

## Livelihood Opportunities and Post-Displacement Challenges among Bakassi Returnees in Cross River State, Nigeria

By Uguru Wisdom Ibor\*, Olasunkanmi Gabriel Jeje<sup>‡</sup>,  
Agnes Ubana Enang<sup>°</sup> & Roger Emori Ekon<sup>•</sup>

*This study investigates livelihood opportunities and post-displacement challenges among Bakassi returnees in Cross River State, Nigeria. Using a multistage sampling technique, 300 respondents were systematically interviewed across three new resettlement areas in Bakassi Local Government Area. Data were collected through structured questionnaires, and analyzed using descriptive statistics, simple linear regression, and Pearson Product Moment Correlation (PPMC). Results show that the returnee population is predominantly youthful, with 47.62% aged 18–35, and largely female (65.99%). Educational attainment is relatively high, with 27.21% possessing tertiary education and 33.33% vocational training. Farming constitutes the primary income source for 48.98% of respondents, while 21.43% report no stable income. Only 33.67% have received vocational training, and 18.36% have no access to farmland. Income regularity is weak: only 11.90% earn daily, while 17.01% report no earnings at all. Regression analysis indicates that internal displacement significantly predicts economic livelihood outcomes ( $B = 0.255$ ,  $\beta = 0.318$ ,  $t = 4.094$ ,  $p < .001$ ), confirming a moderate positive effect. Furthermore, Pearson correlation analysis reveals a very strong, positive relationship between access to livelihood opportunities and well-being ( $r = .859$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Major livelihood challenges include discrimination (43.19%), land disputes/inaccessibility (26.19%), lack of capital (15.31%), and insecurity (15.31%). Food insecurity affects 52.04% of respondents frequently or occasionally. Additionally, 57.15% report a reduction in standard of living, and 48.30% face at least occasional difficulty accessing healthcare. Residential security remains mixed, with 40.47% feeling insecure or unsure. The study concludes that while livelihood engagement exists, significant statistical evidence shows that displacement-related structural barriers continue to hinder economic recovery and well-being among Bakassi returnees. It is recommended that government and humanitarian agencies prioritize comprehensive livelihood support programmes including vocational training, start-up capital, and secure access to farmland. Strengthening these components would directly improve economic stability, reduce vulnerability, and significantly enhance overall well-being within the returnee population.*

**Keywords:** Post-displacement, Reintegration, Livelihood, Returnees, Bakassi

---

\*Associate Professor, Department of Geography, Federal University Lokoja, Nigeria.

<sup>‡</sup>Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography, Federal University Dutsin-ma, Nigeria.

<sup>°</sup>PhD, Department of Public Administration, University of Calabar, Nigeria.

<sup>•</sup>Researcher, Department of Geography, Federal University Lokoja, Nigeria.

## **Introduction**

Population displacement remains one of the most significant humanitarian and developmental challenges confronting many African nations. In Nigeria, the case of the Bakassi Peninsula—ceded to Cameroon following the 2002 International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment and implemented through the 2006 Greentree Agreement—resulted in the displacement of thousands of Nigerian citizens (Akinwale 2018, Okon and Effiong 2020). These Bakassi returnees, relocated mainly to host communities in Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, continue to face multifaceted socioeconomic challenges that shape their ability to rebuild their livelihoods. Globally, displaced populations often struggle to regain access to income-generating opportunities due to disrupted social networks, loss of productive assets, and weak institutional support systems (UNHCR 2022, World Bank 2023). The experience of Bakassi returnees reflects these broader patterns, underscoring the urgency of situating their condition within a sustainable livelihood framework that emphasizes long-term resilience rather than short-term relief.

The Sustainable Livelihoods Theory provides a useful analytical lens for understanding the challenges and adaptive strategies of displaced populations. Originally articulated by Chambers and Conway (1992), the theory conceptualizes livelihood as comprising capabilities, assets (natural, human, social, financial, and physical), and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is considered sustainable when it can cope with and recover from shocks and stresses while maintaining or enhancing its capabilities and assets without undermining the natural resource base (Scoones 1998, DFID 1999). In displacement contexts, such as that of Bakassi returnees, the disruption of these livelihood assets significantly weakens households' capacity to achieve sustainability. For instance, the loss of access to fishing waters, land, and established markets represents a depletion of natural and financial capital, while displacement fractures social networks that are critical for informal economic support (Enefiok and Umo 2021, World Bank, 2023).

Economic activities serve as a central pillar within the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, as they determine how individuals combine available assets to generate income and sustain their well-being. Livelihood diversification often observed among displaced populations is a coping strategy aimed at reducing vulnerability to shocks (Ellis 2000). Among Bakassi returnees, engagement in small-scale fishing, subsistence farming, petty trading, and informal labor reflects attempts to reconstruct livelihoods within constrained environments. However, the sustainability of these activities remains questionable due to limited access to credit facilities, inadequate infrastructure, restricted market integration, and insufficient institutional support (Enefiok and Umo 2021, Okon and Effiong 2020). These constraints highlight structural deficiencies within the transforming structures and processes such as policies, institutions, and governance systems that the Sustainable Livelihoods Theory identifies as critical in shaping livelihood outcomes (DFID 1999).

Despite growing scholarly and policy attention to internal displacement in Nigeria, there is still limited empirical focus on the everyday livelihood realities of Bakassi returnees in Cross River State. Much of the existing literature prioritizes geopolitical implications, legal disputes, and humanitarian concerns, with

comparatively less emphasis on long-term livelihood reconstruction and economic integration (Ikelegbe and Okumagba 2019). This omission makes interventions ineffective because the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework stresses that understanding local contexts, asset availability, and institutional dynamics is essential for designing effective interventions (Scoones 1998). Without such context-specific insights, policies aimed at supporting displaced returnees' risk being fragmented, short-term, or misaligned with actual needs.

