

The United States Role of the Occurrence of Violence in Cyprus

By Ilksoy Aslim*

Cyprus used to be under occupation of the foreign states for many centuries and sovereignty usually with few exceptions was not transferred peacefully. As it is well known, in the 19th century, use of force in international relations was seen as normal. In the 1878 however, transformation of sovereignty in Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to the United Kingdom (UK) was by peaceful means. The UK ruled Cyprus mostly in peace until the uprising in 1931. The upheaval of the Greek Cypriots against the UK was to unite Cyprus with Greece (Enosis). The uprising was settled by violence and the constitutional rights suspended immediately. In 1955 when the riot of the Greek Cypriots occurred again this time the UK was successful to get support of Türkiye¹ and the Turkish Cypriots and converted the anti-colonial struggle to the ethnic strife. Clearly, the occurrence of violence in Cyprus in 20th Century begun during the British period but it continued after the colonial period. Although the United States (US) refrained direct involvement to Cyprus problem it assisted to the formation of the Republic of Cyprus by 1960s. During the Cold War conditions, the US had to involve to the Cyprus problem because of two reasons: Firstly, in order to prevent a war between Türkiye and Greece, the two "motherlands" of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots; secondly to stop the violence between two local communities. In Washington DC the US leadership met with Greek and Turkish prime ministers in 1964 and they decided to solve the Cyprus problem forever. In Geneva the US representative had several meetings with the officials of Greece and Türkiye. There, the US former secretary of state offered his plan that included the use of violence for the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus. The US plan could not be implemented at the time but after 10 years, its spirit became the source of the violence in Cyprus. In this study mainly the role of the US in occurrence of violence in the island will be studied.

Introduction

In order to understand the US role of violence in Cyprus shortly we have to understand the meaning of statehood and means of using coercion. According to Max Weber, the state is a political entity that holds the legal monopoly of exercising physical power over a particular territory.² This was not different for the colonial powers. When the colonial states began to have colonies they

*Lecturer, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University, Cyprus.

1. The Republic of Turkey is known as Republic of Türkiye at the United Nations from June 2023 after formal request of Ankara.

2. T. Waters, & D. Waters (Eds.), (2015), *Max Weber in Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*, Palgrave, London.

extended their sovereignty to that region and established the mechanisms for using physical power. Many indigenous people in the colonies actively served in the colonial administration and the security forces. These forces which can be called as "local troops" were used as cheap labor by the European colonial powers and facilitated the control of the empire.³ These troops were also used by the colonial powers against "freedom fighters" in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, where insurgency was in question.⁴ Nevertheless, the colonial powers needed other means beside open violence. Their main tool was the colonial laws. Colonial governments using the laws that they produced, defined those who oppose their regime as criminals. Walter Benjamin explains the relationship between the law and the use of force by saying, "to make the law is to make power".⁵ In this context, colonial administrations tried to suppress the rebels by applying martial law in cases where the normal rules of law did not work and the UK did not act differently in Cyprus. The US after 1964 had to involve to the Cyprus issue as being the leader of the Western World and found two fragmented societies that were affecting the interests of the West by leading Türkiye and Greece to confront each other. This treat would make US to involve more to the problem and prepare a plan that would have consequences on Cyprus.

The Source of Violence in Cyprus after the World War II

The theorists who may best describe the structural relationship between colonialism and violence after the World War II are Frantz Fanon and Aimé Cesaire. According to them, the main element of establishing and maintaining colonialism is violence.⁶ For them, violence also was an important tool used against the independence movements in the colonies. However, Niall Ferguson does not agree with the evaluations of these theorists. Ferguson argues that the positive aspects of the British Empire in terms of modernization and development outweigh the negative ones.⁷ We have to remember that before the World War II, the UK was seen as the hegemon power of the world and its legacy continue to be influential in international relations during the following period. It is undeniable that UK carried its own "civilization" with its socio-economic structure from

3. P. Dwyer, P. & A. Nettelbeck, (Eds.), (2018), *Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World*, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Serie, Cambridge, p. 7.

4. M. Thomas & Others, (2018). *Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918–1975*, London: Hodder Education, p. 414; T. Waters (ed. and trans.), (2015). *Max Weber in Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*, Palgrave, London.

5. Dwyer, *opcit*, p. 11.

6. *Ibid*.

