

## Philosophical *plasma* in Dio Chrysostom's Fourth Discourse on Kingship and Socrates' Political Testament in *Alcibiades*

By Ranko Kozić\*

*On the basis of evidence obtained by unravelling enigmas in Dio's fourth discourse and lifting the veil of mystery surrounding some of the crucial, sophistic-related passages from the mentioned writing, we were able to arrive to a conclusion that, no matter what the so-called sophists say of the phenomenon in their attempts to disguise the essence of things, the Second Sophistic is closely connected not so much with rhetoric as with philosophy itself or, to be more precise, Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, as proved by Dio's frequent use of philosophical, or rather Socratic *plasma* in his discourses. Paradoxically enough, after careful analysis of Dio's invective against sophists, it turned out that his conception of the sophistic is basically the same as that of Isocrates, the only difference being that in the latter there was still a room for the legacy of the old sophistic, something to which Dio was fully opposed.*

### Introduction

The term 'philosophical *plasma*' immediately strikes the eye as one reads the title of this study by virtue of the fact that it has not been used thus far in research on the Second Sophistic, which is why it may very easily be called into question by the biased and perhaps even the unbiased reader. At the very outset, the author sees himself obliged to give answer to the questions such as: "what the so-called philosophical *plasma* actually is" and "what made him coin the term." We will attempt to clarify the issue by proceeding in reverse order, i.e. by first giving an answer to the last question, because the stress will thus be laid on the methodological challenges the scholars confront in doing research on the Greek renaissance of the first century, ever since von Arnim's classical monograph saw the light of day some hundred and twenty years ago,<sup>1</sup> namely a renaissance that exercised decisive influence over the entire corpus of post-classical Greek literature.

What gave occasion to introduce the newly-coined term into the mentioned research area was the fact that the use of key terms such as *philosophos*, *sophistes* and *rhetor* by the major exponents of the Second Sophistic has not been sufficiently clarified by previous research on the subject, with the studies of the mentioned renaissance thus getting caught, time and again, in a vicious circle, as a result of

---

\* Professor, Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade, Serbia.

1. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampf um die Jugendbildung* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1898). Hereinafter referred to as von Arnim, *Dio von Prusa*.

which the old and the new sophistic have become closely and, sometimes, too closely associated with each other.<sup>2</sup> To tell the truth, the term 'second sophistic' was itself, in a certain measure, disputable to none other than Wilhelm Schmid and Albin Lesky, the authors of the two extensive and model monographs on history of Greek literature, in so far as it is, according to the latter,<sup>3</sup> misleading and, in the view of the former,<sup>4</sup> represents a specific kind of legend with a noticeable tendency concerning Aeschines as the creator of the new sophistic, with the preliminary remark that Gerth's attitude towards the phenomenon, otherwise essentially based on Grainger's,<sup>5</sup> deserves also to be quoted here, namely the attitude that there are no substantial differences between the old and the new sophistic, in so far as both phenomena were essentially characterized by a purely formal element such as rhetoric.<sup>6</sup> Ironically enough, increasing evidence suggests that this was entirely the wrong approach to take to the phenomenon, as shown by the fact that the new sophistic will turn out to be, unlike the old one, essentially determined by philosophy itself, as will be demonstrated below.

---

2. This seems to be a result of Philostratus' enigmatic depiction of the phenomenon, as evidenced by the fact that in his *Lives of the Sophists* almost no distinction was made between the old and the new sophistic (481: ἡ δὲ μετ' ἐκείνην, ἣν οὐχὶ νέαν, ἀρχαία γὰρ, δευτέραν δὲ μᾶλλον προσητέον) which, unfortunately, found its reflection in the attitude taken by Wilhelm Kroll, "Rhetorik", *RE Suppl.* Bd. VII 1039 ff. Cf. our study "ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΕΝ ΔΟΞΗ ΤΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΣΑΙ: An Enigmatic Depiction of the Second Sophistic in Philostratus and Eunapius' *Lives of the Sophists* or What is Indeed the Mentioned Sophistic?, *Athens Journal of Philosophy* 1 (2022), 51-70 where an attempt was made to lift the veil of mystery surrounding the phenomenon as described by Philostratus. Also worth noting is K. Eshleman's study "Defining the Circle of Sophists: Philostratus and the Construction of the Second Sophistic," *Classical Philology* 103 (2008), 395-413 in so far as it represents a rare attempt to challenge established views of the new sophistic.

3. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1971), 1139.

4. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur: Die nachklassische Periode der griechischen Literatur von 100 bis 539 nach Christus* (München: C. H. Beck, 1981), 688.

5. *Un milliardaire antique, Herode Atticus et sa famille* (Cairo: Imprimerie Misr, 1930), ix. Cf. André Boulanger, *Aelius Aristide et la sophistique dans la province d'Asie au II siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1925), 73.

6. "Die Zweite oder Neue Sophistik", *RE Suppl.* VIII, 725. Such attitudes to the phenomenon of the Second Sophistic can be explained by the influence of Rohde's theses on the so-called sophistic rhetoric, as expressed in the famous chapter "Die griechische Sophistik der Kaiserzeit" (310-387) of his classical work, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1914), where almost no distinction was made between the new and the old sophistic, namely theses that were regarded by none other than Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa, von VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance* (Stuttgart und Leipzig: Teubner, 1915), 275 (hereinafter referred to as Norden, *Kunstprosa*) as almost flawless. Truth be told, Rohde argued correctly that the look of the so-called Second Sophistic was, as Schmid put it, "rückwärts gewendet," i.e. turned backwards, but not so much, as he thought, to the old sophistic as to a specific legend only vaguely associated with it, as shall be seen later.

Von Arnim's work itself provides an instructive example of how misleading it is to assume that the content of the notions *philosophos*, *sophistes* and *rhetor* had not considerably changed over time and remained basically the same in the period of the Second Sophistic as it had been in the Athens of Socrates and Plato, where one of the most bitter disputes in the history of ideas raged, with all the exponents of the mentioned intellectual currents taking an active part in it. Truth be told, it was due to deficiencies in his methodological approach that von Arnim was forced to formulate a theory of the bitter struggle between sophistic, philosophy and rhetoric for gaining pre-eminence in the education of the youth in the course of the last four centuries BC, resulting, in his view, in a landslide victory for rhetoric in the period of the Second Sophistic,<sup>7</sup> as a consequence of which he regarded the Second Sophistic as a specific offshoot of the old one<sup>8</sup> despite a lapse of almost five centuries since the latter left a gap in continuity.

### **Von Arnim's Thesis and an Enigma in Dio's Invective against the Sophists: Which Sophistic is targeted in his Tirades—the New or the Old?**

That something has gone wrong with Arnim's thesis can be inferred from Dio's disparaging attitudes to sophists, as expressed in his fourth discourse on kingship. It is in this discourse that the sophists are characterized as ignorant,<sup>9</sup> tricky fellows,<sup>10</sup> men attracting only simpletons,<sup>11</sup> lecherous eunuchs<sup>12</sup> and

---

7. In an attempt to prove his thesis, he points to the fact (*Dio von Prusa*, 77–84) that an almost parallel turning to rhetoric occurred in both the Peripatos and the Academy when headed in the third century BC by Lycon and Arcesilaus respectively, with this kind of innovation in the teaching process being regarded by the author as a decline in the case of Peripatos and a rise, as far as the Academy is concerned. He, moreover, considered Ariston's living word resembling, in his view, the song of the Sirens to be the culmination of the mentioned process, a song which was, instead of with Socrates (*Plat., Symp.*, 215e) erroneously associated with the sophistic and yet regarded as a convincing proof of its victory over philosophy. In this context, it should also be noted that every theory that supports the assumption that the Second Sophistic is primarily characterised by rhetoric can rightly be regarded as yet another instance of adopting von Arnim's theses.

8. Von Arnim's conclusion (*Dio von Prusa*, 104–112 ff.) is essentially based on the passage from Cicero (*On the Orator*, 3, 109–110), in which the head of the Academy, Philo of Larissa, is represented as advocating the educational ideal of the old sophistic: "Noch entschiedener wird im ersten Jahrhundert von philosophischer Seite das sophistische Bildungsideal erneuert. Ein Scholarch der Akademie, Philon von Larissa ist es, der in den ersten beiden Jahrzehnten des ersten Jahrhunderts das einst durch Platon überwundene sophistische Bildungsideal mit Begeisterung vertritt."

9. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 28: ... ἀλλ' ἐκείνων (sc. τῶν σοφιστῶν) μὲν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐχ ὅπως βασιλεύειν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ζῆν ἴσασιν.

10. *Ibid.*, 32: ... καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτὸν ἔτι τι τούτων (sc. ἐκείνης τῆς παιδείας) ἀφέλοιτο οὔτε καιρὸς οὔτε ἄνθρωπος σοφιστής.

miserable creatures,<sup>13</sup> only to be afterwards closely associated with the hybrid race of the centaurs<sup>14</sup> as a monstrous brood sprung from Ixion's embrace of a dark and dismal cloud. Not even this mythical comparison was sufficient enough for Dio to express contempt for the exponents of such educational aspirations, as can be deduced from the fact that he felt the need to have recourse to Socrates' favourite habit of drawing analogies with the animal world, with the sophists now being characterized as untrained and unruly dogs misleading others more experienced in hunting by both barking at random and behaving as if they knew the scent and saw the prey and thus ending up deceiving the hunters and becoming like their human *analogon* the very symbol of ignorance and inexperience.<sup>15</sup> That the exponents of this intellectual current were considered a very dangerous, anti-state element against which one should fight an unrelenting battle, sparing no effort and no-one can be inferred from the fact that most of Dio's insulting sophistic-related comparisons appear in his discourses on kingship, which gains in importance when we take into account the state- and nation-building nature of these writings. This in itself is of paramount significance for what follows below.

As expressed in his *Dio*, Synesius' thesis on Dio Chrysostom's two life phases, diametrically opposed to each other and roughly coinciding with the period "before his exile" and "subsequent to his exile,"<sup>16</sup> gave occasion to set up a crude dichotomy within Dio's oeuvre, as shown by the fact that Dio was a sophist in his early period, only to recant these youthful beliefs and become a philosopher in the years of his maturity—a dichotomy that has been readily adopted by previous research on the subject. In support of his thesis, Synesius points to Dio's

11. *Ibid.*, 35.

12. *Ibid.*: καὶ γνῶση ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει σοφιστῆς ἄνθρωπος εὐνοῦχου ἀκολάστου.

13. *Ibid.*, 38: ... ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τύχῃς τοῦ διδασκάλου τοῦ Διὸς ὀμιλητοῦ ... οὐδὲν σοὶ πλεόν, οὐδὲ ἂν ὄλον κατατρίψῃς τὸν βίον ἀγρυπνῶν τε καὶ ἀσιτῶν παρὰ τοῖς κακοδαίμοσι σοφισταῖς.

14. *Ibid.*, 131: ... θαυμαστὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλογα, προσεικότα τοῖς Κενταύροις ... ξυγγράματα σοφιστῶν.

15. *Ibid.*, 34: ὡς περ αἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀκόλαστοι κύνες ἐν τῇ θήρᾳ μηδὲν ξυνεῖσαι οὐδὲ γνωρίσασαι τὸ ἵχνος, ἐξαπατῶσιν ἄλλας τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ σχήματι ὡς εἰδυῖαί τε καὶ ὀρώσαι ... τοιοῦτον εὔροις ἂν καὶ περὶ τοὺς καλουμένους σοφιστὰς πολλὸν ὄχλον ἐνίστε συνεπόμενον ἀνθρώπων ἡλιθίων. It is worth mentioning that, contrary to what was thought, the sophistic as a phenomenon was subject to severe criticism not only in the *Discourses on Kingship*, but also in Dio's entire oeuvre, as can be inferred from the index provided by H. Lamar Crosby in his study edition of the author. Thus we are faced with a paradox in so far as it turns out that the greatest exponent of the new sophistic is a bitter enemy of the old, a piece of evidence that refutes the theory which puts an equals-sign between the two phenomena.

