Athens Journal of Business & Economics 2025, 11: 1-13
https://doi.org/10.30958/ajbe.X-Y-Z

Anti-Net Zero Narratives in the UK

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In the global struggle to address climate change, a commitment to net zero emissions has become part of the corporate mantra, but net zero is also seen as a contested agenda. While the UK has been cast as one of world leaders in the drive to a net zero future, little has been published in the academic business and management literature on anti-net zero thinking in the UK. This paper looks to explore some of the organisational and individual narratives of anti-net zero in the UK, and thus to make a small contribution to helping to fill that gap in the literature. The author also explores a number of more general issues, namely the impact of net zero in the business world, the growth opportunities associated with net zero, the role of technology, the importance of behavioural change, net zero under capitalism and future research agendas, in a concluding discussion.

Keywords *Net Zero; Anti-Net Zero; Counter Climate Movement; Anthropogenic; Capitalism.*

Introduction

The concept of net zero emissions, a state in which greenhouse gases, principally carbon dioxide, passing into the atmosphere are balanced by their removal from the atmosphere, has increasingly become part of the corporate mantra, in the fight against climate change. Amongst the major consumer facing companies in the UK, Tesco (2024), for example, argued *'we aim to be carbon neutral in our Group operations by 2035 and net zero across our full value chain, aligned to a 1.5°C trajectory, by 2050'*, while Apple claimed to be *'working to bring our net emissions to zero across our entire carbon footprint'* (Apple 2024). In part these commitments reflect consumer facing companies increasing awareness of the need to respond to widespread, though not universal, consumer concerns about the impact of climate change. In part, they also reflect political pressure from the UK government for companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.

However, The D Group (2024), a leading cross-sector strategic development network in the UK, argued that *'Net Zero is now part of the mainstream debate in national politics. As a result, it is also becoming a more contested agenda.'* Tobin and Paterson (2024), for example, charted out the changing political dynamic around climate change in the UK and argued that while some opposition to climate policy has been long standing in the UK, it is only since 2021, that *'a backlash has been organised against net zero',* and that since that time that a group of Conservative MPs began to speak and publish widely against net zero as a goal in itself and created the Net Zero Scrutiny Group. That said, while the UK has been cast as one of world leaders in the drive to a net zero future, little has been published

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in the academic business and management literature on anti-net zero thinking in the UK.

With this in mind, this short paper looks to harness elements of the DeSmog (2024) 'Climate Disinformation Database' to explore some of the narratives of anti-net zero in the UK, in two ways. Firstly, a simple exploratory examination of the positions on climate change adopted by some of the organisations and individuals listed in the database, allows a general review of the anti-net zero narratives. Secondly, a selective examination of the websites of a small number of the organisations in the database, allows a more detailed focus on some of the specifics of anti-net zero narratives Such a review seems timely, in that while 'net-zero is the dominant lens through which countries, states and regions, cities and companies approach carbonisation' (Net Zero Tracker 2022), an examination of alternative perspectives and positions, may help to enhance the wider understanding of, and responses to, climate change in the business world. The paper includes a summary of the origins and characteristics of the net zero concept, a brief review of the relevant literature, outline details of the method of enquiry, an exploration of some of the themes that constitute anti-net zero narratives within the UK, and a short concluding discussion.

Characteristics and Origins of the Net Zero Concept

Net zero greenhouse gas emissions represent the balance between the amount of such gases produced in, and the amount removed from, the atmosphere, and net zero is reached when the amount added is no more than the amount removed. Lang (2024), writing under the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit banner, argued that *'the concept of net zero has come a long way in a very short time - it has gone from science to policy to mainstream in less than a decade'*, but with any eye to the future suggested that *'it's the three decades ahead, particularly the first, that will determine whether the new window through which decarbonisation is now viewed globally delivers what it promises.'* Fankhauser et al. (2021) argued that *'the concept of net-zero carbon emissions has emerged from physical climate science'* but that *'it is operationalized through social, political and economic systems.'*

International policies on reducing greenhouse gas emissions are rooted in the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. The Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 1997, but due to a complex ratification process only came into force in 2005, committed industrialised countries and economies in transition, to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with agreed individual targets. The Paris Agreement came into force in 2016, and the vast majority of the world's countries committed themselves to limit the rise in global warming to well below 2°C, and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C, which would effectively see greenhouse gas emissions fall to net zero by 2050.

