affiliation with the Orthodox Church, and certain customs and activities associated with Greek heritage culture but adapted to the Australian context. The Greek dancing classes that are the context of this study are an example of this. While traditional dancing may not be of great importance to individuals of a similar age and background to the participants in this study, as noted by one of them above, it is an integral part of community life in Melbourne, in part because dance and other traditional art forms are accommodated in various forums under multicultural policy (see Lee al. 2012) but also because such activities are consonant with the participants' sense of self as well as their Australian identity.

One of the most interesting aspects of the participants' motivation to take part in Greek dancing was a desire for exercise as an adjunct to physical fitness. The focus on these issues, including weight management, is very strong in Australia, and it is perhaps not surprising that many of the participants specifically mentioned the role Greek dancing plays as a form of exercise and fitness strategy. It is also likely that a part of the popularity of this activity can be attributed to this exercise function which is consistent with an important aspect of Australian mainstream culture as well as the cultural component identified with being Greek. In fact, it is unclear to what extent Greek dancing might seem attractive to many of the participants if it were less closely aligned with the concept of socially desirable

fitness activity that dominates Australian society. In fact, many participants regard their dancing as a replacement for other kinds of physical activity, such as going to the gym, and hence see themselves as fulfilling two important demands: the need to maintain health and be physically fit and the desire to demonstrate their Greekness by taking part in a *"Greek"* activity.

The adaptation of traditional dance to the Australian context, where it fits into the category of folk dance that is seen as part of the experience of the various cultural communities that make up the broader Australian community, is notable. The younger members of the Melbourne Greek community are generally highly integrated into the Australian context and increasingly espouse Australian values and social behavior. This integration has been facilitated by language, with the majority of the community, except for the oldest members, being speakers of English (Tamis 2010). The movement of people of Greek background into the English-speaking mainstream in Australia has also been significant in the adaptation of the Greek way of life to more conform to the Australian norm. In this sense, the elements of behavior and experience that are seen as constituting Greek cultural identity have emerged from the Australian context and the norms of the English-speaking society. This process began decades ago when the institutions of the Greek diaspora community began to develop and has continued to the present time. This also accounts for the widely observed phenomenon where members of diaspora communities experience culture shock upon visiting Greece, much less attempting to return there to live (see, for example, Christou 2009). It is not unusual for them to find that the elements that constitute being Greek in the location where they were living are quite different from those seen as central by Greeks living in Greece (see, for example, Holeva 2004). This can be seen as the result of language shift, the influence of the mainstream culture, and the fact that the structure of the diaspora institutions has come largely from the first generation of migrants, whose views and perceptions reflect the Greece of their youth rather than the modern context of today.

Interestingly, it has been observed that diaspora communities such as the one in Melbourne are increasingly connected both to Greece and to other Greek communities elsewhere in the world through individual-level activity on the internet and in social media. The advent of rapid, inexpensive digital communication technologies has allowed for a level of interaction between people who are widely separated by distance and also for an unprecedented flow of information. The significance of this in Greek diaspora communities has been noted and has been observed to be an important means by which younger individuals are coming to understand their heritage background (see Panagakos 2010). The importance of a presence on social media in the context of cultural identity was observed among the participants in this study who hoped that their performances as part of the dance school would receive attention on YouTube and generate favorable comments from viewers. In this, social media seems to have become a new forum for the creation and maintenance of a specific ethnic heritage which, for the participants in this study, was associated with a sense of personal pride and also belonging to the larger Greek community in Melbourne, Australia and worldwide.

For the participants in this study, their participation in Greek dancing was a clear link to their heritage, as they understood it, and also strengthened the bond between the generations of the diaspora. All of the participants understood that it was members of the immigrant generation who had struggled to establish the community and recreate certain aspects of Greek life in Melbourne. They generally respected this effort and genuinely wished to please parents and grandparents by participating in the institutions of the community. Many of them were surprised at the extent to which their participation in Greek dance pleased these older members of the community, and this was an added inducement to continue. In this, it is important to note that Greek dancing itself, as a cultural activity, derives from this older generation's perceptions of their culture of origin and its characteristic elements (see Thomas 2003, for discussion of this). The participants in this study tended to seek the approval of family members, and the Greek community in general, for their dancing, which suggests the social value of the activity alongside the personal satisfaction they derived from participation.

Overall, the participants made a strong link between their dancing and their overall well-being that was observed to have a number of separate dimensions. One important aspect of this was the perception that dancing allowed them to express the Greek side of their individual identity and maintain a strong connection to the Greek community. The contribution of a strong cultural identity to well-being has been established by a number of authors (Phinney et al. 2001, Ryff et al. 2003, Umana-Taylor 2004, among others) and is apparent in the participants in this study. A second aspect of the participants' well-being derives from their perception that their Greek dancing provides a significant level of exercise and contributes to their overall health and fitness. This link is well-established and is supported by a growing body of literature (see Penedo and Dahn 2005). Participation in a regular form of physical activity also has high social value in Australia and is widely viewed as the individual taking care of him or herself. This view was visible in the statements of participants and reflects a generalized view I Australian society. An additional aspect of well-being deriving from participation in Greek dancing is the opportunity to socialize and separate oneself from problems and concerns that derive from other domains of life. This role of their participation in dance was stressed by several individuals who viewed the activity as an escape from other problems, a way of relieving stress and an opportunity to clear their mind. Leisure activities are known to contribute to well-being and to be important elements of happiness (Newman et al. 2014).

Taken together, there are at least three different aspects of Greek dancing that were seen by participants in this study as having a direct contribution to their well-being and, by extension, to their general health. This gave them a strong sense of happiness that came from fulfilling a number of psychological demands relating to their conceptualization of personal identity as Greek and Australian, to their desire to please older relatives and maintain their Greek heritage, to participate in a physical activity that provided exercise and contributed to fitness, and to engage in a leisure pursuit that served as an opportunity to relieve stress and shift their focus away from their problems. The ability of Greek dancing to offer these psychological and social benefits is reflected in its popularity in the Melbourne

Greek community and its attraction to younger individuals who are highly integrated into the Australian mainstream.

Conclusion

The results of this study suggest the importance and potential value of leisure activities that are consonant with the heritage identity of individuals as well as with the values of the larger social context in which they live. This is especially relevant in multicultural nations like Australia where there may be a significant mismatch of values, attitudes and social norms between the English-speaking mainstream and the practices of various cultural communities. While the potential for conflict exists and has been noted for some ethnic groups (see, for example, Renzaho et al. 2011, Milner and Khawaja 2012; among others), the Greek diaspora has been successful in bridging this gap and acculturating successfully into the Australian context. Nonetheless, the findings of this study suggest that heritage and cultural identity remain important, even to individuals who have shifted considerably from the patterns of behavior and action established by the immigrant generation.

There can be no doubt that current circumstances also contribute to the social and psychological benefit attributable to Greek dancing among the participants of this study. The role of social media and the digital environment should not be overlooked in seeking to understand the ways in which younger members of the Greek community in Melbourne and Australia see themselves and choose to display their "Greekness". It is likely that this same technology has contributed to a more desirable view of heritage culture in general and the fact of dual identity that characterizes the experience of many Australians. By being able to establish and maintain personal connections with others of similar background as well as with friends and family in Greece, it is clear that the participants in this study, as well as others like them in the Melbourne community, have been able to reshape their self-conception and develop a new Greek identity of which folk dancing is a part.

The prime importance placed on maintenance of cultural heritage as well as the community institutions established by the immigrant generation to Melbourne is recognized by individuals of all ages in the Greek diaspora community. The contribution of dancing groups to this is significant and suggests that this activity will continue to be seen as valuable, especially as its other social benefits are consonant with the perceptions of the Australian community in general. Even as the nature of being Greek in Australia continues to change over time with the experience of community members, it appears that dancing, as a manifestation of heritage culture, is likely to have a play in the culture-specific activities of the group. In this, it is interesting to note that the presence of new Greek immigrants, whose number remains small, has not had the potential to change the nature of the local perception of Greekness. Instead, these newcomers have been observed to be accommodating to the norms of the local community. This suggests that the conceptualization of Greekness built on the perceptions and memories of the

immigrant generation is strong and benefits from its compatibility with the Australian mainstream in which it developed. The findings of this study indicate that future studies of other dancing groups of communities in diaspora would be useful in further understanding issues of the symbolic aspects of cultural identity, as would similar study in Greece that would provide a comparison of the participant experiences described here.

Overall, it can be concluded that Greek dancing, as one manifestation of a Greek identity among members of the Melbourne diaspora community, has important social and psychological benefits for those who take part in it as well as for the overall well-being of the community in addition to the individuals themselves. These benefits may be recognized explicitly or manifested in an implicit manner but suggest the high social value of the activity within the diaspora community and are a manifestation of the expression of heritage culture and a uniquely local understanding of Greekness within the larger Australian context.

References

Arrindell WA, Hatzichristou C, Wensink J, Rosenberg E, van Twillert B, Stedema J, Meijer D (1997) Dimensions of national culture as predictors of cross-national differences in subjective well-being. *Personality and Individual Differences* 23: 37–53.

Avgoulas M (2013) The Greek diaspora of Melbourne, Australia. *Polidromo – Periodical for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism in Education and Society* 6(1): 54-58.

Bailey BA, Davidson JW (2005) Effects of group singing and performance for marginalized and middle-class singers. *Psychology of Music* 33: 269– 303.

Belardinelli R, Lacalaprice F, Ventrella C, Volpe L, Faccenda E (2008) Waltz dancing in patients with chronic heart failure. New form of exercise training. *Circulation Heart Failure* 1: 107– 114.

Bennett T, Carter D (2001) *Culture in Australia: Publics, Policies, Programs*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Berry J (1997) Immigration, Acculturation and Adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review* 46: 5-68.

Christou A (2009) Emulating the Homeland – Engendering the Nation: Agency, Belonging, Gender and Identity in Second-Generation Greek-American Migrant Stories. In D Conway and RB Potter (eds), *Return Migration of the Next Generations: 21st Century Transnational Mobility*, 101-118. Ashgate, Surrey, UK and Burlington, VT.

Connor M (2000) Recreational Folk Dance: A Multicultural Exercise Component in Healthy Ageing. *Australian Occupational Therapy Journal* 47(2): 69-76.

Damanakis M, Konstantinidis SA, Tamis A (2014) *Νέα Μετανάστευση: Από και προς την Ελλάδα*. Πανεπιστήμιο Κρήτης.

Danousi J (2015) *Memory and Migration in the Shadow of War: Australia's Greek Immigrants after Word War II and the Greek Civil War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Diener E, Diener M (1995) Cross-cultural correlates of life satisfaction and self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 6: 653–663.

Diener E, Diener M, Diener C (1995) Factors predicting the subjective well being of

nations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69: 851–864.
Gardner SM, Komensaroff P, Fensham R (2008) Dancing beyond Exercise: Young People's Experience in Dance Classes. *Journal of Youth Studies* 11(6): 701-709.
Hackney ME, Kantorovich S, Earhart G (2007) A study on the effects of Argentine tango as a form of partnered dance for those with Parkinson disease and the healthy elderly. *American Journal of Dance Therapy* 29: 109– 127.
Hanna JL (2006) *Dancing for health. Conquering and preventing stress*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Haskell W, Lee IM, Pate RR, Powell E, Blair S, Franklin B, et al. (2007) Physical activity and public health. Updated recommendation for adults from the American College of Sports Medicine and the American Heart Association. *Circulation*, 116, 1 – 13. Ho, R.T.H.
Holeva A (2004) Current Trends of the Cultural and linguistic Values of the Greek Australian Community in South Australia. *International Education Journa*l 4(4): 212-225.
Howard R (1998) Being Canadian: Citizenship in Canada. *Citizenship Studies* 2: 133-152.
Kreutz G (2008) Does partnered dance promote health? The case of tango argentino. *The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health* 128: 79 – 84.
Large EW (2000) On synchronizing movements to music. *Human Movement Science* 19: 527– 566.
Laukka P (2006) Uses of music and psychological well-being among the elderly. *Journal of Happiness Studies* 8: 215–241.
LaFramboise T, Coleman H, Gerton, J (1993) Psychological Impact of Biculturalism: Evidence and Theory. *Psychological Bulletin* 114: 395-412.
Lee IS, Arcodia C, Lee, TJ (2012) Key Characteristics of Multicultural Festivals: A Critical Review of the Literature. *Even Management* 16(1): 93-101.
Liebkind K (2001) Acculturation. In R Brown, S Gaertner (eds) *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes*, 386-406. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
McNeill WH (1995) *Keeping together in time: Dance and drill in human history*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Milner K, Khawaja NG (2012) Sudanese Refugees in Australia: The Impact of Acculturation Stress. *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology* 4(1): 19-29.
Murcia CQ, Kreutz G, Clift S, Bongard S (2010) Shall we dance? An exploration of the perceived benefits of dancing on well-being. *Arts & Health* 2(2): 149-163
Newman DB, Tay L, Diener E (2014) Leisure and Subjective Well-Being: A Model of Psychological Mechanisms as mediating Factors. *Journal of Happiness Studies* 15(3): 555-578.
Nieminen P (1998) Motives for dancing among Finnish folk dancers, competitive ballroom dancers, ballet dancers and modern dancers. *European Journal of Physical Education* 3: 22 – 34.
Panagakos A (2010) Downloading New Identities: Ethnicity, Technology and Media in the Global Greek Village. *Global Studies in Culture and Power* 10(2): 201-219.
Penedo FJ, Dahn JR (2005) Exercise and Well-Being: A Review of Mental and Physical Health Benefits Associated with Physical Activity. *Current Opinion in Psychiatry* 18(2):189-193.
Phinney J (1990) Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: A Review of Research. *Psychological Bulletin* 108: 499-518.
Phinney JS, Horenczyk G, LIebkind K, Vedder P (2001) Ethnic Identity, Immigration and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective. *Journal of Social Issues* 57(3): 493-510.
Renzaho AMN, McCabe M, Sainsbury WJ (2011) Parenting, Role Reversals and the

Preservation of Cultural Values among Arabic Speaking Migrant Families in Melbourne. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 35(4): 416-424.

Ritter M, Low KG (1996) Effects of dance/movement therapy: A meta-analysis. *The Arts in Psychotherapy* 23: 249– 260.

Ryff CD, Keyes CLM, Hughes DL (2003) Status inequalities, perceived discrimination, and eudaimonic well-being: Do the challenges of minority life hone purpose and growth? *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 44: 275 -290.

Schwartz SJ, Zamboanga BL, Weisskirch RS (2008) Broadening the study of the self: Integrating the study of personal identity and cultural identity. *Social and Personality Compass* 2: 635-651.

Tamis AM (2010) Greek language and culture in Australia. In AM Tamis, CJ Mackie, S Byrne (eds) *Philathenaios, studies in honour of Michael J. Osborne*. Athens, Greece: Greek Epigraphic Society.

Thomas T (2003) Older Migrants and their Families in Australia. *Family Matters* 66:40-45.

Tsolidis G, Pollard V (2009) Being a "Wog" in Melbourne: Young People's Self-Fashioning through Discourses of Racism. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 30(4): 427-442.

Umana-Taylor AJ (2004) Ethnic Identity and Self-Esteem: Examining the Role of Social Context. *Journal of Adolescence* 27:139-146.

Usborne E, Taylor DM (2010) The Role of Cultural Identity Clarity for Self-Concept Clarity, Self-Esteem and Subjective Well-Being. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 36(7): 883-897.

Wakefield WD, Hudley C (2007) Ethnic and Racial Identity and Adolescent Well-Being. *Theory into Practice* 46(2): 147-154.

Warburton DE, Nicol CW, Bredin S (2006) Health benefits of physical activity: The evidence. *Canadian Medical Association Journal* 174: 801– 809.

Athens Journal of Social Sciences *Volume 6, Issue 2 – Pages 113-138*

Education and Universalism in Europe: When Education Supports Democracy[1]

By Fiorenzo Parziale[*] & Sandra Vatrella[†]

The increasing of unemployment, social insecurity and poverty are making many Europeans contest the democratic foundations of Europe. It is a world systemic crisis that, on the one hand, nurtures the migration flows, on the other hand, it intensifies the individualist tenets of neoliberalism and contemporarily the hostility against migrants to which the social insecurity is often attributed because in a sense they are the evident proof of the end of welfare assured by Nation-State in the past. In this context, it is relevant to understand the role of education in promoting the "democratic universalism", the founding value of democracy according to which institutions should remove social inequalities. Today this value is in crisis also because it asks to be re-elaborated recognising cultural pluralism, especially if we consider European societies are becoming multicultural increasingly.

Keywords: *Democracy, Educational Mobility, Social Inequalities, Universalism*

Introduction: The Crisis of Democratic Universalism

The article aims to understand the role formal education plays in promoting "democratic universalism". With this concept we mean the idea according to which the leading role of democratic institutions should be assuring both the removing of social barriers that hinder equality and contemporarily the recognition of the Other, considering the current pluralistic societies, especially in Europe (Honneth 2016, Geiselberger 2017).

It is a topic we deal with starting from some reflections on the crisis both of egalitarianism (Crouch, 2004) and "liberal secularism" (Žižek 2017), otherwise defined as "cultural liberalism" (Sciolla, 2013).

Regarding the crisis of egalitarianism, in the last decades neoliberalism fostered the process of capitalist expansion on a global scale, on the one hand by placing the immediate financial return before the medium-long-term productive investment (Piketty 2014), on the other hand by making the workers pay for the enterprise risk and the capitalist competition (Gallino 2013).

Therefore, we may attribute the crisis of egalitarianism to the individualism that neoliberalism has produced over time through both an economic system that encourages competition and the declaration that consumers' satisfaction is more

[*]Assistant Professor, Sapienza-University of Rome, Italy.
[†]Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Verona, Italy.

[1] This work comes from a common effort; however, if you would attribute the single sections, paragraphs 1, 3, and 4.2 were written by Fiorenzo Parziale, and paragraphs 2 and 4.1 by Sandra Vatrella. Lastly, the paragraph 5 was written jointly by the two authors.

https://doi.org/10.30958/ajss.6-2-3 doi= 10.30958/ajss.6-2-3

relevant than the workers' rights (Harvey 2007, Crouch 2014).

Consequently, discontent because of unemployment and social insecurity connected to the financial crisis in 2007 has often given rise to the request of securitarian more than egalitarianism policies.

It is within this context that we may also identify the crisis of "cultural liberalism". In particular, we refer to the growing hostility of Europeans towards immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, and the related lack of recognition of these as people with the same rights and duties of natives: the combination of the impoverishment of workers and strong individualism hinders the recognition of strangers.

As Taylor (1994) notes, cultural liberalism promotes the multiculturalism rather than hindering it, insofar as it recognises and enhances individual autonomy against the constraints of religious or secular traditions.