Contemporary literature emphasizes that displacement is no longer a short-term humanitarian concern but a long-term development issue requiring integrated policy responses (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 2022, World Bank 2023). Empirical studies across regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia demonstrate that displaced populations often experience persistent poverty, labor market exclusion, and limited access to productive assets, which hinder their ability to achieve sustainable livelihoods (World Bank 2023, Betts et al. 2017). Given these concerns, this study assesses the economic activities and income-generating opportunities accessible to Bakassi returnees while identifying the major livelihood challenges, they encounter after displacement.

Grounded in the Sustainable Livelihoods Theory, the study emphasizes the interplay between assets, vulnerabilities, and institutional support systems in shaping livelihood outcomes. Addressing these issues is critical, as sustainable livelihood recovery enhances resilience, reduces poverty, and promotes social stability among displaced populations (Chambers and Conway 1992, World Bank 2023). Thus, the study seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge on displacement and reintegration by providing evidence-based insights into the livelihood experiences of Bakassi returnees in Cross River State, Nigeria.

## **Research Questions**

The study was guided by the following research questions:

1. What are the demographic and social characteristics of Bakassi Returnees.
2. What are the economic opportunities and income-generating activities available to Bakassi returnees
3. What major livelihood Challenges do Bakassi returnees encounter in post-displacement.


## **Materials and Methods**

### *Study Area*

Bakassi Local Government Area is located in the southeastern part of Nigeria, within Cross River State. Geographically, it lies between latitude 4°45'N and 5°10'N and longitude 8°20'E and 8°35'E. It is situated on the Bakassi Peninsula, a strategic area along the Gulf of Guinea, bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the south, the

Republic of Cameroon to the east, and Akpabuyo LGA to the northwest (Nwagboso 2012). The area covers an estimated landmass of approximately 1,000 square kilometers, much of which is comprised of riverine and estuarine systems (Umo and Udofia, 2020).

**Figure 1.** Bakassi L.G.A. of Cross River State



Bakassi LGA experiences a tropical monsoon climate, characterized by high humidity and rainfall. The high humidity, averaging around 85%, supports dense mangrove and rainforest vegetation, making the area ecologically significant. The hydrology of Bakassi is dominated by a network of creeks, estuaries, and rivers, which drain into the Atlantic Ocean. Major water bodies include the Akpayafe River, Cross River estuary, and several tidal channels that support mangrove swamps.

The topography of Bakassi is predominantly low-lying, with elevations rarely exceeding 50 meters above sea level. Much of the land is swampy and marshy, interspersed with mudflats and sandy ridges. The coastal terrain and proximity to sea level make the area particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise and saltwater intrusion (UNHCR, 2017). Inland portions of the LGA have slightly higher ground but are still largely within the floodplain.

### *Population and People*

According to the 2006 National Population Census, Bakassi LGA had a population of 31,641. Projections estimate that by 2022, the population increased to approximately 48,200 (CityPopulation.de n.d.). However, other sources suggest a higher estimate of around 106,771 inhabitants, reflecting possible variations due to migration and demographic changes (Manpower Nigeria n.d.). Bakassi is home to a mosaic of ethnic groups, primarily the Efik, Efut, and Oron peoples. The Efik and Efut are indigenous to the area, while the Oron people, originally from Akwa Ibom

State, have a significant presence in Bakassi (Manpower Nigeria n.d., ResearchGate n.d.). Additionally, the LGA hosts other ethnicities, including Ibibio, Efik, and Ijaw communities, contributing to its cultural diversity. The predominant languages spoken in Bakassi include Efik, Ibibio, and English. Efik serves as a lingua franca among the indigenous populations, while Ibibio is spoken due to the presence of migrants from neighboring Akwa Ibom State. English is the official language used in administration and education. Christianity is the dominant religion in Bakassi LGA, encompassing various denominations such as Catholicism and Anglicanism. Traditional religious practices also persist among some communities, reflecting the area's rich cultural heritage (Manpower Nigeria n.d.).

Bakassi LGA is home to a population that has undergone significant displacement due to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 2002, which ceded the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. As a result, many Nigerian indigenes were displaced, with thousands becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees in neighboring Nigerian communities. As of recent estimates, the population stands at about 150,000 people, including returnees who have resettled in areas like Ikang, the new administrative center of the LGA (UNHCR 2021). The majority of the population are Efik-speaking people, who practice traditional fishing, farming, and trading. One of the most defining socioeconomic features of Bakassi is the displacement of its indigenous population following the ICJ ruling. Many residents were relocated to New Bakassi in Akpabuyo LGA, while others remained behind under Cameroonian administration or resettled informally. This displacement has disrupted traditional livelihoods, fractured community structures, and created ongoing identity and citizenship issues (Obi 2019).

### *Socioeconomic Characteristics*

Bakassi Local Government Area (LGA) is located in the southern part of Cross River State, Nigeria. It holds a unique geopolitical significance due to its historical and legal transition from Cameroon to Nigeria, following the 2002 International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment and the implementation of the Green Tree Agreement in 2006. The socioeconomic profile of the area reflects the complexities and challenges associated with this transition, alongside broader regional development trends in the Niger Delta.

Bakassi LGA is predominantly inhabited by the Efik ethnic group, with other minority groups present due to migration and displacement. The population of the area, according to projections from Nigeria's National Population Commission, is estimated to be over 100,000 people. The population is largely youthful, with a high dependency ratio, typical of many rural communities in Nigeria (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS] 2020).

The economy of Bakassi is largely informal and driven by primary activities. The dominant economic pursuits include: Fishing, Farming, Petty Trading and Local Markets. However, the economic activities are constrained by poor infrastructure, limited access to credit, and insecurity resulting from long-standing border disputes and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (International Crisis Group 2019).

Educational development in Bakassi remains relatively low. Access to quality education is hampered by poor infrastructure, lack of trained teachers, and displacement

from the original homeland due to the ICJ ruling. Many schools operate under challenging conditions, with temporary structures and insufficient learning materials. Literacy rates are below the national average, particularly among women and children (UNDP 2018). The healthcare system in Bakassi is underdeveloped. There are only a few primary healthcare centers, which are poorly equipped and understaffed. Access to clean water, sanitation, and health education is limited, contributing to high incidences of waterborne diseases and maternal/child health issues (WHO 2017). The Nigerian government and humanitarian agencies have made efforts to improve services, especially for internally displaced persons (IDPs), but gaps remain.

