

Philosophical *plasma* in Dio Chrysostom's Fourth Discourse on Kingship and Socrates' Political Testament in *Alcibiades*

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*On the basis of evidence obtained by unravelling enigmas in Dio's fourth discourse and lifting the veil of mystery surrounding some of the crucial, sophistic-related passages from the mentioned writing, we were able to arrive to a conclusion that, no matter what the so-called sophists say of the phenomenon in their attempts to disguise the essence of things, the Second Sophistic is closely connected not so much with rhetoric as with philosophy itself or, to be more precise, Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, as proved by Dio's frequent use of philosophical, or rather Socratic *plasma* in his discourses. Paradoxically enough, after careful analysis of Dio's invective against sophists, it turned out that his conception of the sophistic is basically the same as that of Isocrates, the only difference being that in the latter there was still a room for the legacy of the old sophistic, something to which Dio was fully opposed.*

Introduction

The term 'philosophical *plasma*' immediately strikes the eye as one reads the title of this study by virtue of the fact that it has not been used thus far in research on the Second Sophistic, which is why it may very easily be called into question by the biased and perhaps even the unbiased reader. At the very outset, the author sees himself obliged to give answer to the questions such as: "what the so-called philosophical *plasma* actually is" and "what made him coin the term." We will attempt to clarify the issue by proceeding in reverse order, i.e. by first giving an answer to the last question, because the stress will thus be laid on the methodological challenges the scholars confront in doing research on the Greek renaissance of the first century, ever since von Arnim's classical monograph saw the light of day some hundred and twenty years ago,¹ namely a renaissance that exercised decisive influence over the entire corpus of post-classical Greek literature.

What gave occasion to introduce the newly-coined term into the mentioned research area was the fact that the use of key terms such as *philosophos*, *sophistes* and *rhetor* by the major exponents of the Second Sophistic has not been sufficiently clarified by previous research on the subject, with the studies of the mentioned renaissance thus getting caught, time and again, in a vicious circle, as a result of which the old and the new sophistic have become closely and, sometimes, too

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1. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampf um die Jugendbildung* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1898). Hereinafter referred to as von Arnim, *Dio von Prusa*.

closely associated with each other.² To tell the truth, the term 'second sophistic' was itself, in a certain measure, disputable to none other than Wilhelm Schmid and Albin Lesky, the authors of the two extensive and model monographs on history of Greek literature, in so far as it is, according to the latter,³ misleading and, in the view of the former,⁴ represents a specific kind of legend with a noticeable tendency concerning Aeschines as the creator of the new sophistic, with the preliminary remark that Gerth's attitude towards the phenomenon, otherwise essentially based on Graindor's,⁵ deserves also to be quoted here, namely the attitude that there are no substantial differences between the old and the new sophistic, in so far as both phenomena were essentially characterized by a purely formal element such as rhetoric.⁶ Ironically enough, increasing evidence suggests that this was entirely the wrong approach to take to the phenomenon, as shown by the fact that the new sophistic will turn out to be, unlike the old one, essentially determined by philosophy itself, as will be demonstrated below.

2. This seems to be a result of Philostratus' enigmatic depiction of the phenomenon, as evidenced by the fact that in his *Lives of the Sophists* almost no distinction was made between the old and the new sophistic (481: δὲ μετ' ἡμεῶν, ἡν οὐκ ἴσταν, ἔρκα.α. γῆρ, δεύσαν δὲ μετ' ἡμῶν προσήσαν) which, unfortunately, found its reflection in the attitude taken by Wilhelm Kroll, "Rhetorik", *RE Suppl. Bd. VII* 1039 ff. Cf. our study "ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΕΝ ΔΟΞΗ ΤΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΣΑΙ: An Enigmatic Depiction of the Second Sophistic in Philostratus and Eunapius' *Lives of the Sophists* or What is Indeed the Mentioned Sophistic?, *Athens Journal of Philosophy* 1 (2022), 51-70 where an attempt was made to lift the veil of mystery surrounding the phenomenon as described by Philostratus. Also worth noting is K. Eshleman's study "Defining the Circle of Sophists: Philostratus and the Construction of the Second Sophistic," *Classical Philology* 103 (2008), 395-413 in so far as it represents a rare attempt to challenge established views of the new sophistic.

3. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1971), 1139.

4. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur: Die nachklassische Periode der griechischen Literatur von 100 bis 539 nach Christus* (München: C. H. Beck, 1981), 688.

5. *Un milliardaire antique, Herode Atticus et sa famille* (Cairo: Imprimerie Misr, 1930), ix. Cf. André Boulanger, *Aelius Aristide et la sophistique dans la province d'Asie au II siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1925), 73.

6. "Die Zweite oder Neue Sophistik", *RE Suppl. VIII*, 725. Such attitudes to the phenomenon of the Second Sophistic can be explained by the influence of Rohde's theses on the so-called sophistical rhetoric, as expressed in the famous chapter "Die griechische Sophistik der Kaiserzeit" (310-387) of his classical work, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1914), where almost no distinction was made between the new and the old sophistic, namely theses that were regarded by none other than Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa, von VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance* (Stuttgart und Leipzig: Teubner, 1915), 275 (hereinafter referred to as Norden, *Kunstprosa*) as almost flawless. Truth be told, Rohde argued correctly that the look of the so-called Second Sophistic was, as Schmid put it, "rückwärts gewendet," i.e. turned backwards, but not so much, as he thought, to the old sophistic as to a specific legend only vaguely associated with it, as shall be seen later.

Von Arnim's work itself provides an instructive example of how misleading it is to assume that the content of the notions *philosophos*, *sophistes* and *rhetor* had not considerably changed over time and remained basically the same in the period of the Second Sophistic as it had been in the Athens of Socrates and Plato, where one of the most bitter disputes in the history of ideas raged, with all the exponents of the mentioned intellectual currents taking an active part in it. Truth be told, it was due to deficiencies in his methodological approach that von Arnim was forced to formulate a theory of the bitter struggle between sophistic, philosophy and rhetoric for gaining pre-eminence in the education of the youth in the course of the last four centuries BC, resulting, in his view, in a landslide victory for rhetoric in the period of the Second Sophistic,⁷ as a consequence of which he regarded the Second Sophistic as a specific offshoot of the old one⁸ despite a lapse of almost five centuries since the latter left a gap in continuity.

Von Arnim's Thesis and an Enigma in Dio's Invective against the Sophists: Which Sophistic is targeted in his Tirades—the New or the Old?