16. Synesius, *Dio*, 1, 35 ff., re-edited in the fifth volume of H. Lamar Crosby's edition of Dio's discourses (LCL 385) under the title *Testimony regarding Dio's Life and Writings*, 374 (hereinafter referred to as Synesius, *Dio* in Lamar Crosby, *Testimony*).

praises of the hair, parrot<sup>17</sup> and gnat,<sup>18</sup> composed in his early period, of which only the first-mentioned has survived, due to the fact that it was included in his own encomium on baldness. The first impression we get while reading Dio's praise of the hair is that it should be considered a short "essay" on cultural phenomenon such as wearing long hair by Spartan youth, rather than a sophisticated writing, as evidenced by the fact that Synesius read it time and again as if under a spell or hypnotized by its beauty. Thus, we have good reason to believe that Dio's two other encomiums on trivial topics such as praising the parrot and the gnat also assumed characteristics of an "essay", if we take into account, above all, Homer's mastery in drawing analogies with similar species of animal life such as flies.<sup>19</sup>

Another passage from the mentioned writing, where Synesius' holds the view that Dio handled what was usually classed among purely rhetorical subjects no longer as a rhetorician but rather like a statesman,<sup>20</sup> makes us understand the real reason for setting up such dichotomies within Dio's oeuvre, and the reason consists in the fact that the nation- and state-building nature of some of his literary products was the key criterion for introducing divisions within an indivisible whole, at least as far as the stylistic point of view is concerned. It is this state-building nature of a certain literary work that will turn out to be of paramount importance in unravelling the key enigma, i.e. obtaining an answer to the question: 'who are indeed these sophists in confrontation with whom Dio uses a whole series of mocking qualifiers so as to discredit them altogether.'

All of the above suggests that what we are dealing with here are the exponents of the old sophistic, but the fact that in a fit of anger Dio crosses swords with the expounders of a spiritual current having a long time ago lost its relevance seems a little bit strange and anachronistic. This can be explained—at least for now—by the fact that the first major exponent of the new sophistic crosses swords not so much with the leading exponents of the old one as with its legacy which he, acting in the best national interests, regarded as extremely toxic, even when almost no fire was smouldering under ashes. Thus, we can see how an uncompromising attitude to the whole legacy of the old sophistic as well as to

---

17. Cf. Synesius, *Dio* in Lamar Crosby, *Testimony*, 372: ... φησί (sc. Philostratus) ... σοφιστοῦ γὰρ εἶναι μὴδὲ τούτων ὑπεριδεῖν. It should be said in this connection that Philostratus (487), unlike Synesius, creates no dichotomies within Dio's oeuvre, as evidenced by the fact that he puts Dio's most popular, and in the opinion of many greatest oration, the *Tale of Euboea* or rather the *Euboean Discourse*, in the same category as the mentioned encomia on trivial topics—something that can serve as a guideline for how we should read his oeuvre.

18. The fables about the elephant and the gnat and the lion and the gnat we come across in Tatius' novel (2, 21, 4 and 2, 22, 1-7 respectively) give us an inkling about the popularity enjoyed by this type of encomium in the period of the Second Sophistic and later times.

19. *Iliad*, 2, 469-473. Cf. Lucian, *The Fly* (*Muscae encomium*).

20. Synesius, *Dio* in Lamar Crosby, *Testimony*, 372.: ... καὶ τὰς ῥητορικὰς τῶν ὑποθέσεων οὐκέτι ῥητορικῶς ἀλλὰ πολιτικῶς μετεχειρήσατο.

every attempt at its revivification was beginning to take hold by the middle of the first century AD—a fact which makes us confront *aporia* because what needs to be explained at the very outset is the curious paradox that almost all the exponents of the Greek renaissance of the first century were so proud to be honoured with the title of sophist. In order to know what may be the reasons therefore, we must carefully analyze Dio's entire oeuvre so as to be able to identify a prime mover in inspiring his tirades as well as the attitudes of all major exponents of the mentioned renaissance. What is referred to here is a powerful driving force provided by a political testament despite the fact that it was given only in bare outline in one of Plato's early dialogues.

What we still need before focusing our attention on the mentioned driving force is yet further evidence that what was targeted in Dio's impassioned invective were only the exponents of the old sophistic and its legacy with almost no flame, as it seemed, smouldering under the ashes in his own time. We must, first of all, search for evidence in Dio's work and complement it with that provided by the authors of the age of Plato so as to be able to obtain a reliable result.

### **Dio's State of Being In-Between Homer and Socrates and Setting up False Dichotomies Within his Oeuvre**

The evidence itself remained unnoticed owing to the fact that it could be found only in Dio's two fairly short "essays" on Socrates (or. 54, 55), with the latter being of particular importance to our objectives, due to both the author's thesis about a close spiritual affinity between the Athenian philosopher and Homer and his attitudes towards philosophical and literary activity. The former, on the other hand, provides an answer to the questions of who indeed these sophists are with whom Dio crosses swords, and what the main reason is for the invective he heaped on them. We find the reason therefore in his characterisation of the mentioned sophists' orations as speeches devoid of even the slightest sense, the large proportion of which can, in his view, only be explained by their authors' base motives to make money and please simpletons and fools.<sup>21</sup> The curious paradox, in Dio's view, is that the writings of the sophists, "who won such admiration, have perished and nothing remains but their name alone, the words of Socrates, for some strange reason, still endure and will endure for all time, though he himself did not write or leave behind him either a treatise or a will."<sup>22</sup>

---

21. *Fifty-Fourth Discourse*, 1-2: ἔλεγον δὲ πολλοὺς μὲν λόγους, νοῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔχοντας οὐδὲ βραχύν ...

22. *Ibid*, 4: ... τῶν μὲν θαυμαζομένων ἐκείνων σοφιστῶν ἐκλελοίπασιν οἱ λόγοι ... οἱ δὲ τοῦ Σωκράτους διαμένουσι καὶ διαμενοῦσι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, τούτου μὲν αὐτοῦ γράψαντος οὔτε σύγγραμμα ... Cf. also the analogy drawn between meat, salt and the

It is now more than apparent that the target of Dio's invective was the legacy of the ancient sophistic, and it is also more than clear that the above-mentioned driving force is to be identified with the living and breathing word praised in hymnal tunes in the *Phaedrus*.

On the other hand, it is in the last mentioned of the two short "essays," in which striking similarities between Socrates and Homer are advocated, that we find a key reason why Synesius set up dichotomies within Dio's oeuvre, as demonstrated by the fact that "they both were devoted to the same ends and spoke about the same things" through different media such as those of verse and prose,<sup>23</sup> and were, furthermore, most "effective at making similes, comparisons" and analogies. This is further corroborated by the fact that drawing seemingly trivial analogies with starlings, daws, locusts, a firebrand, ashes, beans and chickpeas is, due to their educational function, at least of the same, if not even greater importance in Homer's work as making similes with the almighty creatures of both wild life and myth, such as lions and eagles or Scylla and Cyclopes,<sup>24</sup> which can sufficiently explain not only what seemed at first sight to be the sudden appearance of encomia on the parrot and the gnat in the period of the Second Sophistic, but also setting up dichotomies within Dio's oeuvre, most likely stemming from Dio's implicitly subdividing the aspects of Homer's poetry into the purely didactic and those with a state-building dimension—something that is also true for Socrates' living word, essentially characterized by a mixture of polar opposites, such as the serious and the laughable.<sup>25</sup> We can rightly assume that, except for Homer's effectiveness at making such comparisons, Socrates' strong personal predilection for drawing analogies with animal life—as expressed in the

---

Socratic grace in Dio's eighteenth discourse *On Training* (13): "For just as no meat without salt will be gratifying to the taste, so no branch of literature, as it seems to me, could possibly be pleasing to the ear if it lacked the Socratic grace." The English version of this and all other passages from Dio's discourses is borrowed from J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby's study edition of Dio's discourses (LCL).

23. *Fifty-Fifth Discourse*, 9: ... ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐσπουδαζέτην καὶ ἐλεγέτην, ὁ μὲν διὰ τῆς ποιήσεως, ὁ δὲ καταλογάδην.

24. *Ibid*, 10: ... τῶν Ὀμήρου τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδοκιμάζεις, ὅπου μέμνηται ψαρῶν ἢ κολοίων ἢ ἀκρίδων ἢ δαλοῦ ἢ τέφρας ἢ κυάμων τε καὶ ἐρεβίνθων ... μόνους δὲ θαυμάζεις τοὺς λέοντας καὶ τοὺς ἄετοὺς (sc. αὐτοῦ) ...

25. The mixture itself, apparently, springs from a particularly characteristic passage from the *Gorgias* (481c), with Calicles being therein represented as poking fun at Socrates' method of argumentation and saying that there is no way of knowing whether Socrates is serious or joking simply due to the fact that if he is serious and what he says is really true, the life of all human beings must have been turned upside down and we must be doing quite the opposite of what we ought to do. On the mixture of the serious and the laughable as a widespread ideal of life and aesthetics in late antiquity and the Middle Ages see Ernst Robert Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern: FranckeVerlag, 1961), 419-434. It is worth mentioning that Platonic origin of the mixture is not even touched upon in his summary presentation of the phenomenon.

prologue to the *Phaedrus* with the celebrated philosopher comparing none other than himself to animals grazing on pasture<sup>26</sup>—may have also given rise to the widespread popularity enjoyed by encomium of such a type in the mentioned period.

If it seems that all the potential these two short “essays” have for helping us understand the dominant tendencies in post-classical Greek literature as a whole has been exhausted with the above, appearances are deceptive. It is in Dio’s 55<sup>th</sup> discourse that we come across the remarks of paramount importance for the poetics of all prose genres in the mentioned period, a discourse in which yet another striking similarity between Homer and Socrates stemming from the basic principles of their poetics was clearly pointed out. What is referred to here is the fusing of myth, history and fable<sup>27</sup> with each other, with all the constituent parts being so firmly combined and inseparably mixed, as exemplified by the centaur’s dual natures in Philostratus’ description of the painting *Education of Achilles*.<sup>28</sup> To say it more precisely, what we are dealing with here is a specific *plasma*,<sup>29</sup> and we shall see later in more detail what it looks like when taking a closer look at Dio’s fourth discourse, with the preliminary remark that the *plasma* itself is a complex phenomenon manifesting itself in three aspects: literary, political-strategic and philosophical, with those two first-mentioned having, as is self-evident, evolved from the final one.

But the concept of *plasma*, here understood in its broader sense as a method of elaborating, combining and fusing the exemplary subject-matter of philosophy

---

26. 230d-e.

27. *Fifty-Fifth Discourse*, 10: ... “Ὅμηρος διά τε μύθων καὶ ἱστορίας ἐπεχείρησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους παιδεύειν ... καὶ Σωκράτης πολλάκις ἐχρήτη τῷ τοιούτῳ ... The fable is, it seems, implicitly, present in Dio’s formulation, if we take, above all, the emblematic scene from the opening passage from the *Phaedo* into account, with Socrates represented in it as having recourse to both the poetic paraphrase of a comic prose model, i.e. Aesop’s fables, and the composition of the sublime lyrics, such as a hymn to Apollo as soon as his prison chains were unfastened. In all likelihood we have yet again to reckon with the influence of the *Gorgias*, as suggested by a particularly characteristic passage from the mentioned dialogue (523a), where *mythos* is explicitly identified with *logos*: ἄκουε δὴ ... μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἠγήση μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἀ μέλλω λέγειν. Moreover, in these two “short essays,” Dio seems to have publicly made known a magic formula, otherwise widely used in the writings of the Second Sophistic and other literary genres as well. What is referred to here is a fusion of Homeric imagery and Socratic or Platonic concept, be it that the latter ended up being condensed and reduced to the form of Homeric image, or be it that the Homeric image was further elaborated so as to assume characteristics of Platonic concept itself.

28. *Imagines*, 2, 2, 4: ἀλλὰ ἵππον ἀνθρώπῳ συμβαλεῖν θαῦμα οὐδέν, συναλεῖψαι μὴν καὶ ἐνώσαι καὶ διαδοῦναι ἄμφω λήγειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ διαφεύγειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰ τὸ τέμμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐλέγχοιεν.

29. Instead of *plasma*, Dio uses a synonymous term (*to eikos*)—a point to which we shall shortly return.



and literature, made its entrance into Greek spiritual space in an impressive way, no matter how summarily it was formulated in Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, where the stress was laid on *wisdom* and *industry*, or rather *sophia* and *epimeleia*,<sup>30</sup> as the two driving forces, which were later to be given the role of a specific bulwark and guarantor of victory when it comes to both countering foreign interference and defending the Greek living space in any future clashes with the barbarian element, be that even the almighty Persian empire itself. These two winged words were, no matter how paradoxical it may sound, quite sufficient to make up almost the whole content of a political manifesto due to the fact that Socrates himself unreservedly recommended the ethical-political aspect of his teaching to his interlocutor Alcibiades as a philosophical basis of his own testament<sup>31</sup>—something that, at least if we may judge by Dio's own attitudes to Socrates and his stylistic devices, may have grown into a universal cultivation and promotion of that legacy, resulting in a negative impact on rival intellectual currents such as those sophistic, which is why the Hellenic world was, relatively early on, transformed into an all too closed society creatively and zealously cultivating the mentioned literary-philosophical *plasma* as a central bulwark of its defence. This process reached its culmination in the third and fourth century AD, i.e., in the period covered by Eunapius' *Lives*, when Platonic philosophy and its legendary protagonist was assigned the role of the last bulwark of defence in an attempt made by dying paganism to resist the Christian religion irrepressibly penetrating the Hellenic living space, as testified by lyrical passages from the mentioned work.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, all of this gives occasion to point to the problem of the method used in previous research on the subject,<sup>33</sup> as shown by the fact that the evidence provided by Eunapius' *Lives* was almost entirely underestimated in the study of the phenomenon, due above all to Rohde's negative influence, as evidenced by the fact that he used his favourite qualifier *barbarian*<sup>34</sup> as a convenient label for

---

30. 123c-124b: καὶ οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν (sc. Xerxis uxorem) εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτω ἄλλω πιστεύων οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ (sc. Alcibiades) ἐπιχειρεῖ πλὴν ἐπιμελεία τε καὶ σοφία· ταῦτα γὰρ μόνα ἄξια λόγου ἐν Ἑλλησιν ...