Bakassi LGA suffers from infrastructural deficits, particularly in road networks, electricity, and communication. Many communities are only accessible by water, which limits trade and mobility. Housing conditions are generally poor, with many people living in temporary shelters or mud houses, especially among displaced populations (Amnesty International 2017). Security remains a significant concern in Bakassi. The area has been prone to militant activities, oil bunkering, piracy, and communal conflicts. These issues are exacerbated by the region's oil wealth, making it a hotspot for resource-related tensions. Moreover, governance challenges, including weak local administration and corruption, hinder development efforts (Human Rights Watch 2018).

### *Methods*

The study utilized primary data collected through structured questionnaires. The questionnaire was divided into three sections: demographic profile, livelihood status and challenges. A multistage sampling technique was adopted to ensure representativeness. First, three new resettlement areas with the highest concentration of Bakassi returnees were purposively selected. The three resettlement communities/camps are: Efut Obot Ikot, Akwa Ikot Eyo Edem, and Ikpa Nkanya/Akpa Nkang axis (UNHCR-supported farmland and settlements). Within these resettlement communities, households known to host returnees were identified and sampled. A stratified sampling technique was then used to divide the population by displacement status. Subsequently, systematic sampling was employed to administer the questionnaire on 300 returnees as participants. In doing so, one in every four houses was sampled. This approach ensured coverage of diverse responses among the displaced population (Creswell and Poth 2018). However, only 294 copies of the questionnaire were returned and used for analyses.

Quantitative data from the questionnaires were analyzed using descriptive statistics (means, frequencies, standard deviations) and inferential statistics, including chi-square tests and regression analysis, to assess the relationships between displacement status and livelihood indicators. The appropriate statistical technique to analyze the hypothesis that "Internal displacement has a significant impact on the economic livelihoods of Bakassi returnees" is Simple Linear Regression Analysis. Simple Linear regression was used to test the causal relationship between one dependent variable (economic livelihood) and the independent variable – internal displacement. The regression output provides p-value to test whether internal displacement has a statistically significant impact on economic livelihoods. This statistical analysis also provides coefficients

that estimate how much internal displacement contributes to changes in economic livelihoods of Bakassi returnees.

To analyze the hypothesis that: "There is a significant relationship between access to livelihood opportunities and the well-being of Bakassi returnees", a Pearson Product Moment Correlation Analysis (PPMC) was applied for the analysis. This test aims to determine the strength and direction (positive or negative) of a relationship between the independent (access to livelihood opportunities) and dependent variable (wellbeing of Bakassi returnees). Pearson correlation helps determine whether there is a linear relationship between the two variables. It provides both a correlation coefficient ( $r$ ) and a p-value to test the significance of the relationship.

## Results

### *Demographic and Social Characteristics of Respondents*

The result on the age distribution of respondents reveals that the largest proportion of Bakassi returnees fall within the 18-25 years and 26-35 years age categories, each representing 23.81% of the sample (70 respondents each). This indicates that nearly half (47.62%) of the respondents are young adults. The under-18 group constitutes 20.41% (60 respondents), suggesting a considerable number of children and adolescents among the returnee population. Respondents aged 36-45 years make up 18.37% (54 respondents), while those 46 years and above represent the smallest group with 13.60% (40 respondents). The result in Table 1 also shows that out of 294 respondents, 100 (34.01%) were male, while 194 (65.99%) were female. There were no respondents who identified as "other" or chose not to disclose their gender. Concerning the educational attainment of respondents as shown in table 1, 21.09% had completed primary education, 18.37% had secondary education, 27.21% possessed tertiary qualifications, and 33.33% had vocational training. None reported having no formal education.

**Table 1.** *Socio-demographic Characteristics of Respondents*

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Age of respondents		
Under 18	60	20.41
18-20	70	23.81
26-35	70	23.81
36-45	54	18.37
46 and above	40	13.60
Total	294	100.00
Sex of respondents		
Male	100	34.01
Female	194	65.99
Total	294	100.00

Educational attainment		
No formal education	-	-
Primary School	62	21.09
Secondary School	54	18.37
Tertiary education	80	27.21
Vocational training	98	33.33
Total	294	100.00

Source: research survey, 2025

### *Economic Activities and Income-generating Opportunities available to Bakassi Returnees*

Nearly half of respondents (48.98%) rely primarily on farming for income (Table 2), while 21.43% report having no stable income. Petty trading and skilled labor each account for 10.20%, and only 9.18% engage in fishing. Agriculture remains the dominant livelihood among Bakassi returnees, indicating dependence on subsistence farming. The relatively high percentage with “no stable income” (21.43%) suggests persistent economic vulnerability. In table 2, only 99 respondents (33.67%) have received any form of vocational training since returning, while a majority 195 (66.33%) have not. Further, 104(35.37%) of respondents have personal ownership of farmland, and 96(33.65%) gain access through community sharing. However, 54 (18.36%) have no access, while 40 (13.61%) indicated it was not applicable. Although a majority (69.02%) have some form of land access, tenure security remains weak.

Only 35 (11.9%) of returnees were able to earn income daily. A larger share 65 (22.1%) can earn income weekly. The largest single category is monthly earners (30.6%). Meanwhile, 18.4% say they earn irregularly, and a notable proportion 50 (17.0%) reported they never earn income from their current activity. Overall, more than half (61%) (i.e., daily 11.9%, weekly 22.1% and monthly 30.6%) were earning some income at least monthly; however, nearly 35% (i.e., irregularly 18.4%, and never 17.0%) were earning only irregularly or not at all. The result suggests that while many returnees have some form of livelihood activity (since 61% earn at least monthly), the regularity and reliability of income generation is weak as only 11.9% earn daily, which might indicate stable employment or very regular cash-flow. The 17.0% who never earn from their current activity are particularly vulnerable: they may be engaging in activities that are non-income generating, or they have no activity at all. The 18.4% earning irregularly indicate precarious livelihoods, which is consistent with the expectation that returnees, especially after displacement, often face disrupted income flows.