For this reason, the process of delegitimisation of cultural liberalism risks translating universalism into a lack of recognition of socio-cultural differences (Ferrara 2011, Marramao 2015), thus undermining the possibility of ensuring social equality in today's multicultural societies (Cuche 2006)[2].

Summing up, what we are dealing with is the fact that negative opinions and hostile attitudes towards minorities call into question the enactment of the democratic universalism in our current societies. Briefly, the lack of recognition of others affects the capability of recognising each as belonging to the same human community, so threatening the guiding principle of social equality.

Thanks to discovering the link between recognition of others and social equality, then we can understand how the crisis of universalism shows up not only among the subordinate classes, who are generally more suspicious towards migrants but also between the upper and middle classes[3]. About this, renowned scholars (e.g. Nussbaum 1997) state that nowadays school could be and represent the main agency able to spread the value of democratic universalism.

In consideration of this observation, and by resorting to the level of formal education as an indicator of scholastic socialisation, in what follows we analyse the degree in which the scholastic socialisation positively affects the individuals' attitude towards democratic universalism.

Formal Education and Universalism: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars from different approaches studied the relationship between scholastic socialisation and

[2] The negative attitudes towards minorities and immigrants are due, at least in part, to identity policies (holding at a global scale) useful to veil the failures of State in regulating economy (Appadurai 2017).

[3] In fact, advantaged classes declare themselves to be more inclined to cultural liberalism, and thus to multiculturalism, however they often give unfavourable opinions on the measures aiming to both remove socio-economic inequalities and promote the universal right to citizenship that allows individuals to take effectively part in public affairs.

democracy: Dewey (1916) thought that formal education fed democratic culture; Lipset (1960) linked the possession of educational credentials to political participation. More generally, Elias (1936) saw in the school one of the main protagonists of the civilisation process.

Nowadays, though, the scholars who follow the Rational Choice theory challenge such an optimist approach, highlighting how the possession of a high level of education does not lead to greater mind-openness. According to them, education does not free individuals from the specific social position they occupy and from the interests associated with them (Wodtke 2012).

So, e.g. the influence that school education exerts on prejudice would disappear or at least it would be reduced significantly if it is assessed by putting under control the effects of the social position and/or income on the degree of appreciation for cultural diversity (Malchow-Møller et al. 2006). Conversely, some scholars advocate a sort of "scholastic cultivation" theory (Gerbner et al. 1986). They state that the possession of a high degree of formal education (conceived as an indicator of scholastic socialisation) positively affects the leanings and attitudes towards the democratic universalism. Consistently, some researches highlight how the levels of formal education are strictly linked to the openness to cultural diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, Assirelli 2014); however, other researches (see Brint 1996) highlight the connection of education level and approval of cultural differences, but not the relationship between the former and egalitarianism on the economic side.

However, as we will show further, the data we analysed demonstrate the possibility to reset this issue in a theoretical framework focused on the complex nature of cultural processes.

Indeed, the scholastic socialisation is a communicative process in which the interpretative practice plays a key role, despite the influence that the social position exerts (Thompson 1995).

In summary, the approach we propose combines the critical hermeneutic with the social phenomenology aiming for a broader neo-Marxian theoretical framework, that makes use of the most critical contributions of the Sociology of Knowledge (Mannheim 1936, Izzo 1966), of the Sociology of Education (Willis 1977, Apple 2004, 2013) and the Sociology of Culture (Williams 1973, Hall 1980).

By resorting to this theoretical framework, we can conceive the scholastic socialisation as a cultural process based on both the social nature of individual thought (Marx and Engels 1845) and a dialectical relationship between praxis and symbolic production. On the one hand, the individual internalises norms, values, and beliefs from his social condition, on the other hand, the transmitted messages are also objectivations (Berger and Luckmann 1966) that in turn effect, as texts, by shaping the individual identity (Ricoeur 1986).

In our study, what we constantly bear in mind is that schools can promote the same universalistic ideology that often betrays (Parziale 2016). More specifically, the formal instruction has a double nature: it is an instrumental resource useful to acquire an advantageous social position, as underline the rational choice scholars (Boudon 1973, Goldthorpe 2000), but is also a social mobility resource that

promotes the belief in universalism (Collins 1979, Brint 1998).

On the one hand, schools reproduce the social inequalities, denying its universalistic promise (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2012, Jackson 2013); on the other hand, that promise nourishes expectations of social equality, because it produces universalistic identities. In this sense, particularly significant are the widespread emancipatory practices put into practice by various teachers and educators moved by a particularly critical political-cultural orientation (Giroux 2005, Apple 2013, Giroux and McLaren 2014, Mayo 2015) just because they have acquired the universal worldview point that schools in part transmit. In other words, we want to underline the cognitive and symbolic function of schools that consists of giving students not only values and norms but also beliefs connected with an emancipatory vision of the world. In this sense, we can identify the main inconsistency of modern schools: they distribute educational credentials that reproduce social inequalities, and at the same time they feed a worldview point that promotes equality and the recognition of the other.

If we were right, then a long scholastic socialisation may mitigate the selfishness connected to the advantageous social positions thanks to its fostering of universalism. This mechanism ought to be more effective towards people from subordinate social classes, opening them up to cultural diversity linked to foreign presence. Indeed, educational mobility requires students of modest social background to acquire an "elaborate cultural code" that they do not initially have (Bernstein 1975).

Therefore, what we are going to do is to corroborate the two following hypotheses on the relationship between formal education and democratic universalism:

1. Formal education has a positive impact on universalism, given the "symbolic-cognitive" function of school socialisation, even with the same social class and institutional context;
2. The orientation towards universalism should be positive and greater in those who have experienced upward educational mobility, capable of making them acquire a representation of the world favourable to the recognition of the other combined with the request of social justice deriving from the critical reflection of their social origins.

Data, Method, Techniques

Our empirical research is based on the elaboration of data gathered by the sixth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), carried on in 2012. In particular, we chose to analyse 25-65 years old interviewees that reside in 23 of 30 Countries reached by this wave: we excluded residents in not European Countries (Russia and Israel) or in European Countries whose number of interviewees has resulted very small (Albany, Cyprus, Estonia, Kosovo, Iceland).

With the aim to corroborate our hypotheses, at the beginning we thought to elaborate a unique index useful to measure democratic universalism, conceived as

the dependent variable; therefore we planned two regression models, one to investigate the first hypothesis, the other one to control the second hypothesis.

The separation in two models was due to the semantic overlap, then confirmed by statistic collinearity, between the independent variable concerned to education and the other variable used to measure educational mobility, that already considers educational level. Nonetheless, principal component analysis (Di Franco and Marradi 2003) has highlighted that our database makes we study universalism only employing two components not correlated each other (r = 0.064): one component is about egalitarianism as principle founding democracy, the other one is connected to the approval of multiculturalism.

The egalitarianism index was elaborated through three variables built through Cantril scale (0-10), whereas the other index is made up of two variables measured with this scale and three ordinal variables that were also converted in numerical ones (Table 1).

Table 1. *The Two Components of Democratic Universalism. Description of Indexes*

Egalitarianism*		**Multiculturalism****	
Variable	**Factor score coefficient**	**Variable**	**Factor score coefficient**
It's important for democracy (0: not at all important-10: extremely important): the government protects all citizens against poverty	0.418	Allow immigrants of different race/ethnic as majority to come here: 1. None, 2. Few, 3. Some, 4. Many	0.261
It's important for democracy (0: not at all important-10: extremely important): the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels	0.392	Allow immigrants from poorer country outside Europe to come here: 1. None, 2. Few, 3. Some, 4. Many	0.251
It's important for democracy (0: not at all important-10: extremely important): the government explains its decisions to voters	0.386	Allow immigrants of same race/ethnic as majority to come here: 1. None, 2. Few, 3. Some, 4. Many	0.241
		Immigrants make country a better or worse place to live: 0. worse - 10. better	0.226
		Country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants: 0. undermined-10. enriched	0.224

*Egalitarianism reproduces 69.8% of variance; **Multiculturalism reproduces 68.7% of variance

Therefore, first we had to proceed to double the two linear regression models, in order to consider the two indexes extracted in a separate way; then, we chose to resort to a final polynomial logistic regression model that could evaluate the

interviewees' likelihood to be simultaneously favourable for equality and multiculturalism, namely of being "universalists" rather than "particularists".

In detail, we identified four types of interviewees: "only egalitarians" (favourable to equality, but unfavourable to multiculturalism: their score is more than 0 on the first index, but it is only equal to 0 or even negative on the second index), "only multiculturalists" (favourable to multiculturalism, but unfavourable to equality: their score is more than 0 on the second index, but it is only equal to 0 or even negative on the first index), "particularists" (their scores are equal to 0 or even negative on the two indexes; therefore they are unfavourable to both values), "universalists" (their scores are positive on the two indexes, so they are favourable to both values).

Consistently with the first hypothesis, we attributed to (formal) educational level the status of the main regressor. About this, we examined an ordinal variable subdivided in the following way: 1) without upper secondary education; 2) with upper secondary education (included advanced vocational); 3) with at least lower tertiary education.

With the aim to analyse the second hypothesis, instead, we replaced this variable with another one corresponding to a typology of educational mobility, achieved by the intersection between parents' educational level and individual educational level. We subdivided interviewees into five groups: 1) those with an "Upward (educational) Mobility", namely individuals with an educational level higher than their parents' one; 2) individuals with an "Immobility at the Top", namely interviewees with at least lower tertiary education like the parent with the highest level of education; 3) those with "Immobility in the Middle", who are individuals with Upper secondary education (advanced vocational included) and belonging to a family where the highest level of education is just this one; 4) interviewees with a "Downward Mobility", that are individuals with an educational level lower than their parents' one; 5) persons with "Immobility at the Bottom", namely individuals remained devoid of upper secondary tier just like their parents.

Among the other variables examined in all models, besides gender (male/female) and age cohort (25-35 years old; 36-50 years old; 51-65 years old), we analysed social class. We consider the occupational position as the most important proxy of social class condition (Goldthorpe 2000). In our classification we drew inspiration from the successful international schema proposed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979), also considering the following reworked versions (Goldthorpe 2000, 2016), and at the same time from the observations made by Marxist scholars, like Olin Wright (1985).

In summary, we preferred as a criterion for classification of interviewees the degree of control exercised on own work and possibly on the others' one.

We believe that this parameter gives us information both on the degree of commodification connected to production relationships between social classes (Wright), and on the individual relationship with the labour market (Goldthorpe).

From these considerations, we attributed to the Upper Class, those interviewees who are entrepreneurs (with at least ten employees) and managers, namely individuals characterised by a high degree of control not only on own

work but also on the other people's one.

For statistical reasons we are constrained to aggregate this class to another one made up of an updated version of the Service Class, on which Alvin Gouldner (1979) focused in the past: this class consists of those who practice an intellectual work, but without necessarily occupy a power position like that employers and managers have; we mean intellectuals and professionals, who distinguish themselves for the high control on own work rather than for the control on organizations and above all on the other people's labour force (Parziale and Scotti 2008) .

Manual workers together with the lower qualified clerks, conceived as new workers in the tertiarised society (Oesch 2003), occupy an opposite position to the middle-upper class: the arrangements of their payment is rigidly regulated, while their work is subject to routine and strict supervision by entrepreneurs and managers. As the lower qualified clerks have a higher degree of freedom than manual workers, therefore we can distinguish two working classes: a traditional, made up of manual employees, and a new working class composed of non-manual workers.

Instead, we placed in the middle classes: a) small business owners, namely own-account workers without or with employees (with up to 9), that generally live an halfway situation between that one experienced by great entrepreneurs and working class; b) clerks and technicians with a middle-high qualified level, namely employees with less control over their work than professionals, but in an advantaged condition as compared to manual workers and lower qualified clerks: as Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) spotted, the employment relations are in the halfway between real salaried labour and the professionals' service relation. Finally, our schema is completed by individuals who are resulted unemployed or inactive at the time the survey was conducted.

Data were weighted on the basis of a variable called "New_weights", that corresponds to the product of the other two variables supplied by ESS: "design weights" and "population size weights".

Our weighting neutralised mistakes deriving by the different distribution of interviewees on the basis their origin Country, and it makes us obtain good evaluations about the data related to different groups of Countries.

About this, we wanted to analyse also the role of a contextual variable that clusters the 23 Countries here considered on the basis of "welfare state regime": we took inspiration from Esping Andersen's classification (Esping-Andersen 2013). Therefore we subdivided countries in five groups: Centre-Western Countries (namely with "corporative welfare state regime": Belgium, France, Germany, Nederland, Switzerland), Anglo-Saxon Countries (with "neoliberal welfare state regime": UK and Ireland), Scandinavian Countries (with "universalist welfare state regime": Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Southern Countries (in this area of Europe we have a "familistic welfare state regime": Italy, Portugal, Spain), and Eastern Countries, in other words a group composed by the ex-soviet bloc countries belonging to Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine), with a specific welfare state regime, in spite of inner differences (Aidukaite 2011) .

We also identified collinearity between the variable corresponding to this classification and the variable related to the geographic area. Therefore considering also this last feature is redundant: the first variable also includes the effect exercised by geographic area. Table 2 describes, in summary, our sample, composed by 20,866 valid cases.

Table 2. *Description of Sample*

Variables	Categories	Values
Educational level	Without upper secondary education	41.8
	With Upper secondary education*	36.8
	At least lower tertiary education	21.4
Type of interviewees	Particularists	18.1
	Only Egualitarians	26.5
	Only Multiculturalists	21,0
	Universalists	34.5
Educational mobility	Immobility in the Middle	30.6
	Downward Mobility	6.9
	Upward Mobility	19,0
	Immobility at the Top	6.2
	Immobility at the Bottom	37.3
Gender	Female	52.8
	Male	47.2
Age	25-35	23.3
	36-50	39.3
	51-65	37.4
Social Class	Middle-Upper Class	16.1
	Middle Lower Class	29.4
	Small Business Owners	10.6
	Non-manual Working Class	14.5
	Manual Working Class	25.5
	Unemployed or Inactive	3.9
Context (Welfare Regime)	Centre-Western	37.2
	Anglo-Saxon	9,0
	Scandinavian	5.3
	Southern	25.8
	Eastern	22.7
N.		20,866

*Advanced vocational included.

Findings

The Importance of Formal Educational Level, in Spite of Social Competition

As we wrote, principal component analysis led us to identify two different features of democratic universalism. On the one hand, there is the multiculturalism, namely the degree of openness to cultural diversity and especially to migrants; on the other hand, there is the egalitarianism that is the idea

according to which democracy should be based on the promotion of social equality (see Table 1).

Our data show a deep difference towards the distribution of the two indexes (Table 3), that aren't correlated. Indeed, the index of multiculturalism has a distribution more symmetric: the minimum value (-2.5) is not very different from the maximum one (+1.9) in absolute terms. Instead, the egalitarianism index is characterized by a minority of cases with values very negative, whereas the maximum value (+0.8) is not only lower to the half of the corresponding value got by the multiculturalism index, but it is also very different from the minimum value, that instead is high a lot (-5.8).

In summary, there is a significant minority of 14.5% of Europeans that show a great repulsion to the egalitarianism, whereas a relevant 60% of individuals take a position against them as they express a positive, also if moderate, propensity to this value.

In reverse, the bipartition between multiculturalists and individuals closed to the cultural diversity is more balanced, with the extreme poles that tend to be equivalent (Table 4) [4].

Table 3. *The Distribution of the Two Indexes*

Values	Quartiles	Multiculturalism	Egalitarianism
Mean		0	0
Median		0.139	0.322
Mode		0.1	0.8
Standard Deviation		1	1
Skewness		-0.304	-1.680
Minimum		-2.5	-5.8
Maximum		1.9	0.8
Percentiles	25	-0.692	-0.502
	50	0.139	0.322
	75	0.613	0.826

Table 4. *The Ordinal Distribution of the Two Indexes*

Classes	Multiculturalism	Egalitarianism
From minimum to -1	16.7	14.5
From -0.99 to 0	31.0	25.1
From 0.1 to 1	37.0	60.4
From 1 to maximum	15.3	-

Multiculturalism splits public opinion more than Egalitarianism; indeed the second one is approved from the majority but in a moderate way, and it is strongly opposed by a minority, to which a fourth of 25-65 years old individuals with a slightly negative attitude towards to this value has to be added.

Therefore, there is not a minority such egalitarian that balances individuals with a very negative propensity to this value: in general way data seem to confirm

[4] Principal component analysis standardizes variables, therefore the indexes obtained have a mean equal to 0 and the standard deviation equal to 1.

how much Crouch (2014) states about the crisis of egalitarianism. If we stratify interviewees for social class and education, we find out the mean score of egalitarianism is higher among degree unemployed, followed by workers (manual and not manual one) with upper secondary education (advanced vocational included). Among middle classes (included small business owners) the repulsion towards this value increases how much education is higher, whereas among upper-class individuals graduates are the less unfavourable to equality (Table 5).

Table 5. *Egalitarianism and Multiculturalism: Comparison of Means between Social Classes Stratified by Education Level (Means)*

Social Class	Highest Level of Education	Egalitarianism	Multiculturalism
Middle-Upper Class	At least lower tertiary education	-0.109	0.489
	Upper secondary education (advanced vocational included)	-0.254	0.008
	Without upper secondary education	-0.152	-0.125
	Total	-0.105	0.448
Middle Lower Class	At least lower tertiary education	-0.106	0.337
	Upper secondary education (advanced vocational included)	0.023	0.119
	Without upper secondary education	0.066	-0.027
	Total	0.015	0.108
Small Business Owners	At least lower tertiary education	-0.238	0.480
	Upper secondary education (advanced vocational included)	-0.037	-0.025
	Without upper secondary education	0.034	-0.287
	Total	-0.036	-0.063
Non-manual Working Class	At least lower tertiary education	0.004	0.267
	Upper secondary education (advanced vocational included)	0.107	-0.038
	Without upper secondary education	0.034	-0.253
	Total	0.057	-0.128
Manual Working Class	At least lower tertiary education	0.050	0.188
	Upper secondary education (advanced vocational included)	0.104	-0.195
	Without upper secondary education	0.061	-0.329
	Total	0.073	-0.276
Unemployed or Inactive	At least lower tertiary education	0.245	0.378
	Upper secondary education*	0.010	0.042
	Without upper secondary education	-0.043	-0.453
	Total	0.012	-0.214
Total	At least lower tertiary education	-0.095	0.429
	Upper secondary education (advanced vocational included)	0.043	0.003
	Without upper secondary education	0.049	-0.251
	Total	0.014	-0.010

*Advanced vocational included.