31. 105d.

32. Cf. Eunapius' account (470-472) of Sosipatra and her youngest son Antoninus whose way of living is essentially characterized by what was openly advocated by Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (4, 7, 10), namely a need for attributing great importance to the mantic and divination in every well-ordered society.

33. When we say *previous research on the subject* we refer to the most influential theories put forward by Hans von Arnim, Paul Graindor, Wilhelm Kroll, Karl Gerth, André Boulanger, Erwin Rohde and Eduard Norden. The same is also true for the expression *the majority of scholars*.

34. *Der griechische Roman*, 386. He inadvertently overlooked the apotheosis of Socrates in Eunapius' *Lives*, as evidenced by the fact that the sophists of the third and fourth century AD kept following in his footsteps and imitating his way of life down to the last detail, as

playing down the otherwise precious testimonies contained in the mentioned writing. Ironically enough, only the text of the mentioned *Lives*, if complemented by Philostratus' biographies of sophists of an earlier period, gives us the opportunity to gain a rare insight into what the Second Sophistic actually is.

### **The Central Principles of Socrates' Political Testament in *Alcibiades* and Their Reflection in the Field of Literature as Depicted in Xenophon's *Memorabilia***

It remains to be seen what reflection the central principles of Socrates' political testament found in what is called creativity in the literary domain. It doesn't take much imagination to conclude that *sophia* and *epimeleia* were now closely associated with the careful and thoughtful elaboration of the literary concept, based on both the Socratic-Platonic and Homeric patterns, as advocated by Dio in his two short "essays" and symbolized in the period of the Second Sophistic by the workshop of Socrates' legendary ancestor, Daedalus, represented in Philostratus' description of the painting entitled *Pasiphae* as looking intently at intelligible reality exceeding by far the power of human mind<sup>35</sup>—a fact which clearly points to the realm beyond Heaven (Hyperouranios) and an entire sea of concepts streaming down from it so as to be carefully elaborated in his atelier and thus enabled to come out of it as truly living creatures, which could, in the last analysis, be regarded as an allusion to Socrates' living word and its magical powers. All of this suggests other possibilities for interpretation regarding the use of the term *sophistes* in Dio's oeuvre, because we can rightly assume that the target of Dio's invective was also his contemporaries and their inability to develop, refine and restructure the concepts derived from the essential premises of Platonic philosophy so as to be fully utilized for the defence and security of the entire Greek world, as can be inferred from a passage from Dio's 32<sup>nd</sup> discourse<sup>36</sup> in which the art of his rivals is regarded as purely deluding and wonder-working due to the lack of the above-mentioned strategic components in its content.

---

can be concluded from the author's account of Prohaeresius (492), Aedesius (482) and Chrysanthius' way of living (501).

35. *Imagines*, 1, 16, 1: ἀντὸς ὁ Δαίδαλος ἀττικίζει μὲν καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὑπέροσον τι καὶ ἔννοον βλέπων ...

36. *To the People of Alexandria*, 39: δεινοὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι καὶ μεγάλοι σοφισταὶ καὶ γόητες· τὰ δ' ἡμέτερα φαῦλα καὶ πεζὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Similar attitudes towards the sophists of his own time were also taken by Dio's contemporary Plutarch, *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* (*De audiendis poetis*), 43f, 48d where the exponents of the mentioned intellectual current are identified with popular lecturers or superficial persons bent on acquiring mere information respectively, which allows us to conclude that what Dio had in mind was just this kind of knowledge.

These central principles of the political testament seem to have been enveloped in an aura of sanctity almost immediately after the death of Socrates, as can be inferred from the evidence provided by Xenophon's *Memorabilia* which could be regarded as a legend of Socrates launched at the most suitable moment for putting the mentioned manifesto's key ideas into practice. Thus, contrary to von Arnim's disparaging attitude,<sup>37</sup> Xenophon's work turned out to be an important link in the entire tradition of Socratism and Platonism, a link without which it is not, it seems, possible to either understand the destiny of the old sophistic movement over the ensuing centuries or fully comprehend the sudden revivification of the legend of Socrates in the later period of the Second Sophistic, as evidenced by the fact that Eunapius sang its praises in hymn-like passages from his *Lives*.

An attentive reader may be surprised by our seemingly audacious attempt to characterize Xenophon's *Memorabilia* as a legend and thus link it more closely to Socrates' political testament given in bare outline in the *Alcibiades*. That there should be no room for surprise will soon be shown. What more closely connects the manifesto and the legend is nothing other than the fact that *sophia* and *epimeleia*, as crucial terms of Socrates' testament in the *Alcibiades*, are also key words of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*,<sup>38</sup> to be precise. However, it should be said that in Xenophon *sophia* as a more general term yields place to a more specific one such as *enkrateia*,<sup>39</sup> a difference that seems to have occurred not without reason, in so far as in Xenophon's legend all other central principles of Socrates' philosophy are presented as revolving around *enkrateia* as a specific axis, which is why *enkrateia* itself assumes characteristics of the quintessence of wisdom, since, in the author's opinion, it alone leads to contemplating the intelligible world and what

---

37. Dio von Prusa, 21. Aldo Brancacci, "Struttura compositiva e fonti della terza orazione 'Sulla regalità' di Dione Crisostomo", *ANRW II*, 36, 5, 3316 uses the term *logos Sokraticos* in order to prove his theory of Dio being inspired by the reflection which Socrates' living word found in Antisthenes.

38. *Epimeleia*, though semantically similar to *sophia*, is, among other things, closely associated in Xenophon (1, 4, 18) with the mantic to which crucial importance would be attached in the later periods of the Second Sophistic, as can be inferred from Eunapius' *Lives*. The fact that Eunapius shaped Sosipatra's character (470: καὶ πάντες ἤδεσαν ὅτι πανταχοῦ εἶη Σωσιπάτρα, καὶ πᾶσι πάρεστι τοῖς γινομένοις) under the influence of the famous passage from Xenophon's work [1, 4, 17: ... (sc. οἴεσθαι οὖν χρῆ) καὶ μὴ τὸν σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὄραν ... τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἰκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι] speaks volumes about the reflection the mentioned legend found in Eunapius.

39. Cf. 1, 6, 8-10., where Socrates advocated the view that *enkrateia*, apart from leading to contemplation of the intelligible world, could also make an athlete of a hopelessly weak person, something that, as he thought, was of decisive importance in the matter of strategic defence. On the other hand, in his conversation with Euthydemus (4, 5, 3-5), Socrates expounds his views on *enkrateia* as being a prerequisite of freedom, in so far as the lack of the former leads to slavery.

is Good in things themselves as well as to classifying the latter into both genera and groups and the possibility closely connected with it, such as constantly choosing Good and avoiding Evil in one's own activity.<sup>40</sup> Secondly, and no less important: the fact itself that *enkrateia* made of a personality with a delicate constitution, such as that of Socrates, an athlete capable of achieving heroic feats<sup>41</sup> might have offered an overdue spark of hope to all those who in the first two centuries AD were inspired by the ideal of the rebirth of the Greek spirit in a political frame alien to it, which explains the need for constantly actualizing the great philosopher's teachings, resulting in a kind of apotheosis of Socrates in Eunapius' *Lives*—a fact which clearly shows how fatal it was to ignore this source in research on the phenomenon.

In Xenophon's work, not only was Socrates represented as a true connoisseur of the intelligible world of ideas but also as an expert in almost all practical disciplines such as military art,<sup>42</sup> home economics,<sup>43</sup> house-keeping,<sup>44</sup> doing sustainable business and account-keeping,<sup>45</sup> with his solidarity with all the members of the community standing out from the rest for its importance and going so far as to induce him to not only help others with his advice, but also to carry like an athlete their own burden on his back.<sup>46</sup>

What is now of the greatest importance for our objectives is to ascertain what reflection the legend of Socrates found in the literary domain. What we encountered in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* surpassed all expectations, in so far as, against the background of Socrates' attitudes taken in his dialogues with both Parrhasius the painter and Cleito the sculptor, not only do we clearly see what the origins of the literary concept applied in the period of the Second Sophistic are, but also obtain a more concrete answer to the question we started our exposition with: what literary or philosophical plasma actually is and what it looks like in detail.

More than anything else, this very answer will enable us to see to what extent Xenophon's mentioned writing assumed characteristics of a legend, as indicated by the fact that Socrates' theses on art advocated in his conversations with the aforesaid artists, found universal acceptance among the leading exponents of the Second Sophistic, as evidenced in Lucian's *Essays in Portraiture (Imagines)* containing

---

40. *Memorabilia*, 4, 5, 11-12: ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἕξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι.

41. *Ibid.*, 1, 6, 7.

42. *Cf.*, 3, 1-5.

43. *Memorabilia*, 2, 7-2, 8 (conversation with Aristarchus).

44. *Ibid.*, 2, 9-2, 10 (conversation with Crito).

45. *Ibid.*, 2, 8 (conversation with Eutherus).

46. *Ibid.*, 2, 7, 1: χρῆ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.

one of his three literary canons<sup>47</sup> which could rightly be regarded as the three instances of self-interpretation to be applied to all the other major exponents of the Second Sophistic as well, as will be seen shortly.

Three facts stand out as crucial in Socrates' conversations with the leading exponents of painting and sculpture of his own time, in so far as the poetics of all major exponents of the Second Sophistic is essentially determined by them—something that enabled us to notice the important implications the testament's key terms, *sophia* and *epimeleia*, have for the entire domain of literary creativity. What is referred to here are stylistic devices, or rather procedures such as (1) *saying things in a roundabout way*, (2) *montage*, and (3) the *live nature* of philosophical and literary concepts, with the first of these being associated with Socrates' own method denoted by the particularly characteristic expression *eikona lego* in Plato's *Gorgias*,<sup>48</sup> and exemplarily shown in the *Memorabilia* with the celebrated philosopher expounding his basic concepts of literature by speaking about painting—something that might encourage every man of letters to strive for creating as many allusive and symbolical fields in his writing as he can, so as to resemble as much as possible none other than himself, i.e. Socrates.

*Montage* itself might at first sight appear to be quite a common method having nothing to do with achieving the highest aims in art and literature, but appearances are deceptive. The method itself is otherwise closely connected to two driving forces, that is to say the two mentioned crucial terms (*sophia* and *epimeleia*) in Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, solely capable of guaranteeing a harmonious combination of the constituent parts when it comes to creating a perfect whole. How popular this method was in the period of the Second Sophistic is indicated by the fact that it was more than faithfully applied in Lucian's *Essays in Portraiture (Imagines)* and *Essays in Portraiture Defended (Pro imaginibus)*, in which painting with words the portrait of Panthia, a woman of godlike beauty and yet inspired by men's aristocratic ideal of *kalokagathia*, is represented as if the greatest names of fine and plastic arts took part in its elaboration by giving their own contribution to the figure by chiselling out that part of Panthia's body in whose modelling each of them was deemed peerless—something that was evidently inspired by a particularly characteristic passage from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* where Socrates explains the idealism of Parrhasius' art by pointing to his method of both carefully selecting from among many single

---

47. The remaining two appear in *Lexiphanes* (22) and the *Dance (De saltatione)*, 60-61.

48. 493d: ἢ οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσῃ; φέρε δὴ, ἄλλην σοὶ εἰκόνα λέγω. This stylistic device enjoyed great popularity in later times, as can be inferred from a particularly characteristic passage from Tatius' novel *Leucippe and Clitophon* (5, 5, 5): ὑφαίνει γὰρ πέπλον ἄγγελον καὶ τὸ δρᾶμα πλέκει ταῖς κρόκαις, καὶ μιμεῖται τὴν γλώτταν ἢ χεῖρ, καὶ Πρόκνης τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τὰ τῶν ὠτῶν μηνύει καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἃ πέπονθε τῇ κερκίδι λαλεῖ—something that provides a valuable insight into how important the concepts applied in the *Gorgias* are for the poetics of Post-Classical Greek literature.

persons the most beautiful parts of their body and elaborately combining them into a harmonious whole,<sup>49</sup> with all of it being, in his view, a necessary prerequisite for making an idealistic portrait and, by the same token, idealistic, i.e. nation- and state-building art, on which he had set his heart.