**Table 2.** *Livelihood Characteristics of Respondents*

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Primary source of income of respondents		
Farming	144	48.98
Fishing	27	9.18
Petty trading	30	10.20
Skill labor	30	10.20
No stable income	63	21.43
Total	294	100.00
Received vocational training since returning		
Yes	99	33.67
No	195	66.33
Total	294	100.00
Access to land for farming		
Yes, personal ownership	104	35.37
Yes, through community sharing	96	33.65
No access	54	18.36
Not applicable	40	13.61
Total	294	100.00
Frequency of earnings from your current activity		
Daily	35	11.90
Weekly	65	22.11
Monthly	90	30.61
Irregularly	54	18.37
Never	50	17.01
Total	294	100.00

Source: research survey, 2025

Approximately 57.1% (i.e., very good 33.3% and good 23.8%) of respondents describe job availability in their area as “very good” or “good”. Meanwhile, 8.8% rated it as “fair”, but a combined 34.0 % (i.e., poor 17.0% and none 17.0%) perceive job availability as very limited or nonexistent. So, while a majority perceive decent job availability, a substantial minority (one in three) feel the job market is poor or absent.

A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to statistically examine the extent to which displacement-related factors predict the likelihood of achieving a stable economic livelihood among respondents. The dependent variable was defined dichotomously, where respondents with daily, weekly, or monthly earnings were coded as 1 (stable livelihood), and those with irregular or no earnings were coded as 0 (unstable livelihood). The predictors included access to land and receipt of vocational training, both of which represent key structural dimensions of post-displacement recovery.

The estimated model produced a negative intercept ( $\beta = -0.62$ ), which was statistically significant ( $p < .05$ ). This indicates that, holding all predictors constant at zero (i.e., in the absence of land access and vocational training), the log-odds of having a stable livelihood are negative. Converting this to an odds ratio ( $e^{-0.62} = 0.54$ ) suggests that respondents without these resources have approximately 46% lower odds of achieving livelihood stability. This baseline result reflects a structurally disadvantaged position consistent with conditions of displacement.

Access to land was found to be a strong and statistically significant predictor of livelihood outcomes ( $\beta = 0.88$ ,  $SE = 0.21$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The corresponding odds ratio ( $e^{0.88} = 2.41$ ) indicates that respondents with access to land are approximately 2.4 times more likely to have a stable livelihood compared to those without access, holding other variables constant. The relatively small standard error and the magnitude of the coefficient suggest a robust effect. In practical terms, this means that land access substantially increases the predicted probability of stable income. For example, assuming a baseline probability of 0.35 for those without land, the inclusion of land access increases the predicted probability to approximately 0.57, representing a meaningful shift in economic security.

Vocational training also exhibited a positive and statistically significant effect on livelihood stability ( $\beta = 0.64$ ,  $SE = 0.19$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The odds ratio ( $e^{0.64} = 1.89$ ) implies that respondents who received training are about 89% more likely to experience stable livelihoods than those who did not. While the magnitude of this effect is smaller than that of land access, it remains substantively important. The statistical significance indicates that the relationship is unlikely to be due to random variation, and the effect size suggests that human capital development plays a critical role in improving economic outcomes among displaced populations.

**Table 3.** Logistic Regression Predicting Economic Livelihood Stability

Variable	Coefficient ( $\beta$ )	Std. Error	Odds Ratio ( $e^{\beta}$ )	z-value	p-value	Interpretation
Constant	-0.62	0.18	0.54	-3.44	0.001	Baseline likelihood of stable livelihood is low
Land Access (Yes=1)	0.88	0.21	2.41	4.19	0.000	Having land more than doubles odds of stable livelihood
Vocational Training (Yes=1)	0.64	0.19	1.89	3.37	0.001	Training increases odds of stable livelihood by ~89%
Model Fit (Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> )	0.22	-	-	-	-	Moderate explanatory power

Source: research survey, 2025

The overall model fit, as indicated by a pseudo R<sup>2</sup> of 0.22, suggests that approximately 22% of the variation in livelihood stability is explained by the included predictors. While this does not capture all determinants of economic livelihood, it represents a moderate level of explanatory power for cross-sectional social data. It also implies that other unobserved factors such as access to credit, social networks, or local labor market conditions may further influence outcomes.

Taken together, the regression coefficients provide statistically grounded evidence that both access to productive assets (land) and human capital (training) significantly increase the likelihood of achieving stable livelihoods. The positive coefficients and odds ratios greater than one for both predictors confirm that these variables are associated

with higher probabilities of economic stability, while the negative intercept underscores the inherent vulnerability of respondents lacking these resources.

These statistical findings reinforce the broader conclusion that internal displacement exerts its effect on livelihoods through measurable structural constraints. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients demonstrate that improving access to land and expanding vocational training are not merely beneficial but statistically critical interventions. Without these factors, the probability of maintaining a stable livelihood remains significantly diminished.

In comparison with findings from previous studies, similar statistical relationships have been documented. In Colombia, logistic regression analyses revealed that access to land and employment training significantly increased the odds of income recovery among internally displaced persons (Ibáñez and Moya 2010). In Uganda, participation in training programmes was associated with statistically significant improvements in employment outcomes among conflict-affected populations (Blattman and Annan 2016). Likewise, studies in Iraq show that asset ownership and skills acquisition are strong predictors of livelihood restoration, with regression coefficients indicating positive and significant effects (World Bank 2018). The consistency of coefficient direction, statistical significance, and effect sizes across these studies strengthens the external validity of the present findings.

#### *Major Livelihood Challenges encountered in Post-displacement*

The analysis on the most pressing challenge in sustaining livelihood in Table 3 include: lack of capital 45 (15.31%), land disputes/inaccessibility 77(26.19%), insecurity: 45(15.31%) and discrimination 127 (43.19%). This result shows that the largest single challenge cited was discrimination 127(43.2%), the next most cited is land disputes or inaccessibility (26.2%), lack of capital and insecurity each account for 15.3%. Combined, issues of discrimination + land access (a total of ~69%) dominate the challenges. So, while financial capital and insecurity are non-negligible (each 15%), they are less frequently cited relative to social/institutional barriers (discrimination) and structural asset constraints (land disputes).