That said, meeting such targets presents a number of major economic, political and social challenges. On the one hand, for example, setting net zero targets, may well disrupt existing business models and challenge vested economic interests. Economically, within current global market models net-zero will need to be to be incorporated into market mechanisms, and here the focus, in part at least, will need

to be on investment in renewable and low carbon power generation. At the same time, there may be challenges for governments in maintaining political commitment and consensus, and they may deem it necessary to provide a variety of incentives to encourage and facilitate the transition to net zero emissions. On the other hand, people may need to change many of their consumption behaviours, and more particularly to, adopt behaviours and to adopt modes of consumption that lead to lower energy demands. More generally, moving to net-zero will require cutting greenhouse gas emissions across the economy. However, the consensus is that in some industries, particularly aviation, it will be very complex, and very expensive, to completely cut emissions, and thus emissions may need to be removed from the atmosphere. Here the focus may need to be on either changing how we use our land so it can absorb more carbon dioxide, or by carbon capture, which essentially would involve extracting carbon directly through new technologies.

Literature Review

A brief Internet search designed to outline the academic literature on anti-net zero, was conducted on Google Scholar and employed the key term anti-net zero. The vast majority of the academic literature on net zero greenhouse gas emissions is supportive of the net zero concept in that looks to examine how a wide range of mechanism and policies can reduce net emissions quickly and defectively. However, three anti-net zero themes can be identified within the literature.

Firstly, there has been a recognition that of the challenges of transitioning to net zero under capitalism. Kaptan (2024) emphasised '*the antagonism between net zero and the capitalist economy* ', while Adler (2022), claimed that the climate crisis called for a *'massive and rapid retooling of our economy and society',* and argued there were reasons to doubt that *'capitalism, even reformed, could meet that challenge.'* Hall and Davis (2021) claimed that the scale of greenhouse gas removal necessary to avoid dangerous climate change warrants *'the use of grand interpretive theories of how the global economy operates'*, and argued that *'critical social science should be able to name the global economy as capitalism'*, and that *'instead of speaking about transforming the global economy as a necessary precondition for limiting climate change, instead speak about transforming, or even transcending, capitalism.'*

Secondly, there has been growing academic interest in the counter climate change movement. Farrell (2016), for example, recognised that anthropogenic climate change posed a major threat to global human well-being and to the functioning of ecosystems, but argued that understanding of the causes of widespread uncertainty about climate change remained limited. In an attempt to explore such causes, Farrell employed network science in an attempt to uncover the institutional and corporate structure of the climate change counter movement and machine learning text analysis to show its influence in the news media and in bureaucratic politics. The author's work revealed that that the organizational power within the counter movement and the magnitude of semantic similarity, were both are both strongly linked with the elite corporate benefactors.

McKie (2018) explicitly recognised that *'climate change is one of the most pressing issues facing the* world', and argued that *'despite the scientific consensus on climate change and its impacts, an organized group of actors have campaigned, distorted, and minimized the impacts of climate change criticizing domestic and international policy approaches to address the adverse effects of climate change. This group of actors is more commonly referred to as the Climate Change Counter Movement.'* McKie claimed that the climate change movement had been a topic of interest for social scientists and environmentalists for over 25 years and that it had played that *'an influential role in negotiating public policy and influencing public opinion on behalf of fossil fuel and corporate actors.'*

More specifically, McKie (2019) employed neutralisation theory to examine the composition of the messages adopted by the Climate Change Counter Movement, and how these messages had changed over time, and argued that their examination provided valuable insights into the environmental harm facilitated by such messages. By way of conclusion, McKie suggested that it the provision of further insight into the arguments adopted by the Climate Change Counter Movement could play 'a vital role in environmental policymaking, influencing public and political attitudes on climate change.' Which might be seen to further enhance the rationale for the present paper. Three years later, in a much more extensive text, McKie (2023) provided a historical account of the emergence and spread of the Climate Change Counter Movement across the globe, drawing on her own extensive database, to explore the movement's organisation in different countries.