As was to be expected, Socrates' idealism went far beyond that of Parrhasius, as evidenced by the fact that he seized the opportunity to drive his interlocutor to the admission that plastic and fine arts, as far as portraiture is concerned, should, above all, aspire to represent the invisible, namely the reflection which the states of mind find in the face and the attitudes of the body (whether still or in motion) of a truly beautiful, good and loveable character,<sup>50</sup> which can explain among other things, why the protagonists of the Greek novel are depicted in an idealistic way. Now we shall see what a higher-order purpose was in Socrates' supplements to Parrhasius' poetics. Just due to such attitudes, Socrates was represented as a painter "who painted with love" and yet inserted into the canon of the great exponents of the fine arts in the above-mentioned work by Lucian<sup>51</sup>—something that points to the fact that already in the period of the Second Sophistic *Memorabilia* had assumed characteristics of a legend, as can be inferred from the fact that this recommendation of Socrates found a clear reflection in Philostratus' *Imagines*, where the principle of painting the invisible<sup>52</sup> is openly advocated.

This higher-order purpose in Socrates' "supplements" to Parrhasius' poetics has become fully manifest in his conversation with Cleito the sculptor in which putting the mentioned idea into practice in much harder, i.e. sculptural matter was advocated with the aim to make the chiselled figures assume characteristics of vitality and thus give the impression not only of their state of mind but also of motion, an attitude, as it seems, widely adopted by the authors of the Second Sophistic, as can be inferred from Lucian's writing *On the Syrian Goddess (De Syria dea)*<sup>53</sup> where sculptures move freely like living creatures as well as Philostratus'

49. *Memorabilia*, 3, 10, 2: ἐκ πολλῶν συνάγοντες τὰ ἐξ ἐκάστου κάλλιστα οὕτως ὅλα τὰ σώματα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι.

50. *Ibid*, 3, 10, 5: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ τὸ σωφρονικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ὕβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειρόκαλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐστῶτων καὶ κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει.

51. It is also worth mentioning that we come across key principles of the new rhetoric outlined in the *Phaedrus* (266b) and reminiscent of *montage*, namely *diareseis* and *synagogai*—i.e., analytical partition of the phenomenon and synoptic reduction of the partitioned to a single idea—well disguised as *archetypa* and *paradeigmata* in Lucian's writing *Pro imaginibus* (10), otherwise closely connected with *Imagines*: καὶ ἑαυτὴν οὖν (sc. Pantheian) τὸ μὲν πλάσμα σου ἐπαινεῖν καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν εἰκόνων, μὴ γνωρίζειν δὲ τὴν ὁμοιότητα. ὥστε ἀφίησί σοι ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν καὶ προσκυνεῖ σου τὰ ἀρχέτυπα καὶ παραδείγματα.

52. *Imagines*, 1, 15, 2 (Ariadne): ... ἀλλ' αὐτὸς γε ὁ Διόνυσος ἐκ μόνου τοῦ ἔραν γέγραπται ...

53. 33: ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἔστηκεν ξόανον ἄλλο χρύσειον ... καλέεται δὲ σημήιον ... ἀποδημείει δὲ δις ἐκάστου ἔτεος ἐς θάλασσαν ἐς κομιδὴν ... ὕδατος.

*Imagines* where painted figures not only move freely but also make utterance,<sup>54</sup> which could be regarded as yet another case of putting the key ideas of Socrates' political testament into practice, this time in the field of art. In line of the above mentioned evidences concerning the subject matter of philosophy underlying the poetics of the authors of the late Greek renaissance, it could rightly be affirmed that the moving portraits and sculptures represent a powerfully conceived metaphor of Socrates' living and breathing word. What can be concluded from all this is the fact that the poetics of the mentioned authors is an idealistic one and that, in keeping with this, we should apply appropriate criteria when attempting to evaluate their works, which has so far been almost entirely ignored, as testified by the fact that these literary works were as a rule closely associated with the ancient sophistic, and, by the same token, decline.

### **Isocrates' Sophistic as Seen Through the Prism of an Almost Complete Interchangeability of the Terms 'Sophistic', 'Philosophy' and 'Rhetoric'**

It was under the authority of Socrates that the *montage* was closely associated with literary creativity, something to which the popularity of the principles of the new rhetoric (*diαιρεσεις, synagogai*) given in a bare outline in the *Phaedrus* may have largely contributed, all the more as they themselves resemble *montage*. In the period of the Second Sophistic, some authors went so far as to present their own poetics as something completely different from what they actually were, with the express intention of conferring an aura of absolute novelty to their assembled creation. Such an understanding of 'literary creativity' would be widely adopted in the future, with Isocrates, Plato's, or rather Socrates' favourite orator setting the trend, an orator in whose oeuvre the concepts of the sophistic, philosophy and rhetoric appear to be interchangeable to such an extent that it is not at all possible to draw a clear line of demarcation between them—something that gives rise to the assumption that some kind of a break in continuity occurred as regards a stylistics- and history of ideas-related timeline starting from Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, passing through Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and leading to Dio Chrysostom and all the other exponents of the Second Sophistic. But despite all that, appearances are deceptive and now we shall see the reason therefore.

More importantly, we are under the impression that what we are dealing with here is not only an almost complete interchangeability between rival intellectual currents such as philosophy, sophistic and rhetoric, but also something that seems to be an utter confusion in Isocrates' understanding of the mentioned

---

54. *Imagines*, 2, 5, 4 (Rhodogune): στόμα δὲ ἀπαλὸν καὶ ἀνάμεστον ὀπώρας ἐρωτικῆς, φιλήσαι μὲν ἥδυστον, ἀπαγγεῖλαι δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον ... χεῖλη ἀνθηρὰ καὶ ἴσα, στόμα σύμμετρον καὶ παραφθεγγόμενον τὴν εὐχὴν τῷ τροπαίῳ, κἄν παρακοῦσαι βουληθῶμεν, τάχα ἔλληγιεῖ.

phenomena<sup>55</sup> due to the fact that at first sight it is not at all possible to recognize any system whatsoever on the basis of which a clear line of demarcation might be drawn between philosophy, rhetoric and the sophistic. Ironically enough, the contour lines of this system, hardly recognizable though they were, began to appear right where Isocrates seemed to be hell bent on disguising the essence of things by equating his own art as well as that of his rivals sometimes with philosophy,<sup>56</sup> and sometimes with the sophistic.<sup>57</sup> As can be inferred from a particularly characteristic passage from the *Antidosis*, Isocrates' attempt to blur the distinction between philosophy and sophistic was, among other things, the result of deep-rooted changes in the public opinion of his own time which no longer made any meaningful distinction between these spiritual currents<sup>58</sup> and, moreover, looked upon Socrates himself as a sophist, as we shall see later. On the other hand, Isocrates was in no small measure inclined to this kind of identification of philosophy with the sophistic, due to the fact that through his wife, Hippias' widow, he had strong ties to sophistic circles themselves. Yet, despite all that, a hardly visible distinction, as expressed in both the levels and methods applied in the aforesaid disciplines, comes to light in the above-mentioned passage.

What these levels and methods look like can be inferred from almost the same context in the *Antidosis*, namely from the passage in which the method of Isocrates' own profession, now equated with philosophy, is characterized as a kind of extremely painful training<sup>59</sup> leading to proficiency in all other activities and arts—in sharp contrast to the position adopted by his rivals holding the view that pain and industry have no such power in the training of the intellect, unlike purely physical exercise<sup>60</sup> capable of making an athlete of a, so to speak, hopelessly weak person. When Isocrates, reacting to the above-mentioned attitudes expressed by his opponents, wonders why it would not be possible to make considerable

---

55. Even the Ionian philosophers of nature (268), the Seven Sages (235) as well as Solon himself (313) were characterized as sophists in the *Antidosis*.

56. *Antidosis*, 209 (... εικότως ἂν ἅπαντες τὴν ἄγνοιαν θαυμάσειαν τῶν τολμώντων οὕτως εικῆ καταφρονεῖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας); 215 (... ἐπ' ἐκείνους τρέψομαι, τοὺς οὐ καταφρονοῦντας μὲν τῆς φιλοσοφίας).

57. *Ibid*, 220: ... σοφιστῆ μισθὸς ... ἐστὶ ... μέγιστος, ἦν τῶν μαθητῶν τινες καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ ... γέωνται ...

58. *Ibid*, 215: ... ἐπ' ἐκείνους τρέψομαι, τοὺς ... μεταφέροντας τὰς πονηρίας τὰς τῶν φασκόντων μὲν εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἄλλο δέ τι πραττόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκείνοις ἐπιτηδεύοντας.

59. *Ibid*, 209: ... εικότως ἂν ἅπαντες ... πρῶτον μὲν εἰ πάσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς τέχνας εἰδότες ταῖς μελέταις καὶ φιλοπονίαις ἀλίσκομένας πρὸς τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως ἄσκησιν ταῦτα μηδεμίαν ἠγοῦνται δύναμιν ἔχειν ...

60. *Ibid*, 210: ... τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ... μηδὲν ἂν νομίζουσι γενέσθαι σπουδαιοτέρας παιδευθείσας καὶ τυχοῦσας τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας ...



progress in the realm of the intellect, if training dogs and horses<sup>61</sup> clearly suggests that the mentioned proficiency is very possible, even in the world of animals, we can clearly see that Isocrates slightly varies and skilfully elaborates passages from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, with Socrates therein represented as advocating the view that virtue can be learnt<sup>62</sup> by going through continuous mental exercises and that it is far easier to find a horse and an ox trainer than a teacher of virtue.<sup>63</sup>

That what we are dealing with here is Isocrates' noteworthy skill in subtly elaborating and artfully assembling the patterns of Platonic philosophy, borrowed either directly from the sources or indirectly from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* as a specific legend of Socrates, is indicated by the fact that the above-mentioned training of the intellect—undergone by adepts of the sophistic under the supervision of the author setting the tone for them—should lead to their becoming acutely aware of *epimeleia*<sup>64</sup> representing, as already seen, the focal point of both Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, by which Isocrates, though in a roundabout way, proved himself to be one of the testament executors.

When in the third passage, appearing along with the two above-mentioned ones in the same relatively narrow context, implanting the noble character traits fully equated with what is called *kalokagathia*<sup>65</sup> in the soul of his adepts is emphasised as his final objective when it comes to conducting the above-mentioned training of the intellect, now characterized as sophistic, we can clearly see what painstaking effort he underwent in his attempt to subtly and delicately elaborate the themes and concepts of Platonic philosophy—something that gave him occasion to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation between his art and that of his rivals, with the former handling the lofty topics,<sup>66</sup> and glorifying the power of philosophy,<sup>67</sup> unlike the latter representing in his view an all too easy mental

61. Ibid, 211: ... ἔτι δ' εἰ περὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τοὺς κύνους ... ὄρωντες τέχνας ἔχοντάς τινας ... περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν μηδεμίαν οἴονται τοιαύτην εὐρῆσθαι παιδείαν ...

62. *Memorabilia*, 1, 2, 23: πάντα μὲν οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ γαθὰ ἀσκητὰ εἶναι, οὐκ ἦκιστα δὲ σωφροσύνη.

63. Ibid, 4, 4, 5: ... φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδαζάντων.

64. Cf. n. 60.

65. Cf. n. 57. *Antidosis*, 220 ... οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτοι (sc. σοφισταί) πολλοὺς μετασχεῖν τῆς παιδείας εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν καθιστᾶσιν, οἱ δὲ πονηροὶ καὶ τοὺς πρότερον συνεῖναι διανοομένους ἀποτρέπουσιν.

66. *Antidosis*, 3: ... προήρημαι καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τηλικούτων τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τοιούτων πραγμάτων, ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἄλλος ἐπιχειρήσειε, πλὴν τῶν ἐμοὶ πεπλησιακότων ἢ τῶν τούτους μιμῆσθαι βουλομένων.