That something has gone wrong with Arnim's thesis can be inferred from Dio's disparaging attitudes to sophists, as expressed in his fourth discourse on kingship. It is in this discourse that the sophists are characterized as ignorant,⁹ tricky fellows,¹⁰ men attracting only simpletons,¹¹ lecherous eunuchs¹² and

7. In an attempt to prove his thesis, he points to the fact (*Dio von Prusa*, 77–84) that an almost parallel turning to rhetoric occurred in both the Peripatos and the Academy when headed in the third century BC by Lycon and Arcesilaus respectively, with this kind of innovation in the teaching process being regarded by the author as a decline in the case of Peripatos and a rise, as far as the Academy is concerned. He, moreover, considered Ariston's living word resembling, in his view, the song of the Sirens to be the culmination of the mentioned process, a song which was, instead of with Socrates (*Plat., Symp.*, 215e) erroneously associated with the sophistic and yet regarded as a convincing proof of its victory over philosophy. In this context, it should also be noted that every theory that supports the assumption that the Second Sophistic is primarily characterised by rhetoric can rightly be regarded as yet another instance of adopting von Arnim's theses.

8. Von Arnim's conclusion (*Dio von Prusa*, 104–112 ff.) is essentially based on the passage from Cicero (*On the Orator*, 3, 109–110), in which the head of the Academy, Philo of Larissa, is represented as advocating the educational ideal of the old sophistic: "Noch entschiedener wird im ersten Jahrhundert von philosophischer Seite das sophistische Bildungs ideal erneuert. Ein Scholarch der Akademie, Philon von Larissa ist es, der in den ersten beiden Jahrzehnten des ersten Jahrhunderts das einst durch Platon überwundene sophistische Bildungsideal mit Begeisterung vertritt."

9. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 28: ... ϕιλλ' ἡγεμον (sc. τῆς σοφιστικῆς) ἡγεμον of πολίτων οὐκ ὀρθῶς βασιλεύειν, ϕιλλ' οὐδέ τις ἀνὴρ ἴσασιν.

10. *Ibid.*, 32: ... καὶ οὐδέ τις ἄλλος αἰτιοῦσθαι τὴν τοῦτον (sc. ἡγεμονίαν τῆς παιδείας) ἐφ' ἧσιν οὐκ αἰρεῖται οὐδέ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου σφιστικῆς.

the hair, parrot¹⁷ and gnat,¹⁸ composed in his early period, of which only the first-mentioned has survived, due to the fact that it was included in his own encomium on baldness. The first impression we get while reading Dio's praise of the hair is that it should be considered a short "essay" on cultural phenomenon such as wearing long hair by Spartan youth, rather than a sophisticated writing, as evidenced by the fact that Synesius read it time and again as if under a spell or hypnotized by its beauty. Thus, we have good reason to believe that Dio's two other encomiums on trivial topics such as praising the parrot and the gnat also assumed characteristics of an "essay", if we take into account, above all, Homer's mastery in drawing analogies with similar species of animal life such as flies.¹⁹

Another passage from the mentioned writing, where Synesius' holds the view that Dio handled what was usually classed among purely rhetorical subjects no longer as a rhetorician but rather like a statesman,²⁰ makes us understand the real reason for setting up such dichotomies within Dio's oeuvre, and the reason consists in the fact that the nation- and state-building nature of some of his literary products was the key criterion for introducing divisions within an indivisible whole, at least as far as the stylistic point of view is concerned. It is this state-building nature of a certain literary work that will turn out to be of paramount importance in unravelling the key enigma, i.e. obtaining an answer to the question: 'who are indeed these sophists in confrontation with whom Dio uses a whole series of mocking qualifiers so as to discredit them altogether.'

All of the above suggests that what we are dealing with here are the exponents of the old sophistic, but the fact that in a fit of anger Dio crosses swords with the expounders of a spiritual current having a long time ago lost its relevance seems a little bit strange and anachronistic. This can be explained—at least for now—by the fact that the first major exponent of the new sophistic crosses swords not so much with the leading exponents of the old one as with its legacy which he, acting in the best national interests, regarded as extremely toxic, even when almost no fire was smouldering under ashes. Thus, we can see how an uncompromising attitude to the whole legacy of the old sophistic as well as to every attempt at its

17. Cf. Synesius, *Dio* in Lamar Crosby, *Testimony*, 372: ... f hs...(sc. Philostratus) ... sofistoà g' r eīnai nhðè toÚwn Øperideñ. It should be said in this connection that Philostratus (487), unlike Synesius, creates no dichotomies within Dio's oeuvre, as evidenced by the fact that he puts Dio's most popular, and in the opinion of many greatest oration, the *Tale of Euboea* or rather the *Euboean Discourse*, in the same category as the mentioned encomia on trivial topics—something that can serve as a guideline for how we should read his oeuvre.

18. The fables about the elephant and the gnat and the lion and the gnat we come across in Tatius' novel (2, 21, 4 and 2, 22, 1-7 respectively) give us an inkling about the popularity enjoyed by this type of encomium in the period of the Second Sophistic and later times.

19. *Iliad*, 2, 469-473. Cf. Lucian, *The Fly* (*Muscae encomium*).

20. Synesius, *Dio* in Lamar Crosby, *Testimony*, 372.: ... ka^ t! j ·htorik! j t! n Øpoqšs ewn oÙkšti ·htorik! j øll! pol itik! j neteceir»s ato.

revivification was beginning to take hold by the middle of the first century AD—a fact which makes us confront *aporia* because what needs to be explained at the very outset is the curious paradox that almost all the exponents of the Greek renaissance of the first century were so proud to be honoured with the title of sophist. In order to know what may be the reasons therefore, we must carefully analyze Dio's entire oeuvre so as to be able to identify a prime mover in inspiring his tirades as well as the attitudes of all major exponents of the mentioned renaissance. What is referred to here is a powerful driving force provided by a political testament despite the fact that it was given only in bare outline in one of Plato's early dialogues.

What we still need before focusing our attention on the mentioned driving force is yet further evidence that what was targeted in Dio's impassioned invective were only the exponents of the old sophistic and its legacy with almost no flame, as it seemed, smouldering under the ashes in his own time. We must, first of all, search for evidence in Dio's work and complement it with that provided by the authors of the age of Plato so as to be able to obtain a reliable result.

Dio's State of Being In-between Homer and Socrates and Setting up False Dichotomies Within his Oeuvre

The evidence itself remained unnoticed owing to the fact that it could be found only in Dio's two fairly short "essays" on Socrates (or. 54, 55), with the latter being of particular importance to our objectives, due to both the author's thesis about a close spiritual affinity between the Athenian philosopher and Homer and his attitudes towards philosophical and literary activity. The former, on the other hand, provides an answer to the questions of who indeed these sophists are with whom Dio crosses swords, and what the main reason is for the invective he heaped on them. We find the reason therefore in his characterisation of the mentioned sophists' orations as speeches devoid of even the slightest sense, the large proportion of which can, in his view, only be explained by their authors' base motives to make money and please simpletons and fools.²¹ The curious paradox, in Dio's view, is that the writings of the sophists, "who won such admiration, have perished and nothing remains but their name alone, the words of Socrates, for some strange reason, still endure and will endure for all time, though he himself did not write or leave behind him either a treatise or a will."²²

21. *Fifty-Fourth Discourse*, 1-2: $\alpha\beta\epsilon\gamma\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\mu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, $\nu\omicron\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\alpha\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$...