7. N. Ferguson, (2002), *Empire: The rise and demise of the British world order and the lessons for global power*, Basic Books, New York.

colonial imperium to its colonies. However, it is also clear that the UK did not hesitate to use excessive violence when it was necessary. For example, thousands of men courted death by the British in India in 1857.⁸

The Greek Cypriots after realizing that they could not get their goal at the United Nations (UN) through Greece, they planned to realize Enosis by means of violence. On April 1, 1955, the Greek Cypriots established a secret organization namely EOKA (The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) for Enosis. This uprising had different consequences for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot in the colonial security forces who did not want to clash with EOKA resigned *en masse*. In order to fill the gap created by the Greek Cypriots the British administration recruited the Turkish Cypriots to the security forces instead of them. Now EOKA's target became the Turkish Cypriots concentrated in the UK security forces. Asmussen argues that the main reason for the colonial administration to recruit the Turkish Cypriots in its police forces was that the British did not trust the Greek Cypriots because of their possible tie with EOKA.⁹ Gülboy approaches differently and associates the preference of the Turkish Cypriots with the colonial policy of the UK. Accordingly, the colonial administration used to use another group to suppress a social revolt, and in this case the British aimed to construct a conflict between the societies for their own interest.¹⁰ Both views had some truth. It was clear that the colonial administration could not trust the Greek Cypriots because of the possibility of EOKA connection and these troops were used by the colonial powers against "freedom fighters." In this context, it was in accordance with the general policies of the UK to use the Turkish Cypriots against the rebellion initiated by the Greek Cypriots. In any case, during the British colonial period the Cypriots became familiar to use of force and coercion.

One of other dimension of the UK's efforts to prevent Enosis was its success to involve Türkiye in the Cyprus issue. The UK called a tripartite conference, which was held in London in August 1955. Accordingly, the participants would only discuss the problems in the Middle East.¹¹ However, contrary to the plan the Cyprus issue was mainly discussed at this meeting. The UK's effort to bring Türkiye to the meeting was aiming to balance the Greeks claim with the Turks. The London Conference failed due to the 6-7 September Events against the Greek minority in Istanbul.¹² The 6-7 September Events further strained the relations

8. B. Chandra & Others, (1989), *India's Struggle For Independence (1857-1947)*, Penguin books, p. 10.

9. J. Asmussen, (2011) "Conspiracy Theories and Cypriot History: The Comfort of Commonly Perceived Enemies", *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 23. No. 2, Spring, p. 130.

10. P. E. Gülboy, (2015), *Sömürgeci Ulus Devlete Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti* [The Republic of Cyprus from Colonial to Nation State], Khora Yayınları, Lefkoşa, p. 224.

11. R. F. Holland, (1985), *European Decolonization 1918-1981: An Introductory Survey*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, p. 254-255.

12. *Ibid*, p. 255.

between the two communities in Cyprus which would affect the relations between Türkiye and Greece. Clearly, as long as the established order was not opposed, the colonial administrations did not prefer use of violence. However, the fact that the EOKA began to use violence against the British prompted the UK to take action on both Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots against the Enosis policy. The British getting the Turks in the Cyprus issue would change the perception of the international community on Cyprus and the anti-colonial struggle between EOKA and the UK could be shown as Turkish-Greek conflict.¹³ When EOKA started its actions, it tried not to specifically target the Turkish Cypriots. However, as some Turkish Cypriots were in the colonial security forces, this created the conditions under which they would also be subjected to the violence of the EOKA. According to Hitchens, Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan thought that the way to neutralize the Greek Cypriots was to mobilize the Turkish Cypriots. As expected, when the colonial administration included the Turkish Cypriots in their own security forces, it caused them to be target of EOKA. The policy implemented by the UK was successful and the anti-colonial struggle turned into an internal ethnic conflict. Also as mentioned above in the international arena it was presented as “the Turkish-Greek” conflict.¹⁴ Reddaway stated that the number of auxiliary police reached 1,770 in 1958 and 1,700 of them were Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵ Meanwhile, it was a well-known but unspoken fact that Turkish Cypriot leaders encouraged Turkish Cypriot youth to join the UK security forces as part of their policies.¹⁶ Accordingly, Turkish Cypriot policemen would help the Turkish Cypriot leadership while fighting against EOKA by taking part in the security forces.¹⁷ Sadrazam also supported this view and stated that the Turkish Cypriots, who were the auxiliary police, contributed greatly to the distribution of weapons brought to the island from Türkiye.¹⁸ As a result, while Turkish Cypriots in the UK security forces died during the fight against EOKA and they were not perceived as British casualties but Turkish. The perception was that EOKA was killing the Turkish Cypriots. When the Turkish Cypriots began to attack against the Greek Cypriots in 1958, the relations between the two communities deteriorated and ethnic violence gradually increased. As can be

13. N. Kızılyürek, (2016), *Bir Hınç ve Şiddet Tarihi* [A History of Resentment and Violence], İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, İstanbul, p. 103-104.