Work on the Climate Change Counter Movement has also been undertaken on a geographical basis. Brulle (2019), for example, claimed that the climate change countermovement in the US had been important in delaying efforts to address climate change, and looked to examine the structure of key political coalitions, and their allied trade associations, in opposing climate action. His findings revealed that these coalitions pooled resources from a large number of corporations to mount sophisticated political and cultural campaigns to oppose efforts to address climate change. Almiron et al. (2020) undertook a similar exercise in six countries within Europe, and their results revealed a consistent contrarian framing through think tanks in the European Union, and a proliferation of contrarian outputs in recent years.

Thirdly, an emerging body of published work in the social sciences (e.g. Hunger and Paxton 2024: Beveridge et al. 2024) on right wing populism seems to offer some potentially valuable insights. Here, in addressing anti-net zero in the UK, Patterson et al. (2023) claimed to have introduced the term *'anti-net zero populism'* to explore the *'ideological and opportunistic movements working to undermine climate policy.'* Further, Paterson et al. (2023) looked to construct a conceptual framework based on *'policy dismantling'* and *'discursive opportunity structures'*, and then examined the framework against six policy areas, including fracking, heat pumps, renewable energy resources, electric vehicles, the petrol and diesel ban and traffic neighbourhoods, involved in the pursuit of net zero. More specifically, Paterson et al. (2023) identified a number of *'attacks on the goal of net zero',* including attacks on the goal of net zero per se, as well as attacks on the six policy areas listed above, and by way of conclusion, argued that *'the rise of backlash to*

climate policy in the UK provides important evidence that institutional mechanisms to stabilise climate policy are not sufficient to lock in transitions.'

However, prior to the publication of Paterson et al.'s (2023) work, Akins (2022) offered a commentary designed to trace *'how right-wing populist politicians and commentators have linked net-zero policies to a cost-of-living crisis, characterising decarbonisation as an undemocratic pursuit, and affirming the need to accelerate policies that enable the fracking of natural gas.'* This commentary looked to explore how in right-wing populist politicians and commentators in the UK linked net zero policies to a cost of living crisis and which characterised decarbonisation as an undemocratic pursuit and affirmed the need to accelerate policies to encourage fracking.

Fiorino (2022) argued that in recent years the Republican Party in the US had taken on the characteristics right wing populism and that this had an effect on climate mitigation policy, not least in that it is hostile to climate mitigation. Here the focus was on four issues, namely the sources of right-wing populism that affect climate policy, why such populism in the US is hostile to mainstream climate policy, more specifically how this hostility was expressed in the Trump administration's policies, and the long-term implications for US climate mitigation. By way of conclusion, Fiorino (2022) asked if right wing populism is a passing phenomenon or a permanent fixture of US politics, and then argued that the answer to this question could determine the future of climate policy, not only in the US, but also in the world.

In their examination of how setting net zero targets can enable the formation of new publics and counter publics, Valenzuela and Lezaun (2024) explored how the expanding universe of net-zero pledges changes the field of climate politics by giving form to new forms of antagonism to net zero goals, and looked to illustrate their argument with reference to three specific examples, namely the UK's adoption of a legally binding commitment to net zero emissions by 2050. The authors suggested that opposition to net zero was not only expressed by a refusal to adopt a target, but also by resistance to disclose information that would make if possible to determine the practical meaning of specific pledges.

Frame of Reference and Method of Enquiry

Research, even exploratory research, into anti-net zero activities poses a number of challenges. On the one hand, the term anti-net zero receives, at best, limited attention in academic and policy discussions of the net-zero concept. This reflects a number of factors, including Manchester University Sustainable Consumption Institute's (2023) claim that *'opposition to climate action has been largely marginal for much of the period that climate change has been on the political* agenda', and it also reflects the consistent and wholehearted support of many governments for net zero policies.

This paper looks to explore some of the themes that make up the narrative of anti-net zero, via a simple Internet survey, conducted on Google in August 2024 The search revealed the DeSmog Climate Disinformation Database (DeSmog 2024

a), which included over 800 organisations and individuals which have *'helped to delay and distract the public and our elected leaders from taking needed action to reduce greenhouse gas pollution and fight global warming'*, as a rich source of information about anti-net zero narratives. DeSmog (undated a) claims to be *'the world's number one source for accurate, fact-based information regarding global warming misinformation campaigns'*, and its Climate Disinformation Database which has an international spread and includes individuals and organisations, in 17 counties, provided a valuable source of information. for this paper.