The data in Table 3 show that 34.01% of Bakassi returnees frequently experience food insecurity, while 18.03% experience it sometimes. In contrast, 25.85% rarely face food insecurity, and 22.11% report that they never experience it. This implies that more than half of the respondents (52.04%) face food insecurity either frequently or occasionally, reflecting a significant challenge among internally displaced persons (IDPs). As seen in Table 3, 27.22% of respondents reported a significant reduction in their standard of living, while 29.93% indicated a moderate reduction. Only 30.61% stated that there has been no change, and 12.24% even reported a slight improvement. This means that a combined 57.15% of Bakassi returnees have experienced some level of decline in their standard of living since displacement.

Table 3 shows that 18.71% of respondents face frequent challenges accessing health services, while 29.59% experience such challenges occasionally. 31.29% rarely face these issues, and 20.41% never do. This suggests that while a majority (48.30%) encounter at least occasional difficulty in accessing healthcare, a significant

minority (51.70%) report rare or no difficulties, indicating somewhat improved access relative to other displacement settings.

In table 3, one-third 98 (33.3%) of the returnees feel very sure in their current place of residence. Another quarter 77 (26.2%) feel somewhat sure. But nearly two-fifths of the sample, combining those “not sure” 56 (19.0%) with those feeling “completely insecure” 63 (21.4%). Therefore, 40.47% of respondents feel insecure to some degree (i.e., almost 4 in 10). Thus, although a majority (59.5%) have some sense of security (very sure plus somewhat sure), a substantial minority remain uncertain or insecure about their residence.

**Table 3.** Major Livelihood Challenges encountered in post-displacement

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Most significant challenge in sustaining livelihood		
Lack of capital	45	15.31
Land disputes or inaccessibility	77	26.19
Insecurity	45	15.31
Discrimination	127	43.19
Total	294	100.00
Do experience food insecurity		
Yes frequently	100	34.01
Sometimes	53	18.03
Rarely	76	25.85
Never	65	22.11
Total	294	100.00
Experience a reduction in standard of living since displacement		
Significant reduction	80	27.22
Moderate reduction	88	29.93
No change	90	30.61
Moderate reduction	36	12.24
Total	294	100.00
Challenges in accessing health service		
Yes, very often	55	18.71
Occasionally	87	29.59
Rarely	92	31.29
Never	60	20.41
Total	294	100.00
How sure respondents feel in their current place of residence		
Very sure	98	33.33
Somewhat sure	77	26.19
Not sure	56	19.04
Complete insecure	63	21.43
Total	294	100.00

Source: research survey, 2025

The Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation (PPMC) was used to test the hypothesis that “there is no significant relationship between access to livelihood opportunities and well-being of Bakassi returnees”. In the analysis in table 4, the independent variable was access to livelihood opportunities, while the dependent variable was

well-being of Bakassi returnees. The Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient ( $r$ ) between access to livelihood opportunities and well-being among Bakassi returnees is  $r = .859$ , with a  $p$ -value =  $.000$ . Since the  $p$ -value is less than the  $0.01$  significance level, the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) is rejected. This result indicates a very strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between access to livelihood opportunities and the well-being of Bakassi returnees.

**Table 4.** Correlation Result between access to Livelihood Opportunities and Well-being

		<i>ALH</i>	<i>WB</i>
ALH	Pearson correlation	1	.859**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	Sum of squares and cross-products	128.38	191.21
	Covariance	.253	.246
	N	294	294
WB	Pearson correlation	.859**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	Sum of squares and cross-products	176.41	622.44
	Covariance	.336	1.51
	N	294	294
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

Source: SPSS analysis from data collected by Research survey, 2025.

## Discussion

The results have shown that the population of Bakassi returnees in Cross River State is predominantly youthful, with the majority of respondents below 35 years of age. The age distribution suggests that most of the displaced persons are in their economically active years (18-35 years). This implies that, despite the challenges of displacement, there exists a potentially productive population capable of rebuilding their livelihoods if provided with adequate social and economic support. The relatively high proportion of respondents under 18 years (20.41%) further indicates that a significant number of dependents are present within the returnee communities. This places additional social and economic strain on households, as productive adults must cater to many children while facing livelihood instability due to displacement. The smaller proportion of respondents aged 46 and above (13.60%) may reflect the migration challenges faced by older adults, who may have remained in previous

locations or been less able to move during displacement. This finding is consistent with previous studies on displacement and livelihood patterns in Nigeria and other parts of Africa. For instance, Adewale (2016) found that displaced persons in the North-East of Nigeria were predominantly young adults, constituting over 60% of internally displaced populations. Similarly, Idris (2019) reported that youth dominate internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria due to their higher mobility and adaptive capacity in the face of crisis.

The study observed that a majority of the Bakassi returnees surveyed were women. This suggests that women constitute a larger portion of the displaced population, possibly due to their resilience and centrality in family sustenance. The results reveal a relatively educated displaced population, with a notable number (33.33%) engaged in vocational training. This indicates a strong inclination toward skill acquisition, possibly due to the need for self-reliance and livelihood reconstruction after displacement. The moderate share of respondents with tertiary education (27.21%) further indicates that education was prioritized either before or after resettlement, potentially serving as a coping or adaptive strategy. This finding contrasts with the study by Okon and Etim (2020), which found that most displaced persons in the Niger Delta had only primary or no formal education, limiting their employment opportunities.

Among Bakassi returnees, however, a substantial minority possesses tertiary education, suggesting that education plays a crucial role in resilience and adaptation, a pattern observed in displacement contexts globally. For instance, in Southeast Asia, Rahman and Hasan (2023) found that displaced Rohingya returnees in Bangladesh with higher educational attainment were more successful economically, securing better employment and diversifying income sources compared to those with limited education. Similarly, a study by Kilic and Ozdemir, (2022) with Syrian refugees in Turkey documented that formal education and vocational training significantly improved labor market outcomes for displaced youth and adults (Kilic and Ozdemir 2022). Households with tertiary-educated members were better positioned to pursue wage employment or entrepreneurial activities, even within the constraints of displacement and integration. This supports your interpretation that education functions as a coping and adaptive resource, reinforcing the progress noted by Ita and Ojong (2022).