14. C. Hitchens, (1994), *Cyprus*, Quartet Books, London, p. 43.

15. J. Reddaway, J. (1986), *Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection*, K. Rustem and BRO & Weidenfield and Nicolson Ltd, London, p. 90.

16. For the explanations of one of the Volkan leaders Şakir Özel is in K. Keser, (2016), *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* [Underground Activities in Cyprus and Turkish Resistance Movement], IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, p. 166.

17. Kızılyürek, (2016), *opcit*, p. 105.

18. H. Sadrazam, (2013), *Kıbrıs'ın Savaş Tarihi* [War History of Cyprus], Vol. 2, Söylem Yayınları, Lefkoşa, p. 581.

seen, ethnic violence in Cyprus was organized by the leaderships of the two communities and the foreign powers.

US Policies after the Collapse of the Bi-communal Republic and Violence in Cyprus

The conflict on Cyprus in the 1950s resulted the involvement of the US in the issue. While the republic was established, three NATO members, the UK, Türkiye and Greece became the guarantors of the new state. The UK ceded the island to the Republic of Cyprus, while it had two sovereign military bases. Since the relations between the two communities became tense in the 1950s, the survival of the state in Cyprus depended on mutual goodwill and working together. The most important problem was that the leaders of the new state adhered to the policies of Enosis and Taksim (partition) and did not protect the Republic of Cyprus sufficiently. The problems regarding the constitution and municipalities could not be overcome. On December 21, 1963, with the first bullet fired the island began to experience war and violence once again. While the “motherlands” Türkiye and Greece supported their communities, they abandoned their global task of the Cold War, containing the USSR and they focused on their national interest. The US and the USSR had to make a deal at the UN to stop the violence in Cyprus. The Resolution 184 of March 4, 1964, made the Greek Cypriots the sole owner of the state until the problem would be resolved. With this decision, the parties accepted the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

It soon became clear that the UN resolution could not solve the problems. Türkiye did not find the solution of the UN satisfactory and began to express it more loudly.¹⁹ In order to reach an acceptable solution Ankara would like to make a military intervention to Cyprus. Athens on the other side demanded to “solve the problem through Enosis” and The US officials started a debate at the State Department of the US. As a result of the discussions, the US plan for Cyprus took shape.²⁰ The plan was proposing a NATO country to rule Cyprus instead of a “wolf in priestly dress.” While the US was discussing possibility of this scenario, on June 4, 1964, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü informed the US ambassador to Ankara that government of Türkiye decided to intervene in Cyprus as a result of the pressure of the Turkish Cypriots, the opposition parties and the public.²¹ Meanwhile, the “Johnson Letter,” which would damage the relations between Türkiye and the US was delivered to Prime Minister İnönü on 5 June. This letter would push Türkiye to have rapprochement with the USSR and being closer to

19. CH JUSMMT Ankara, 12.3.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2081, NARA.

20. Ball to Rusk, 27, 10.5.1964/TOSEC, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2084, NARA.

21. T. Bahçeli, (1990), *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, WestPoint Press, Boulder, San Francisco & London, p. 63.

Non-Aligned countries.²² The US officials were thinking according to the “Western” interest and the NATO members had common obligations in defense. Also, with the decision taken within the NATO in 1956, it was agreed that the problems between the allies should be resolved by peaceful means.²³ The Johnson Letter opposed intervention in Cyprus and declared that the US weapons could not be used for this purpose. This letter prevented Ankara’s intervention but existing influence of the US on Türkiye was also eroded.