22. *Ibid.*, 4: ... $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\alpha\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$... *of* $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\alpha\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$... Cf. also the analogy drawn between meat, salt and the Socratic grace in Dio's eighteenth discourse *On Training* (13): "For just as no meat without salt will be

It is now more than apparent that the target of Dio's invective was the legacy of the ancient sophistic, and it is also more than clear that the above-mentioned driving force is to be identified with the living and breathing word praised in hymnal tunes in the *Phaedrus*.

On the other hand, it is in the last mentioned of the two short "essays," in which striking similarities between Socrates and Homer are advocated, that we find a key reason why Synesius set up dichotomies within Dio's oeuvre, as demonstrated by the fact that "they both were devoted to the same ends and spoke about the same things" through different media such as those of verse and prose,²³ and were, furthermore, most "effective at making similes, comparisons" and analogies. This is further corroborated by the fact that drawing seemingly trivial analogies with starlings, daws, locusts, a firebrand, ashes, beans and chickpeas is, due to their educational function, at least of the same, if not even greater importance in Homer's work as making similes with the almighty creatures of both wild life and myth, such as lions and eagles or Scylla and Cyclopes,²⁴ which can sufficiently explain not only what seemed at first sight to be the sudden appearance of encomia on the parrot and the gnat in the period of the Second Sophistic, but also setting up dichotomies within Dio's oeuvre, most likely stemming from Dio's implicitly subdividing the aspects of Homer's poetry into the purely didactic and those with a state-building dimension—something that is also true for Socrates' living word, essentially characterized by a mixture of polar opposites, such as the serious and the laughable.²⁵ We can rightly assume that, except for Homer's effectiveness at making such comparisons, Socrates' strong personal predilection for drawing analogies with animal life—as expressed in the prologue to the *Phaedrus* with the celebrated philosopher comparing none other

gratifying to the taste, so no branch of literature, as it seems to me, could possibly be pleasing to the ear if it lacked the Socratic grace." The English version of this and all other passages from Dio's discourses is borrowed from J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby's study edition of Dio's discourses (LCL).

23. *Fifty-Fifth Discourse*, 9: ... $\Phi\epsilon\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\iota\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\ \tau\acute{\iota}\sigma\upsilon\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\ \zeta\sigma\tau\eta\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \epsilon\gamma\sigma\tau\eta\nu\ \delta\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \delta\iota\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\eta\ \rho\omicron\iota\sigma\sigma\epsilon\omega\upsilon\ \delta\omicron\delta\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\delta\eta\nu.$

24. *Ibid*, 10: ... $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\ \omicron\mu\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\ \tau\omicron\iota\alpha\grave{\alpha}\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\delta\omicron\kappa\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\zeta\epsilon\iota\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\omicron\upsilon\ \nu\acute{\iota}\mu\eta\tau\alpha\iota\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \tau\acute{\iota}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\omicron\iota\phi\ \acute{\alpha}\ \epsilon\kappa\rho\delta\omega\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\ \delta\alpha\lambda\omicron\grave{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\sigma}\rho\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\ \kappa\upsilon\lambda\omicron\nu\nu\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\eta}\beta\eta\tau\omicron\nu\nu\ \dots\ \nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\upsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\zeta\epsilon\iota\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\acute{\gamma}\eta\ \lambda\acute{\iota}\sigma\omicron\tau\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\acute{\gamma}\eta\ \epsilon\tau\omicron\acute{\gamma}\eta\ (\text{sc. } \acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\grave{\alpha})\ \dots$

25. The mixture itself, apparently, springs from a particularly characteristic passage from the *Gorgias* (481c), with Calicles being therein represented as poking fun at Socrates' method of argumentation and saying that there is no way of knowing whether Socrates is serious or joking simply due to the fact that if he is serious and what he says is really true, the life of all human beings must have been turned upside down and we must be doing quite the opposite of what we ought to do. On the mixture of the serious and the laughable as a widespread ideal of life and aesthetics in late antiquity and the Middle Ages see Ernst Robert Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1961), 419-434. It is worth mentioning that Platonic origin of the mixture is not even touched upon in his summary presentation of the phenomenon.

no matter how summarily it was formulated in Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, where the stress was laid on *wisdom* and *industry*, or rather *sophia* and *epimeleia*,³⁰ as the two driving forces, which were later to be given the role of a specific bulwark and guarantor of victory when it comes to both countering foreign interference and defending the Greek living space in any future clashes with the barbarian element, be that even the almighty Persian empire itself. These two winged words were, no matter how paradoxical it may sound, quite sufficient to make up almost the whole content of a political manifesto due to the fact that Socrates himself unreservedly recommended the ethical-political aspect of his teaching to his interlocutor Alcibiades as a philosophical basis of his own testament³¹—something that, at least if we may judge by Dio's own attitudes to Socrates and his stylistic devices, may have grown into a universal cultivation and promotion of that legacy, resulting in a negative impact on rival intellectual currents such as those sophistic, which is why the Hellenic world was, relatively early on, transformed into an all too closed society creatively and zealously cultivating the mentioned literary-philosophical *plasma* as a central bulwark of its defence. This process reached its culmination in the third and fourth century AD, i.e., in the period covered by Eunapius' *Lives*, when Platonic philosophy and its legendary protagonist was assigned the role of the last bulwark of defence in an attempt made by dying paganism to resist the Christian religion irrepressibly penetrating the Hellenic living space, as testified by lyrical passages from the mentioned work.³²

Thus, all of this gives occasion to point to the problem of the method used in previous research on the subject,³³ as shown by the fact that the evidence provided by Eunapius' *Lives* was almost entirely underestimated in the study of the phenomenon, due above all to Rohde's negative influence, as evidenced by the fact that he used his favourite qualifier *barbarian*³⁴ as a convenient label for

30. 123c-124b: καὶ οἴμαι ἴσως ἂν (sc. Xerxis uxorem) εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὄσκει ὅτι ἕλλησι πιστεῦναι οἴομαι Διὶ καὶ (sc. Alcibiades) ἡμῶν εἰς πᾶσι τοῖς καὶ σοφίας ταῦτα γὰρ μὴ ἔχοντες ἔσονται ἡμεῖς ἕλλησιν ...

31. 105d.

32. Cf. Eunapius' account (470-472) of Sosipatra and her youngest son Antoninus whose way of living is essentially characterized by what was openly advocated by Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (4, 7, 10), namely a need for attributing great importance to the mantic and divination in every well-ordered society.

33. When we say *previous research on the subject* we refer to the most influential theories put forward by Hans von Arnim, Paul Graindor, Wilhelm Kroll, Karl Gerth, André Boulanger, Erwin Rohde and Eduard Norden. The same is also true for the expression *the majority of scholars*.