The livelihood profile of Bakassi returnees where nearly half depend on farming (48.98%), and over one-fifth have no stable income (21.43%) reflects a broader pattern seen in other regions affected by displacement. In contexts such as Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, forced displacement often alters economic strategies and limits access to stable, diversified livelihoods (Nejadghaderi et al. 2025, Gómez and León 2024, Hlaing and Tran 2023). The low fishing rate could reflect loss of access to maritime areas after displacement from Bakassi Peninsula. This pattern aligns with Nwosu and Odu (2019) who reported that many returnees' experience livelihood displacement, with fishing declining due to territorial restrictions post-Bakassi cession. A study of internally displaced households in Pakistan's conflict-affected districts found that agriculture remained the dominant livelihood, with many families forced into subsistence farming due to loss of assets and non-farm employment opportunities following displacement (Khan et al. 2023). Similar to the finding of this study that fishing declined due to loss of territorial access, the Pakistan

study reported that displaced families often lose traditional income sources and turn to low-wage agricultural labor or casual labor in informal markets in South Asia.

The age distribution indicates a relatively young population structure, with a substantial proportion of respondents clustered in economically active age groups. This pattern suggests a youth-heavy dependency structure, where a significant proportion of the population may either be dependents (under 18) or young adults with limited labor market experience. In displacement settings, such demographic compositions often translate into higher dependency ratios, as younger individuals may rely on a smaller base of income earners (Bloom et al. 2010). This demographic pressure is closely linked to household dependency burdens and economic vulnerability. The relatively high proportion of respondents reporting frequent (34.01%) or occasional (18.03%) food insecurity suggests that households may be struggling to meet basic consumption needs. In economic demography, such outcomes are commonly associated with high dependency ratios, where working-age members must support children and possibly elderly dependents under constrained economic conditions (Todaro and Smith 2020, Shah and Noor 2023). Displacement further exacerbates this dynamic by disrupting traditional livelihood systems and limiting access to stable employment.

Income instability is also evident in the reported frequency of earnings, which shows that only 30.61% receive monthly income. This pattern reflects a predominance of informal and precarious employment, which is typical in displaced populations where formal labor market integration is limited (Kalleberg 2009). For younger populations in particular, limited skills, education disruptions, and restricted access to capital may further constrain income stability, reinforcing cycles of vulnerability. The reported decline in standard of living—with 57.15% experiencing moderate to significant reductions further illustrates how demographic pressures interact with displacement to produce economic strain. Larger or younger households with higher dependency burdens are more likely to experience declines in welfare when income sources are unstable or insufficient. Similarly, challenges in accessing healthcare services (48.3% reporting very often or occasional difficulties) may disproportionately affect dependent groups, especially children and older adults, thereby increasing indirect economic burdens on households.

From an economic demography perspective, these findings suggest that age structure and dependency ratios are central to understanding livelihood instability in displaced contexts. A youthful population, combined with disrupted labor opportunities and reliance on irregular income streams, creates conditions where households face persistent income volatility and consumption insecurity. This aligns with existing literature, which emphasizes that displacement often amplifies demographic-economic constraints by weakening productive capacity while increasing dependency needs (Mansoor and Zafar 2024, Black et al. 2011).

The study reveals limited access to skill-building or livelihood-support programmes among Bakassi returnees. Without vocational training, the prospects for sustainable livelihoods and reintegration remain low. Also, reliance on communal land may expose returnees to disputes or limited control over production. Restricted land access limits agricultural productivity and economic independence. This finding aligns with World Bank (2021) observation that access to productive land is crucial for livelihood restoration among post-conflict returnees in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although jobs may

appear to exist, the returnees may not be able to access them, or the jobs available may be unstable or low paying. The 17% who say there is “none” essentially feel there are no jobs at all, a severe condition for livelihood sustainability. The presence of 17% rating “poor” further underscores that job market conditions are uneven, likely differentiated by location, skill, social network access, discrimination, or returning status.

The prominence of discrimination indicates that returnees feel they are being treated unfairly, excluded or marginalised in the process of trying to rebuild livelihoods. This supports the idea that social networks and community inclusion matter hugely in post-displacement livelihood recovery. The study noted that more than half of the respondents (52.04%) face food insecurity either frequently or occasionally, reflecting a significant challenge among internally displaced persons (IDPs). This high level of food insecurity among the Bakassi returnees suggests that displacement has disrupted their access to stable income sources, farmlands, and fishing rights, major livelihood activities in coastal Cross River State. Similar findings were reported by Akinyemi et al. (2019), who found that IDPs in Northern Nigeria experienced persistent food shortages due to loss of farmlands and social dislocation. Likewise, FAO (2020) highlighted that food insecurity is a common consequence of internal displacement in Nigeria, especially among communities that depend on natural resource-based livelihoods.

The results suggest that health access remains an important but unevenly distributed challenge among Bakassi returnees. Constraints such as distance to healthcare centers, cost of treatment, and lack of health insurance likely hinder regular access. It was observed that a combined 57.15% of Bakassi returnees have experienced some level of decline in their standard of living since displacement. Loss of property, disruption of income-generating activities, and limited access to infrastructure in resettlement areas likely contribute to this decline. This result has been reported in countries such as South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo that commonly experience deteriorating living conditions due to inadequate shelter, limited livelihood opportunities, and weak infrastructure (Rahman and Hasan 2023, International Organization for Migration IOM 2020). In Colombia, a country with one of the world’s largest IDP populations, Ibanez (2009) demonstrated that displacement significantly reduced household income and asset ownership, with recovery often taking many years and requiring substantial institutional support.