In the following period, the US tried to reach a solution through Türkiye and Greece and proposed a plan in which non-peaceful methods could be used. George Ball, the US Under-Secretary of State, who is the most experienced person on Cyprus, has been appointed head of the new US initiative.²⁴ Until mid-June, Ball met with the leaders of the UK, Türkiye and Greece to clarify his thoughts.²⁵ According to Ball, Greece realized for the first time that the Cyprus problem was dragging Athens into the war, and started to talk about a negotiation process in which the Cypriot President Makarios did not participate. Having received the support of Türkiye for a US initiative after Greece, Ball presented his report at 11 June to President Johnson.²⁶ Johnson invited İnönü and Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou to Washington DC and he received a consent of them to discuss the US Plan in Geneva.²⁷ The talks would be within the UN initiative but under the auspices of Dean Acheson, the former US secretary of state. The proposed document was called Acheson Plan, suggested a kind of Enosis while giving Türkiye a sovereign base, it also ensured the security of the Turkish Cypriots. The great part of the island would be given to Greece and the Turkish Cypriots would gain autonomy at the local level.²⁸ According to the US, this plan was a solution that the Greeks could accept as Enosis and the Turks as Taksim. As can be seen, the US plan aimed to effectively eliminate the Republic of Cyprus. The fact that the Cypriots were not represented in the talks in Geneva showed that the plan was aimed to be imposed on them. While preparing the plan, the US thought that the agreements between Türkiye and Greece would be sufficient and

22. Rusk, Deptel to Ankara 1290, 5.6.1964, “Message from Johnson to İnönü”, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA.

23. Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, 13 December, 1956]; Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation of the Turkish Ambassador and the Secretary, 4.6.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA.

24. Telcon between Johnson and Rusk, 9.6.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2081, NARA.

25. Rusk to Ankara 1337, 11.6.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA; G. W. Ball, (1982), *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, London, pp. 352-355.

26. Memorandum from Ball to Johnson, Subject: The Cyprus Problem, 11.6.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA.

27. Memcon between the US and the Turkish Delegations, 22.6.1964 & Memcon between the Greek and American Delegations, 24.6.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA.

28. Acheson to Ball, Embtel 114, 14.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA 2087.

assumed that they would persuade their communities in Cyprus. As can be seen, one of these methods was the use of violence, if necessary, against those who opposed the plan.

The US Plan

Acheson started the negotiations with the Turkish representative Nihat Erim on 9 July. Apart from that, he continued his contacts with the UN mediator.²⁹ After Acheson presented his own proposals, Erim “presented the partition plan of the Turks” as a counter-suggestion. Acheson thought that a Turkish base could be established on the Karpaz peninsula and Türkiye’s “need for security” would be met. Acheson claimed that the security and welfare of Turkish Cypriots could be solved within the scope of Enosis. Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots would have a local and autonomous administration under the control of the Greek government. In addition, one or more regions with a Turkish Cypriot majority would be created and these area(s) be administered by the Turkish Cypriots. In this/these region/regions, the Turkish Cypriots would have their own police, courts, water administrations and powers to build regional roads, apart from levying taxes.³⁰ In short, the US plan essentially gave the majority of the island to Greece, while the Karpaz peninsula was presented to Türkiye as a sovereign territory. Türkiye found the US plan as positive and stated that it could accept it.

The US wanted the plan to be discussed in secret and to inform the Cypriots after the agreement of the parties. However, the contents of the talks were leaked outside and Makarios became aware of the details of the plan. Makarios immediately went to Athens to reject the plan and tried to get the support of the Greek people. The prediction of the US that “Greece decides and Greek Cypriots accept it” did not come true and Makarios managed to gain the support of the Greek public. The US ambassador, Labouisse, reported the success of Makarios in Athens on July 31st: “Yesterday, Archbishop Makarios was at the center of Greek policy, pushing the Papandreou government behind the scenes. [...] The center of the Hellenism was Nicosia, not Athens.”³¹ During his meetings with the Greek government in Athens, Makarios also received a promise from Prime Minister Papandreou that the US plan would be rejected.

Despite Papandreou's promise to Makarios, he gave up on his promise as a result of the great pressure exerted by the US on Greece and Athens decided to

29. The report of the NSC meeting, 4.8.1964: Records of Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus 1 Contingency Plans to Cyprus VI Miscellaneous, box 12, NARA.

30. Acheson to Ball, Embtel 92, 11.7.1964/92, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2087, NARA.

31. Labouisse, for Acheson, Embtel Athens 187, 31.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2087, NARA.

continue the talks in Geneva.³² Hearing this decision of Papandreou, Makarios restarted the military attacks against the Turkish Cypriots. According to Drousiotis, this military attack was intended to collapse the talks in Geneva. Because the continuation of the conflicts in Cyprus would strain Turkish-Greek relations and the negotiations would fail.³³ The UK's past plans for Cyprus have fueled increased violence on the island. In the same way, the US plan of 1964 caused a re-experience of ethnic violence in Cyprus from the very beginning.