67. Ibid, 10: ἔστι γὰρ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἓνια μὲν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ πρέποντα ῥηθῆναι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀγῶνας οὐχ ἀρμόττοντα, περὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας πεπαρησιασμένα καὶ δεδηλωκότα τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς.

juggling (*teratologiai*)<sup>68</sup> otherwise associated with soft living and pleasures of all kinds, which represents yet another hidden allusion, this time to Socrates' famous characterization of the sophistical rhetoric in the *Gorgias* as a certain habitude of producing a kind of gratification and pleasure.<sup>69</sup>

Turning away from such an art or rather practice, in another passage from the *Gorgias* (463a–c) characterized as satisfying the whims and pleasures of the audience as well as a kind of counterfeiting of genuine discipline in the realm of spirit such as the legislature, is announced by Isocrates through the use of the term synonymous with *training*, namely *gymnastics*, with his oratory thus implicitly assuming nation- and state-building characteristics in full accordance with Socrates' analogy drawn between gymnastics and the legislature in the already quoted passage from the *Gorgias*.<sup>70</sup>

To tell the truth, the art of Isocrates can rightly be characterized as a mental acrobatics, in so far as his alternate use of polar opposites such as the sophistic and philosophy in the same context and with the same meaning makes us feel dizzy, blurring our eyes and beating a devil's tattoo in our ears, with just these symptoms being most acutely felt by none other than Socrates himself when he made attempts to define key ethical terms, in each of which a certain notion ended up being equated with the very opposite, as expressed, not altogether devoid of humour, in Plato's early dialogues, above all *Lysis*,<sup>71</sup> *Laches* and *Charmides*—a fact that clearly points to the Platonic origin of Isocrates' acrobatics which stands in sharp contrast to the mental juggling of the sophists.

This characteristic feature of Isocrates' style speaks to the extent of the game of hide-and seek played by the author with the scholar. Due to its being barely visible, this very feature makes us ask ourselves whether there are other, perhaps yet more important, reflections of Plato's, or rather Socrates' style in Isocrates' poetics, and by this we mean above all the philosophical dimension of the style itself. We start from the assumption that every author, even against his will, inevitably reveals elements of self-interpretation, as was the case with Isocrates

68. Ibid, 284-285: ... τοὺς δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀναγκαίων ἀμελοῦντας, τὰς δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν τερατολογίας ἀγαπῶντας φιλοσοφεῖν φασιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθάνοντας καὶ μελετῶντας ἐξ ὧν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικήσουσι, ὧν περ ἕνεκα καὶ πονητέον καὶ φιλοσοφητέον καὶ πάντα πρακτέον ἐστίν, which can be regarded as yet another echo of *Memorabilia* in the *Antidosis*, this time of the famous passage: ... καὶ τοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῶν τοιούτων τινός, δι' ὧν ἂν τις καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα καλῶς διοικήσειε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσειε καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει ὄφελιμος γένοιτο καὶ ἐχθρῶν κρατήσειεν.

69. 462c: χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

70. 464b: ... τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικὴν (sc. ἀντίστροφον λέγω). 465b: ... καὶ ὅτι ὁ ὀσοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.

71. 216c: ... αὐτὸς ἰλιγγιῶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπορίας ... 222b: ... μεθύομεν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ...

who accidentally betrayed himself in the only passage from the *Antidosis*, in which he characterizes his own oratory as a kind of music, in so far as his speeches are, in his view, more akin to works composed in rhythms and therefore more suited than those made in courts to be set to music<sup>72</sup>—something that represents a well-disguised allusion to the emblematic scene in the prologue to the *Phaedo*, with both philosophy and paraphrase of the literary pattern being therein identified by Socrates with sublime and popular music respectively,<sup>73</sup> which found its reflection in Eunapius' *Lives* where the speech of some of his protagonists grows of itself into music.<sup>74</sup>

Now the question arises whether we should still give credence to what was largely accepted in previous research on the subject, namely a theory advocating a close relationship between Isocrates' style and Gorgias' mannerisms, or rather figures of sound such as *homoioteleuta*, *homoiokatarkta*, *parecheseis* and *parisoseis*. Truth be told, we are confronted with a constant game between seeming and being in Isocrates' mentioned work, as shown by the fact that what seemed Gorgias' influence<sup>75</sup> turned out to be an execution of Socrates' political testament in terms of style in line of the above mentioned evidences concerning the nation- and state-building aspects of Isocrates' rhetoric. The only instance in the *Antidosis* where the term philosophy assumes the meaning of *philosophical plasma*, i.e. *subject matter of philosophy* suitable to be used in the educational process can serve as proof of that.

The instance itself is particularly revealing, all the more so because Isocrates, in an attempt to characterize his own rhetoric, makes use of the crucial word of Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, i.e. *epimeleia*,<sup>76</sup> now understood as a toilsome, unrelenting study<sup>77</sup> of both the philosophical texts and the concepts

---

72. *Antidosis*, 46: ... γράφειν δὲ προήρηται λόγους ... οὐδ' ἅπαντες ἂν φήσαιεν ὁμοιοτέρους εἶναι τοῖς μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν πεποιημένοις ἢ τοῖς ἐν δικαστηρίῳ λεγομένοις.

73. 61a: ... εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνὸπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν ... ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσῆς μεγίστης μουσικῆς ... νῦν δ' ... ταύτην τὴν δημώδη ... ποιεῖν. Cf. *Laches*, 188d where Socrates is characterized as a perfect musician simply due to the fact that he “tuned himself with the fairest harmony” by making “a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds.”

74. 501-502 (Chrysanthius' speech): ὥσπερ οὖν τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ γλυκύτερα τῶν μελῶν πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀκοὴν ἡμέρωσ καὶ πράωσ καταρρεῖ καὶ ... πᾶσιν ἦν ἐναρμόνιος, καὶ τοσαύταις διαφοραῖς ἡθῶν ... καθηρμόζετο.

75. What G. Norlin, “General Introduction” to his edition of Isocrates (LCL 209), xv maintains about the influence exercised by Gorgia upon Isocrates' style could also be true for Socrates, or rather Plato as the mentioned author's model.

76. *Antidosis*, 292: συμφέρει γὰρ ἐπὶ ... τῶν λόγων, μὴ τὰς εὐτυχίας ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιμελείας εὐδοκιμεῖν.

77. What it is all about is a direct reflection of the crucial passage from the second part of the *Phaedrus* (473e): ταῦτα δὲ οὐ μῆποτε κτησῆται ἄνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας ...

underlying them,<sup>78</sup> with *epimeleia* itself, along with the very reasons for putting it into practice, such as avoiding errors in political course of action, clearly pointing to the model to be chosen.<sup>79</sup> On the other hand, Isocrates views the approach adopted by his rivals as the polar opposite to his own art of speaking, in so far as it is essentially characterized by both the unbearable lightness of utterance and improvisation based on pure natural gift and, moreover, governed by chance<sup>80</sup>—something that points to Gorgias and the milieu of the old sophistic.

On the basis of the above, we are driven to the conclusion that Isocrates, following the model of Daedalus' workshop as depicted in Philostratus' *Imagines*,<sup>81</sup> turned his own school into a kind of atelier, where *plasma*, i.e. subject matter of literature and philosophy of vital importance for both the state and society, was devoutly shaped and modelled, which is why it could rightly be characterized as nation- and state-building *plasma*.

What still remains to be done is to unravel the reasons why Isocrates characterizes himself as a sophist. That he remained faithful to the concepts of Platonic philosophy and, moreover, looked upon himself as Socrates' follower can be inferred from the fact that in the *Antidosis*<sup>82</sup> he constantly lays stress on parallelisms between his own judicial procedure and that of Socrates—something that stands in sharp contrast to all those instances in which he identifies as a sophist.<sup>83</sup> Fortunately enough, we can eliminate this apparent contradiction

78. *Antidosis*, 292: ... οἱ δὲ φιλοσοφία ... τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην λαβόντες ... ἦττον περὶ τὰς πράξεις πλημμελοῦσιν.

79. This devotedness to the Platonic ideals comes to light even more in the opening passages from the *Nicoles*(9) in which, under the influence of the emblematic analogy drawn by Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (266b-c), rhetoricians, characterized as the teachers of philosophy, are regarded as gods. In the opening passage from Dio's twenty-second discourse *On Peace and War* we come across the same identification of rhetoric with state-building philosophy under the influence of the famous analogy drawn in the *Gorgias* (464b) between beauty care, gymnastics, the sophistic and legislation, on the one hand, and cookery, medicine, rhetoric and justice, on the other, namely an analogy that also found its reflection in both Aristides' first Platonic discourse, *In Defense of Oratory* (or. 2, 215), and, as we have already seen, Isocrates' *Antidosis*.

80. Cf. n. 76. In the same context, Isocrates uses the term synonymous with *epimeleia*, i.e. *philoponiai*, with the aim to lay stress on efforts of study as the only way to elaborate successfully the borrowed concepts, which is why the mentioned toil is to be praised more than talent and pure invention (291). Cf. the same attitude adopted by Lucian in *Prometheus es in verbis* (3) where *epimeleia* is identified with *montage* of literary concepts.

81. 1, 16.

82. 15; 27.

83. Cf. Norlin's attitude, "General introduction", xvi: "Indeed, the use of this term (sc. sophist) by Isocrates may be nothing more than a protest against the preposterous claims made by certain sophists for the omnipotence of their instruction."

through unique testimony in ancient literature, otherwise provided by Aeschines,<sup>84</sup> according to which Socrates was regarded as the sophist par excellence by the Athenian public opinion of his own time— something that points to the possibility that the term *sophistes* was often used by Isocrates with the meaning of *Socrates' disciple*. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that Isocrates, in keeping with high hopes Socrates pinned on him, eagerly joined the efforts already made by others to put key messages of the political testament in the *Alcibiades* into practice, acutely aware though he was that his own oeuvre hardly brought something new as far as original ideas are concerned. However, if there is something new in all this, that has to do with the fact that the entire exemplary subject matter<sup>85</sup> of literature and philosophy and, by the same token, that of the ancient sophistic was implicitly included in this specific “execution” of the political testament,<sup>86</sup> with Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* being in all likelihood the model that served that purpose, as can be inferred from the fact that Prodicus’ parable of Hercules at the crossroads<sup>87</sup> as well as Socrates’ conversations with the leading exponents of the old sophistic was given a relatively large space in the above-mentioned writing.

Isocrates’ attitude to the sophistic, if compared to that of Dio, gives rise to the conclusion that the Second Sophistic is not the same phenomenon everywhere as

---

84. *Against Timarchus*, 173: ἔπειθ' ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνετε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπεδευκῶς ... Δημοσθένης δ' ὑμῖν ἐταίρους ἐξαιρήσεται ... This testimony gains in importance all the more so since in Philostratus’ *Lives of the Sophists* (483) we encounter the fact that in their private life the two great men of the forensic oratory, Demosthenes and Aeschines, “claimed consideration and applause on the very ground that they were sophists”. On the portrait of Socrates in ancient literature cf., among other works, Heinrich Meier, *Sokrates: sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1913), Olof Gigon, *Sokrates: sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1947), Helmut Kuhn, *Sokrates: Versuch über den Ursprung der Metaphysik* (München: Kösel Verlag, 1959), André-Jean Festugière, *Socrate* (Paris: F. Flammarion, 1934). As regards Socratics cf., among other works, Jean Humbert, *Socrate et les petits socratiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), Heinrich Dittmar, *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker, Untersuchungen und Fragmente* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1912), Barbara Ehlers, *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines* (München: Beck, 1966 (Zetemata 41), Gabriele Giannantoni, *I Cirenaici: raccolta delle fonti antiche; traduzione e studio introduttivo* (Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1958), Erich Mannebach, *Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum fragmenta* (Leiden: Brill, 1961), Monique Dixsaut-Aldo Brancacci, *Platon source des présocratiques: exploration* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2003).

85. *Nicoles*, 10: ἐγὼ δ' ἀποδέχομαι καὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς λόγους τοὺς καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖν δυναμένους.

86. *Antidosis*, 271, where it has been hinted at the ability of the sophist, now characterized as philosopher, to arrive generally at the best course after quickly gaining insight into the state of things.

87. *Memorabilia*, 2, 1, 21-2, 2, with Prodicus characterized as the wise man at the very beginning of Xenophon’s narrative.

a majority of scholars have wrongly assumed in previous research on the subject, since in Isocrates' conception of the state, as distinguished from that of Dio, there was still a room for the legacy of the old sophistic representing, in his view, simply an easier method that, despite its deficiencies, might yet be applied in achieving the same goal, such as creating an ideal, harmonious society.

What applies for Isocrates so also does for Dio, as well as all the major exponents of the Second Sophistic in so far as they were much closer to the Socratic-Platonic legacy than to that of the old sophistic. Thus, the necessary prerequisites are fulfilled to take a closer look at philosophical or literary *plasma* as used by the author in his fourth discourse on kingship.