34. *Der griechische Roman*, 386. He inadvertently overlooked the apotheosis of Socrates in Eunapius' *Lives*, as evidenced by the fact that the sophists of the third and fourth century AD kept following in his footsteps and imitating his way of life down to the last detail, as can be concluded from the author's account of Prohaeresius (492), Aedesius (482) and Chrysanthius' way of living (501).

playing down the otherwise precious testimonies contained in the mentioned writing. Ironically enough, only the text of the mentioned *Lives*, if complemented by Philostratus' biographies of sophists of an earlier period, gives us the opportunity to gain a rare insight into what the Second Sophistic actually is.

The Central Principles of Socrates' Political Testament in *Alcibiades* and Their Reflection in the Field of Literature as Depicted in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*

It remains to be seen what reflection the central principles of Socrates' political testament found in what is called creativity in the literary domain. It doesn't take much imagination to conclude that *sophia* and *epimeleia* were now closely associated with the careful and thoughtful elaboration of the literary concept, based on both the Socratic-Platonic and Homeric patterns, as advocated by Dio in his two short "essays" and symbolized in the period of the Second Sophistic by the workshop of Socrates' legendary ancestor, Daedalus, represented in Philostratus' description of the painting entitled *Pasiphae* as looking intently at intelligible reality exceeding by far the power of human mind³⁵—a fact which clearly points to the realm beyond Heaven (Hyperouranios) and an entire sea of concepts streaming down from it so as to be carefully elaborated in his atelier and thus enabled to come out of it as truly living creatures, which could, in the last analysis, be regarded as an allusion to Socrates' living word and its magical powers. All of this suggests other possibilities for interpretation regarding the use of the term *sophistes* in Dio's oeuvre, because we can rightly assume that the target of Dio's invective was also his contemporaries and their inability to develop, refine and restructure the concepts derived from the essential premises of Platonic philosophy so as to be fully utilized for the defence and security of the entire Greek world, as can be inferred from a passage from Dio's 32nd discourse³⁶ in which the art of his rivals is regarded as purely deluding and wonder-working due to the lack of the above-mentioned strategic components in its content.

These central principles of the political testament seem to have been enveloped in an aura of sanctity almost immediately after the death of Socrates, as can be

35. *Imagines*, 1, 16, 1: αὐτῷ Δαδάλου ἐτικτίζει μὲν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὀψῆρας ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωπον βλάπτειν ...

36. *To the People of Alexandria*, 39: δεῖνοί γε ἰσχυροὶ καὶ μέγιστα καὶ γόνιμοι: τὸ δὲ μάλιστα φαῖναι καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους. Similar attitudes towards the sophists of his own time were also taken by Dio's contemporary Plutarch, *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* (*De audiendis poetis*), 43f, 48d where the exponents of the mentioned intellectual current are identified with popular lecturers or superficial persons bent on acquiring mere information respectively, which allows us to conclude that what Dio had in mind was just this kind of knowledge.

inferred from the evidence provided by Xenophon's *Memorabilia* which could be regarded as a legend of Socrates launched at the most suitable moment for putting the mentioned manifesto's key ideas into practice. Thus, contrary to von Arnim's disparaging attitude,³⁷ Xenophon's work turned out to be an important link in the entire tradition of Socratism and Platonism, a link without which it is not, it seems, possible to either understand the destiny of the old sophistic movement over the ensuing centuries or fully comprehend the sudden revivification of the legend of Socrates in the later period of the Second Sophistic, as evidenced by the fact that Eunapius sang its praises in hymn-like passages from his *Lives*.

An attentive reader may be surprised by our seemingly audacious attempt to characterize Xenophon's *Memorabilia* as a legend and thus link it more closely to Socrates' political testament given in bare outline in the *Alcibiades*. That there should be no room for surprise will soon be shown. What more closely connects the manifesto and the legend is nothing other than the fact that *sophia* and *epimeleia*, as crucial terms of Socrates' testament in the *Alcibiades*, are also key words of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*,³⁸ to be precise. However, it should be said that in Xenophon *sophia* as a more general term yields place to a more specific one such as *enkrateia*,³⁹ a difference that seems to have occurred not without reason, in so far as in Xenophon's legend all other central principles of Socrates' philosophy are presented as revolving around *enkrateia* as a specific axis, which is why *enkrateia* itself assumes characteristics of the quintessence of wisdom, since, in the author's opinion, it alone leads to contemplating the intelligible world and what is Good in things themselves as well as to classifying the latter into both genera and groups and the possibility closely connected with it, such as constantly choosing

37. Dio von Prusa, 21. Aldo Brancacci, "Struttura compositiva e fonti della terza orazione 'Sulla regalità' di Dione Crisostomo", *ANRW II*, 36, 5, 3316 uses the term *logos Sokraticos* in order to prove his theory of Dio being inspired by the reflection which Socrates' living word found in Antisthenes.

38. *Epimeleia*, though semantically similar to *sophia*, is, among other things, closely associated in Xenophon (1, 4, 18) with the mantic to which crucial importance would be attached in the later periods of the Second Sophistic, as can be inferred from Eunapius' *Lives*. The fact that Eunapius shaped Sosipatra's character (470: καὶ πέντε ἔδσαν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἐπὶ Σωσιπείτρα, καὶ πᾶσι πῆρεστι τοῖς γινόμενοις) under the influence of the famous passage from Xenophon's work [1, 4, 17: ... (sc. οἴσεται οὐκ ἀκαὶ μὴ τὸν σὸν μὲν ὅμα δὴνας αἰ τῆς πόλις στήδια τῆς κνεσται, τὸν δὲ γεὸν ἦν καὶ μὴν ἐδύνατον εἶναι ἄμα πέντε ἔδσαν ... τῶν δὲ τοῦ γεὸν φέρουσιν μὴ ἴκανον εἶναι ἄμα πέντε τῶν μὲν ἐσται)] speaks volumes about the reflection the mentioned legend found in Eunapius.

39. Cf. 1, 6, 8-10., where Socrates advocated the view that *enkrateia*, apart from leading to contemplation of the intelligible world, could also make an athlete of a hopelessly weak person, something that, as he thought, was of decisive importance in the matter of strategic defence. On the other hand, in his conversation with Euthydemus (4, 5, 3-5), Socrates expounds his views on *enkrateia* as being a prerequisite of freedom, in so far as the lack of the former leads to slavery.

Good and avoiding Evil in one's own activity.⁴⁰ Secondly, and no less important: the fact itself that *enkrateia* made of a personality with a delicate constitution, such as that of Socrates, an athlete capable of achieving heroic feats⁴¹ might have offered an overdue spark of hope to all those who in the first two centuries AD were inspired by the ideal of the rebirth of the Greek spirit in a political frame alien to it, which explains the need for constantly actualizing the great philosopher's teachings, resulting in a kind of apotheosis of Socrates in Eunapius' *Lives*—a fact which clearly shows how fatal it was to ignore this source in research on the phenomenon.