The increase of violence in Cyprus caused Acheson to intensify his work even more. Acheson's initial goal was to reduce the differences between the positions of Greece and Türkiye and to prevent the talks from collapsing. According to the US representative, progress on Turkish Cypriot rights and Papandreou's attitude towards the transfer of UK military bases to NATO under Turkish command had to be seen positive. Thus, both Türkiye's security would be ensured and its prestige would be preserved. Acheson also claimed that it would be possible to transfer the sovereignty of Meis (Kastellorizo), a Greek island to Ankara.³⁴ Acheson's philosophy was to satisfy Ankara by meeting Türkiye's security needs and ensuring that the rights of Turkish Cypriots. However, Acheson, who was thinking within the framework of global policies, could not understand why Türkiye was giving more importance to "double Enosis" as he was waiting Ankara to show its satisfaction.³⁵ Türkiye's expectation of a sovereign base ended with Greece's response to Acheson. Although Greece accepted the base proposal in its reply to Acheson on 10 August, it insisted that the base would be leased, not sovereign.³⁶ For the US, the bases being sovereign or leased meant practically the same thing and Türkiye should have understood this point.³⁷

In this process, Prime Minister Papandreou worked on the plan and decided that by Enosis the problem could finish. The Enosis decision however should be taken in the (Greek Cypriots) House of Representatives of Cyprus. Papandreou sent Defense Minister Petros Garoufalias to Cyprus to get Makarios consent on Enosis. While Makarios said he could accept Enosis, he wanted the "impossible" and brought up the condition that the UK should remove its bases from the

32. Labouisse to Acheson, Embtel Athens 197, 2.8.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2089, NARA.

33. Drousiotis, M. (2008), *The First Partition: Cyprus 1963-1964*, Alfadi Publications, Nicosia, pp. 234-235.

34. Labouisse, Embtel Athens 116, 14.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2088, NARA.

35. Acheson to Ball, Embtel Geneva 168, 21.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2090, NARA.

36. Labouisse to Acheson, Athens 260, 11.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis - Athens Telegrams 1 to Cyprus Crisis - Geneva Telegrams 1, box 14, NARA.

37. Labouisse, Embtel Athens 327, 17.8.1964: 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2090, NARA.

island and not give any base to Türkiye.³⁸ While the aforementioned process was going on in Cyprus, accepted Papandreou's proposal for a parliamentary decision and said that if the Parliament could not take a decision, the coup route could also be tried. According to the US representative, all that was needed was a secret agreement between Greece and Türkiye.³⁹ As can be seen, the US plan, which came to the fore for peaceful purposes, also left the door open for a coup when necessary. In fact, the problem for the US was that Türkiye did not trust Papandreou and that the Greek Prime Minister was not strong enough to control Makarios.⁴⁰

Makarios' uncompromising stance caused the US to play their cards a little more openly. When US Department of State officials offered Greece to play the leading role and it should contact directly with the Greek Cypriot National Guard Commander General Georgios Grivas. On August 20, Ball sent the new "American" plan to Athens to be conveyed to Papandreou. What had to be done for the US was clear, and Greece could not be told how to achieve Enosis. Responsibility was on Greece and Papandreou had to strive to achieve success.⁴¹ However, due to Greece's refusal to give land to Türkiye from Cyprus⁴² and Türkiye's refusal to give consent anything less than a sovereign base on the island,⁴³ Acheson announced on 22 August that the plan was rejected by the parties and the Geneva talks failed.⁴⁴

During his time in Geneva, Acheson was in constant communication with the US missions in Washington DC, Athens and Ankara. After the parties rejected the plan the George Ball requested Acheson to continue his task and determined how Enosis could be implemented in practice. According to Acheson, both Greece and Türkiye had sufficient strength to achieve their aims. The US preferred Greece's Enosis plan and not Türkiye's Taksim plan. For this reason, Greece had to take more responsibility and work on Enosis. For this, Greece should assure Türkiye that the security and well-being of the Turkish Cypriots would be protected so that it could prevent Ankara's military intervention. After

38. Drousiotis, *opcit*, p. 279.

39. Acheson to Rusk, Embtel 426, 19.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis - Athens Telegrams 1 to Cyprus Crisis - Geneva Telegrams 1, box 14, NARA.