These findings have to be explained considering the interaction between education and social class. Indeed, education can be conceived as a "component variable" of social condition (Rosenberg 1968). For example, few individuals are devoid of tertiary education when they belong to the middle-

upper class, whereas about 60% of workers or unemployed are even without high school diploma, and only a small minority of them has a degree.

In absolute terms education level seems to influence positively only on multiculturalism (see Table 5), whereas egalitarianism is preferred by individuals who are more disadvantaged in labour market but own not very low educational resources. Therefore the "relative education" rather than that "absolute one" (Nie et al. 1996) would seem to exercise a positive influence on egalitarianism. Indeed, the basically more disadvantaged individuals assume an attitude more favourable towards equality when they have a cultural capital higher than the other members of their same group: this is the case of workers with upper secondary education compared to those without this qualification, or of unemployed with tertiary education compared to those with a lower education level.

The importance of relative education level rather than that absolute one has to be reconnected to the unbalanced distribution of education level between social classes (Table 6).

Table 6. *Social Class Stratified for Education Level*

	Without upper secondary education	**Upper secondary education (advanced vocational included)**	**At least lower tertiary education**	**Total**
Middle-Upper Class	3.9	3.8	92.3	100 (3,359)
Middle-Lower Class	30.2	51.3	18.5	100 (6,135)
Small Business Owners	49.3	35.6	15.0	100 (2,212)
Non-manual Working Class	42.3	44.2	13.6	100 (3,025)
Manual Working Class	59.1	36.7	4.2	100 (5,320)
Unemployed or Inactive	60.5	31.9	7.6	100 (815)
Total	41.8	36.8	21.4	100 (20,866)

This observation leads us to think that education level exercises a contradictory influence on egalitarianism because it promotes the recognition of the other, but it also represents a resource useful to achieve an advantaged social position, becoming a source of social distinction (see Bourdieu 1979).

Our multiple regression models confirm that multiculturalism depends on formal education level when social class and other variables we examined are held constant: what is important is the possession of degree (Table 7).

Table 7. *Multiple Linear Regression Model: The Effect of Formal Education Level on Multiculturalism, other Conditions being Equal*

	Unstandardized coefficients B	**S.E.**	**Standardized coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sign.**	**Tolerance**	**VIF**
(Constant)	-0.100	0.035		-2.819	0.005		
Upper secondary education*	0.200	0.015	0.094	13.489	0.000	0.745	1.342
Tertiary education	0.503	0.021	**0.214**	23.594	0.000	0.439	2.280
Female	-0.052	0.013	-0.026	-4.142	0.000	0.918	1.089
25-35 years old	0.139	0.016	**0.059**	8.623	0.000	0.767	1.304
36-50 years old	0.048	0.014	0.023	3.457	0.001	0.795	1.258
Middle-Lower Class	-0.052	0.024	-0.024	-2.138	0.033	0.296	3.374
Small Business Owners	-0.163	0.028	-0.050	-5.739	0.000	0.469	2.131
Not Manual Working Class	-0.200	0.028	**-0.071**	-7.258	0.000	0.374	2.677
Manual Working Class	**-0.318**	0.026	**-0.142**	-12.015	0.000	0.260	3.846
Unemployed or Inactive	**-0.276**	0.037	-0.055	-7.420	0.000	0.658	1.519
Centre-Western	0.200	0.017	**0.097**	11.983	0.000	0.548	1.824
Anglo-Saxon	-0.253	0.022	-0.083	-11.608	0.000	0.714	1.400
Scandinavian	0.362	0.030	**0.079**	12.099	0.000	0.847	1.181
Southern	0.130	0.018	0.056	7.144	0.000	0.595	1.679

Note: 11.0% of variance reproduced by model; values more negative are written in grey, values more positive in black.
*Advanced vocational included.

Besides, small business owners and working classes show once again their repulsion to multiculturalism, unlike upper-middle class. The residents in countries with corporative welfare regime (centre-western countries) display a propensity likewise favourable to this value, but the effect does not result particularly strong. The effect exercised by age cohort is even weaker, with a slightly positive propensity observed among the young people (25-35 years old).

Now moving to consider the type of interviewees' educational mobility, our research highlights that other things being equal, those who remain entrapped in a condition of cultural deprivation (Immobility at the Bottom) tend to express a strict identity adverse to diversities. Whereas, the most educated, especially those who have degree parents (Immobility at the Top) and the individuals who have proceeded educational mobility upward, are the most open towards migrants and

cultural pluralism (Table 8).

Table 8. *Multiple Linear Regression Model: The Effect of Educational Mobility on Multiculturalism, Other Conditions Being Equal*

	Unstandardized coefficients B	**S.E.**	**Standardized coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sign.**	**Tolerance**	**VIF**
(Constant)	-0.180	0.038		-4.763	0.000		
Female	-0.044	0.013	-0.022	-3.245	0.001	0.917	1.091
25-35 years old	0.123	0.018	**0.053**	7.010	0.000	0.748	1.336
36-50 years old	0.056	0.015	0.028	3.794	0.000	0.790	1.266
Middle-Lower Class	-0.055	0.025	-0.025	-2.152	0.031	0.310	3.222
Small Business Owners	-0.155	0.030	-0.048	-5.174	0.000	0.486	2.057
Not Manual Working Class	-0.198	0.029	**-0.070**	-6.803	0.000	0.396	2.526
Manual Working Class	-0.274	0.028	**-0.120**	-9.759	0.000	0.277	3.611
Unemployed or Inactive	-0.266	0.040	-0.053	-6.709	0.000	0.675	1.481
Centre-Western	0.229	0.018	**0.111**	12.985	0.000	0.572	1.749
Anglo-Saxon	-0.190	0.025	-0.056	-7.502	0.000	0.769	1.301
Scandinavian	0.362	0.031	**0.082**	11.585	0.000	0.848	1.179
Southern	0.171	0.019	**0.076**	9.025	0.000	0.600	1.667
Immobility in the Middle	0.236	0.017	**0.109**	14.033	0.000	0.696	1.437
Downward Mobility	0.283	0.027	0.072	10.366	0.000	0.866	1.155
Upward Mobility	0.520	0.024	**0.205**	21.721	0.000	0.472	2.117
Immobility at the Top	0.601	0.033	**0.147**	18.455	0.000	0.666	1.502

Note: 10.7% of variance reproduced by model; values more negative are written in grey, values more positive in black.

The two models just examined are equivalent and confirm our hypotheses. As regards the role of formal education, scholars that support the "Cultivation Theory" result more persuasive than those resorting to Rational Choice Theory: holding under control social class, the effect of education does not disappear by any means. At the same time, the second theory seems to be right when it states that less affluent classes are more closed to migrants for reasons that we can not merely attribute to the lack of high education. Nonetheless, the findings would seem to suggest that competition between natives and foreigners appear to be played mainly on the sociocultural side (symbolic competition) rather than that just economic one: as we wrote (see Table 6), individuals belonging to subaltern classes tend to have low cultural capital. Therefore they are less far from

foreigners for social resources owned than how much they are far from the members of upper and middle classes.

The frame changes when we analyse the index of egalitarianism as the dependent variable (Table 9 and 10).

First of all, the new models are less explicative statistically. Only the five per cent of the variance of the dependent variable is reproduced by them; then, findings show education and educational mobility do not exercise any relevant influence, neither positive nor negative, on propensity to egalitarianism: the less propensity of graduates towards egalitarianism reduces to small differences, once we adopt a multivariate perspective.

Furthermore, the approval of egalitarianism does not seem to reflect any social cleavage, except reiterate that unemployed (and inactive) individuals and those one with high educated and belonging to family environments in which educational level is as much high (we are referring to the interviewees with "Immobility at the Top") is more adverse to the idea that contrasting social inequalities should be one of the most important duties of democratic institutions. Working class, instead, show a very slight tendency to connect democracy with social equality.

Table 9. *Multiple Regression Model: The Effect of Formal Education Level on Egalitarianism, Other Conditions Being Equal*

	Unstandardized coefficients B	**S.E.**	**Standardized coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sign.**	**Tolerance**	**VIF**
(Constant)	-0.043	0.035		-1.209	0.227		
Upper secondary education*	-0.005	0.015	-0.003	-0.373	0.709	0.743	1.346
Tertiary education	-0.090	0.021	**-0.038**	-4.208	0.000	0.438	2.285
Female	0.107	0.012	**0.054**	8.582	0.000	0.920	1.087
25-35 years old	-0.103	0.016	-0.044	-6.431	0.000	0.770	1.298
36-50 years old	-0.040	0.014	-0.020	-2.946	0.003	0.797	1.254
Middle-Lower Class	0.067	0.024	0.030	2.748	0.006	0.295	3.390
Small Business Owners	-0.009	0.028	-0.003	-0.317	0.751	0.464	2.157
Not Manual Working Class	0.082	0.027	0.029	2.993	0.003	0.374	2.673
Manual Working Class	0.091	0.026	**0.041**	3.446	0.001	0.257	3.893
Unemployed or Inactive	-0.100	0.037	-0.020	-2.669	0.008	0.661	1.514
Centre-Western	-0.249	0.016	**-0.120**	-15.412	0.000	0.591	1.693
Anglo-Saxon	-0.402	0.022	**-0.129**	-18.568	0.000	0.752	1.330
Scandinavian	-0.243	0.030	-0.052	-8.050	0.000	0.872	1.147
Southern	0.212	0.018	0.090	11.989	0.000	0.635	1.574

Note: 5.2% of variance reproduced by model; values more negative are written in grey, values more positive in black.

* Advanced vocational included

Table 10. *Multiple Regression Model: The Effect of Educational Mobility on Egalitarianism, Other Conditions Being Equal*

	Unstandardized coefficients B	**S.E.**	**Standardized coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sign.**	**Tolerance**	**VIF**
(Constant)	-0.075	0.037		-2.024	0.043		
Gender	0.108	0.013	**0.055**	8.160	0.000	0.917	1.090
25-35 years old	-0.104	0.017	-0.045	-6.029	0.000	0.751	1.332
36-50 years old	-0.036	0.015	-0.018	-2.494	0.013	0.792	1.263
Middle-Lower Class	0.089	0.025	**0.041**	3.537	0.000	0.309	3.233
Small Business Owners	0.013	0.030	0.004	0.452	0.651	0.479	2.087
Not Manual Working Class	0.094	0.029	0.034	3.294	0.001	0.396	2.527
Manual Working Class	0.108	0.028	0.048	3.903	0.000	0.273	3.660
Unemployed or Inactive	-0.064	0.039	-0.013	-1.641	0.101	0.675	1.481
Centre-Western	-0.252	0.017	**-0.123**	-14.870	0.000	0.613	1.631
Anglo-Saxon	-0.359	0.025	**-0.104**	-14.380	0.000	0.801	1.248
Scandinavian	-0.253	0.031	-0.056	-8.137	0.000	0.872	1.147
Southern	0.219	0.018	**0.097**	11.972	0.000	0.638	1.568
Immobility in the Middle	-0.003	0.016	-0.001	-0.166	0.869	0.691	1.446
Downward Mobility	0.005	0.027	0.001	0.189	0.850	0.863	1.158
Upward Mobility	-0.038	0.024	-0.015	-1.626	0.104	0.471	2.121
Immobility at the Top	-0.184	0.032	**-0.046**	-5.752	0.000	0.667	1.500

Note: 5.2% of variance reproduced by model; values more negative are written in grey, values more positive in black.

The role of institutional context appears quite peripheral: we can only state that egalitarianism is more diffused among Southern. In other words, interviewees living in countries characterised the weakest welfare regimes tend to request institutions contrast social inequalities, while the opposite tendency is detected among interviewees reside in Centre-Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries when we control the role of the other variables examined in the models.

Therefore, contrary to what we could have expected, even individuals living in a context characterized by a universalist welfare state (this is the case of Scandinavian countries) do not tend to think that democratic institutions have to remove social inequalities (perhaps because these institutions already act in this way and people take for granted a certain level of equality without asking a further

redistributive action by State).

Cognitive Mobility and Critical Thinking, the Roots of Democratic Universalism

The theoretical framework we adopted allows us to carry on a more in-depth analysis, paying attention to the complex nature of socio-cultural processes and their embeddedness in real conditions of social actors.

The findings we reached so far confirm the influence of social conditions on way of thinking; for example, we noted the tendency of lower classes to identify themselves in closed communities, often artificial construction built by political institutions to avoid policies addressed to a real redistribution of economic resources (Appadurai 2017). This last phenomenon compensates the absence of class struggle.

However, our data lead us to think that the war among the most deprived persons, between natives and migrants, develop along a socio-cultural even before than economic line. It is true that most disadvantaged natives get to attribute their lousy condition, not to capitalistic exploitation but the competition of migrant workers, also if this competition is not always real. However, it more evident that, actually, several members of the working class often tend to discredit migrants because in this way they can avoid to perceive themselves at the bottom of the social scale.

This mechanism explains why the request of egalitarianism would not seem so relevant for working classes. At the same time, our data show that the repulsion to egalitarianism would not be attributable particularly to upper classes so easily, once you also consider the interviewees' educational level.

As we said, education should exercise an ambivalent function: it facilitates competitive dynamics and individual ambition, but at the same time it transmits values, beliefs and also cognitive competencies addressed to the recognition of the other and oriented to a universal worldview point promoting equality.

So far we saw that education affects positively on multiculturalism, whereas this influence is less clear and less strong on egalitarianism. Nevertheless, if we examine the attitude of being favourable to both values examined, we obtain interesting and clearer findings.

In order to reach this aim, we classified interviewees in four types. On the one side we have the "particularists", adverse to both values we examined, and on the other side, we have the "universalists", namely those who request/express the democratic universalism as well we defined it previously.

The figure 1 shows that universalists are more homogeneous than other interviewees (standard deviation on multiculturalism is 0.0551; standard deviation on egalitarianism is 0.270): they have a positive but variable score on multiculturalism and a level of egalitarianism greater than mean. On the contrary, particularists are more heterogeneous, especially for the degree of egalitarianism (standard deviation on multiculturalism is 0.624; standard deviation on egalitarianism is 1.027): some of them are not too far from the mean value, but others express the opinion that reflect a determined anti-egalitarianism.

A similar level of heterogeneity is observed among interviewees classified as

"only multiculturalists" (standard deviation: 0.515 on the first factor; 0.807 on the second one), who show a positive score on the index that gives them the name and a negative score on the other index. Eventually, interviewees, we defined "only egalitarians" show a degree of heterogeneity that is at the halfway between universalists and the other two groups (standard deviation on multiculturalism is 0.661; standard deviation on egalitarianism is 0.266).

Figure. 1. *The Interviewees' Position on the Two Indexes*



The resorting to the polynomial logistic regression allows to build two models reproducing respectively 15.1% and 15.4% of the dependent variable, that is the interviewees' likelihood of being other than "particularists".

These models are not only more explicative than previous ones, but they also clarify the role of education towards universalism.

Indeed, the first model (Table 11) shows how the possession of degree slightly reduces the likelihood of being only egalitarian rather than particularist, but it significantly increases the possibility of being only multiculturalist or even universalist rather than particularist.

To be more exact, if it is true that education promotes multiculturalism rather than universalism, however the likelihood of being universalist (rather than particularist) by an individual with a degree is 94% higher than the same probability measured among individuals without upper secondary diploma (and it is 61% higher than the likelihood observed among interviewees just with upper secondary diploma).

Table. 11. *Multinomial Logistic Regression Model: Propensity to have an Attitude*

Different from Particularism on the Basis of Educational Level, Being Equal Other Conditions

	Only Egualitarians			**Only Multiculturalists**			**Universalists**		
	B	**Sign.**	**Exp(B)**	**B**	**Sign.**	**Exp(B)**	**B**	**Sign.**	**Exp(B)**
Constant	0,623	0,000		-0,735	0,000		0,008	0,943	
Tertiary	-0,232	0,003	0,793	**1,016**	0,000	2,761	**0,665**	0,000	1,944
Upper secondary or advanced vocational	-0,069	0,139	0,933	0,356	0,000	1,427	0,281	0,000	1,325
Without upper secondary education (reference category)		.	.		.	.		.	.
Female	**0,142**	0,001	1,152	-0,252	0,000	0,777	0,045	0,261	1,046
25-35	-0,233	0,000	0,792	**0,421**	0,000	1,523	0,043	0,399	1,044
36-50	-0,100	0,023	0,904	0,169	0,001	1,184	0,013	0,760	1,013
51-65 (reference category)		.	.		.	.		.	.
Middle-Upper Class	0,068	0,603	1,070	**0,556**	0,000	1,744	**0,706**	0,000	2,025
Middle-Lower Class	0,086	0,409	1,090	**0,293**	0,016	1,340	**0,573**	0,000	1,774
Small Business Owners	-0,149	0,185	0,862	0,004	0,976	1,004	0,126	0,270	1,134
Non-manual Working Class	**0,121**	0,260	1,128	-0,066	0,603	0,936	**0,392**	0,000	1,480
Manual Working Class	**0,151**	0,143	1,163	-0,294	0,018	0,745	0,167	0,117	1,182
Unemployed or Inactive (reference category)		.	.		.	.		.	.
Centre-Western	-0,638	0,000	0,528	**0,559**	0,000	1,750	-0,218	0,000	0,804
Anglo-Saxon	-0,742	0,000	0,476	-0,312	0,000	0,732	-0,967	0,000	0,380
Scandinavian	-0,903	0,000	0,405	**0,637**	0,000	1,891	-0,071	0,447	0,932
Southern	**0,420**	0,000	1,522	0,257	0,001	1,294	**0,665**	0,000	1,945
Eastern (reference category)		.	.		.	.		.	.

Note: 15.1% of variance is reproduced by the model; the values more negative are written in grey, values more positive in black. To understand accurately the meaning of the value attributed to a certain modality you have to compare this value with the other ones attributed to the modalities of the same variable. You have not to forget that the basis of comparison is the reference category for each variable.

Therefore, education exercises a crucial role, once you consider social class

and the other variables here examined. The fact that Middle-Upper Class and Lower-Middle Class, followed by Non-Manual Working Class, are more universalist seem partly attributable to their relative advantaged condition, that is far from the state experienced by who exercises manual labour, like the members of the traditional working class and several small business owners. The last two groups are the least multiculturalists and the least universalists.

The findings of the first model suggest that, in contrast to what Cultivation Theories state, thought is embedded in social conditions (Marx and Engels 1845) but, on the contrary of what Rational Choice Theory scholars believe, education is a cognitive resource that partly makes individuals watch the world not only on the basis of their immediate and material interests. For example, tertiary education, that is connected to a long scholastic socialisation, shapes social identities towards to the openness to the other.