In Xenophon's work, not only was Socrates represented as a true connoisseur of the intelligible world of ideas but also as an expert in almost all practical disciplines such as military art,⁴² home economics,⁴³ house-keeping,⁴⁴ doing sustainable business and account-keeping,⁴⁵ with his solidarity with all the members of the community standing out from the rest for its importance and going so far as to induce him to not only help others with his advice, but also to carry like an athlete their own burden on his back.⁴⁶

What is now of the greatest importance for our objectives is to ascertain what reflection the legend of Socrates found in the literary domain. What we encountered in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* surpassed all expectations, in so far as, against the background of Socrates' attitudes taken in his dialogues with both Parrhasius the painter and Cleito the sculptor, not only do we clearly see what the origins of the literary concept applied in the period of the Second Sophistic are, but also obtain a more concrete answer to the question we started our exposition with: what literary or philosophical plasma actually is and what it looks like in detail.

More than anything else, this very answer will enable us to see to what extent Xenophon's mentioned writing assumed characteristics of a legend, as indicated by the fact that Socrates' theses on art advocated in his conversations with the aforesaid artists, found universal acceptance among the leading exponents of the Second Sophistic, as evidenced in Lucian's *Essays in Portraiture (Imagines)* containing one of his three literary canons⁴⁷ which could rightly be regarded as the three

40. *Memorabilia*, 4, 5, 11-12: $\epsilon\lambda\lambda\iota\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ ι $\nu\omicron\iota\omicron\iota\iota$ $\alpha\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ $\sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\epsilon\alpha$ $\nu\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\kappa\rho\epsilon\tau\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$ $\tau\hat{\iota}$ ν $\pi\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\omega\upsilon\kappa\alpha$ $\lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\alpha$ $\kappa\alpha$ α $\rho\gamma\alpha$ $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\gamma\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta$ $\tau\hat{\iota}$ $\mu\grave{\epsilon}\nu$ $\epsilon\gamma\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}$ $\pi\rho\alpha\iota\epsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota$, $\tau\hat{\iota}$ ν $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ $\kappa\alpha\kappa\hat{\iota}$ ν $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota$.

41. *Ibid*, 1, 6, 7.

42. *Cf.*, 3, 1-5.

43. *Memorabilia*, 2, 7-2, 8 (conversation with Aristarchus).

44. *Ibid*, 2, 9-2, 10 (conversation with Crito).

45. *Ibid*, 2, 8 (conversation with Eutherus).

46. *Ibid*, 2, 7, 1: $\epsilon\rho\theta\acute{\omicron}\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ $\tau\omicron\grave{\alpha}$ $\beta\epsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\iota$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$ $\delta\iota\delta\omicron\chi\alpha\iota$ $\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\iota\iota$: $\beta\omega\gamma$ $\gamma\acute{\iota}$ ρ $\nu\tau$. $\sigma\epsilon$ $\kappa\alpha$ $\lambda\acute{\omicron}$ $\mu\epsilon\gamma$ $\kappa\omicron\upsilon\phi$ $\sigma\alpha\iota$ $\mu\epsilon\upsilon$.

47. The remaining two appear in *Lexiphanes* (22) and the *Dance (De saltatione)*, 60-61.

Imagines where painted figures not only move freely but also make utterance,⁵⁴ which could be regarded as yet another case of putting the key ideas of Socrates' political testament into practice, this time in the field of art. In line of the above mentioned evidences concerning the subject matter of philosophy underlying the poetics of the authors of the late Greek renaissance, it could rightly be affirmed that the moving portraits and sculptures represent a powerfully conceived metaphor of Socrates' living and breathing word. What can be concluded from all this is the fact that the poetics of the mentioned authors is an idealistic one and that, in keeping with this, we should apply appropriate criteria when attempting to evaluate their works, which has so far been almost entirely ignored, as testified by the fact that these literary works were as a rule closely associated with the ancient sophistic, and, by the same token, decline.

Isocrates' Sophistic as Seen Through the Prism of an Almost Complete Interchangeability of the Terms 'Sophistic', 'Philosophy' and 'Rhetoric'

It was under the authority of Socrates that the *montage* was closely associated with literary creativity, something to which the popularity of the principles of the new rhetoric (*diaireseis, synagogai*) given in a bare outline in the *Phaedrus* may have largely contributed, all the more as they themselves resemble *montage*. In the period of the Second Sophistic, some authors went so far as to present their own poetics as something completely different from what they actually were, with the express intention of conferring an aura of absolute novelty to their assembled creation. Such an understanding of 'literary creativity' would be widely adopted in the future, with Isocrates, Plato's, or rather Socrates' favourite orator setting the trend, an orator in whose oeuvre the concepts of the sophistic, philosophy and rhetoric appear to be interchangeable to such an extent that it is not at all possible to draw a clear line of demarcation between them—something that gives rise to the assumption that some kind of a break in continuity occurred as regards a stylistics- and history of ideas-related timeline starting from Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, passing through Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and leading to Dio Chrysostom and all the other exponents of the Second Sophistic. But despite all that, appearances are deceptive and now we shall see the reason therefore.

More importantly, we are under the impression that what we are dealing with here is not only an almost complete interchangeability between rival intellectual currents such as philosophy, sophistic and rhetoric, but also something that seems

54. *Imagines*, 2, 5, 4 (Rhodogune): $\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\mu\alpha$ δὲ ἰπαλὸν καὶ ἐκνεύοντων ἵππων ἰκάνων, φίλων αἰνέων ἄδυστον, ἐπαγγεῖλαι δὲ οὐκ ἐδίων ... ἐκλήθη ἐκνήθη καὶ ἴσα, $\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\mu\alpha$ ἰκάνων καὶ παραφρονοῦντων ἐκνήθη τὸ τροπαιῶν, κ' ἵππων παρακοῶν αἰβουλήν, τῆκα ἰκάνων.

to the model to be chosen.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Isocrates views the approach adopted by his rivals as the polar opposite to his own art of speaking, in so far as it is essentially characterized by both the unbearable lightness of utterance and improvisation based on pure natural gift and, moreover, governed by chance⁸⁰—something that points to Gorgias and the milieu of the old sophistic.

On the basis of the above, we are driven to the conclusion that Isocrates, following the model of Daedalus' workshop as depicted in Philostratus' *Imagines*,⁸¹ turned his own school into a kind of atelier, where *plasma*, i.e. subject matter of literature and philosophy of vital importance for both the state and society, was devoutly shaped and modelled, which is why it could rightly be characterized as nation- and state-building *plasma*.