### **Philosophical *plasma* in Dio's Fourth Discourse as a Telling Indicator of What the Second Sophistic Actually Is**

It would be very hard to imagine a literary product more suitable than Dio's fourth discourse on kingship for getting a full insight into both the process of creating literary-philosophical *plasma* and its exemplary aspects. What we encounter in the mentioned discourse surpasses all expectations since its structural elements already reflect a trend in Greek literature over the time period extending from Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades* to Dio's age and beyond, as previously mentioned. We can see, so to speak, with the naked eye the mentioned structural elements of Dio's discourse consisting of the concepts borrowed from the *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*—where Plato's attitudes to rhetoric and literature in general are expressed – as well as those taken from the *Alcibiades* and the *Republic* and related to both the politics of strategic defence and the theory of the state, namely concepts that are further complemented by the striking analogies used by Xenophon in *Memorabilia* with the intent to present the teachings of the great philosopher in the most effective way, as shall be seen below. In order to understand the full implication such a montage of concepts—on more than one occasion characterized as *plasma*—has for acquiring essential knowledge of the poetics of late Greek literature, it remains to be seen how Dio himself defines his own stylistic technique—something that may yield unexpected and highly interesting results as far as other genres of Greek literature are concerned.

In the opening passage from his fourth discourse, Dio tells us that, since it had happened that he had nothing else that demanded his attention, he had enough time at his disposal to paint a picture of how the most paradoxical encounter that could have ever occurred, such as that between the greatest wisdom and the highest power—or, in other words, between utter poverty and the greatest wealth personified by Diogenes and Alexander respectively—had in all

likelihood been unfolding.<sup>88</sup> The encounter itself was as paradoxical as was the author's intention to take up the challenge of not only depicting its particulars but also of representing it in the light of the greatest likelihood possible, although centuries had gone by since the meeting took place. It is for this greatest likelihood that the synonym of the term *plasma*, namely *to eikos*, is used, which gives occasion to view the latter—despite its being, as it seems, the only testimony of such a kind in Greek literature—as yet another among the technical terms used in the rhetorical manuals to denote a subtype of the third type of narrative, namely the fictional, or rather realistic one comprising all those stories that might have happened but, nonetheless, did not occur, with *plasmaticon*, *drama* and *dramatikon* representing the remaining technical terms for both the above-mentioned subtype of narration and the novel as a genre.

Now we will only very briefly touch upon the notion of fictionality in classical literature. As can be inferred from the crucial passage from Dio's fourth discourse, fictionality itself is nothing other than assembling parts of heterogeneous provenance into a harmonious whole, as advocated by none other than Socrates in his conversation with Parrhasius the painter in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*<sup>89</sup> and, moreover, wholeheartedly recommended in Lucian's *Essays in Portraiture*<sup>90</sup>—something that should be taken into account seriously, especially when it comes to understanding the notion of fictionality in the Greek novel, in the plot of which the descriptions of paintings and sculptures play an important role.

It would be logical to assume that in Dio's discourse the technique of assembling the literary-philosophical concepts was consistently and systematically implemented, i.e. applied on both a small and a large scale, with the latter relating to the composition of the whole. This very composition resembles to a large extent the plot of Plato's *Gorgias* in so far as the dialogue between Diogenes and Alexander, as is otherwise the case with the one going on between Socrates and Callicles in Plato's dialogue,<sup>91</sup> ends with Diogenes<sup>92</sup> instead of Socrates' monologue.<sup>93</sup> However, there is still a difference in composition between Plato's dialogue and Dio's discourse, and it is of a purely formal nature, since Diogenes and Alexander are the only interlocutors in the latter, as distinguished from the former where Gorgias and his followers are represented as coming one after

---

88. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 1: χαίρουσι φύσει πάντες τιμωμένην ὀρώντες φρόνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς μεγίστης ἐξουσίας ... ὥστε ... αὐτοὶ πλάττουσιν ὑπερβάλλοντες ... ὡς δὲ εἰκὸς ἐκεῖνοις γενέσθαι τὴν ξυνουσίαν νῦν εἶπομ' ἄν ...

89. Cf. n. 49.

90. Cf. n. 51.

91. *Gorgias*, 481b-505b.

92. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 78-139.

93. *Gorgias*, 507c-522e. How popular the concepts applied in the *Gorgias* were in later times can be also inferred from a particularly characteristic scene from the seventh book of Prodromos' novel *Rhodanthe and Dosicles* (vv. 332 ff).

another to discuss the issue with Socrates after they had been one by one defeated by force of Socrates' clinching arguments, which led to a profoundly submissive capitulation. If this difference of a purely formal nature caused a compositional similarity between Dio and Plato's dialogues to go unnoticed, this cannot be said of Dio's creative elaboration of the emblematic analogy Callicles draws in the *Gorgias* between Socrates and a small, snotty and babbling child<sup>94</sup> lovely lisping while playing at his favourite pastimes, including even those philosophical, namely an analogy in which the style of Socrates' speeches is, moreover, characterized as *neanieuesthai*,<sup>95</sup> i.e., as a youthful audacity and effrontery, that, despite all this, could be effectively applied to *demegoria*, a demagogical speech to be delivered in front of a large crowd.

A major theme of the *Alcibiades*, such as countering the mighty barbarian elements and their uncouth military power personified by the Persian empire—a theme which Socrates' political testament grew out of—and the above-mentioned famous analogy in the *Gorgias* in which Socrates was identified with a small, snotty child are closely interwoven in the general composition of the discourse, but, on the other hand, we should bear in mind the difference in handling the above-mentioned analogy by Dio and Plato, with Alexander in the former, instead of Socrates, being the subject of the comparison and treated by Diogenes as a small, snotty child unaware of the basic fact that he does not yet possess the personality traits, such as *sophia* and *epimeleia*, which alone could guarantee successful confrontation with the great barbarian power and thus prevent the Hellenic living space from undergoing harmful influences coming from the outside. Both the central concept and the mentioned analogy are inextricably and yet imperceptibly intertwined with the image of Socrates as depicted in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, as can be inferred from the fact that in Dio's discourse Diogenes is represented, like Socrates in the mentioned work, as a unique hero and an expert in all the domains of knowledge including the military art—something that forms a kind of backdrop against which Alexander's megalomaniac aspirations for gaining fame, reputation and power at any cost are ridiculed as childish, which gave occasion to Diogenes for playing the role of a nurse who,

---

94. *Gorgias*, 485a: ... καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μαιρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῆ, καταγέλαστον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται. Cf. 499c where Socrates accuses Callicles of treating him like a child: ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καὶ μοι ὥσπερ παιδί χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. Cf. also 500b where Socrates warns Callicles against indulging in jesting with him, or taking what he says as though he were jesting: καὶ πρὸς Φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἴου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μήδ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος.

95. *Ibid*, 482c: ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν ...



after giving the child a whipping,<sup>96</sup> tells him a fairy tale to comfort and please him, by which Alexander's case assumes tragicomic proportions.<sup>97</sup>

Such a comparison of Alexander to a small child makes us ask ourselves what the concept itself would have looked like if worked out by Socrates, all the more as he himself, as can be inferred from Plato's early dialogues, most of all *Charmides*, *Laches* and *Lysis*, very much liked playing with the Athenian youth at the noblest of pastimes such as defining key ethical notions, with his speeches about children miraculously morphing into those about adults, as evidenced by a particularly characteristic passage from the *Laches*.<sup>98</sup> The answer to the question posed will be provided by the myth of the winged chariot from Socrates' second discourse on love in the *Phaedrus*, with Socrates poking fun at Phaedrus of Myrrhinous in a context characterized by the sublime, lyrical mood as if the latter were a small, snotty child—a fact which, with the exception of Aristotle<sup>99</sup> and Lucian,<sup>100</sup> escaped the notice of both the interlocutor himself and ancient literary criticism. This stylistic feature of Socrates was beyond imitation even for Dio, forcing him to turn to adapting, or rather assembling the concepts of Platonic philosophy so as to blend them together into a harmonious whole and thus make the most of their allusive potential.

The aforesaid emblematic myth of the winged chariot in the *Phaedrus* might have served, if not stylistic, at any rate some other purpose, such as that relating to Dio's polemics against sophists—something that can provide valuable insights into what was regarded as a sublime achievement in the matter of literary creativity in the period of the Second Sophistic and thus enable us to answer the question as to whether the sophistic in general and, above all, the ancient one could still be associated with the mentioned creativity.

In one of the opening passages from Dio's fourth speech on kingship, Diogenes is represented as using Olympias' view of Alexander as Ammon's, or rather Zeus' child<sup>101</sup> as an opportunity to point out to Alexander with barely concealed irony that just on account of his pretended origin the knowledge of the

---

96. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 73-74: διηγείτο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα (sc. μῦθον) ... βουλόμενος αὐτὸν παραμυθήσασθαι, καθάπερ αἱ τίθηται τὰ παιδία, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς πληγὰς ἐμβάλωσι...

97. Something that can be inferred from either a stern glance cast by Diogenes at Alexander (24) or the scene featuring Alexander as a small pupil uneasy in the presence of his master (26).

98. 188b: ἠπιστάμην ὅτι οὐδὲν περὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἔσοιτο Σωκράτους παρόντος, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡμῶν.

99. *Art of Rhetoric*, 3, 7 (1408b) 11 ff. Cf. E. Norden, *Kunstprosa*, 109.

100. *Hall (De domo)*, 4: ... κἀνταῦθα καθεζόμενος Φαίδρου τε τοῦ Μυρρινουσίου κατειρωνεύετο ...

101. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 19: ἢ οὐκ Ὀλυμπιάς ἐστὶν ἡ εἰποῦσα ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ Φιλίππου τυγχάνεις γεγονώς, ἀλλ' ἐκ ... Ἄμμωνος.

kingly art should have already been imprinted on his soul,<sup>102</sup> a knowledge that might recommend him for the exercising of absolute power, with tiaras and sceptres<sup>103</sup> thus ending up being only outward, childish characteristics of his power, something that offended Alexander to such an extent that he, for fear that he might be found ignorant of the science of kingship, asked Diogenes an open question about who might yet impart that science to him and where one had to go to learn it.

After obtaining an answer to his question, Alexander seemed to have had more of the same in so far as he was now confronted with an even greater aporia, since it turned out that the mentioned kingly art cannot be learnt, not in the least where he expected it the most, namely in the schools of the sophists, due to the fact that they do not even know how to live, to say nothing of how to be a king and how to acquire reliable knowledge for precisely this purpose. The greatest paradox consists in the fact that this art can only be given as a gift from heaven reserved for those who can be considered as sons of Zeus. Diogenes gives Alexander to understand what it actually means by saying that there are two kinds of education, the daemonic (i.e. from heaven) and the human, with the former being great, strong and, despite all this, easy, unlike the latter, which is small and weak and full of no little deception and yet being necessary as a specific kind of supplement to the former, if everything is to be right,<sup>104</sup> despite consisting of only a few things that can be learnt in a few lessons, which is why it is called *paidia*, i.e. something for children,<sup>105</sup> unlike the former characterized as *paideia*,<sup>106</sup> namely the real education. When in the following context Diogenes puts forward an argument backed up by Heracles' mythical death in support of his thesis that such a kind of knowledge, sprung from heaven and called divine or daemonic, continues to exist unimpaired even in a man completely burned out by fire,<sup>107</sup> and when again he argues that what matters is not at all learning but sheer recollection,<sup>108</sup> we are driven to the conclusion that the myth of the winged chariot from Socrates' great discourse on love in the *Phaedrus*, assumed, aside from a literary and stylistic dimension, also a political and strategic one, just as envisioned by the great philosopher in his testament.

---

102. Ibid, 23: τοῖς δὲ τοῦ Διὸς ἐκγόνοις οὐκ οἶει σημεῖον ἐνεῖναι τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐξ οὗ φανεροὶ ἔσονται ...

103. Ibid, 25: ... οὐκ ἔστι (sc. κυβερνήτης), οὐδ' ἂν πάντες ... πολλὰ διαδήματα καὶ ... τιάρας προσάψωσι αὐτῷ.

104. Ibid, 29: οὐκ οἶσθα ... ἔφη, ὅτι διττὴ ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία, ἡ μὲν τις δαιμόνιος, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη;

105. Ibid, 30: καλοῦσι δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ταύτην μὲν παιδείαν, καθάπερ οἶμαι παιδιάν ...

106. Ibid: ... τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν (sc. καλοῦσι) ἐνίοτε μὲν παιδείαν, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην.

107. Ibid, 32: ἀλλὰ κἄν ἐμπρήση τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλέα φασὶν αὐτὸν ἐμπρήσαι, μένει ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ...