Moreover, the institutional context would seem to count, but it does not work following an additive mechanism. Interviewees from countries with a more universalist welfare state (Scandinavian Model) do not tend to be the most inclined to universalism. Instead, the likelihood of being universalists increases among Southern European interviewees, geographically in closest contact with migration flows and characterised by a weaker institutional system that leads them to ask more equality, given the low social protection assured in their country (Table 11).

The second model confirms the results of the first one, but also shows when the role of education becomes stronger and more relevant. About this, the model illustrates in which conditions education affects someone's attitude towards to world. First of all, our data show that when you belong to a family without upper secondary education, and you are not in the condition of improving your sociocultural condition (this is the case of the individuals with "immobility at the bottom"), then you tend to be particularist or at most only egalitarian. On the opposite the attitude of being universalist increases when you confirm the good cultural capital of parents (this is the case of persons with "immobility at the top").

Not only, but the openness to a universalist worldview point is also more likely for individuals who reach a level of education higher than their parents' one: this is the case of Individuals with an "upward educational mobility" (Table 12).

If we examine all the models together (therefore also those illustrated in the previous paragraph), we can state that tertiary education is crucial for individual coming from lower classes.

Table 12. *Multinomial Logistic Regression Model: Propensity to have an Attitude Different from Particularism on the Basis of Educational Level, Being Equal other Conditions*

	Only Egualitarians			**Only Multiculturalists**			**Universalists**		
	B	**Sign.**	**Exp(B)**	**B**	**Sign.**	**Exp(B)**	**B**	**Sign.**	**Exp(B)**
Constant	0,717	0,000		-0,742	0,000		-0,117	0,353	
Immobility in the Middle	-0,048	0,361	0,953	0,423	0,000	1,527	0,334	0,000	1,397
Downward Mobility	-0,166	0,065	0,847	0,397	0,000	1,487	0,412	0,000	1,509
Upward Mobility	-0,159	0,074	0,853	**0,987**	0,000	2,682	**0,783**	0,000	2,188
Immobility at the Top	**-0,318**	0,016	0,728	**1,299**	0,000	3,667	**0,641**	0,000	1,898
Immobility at the Bottom (reference category)		.	.		.	.		.	.
Female	**0,135**	0,003	1,144	**-0,232**	0,000	0,793	0,083	0,054	1,087
25-35	**-0,234**	0,000	0,791	**0,364**	0,000	1,439	0,021	0,705	1,022
36-50	-0,089	0,067	0,915	0,162	0,002	1,176	0,039	0,406	1,040
51-65 (reference category)		.	.		.	.		.	.
Middle-Upper Class	-0,045	0,748	0,956	**0,500**	0,001	1,649	**0,649**	0,000	1,914
Middle-Lower Class	0,011	0,925	1,011	0,200	0,129	1,222	**0,553**	0,000	1,739
Small Business Owners	**-0,200**	0,102	0,819	-0,048	0,737	0,953	0,140	0,265	1,150
Non-manual Working Class	-0,009	0,935	0,991	-0,094	0,495	0,910	**0,347**	0,004	1,415
Manual Working Class	-0,006	0,956	0,994	**-0,320**	0,017	0,726	0,201	0,086	1,223
Unemployed or Inactive (reference category)		.	.		.	.		.	.
Centre-Western	**-0,671**	0,000	0,511	**0,598**	0,000	1,819	-0,202	0,000	0,817
Anglo-Saxon	**-0,636**	0,000	0,529	**-0,200**	0,022	0,819	**-0,820**	0,000	0,440
Scandinavian	**-0,909**	0,000	0,403	**0,621**	0,000	1,861	-0,094	0,336	0,910
Southern	**0,431**	0,000	1,538	0,324	0,000	1,382	**0,755**	0,000	2,128
Eastern (reference category)		.	.		.	.		.	.

Note: 15.4% of variance is reproduced by the model; the values more negative are written in grey, values more positive in black. To understand accurately the meaning of the value attributed to a certain modality you have to compare this value with the other ones attributed to the modalities of the same variable. You have not to forget that the basis of comparison is the reference category for each variable.

Indeed, interviewees with an upward educational mobility show a likelihood of being universalists that are 200% higher than the same likelihood revealed among interviewees who, like their parents, do not have upper secondary diploma, and so they live the reproduction of socio-cultural gap paid by their origins family (we are referring to individuals with "immobility at the bottom").

It is important to highlight that individuals who live educational mobility tend to be universalist to a greater extent also than those achieve tertiary education confirming their educational background. The likelihood of being universalists rather than particularists by interviewees with upward educational mobility is 30% higher than the same likelihood of interviewees that reproduce the high level of education of their family (in this last case we talk about individuals with an educational "immobility at the top").

Summary and Discussion

This paper set out to understand how much education promotes democratic universalism, namely the value inspiring the modern democracy according to which institutions have to guarantee social equality (Honneth 2016). In current Europe, this value requests to be reworked, considering multiculturalism: equality is promoted just if it entails the recognition of the freedom to express cultural diversity. Otherwise, universalism downgrades to cultural imperialism, producing exclusion rather than social inclusion.

The analysis of data gathered by the sixth edition of ESS highlighted that egalitarianism and multiculturalism are not correlated, with the first value in partial crisis, like Crouch (2004, 2014) spotted, whereas the second value splits European public opinion.

Given this situation, some scholars remark the socializing role of educational system (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, Sciolla 2013, Assirelli 2014); the achieving of a high level of education, in particular the degree comes from a long-time scholastic socialisation thanks to which democratic values and attitudes are learned: tolerance for diversities, cultural pluralism and civic sense.

Nonetheless, Rational Choice scholars attribute values, norms, opinions and attitudes to the material interests connected to social positions of individuals, not to scholastic socialisation: high education would not guarantee the openness of mind. According to these scholars, if researchers considered interviewees' social class, the effect exercised by education on removal of prejudices and recognition of the other would disappear or would be very weak (Malchow-Møller et al. 2006, Wodtke 2012).

Other researches, like that one about professionals carried on by Brint (1996), came to identify a positive association between education and openness to cultural diversity, but not between the first one and egalitarianism.

According to us, we may analyse better the question considering the ambivalence of educational system: schools reproduce social inequalities, justifying them on behalf of universalism (Bourdieu 1984), but just this promise feeds up the belief in social mobility and emancipation (Collins 1979, Parziale

2016).

Therefore, we elaborated two hypotheses that pay attention to the "cognitive and symbolic function of education", without ignoring the inverse function of reproducing of social inequalities.

In other words, scholastic socialisation has an ambivalent nature: on the one hand it justifies the reproduction of social inequalities to which schools also contribute; on the other hand, it provides individuals achieving high level of education with values and cognitive competencies that foster the recognition of the other (Colombo 2014), feeding up a universalistic worldview point.

Our regression models highlight precisely this contradiction that we have interpreted by resorting to a theoretical framework based on the social embeddedness of thought (Marx and Engels 1845), combining it with the idea that the texts produced by socialization shape the identity of individuals thanks to the "appropriation" of the former by the latter ones (Ricoeur 1986).

The main finding of our research is that the educational system encourages universalism – today to be understood as a combination of egalitarianism and multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995) – when it enhances values and beliefs of individual belonging to most educated families, also if these last ones correspond to most advantaged classes, or when it promotes the educational mobility of individuals coming from lower classes.

In particular, individuals with upward educational mobility migrate by a deprived socio-cultural condition to another better one. This social trajectory seems to make scholastic socialisation of universalism more effectiveness; scholastic socialisation is not a mere transmission of values, norms and beliefs, but it consists in the acquiring of a specific cultural code: working-class students have to pass from a "restricted code" to an "elaborated code" in order to achieve an excellent scholastic performance (Bernstein 1975, 2006). The second type of code allows developing theoretical thinking that in turn pushes individuals to (try to) go beyond particularism connected to gender, ethnic, religious or class belonging.

In other words, we can identify a mechanism according to which persons follow a trajectory that denies the common mechanism of reproducing of educational inequalities by schools (Scuola di Barbiana 1967, Willis 1977, Bourdieu 1979, Bowles and Gintis 2003, Apple 2012). For this reason, we may define individuals with educational mobility as "Heretics" (Parziale 2016): in several cases, their identity is the outcome of a deeper socialisation derived by the acquiring of a cultural code different from what they learned in primary socialisation.

Indeed, those who move from the first to the second code experience a profound change that entails the counteracting of prejudices. In this case, the long educational path seems to be connected to the authentic recognition of differences (Adorno et al. 1950, Honneth 1992, Taylor 1994): this trajectory encourages a positive attitude to egalitarianism, and thus to the universalism.

In this sense, you may say that in general people with high education tend to develop "post-conventional thinking" (Kohlberg 1971, Habermas 1976). This kind of thinking is focused on the autonomy of the subject against the constraints of the political and economic system. In this case, the educational system makes not only

one learns "the generalised other" (Mead 1934), so that he/she becomes a member of society, but also this one develops a critical sense that goes beyond the social constraints (Habermas 1984).

Therefore, we come to conclude that schools can represent one of the leading agencies promoting a forma mentis favourable to democratic universalism in the current pluralistic societies, as long as they support social inclusion and education mobility. This last phenomenon does not help only to guarantee meritocracy or to nourish trust in democratic institutions (possibly through misleading), but above all, it constitutes a virtuous path during which teachers succeed in convincing students to make that "extra effort" allowing them the modification of the starting cultural code.

This effort does not lead to the reproduction of familial, cultural competencies (Bourdieu 1984), instead it causes the questioning of common feeling, certainties of own social world, opening the way for the condition of "disoriented" like a foreigner in a new Country (Schütz 1962): those who live educational mobility are led to develop better the capability to distance themselves from cultural objectivations.

This outcome produces that critical sense Gouldner (1979) attributed to that group he called the "new class" ("the service class") in the past, and today we can attribute to the broader expansion of cognitive work among middle classes[5].

Perhaps, our paper allows to glimpse an effect of this process in the age of globalisation; we mean the birth of a new social cleavage between individuals with tertiary education and individuals lower educated. But, our research suggests not to refer this cleavage to an abstract learning process, separated from social stratification system and real educational practices. We may state that scholastic socialisation is comparable to "texts" that are interpreted differently according to the real social and educational trajectories crossed by its "readers".

References

Adorno TW, Frenkel-Brunswick E, Levinson DJ, Sanford RN (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper-Row.

Aidukaite J (2011) *Welfare reforms and socio-economic trends in the 10 new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe*. In *Communist and post-communist studies* 44(3): 211-219.

Appadurai A (2017) The Democracy Fatigue. In H Geiselberger (ed), *The Great Regression*. Cambridge (UK): Polity Press.

Apple MW (2004) *Ideology and curriculum*. London and New York: Routledge.

Apple MW (2012) *Can education change society?* London and New York: Routledge.

Apple MW (2013) *Education and power*. London and New York: Routledge.

Assirelli G (2014) *Studiare di più rende cittadini migliori? Analisi della relazione tra istruzione e civicnessin Italia*. In *Scuola democratica* 1: 29-52.

Bernstein B (1975) *Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions*, vol. 3. London:

[5] In the same way as the classic sociologists (Weber 1920, Simmel 1908, Elias 1936, Habermas 1981), also Gouldner connects scholastic socialisation to the broader process of rationalization and intellectualisation of the world.

Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Bernstein B (2006) Vertical and horizontal discourse: An essay. In *Education and Society*, 53-73. Routledge.
Berger P, Luckmann T (1966) *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. New York: Garden City.
Boudon R (1973) *L'inegalité des chances*. Paris: Armand Colin.
Bourdieu P (1979) *La Distinction. Critique sociale dujugement*. Paris: Editions de Minuit.
Bourdieu P (1984) *Homo academicus*. Paris: Editions de Minuit.
Bowles S, Gintis H (2003) *Schooling in capitalist America twenty-five years later*. In *Sociological Forum* 18(2): 343-348.
Brint S (1996) *In an age of experts: The changing role of professionals in politics and public life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brint S (1998) *Schools and Societies.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bukodi E, Goldthorpe JH (2012) Causes, Classes and Cases. In *Longitudinal and Life Course Studies* 3: 292-296.
Collins R (1979) *The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification*. New York: Academic Press.
Colombo E (2014) *Istruzione e atteggiamento nei confronti della differenza culturale. Una rassegna delle principali interpretazioni sociologiche.* In *Scuola democratica* 1: 9-28.
Crouch C (2004) *Post-democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Crouch C (2014) *Il potere dei giganti: Perché la crisi non ha sconfitto il neoliberismo*. Bari: Laterza.
Cuche D (2006) *La nozione di cultura nelle scienze sociali*, Il Mulino, Bologna.
Dewey J (1916) *Education and democracy*. Macmillan, New York.
Di Franco G, Marradi A (2003) *Analisi fattoriale e analisi in componenti principali*. Acireale: Bonanno.
Elias N. (1936) *ÜberdenProzessderZivilisation*. Basel: HauszumFalken. [it.tr. *La civiltà delle buone maniere. Le trasformazioni dei costumi nel mondo aristocratico occidentale*. Bologna: il Mulino, 2009].
Erikson R, Goldthorpe JH (1992) *Individual or family? Results from two approaches to class assignment*. In *Acta Sociologica* 35(2): 95-105.
Erikson R, Goldthorpe JH, Portocarero L (1979) *Intergenerational class mobility in three Western European societies: England, France and Sweden*. In *The British Journal of Sociology* 30(4): 415-441.
Esping-Andersen G (2013), *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Ferrara A (2011) *Democrazia e apertura.* Milano: Mondadori.
Gallino L (2013) *La lotta di classe dopo la lotta di classe*. Bari: Laterza.
Geiselberger H (ed) (2017) *The Great Regression.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gerbner G., Gross L., Morgan M., Signorielli N., *Living with television: The dynamics of the cultivation process*, in J. Bryant, D. Zillmann (Eds.), *Perspectives on media effects*, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1986, pp. 17-40.
Giroux HA (2005) *Schooling and the struggle for public life. Democracy's promise and education's Challenge*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Giroux HA, McLaren P (eds) (2014) Between borders: Pedagogy and the politics of cultural studies. London and New York: Routledge.
Goldthorpe JH (2000) Social class and the differentiation of employment contracts. In *On Sociology: Numbers, Narratives and the Integration of Research and Theory.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldthorpe JH (2016) *Social class mobility in modern Britain: changing structure,*

constant process. *Journal of the British Academy* 4: 89-111.
Gouldner AW (1979) *The future of intellectuals and the rise of the new class.* New York: Macmillan.
Habermas J (1976) *Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus.* Frankfurt a. M.: Surkhamp.
Habermas J (1981) *Theorie des kommunikativenHandelns.* Frankfurt a. M.: Surkhamp.
Harvey D (2007) *A brief history of neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Honneth A (1992) *Integrity and disrespect: Principles of a conception of morality based on the theory of recognition.* In *Political Theory* 20(2): 187-201.
Honneth A (2016) *L'idea di socialismo: Un sogno necessario*. Milano: Feltrinelli Editore.
Hainmueller J, Hiscox MJ (2007) Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe. In *International Organization* 61(2): 399-442.
Hall S (1980) *Cultural studies: Two paradigms*. In *Media, Culture & Society* 2(1): 57-72.
Izzo A (1966) *Sociologia della conoscenza*. Roma: Armando Editore.
Jackson M (2013) *Determined to succeed?: performance versus choice in educational attainment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kohlberg L (1971) Stages of moral development. *Moral education* 1: 23-92.
Kymlicka W (1995) *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lipset SM (1960) *Political man: The social bases of politics*. New York: Garden City.
Malchow-Møller N, Munch J, Schroll S, Skaksen J (2006) A*ttitudes towards immigration: does economic self-interest matter?* IZA Discussion Paper, n. 2283.
Mannheim K (1936) *Ideology and utopia*. New York: Harcourt.
Marramao G (2015) *Commento. Democrazia deliberativa e universalismo della differenza*. *Parole chiave* 23(1): 57-62.
Marx K, Engels F (1932) *De Duitse ideologie*, manuscript of 1845. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
Mayo P (2015) *Hegemony and education under neoliberalism: Insights from Gramsci*. London: Routledge.
Mead GH (1934) *Mind, self and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nie NH, Junn J, Stehlik-Barry K (1996) *Education and democratic citizenship in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nussbaum MC (1997) *Cultivating humanity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Oesch D (2003) *Labour market trends and the Goldthorpe class schema: A conceptual reassessment.* In *Revue Suisse de Sociologie* 29(2): 241-262.
Parziale F (2016) *Eretici e respinti. Classi sociali e istruzione superiore in Italia.* Milano: Franco Angeli.
Parziale F, Scotti I (2008) Valutazione delle occupazioni e gruppi socio-occupazionali. In *Sociologia del Lavoro 112*: 63-79.
Piketty T (2014) *Capital in the Twenty First Century*. Cambridge, MA: University Press.
Ricoeur P (1986) *Lectures on ideology and utopia*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rosenberg M (1968) *The Logic of Survey Analysis*. New York: Basic Books.
Schütz A (1962) *Collected Papers I.* Dordrecht: Springer.
Sciolla L (2013) *Il ruolo dell'istruzione formale nella formazione dei valori e dei comportamenti di cittadinanza attiva*. In *Scuola Democratica* 3(2013): 839-849.
Scuola di Barbiana (1967) *Lettera a una professoressa.* Firenze: Libreria Editrice Fiorentina.
Simmel G (1908) *Soziologie. Untersuchungenüber die Formen der Vergesellschaftun*g. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
Taylor C (1994) *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Thompson JB (1995) *The media and modernity: A social theory of the media*. Stanford:

Stanford University Press.
Weber M (1920) *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions soziologie*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
Williams R (1973) *Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory*. In *New left review* 82: 3-16.
Willis P (1977) *Learning to Labour*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Wodtke GT (2012) The impact of education on intergroup attitudes: A multiracial analysis. In *Social Psychology Quarterly* 75(1): 80-106.
Wright O (1985) *Classes*. London: Verso.
Žižek S (2017) *The Populist Temptation*. In H Geiselberger (ed) *The Great Regression.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Athens Journal of Social Sciences *Volume 6, Issue 2 – Pages 139-154*

Why Insurgent Campaigns Rarely Win the Democratic Presidential Primary in the United States

By L. Jan Reid[*]

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines insurgent as "one who acts contrary to the policies and decisions of one's own political party." In this paper, an "insurgent presidential campaign" is defined as the campaign of a candidate who did not have the support of the United States of America's (U.S.) Democratic Party establishment. A "populist campaign" is a subset of an insurgent campaign, because although all populist campaigns are insurgent campaigns, not all insurgent campaigns are populist campaigns. This paper defines a "populist campaign" as one that seeks to mobilize an unrepresented segment of the population against an institution or government, usually in defense of the unrepresented. Whether left-wing or right-wing, populist candidates seek to unite the supposedly uncorrupt and unsophis¬ticated unrepresented against supposedly corrupt dominant elites. Insurgent campaigns have rarely been successful in capturing the Democratic Party presidential nomination in the United States. Only three insurgent campaigns have been successful over the past 50 years: the campaigns of George McGovern in 1972, Jimmy Carter in 1976, and Barack Obama in 2008, all of which were populist campaigns. The paper analyzes U.S. presidential campaigns for the period 1968-2016; reviews books and academic literature; and makes conclusions concerning the success and failure of insurgent campaigns. Finally, the paper recommends ways in which future insurgent campaigns could be more successful.