What still remains to be done is to unravel the reasons why Isocrates characterizes himself as a sophist. That he remained faithful to the concepts of Platonic philosophy and, moreover, looked upon himself as Socrates' follower can be inferred from the fact that in the *Antidosis*⁸² he constantly lays stress on parallelisms between his own judicial procedure and that of Socrates—something that stands in sharp contrast to all those instances in which he identifies as a sophist.⁸³ Fortunately enough, we can eliminate this apparent contradiction through unique testimony in ancient literature, otherwise provided by Aeschines,⁸⁴

79. This devotedness to the Platonic ideals comes to light even more in the opening passages from the *Nicoles*(9) in which, under the influence of the emblematic analogy drawn by Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (266b-c), rhetoricians, characterized as the teachers of philosophy, are regarded as gods. In the opening passage from Dio's twenty-second discourse *On Peace and War* we come across the same identification of rhetoric with state-building philosophy under the influence of the famous analogy drawn in the *Gorgias* (464b) between beauty care, gymnastics, the sophistic and legislation, on the one hand, and cookery, medicine, rhetoric and justice, on the other, namely an analogy that also found its reflection in both Aristides' first Platonic discourse, *In Defense of Oratory* (or. 2, 215), and, as we have already seen, Isocrates' *Antidosis*.

80. Cf. n. 76. In the same context, Isocrates uses the term synonymous with *epimeleia*, i.e. *philoponiai*, with the aim to lay stress on efforts of study as the only way to elaborate successfully the borrowed concepts, which is why the mentioned toil is to be praised more than talent and pure invention (291). Cf. the same attitude adopted by Lucian in *Prometheus es in verbis* (3) where *epimeleia* is identified with *montage* of literary concepts.

81. 1, 16.

82. 15; 27.

83. Cf. Norlin's attitude, "General introduction", xvi: "Indeed, the use of this term (sc. sophist) by Isocrates may be nothing more than a protest against the preposterous claims made by certain sophists for the omnipotence of their instruction."

84. *Against Timarchus*, 173: οπειδ' ὅτι, ὃ ἔνδρεϊ 'Αφῆρασι, Σωκράτην μὲν τῶν σοφιστῶν ἐπεκτείνε, ὅτι Κριτῶν τῶν πεπεδευκῶν ... Δῆμος γὰρ ἠνθ' ὅτι τῶν ταύρων τῶν αἰρετῶν ... This testimony gains in importance all the more so since in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* (483) we encounter the fact that in their private life the two great men of the forensic oratory, Demosthenes and Aeschines, "claimed consideration and applause on the very ground

according to which Socrates was regarded as the sophist par excellence by the Athenian public opinion of his own time— something that points to the possibility that the term *sophistes* was often used by Isocrates with the meaning of *Socrates' disciple*. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that Isocrates, in keeping with high hopes Socrates pinned on him, eagerly joined the efforts already made by others to put key messages of the political testament in the *Alcibiades* into practice, acutely aware though he was that his own oeuvre hardly brought something new as far as original ideas are concerned. However, if there is something new in all this, that has to do with the fact that the entire exemplary subject matter⁸⁵ of literature and philosophy and, by the same token, that of the ancient sophistic was implicitly included in this specific “execution” of the political testament,⁸⁶ with Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* being in all likelihood the model that served that purpose, as can be inferred from the fact that Prodicus’ parable of Hercules at the crossroads⁸⁷ as well as Socrates’ conversations with the leading exponents of the old sophistic was given a relatively large space in the above-mentioned writing.

Isocrates’ attitude to the sophistic, if compared to that of Dio, gives rise to the conclusion that the Second Sophistic is not the same phenomenon everywhere as a majority of scholars have wrongly assumed in previous research on the subject, since in Isocrates’ conception of the state, as distinguished from that of Dio, there was still a room for the legacy of the old sophistic representing, in his view, simply an easier method that, despite its deficiencies, might yet be applied in achieving the same goal, such as creating an ideal, harmonious society.

that they were sophists”. On the portrait of Socrates in ancient literature cf., among other works, Heinrich Meier, *Sokrates: sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1913), Olof Gigon, *Sokrates: sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1947), Helmut Kuhn, *Sokrates: Versuch über den Ursprung der Metaphysik* (München: Kösel Verlag, 1959), André-Jean Festugière, *Socrate* (Paris: F. Flammarion, 1934). As regards Socratics cf., among other works, Jean Humbert, *Socrate et les petits socratiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), Heinrich Dittmar, *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker, Untersuchungen und Fragmente* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1912), Barbara Ehlers, *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines* (München: Beck, 1966 (Zetemata 41), Gabriele Giannantoni, *I Cirenaici: raccolta delle fonti antiche; traduzione e studio introduttivo* (Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1958), Erich Mannebach, *Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum fragmenta* (Leiden: Brill, 1961), Monique Dixsaut-Aldo Brancacci, *Platon source des présocratiques: exploration* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2003).

85. *Nicoles*, 10: ἡ δὲ ἐποδοῖται καὶ ἀπαντᾷ τοῦ ἰσοκράτους τοῦ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐν ἑαυτῇ.

86. *Antidosis*, 271, where it has been hinted at the ability of the sophist, now characterized as philosopher, to arrive generally at the best course after quickly gaining insight into the state of things.

87. *Memorabilia*, 2, 1, 21-2, 2, with Prodicus characterized as the wise man at the very beginning of Xenophon’s narrative.

What applies for Isocrates so also does for Dio, as well as all the major exponents of the Second Sophistic in so far as they were much closer to the Socratic-Platonic legacy than to that of the old sophistic. Thus, the necessary prerequisites are fulfilled to take a closer look at philosophical or literary *plasma* as used by the author in his fourth discourse on kingship.

Philosophical *plasma* in Dio's Fourth Discourse as a Telling Indicator of What the Second Sophistic Actually Is

It would be very hard to imagine a literary product more suitable than Dio's fourth discourse on kingship for getting a full insight into both the process of creating literary-philosophical *plasma* and its exemplary aspects. What we encounter in the mentioned discourse surpasses all expectations since its structural elements already reflect a trend in Greek literature over the time period extending from Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades* to Dio's age and beyond, as previously mentioned. We can see, so to speak, with the naked eye the mentioned structural elements of Dio's discourse consisting of the concepts borrowed from the *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*—where Plato's attitudes to rhetoric and literature in general are expressed – as well as those taken from the *Alcibiades* and the *Republic* and related to both the politics of strategic defence and the theory of the state, namely concepts that are further complemented by the striking analogies used by Xenophon in *Memorabilia* with the intent to present the teachings of the great philosopher in the most effective way, as shall be seen below. In order to understand the full implication such a montage of concepts—on more than one occasion characterized as *plasma*—has for acquiring essential knowledge of the poetics of late Greek literature, it remains to be seen how Dio himself defines his own stylistic technique—something that may yield unexpected and highly interesting results as far as other genres of Greek literature are concerned.