40. Acheson to Rusk, Embtel 425, 19.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis - Athens Telegrams 1 to Cyprus Crisis - Geneva Telegrams 1, box 14, NARA.

41. Ball to Labouisse, Deptel Flash 327, 20.8.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2091, NARA.

42. Labouisse for Acheson, Flash Deptel 366, 21.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box 2089, NARA.

43. Acheson, Embtel Geneva 445, 21.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box. 2091, NARA.

44. Acheson, Embtel Geneva 461, 22.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams II to Cyprus Crisis-Dept's Outgoing Telegrams II, box 15, NARA.

the agreement with Türkiye, Enosis had to be carried out by the Commander of the National Guard Grivas and the Greek troops on the island.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, in practice the US should encourage Greece and Türkiye to make an agreement before and after Enosis. The third version of the US plan was conveyed to Papandreou and the Prime Minister invited Makarios to Athens to persuade him before responding to the US request. When Makarios accused the Greek Prime Minister of treason in Athens, all the plans changed. According to Labouisse, Makarios accusation of Papandreou of treason against Cyprus completely “shake” the Prime Minister’s position.⁴⁶ Moreover, Türkiye did not trust Papandreou, and the Greek Prime Minister would not act in Cyprus without Türkiye’s guarantee. The US had to consider its plan after Makarios unequivocal rejection of any foreign base including NATO on the island in response to Enosis. Clearly in this stage the agreement between Türkiye and Greece was considered impossible.⁴⁷

The plan, which was shaped for the 4th time on August 26, aimed to achieve Enosis in Cyprus without an agreement between Türkiye and Greece, but with the help of the US.⁴⁸ Acheson’s latest plan gave Greece and Türkiye more responsibility. Accordingly, Türkiye and Greece would avoid fighting among themselves and Makarios would be removed from his post. For this, Greece had enough power on the island and the US would help it if necessary. The last step was the inclusion of Türkiye in the Cyprus case. To this end, the US would direct the Turks to create their own military strategy on the island, top secretly and indirectly. Türkiye would occupy the Karpas peninsula, which it specifically aimed to own but would not go beyond it. When Türkiye landed troops on the island, the Greek media would announce that the landing was not intended to attack any part of the island, but to re-establish the constitutional order on the island in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee.⁴⁹ As can easily be understood, according to the final version of the US plan, Greece and Türkiye would not enter into any conflicts with each other while taking the previously agreed areas under their control. On the other hand, both sides would be free in their movements

45. Acheson for Ball, Embtel Geneva 462, 22.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams II to Cyprus Crisis-Dept’s Outgoing Telegrams II, box 15, NARA.

46. Labouisse, Immediate Embtel Athens 405, also for Acheson, 25.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Athens Telegrams 1 to Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams 1, box 14, NARA.

47. Labouisse, Flash Embtel Athens 407, also for Acheson, 25.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box 2089, NARA.

48. Acheson to Ball, Immediate Embtel Geneva 486, Subject: “Outline of Acheson Plan No. 4”, 26.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams II to Cyprus Crisis-Dept’s Outgoing Telegrams II, box 15, NARA.

49. Ibid.

while maintaining control in their own territories. This understanding paved way for both sides to use violence in Cyprus during the present period and in the following period.

The last plan of the US never came before the parties but the third version of the plan was giving Türkiye and Greece enough hints that the parties could understand their space to act freely when necessary. The fourth plan did not come before the parties because of various reasons. The upcoming presidential elections in the US and the need for Türkiye and Greece to take radical decisions for the implementation of the plan were possible reasons why the plan was not brought to the agenda. In addition, it is possible to count the possibility that Makarios had a very strong position in Cyprus and Greece. Nevertheless, the implementation of such a plan would cause more bloodshed on the island that might not decrease the tension between the relevant parties in the short period during the era that Western bloc needed solidarity between the members. However, only after ten years later firstly Greece and then Türkiye intervened militarily on the island in accordance with the spirit of the US plan for their own goals.