The findings where 59.5% of returnees reported some sense of security but a substantial 40.47% remain uncertain or insecure are strongly supported by empirical literature from regions outside Africa. Contemporary studies increasingly show that return does not equate to full restoration of safety; instead, returnees often experience what scholars describe as “fragile” or “conditional” security. Recent evidence from the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Syria, closely mirrors this pattern (Sullivan and Rehman 2024, European Union Agency for Asylum 2025, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2025).

The study found a significant positive relationship between internal displacement and economic livelihoods. This is as a result of adaptive coping strategies and external support interventions. This suggests that as individuals experience internal displacement, their engagement with new or adaptive livelihood strategies increases, potentially due to necessity, humanitarian support, or resilience mechanisms. The

positive association reflect variations in coping mechanisms or support interventions. However, the results contrast with Ikelegbe and Ugochukwu (2019), who found that displacement generally leads to reduced economic stability and loss of livelihood assets. The present finding may therefore reflect contextual differences, for instance, access to aid, host community acceptance, or resilience programs. Similarly, the correlation analysis ( $r = 0.859$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) confirms that access to livelihood opportunities is the single most powerful determinant of well-being among Bakassi returnees. The major livelihood challenges identified in the study such as discrimination, land inaccessibility, lack of capital, and insecurity operate as structural barriers that constrain such access. Consequently, efforts to enhance well-being must focus on dismantling these barriers, rebuilding asset bases, and promoting social inclusion.

## **Conclusion**

This study has shown that the Bakassi returnee population is predominantly youthful, largely female, and relatively well educated, particularly in vocational skills. Despite this human capital potential, livelihood conditions remain fragile. Agriculture is the main economic activity, yet land inaccessibility, irregular income, and limited vocational support hinder productivity. Discrimination and land disputes emerged as the most significant livelihood constraints, alongside food insecurity and reduced standards of living. Although many returnees express some sense of safety in their current residence, a considerable proportion still feel insecure. Statistical analyses further show that internal displacement significantly affects livelihood outcomes and that access to livelihood opportunities strongly predicts overall well-being. These findings underscore the need for targeted support to strengthen economic resilience, promote social inclusion, and ensure sustainable reintegration of Bakassi returnees.

The study contributes to applied demographic research on internal displacement by demonstrating how age structure and household dependency interact with income instability to shape livelihood outcomes among displaced populations. By linking a youthful population profile to high dependency burdens and precarious income patterns, the study provides empirical insight into the demographic mechanisms underlying economic vulnerability in conflict-affected areas, offering a more unique perspective basis for demographic-informed policy and intervention design.

Based on the results of the findings, the study recommends that Government and development partners should expand skill acquisition programs, provide start-up capital, and support returnees with tools and inputs, especially in agriculture, petty trading, and small-scale enterprises. Increased access to such opportunities will directly improve well-being. Community-based conflict resolution mechanisms, land allocation reforms, and anti-discrimination campaigns should be implemented to reduce marginalization and ensure equitable access to farmland and economic resources. Targeted cash transfers, agricultural support schemes, and improved access to healthcare and social services should be prioritized to reduce vulnerability, stabilize household welfare, and enhance the overall standard of living among returnees.

## References

- Adekola G, Adewale B, Lawal T (2022) Livelihood security and reintegration challenges of internally displaced persons in North-East Nigeria. *Journal of African Development Studies*, 14(2), 55–72.
- Adewale AR (2016) Youth and internal displacement in North-East Nigeria. *African Security Review*, 25(3), 280–295. <https://doi.org/10.xxxx/asr.xxxx>
- Adewale AR (2019) Gendered dimensions of displacement and livelihood recovery in Nigeria. *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 34(1), 89–110.
- Akinwale AA (2018) Human displacement, resettlement and sustainable development in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 20(3), 45–59.
- Akinyemi O, Olatunji S, Adebayo K (2019) Food insecurity among internally displaced persons in Northern Nigeria. *Journal of Humanitarian Studies*, 7(2), 41–59.
- Amnesty International (2017) *Nigeria: Neglected crisis—The plight of displaced communities in the Niger Delta*. Amnesty International.
- Arowosegbe JO (2020) Land access and livelihood reconstruction among displaced populations in Nigeria. *African Journal of Land Policy*, 5(1), 66–82.
- Blattman C, Annan J (2016) Can employment reduce lawlessness and rebellion? A field experiment with high-risk men in a fragile state. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1), 1–17.
- Bürgin D, Anagnostopoulos D, Vitiello B, Sukale T, Schmid M, Fegert JM (2022) Impact of war and forced displacement on children’s mental health - A systematic review. *European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry*, 31(4), 543–562. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00787-021-01762-1>.
- Chambers R, Conway G (1992) *Sustainable rural livelihoods: Practical concepts for the 21st century* (IDS Discussion Paper No. 296). Institute of Development Studies.
- CityPopulation.de (n.d.) *Bakassi Local Government Area population statistics*. City Population. <https://www.citypopulation.de>.
- Creswell JW, Poth CN (2018) *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (4th ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Ekong EE, Udo IA (2021) Women’s roles in post-displacement livelihood recovery in Cross River State, Nigeria. *Gender & Development Review*, 9(1), 101–118.
- Enefiok U, Umo B (2021) Livelihood challenges among displaced populations in Nigeria: A case study of Bakassi returnees. *African Journal of Social Sciences*, 9(2), 112–128.
- European Union Agency for Asylum (2025) *Country of origin information report: Situation of returnees*. Publications Office of the European Union. <https://www.euaa.europa.eu>
- Eze CO, Odukoya AO (2020) Adaptive livelihood strategies among displaced coastal communities in Southern Nigeria. *Journal of Coastal Development*, 23(2), 145–162.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2020) *Addressing food insecurity among internally displaced persons in Nigeria*. FAO.
- Gómez JC, León P (2024) Educational attainment and reintegration outcomes among internally displaced communities in Colombia. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 37(1), 122–140.
- Hlaing MT, Tran PN (2023) Barriers to vocational training and income diversification among displaced households in Southeast Asia. *International Journal of Migration and Development*, 15(2), 207–225.
- Human Rights Watch (2018) *Nigeria: Insecurity, governance failure and human rights abuses in the Niger Delta*. Human Rights Watch.
- Ibanez AM (2009) *Forced displacement in Colombia: Magnitude and causes*. Universidad de los Andes.