In the opening passage from his fourth discourse, Dio tells us that, since it had happened that he had nothing else that demanded his attention, he had enough time at his disposal to paint a picture of how the most paradoxical encounter that could have ever occurred, such as that between the greatest wisdom and the highest power—or, in other words, between utter poverty and the greatest wealth personified by Diogenes and Alexander respectively—had in all likelihood been unfolding.⁸⁸ The encounter itself was as paradoxical as was the author's intention to take up the challenge of not only depicting its particulars but also of representing it in the light of the greatest likelihood possible, although centuries had gone by since the meeting took place. It is for this greatest likelihood

88. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 1: *ca.rousi f Úsei p£ntej timwšnhn Ðrî ntej fr Òhsin ØpÕ tÁj neg.sthj Tous .aj ... éste ... aÚto^ pl£ttousin Øperb£llontej ... æj dè e,kÕ Te.noij genšs qai t¾n xunous .an nàn eþpoini " n ...*

that the synonym of the term *plasma*, namely *to eikos*, is used, which gives occasion to view the latter—despite its being, as it seems, the only testimony of such a kind in Greek literature—as yet another among the technical terms used in the rhetorical manuals to denote a subtype of the third type of narrative, namely the fictional, or rather realistic one comprising all those stories that might have happened but, nonetheless, did not occur, with *plasmaticon*, *drama* and *dramatikon* representing the remaining technical terms for both the above-mentioned subtype of narration and the novel as a genre.

Now we will only very briefly touch upon the notion of fictionality in classical literature. As can be inferred from the crucial passage from Dio's fourth discourse, fictionality itself is nothing other than assembling parts of heterogeneous provenance into a harmonious whole, as advocated by none other than Socrates in his conversation with Parrhasius the painter in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*⁸⁹ and, moreover, wholeheartedly recommended in Lucian's *Essays in Portraiture*⁹⁰—something that should be taken into account seriously, especially when it comes to understanding the notion of fictionality in the Greek novel, in the plot of which the descriptions of paintings and sculptures play an important role.

It would be logical to assume that in Dio's discourse the technique of assembling the literary-philosophical concepts was consistently and systematically implemented, i.e. applied on both a small and a large scale, with the latter relating to the composition of the whole. This very composition resembles to a large extent the plot of Plato's *Gorgias* in so far as the dialogue between Diogenes and Alexander, as is otherwise the case with the one going on between Socrates and Calicles in Plato's dialogue,⁹¹ ends with Diogenes⁹² instead of Socrates' monologue.⁹³ However, there is still a difference in composition between Plato's dialogue and Dio's discourse, and it is of a purely formal nature, since Diogenes and Alexander are the only interlocutors in the latter, as distinguished from the former where Gorgias and his followers are represented as coming one after another to discuss the issue with Socrates after they had been one by one defeated by force of Socrates' clinching arguments, which led to a profoundly submissive capitulation. If this difference of a purely formal nature caused a compositional similarity between Dio and Plato's dialogues to go unnoticed, this cannot be said of Dio's creative elaboration of the emblematic analogy Calicles draws in the *Gorgias* between Socrates and a small, snotty and babbling child⁹⁴ lovely lisping

89. Cf. n. 49.

90. Cf. n. 51.

91. *Gorgias*, 481b-505b.

92. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 78-139.

93. *Gorgias*, 507c-522e. How popular the concepts applied in the *Gorgias* were in later times can be also inferred from a particularly characteristic scene from the seventh book of Prodromos' novel *Rhodanthe and Dosicles* (vv. 332 ff).

94. *Gorgias*, 485a: ... καὶ οὐκ ἀσχροῦ μεῖρακ. Ἰ. Ὅτι φιλοσοφῆν: τῷ εἰδὼν δὲ ἡδὴ πρὸς βῦτρον ἰνὴν ἔφαθ' ὅτι φιλοσοφῆν, καταγῆλαστον, ὃ σὲ κρατεῖ, τὸ κράμα γίνεταί.

while playing at his favourite pastimes, including even those philosophical, namely an analogy in which the style of Socrates' speeches is, moreover, characterized as *neanieuesthai*,⁹⁵ i.e., as a youthful audacity and effrontery, that, despite all this, could be effectively applied to *demegoria*, a demagogical speech to be delivered in front of a large crowd.

A major theme of the *Alcibiades*, such as countering the mighty barbarian elements and their uncouth military power personified by the Persian empire—a theme which Socrates' political testament grew out of—and the above-mentioned famous analogy in the *Gorgias* in which Socrates was identified with a small, snotty child are closely interwoven in the general composition of the discourse, but, on the other hand, we should bear in mind the difference in handling the above-mentioned analogy by Dio and Plato, with Alexander in the former, instead of Socrates, being the subject of the comparison and treated by Diogenes as a small, snotty child unaware of the basic fact that he does not yet possess the personality traits, such as *sophia* and *epimeleia*, which alone could guarantee successful confrontation with the great barbarian power and thus prevent the Hellenic living space from undergoing harmful influences coming from the outside. Both the central concept and the mentioned analogy are inextricably and yet imperceptibly intertwined with the image of Socrates as depicted in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, as can be inferred from the fact that in Dio's discourse Diogenes is represented, like Socrates in the mentioned work, as a unique hero and an expert in all the domains of knowledge including the military art—something that forms a kind of backdrop against which Alexander's megalomaniac aspirations for gaining fame, reputation and power at any cost are ridiculed as childish, which gave occasion to Diogenes for playing the role of a nurse who, after giving the child a whipping,⁹⁶ tells him a fairy tale to comfort and please him, by which Alexander's case assumes tragicomic proportions.⁹⁷

Such a comparison of Alexander to a small child makes us ask ourselves what the concept itself would have looked like if worked out by Socrates, all the

Cf. 499c where Socrates accuses Callicles of treating him like a child: „oà „oà, ð Kal l .kl eij , æj panoàrgoj eĩ ka..moi é s per paid' crÍ, tot è mèn t! a Û! f £ s kwn o Û w j œ ein tot è dè ~ t š r w j , T x a p a t i n m e . Cf. also 500b where Socrates warns Callicles against indulging in jesting with him, or taking what he says as though he were jesting: ka ^ p r Q̃ Fil .ou, ð Kal l .kl eij , m t e a Û Q̃ o p u d e n p r Q̃ T h e p a .z e i n m d' Ó i " n t Ú V j p a r t ! d o k o à n t a ç p o k r .n o u , m t ' a â t ! p a r ' T h o à o Û w j ç p o d š c o u æ j p a .z o n t o j .

95. Ibid, 482c: ð S è k r a t e j , d o k e j n e a n i e ũ s q a i T h t o j l Q̃ o i j æ j ç l h q i j d h n h g Q̃ o j í n ...

96. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 73-74: dihgēto d¼ met! taàta (sc. màqon) ... boul Òreno j a Û Œ n p a r a m u » s a s q a i , k a q £ p e r a f t . t q a i t ! p a i d . a , T h e i d ! n a Û o j p l h g ! j T h b f l w s i ...