Keywords: *Insurgent Campaigns, Populism, Presidential Campaigns.*

Introduction

This paper analyzes presidential campaigns in the United States' (U.S.) Democratic Party for the period 1968-2016; reviews books and academic literature; and makes conclusions concerning the success and failure of insurgent campaigns.

In order to win the Democratic presidential nomination, a candidate must receive over 50% of the votes of delegates to the Democratic National Convention. Delegates consist of appointed superdelegates, and delegates chosen in direct primary elections and in state caucuses. In a direct primary, voters cast ballots for delegates who are pledged to vote for a candidate. Direct primaries have become more popular over time. The number of direct primaries has grown from 13 of the 50 U.S. states in 1968 to 38 states in 2016.

Superdelegates are party insiders such as elected politicians and Democratic Party officials.[1] In 2016, the superdelegates (15% of the total number of delegates) were composed of:

[*]President, Coast Economic Consulting, USA.

https://doi.org/10.30958/ajss.6-2-4 doi= 10.30958/ajss.6-2-4

437 elected members from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) (including the chairs and vice-chairs of each state's Democratic Party)
20 distinguished party leaders, consisting of current and former presidents, current and former vice-presidents, former congressional leaders, and former DNC chairs
191 Democratic members of the United States House of Representatives (including non-voting delegates from Washington, DC and U.S. territories)
47 Democratic members of the United States Senate
21 Democratic governors (including territorial governors) and the Mayor of the District of Columbia).

Hypotheses

The paper hypothesizes that most Democratic Party insurgent campaigns have been unsuccessful due to lack of money, announcing too late, and inadequate field organization (Field organization includes door-to-door canvassing, contacting voters by telephone, voter registration, and get-out-the-vote campaigns).

Literature Review

The literature review explored the four subjects discussed below. These subject areas were chosen because, taken together, they help explain much of the success and failure of insurgent campaigns during the period of the study.

The four subjects are:

Causes of Populism
Delegate Selection Rules
Field Organization
Fundraising

Causes of Populism

There are two theories that seek to explain the rise of populism, which is a subset of insurgent campaigns. These theories are: the economic inequality perspective and the cultural backlash perspective. Inglehart and Norris have explained that according to the economic inequality perspective, "rising economic insecurity and social deprivation among the left-behinds has fueled popular resentment of the political classes" (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 2).

The cultural backlash theory suggests that a surge in votes for populist parties can be explained not as a purely economic phenomenon but in large part as a reaction against progressive cultural change. (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 3)

[1]Of the 259 elected officials who were superdelegates in 2016, populist Sen. Bernie Sanders received the votes of just eight politicians (including himself).

Inglehart and Norris found that economic inequality and cultural backlash reinforced each other, and that the rise of populist parties constitutes a reaction against a wide range of rapid cultural and economic changes that seem to be eroding the basic values and customs of Western societies.

The work of Inglehart and Norris is focused on right-wing populist parties. Except for the candidacy of Governor George Wallace of Alabama in 1972 and 1976, all of the campaigns in this study were left-wing insurgent campaigns.

The Gini coefficient (also known as the Gini index or Gini ratio) is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a nation's residents and is the most commonly used measure of inequality. It was developed by the Italian statistician and sociologist Corrado Gini and published in his 1912 paper Variability and Mutability (Variabilità e mutabilità). A Gini coefficient of 1 indicates maximum income inequality and a Gini coefficient of 0 indicates no income inequality (Gini 1912).

I was unable to find a significant statistical relationship between support for an insurgent campaign and income inequality as measured by the Gini index.[2] When the Gini index was regressed against the percent of vote for insurgent campaigns, the paper found that the estimated coefficient was -2.08 with a probability of 17% (83% significance).

Using a standard 95% significance level, the regression results indicated no statistically significant relationship between the Gini coefficient and the percent of the vote for insurgent campaigns.

Delegate Selection Rules

After the 1968 general election, insurgent Democrats engineered a change in the nominating process. Patterson (2016: 17) has pointed out that "State parties were instructed to choose their convention delegates through either a primary election or a caucus open to all registered party voters."

After Senator George McGovern won the democratic nomination but was defeated in a landslide by President Richard Nixon in 1972, the Democratic Party changed its nominating process by establishing a superdelegate system, eliminating winner-take-all primaries, and eliminating the quota system for delegates under age 30.

Field Organization

Middleton and Green (2008) studied the effect of MoveOn.org's 2004 efforts on behalf of Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry. They found that voter contacts by MoveOn.org increased voter turnout by 10.5% among voters contacted by the organization.

Green and Gerber (2000) studied get-out-the-vote efforts and estimated the efficiency of the following methods:

[2]Gini coefficient data for the United States was obtained from the Controller's Office of the State of Nevada. (State of Nevada 2016).

Canvassing: One additional vote for every 14 people successfully contacted.
Phone banks: One additional vote for every 35 people successfully contacted.
Literature Drops: One additional vote for every 66 people successfully contacted.
Direct Mail: One additional vote for every 133 people successfully contacted.

Fundraising

Presidential campaign spending was relatively stable until the 2004 campaign. Figure 1 shows the growth in spending on presidential campaigns over time (Metrocosm.com).

Figure 1. *Presidential Campaign Spending (1960-2012)*



Barack Obama's successful 2008 campaign raised the most money of any insurgent campaign during the period of the study. The second highest was the 2016 campaign of Sen. Bernie Sanders, who raised a total of $235.4 million. Of this amount, Sanders raised $215.3 million online from over 8.2 million individual contributors (Weaver 2018: 101).

Electoral History

Table 1 provides the percentage of the vote for insurgent campaigns in direct primaries from 1968-2016. A graphical representation of these percentages is given in Figure 2.

Table 1. *Insurgent Campaigns from 1968-2016*

Year	Candidate(s)	Percent of Vote	Result
1968	Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy	69.36%	Kennedy was assassinated, and McCarthy finished second at the Democratic convention.
1972	George McGovern, George Wallace, and Shirley Chisholm	51.51%	McGovern won the nomination despite finishing second to Sen. Hubert Humphrey in the popular vote.
1976	Jimmy Carter and George Wallace	54.43%	Carter won the nomination and was elected President.
1980	Edward "Ted" Kennedy	37.58%	President Carter won the nomination.
1984	Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson	58.47%	Vice President Walter Mondale won the nomination.
1988	Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson	30.99%	Governor Michael Dukakis won the nomination.
1992	Jerry Brown and Tom Harkin	21.59%	Governor Bill Clinton won the nomination.
1996	None	NA	President Bill Clinton won the nomination.
2000	None	NA	Vice President Al Gore won the nomination.
2004	John Edwards, Howard Dean, Dennis Kucinich, and Al Sharpton.	31.09%	Senator John Kerry won the nomination.
2008	Barack Obama	47.36%	Despite finishing second in the popular vote, Barack Obama won the nomination.
2016	Bernie Sanders	43.84%	Senator Hillary Clinton won the nomination
	Average	**44.62%**	

Figure 2. *Percent of the Vote of Insurgent Campaigns (1968-2016)*



1968 Campaign

In 1968, Democratic President Lyndon Johnson was running for re-election in the middle of the Vietnam War. He was challenged by the insurgent campaign of Sen. Eugene McCarthy in the New Hampshire primary, and later by Sen. Robert Kennedy.

Despite the growing opposition to Johnson's policies in Vietnam, no prominent Democratic politician was prepared to run against a sitting president of the Democratic party. Antiwar activists formed a "Dump Johnson" movement and initially approached Senator Robert F. Kennedy of New York. They then appealed to Senator Frank Church of Idaho, Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, and Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota. Efforts to draft McCarthy were successful, and McCarthy ran as an antiwar candidate in the New Hampshire primary (Herzog 1969).

On March 12, McCarthy won 42% of the primary vote to Johnson's 49%. On March 16, Sen. Edward "Ted" Kennedy announced for president and renounced his earlier support for Johnson. On March 31, Johnson announced that he would not run for re-election.

From that point on, Vice President Hubert Humphrey became the favored candidate of the Democratic establishment. He had the support of President Johnson and was the favorite to win the nomination. Kennedy realized that he would not be able to win enough delegates in primaries to obtain the nomination but hoped that he would be able to sway enough delegates at the convention to deny Humphrey a first-ballot nomination.

Robert Kennedy was assassinated on June 5, 1968. At the time of his death, the committed delegate totals were Humphrey 561, Kennedy 393, and McCarthy 258. Of the remaining 1,385 delegates appointed by politicians or chosen by caucuses, Humphrey received 1,198 (86.5%) of the outstanding delegate votes and easily won the nomination (Holland 1996).

1972 Campaign

Initially, the Democratic Party establishment had supported Sen. Ed Muskie, who was the vice-presidential nominee in 1968. After Muskie withdrew from the race on April 28, 1972, Humphrey became the establishment candidate. Humphrey's primary opposition came from the insurgent campaigns of McGovern and Wallace. Wallace was best known for his segregationist history and for his flamboyant opposition to the school busing of children in order to achieve racial balance in public schools.

Wallace ran what was later described as a "rock star" campaign in which he organized large pro-Wallace rallies throughout the country in the hope of winning primary elections. His efforts were successful; Wallace won several primaries outside of his southern base.

Wallace was shot on May 15, 1972 and confined to a wheelchair, thereby effectively ending his campaign. On the following day primaries were held in Michigan and Maryland, both of which Wallace won. A Gallup poll of Democratic

Party voters conducted from May 1, 1972 to May 15, 1972 found that Wallace and Humphrey were tied at 26%, followed by McGovern at 25% (Our Campaigns 2016).

The McGovern campaign had strong field organization but weak fundraising, raising only $5.45 million during the primaries (Hart 1973). McGovern's field organization was unique in that it encouraged local campaigns and provided them with literature far in advance of their state primaries.

McGovern, who finished second in the popular vote, won seven out of 22 direct primaries, compared to five for Wallace and four for Humphrey. McGovern won the nomination because he had a better understanding of the delegate selection rules, was able to win the majority of caucus states, and because he was able to win "winner-take-all" primaries.

In 1972, 22 states held direct primaries, many with different delegate allocation rules. Seven states held winner-take-all primaries in which the candidate who got the most votes received all of the delegates for that state. Winner-take-all primaries were held in California, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee. Out of 3,014 convention delegates, 725 (24%) were chosen in these seven states. McGovern received the votes of 676 (93%) of the 725 delegates chosen in these seven primaries. Wallace carried Tennessee and received 49 delegate votes (Skelley 2016).

In 1972, both the Wallace and the McGovern campaigns had two important characteristics: a large group of committed supporters, and a shortage of money. The McGovern campaign was the first to recognize the importance of caucus states. Caucus states were easier for insurgent candidates to win because caucus attendees tended to be the most committed activists. Additionally, caucus-state campaigns were much less expensive than direct primaries. As a result, McGovern won nine out of 13 of the caucus states in which delegates were committed to a candidate. In 18 caucuses, all of the elected delegates were uncommitted.

1976 Campaign

The Democratic Party establishment was not able to coalesce around a single candidate in 1976. The 1976 campaign was decided by superior strategy and was not strongly affected by fundraising or field organization.

The Democratic Party eliminated winner-take-all primaries in 1976 and apportioned delegates by the share of the vote for each candidate who received over 20% of the vote. Unfortunately, most candidates did not understand the new system.

Most of the Democratic candidates failed to realize the significance of the increased number of primaries, or the importance of creating momentum by winning the earliest contests. The one candidate who did see the opportunities in the new nominating system was Jimmy Carter, a former state senator and Governor of Georgia. Carter won the nomination because he understood the delegate selection rules and because he devised a strategy to exploit those rules.

Carter's strategy was to run in all of the primaries and caucuses, beginning with the Iowa caucus, thus building momentum by winning "somewhere" each

time primary elections were held. Carter finished second in the Iowa caucuses and won the New Hampshire primary on February 24, proving that a Southerner could win in the North. He defeated George Wallace in the North Carolina primary March 23, thus eliminating his main rival in the South. He defeated Sen. Henry Jackson in Pennsylvania on April 27, and Jackson quit the race. On April 6, Carter won the Wisconsin primary and eliminated Rep. Morris "Mo" Udall as a serious contender.

1980 Campaign

Sen. Ted Kennedy was the insurgent candidate in 1980 when he ran against incumbent President Jimmy Carter. Kennedy received only 37% of the vote and was easily defeated by Carter. Although Kennedy had a strong fundraising base, he lost because he ran against an incumbent, he failed to build a strong field organization, and he announced too late. He announced on November 7, 1979, less than seven months before the last primary on June 3, 1980 (4president.org 2011).

1984 Campaign

In 1984, former vice president Walter Mondale was opposed by the insurgent campaigns of Sen. Gary Hart and Rev. Jesse Jackson. Jackson was the first viable African-American candidate for the Democratic Party nomination, receiving 18.1% of the votes cast. Hart won 17 primaries, Mondale won eight, and Jackson two. In theory, the insurgent campaigns were unsuccessful because they took votes away from one another. In total, insurgent campaigns received more votes than Mondale in ten primaries won by Mondale.

1988 Campaign

In 1988, Gov. Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts was supported by the Democratic establishment. As in 1984, the establishment candidate was opposed by Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson. Hart withdrew from the race on March 12, 1988, leaving Jackson as the only serious opposition to the Dukakis candidacy.

Although Jackson had a good field organization in direct primaries, his campaign suffered from lack of money. Jackson lost the nomination because he announced too late, he failed to win caucus states, and he had inadequate funds (see Tables 2-4). In contrast to previous insurgent campaigns, Jackson won a plurality of delegates in only two out of eleven caucus states (Delaware and Michigan) (Our Campaigns 2016).

1992 Campaign

In 1992, establishment candidate Bill Clinton was opposed by the insurgent campaigns of then-former governor of California Edmund Gerald "Jerry" Brown Jr. and Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa. The latter two were the weakest showings of any of the insurgent campaigns in the study, and Clinton easily won the nomination.

The insurgent campaigns had inadequate funds, and poor or nonexistent field organization, as measured by their performance in caucus states.

Of the 15 caucus states, Clinton won ten, Brown won two, and Harkin won three. Out of $92.05 million raised in the 1992 primary, Clinton raised $44.96 million, Brown $11.31 million, and Harkin $6.03 million. In percentage terms, Brown raised 12.29% of the money and received 20.2% of the vote; while Harkin raised 6.55% of the money and received 1.4% of the vote.

2004 Campaign

In 2004, establishment candidate Sen. John Kerry was opposed by the insurgent campaigns of Sen. John Edwards of North Carolina, former governor Howard Dean of Vermont, Rep. Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, and Rev. Al Sharpton. The most notable of the four campaigns was conducted by Edwards, who received 19.4% of the vote. The four campaigns raised $100 million out of total fundraising of $420 million. Thus, they raised 24.3% of the total funds and received 31.1% of the vote. As with past insurgent campaigns, their loss can be attributed to lack of money and poor field organization.

Their poor field organization is best illustrated by their performance in caucuses. Edwards won the caucus in his home state of North Carolina, but Kerry won the other 18 caucuses (Leip 2012).

2008 Campaign

Figure 3. *Superdelegate Support in the 2008 Campaign*



Hillary Clinton, who was opposed by Sen. Barack Obama, was initially supported by the Democratic Party establishment. In February 2008, Clinton had a lead among superdelegates of approximate 100 delegate votes. By May 2008, her lead among superdelegates had evaporated as the establishment switched their support from Clinton to Obama. Figure 3 shows the level of superdelegate support for the two candidates over time (Silver 2016).

In the direct primaries, Obama received 47.4% of the vote; and Clinton received 48.0%. Obama had superior field organization, as evidenced by his victories in seven out of eight caucuses. Obama was also able to raise more money than Clinton. Obama raised $339.3 million; and Clinton raised $233 million.

Obama won the nomination because his campaign was well funded and had a superior field organization (Obama's campaign raised more money than any previous insurgent campaign).

2016 Campaign

In 2016, Hillary Clinton was again the establishment candidate, and was opposed by Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont. The Sanders campaign received 43.84% of the vote, which was the second-best showing by a single insurgent campaign in the Democratic primary in the period of the study. The success of the Sanders campaign was due to a combination of good field organization and the excellent use of social media, including online fundraising expertise. Sanders had over 8 million followers on three social-media platforms: Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram (Weaver 2018: 102).

As of June 30, 2016, Sanders had raised $235.4 million, or 45.4% of the funds raised by all candidates in the 2016 Democratic primary. (Federal Election Commission 2016) Clinton won 55.2% of the popular vote and defeated Sanders at the Democratic convention by a margin of 2,842 to 1,665, in part due to support from superdelegates. In summary, Sanders raised 45.2% of the money, received 43.8% of the votes cast, but only 36.9% of the votes of delegates.

Although Sanders raised more money than any other insurgent campaign except Obama in 2008, the paper estimates that Sanders may have won the nomination if he had been able to raise still more money and used that money in a more efficient way. Sanders received 0.96% of the vote for every percent of total Democratic Party primary fundraising. In order to win a plurality (49.5%) of the popular vote, Sanders would have needed to raise 47.6% of total Democratic primary fundraising, or approximately $265.9 million. Thus, Sanders would have needed to raise an additional $30.5 million, which would be an increase of almost 13% (265.9/235.4 = 1.1295).

Because a political campaign cannot raise an infinite amount of money, the effectiveness of the money raised depends upon how that money is spent. If more money is spent on rallies or television advertisement, less money will be spent on field organization. Like the Wallace campaigns in 1972 and 1976, the Sanders campaign focused on arranging large public rallies featuring the candidate. These rallies helped the Sanders campaign reach voters and increase turnout, but they resulted in less importance being placed on field organization.

Sanders lost the nomination because of a shortage of money and inadequate field organization. Sanders won 12 out of 18 caucuses, which was the third best showing of the insurgent campaigns in the study. (Andrews et al. 2016).

On April 27, 2016, the Sanders campaign laid off over 40% (225 out of 525) of their field organizers (Freeman et al. 2016). Before the layoffs, Sanders had won 17 out of 42 caucuses and primaries compared to only 5 out of 17 caucuses and primaries after the layoffs. The layoffs also may have had a negative effect on the Sanders campaign's polling numbers as reported by RealClear Politics.