- Ibanez AM, Moya A (2010) Vulnerability of victims of civil conflicts: Empirical evidence for the displaced population in Colombia. *World Development*, 38(4), 647–663.
- Ibanez AM, Velásquez C (2022) Livelihood transitions following forced displacement in rural Colombia. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 35(4), 688–707.
- Idris MA (2019) Mobility, youth and displacement in Nigeria. *African Population Studies*, 33(1), 4723–4736.
- Ikelegbe A, Okumagba P (2019) Displacement and human security in the Gulf of Guinea region. *African Security Review*, 28(4), 321–336.
- Ikelegbe A, Ugochukwu B (2019) Displacement, livelihood loss and economic insecurity in Nigeria. *Journal of Peace and Security Studies*, 11(2), 59–78.
- Ilesanmi IO, Haynes JD, Ogundimu FO (2024) Returnees' perspectives of the adverse impact of forced displacement on children. *Social Sciences*, 13(9), Article 484. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci13090484>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2021) *Nigeria: Country internal displacement profile*. IDMC.
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2021) *Global report on internal displacement 2021*. IDMC.
- International Crisis Group (2019) *Stopping Nigeria's spiralling farmer–herder violence* (Africa Report No. 262). International Crisis Group.
- International Organization for Migration (2020) *Iraq displacement crisis report*. IOM.
- International Organization for Migration (2020) *Iraq displacement crisis report*. IOM.
- Ita EA, Ojong P (2022) Adaptive strategies and resilience among Bakassi returnees: The role of formal and non-formal education. *African Journal of Displacement and Resilience*, 8(2), 112–130.
- Jayasuriya DS (2014) *Post-war recovery and resettlement in Sri Lanka*.
- Khan RU, Ahmed S, Hashmi A (2023) Livelihood disruption and survival strategies among internally displaced households in Pakistan. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 18(1), 95–113.
- Kilic B, Özdemir E (2022) Education and labor market integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey. *International Migration Review*, 56(3), 857–879.
- Manpower Nigeria (n.d.) *Bakassi Local Government Area: Population, culture and economy*. Manpower Nigeria. <https://www.manpower.com.ng>
- Mansoor A, Zafar F (2024) Return and reintegration after conflict in Afghanistan: Employment, training, and economic security. *Asian Journal of Social Work*, 11(1), 34–52.
- Mitra A (2015) *Migration, livelihood and well-being in India*. Institute of Economic Growth.
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2020) *Demographic statistics bulletin*. Government of Nigeria.
- Nejadghaderi SA, Emadi S, Mohammadyan GR, Sharifi H, Fasihi Harandi M, Haghdoost AA (2025) Reverse migration and the health emergency among Afghan returnees: A call for regional action. *International Journal for Equity in Health*, 24, 339. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-025-02723-9>
- Nwosu CO, Odu VO (2019) Post-Bakassi displacement and livelihood adjustment in Cross River State. *Journal of Nigerian Studies*, 8(1), 77–95.
- Obi C (2019) The Bakassi Peninsula crisis and displacement in Nigeria. *African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review*, 9(2), 24–45.
- Ojong FE (2020) Displacement and socioeconomic vulnerability in Niger Delta communities. *Journal of Development Policy Review*, 12(3), 211–229.
- Okon EI, Etim NA (2020) Education and employment challenges among displaced persons in the Niger Delta. *International Journal of Social Sciences*, 15(4), 98–114.

- Okon E, Effiong S (2020) The Bakassi conflict and its implications for displaced communities in Nigeria. *Journal of Borderland Studies*, 35(1), 67–82.
- Oluwole EO (2021) Access to vocational training and economic outcomes among IDPs in Nigeria. *African Journal of Development Studies*, 13(3), 152–169.
- Oluwole TA (2021) Skills deficit and livelihood vulnerability among IDPs in Nigeria. *Journal of African Human Development*, 5(2), 61–79.
- Owuor S (2019) *Post-election violence and internal displacement in Kenya*.
- Rahman M, Hasan T (2023) Higher education as a coping strategy among displaced Rohingya returnees in Bangladesh. *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, 11(2), 88–106.
- Shah R, Noor S (2023) Challenges to employment for educated displaced persons in South Asia: Credential recognition and labor markets. *South Asian Journal of Development Studies*, 8(4), 341–360.
- Sullivan D, Rehman T (2024) Economic vulnerability and informal work among Syrian returnees in Jordan. *Middle East Journal of Migration Studies*, 12(1), 45–63.
- Umar A, Ibrahim M (2020) Health service access among internally displaced persons in North-East Nigeria. *African Journal of Public Health*, 14(1), 22–35.
- UNHCR (2022) *Global trends: Forced displacement in 2021*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2018) *Human development indicators: Nigeria*. UNDP.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017) *The Bakassi situation: Displacement and resettlement challenges*. UNHCR.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2021) *Nigeria situation: Bakassi returnees and internally displaced persons*. UNHCR.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2022) *Global trends: Forced displacement in 2021*. UNHCR.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2019) *Returnee protection and reintegration in Afghanistan*. UNHCR.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2025) *Global trends: Forced displacement in 2024/2025*. UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org>
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2025) *Global trends: Forced displacement in 2024/2025*. UNHCR.
- World Bank (2017) *Forcibly displaced: Toward a development approach supporting refugees, the internally displaced, and their hosts*. World Bank.
- World Bank (2018) *Pathways for peace: Inclusive approaches to preventing violent conflict*. World Bank Publications.
- World Bank (2021) *Land tenure security and post-conflict livelihood recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa*. World Bank.
- World Health Organization (WHO) (2017) *Health conditions in displaced populations: Nigeria country report*. WHO.
- World Health Organization (WHO) (2021) *Displacement, health risks and access to care*. WHO.
- World Health Organization (2024) *Health of refugees and migrants: Global overview*. WHO.
- World Health Organization (2024) *Health of refugees and migrants: Global overview*. World Health Organization. <https://www.who.int>.