More specifically, the author focussed on individuals and organisations listed in the database as being based in the UK and extracted three sources of information. Firstly, a simple exploratory review was undertaken of the positions on climate change adopted by a number of the organisations listed as being based in the UK. Secondly, a similar exercise was undertaken of the personal positions on climate change associated with a number of the individuals listed as being based in the UK. In both reviews the author was responsible for selecting the organisations and individuals, and this seemed justified in that the aim was to provide some of the nature and flavour of anti-net zero narratives. The information in the data base on both organisations and individuals was well structured and clearly signposted, and the author took the view that a detailed content analysis of the entry of each organisation and individual would be unnecessary in an exploratory study. Thirdly, an examination of the websites of two of the organisations in the database, namely the Global Watch Policy Foundation, Net Zero Watch allowed a focus on some of the specifics of anti-net zero narratives. More generally, as the database is in the public domain the author took the considered view that he was not required to seek formal-permission to draw information from it.

Anti-Net Zero Narratives

The anti-net zero material posted about each of the selected UK organisations and individuals on the DeSmog database embraces a wide range of interlinked themes, but rather than attempting a comprehensive coverage, or looking to provide details of each of the reported individual and organisational anti-net zero narratives, this paper looks to offer some of the nature and flavour of the opposition to net zero. Here, the information about UK organisations and individuals on the DeSmog database revealed a number of interlinked themes across a spectrum encompassing, accepting the reality of climate change coupled with concern about the pace set for the establishment of net zero targets, through questioning the data and the science of climate change, looking to highlight the differential effect of net zero policies across society, emphasising the benefits of carbon dioxide within the atmosphere, to claiming that climate change is not anthropogenic, but a natural phenomenon.

At the organisational level, the Net Zero Scrutiny Group, for example, was reported as accepting the fundamental facts of climate change and the need to reduce emissions, but also as arguing that government plans to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 were too rapid and too expensive. Net Zero Watch (undated a), argued *'it's sometimes claimed that we are in a climate emergency. The problem is that the data*

doesn't support this idea', while the DeSmog database reported Net Zero Watch arguing *'we don't dispute that climate changes, we dispute that we are on the verge of a climate catastrophe.'*

Net Zero Watch claimed that its goal was to highlight *'the serious implications of expensive and poorly considered climate change policies'* (Net Zero Watch undated a) and argued *'it's sometimes claimed that we are in a climate emergency. The problem is that the data doesn't support this idea'* (Net Zero Watch undated b), and claimed that it's goal was to highlight *'the serious implications of expensive and poorly considered climate change policies'* (Net Zero Watch undated b). Here Montford (2022), writing under the Net Zero Watch banner suggests that the move to net zero will cost £2,000 per household. The DeSmog data base reported that the Director General of the UK's Institute for Economic Affairs had argued driving towards net zero by 2050 was an overly costly target and that the UK government should abandon its net zero pursuits.

The European Climate Realist Network (2024), based in the UK, believes that

- *'That climate changes on all time scales*
- *That it is unknown what percentage of the warming in the past century is due to greenhouse gases.*
- *That there is no a priori reason to assume that the current and expected warming will have negative consequences*
- *That the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change overplays the role of greenhouse gases and underplays the role of other processes, like natural variability and solar or planetary influences.*
- *That climate models still have far too many shortcomings to use them as the major foundation for climate policy.*
- *That current climate policies will probably do more harm than good to society.*
- *That the climate debate has been far too politicized for a long time, and that a much more open scientific debate is badly needed.'*

Car 26 claims to campaign for rational analysis of climate matters, and is reported in the DeSmog database as being associated with the beliefs that climate change is not anthropogenic, and there are plenty of historical examples of climate change, and also questioning if carbon dioxide is a significant factor in global warming. The DeSmog database reported Spiked's claim that the climate emergency is the elites' response to the populist challenge. It represents the suspension of people's democratic aspirations.

The anti-net zero narratives of a large number of individuals are cited in the DeSmog database and, here again the aim is to provide a flavour of such narratives. John Stewart Agnew, a farmer and one-time Member of the European Parliament for the UK Independence Party, for example, is reported by the DeSmog database as describing global warming as a scam, and blaming climatic change on cosmic ray fluctuations, sunspot activity and planetary gravitational pulls from elsewhere in the galaxy. Lee Anderson, a Reform UK Member of Parliament, is reported by the DeSmog database as claiming that net zero was nonsense, that if the UK became net zero tomorrow it wouldn't make any difference to the earth's atmosphere,

because of the higher level of emissions produced by other countries, and that net zero is unfair on the poorest in society, because they are paying the price.