108. Ibid, 33: οὐ γὰρ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὑπομνησθῆναι δεῖται μόνον ...

The seemingly strange and not yet fully clarified detail in the plot of Heliodorus and Prodromos' novel, with the protagonists walking barefooted over the hot glowing surface<sup>109</sup> and the huge burning pyre<sup>110</sup> respectively, clearly points to the mentioned political dimension associated with both the myth of the winged chariot and the central principles of the new rhetoric given in a bare outline in the *Phaedrus* as a programmatic manifesto of the entire Platonic philosophy, and, along with the arguments put forward by Dio, speaks volumes about the philosophical and political concepts underlying the plot of the Greek novel. Excepting the age of Plato and Aristotle, it is, apparently, not before Dio's time that a clear-cut line of demarcation was drawn, on the one side, between real philosophy and real rhetoric, between which, unlike the thought of von Arnim, no bitter strife raged, and the beguiling and counterfeit art and habitude of the sophists, most likely based on the rhetoric of an all too scholastic and forensic type, on the other.

### **Dio's Mastery in Blending Together Concepts of Platonic Philosophy and the Far-Reaching Message Hidden in it**

If it was not so difficult to notice the Platonic origins of Dio's theses on divine and human education, the same cannot be said of the Platonic concepts used by Dio in the final passages from the mentioned discourse with the aim to show how perverted Alexander's idea of power and kingship actually was. What we are dealing with here is the most subtle form of elaboration, with the Socratic conception of *daimonion* being almost imperceptibly fused to both the doctrine of the parts of the soul in the fourth<sup>111</sup> and the theory of forms of government and their successive decline in the eighth book of the *Republic*, which was difficult to detect, all the more so, since other Platonic concepts, such as that in which the absolute affinity between word and image is emphasised, are not only used but also amply paraphrased by Dio in the self-same context. Paradoxically enough, it is the last mentioned concept that, although pushed into the background, can serve as an ideal link between Plato's patterns and their disguised elaboration in Dio, since it immediately precedes<sup>112</sup> the latter's expounding his views on the three kinds of daemons essentially determining the three wrong and destructive

---

109. Heliodorus, *Aethiopica*, 10, 9, 3: ... ἐνέδν τε τὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν ἱερὸν χιτῶνα ... τὴν τε κόμην ἀνείσα καὶ οἶον κάτοχος φανείσα προσέδραμέ τε καὶ ἐφήλατο τῇ ἐσχάρᾳ ...

110. Theodoros Prodromos, *Rhodanthe and Dosikles*, 1, 379-384: ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ προσῆλθον εἰς μέσην φλόγα, / τὸ πῦρ πατῶν ἄκουστος ἐντὸς ἰστάμην ... Cf. also Heliodorus, 8, 9, 13-15.

111. *Republic*, 439d (*logistikon; epithymetikon*), 440e (*thymoeides*).

112. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 4, 85-87: φέρε οὖν καθάπερ οἱ κομῆσοι τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα ἔμβραχυ φέρουσι τὴν αὐτῶν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τέχνην ... καὶ ἡμεῖς μὴ χείρους μηδὲ φαυλότεροι περὶ τοὺς λόγους φανῶμεν ...

ways of living, just as Socrates' depiction of the aristocratic form of government in the seventh book of the *Republic* is preceded by his drawing a comparison between the conceptualization of an ideal, well-ordered *polis* and an artist's tracing of its lineaments<sup>113</sup> by first wiping the tablet clean and thereafter using the heavenly model to paint the city and the characters of men within it, as described in the sixth book of the mentioned work.<sup>114</sup> In accordance with the above mentioned, Socrates' exposition on the successive forms of decline of an ideal, aristocratic type of government in the eighth book of the *Republic* is immediately preceded by his interlocutors' characterization of his method as a perfect, matchless plastic art, i.e. sculpture.<sup>115</sup>

All of this leads us to Dio's theory of the daemons as well as his mastery in disguising his literary models. Socrates himself regarded his daemon, or rather *daimonion* as *genius*, i.e. as his good inner voice,<sup>116</sup> as distinguished from the use of the term in Dio's mentioned discourse where it has the meaning of a *malign spirit*,<sup>117</sup> in so far as the *daimonion* deludes the one in whose soul it took up its abode into repeatedly making wrong decisions. The reason lies in the fact that in Dio's view, all types of perverted life are to be regarded as a consequence of neglecting the rational part of the soul<sup>118</sup>—something that corresponds perfectly with Socrates' establishing close relationships between the degeneration and decline of the aristocratic type of government and the unwillingness of the ruling class to make efforts to consequently apply an exceptionally important combination of music and reasoning to their active life,<sup>119</sup> with the term 'music' very likely including implicitly all types of artistic activity, along with the literary.

---

113. *Republic*, 500e: ... ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ ... ζωγράφοι; The English version of this and all other passages from Plato's *Republic* is borrowed from P. Shorey's study edition of the mentioned dialogue (LCL).

114. *Ibid*, 501a: λαβόντες ... ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἦθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν ...

115. *Ibid*, 540c: παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς ἀπείργασαι.

116. According to Karin Alt, "Dämon/(Schutz-)Geist; Daimonion" in Ch. Schäfer (ed.), *Platon-Lexikon, Begriffswörterbuch zu Platon und der platonischen Tradition*, WBG, Darmstadt 2007, appears in a few passages from Plato's oeuvre in the meaning of Socrates' attendant spirit: *Apology* (3c-d; 40a), *Euthyphron* 3b, *Theaetetus* 151a, *Phaedrus* 242b-243b, *Theages* 128d-e.

117. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 83: τριῶν δὲ ἐπικρατούντων ... βίων ... τοσούτους φατέον εἶναι καὶ δαίμονας ... It should be noted that Dio, instead of Socrates' term *daimonion*, uses the older one, namely *daimon*, appearing, according to K. Alt, op. cit., in Homer and Hesiod but without the negative connotations it has in Dio.

118. Instead of Plato's term τὸ λογιστικόν, Dio uses the abstract noun λογισμός.

119. *Republic*, 548b-c: οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡμεληκέναι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικὴν μουσικῆς τετιμηκέναι.

In the discourse itself, there is, however, a lack of mention of music as a cause of decline, but due to Dio's marked tendency to represent Alexander as a small, snotty and uneducated child, there was no need to lay particular stress on just this type of cause.

In order to fully appreciate Dio's handling of the borrowed concepts, we must take a brief look at Plato's division of soul into three parts, namely into what is called *logistikón* (the rational part),<sup>120</sup> *thymoeides* (the irascible)<sup>121</sup> and *epithymetikon* (the appetitive).<sup>122</sup> If we take into account that *logistikón* had to be omitted simply due to the fact that it could in no way be associated with Alexander's perverted ways of living, what remained at Dio's disposal in his attempt to formulate a theory of bad and destructive ways of lives, were the two other parts from Plato's division of the soul, namely *thymoeides* and *epithymetikon* with the following types of daemons corresponding to them in Dio's subdivision: *philedon*, *hedypathes* or *trypheros* (luxurious, self-indulgent),<sup>123</sup> *philochrematos* or *philoploutos* (acquisitive, avaricious),<sup>124</sup> *philotimos* or *philodoxos* (desirous of honour and glory).<sup>125</sup>

Only after a close reading of the entire eighth book of the *Republic* shall we be able to unravel the hidden meanings of the terms used by Dio and thus be in a position to fully understand his skill in combining, elaborating and fusing the patterns of Platonic philosophy, resulting in the fact that the key message of the mentioned book of *the Republic* is even more emphasised when it comes to ascertaining where neglect of music and reasoning actually leads as far as a ruling class is concerned.

We will attempt to clarify the issue by proceeding in reverse order, i.e. by first trying to shed light on the appearance of the term *philotimos* in Dio's division, since it allows us to better comprehend not only the alarming proportions which Alexander's personality deviation assumed in the eyes of Diogenes, but also a destructive force which, almost unnoticeable and undetectable, undermines the best type of government bringing about its decline, as demonstrated in the mentioned book of the *Republic*. Plato, or rather Socrates points to both neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and the preference

---

120. Ibid, 439d: οὐ δ' ἀλόγως ... ἀξιόσομεν ... τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς.

121. Ibid, 440e: νῦν δέ ... φαμεν, (sc. θυμοειδές) ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὄπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν.

122. Ibid., 439d: ... τὸ δ' ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλογιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἐταῖρον.

123. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 84 ... ὁ μὲν ἡδυπαθῆς καὶ τρυφερὸς περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονάς.

124. Ibid: ... ὁ δ' αὖ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλόπλουτος ...

125. Ibid: ... ὁ δὲ τρίτος ἀμφοτέρων ἐπιφανέστερός τε καὶ μᾶλλον τεταραγμένος, ὁ φιλότιμος καὶ φιλόδοξος ... ἐκδηλοτέραν καὶ σφοδροτέραν ἐπιδεικνύμενος τὴν ταραχὴν καὶ τὴν μανίαν ...

for gymnastics over music<sup>126</sup> as the principal cause of the decline of an aristocratic form of government, with the love of contentiousness (*philonikia*) and covetousness of honour (*philotimia*)<sup>127</sup> thus casting a baneful spell upon it. Plato speaks in more detail about it in the passage dealing with the transformation of the youth of aristocratic origin into the timocratic boy, unfolding not without some kind of a “split of personality,” with the father of the lad “watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle (*logistikon*) in his soul and the others, members of his company, “the appetitive (*epithymetikon*) and the passionate” (*thymoeides*), which is why he, “under these two solicitations, comes to a compromise and turns over the government in his soul to the intermediate principle of ambition (*philonikos*) and high spirit (*thymoeides*)<sup>128</sup> and becomes a man haughty of soul (*hypselophron*) and covetous of honour (*philotimos*).”<sup>129</sup>

In Plato's description of the transition of timocratic society into oligarchy, we come across the second term appearing in Dio's subdivision of daemons highly destructive to state and society, namely *philochrematos*, a transition that unfolds with the son of the timocratic man thrusting “headlong from his bosom's throne the principle of love of honour (*philotimia*) and high spirit (*thymoeides*),” and turning to accumulating money and little by little collecting property “with thrift and hard work”<sup>130</sup>—something that will result in both his establishing on the mentioned “throne the principle of appetite (*epithymetikon*) and avarice” (*philochrematon*)<sup>131</sup> and setting it up “as the greatest king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold.” Socrates' attitude that the oligarchical man never turns his thought to true education,<sup>132</sup> given his tendency towards “prizing wealth above everything” and “satisfying his own necessary appetites and desires” by “subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable,”<sup>133</sup> can be adduced as yet another instance of Dio's skill in assembling the concepts of Platonic philosophy. The same is true for Socrates' view that the oligarchical man, despite all his thrift,

---

126. Cf. n. 119.

127. *Republic*, 548c: διαφανέστατον ἐν αὐτῇ (sc. πολιτεία) ἔν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατούντος, φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι.

128. *Ibid*, 550a-b: ... ἐλκόμενος (sc. ὁ νέος) ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄρδοντός τε καὶ αὔξοντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές ...

129. *Ibid*: ... καὶ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν παρέδωκε τῷ ... φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ καὶ ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος ἀνὴρ.

130. *Ibid*, 553b-c: ... ἀπολέσας (sc. παῖς) τὰ ὄντα ... εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές ... καὶ ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ πενίας ... γλίσχρως ... χρήματα συλλέγεται.

131. *Ibid*: ... τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκείνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίζειν ...

132. *Ibid*, 553b-c: κηφνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἀπαιδευσίαν ... ἐγγίγνεσθαι ...

133. *Ibid*, 554a: : ... τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ ἀποπιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρεχόμενος, ἀλλὰ δουλούμενος τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ...

is not yet immune from various desires and appetites, with the consequence that he ends up being some sort of a double man<sup>134</sup>—something that is described in more detail in Dio’s discourse (91-100).

The third term, i.e. *philedon*, in Dio’s division of harmful daemons dwelling in man’s soul, seems to originate from Plato’s expression *pantodapai hedonai* appearing in an account of how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type in the mentioned book of the *Republic*, with the son bred in his oligarchical father’s ways first “controlling by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters of wealth,” namely those denominated unnecessary,<sup>135</sup> and, after associating “with fierce and cunning creatures, who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind, getting a taste of the honey of the drones,”<sup>136</sup> as a result of which the pleasures “seize the citadel of” his “soul finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honourable pursuits, which are the best guardians in the minds of the men dear to the gods.”<sup>137</sup> This is why he, like the city itself, becomes a manifold, many-coloured man<sup>138</sup> “stuffed with most excellent differences” with his “torn and distracted” soul thus being “ever in battle and ceaseless strife with itself”<sup>139</sup>—something that makes him unfit for the exercise of the ruler’s authority, as depicted by Dio not without taking pleasure in highlighting the details concerning Alexander (133 - 136).

In spite of reliable results obtained by taking a closer look at both the transposition and elaboration of Platonic patterns in Dio’s fourth discourse, we would still be only halfway to achieving our goals, if we could not shed light on the short final passage assuming characteristics of a solemn *parainesis* and giving an impression of being composed by the author to compensate for the caustic and at times utterly sarcastic tone of polemics.