On April 24, 2016, USA Today/Suffolk found that Sanders trailed Clinton by a margin of 45% to 50% nationally. On June 5, 2018, IBD/TIPP found that Sanders trailed Clinton by 37% to 51%; a decline of nine points in just 42 days (RealClear Politics 2016).

The effectiveness of an individual voter contact depends upon how personal that contact is. For this reason, door-to-door canvassing is more effective than a telephone call, although telephone calls can reach more voters per hour.

According to California politician Phil Baldwin, "the Sanders campaign prioritized phone calls rather than door to door campaigning." The Sanders campaign identified undecided voters by phone, whom they then contacted in their door-to-door campaign. In some precincts, this resulted in as few as five households being contacted in person.

Analysis of Hypotheses

The paper hypothesized that most Democratic Party insurgent campaigns have been unsuccessful due to announcing too late, lack of money, and inadequate field organization. The paper provides an analysis of some of these hypotheses below. The paper does not provide regression analysis for these three factors because of a lack of observations.

Announcing too Late

With the exception of the campaigns of Robert Kennedy and George Wallace, insurgent campaigns are typically not as well known as their establishment opposition. They also initially have less financial resources, which means that they are not able to immediately build their candidacy's name recognition via paid media. Insurgent campaigns must build a constituency slowly through grassroots, person-to-person campaigning. Thus, an insurgent campaign ought to benefit from a longer campaign in which it announces earlier.

The paper compares the campaigns of the leading insurgent during each election to the number of days between the candidate's announcement and the last primary of that campaign year. The results show that of the four candidates with the highest number of campaign days, three (McGovern in 1972, Carter in 1976, and Obama in 2008) won the democratic nomination. The 1984 Hart campaign had the third-highest number of campaign days, but it did not win the nomination. As mentioned previously, there were two insurgent campaigns (Gary Hart and

Jesse Jackson) in 1984 that competed for the same votes. In part, the Hart campaign was unsuccessful because of the presence of Jackson in the race. The latter two insurgent campaigns received more votes in 1984 than did Mondale in ten primaries won by Mondale. The results are given in Table 2 below.

Table 2. *Insurgent Campaigns Performance and Number of Campaign Days (1968-2016)*

Candidate	Campaign Days	Percent of Vote
Eugene McCarthy (1968)	194	38.7%
George McGovern (1972)	519	25.3%
Jimmy Carter (1976)	544	40.2%
Ted Kennedy (1980)	179	37.6%
Gary Hart (1984)	481	35.9%
Jesse Jackson (1988)	248	29.4%
Jerry Brown (1992)	232	20.2%
John Edwards (2004)	266	19.4%
Barack Obama (2008)	479	47.4%
Bernie Sanders (2016)	411	43.8%
Average	**355.3**	**33.8%**

Fundraising Deficiencies

Except for the 2008 Obama campaign, insurgent campaigns have raised far less money than have establishment campaigns. The paper compares the percentage of money raised by insurgent campaigns to the percent of the vote that they received in direct primaries.

In the 2016 primary campaign, Sanders raised $235.4 million out of a total of $510.2 million (45.43%) raised by all candidates, and received 43.84% of the vote for a ratio of 0.96. In other words, for every percent of funds raised by Sanders, he received 0.96% of the votes cast in direct primaries. The results are given in Table 3 below.

Table 3. *Insurgent Campaigns Performance and Percent of Money Raised (1972-2016)*

Candidate	Percent of Money	Percent of Vote	Ratio
George McGovern (1972)	26.4%	25.3%	0.96
Jimmy Carter (1976)	32.6%	40.2%	1.23
Ted Kennedy (1980)	39.9%	37.6%	0.94
Gary Hart (1984)	17.6%	35.9%	2.04
Jesse Jackson (1988)	22.1%	29.4%	1.33
Jerry Brown (1992)	12.3%	20.2%	1.64
John Edwards (2004)	7.3%	19.4%	2.66
Barack Obama (2008)	50.5%	47.4%	0.94
Bernie Sanders (2016)	45.4%	43.8%	0.96
Average	**30.10%**	**33.8%**	**1.36**

The paper found that two of the three successful insurgent campaigns were won by the candidates (Carter in 1976 and Obama in 2008) who raised the most money relative to their competitors.

Field Organization

The paper used the performance of insurgent campaigns in caucus states as a proxy for the quality of the campaign's field organization. Caucus states should be easier for insurgent candidates to win because caucus attendees tend to be the most committed activists. Additionally, state caucus campaigns are much less expensive than direct primaries.

Since caucus attendees tend to be activists who are aware of the positions of the candidates, it is often not necessary to spend money on media advertising directed toward them. Field organization is more important in caucus states than in direct primaries, because the process of electing delegates and lobbying uncommitted delegates is a very labor-intensive activity.

Using performance in caucus states as a proxy for field organization quality, the paper found that two of the three successful insurgent campaigns were won by the candidates (McGovern in 1972 and Obama in 2008) with the strongest field organizations. The results are given in Table 4 below.

Table 4. *Insurgent Campaigns Performance in Caucus States (1972-2016)*

Candidate(s)	**Caucus States Won**	**Percent of States Won**
George McGovern (1972)	9/13	69.23%
Jimmy Carter and George Wallace (1976)	3/21	14.29%
Ted Kennedy (1980)	1/14	7.14%
Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson (1984)	11/26	42.31%
Jesse Jackson (1988)	2/11	18.18%
Jerry Brown and Tom Harkin (1992)	5/15	33.33%
John Edwards (2004)	1/17	5.88%
Barack Obama (2008)	14/17	82.35%
Bernie Sanders (2016)	12/18	66.67%
Average		**37.71%**

Analysis of Results

The paper hypothesizes that most United States Democratic Party insurgent campaigns have been unsuccessful due to announcing too late, lack of money, and inadequate field organization. The paper provides evidence to suggest that most insurgent campaigns are unsuccessful because of weaknesses in one or more of those three areas. For example, the 2016 Sanders campaign was fifth in the number of campaign days (Table 2), third in fundraising relative to its competitors (Table 3), and third in field organization (Table 4) as measured by caucus-state performance.

With the exception of the 1968 antiwar campaigns of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, insurgent campaigns have not had the support of a majority of voters in Democratic Party primaries. In order for an insurgent campaign to be successful, there must be one strong insurgent candidate running against multiple centrist candidates. This was not true in 1984, when there were two strong insurgent candidates (Hart and Jackson) running against a single establishment candidate (Mondale). As a result, Mondale won the Democratic Party primary nomination, even though Hart and Jackson combined had more votes than Mondale in ten primaries won by Mondale.

To be successful in future U.S. Democratic Party nomination contests, an insurgent campaign must announce early, have adequate funds, build a strong field organization, and develop a strong social-media presence similar to that of Sen. Bernie Sanders' 2016 campaign.

Conclusion

This paper analyzes presidential campaigns in the United States of America's (U.S.) Democratic Party for the period 1968-2016; reviews books and academic literature; and makes conclusions concerning the success and failure of insurgent campaigns.

The paper hypothesized that most insurgent campaigns have been unsuccessful due to announcing too late, lack of money, and inadequate field organization. The paper provides evidence to suggest that most insurgent campaigns are unsuccessful because of weaknesses in one or more of those three areas. For example, the 2016 Sanders campaign was fifth in the number of campaign days (Table 2), third in fundraising relative to their competitors (Table 3), and third in field organization (Table 4) as measured by caucus-state performance.

Finally, the paper recommends that insurgent campaigns should announce early, have adequate funds, build a strong field organization, and develop a strong social-media presence similar to the 2016 campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Dr. Katarzyna Romańczyk, Ron Knecht (J.D.), and Phil Baldwin (B.A.) for helpful comments and suggestions, and to Gina L. Serman Reid (B.S.), manuscript editor.

References

4president.org (2011) *Ted Kennedy 1980 Presidential Campaign Announcement Speech*. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2ADzoym. [Accessed 22 May 2018].

Andrews A, Bennett K, Parlipiano (2016) *2016 Delegate Count and Primary Results*. New York Times, July 5, 2016. Retrieved from https://nyti.ms/2kF7I4H. [Accessed 23 May 2018].

Federal Election Commission (2016) *Presidential Campaign Finance Summaries*, presreceipts_2016_m7.xls. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2ABJ10q. [Accessed 10 May 2018].

Freeman D, Jansing C, Dann C (2016) *Sanders to Lay Off Staff After Tuesday Primary Losses*. NBC News. Retrieved from https://nbcnews.to/2CRis98. [Accessed 10 May 2018].

Gini C (1912) Variabilità e mutabilità [*Variability and Mutability*]. Cuppini C, Bologna, Italy. Reprinted in Memorie di metodologica statistica, (Ed. Pizetti E, Salvemini T). Rome: Libreria Eredi Virgilio Veschi (1955).

Green D, Gerber A (2000) *Get Out the Vote*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press.

Hart G (1973) *Right from the Start*. New York: Quadrangle.

Herzog A (1969) *McCarthy for President*. New York: The Viking Press.

Holland K (1996) *All the Votes . . . Really*. CNN.com. Retrieved from https://cnn.it/2OXkOdX. [Accessed 21 May 2018].

Inglehart R, Norris P (2016) *Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash*. Harvard Kennedy School, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, August 2016. HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2SzypGh. [Accessed 25 April 2018].

Leip D (2012) *Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2CTrPFu. [Accessed 22 May 2018].

Metrocosm.com (2015) Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2DeI0Or. [Accessed 20 May 2018]

Middleton J, Green D (2008) Do Community-Based Voter Mobilization Campaigns Work Even in Battleground States? Evaluating the Effectiveness of MoveOn's 2004 Outreach Campaign. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3:63-82.

Our Campaigns (2016) *US President – D Primaries*. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2ABUNIl. [Accessed 21 May 2018].

Patterson T (2016) *Pre-Primary News Coverage of the 2016 Presidential Race: Trump's Rise, Sanders' Emergence, Clinton's Struggle*. HKS Working Paper No. 16-023. Retrieved from SSRN: https://bit.ly/2P1nrLQ. [Accessed 14 May 2018].

RealClear Politics (2016) *2016 Democratic Presidential Nomination*. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2QcqiOF. [Accessed 27 May 2018].

Silver N (2016) *Superdelegates Might Not Save Hillary Clinton*. FiveThirtyEight.com. Retrieved from https://53eig.ht/2yFm1fK. [Accessed 22 May 2018].

Skelley G (2016) *The Modern History of the Democratic Presidential Primary 1972-2008.* Sabato's Crystal Ball. University of Virginia Center for Politics. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2P2Lav6. [Accessed 22 May 2018].

State of Nevada (2016) *Controller's Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2017*, background material. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2PE877v. [Accessed 14 May 2018].

Weaver J (2018) *How Bernie Won*. Thomas Dunne Books: New York: St. Martin's Press.

Athens Journal of Social Sciences *Volume 6, Issue 2 – Pages 155-176*

Social Class and Islamic Identity: Chinese Uyghur Students and Working Class in Turkey

By David Makofsky[*]
Bayram Unal[†]
Maimaitijiang Abudugayiti[‡]

Using a sample of Uyghurs in Turkey, we are testing the inclusion of social class, gender and Islamic customary practice on 'modernization theory'. 'Modernization theory', developed in the 1960's by applied social scientists from a Weberian-oriented tradition has had its own shortcoming: it proved to be too general to be useful. By specifying its application to the contemporary Islamic world, we hope to improve its utility. A questionnaire was developed concerning issues raised in the process of the modernization: ethnic identity, the maintenance of customary Muslim community practices, social class and gender differences. A sample is drawn from Uyghur students and professionals in Turkey in the spring of 2015, and then supplemented by visiting a Uyghur refugee camp in Turkey All the respondents were born in Xinjiang, in North West China and most of them were visiting exchange students from China or working-class Uyghur refugees as the situation in Xinjiang worsened after the 2009 uprising. The study compares the distinctive cultural-historical characteristics of Islamic modernization to that of Western modernization.

Keywords: *Muslim China, Muslim Identity, Muslim 'modernization', refugees, social class, Uyghurs*

Uyghurs, 'Modernization' Theory, 'Islamic Liberalism'

There is now widespread interest in an Islamic group in Chinese Central Asia, the Uyghurs (China Digital Times 11/2018). Although the situation in the Xinjiang province of China is increasingly difficult, this study was carried out three years ago in Turkey, and the situation was not so dangerous. Everyone who has been interviewed was born and raised in the Muslim and Turkic speaking area of Uyghur Independent Republic of Xinjiang, one of the northwest provinces of China.

The Uyghurs, together with their close linguistic neighbors, the Uzbeks, are among the most populous of the Turkic speaking Muslim people of Central Asia who live in the vast region of grasslands and mountains that stretch from the Mediterranean to the center of China, Xian. Numbering between 10 and 15 million in the home province and all over the country, the Uyghurs are one of the largest ethnic groups in China. Their nomadic ancestors migrated westward from the Eastern part of Central Asia to what is now contemporary Anatolia over the course

[*]Adjunct Professor, Indiana University Northwest, USA.
[†]Associate Professor, Sociology, Nigde University, Turkey.
[‡]Graduate Student, Ankara University, Turkey.

https://doi.org/10.30958/ajss.6-2-5 doi= 10.30958/ajss.6-2-5

of many centuries, but among those who remained in distinct oasis communities along the Silk Road are the Uyghur Turks. The Uyghur dialect is considered close to 'old Turkish'.

Uyghur civilization itself grew up among the central Asian oasis cities of 'The Silk Road': Aksu, Kashgar, Hoten, and Turfan. Their conversion to Islam was not completed until the Sixteenth century, although the great contribution to the development of Muslim culture was the project of Mahmud Kashgari, (Divan-i Lughat Turk) completed in 1072-1074. Previously, Nestorian Christianity and Buddhism had made significant inroads, although the earliest religions were those of shamanism and of Zoroasterism. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the incorporation of Xinjiang in the 1950's, the PRC made a substantial investment in the region. The province is rich in mineral resources. Xinjiang's economy by today's standards in China is relatively well off, although most Uyghurs are relatively poor by urban South East Chinese standards.

There is a large body of research chronicling the history of the Uyghur - Han (Chinese) relations, which echoes both cooperation and conflict continuing over many centuries and dating back to the construction of the Great Wall. The "conflict" literature documents everyday hostility (Bovington 2002) as well as popular protest on a regular basis (Gladney 1992, Bovington 2002, Millward 2009, Baranovitch 2003). Much of this discontent and mistreatment is available in the writings of the Uyghur scholar, Erkin Emet, who serves as a principle Uyghur voice on matters of ethnic relations in the Uyghur professional community. One of his works is introduced here (2015), but the English source for his work is in broadcasts for Radio Free Asia.

As with many their Muslim neighbors in the Central Asia and the Middle East, Uyghur society is undergoing a change comparable to that described in Europe by the labor historian E.J. Hobsbawm (1989, 1999). The "Dual Revolution" that led to the creation of Modern Europe was that of industrialization and political awakening that appeared in Europe in the 19th Century. Those revolutions spread out to the rest of the world through the processes of trade, war, and imperialism and played an important role in the world wars of the 20th century. What makes frameworks such as those of labor historians important is that they are describing the cultural and psychological process of change, and this is an important issue in the theory of 'modernization'. Hobsbawm, for instance, understood 'revolution' not merely as a change in the state, or government, but a change in a value system, an attitude towards the work, religious behavior, and the family.

Contemporary social transformation in the world of Islam is parallel to these earlier developments - with a critical difference. The arrival of the modernizing revolution in the mid-20th century in the Islamic world (an area much extensive than the Middle East) came to cultures that have been colonized over the past hundred and fifty years. The Western and other powers that threatened Islamic culture were viewed as 'foreign' by the some of the local population, paralleling the relation between the Uyghurs and the 'new' Communist China as they had with the 'old' Qing Dynasty. The role of secularism, a key component to the value change

in Western European experience, has a unique and perhaps more serious obstacle to face in the form of Islamic culture.

Four historical conditions link the Middle Eastern, North African and Uyghur Central Asian modernizing movements:

a. Unlike the Western experience, much of the world of Islam has been ruled by foreign powers - this is the modernization of the colonized either through direct occupation or through the more indirect neo-liberal economic model.
b. Popular protest in the Muslim world occurs in a political environment where there are very few features of what we in the West call 'civil society'. Civil institutions such as newspapers or legal associations independent of the state are relatively weak. Movements that might have a potential for new ideas have little access to the general public.
c. This process of change has come into conflict with customary practices in the Muslim community. Popular conceptions of 'Islamic practice' have been threatened, and that represents a challenge to people's identity as Muslims, and a genuine popular confusion over what happened to the 'world that has been lost'.
d. Although it would appear that secular nationalists represented authentic popular leaders in the post-colonization period after 1950, the tension between secular nationalism and Muslim faith and practice has proven to be far more important than was previously imagined.

In these terms the major focus of attention here is not on Uyghur-Han conflict; rather it is on the Uyghurs as a Muslim group and part of the process of 'Muslim modernization'. The social dynamics was formerly seen through the theoretical lens of the post-World War II world, represented by the 'modernization hypothesis'. This hypothesis incorporated large part of the nineteenth and twentieth century European experience and applied it throughout the world. Unrest, unhappiness, and the discontent of the poor - the cause of the problem and its solution were political and economic in nature. The introduction of the capitalist economy and its distinctive specialization of labor represented a new mode of production that unsettled the previous economic order. Political unrest grew out of the rise of a 'new classes' (organized workers, businessmen) demanding representation and the anticipation of democratic freedoms - see Hobsbawm's (1989, 1999, 2004) writings on the European experience.

The modernization hypothesis incorporated a view of change in attitudes. Three types of 'personality types' or 'outlooks' were associated with these changes - 'traditional', 'transitional' and 'modern'. Postmodernist critics of this approach to 'modernism' claim that this approach to identity, typified by Daniel Lerner (1958) represents a relatively static and 'essentialist' approach to identity that is not consistent with the situation of Muslims (Gest 2015:1873). The attitudinal feature most associated with modernity was "empathy", that is, the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation. (Lerner 1958: 49). Empathy, then, would lead the person to desire the lifestyles and values exercised in those far-away lands, and

Western 'modernization'-ists are held to be secular equivalents of Christian missionaries.

The application of the 'modernization hypothesis' began with the study of Arab, and Turkish societies in the Mesopotamian area after World War One, but also involved the Muslim peoples of Central Asia as part of the revolutionary events in Russia and China. Political conflicts after World War One (July 1914-November 1918) led to the establishment of modern Turkey and the creation of European-administered colonies in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. Similarly, after World War II (September 1939-August 1945) 'native' military leaders in Egypt Iraq and Syria led nationalist movements governed the state through modern secular organizations. In the Middle East the army, Muslim and secular, was at the center of this process. These movements resembled in some form the movements that laid the foundation for the Western European states of the 19th century. The military nationalist regimes were and to a large extent have remained single party 'republics', authoritarian but committed to economic development and the extension of public education and welfare. In Central Asia the Muslim people were remote from the urban centers and viewed the new revolutionary governments with some skepticism.