Conclusion

Western world, especially the US perceived communism threat during first decades of the Cold War. In this context Washington would like to solve the problems of NATO within the "family" to avoid approaches that would benefit the USSR. In 1960s tension between the US and the USSR in the Far East began to move to the Middle East region. For this reason, it was very important to keep NATO's southern flank out of trouble. When the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960, the US considered keeping Cyprus under the control of Greece and Türkiye with the support of the UK. However, this "semi-independent state" collapsed at the end of 1963 as the parties focused on their national goals. As mentioned before the US wanted to solve the Cyprus problem within the NATO organization. However Cypriot President Makarios aimed to take the Cyprus problem to the UN where especially the nonaligned states that Cyprus was a member would give full support to him. Also Makarios would get backing of the communist countries as well. The main goal of the US during this period was firstly to prevent a conflict between Turkey and Greece in order to protect the integrity of NATO's southern flank and secondly to control Makarios actions at the UN. When the island became the arena Cold War confrontation during this period, the US reluctantly had to deal more with the problem. The US attempt to bring a NATO unit to Cyprus as a peacekeeping force was blocked by Makarios and the US had to approve a UN force to come to the island that did not include the Soviet bloc troops. However, the arrival of the UN peacekeeping force to Cyprus was delayed and Türkiye began to claim its military intervention to Cyprus. To prevent Türkiye the US started to work on a plan that would radically

solve the Cyprus problem. This was the Acheson Plan which would have devastating effects during 1964 and in the following period.

It will be enlightening to remember that the UK was successful to separate the Greek and Turkish Cypriots after 1955. What the US "could do" during the formation of the Republic of Cyprus was to work on some mechanisms to have links between the two communities. Nevertheless, even the constitution that US mediated to be produced was divisive in character. The US effort was partly successful because the priority of Washington was to unite the Greek and Turkish Cypriots against communism. Although both leaderships united against communism the communities continue to be fragmented because of the divisive nationalisms. When the two communities at late December 1963 began intercommunal strife the US produce a plan to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus and unite Cyprus with Greece while giving a base to Türkiye. Türkiye at the beginning accepted the first version of the plan because it would have a sovereign base in Cyprus. When the second version of the plan introduced however Ankara rejected the plan. The reason was that the US changed its offer from sovereign to lease base and asked Türkiye to accept it. In the case of Greece contrary to the opinion of Washington Greece did not have enough influence on Makarios to get consent for the US deal. While the plan was being discussed in Geneva, Makarios was able to weaken the Greek government by saying "Greece is selling Cyprus." Makarios did not only ensure more soldiers and ammunition from Greece but was able to start a new military operation against the Turkish Cypriots. The bloodshed continued in Cyprus.

Consequently the Acheson Plan was rejected by all parties. However, the US Plan had its legacy and subsequent effects in the following years. Because what was discussed during the Acheson Plan period had its effect. When the Geneva negotiations process is reconsidered it will be seen that there has been a significant evolution in the mindset of Turkey and Greece after the Acheson Plan.

As discussed above the UK Cyprus policies in the 1950s and the US in the 1960s gave way to the violence on the island. Because of the strategic reasons London did not hesitate to use violence as a tool to maintain its sovereignty in Cyprus. The Acheson Plan was not implemented but had great repercussions in the following years. Perhaps the most dramatic reflection of the US plan was in 1974. Both Greece and Türkiye established the intellectual infrastructure of their plans to intervene in Cyprus inspired by the Acheson Plan. The coup carried out by the Greek military junta in Cyprus on 15 July was highly compatible with the coup scenario proposed by Acheson. Although the US was against the Greek military junta's coup in Cyprus, it could/did not prevent the coup. On 20 July Türkiye was acted within the spirit of the Acheson Plan when landing troops on the island. Türkiye knew it well that the US which could/did not stop Greece, would not prevent it either. For this reason, Türkiye was very comfortable and took control of the north of the island by acting in accordance with its partition plan proposed in Geneva. The Acheson Plan was based on the fact that Greece

and Türkiye would not fight because of Cyprus and accordingly the parties did not enter a war at Aegean Sea or Trace in 1974 despite all the tensions. Also the parties during the 1974 events acted more autonomous than they could not do in 1964. In 1964 the Cold War was in full gear and the members of NATO were completely dependent on the global policies of the US. Due to the détente of 1970s the allied countries were freer to implement their own national policies. It was the détente between US and USSR that made Greece and Türkiye freer than 1964. Clearly, Greece and Türkiye used certain elements of the US plan of 1964 in 1974 which caused violence in Cyprus again and the result was *de facto* division of the island.

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