---

134. Ibid, 554d-e: ... ἂν εἶη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἰς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις ...

135. Ibid, 558c-d: ... βία δὴ καὶ οὗτος ἄρχωντῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν, ὅσαι ἀναλωτικαὶ μὲν, χρηματιστικαὶ δὲ μή· αἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι κέκλινται.

136. Ibid, 559b: ὅταν νέος ... ἀπαιδευτὸς καὶ φειδωλῶς, γεύσηται κηφόνων μέλιτος ... ἐνταῦθα που οἴου εἶναι ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς ... ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς δημοκρατικὴν.

137. Ibid, 560b: τελευτῶσαι (sc. ἐπιθυμίαι) δὴ οἶμαι κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν ... κενὴν μαθημάτων ... καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, οἳ δὲ ἄριστοι φρουροὶ ... ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσι διανοίαις.

138. Ibid, 561e: οἶμαι δέγε ... καὶ παντοδαπὸν τε καὶ πλείστων ἡθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὅσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτοντὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι.

139. This Platonic concept is further elaborated by being subjected to the visualisation and personification in Dio’s discourse (136-138). All of the above mentioned gives rise to the assertion that A. Brancacci, *Rhetorikē Philosophousa: Dione Crisostomo nella cultura antica e bizantina*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1985 (Collana Elenchos, 11) is right when he says that in Dio’s teaching philosophy and rhetoric became fused in an original and unique synthesis—something for which he coined the telling expression *rhetorikē philosophousa*.

But appearances are deceptive in so far as what seemed a common stylistic device turned out to be an emblematic image of Platonic philosophy, well-disguised and therefore hard to notice because of the sudden shift in the meaning of *daimon* from "malign spirit" to "Socrates' good inner voice," i.e., his attendant spirit, being in this short final passage from Dio's discourse presented as a driving force for acquiring all Alexander desperately needed, i.e. true education and an almost divine art of reasoning of paramount importance for every well-ordered society.

All this pointed to the fact that the whole passage is laden with meaning that can be deciphered only on condition that Dio's models are identified. Just due to the fact that it is a hymnal tone we are dealing with here, namely tones and tunes inspired by patterns in both the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*, we can rightly assume that the philosopher's prayer to Pan at the very end of the former as well as Agathon's discourse (as far as the form is concerned) in the latter were Dio's mysterious models, something that might shed a new light on the phenomenon of the Second Sophistic.

Surprisingly enough, if we may judge by this newly deciphered meaning of the final passage from Dio's fourth discourse, the philosopher's prayer at the very end of the *Phaedrus* turned out to be a hymn of both Platonic philosophy and the Second Sophistic, namely a hymn which unravels the truth of the last mentioned phenomenon no matter what its exponents say of it in their attempts to disguise the essence of things.

### Concluding Thoughts

As shown above, Dio's fourth discourse provides valuable evidence as to what the Second Sophistic actually is and therefore guidelines for how we should read the works of its major exponents. After careful analysis of the text, we were able to arrive at the preliminary conclusion that, no matter what Philostratus says about it, the Second Sophistic is quite a different phenomenon from the ancient one since it is, contrary to what was previously thought, essentially determined by philosophy as distinguished from the latter basically characterized by rhetoric. In order to grasp the essence of the problem, it was necessary to compare Dio's understanding of the sophistic to Isocrates' classical view of the phenomenon which appeared at first sight to be diametrically opposed to that of the former. This initially created false impression could have been corrected if only a carefully concealed detail in Isocrates' self-interpretation in the *Antidosis*, i.e. *epimeleia*, had been noticed and recognized as the author's key term in his definition of his own art of speaking as elaborating and working out patterns found in literary and, above all, philosophical texts—something that is also true for Dio and all the major exponents of the Second Sophistic.



This opened up new perspectives due to the fact that *epimeleia* and *sophia*, or rather *enkrateia* constitute key terms of both Xenophon's *Memorabilia* as a legend of Socrates and Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, something that led to the conclusion that the Second Sophistic itself is essentially determined by the mentioned legend, no matter what Philostratus says about the phenomenon in an attempt to disguise the essence of things. All this gave rise to the final conclusion that Dio's and Isocrates' understanding of the sophistic were not diametrically opposed, as previously thought, since it turned out that in the latter's conception of the sophistic there was still room for the legacy of the old sophistic, something to which the former was fully opposed, as can be inferred from the invective he heaped on it.

Thus, unlike the thought of von Arnim and the majority of scholars, the supposed bitter struggle between the rival spiritual currents in the course of the last four centuries BC resulted in a landslide victory for philosophy or, to be more precise, philosophical *plasma* essentially based on the principles set forth in the *Phaedrus*. Now the question arises as to what wider lessons we need to learn from these findings. From the above, it is clear that future research should focus on the philosophical poetics of the Second Sophistic rather than make a futile effort to explain everything by referring to the omnipotence of rhetoric. Only thus shall we gain a deeper understanding, not only of the new sophistic, but also of post-classical Greek literature in its entirety. Otherwise it all becomes a pile of sundry facts—some of them curious and interesting but making no meaningful picture as a whole.

### Bibliography

- Aelius Aristides. *In Defense of Oratory (A Reply to Plato)*. Edited and Translated by Michael Trapp. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017.
- Aeschines. *Against Timarchus*. Edited and Translated by Charles Darwin Adams. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1919.
- Achilles Tatius. *Leucippe and Cleitophon*. Edited and Translated by S. Gaselee. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1917.
- Alt, Karin. "Dämon/(Schutz-)Geist; Daimonion." (Daemon/Attendant Spirit; Daimonion.) In Ch. Schäfer (ed.), *Platon-Lexikon, Begriffswörterbuch zu Platon und der platonischen Tradition*. Darmstadt: WBG, 2007.
- Aristotle. *Art of Rhetoric*. Edited and Translated by John Henry Freeze. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926.
- Brancacci, Aldo. "Struttura compositiva e fonti della terza orazione 'Sulla regalità' di Dione Crisostomo." (Compositional Structure and Sources of Dio Chrysostom's Third Discourse on Kingship.) *ANRW II* 36, no. 5: 3308-3331.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Rhetorikē Philosophousa: Dione Crisostomo nella cultura antica e bizantina*. (Dio Chrysostom in Ancient and Byzantine Culture.) Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1985 (CollanaElenchos, 11).
- Boulanger, André. *Aelius Aristide et la sophistique dans la province d'Asie au II siècle de notre ère*. (Aelius Aristides and the Sophistic in the Roman Province of Asia in the Second Century AD.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1925.

- Cicero. *On the Orator*. Edited and Translated by E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948.
- Curtius, Ernst Robert. *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*. (European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages.) Bern: Francke Verlag, 1961.
- Dio Chrysostom. *The Fourth Discourse on Kingship*. Edited and Translated by J. W. Cohoon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1932.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Seventh, or Euboean, Discourse*. Edited and Translated by J. W. Cohoon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1932.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Eighteenth Discourse: On Training*. Edited and Translated by J. W. Cohoon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1939.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Twenty-Second Discourse: On Peace and War*. Edited and Translated by J. W. Cohoon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1939.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Thirty-Second Discourse: To the People of Alexandria*. Edited and Translated by J. W. Cohoon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1940.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Fifty-Fourth Discourse: On Socrates*. Edited and Translated by H. Lamar Crosby. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1946.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Fifty-Fifth Discourse: On Homer and Socrates*. Edited and Translated by H. Lamar Crosby. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1946.
- Dittmar, Heinrich. *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker, Untersuchungen und Fragmente*. (Aeschines of Sphettus: Studies on History of Socratic Literature, Analysis of Fragments.) Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1912.
- Dixsaut, Monique-Brancacci, Aldo. *Platon source des présocratiques: exploration*. (Plato as a Source of Pre-Socratic Philosophy: An Exploration.) Paris: J. Vrin, 2003.
- Ehlers, Barbara. *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines*. (A Pre-Platonic Explanation of Socratic Eros: The Dialogue Aspasia by Aeschines the Socratic.) München: Beck, 1966 (Zetemata 41).
- Eshleman, Kendra. "Defining the Circle of Sophists: Philostratus and the Construction of the Second Sophistic," *Classical Philology* 103 (2008): 395-413.
- Eunapius. *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists*. Edited and Translated by W. C. Wright. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Festugière, André-Jean. *Socrate*. (Socrates.) Paris: F. Flammarion, 1934.
- Gerth, Karl. "Die Zweite oder Neue Sophistik." (The Second or New Sophistic.) In *RE Pauly-Wissowa*, Suppl. VIII, 725. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1962.
- Giannantoni, Gabriele. *I Cirenaici: raccolta delle fonti antiche; traduzione e studio introduttivo*. (The Cyrenaics: The Collection of Ancient Sources; Translation and General Introduction.) Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1958.
- Gigon, Olof. *Sokrates: sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte*. (Socrates as Portrayed in Poetry and Historical Narrative.) Bern: Francke Verlag, 1947.
- Graindor, Paul. *Un milliardaire antique, Herode Atticus et sa famille*. (An Ancient Billionaire: Herodes Atticus and his Family.) Cairo: Imprimerie Misr, 1930.
- Homer. *Iliad*. Edited and Translated by A. T. Murray. (Revised by W. F. Wyatt.) Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Humbert, Jean. *Socrate et les petits socratiques*. (Socrates and Minor Socratics.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.
- Isocrates. *Antidosis*. Edited and Translated by G. Norlin. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1929.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Nicoles or the Cyprians*. Edited and Translated by G. Norlin. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1928.
- Kroll, Wilhelm. "Rhetorik." (Rhetoric.) In *RE Pauly-Wissowa*, Suppl. Bd. VII. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1940.
- Kuhn, Helmut. *Sokrates: Versuch über den Ursprung der Metaphysik*. (Socrates: Essay on the Origin of Metaphysics.) München: Kösel Verlag, 1959.
- Lesky, Albin. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*. (A History of Greek Literature.) Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1971.
- Lucian. *Dance (De saltatione)*. Edited and Translated by A. M. Harmon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1936.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Essays in Portraiture (Imagines)*. Edited and Translated by A. M. Harmon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Essays in Portraiture Defended (Pro imaginibus)*. Edited and Translated by A. M. Harmon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Fly (Muscae encomium)*. Edited and Translated by A. M. Harmon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1913.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Hall (De domo)*. Edited and Translated by A. M. Harmon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1913.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Lexiphanes*. Edited and Translated by A. M. Harmon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1936.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Syrian Goddess (De Syria dea)*. Edited and Translated by A. M. Harmon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *To One Who Said 'You're a Prometheus in Words' (Prometheus es in verbis)*. Edited and Translated by K. Kilburn. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959.
- Mannebach, Erich. *Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum fragmenta*. (The Fragments of Aristippus of Cyrene and the Cyrenaics.) Leiden: Brill, 1961.
- Meier, Heinrich. *Sokrates: sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung*. (Socrates: his Oeuvre and his Place in History.) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1913.
- Norden, Eduard. *Die antike Kunstprosa, von VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*. (The Ancient Literary Prose from 6th Century BC to the Renaissance Period.) Stuttgart und Leipzig: Teubner, 1915.
- Philostratus. *Lives of the Sophists*. Edited and Translated by Wilmer Cave Wright. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1921.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Imagines*. In Philostratos, *Die Bilder*. Edited, Translated and Explained by Otto Schönberger. München: Heimeran Verlag, 1968 (Sammlung Tusculum).
- Plato. *Alcibiades*. Edited and Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1927.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Laches*. Edited and Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Lysis*. Edited and Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Gorgias*. Edited and Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Phaedo*. Edited and Translated by H. N. Fowler. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Phaedrus*. Edited and Translated by H. N. Fowler. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Republic*. Edited and Translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1930.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Symposium*. Edited and Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- Plutarch. *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry*. Edited and Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1921.
- Prodromos, Teodoros. *Rodante e Dosicle*. In *Il romanzo bizantino del XII secolo*. (Twelfth Century Byzantine Novel.) Edited and Translated by Fabrizio Conca. Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1994.
- Rohde, Erwin. *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer*. (The Greek Novel and its Forerunners.) Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1914.
- Schmid, Wilhelm-Stählin, Otto. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur: Die nachklassische Periode der griechischen Literatur von 100 bis 539 nach Christus*. (A History of Greek Literature: Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Period –From 100 to 539 AD.) München: C. H. Beck, 1981.
- Synesius. *Dio*. In *Dio Chrysostom*. Edited by H. Lamar Crosby. Volume 5. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampf um die Jugendbildung*. (Life, Works and Writings of Dio of Prusa: Sophistic, Rhetoric, Philosophy in their Struggle for the Education of the Youth.) Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1898.
- Xenophon. *Memorabilia*. Edited and Translated by E. C. Marchant. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1923.