Empathy and Secularism: Muslim Liberalism

An American sociologist with a Muslim background, Mansoor Moaddel, made the following observation distinguishing between Muslim experiences in various settings. Moaddel contrasted two types of Islam (1999: 108-109):

> "From the nineteenth century on, Europeans and their westernized allies in the Islamic countries have predominantly condemned Islam for its mistreatment of women. The responses of the Islamic scholars have been diverse. In Islamic fundamentalism, there is an outright attack on the West for its cultural 'decadence' and sexual promiscuity. (Muslim) Women are instructed to cover their bodies from head to toe with the exception of the face."

"In contrast, a group of modernist Muslim theologians, notably in India and Egypt around the turn of the century (1900), advanced a modernist exegesis of the Quran, arriving at an Islamic feminist conception of gender relations. These scholars championed women's rights to education and involvement in social affairs, questioned the existing restrictions on women, criticized men's attitudes and behavior toward women and rejected polygamy."

Moaddel (1999: 111) argued that liberalism in Egypt and India was made possible by the decline of the old Islamic elite. "As a result, the requisite social resources and space for new culture production were provided, a pluralistic discursive field emerged, and the growth of Islamic modernist discourse was made possible".

Liberal Muslim thought cannot be understood as limited to the condition of women. It involves the rethinking and reformulation of an entire set of cultural values. Secularism and rationalization involve the reforming of institutions to train

a professional class. Although Moaddel refers to Egypt and India, its impact can be felt throughout the world of Islam.

Study Group, Methodology

A sample of Uyghurs was used to investigate the identity formation through a psychological framework employed in the study of Muslims in Europe (Gest 2015). The framework uses a "postmodernist" approach to identity formation. The investigation reported here follows two years of research in the Uyghur home region of Xinjiang - see Makofsky, (2013, 2014). It is not possible to systematically sample Uyghurs in Xinjiang province in China, since the police make it difficult to talk to ordinary citizens.

Almost all of the Uyghur students in Turkey for that year that were associated with the Uyghur welfare associated were sampled, and so there was no systematic exclusion, and a questionnaire was administered. The questions dealt with attitudes towards secularism, national identity, and attitudes towards customary Muslim practice in their community, the Xinjiang Autonomous Province in China.

A comparison to the attitudes of working-class Uyghurs was desired, and to obtain that we approached those who headed a large Uyghur refugee camp near Kayseri in Anatolia. Some historical context should be given: The new China' had been established in 1949, but in the weeks around July 5, 2009, there was a Uyghur uprising in factories and eventually in Urumqi, the capitol of Xinjiang province (Millward, 2009). Disturbances have continued, and the situation has been termed a 'limited war' by the Mercator Research Center on China (Julienne, et al. 2015). All of those questioned were Chinese citizens now in Turkey. The situation has deteriorated to the point where it is reported that there are hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs held in "re-education camps" back in China (China Digital Times 11/2018).

One part of the sample is from the better educated children of Uyghur society, attending college and/or doing graduate or professional work. In general, their parents probably lacked these educational opportunities because it was not until this generation that modern higher education (high school, college, university) extended to Xinjiang. All in the sample are in touch with Uyghur support organizations in Turkey, and all are of the Muslim faith. This is a convenience sample and, there is no way to determine if these exchange students and longer-term residents were representative of the population of young Uyghur college students in China or any defined population. The Uyghur support organization helped distribute the questionnaire to students from China visiting Turkey and young Uyghur professionals living in Turkey. Most of the respondents were in their twenties. Nearly every Uyghur who was in touch with the organization in the spring of 2015 was asked to fill out the questionnaire; some were interviewed in person afterwards.

The other group in the sample were Uyghur refugees in Kayseri, a city in central Turkey that houses a large refugee camp run by the Uyghur support organization. Immediately after the revolt of 2009 this camp was established.

Some have left the camp, more have come, and now there are more than 2000 Uyghurs in the Kayseri camp. Originally most of those in Kayseri were Uyghur factory and construction workers living in migrant worker camps and tents in Urumqi.

Data gathered in Kayseri among working class refugees was not easy to obtain. Our Uyghur assistant associated with Professor Erkin Emet helped gather more than 50 people after a Friday (Cuma) group prayer at the mosque. The questionnaires were distributed, and the questions were read one by one. But when the questionnaires were collected, it was found that many of the refugee respondents did not fill them out correctly. For example, many of them filled in all four answers for a single question. They knew which answer they wanted to choose, but they didn't understand how to mark the answer. Some people left some questions blank. So, the interviewer stayed there for a few hours, and let respondents make corrections. There are obvious limitations to this approach, but the fact is that attitudes of the working class are central to the process we are describing.

Who Is Being Surveyed? Demographic Characteristics of the Three Groups

Uyghur Kayseri (refugee) male - there were 52. The sole female in the group, a teen aged girl, was excluded since one finding of this investigation is that significant gender differences exist.

Uyghur male students - there were 54 gathered in Ankara and Istanbul in the spring of 2015 and more were gathered in 2016.

Uyghur female students there are 30 gathered in Ankara and Istanbul in the spring of 2015 and more were gathered in 2016.

Age

Kayseri (refugee) males: The median age is 29 years. The range includes 5 in their young teens and 2 in their 50's.

Uyghur student males: Of the 54 gathered in 2015 the youngest was a 16-year-old, the median age was 25 and there is one fellow in his 40’s. Most are in their 20's.

Uyghur student females: Of the 30 gathered in 2015 there were two teen-agers, and one woman over 30. The median age is 24. This is a very homogeneous group.

Questions Raised by the Data

Attitudes towards 'Islam' - Muslim Customary Practice - Where are the Secularists?

What is 'Islam' - the definition being used here is the adherence to customary Islamic practice relative to their community.

The first set of questions sets forth the first paradox - every respondent appears to follow Islamic customary practice

Table 1. *Question: 15. I Will Only Eat Hallal Food (% in row)*

Category	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
Refugee males	51 (98.08)	0	1 (1.92)	52
Student males	54 (100)	0	0	54
Student females	28 (93.33)	1 (3.33)	1 (3.33)	30

Table 2. *Question 5. I Will Only Marry a Muslim (% in row)*

Category	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
Refugee males	51 (98.08)	0	1 (1.92)	52
Student males	44 (83.02)	7 (13.21)	2 (3.77)	53
Student females	28 (93.33)	1 (3.33)	1 (3.33)	30

Table 3. *Question17. I Do Not Drink Beer or Alcoholic Beverages (% in row)*

Category	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
Refugee males	51 (98.08)	0	1 (1.92)	52
Student males	52 (96.30)	2 (3.70)	0	54
Student females	28 (93.33)	1 (3.33)	1 (3.33)	30

Table 4. *Question 22. I Always Fast During Ramadan (Razi) (% in row)*

Category	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
Refugee males	50 (96.15)	0	2 (3.85)	52
Student males	47 (87.04)	4 (7.41)	3 (5.56)	54
Student females	27 (93.1)	1 (3.45)	1 (3.45)	29

Statistical Significance

In Tables 1-4, the agreement of respondents in this community towards issues central to Islamic practice is in only one case less than 90%. This, in itself, is a remarkable finding.

This is not a group of Wahhabi imams from Saudi Arabia or orthodox Hassidic Jews in Rockland County, New York. The Kayseri refugees aside, this is a group of Chinese college and graduate students in their teens and twenties getting degrees in Ankara and Istanbul. All of them were raised in a secular culture in a secular country, the Peoples Republic of China. Although some may have been brought up in the small towns of Xinjiang, most of them have spent at least one year in Beijing, Shanghai, Ankara, or Istanbul, and have been exposed to bars, strip clubs, pornography, and U.S. influenced media, which is exhibited in

shopping malls worldwide. The young men watch action movies, such as the Fast and the Furious; the young women have favorite movies such as The Devil Wears Prada or Titanic.

To make things even more curious, it should be pointed out that, despite what the respondents appear to be saying, these Muslim norms are not regularly practiced. Uyghur boys boast about going out with Chinese or Turkish girls (re: I will only marry a Muslim). In Kashgar some Uyghur restaurants open for breakfast during Ramadan (re: I always fast during Razi). Often, respondents, especially male, will say that they once drank, but now they do not. Especially outside of Xinjiang women may not wear head covering at all.

This highlights the distinctive character of the expressed attitude towards Islam. The "postmodern" psychological approach highlights the fluidity of identity formation (Gest 2015:1874). Rather than fitting into categories of "more secularist", which would be classified as 'transitional' in the approach termed "modernism" the real issue here is ethnic identity. Acknowledging Islamic practice is what makes the respondents "Uyghur"; otherwise, they are simply "Chinese". Even if they do not follow Islamic codes, they feel they must say that they do. It can be conjectured that these responses have more to do with Muslim identity rather than a description of individual practice. As we will see, such responses are given by Uyghurs in Turkey, by Arabs in Europe, and even by Muslim youth in their homelands. Responses such as these cannot be taken at face value since Islamic customary practice is not followed all the time, and yet violation of normative values may not constitute hypocrisy.

Among working class Muslim youth in Europe, Julian Gest (2015: 5) observes: "identity formation is a process. It is therefore important to use investigative methods that examine individuals' deliberative considerations as they make everyday choices in real time. In listening individuals' descriptions of their deliberations and choices regarding identity, it is possible to fathom how they understood the relationships among their different identifications and how they consciously and unconsciously attempted to transform or redefine these relationships in order to create a more coherent identity."

That coherent identity, in a changing world, is called "Islam". The form taken by that identity is the adherence to Islamic customary practice, and if that is the case there is only limited room for secularism.

Just as Questions I-IV are 'easy to answer', because the respondents certainly know the 'correct answer', other questions show less unified patterns.

Attitudes towards Women and towards Islamic Liberalism

Table 5. *Question 4. Women Should Only Dress In An Islamic Way* (% in row)

Category	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Total**
Refugee males	50 (98.04)	1 (1.96)	0	51
Student males	41 (77.36)	8 (15.09)	4 (7.55)	53
Student females	18 (62.07)	9 (31.03)	2 (6.09)	29

Statistical Significance

Question 4 prob (refugee males agree) <= prob (student females agree) <=. 001.
Question 4 prob (student males agree) <= prob (student females agree) <=. 01.

There is a statistically significant difference between refugee Uyghur men and student Uyghur women representing the poles of Islamic fundamentalism / conservatism and Islamic liberalism There is also a statistically significant difference between student Uyghur men and student Uyghur women. Women are significantly more liberal with regards to customary dress practice.

When female respondents are questioned about this question, some saw it in a distinctive way. One young woman responded: "The Chinese do not allow us to wear headscarves in school." The Chinese government had given a great deal of publicity to the fact that the French do not allow headscarves for girls. Another female respondent had heard that French law limiting the use of Muslim head covering and asked what all of that had to do with Uyghurs. This is the issue, the sentiment expressed that to oppose Islamic dress for women is to betray the Uyghur cause. For these women, instead of the choice being framed as Islam against secularism, it was framed in national/ethnic terms as Chinese authorities imposing a choice on Muslim schoolgirls.

Table 6. *Question 20. The Proper Place for Women is in the Home, with the Family (% in row)*

Category	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
Refugee males	46 (90.2)	4 (7.84)	1 (1.96)	51
Student males	34 (62.96)	10 (18.52)	10 (18.52)	54
Student females	12 (40.0)	8 (26.67)	10 (33.33)	30

Statistical Significance

Question 20 prob (refugee males agree) <= prob (student females agree) <=. 001.
Question 20 prob (student males agree) <= prob (student females agree) <=. 01.

Refugee Uyghur males represent the most fundamentalist / conservative group in Islamic terms, Uyghur student women most liberal group in Islamic terms.

Student Uyghur males are more conservative in Islamic terms than Uyghur student females.

Lipset (1981: 92) surmised that two ideological elements prevailed "in the poorer strata everywhere"

> "The first element was a complex of attitudes … referred to as economic liberalism i.e., the opinion that income, status, and power should be redistributed more equally in society, that government policies to establish this redistribution were desirable, that the government should introduce a graduated tax system, and that trade unions should become more powerful. The second element was another complex of attitudes that could be labeled non-economic conservatism, including the opinion that civil liberties ought to be restricted in general and for deviant groups in particular, that government policies should be anti-internationalist and pro-nationalist, and that the government should conduct a restrictive immigration policy."

Based on the historic Western experience, it is generally believed that the section of the population with lower income and less education possess the authoritarian attitudes that might attract them to fundamentalism. In the late 1950's Lipset published a well-known article Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism. His central thesis is that the working class (or the poor, the farmers, etc.), more than other social classes, is predisposed to authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. Although there has been much criticism of this thesis, it is often held that education and not social class seems to be the most important factor in determining authoritarianism (Dekker and Ester 1987).

The definition of Muslim liberalism deals with the relation of women to customary practice in Table 5 and 6, Customary practices in the Muslim communities in China and in Turkey affect women's dress and social behavior.

Certain facts stand out from the responses to 'women dressing in an Islamic way'.

a. Islamic conservative/fundamentalist attitudes are related to agreement to the very judgmental questions 4 and 20, and there is a consistent pattern of conservative/fundamentalist -to-liberal beginning with refugee males followed by student males, with the most liberal being student females.
b. Within the student group there is a statistically significant difference between males and females concerning conservative/fundamentalism and liberalism. Uyghur young men seem to feel much more strongly about the necessity of Islamic dress for women, that is, they are more conservative towards Islam.

These women are a critical part of the generation of Muslim community 'modernization'. That is, they are in their twenties, they are too old to be told what to do and what to think. In today's Xinjiang, today’s China, the generation of women being interviewed is older than the young adolescents married out of primary and middle school only a few decades ago. There are anecdotes from interviews to suggest girls remain in school to avoid 'early teen’ arranged marriages, and therefore marry in their twenties. The older the girl, the more the evolved customary practice of arranged marriage works against young men. In Xinjiang, arranged marriage also include a 'bride price', and poorer Uyghur boys are at a definite disadvantage; an older girl may believe she has more options than

accepting the male of her parents' choice. A young man may have to remain unmarried if his family has no money, and the younger and more attractive women are all married away.

Young men may be reluctant to marry a woman who may be perceived as being of higher status than they are. Some of these young men who were opposing arranged marriage may be boys unable to meet a good bride price and are seeing all their attractive female acquaintances married.

The right to work in outside-the-home employment, freedom of dress, the rights of the individual vs. parental control, the right to determine their own future are values that are pervasive, but not necessarily observed, in the West. These values are challenged by customary practice in the Muslim community in Xinjiang.

The few young men that discussed this framed it in a different manner. Young women should dress in an Islamic way - it was not simply a matter of the Chinese, but a matter of Islam. In any case, young men appear to be more in agreement that young women should dress in conformity with what they believe is Muslim practice. The paradox of all this is that in women's fashion in urban areas of Xinjiang such as Urumqi, which is North East Xinjiang and very Chinese, there is an intermingling of Islamic and Western ('Chinese') dress in almost all the public areas, such as the bazaar, the street, and in fast food restaurants. It is common to see women walking together, one in a Uyghur hijab and the other in what we might call 'Western/Chinese' clothes - although almost no Muslim woman wears form-fitting clothes.

Whether Muslim men are in China or in Europe, researchers find that men want to explore the "other" (Gest 2015:1876). Perhaps this is a special challenge, because the men want their wives to follow a "strict Islamic way". This may conform to the followers of postmodernist identity theory, that the Muslim men want the best of both the "traditional" and the "modern" types – a modern woman and an Islamic wife. Is this an example of a transition personality in identity, or is this an example of the fluidity of personality in the modern Muslim male?

Question 20, concerning employment outside the home raises many serious issues. Upon questioning, a few Uyghur female respondents simply did not want to work and hoped to find a suitable mate to support them. More important, once respondents are interviewed, it was found that questions of female employment are closely tied to two related questions - Do you want to live in Xinjiang? Do you want to live close to your parents? Obviously if women move to Beijing or Shanghai, they are more likely to find professional employment, live much further from community control, and much less likely to be subject to customary practice.

The problem of questioning this sample is that the response of young Uyghur college women is that they want and expect to find work commensurate with their education. In Xinjiang, for educated women urban employment may include teaching in college or grade school, office work, or translation work (Chinese to Uyghur, or reverse) for government agencies.

If a young woman prefers to live close to parents or in-laws, an affirmative answer means that their employment opportunities are very limited. This is especially true outside Urumqi, the provincial center of the government and the

site of two major universities, the Art Institute, etc. Thus, one frequent response of educated Uyghur young women is that they want to live in Urumqi, and not in their hometown.

Working class employment for young men and women may include factory work. Based on conversations, it seemed clear to me that educated young women do not want to find factory employment. In China, it is an achievement to graduate from high school, although many do. In the past, especially for Uyghurs, high school graduation was rare. Wives of artisans and shopkeepers may work at home in needlecrafts, or in small shops, which also employ family members.

Let's try to understand what the male respondents may be driving at:

The questionnaires and interviews occurred during a national election in Turkey, and one young Uyghur male, referring to the question of female employment, made reference to what was considered to be a major event in the campaign. The popular Turkish 'Islamic' politician Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a statement to the effect that he had grown up with the Koran and lived with the Koran. 'This is an important thing to understand,' the young man explained. "Islamic teaching tells us that no man should see even the eyes of a faithful Muslim wife. At the least when a Muslim woman works, she does not work away from the eyes of her husband."

This narrative goes a long way to explain what some conservative Islamic oriented men might take to be the meaning of the question. Uyghur homes in suburban and rural Xinjiang are centers of economic activity. Uyghur residences have ample space for small domestic animals such as sheep, goats and chickens. Livestock is raised and traded and sold for a profit or may be slaughtered and sold for barbeque meat at a bazaar or on the street. At the bazaar a customer can find home produced goods, wrapped candy, handmade *doppas* (Uyghur caps).

Some young men are not saying that women should not work, rather, women should not GO TO work, they should work in the home and have the husband sell the product at the market. At times women sit in the market on blankets, not in regular stalls, and one day a week at the market may be exempted for this general rule of Islamic practice. In an interview with a wood products craftsman, his wife stayed at home and painted the products. Any citizen of China can attend Chinese language elementary, secondary, and university level schools, but in Xinjiang province there are regular schools up to the college level offering instruction in Uyghur.

To say, however, that women should not work away from the supervision of a husband or family member means that modern forms of employment are not available to women. This may limit opportunities in office or white-collar employment involving clerical-sales tasks and may limit professional employment in teaching or government work. For poorer families, this would limit female factory work, although this may not be practical.