Jacob Rees-Mogg, former Conservative Member of Parliament and one time Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, is reported in the DeSmog database as arguing that the government had developed its net zero policies without thinking through the costs, that whatever approach the UK government adopted would not make any difference to global warming, and that the way forward was to allow technology to work out how to generate cleaner energy and then let the market decide. More generally, Jacob Rees-Mogg, was reported as suggesting that it was important to be realistic about what can be changed, and about the timescale over which such changes might be made, and arguing about the need to focus on changes in adaptability, rather than changes in behaviour.

John Redwood, a Conservative Member of Parliament from 1987-2024, was reported in the DeSmog database, as claiming that natural variability, and not man-made emissions, is to blame for the climate changing, and more specifically that the climate changes for all sorts of reasons, including volcanic activity, the jet stream, water vapour in the atmosphere, cloud formation and the sun's cycles as well as man-made carbon dioxide. Viscount Mathew Ridley, a Hereditary Peer in the House of Lords, was reported in the DeSmog database, arguing that global warming is good for society, in that it is creating a greener, safer planet, and that is, so far, mostly beneficial: and that *'this startling fact is kept from the public by a determined effort on the part of alarmists and their media allies who are determined to use the language of crisis and emergency'* (DeSmog undated b).

Some of the documents posted by Net Zero Watch and Global Watch Policy Foundation provided a focus on some of the specifics of anti-net zero narrative. In *'The War on the* Car', Ruppert (2023) writing under the Net Zero banner, suggested that while choosing a car was once a pleasurable experience, it's now as if *'the local and national rule makers don't want us to drive anymore'*, and that *'the interpretation has to be that Net Zero means absolute zero access to personal transportation'*, and that the point is *'keeping the plebs in their rightful place, namely the bus stop.'* More substantively Ruppert then proceeds to dismantle a number of the arguments about electric cars, the introduction of a car scrappage scheme in 2009, the introduction of ultra-low mission zone schemes, and road pricing, all arguably seen to facilitate a transition to net zero on the UK's roads.

In *'The Retreat from Net Zero'*, Clark (2024), also writing under the banner of Net Zero Watch, suggested that while politicians at the United Nations meetings on climate change had regularly emphasised the importance of decarbonising their economies, in reality they consistently put *'economic development well ahead of their promises to cut emissions.'* Clark (2024) also argued there was little evidence to suggest that many countries were joining the UK in setting demanding targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, not least in that achieving such targets would *'involve the wholesale reinvention of agriculture, as well as industries such a steel, cement and fertilisers.'*

Pile (2021), in a paper published by The Global Watch Policy Foundation, argued that *'since the 2000s, the UK government and EU have set ambitious emissions-reduction targets, but they do not know how to achieve them without*

damaging the economy and causing a political backlash', and that claimed that there was *'no appetite for costly policies that require significant expense and draconian regulation of lifestyle.'* Pile (2021) concluded that the UK public's appetite for climate policies *'remains untested'*, and that *'further attempts to circumvent necessary democratic processes by convening glorified focus groups will merely prolong the crises that the UK's climate agenda is creating.'*

In addressing *'UK Food Strategy and Net Zero',* published by The Global Watch Policy Foundation, Livermore (2023) argued that *'the goal of Net Zero by 2050 for the UK is a highly demanding one that is almost certainly unachievable with current technology at a cost that consumers and voters would tolerate'*, and that *'far from giving a lead to the rest of the world, striving to achieve it would simply demonstrate the need to develop more cost-effective ways to generate and store energy on a vast scale without using fossil fuels.'* More specifically, Livermore (2023) claimed that *'imposing Net Zero targets on the farming sector would add a further degree of folly'*, and that *'Net Zero without some form of carbon capture would see the demise of farming in this country.'*

Concluding Discussion

This short exploratory paper reveals a number of the anti-net zero narratives within the public domain in the UK, and, as such, adds to the limited body of work that has been published in the academic business and management literature on anti-net zero thinking within the climate change debate. Many of the scenarios sketched out in the anti-net zero narratives, suggest that everyday life and the economy will be very different in a net zero future, and in truth, neither the UK government nor the major businesses who have emphasised their corporate commitment to the drive to net zero, have yet offered any pictures of what a net zero future might look like. That said, paradoxically, it may be similar to the future envisaged by those who are campaigning for a more sustainable future.

While a number of the themes in the anti-net zero narrative are contested by mainstream political and corporate voices, it is difficult to escape the overall conclusion that a continuing drive to net-zero will have a wholesale and wide-ranging impact in the business world. McKinsey and Company (2024), for example, identified six characteristics of the net-zero transition, namely that it is universal, significant, frontloaded, uneven, exposed to risk, and rich in opportunity. It is seen to be universal, for example, in that all the major land use and energy systems contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, and thus all will require massive change in order to move to a net zero future. More specifically, McKinsey and Company (2024) emphasised that all these systems are interdependent, and thus 'reaching net zero emissions will thus require a universal transformation of the global economy.'

More positively, McKinsey and Company (2024) claimed that there could be considerable growth opportunities for countries and companies if they were able to access the growing markets in the transition to a net-zero economy. Here, opportunities were identified in decarbonising products and processes, and in the production of low-carbon products. Stern and Valero (2021), for example, looked

to examine how policies and institutions might foster *'private sector investment in sustainable and productive assets at the scale and pace required to tackle climate change and simultaneously achieve a strong economic recovery and growth into the future.'* While the authors concluded that *'a robust carbon price be complemented by a suite of mutually reinforcing policies, regulations and investments in infrastructure, human capital and innovation'*, and that *'achieving large-scale change quickly will require an understanding of the opportunities and displacements in the next wave of technological change'*, they also recognised the importance of the *'demand side'*, and that *'changes in behaviours and preferences of consumers, workers, shareholders and voters are also key to driving change in business and policy decisions'* (Stern and Valero 2021).

For some commentators, technology certainly has an important role to play in driving the transition to net zero. The World Economic Forum (2023), for example, highlighted a number of technologies, including direct air capture and artificial intelligence, seen to be potential game changers in achieving net zero. For the World Economic Forum, the significance of direct air capture, for example, lies in its ability to address challenging emission sources such as long-distance transport and heavy industry and in its potential ability to address historical emissions. That said, the currently limited ability, and the cost, of direct air capture, are seen to be barriers to its widespread adoption. Artificial intelligence can facilitate the automation of a number of important tasks including energy management, energy demand and usage, and storage optimisation, but here again costs might be a major barrier to adoption.

The International Energy Agency argued that behavioural changes which affect the way people use energy were essential in the drive to reach net zero emissions by 2050. Here while the International Energy Agency (2021) emphasised the importance of deploying clean energy technologies and in harnessing technologies to improve energy efficiency, but also recognised that net zero emissions would not happen without *'the consent and support of people.'* Such behavioural changes are seen to include adjusting everyday behaviours that reduce wasteful or excessive energy consumption. Further, the International Energy Agency argued that such behavioural changes were particularly important in developed economies, where energy intensive lifestyles are the norm, and would involve cycling and walking instead of driving a motor vehicle, and turning down domestic heating. Some of the very activities on which the anti-net zero arguments and campaigns are based!

More generally, the World Economic Forum (2024) posed the question *'Is capitalism incompatible with effective climate change?'* In many ways, the tensions between the drive to net zero and the workings of the capitalist system are at the heart of the challenge of net zero. Essentially capitalism is seen to prioritise economic growth over social and environmental concerns, and to lead to unsustainable consumption, the continuing use of fossil fuels and the destruction of nature. Gomes and Bohm (2023) investigated the threat of right-wing populism to rapid climate change and highlighted its role in undermining the global co-operation necessary for the *'deep transformation required within capitalism'* to achieve the drive to net zero.

This paper clearly has its limitations in that it essentially draws its empirical material exclusively from Internet sources, and that it relies on the author's selection from these sources. However, the author believes that this is a valid approach in

what is an exploratory paper in a field where little work has been published to date, and that the paper might provide a platform for future research. Future research agendas, for example, might include, detailed empirical investigations not only of how anti-net zero organisations promote their messages to both large and small businesses, but also of consumers' attitudes to, and patronage of, companies that effectively adopt anti-net zero approaches. At the same time, theoretical work that looks to locate such arguments within more general debates about how businesses approach climate change also merit attention.

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