National Tradition versus Islam

Uyghur and Muslim, Uyghur or Muslim?

Table 7. *Question1. Nowruz is not Muslim, so it cannot be celebrated by Uyghurs (% in row)*

Category	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
Refugee males	26 (52.0)	4 (8.0)	20 (40.0)	50
Student males	20(37.04)	9 (16.67)	25 (46.3)	54
Student females	12(40.0)	8 (26.67)	10 (33.33)	30

Statistical Significance

Question 1 prob (refugee males agree) <= prob (student females agree) <=. 05.
Question 1 prob (refugee males agree) <= prob (student males agree) <=. 05.

The refugee Uyghur Males are significantly are significantly more likely than the students to be 'Islamically conservative' - to support a more 'Islamic' rather than 'nationalist' and 'non-Islamic' interpretation of Uyghur history.

It may appear that Uyghur respondents very much wanted to create an identity that unifies Muslim customary practice and idealized vision of the Uyghur past. To make this an image of contemporary Uyghur identity is admirable, yet when young Uyghurs get down to specifics, this unity runs into a great deal of difficulty.

Among the festival days celebrated by the Uyghurs, Nowruz is different from the others; it is not an Islamic holiday. Nowruz is the ancient holiday of Central Asia, traditionally associated with Zoroaster, the famous holy man of Central Asia, who represents a pre-monotheistic philosophy of science and natural religion. For the large number of Central Asian people that follow this tradition of the zodiac, the year begins with the New Day when the Sun leaves the sign of Pisces and enters the sign of Aries, during the Vernal Equinox. This is all pre-Islamic.

The Uyghur ancestors were part of the people who adopted Shamanism and early Central Asian religions, and then followed Nestorian Christianity and Buddhism before the arrival of Islam in the Eighth century. The ties to pre-Islamic faith are rooted in popular culture. This is one of the cases where classifications such as "traditional" and "modern" follow conventional lines of identity formation, since if we maintain that rigid identification with Islam is "traditional" then the working class is a somewhat more traditional than the more educated students. Despite this, a sizable proportion of the refugees defend the folk holiday from a non-Islamic tradition.

National Traditions vs. Islam

Figure 1. *Ghazi Ahmet,* Meshrep - *Title and Artist not identified in the Questionnaire*

Source: https://bit.ly/2zFrHHh.

Table 8. *Question 29. This (Figure 1) is not Muslim - It Is Not a Proper Uyghur Painting (% in row)*

Category	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Total**
Refugee males	22 (43.14)	5 (9.80)	24 (47.06)	51
Student males	16 (29.63)	14 (25.93)	24 (44.44)	54
Student females	6 (20.69)	7 (24.14)	16 (55.17)	29

Statistical Significance

Question 29 prob (refugee males agree) <= prob (student females agree) <=. 001.
Question 29 prob (student males agree) <= prob (student females agree) <=. 01.

There are statistically significant differences between student females and refugee marks and to a lesser extent between student females and student males. In both cases women are more 'Islamically liberal', and the students as a whole are more "Islamically liberal" than the male refugees.

Table 9. *Question 30 I would be happy to have this painting (Figure 1) in my home (% in row)*

Category	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
Refugee males	10 (19.23)	7 (13.46)	35 (67.31)	52
Student males	22 (40.74)	14 (25.93)	18 (33.33)	54
Student females	11 (37.93)	13 (44.83)	5 (17.24)	29

Statistical Significance

Question 30 prob (refugee males agree) >= prob (student females agree) <=. 05.
Question 30 prob (refugee males agree) >= prob (student males agree) <=. 05

The refugee Uyghur Males are significantly are significantly more likely than the students to be 'Islamically conservative' - to support a more fundamentalist interpretation of the national history

What happens when Uyghur culture is inconsistent with Islam? This is asked in a question concerning Nowruz, a holiday, and in a question about a painting of a Uyghur celebration, Ghazi Ahmet's *Meshrep* (party) (see Figure 1, Table 8, 9). The problem with Figure I is the woman in the center of the painting. From her clothes, and from the dress and instruments of the men, this is clearly a Uyghur painting

In Figure 1 we see the work of a Uyghur modernist painter, Ghazi Ahmet. From a Uyghur tradition where the human figure, and especially the female body, is not shown in a painting, Uyghur modernist works are provocative. This painting has caused controversy since it was created. A *Meshrep* is a traditional party. This painting is well known internationally and was exhibited in Europe, but it still evokes criticism from the Uyghur respondents who see it as 'not Muslim'.

As in the previous discussion of identity, there is a great deal of tension in reconciling conservative Muslim values when these are in direct conflict with secular national identity. The painting is clearly not Muslim but was painted by a Uyghur and depicts a Uyghur celebration. As one student said, "Anyone who does not respect this painting does not know anything about our (Uyghur) history."

Uyghur Attitudes on Islam Compared to other Studies of Muslim 'Attitudes'

The object of this study is to consider how modernization theory, developed from the European experience, can be appreciated with the examination of the Muslim experience. Consider the questions that the interviews raised:

Uyghur Attitudes towards 'Islam' - Muslim customary practice -Where are the Secularists?

What does it mean to say, "I follow the basic tenets of Islam and customary practice"? Respondents often admit that some of these customs are not followed,

but that is not the point. As one of Julian Gest's (2015) respondents said: "Islam simplifies. It's all about unification ... I am a Muslim. Not a Barelwi, Tablighi Jamaat, Salafi, Hanafi or whatever. I'm a Muslim. I'm not British or Bengali. I'm Muslim."

In the Western European experience, the modernizing states were the ruling powers and the same situation exists in China despite the ideology of the Chinese revolution. The 'third world' Muslims in both settings do not find they are participating in the world of events as a 'full citizen', whose models are available through decades of films and television. By this Twenty First century, many of those involved personally know or certainly have heard of those who find jobs either in major cities in their own country or in other countries. In that senses, all are refugees, a stranger in a new world deciding how much to accept of Islam and Islamic customary practice.

So Asef Bayat comments on the Arab Spring of 2011 (page 590):

> "After having to make do with failing secular regimes and having turned to popular Islamic parties ... Islamist politics was such an unrivalled trend prior to the uprisings that, for many observers and policy makers, any real challenge to the despotic regimes would unleash Islamist revolutions in the region. Contrary to expectations, this was not the case. Surprisingly, the Arab revolts espoused the kind of aura, idioms, culture and constituencies that radically distinguished them from the earlier Islamist movements."

Again, Bayat: "Just as all do not follow the customary practice, it may even be a characteristic of our times that customary practice has more salience in the lives of Muslims. Many protestors appeared to deploy religious rituals (such as praying in streets and squares), utilizing religious times (Fridays) and places (like mosques); but these religious rituals are all part of the regular doings of all pious Arabs who perform them in everyday life, rather than carrying them out to Islamize the uprisings."

Secularism is a process as well as a philosophy. That is, secular elites may control education, but these same elites may not be secular humanists. Isaac Newton, one of the principal actors in the secularization of scientific investigation in England, was a devout Christian. It may also be said that secular humanism offers very little for the masses. It does not structure the time, the day, the place, and the holidays for those who wish a comprehensive faith, and Islam does exactly that.

From the writings on the of another investigator of contemporary Muslim identity, Juan Cole (2015: 275), the major parties of the states involved in the Arab Spring, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria began by offering freedom and an increased standard of living to the masses. Over the course of time the leadership in these states had become 'Republican Monarchs', leading corrupt administrations with weak legitimacy.

"Secularism", for a young Muslim often means a betrayal of ethnicity, not simply a refusal to respect religious practice. Depending on his/her relation to the dominant culture, the Muslim may be risking physical health or life career by their

behavior. Rather than "fitting in" to an identity construct, the adjustment is constantly being negotiated. This is the major problem with "modernizing" theory as originally formulated. The researcher wants to classify while the individual actually "negotiates". In the sense of identity as negotiation, women are much better served by "liberalism", they obtain much more freedom, especially with the abandonment of teen aged arrange marriages.

Uyghur Attitudes towards Women and Islamic Liberalism, they obtain more Freedom of Action

Just as those who created 'modernization theory failed to appreciate the impact of the colonial experience and the weaknesses of secular leadership over time, similarly the resilience and deep-rootedness of the patriarchal culture was not appreciated. Seven decades after the victories of secular regimes in the Muslim world finds women's participation in the workforce restricted, and parentally arranged marriages taking place while girls were in their young teens (although this has changed a great deal).

Again, Gest (2015: 185): makes the following observation "Social discourse about Muslims and Islam has been dominated by the promulgation of images portraying an irreconcilably foreign and illiberal group of young men and suppressed women to characterize a religion that is arguably more ethno culturally heterogeneous than any other. Such imagery has been, to a large extent, the product of reactionary efforts to construct and root simplistic essentialisms amid – and also because of – the perception that Islam is competing with national identities." Yet as we saw in the surveys, among the Uyghurs, that the attitudes and behavior of women represent the unspoken face of challenge to Muslim conservatism - everyone seems to be concerned about what Muslim women wear, whether or not the continue with their education, who they date, who they marry, when they marry - the behavior of males is of no interest at all.

In Turkey, there is a burgeoning feminist movement and there is a body of self-reflecting feminist thought (Alemdaroglu 2015:59): "I have many men around me. I know they are interested in me, but I do not think of any of them seriously. Having a serious relationship seems nonsense. Why should dating somebody bring more restrictions? Why would I want that? I see a lot of contradictions. Men want to keep the traditional values alive. I challenge their expectations in many ways. I have started to think that to tolerate that mentality is very meaningless... As women become more educated and get high-status jobs, they refuse to be as submissive as their mothers. However, it takes time for men to realize that women are no longer village girls or high- school graduates."

Although the responses of women in the survey were significantly more liberal than that of the man the Arab urban societies, as Cole points out (2015: 271) too often, in corrupt Arab societies such as Egypt and Tunisia, issues such as feminism are the hallmark of the wives of the political elites -it is often necessary to uncouple feminism from Suzanne Mubarak or Leila Ben Ali.

Among European migrants we find that perceptions of discrimination were found to also contribute to a strengthened Muslim identity between European-born

Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in urban areas of Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Just 2014: 128), although there is some evidence that this relationship weakens when childhood religious socialization is taken into account. Similarly, interviews with Muslim women in France showed that the majority of second-generation Muslim women chose to wear the veil as a reaction to the debates over headscarves in public spaces (Just 2014: 130).

National Tradition versus Islam

Uyghur and Muslim, Uyghur or Muslim?

If there is one area of debate in which the Muslim world faces its greatest challenge, it is in the conflict between Islam and national (secular) traditions. Are we seeing another stage of change after the "secular monarchies" and populist Islam? Is this world now affected by what Asef Bayat terms both a 'post-Islamist orientation' and a 'non-movement' movement (2013: 589)?

"Since the 1980s, activism had remained limited to traditional party politics, a tired method that lost much of its efficacy and appeal by the mid-2000s. Radical Islamists had resorted to Leninist-type underground organizations; student activism was forced to remain on campus; laborers, going beyond conventional organizations, launched wild-cat strikes; middle-class professionals resorted to NGO work; and all embraced street politics when permitted, for instance during demonstrations in support of the Palestinian cause. But the vast constituencies of the urban poor, women, youth and others resorted to "non-movements" — the non-deliberate and dispersed butcontentious practices of individuals and families to enhance their life chances. The urban poor made sure to secure shelter, consolidate their communities, and earn a living by devising work in the vast subsistent and street economy. Muslim women strove to assert their presence in public, go to college, and ensure justice in courts. And youths took every opportunity to affirm their autonomy, challenge social control and plan for their future, even though many remained atomized and dreamed of migrating to the West."

Certainly, Juan Cole seems to agree with this evolutionary hypothesis. In his work on "The New Arabs", Cole observes a transition from the traditional monarchies, to the republican monarchies - of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, Libya. This authoritarian cycle has been disrupted by the rise of a group he calls "the new left", an alliance between a young new force of educated urbanites and a working class that sees no point of a blind allegiance to "old leadership". Cole's framework is not as amorphous as that of Bayat, since he sees in the Egyptian (failed) revolution and the Tunisian (successful) revolution the basis for a new social-political constituency in Muslim politics.

What is interesting about all of this is the unseen shifting of "non-ideological" support of the "street", first behind the secular regimes, then behind the Islamic parties, then behind the Islamic-secularist response.

Very similar attitudes can be seen in the Uyghur sample. On matters dealing with secular affairs and national ethnic identity, the educated group of men and

women are more uniformly secular and question the "conservative Islamic" stance. The working class on these issues is more divided, and the entire discussion drifts in a more liberal and secular direction.

The Hesitant Liberals

Uyghur Muslim identity is hardly fixed or adequately described by references to what is 'essential' to Islamic identity. As in Europe and the Middle East, some part of Uyghur identity is formed by the negative element in what has become what many believe to be their colonial experience under the Chinese. In the Middle East, continual military intervention of European/US imperial powers and now of Saudi/Gulf State or Iranian forces play a large part in creating indifference towards 'Western' values. For the Uyghurs, this negativity is not a fixed trait of identity, since there are many instances of extensive Uyghur cooperation with the Chinese government. A report on the affirmative action program in the PRC (Makofsky, 2014) documents the extensive efforts in the field of education and employment that have become an important component that has shaped Uyghur intellectual and professional life.

For the Muslims themselves, looking at the evidence, two generalities can be made concerning Islamic identity. The first is that there is a tacit alliance between Muslim males, educated or not, to retain separate and unequal spheres of influence between men and women, and to insist that this is 'natural' and that this is 'what women want'. A systematic look at the many studies -there is a Turkish feminist movement and I have cited two examples (Alemdaroğlu 2015, Just 2014) - would convince anyone that the application of Muslim customary tradition is neither 'natural' nor is it 'what women want' since it is hardly clear exactly what it is that Muslim women want. The 'post modernist approach to identity' itself denies that any set of choices are more 'natural' than any other.

The second major issue that faces Muslims is the conflict between secular and national tradition and that of the tenets of Islam. Despite the successes of 'Islamic populism' with the Muslim Brotherhood and Erdogan's AKP party in Turkey, it is a big step to imagine educated support for Islamic conservatism/ fundamentalism. In terms of Islamic conservatism, the educated classes, men and women, have too much respect for the historic gains of ethnic secularism and nationalism, and the working class itself is quite divided on these matters. As Gest points out in his study, there is a strong desire on the part of many Muslims to see nationalism and Islam proceed together. In the Middle East, this occurred both among the Shi'a supporting the Iranian Revolution and the Sunni supporting the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the refugee sample and the student sample, we see communities of young Uyghurs who are inclined towards the fulfilment of "Islamic" identity forms (I will only marry a Muslim, I eat only halal food) even as they pursue ostensibly more liberal European or Chinese lifestyles. The students interviewed exhibited a concern with following an authentic brand of Islam, but also a clear desire for breaking away from the strictures of faith. The refugees expressed a more rigid

perception of Islam, that they would always remain essentially Uyghur and Muslim in their self-reflection and practice, but it is difficult to determine their future in the face of Chinese "re-education" camps.

These different worldviews of the working class and the students point to the salience of social class and gender amidst the claims that such considerations may not be relevant any longer. If anything, emphasis on Islam may galvanize little more than superficial acknowledgment of belief.

What makes the struggle between secular national identity and allegiance a volatile subject is that there is really no clear resolution. Within the realm of Identity, it is difficult to find "coherence" in the midst of individuals engaged in profound "identity" crises. Essentialist identity structures thereby demonstrate their power as simplifiers. The offer subjects easy answers to complicated lifestyles and circumstances. Those who invoke these ideas are often provide political claims to represent or defend an embattled community. An identity such as "Islam" offers individuals an externally validated social place to come to terms with the uncertainty in urban environments where they often face discrimination and economic uncertainty. And they seem to resonate with a human social need for the collective reinforcement of their individual social choices, particularly in circumstances characterized by instability and dispute.

Acknowledgment

We would like to thank Tubitak, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey for their support on the Uyghur project

References

Alemdaroğlu A (2015) Escaping Femininity, Claiming Respectability: Culture, Class and Young Women in Turkey. *Women's Studies International Forum* 53:53–62.

Bayat A (2010) *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Amsterdam: ISIM/Amsterdam University Press.

Bayat A (2013) Arab Spring and Its Surprises. *Development and Change* 44(3): 587–601. doi: 10.1111/dech.12030.

Baranovich N (2003) From Margins to the Centre: the Uyghur Challenge in Beijing. *China Quarterly* 175(September): 726-750.

Bovington G (2002) The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang. *Modern China* 28(1): 39-78.

Campante, F R, Chor D (2012) Why was the Arab World poised for Revolution: Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(2): 167-188.

China Digital Times (2018, November 1) *Camps Expand in Xinjiang as Discontent Grows*. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2BDqeT4.

Cole, J (2014) *The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is changing the Middle East.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Dekker P, Ester P (2006) Working-Class Authoritarianism: A Re-Examination of the Lipset Thesis. *European Journal of Political Research* 15: 395 - 415. doi:

10.1111/j.1475-6765.1987.tb00884.x.
Emet E (2015) *Doğu Türkistan Uygur Davası Nedir Olayların Kısa Açıklaması*. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2Shn8K4.
Gest J (2015) Reluctant Pluralists: European Muslims and Essentialist Identities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, Special Issue: Muslims, Migration and Citizenship: Processes of Inclusion and Exclusion* 38(11): 1868-1885. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2014.920092.
Gladney D (1992) *Ethnic Identity in China: Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality*. Wadsworth: Belmont, CA. ISBN10 0155019708 ISBN13 9780155019706.
Hobsbawm E *(*1999) The *Age of Revolution, 1789–1848*. California: Textbook Publishers.
Hobsbawm E (2004) *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875*. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd.
Hobsbawm E (1989) *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914*. New York: Random House, 1987. First Vintage Books edition.
Julienne M, Rudolf M, Bucknow J (2015)The Terrorist Threat in China. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2BDt6PG.
Just A, Sandovici M, Listhaug O (2014) Islam, religiosity, and immigrant political action in Western Europe. *Social Science Research* 43: 127–144.
Lerner D (1958) *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East.* Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
Makofsky D (2013) The Artist and the Artisan in Xinjiang (China) Central Asia: the changing Uyghur Muslim culture. *European Journal of Applied Social Sciences Research* 1(June 1): 29-34.
Makofsky D (2014) The Effectiveness of Affirmative Action Programs in Developing Countries. *International Journal for Cross-Disciplinary Subjects in Education (IJCDSE)* 5(4).
Millward JA (2009) Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi violence mark a turning point? *Central Asian Survey* 28(4): 347–360.
Moaddel M (1999) Religion and Women: Islamic Modernism vs. Fundamentalism. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 37(1): 108-130.