97. Something that can be inferred from either a stern glance cast by Diogenes at Alexander (24) or the scene featuring Alexander as a small pupil uneasy in the presence of his master (26).

more as he himself, as can be inferred from Plato's early dialogues, most of all *Charmides*, *Laches* and *Lysis*, very much liked playing with the Athenian youth at the noblest of pastimes such as defining key ethical notions, with his speeches about children miraculously morphing into those about adults, as evidenced by a particularly characteristic passage from the *Laches*.⁹⁸ The answer to the question posed will be provided by the myth of the winged chariot from Socrates' second discourse on love in the *Phaedrus*, with Socrates poking fun at Phaedrus of Myrrhinous in a context characterized by the sublime, lyrical mood as if the latter were a small, snotty child—a fact which, with the exception of Aristotle⁹⁹ and Lucian,¹⁰⁰ escaped the notice of both the interlocutor himself and ancient literary criticism. This stylistic feature of Socrates was beyond imitation even for Dio, forcing him to turn to adapting, or rather assembling the concepts of Platonic philosophy so as to blend them together into a harmonious whole and thus make the most of their allusive potential.

The aforesaid emblematic myth of the winged chariot in the *Phaedrus* might have served, if not stylistic, at any rate some other purpose, such as that relating to Dio's polemics against sophists—something that can provide valuable insights into what was regarded as a sublime achievement in the matter of literary creativity in the period of the Second Sophistic and thus enable us to answer the question as to whether the sophistic in general and, above all, the ancient one could still be associated with the mentioned creativity.

In one of the opening passages from Dio's fourth speech on kingship, Diogenes is represented as using Olympias' view of Alexander as Ammon's, or rather Zeus' child¹⁰¹ as an opportunity to point out to Alexander with barely concealed irony that just on account of his pretended origin the knowledge of the kingly art should have already been imprinted on his soul,¹⁰² a knowledge that might recommend him for the exercising of absolute power, with tiaras and sceptres¹⁰³ thus ending up being only outward, childish characteristics of his power, something that offended Alexander to such an extent that he, for fear that he might be found ignorant of the science of kingship, asked Diogenes an open question about who might yet impart that science to him and where one had to go to learn it.

98. 188b: ὁπισθεν ἴδι οὐπερ τὴν νειράκων μὴ ἐπιπέσοιτο Σωκράτους παρ' ἡτοίχου, ἔλλειπερ ἢ μὴν.

99. *Art of Rhetoric*, 3, 7 (1408b) 11 ff. Cf. E. Norden, *Kunstprosa*, 109.

100. *Hall (De domo)*, 4: ... κενταὰγα καζὲνενoj Fa.drou te toà Murrinous.ou kateirwneÚeto ...

101. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 19: Ἀοὐκ Ὀλυμπίας ἡ ἀποῖσα ἴδι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν ἢ ἡ ἀποῖσα ἴδι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν.

102. *Ibid*, 23: τοῦ δὲ τοῦ Διὸς ἔκγονου οὐκ ὀφείλει σὺν ἡμῶν τῆσιν ἰδέσθαι, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν.

103. *Ibid*, 25: ... οὐκ ἔστι (sc. κυβερνήτης), οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν ... πολὺ διαδύματα καὶ ... τιφραγ προσέψωσι αὐτῷ.

sixth book of the mentioned work.¹¹⁴ In accordance with the above mentioned, Socrates' exposition on the successive forms of decline of an ideal, aristocratic type of government in the eighth book of the *Republic* is immediately preceded by his interlocutors' characterization of his method as a perfect, matchless plastic art, i.e. sculpture.¹¹⁵

All of this leads us to Dio's theory of the daemons as well as his mastery in disguising his literary models. Socrates himself regarded his daemon, or rather *daimonion* as *genius*, i.e. as his good inner voice,¹¹⁶ as distinguished from the use of the term in Dio's mentioned discourse where it has the meaning of a *malign spirit*,¹¹⁷ in so far as the *daimonion* deludes the one in whose soul it took up its abode into repeatedly making wrong decisions. The reason lies in the fact that in Dio's view, all types of perverted life are to be regarded as a consequence of neglecting the rational part of the soul¹¹⁸—something that corresponds perfectly with Socrates' establishing close relationships between the degeneration and decline of the aristocratic type of government and the unwillingness of the ruling class to make efforts to consequently apply an exceptionally important combination of music and reasoning to their active life,¹¹⁹ with the term 'music' very likely including implicitly all types of artistic activity, along with the literary. In the discourse itself, there is, however, a lack of mention of music as a cause of decline, but due to Dio's marked tendency to represent Alexander as a small, snotty and uneducated child, there was no need to lay particular stress on just this type of cause.

In order to fully appreciate Dio's handling of the borrowed concepts, we must take a brief look at Plato's division of soul into three parts, namely into what is called *logistikon* (the rational part),¹²⁰ *thymoeides* (the irascible)¹²¹ and *epithymetikon*

114. Ibid, 501a: λ ab $\acute{\omicron}$ ntej ... $\acute{\epsilon}$ s per p.naka p $\acute{\omicron}$ in te ka $\acute{\wedge}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ h ϵ nqr $\acute{\epsilon}$ pwn, pr $\acute{\iota}$ ton n $\acute{\epsilon}$ n kaqar $\acute{\iota}$ n poi \gg sian $\acute{\iota}$ n ...

115. Ibid, 540c: pagk $\acute{\epsilon}$ l ouj, α h, to $\acute{\gamma}$ Υ rcontaj, δ S $\acute{\epsilon}$ kratej, $\acute{\epsilon}$ s per ϵ ndriantopoi $\acute{\omicron}$ ϵ pe.rgasai.

116. According to Karin Alt, "Dämon/(Schutz-)Geist; Daimonion" in Ch. Schäfer (ed.), *Platon-Lexikon, Begriffswörterbuch zu Platon und der platonischen Tradition*, WBG, Darmstadt 2007, appears in a few passages from Plato's oeuvre in the meaning of Socrates' attendant spirit: *Apology* (3c-d; 40a), *Euthyphron* 3b, *Theaetetus* 151a, *Phaedrus* 242b-243b, *Theages* 128d-e.

117. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 83: tri $\acute{\iota}$ n d $\acute{\epsilon}$ Υ ikrato $\acute{\omicron}$ ntwn ... b.wn ... tos o $\acute{\omicron}$ uj fat $\acute{\sigma}$ on einai ka $\acute{\wedge}$ da. μ onaj ... It should be noted that Dio, instead of Socrates' term *daimonion*, uses the older one, namely *daimon*, appearing, according to K. Alt, op. cit., in Homer and Hesiod but without the negative connotations it has in Dio.

118. Instead of Plato's term t $\acute{\omicron}$ l ogis tik $\acute{\omicron}$ n, Dio uses the abstract noun l ogis n $\acute{\omicron}$.

119. *Republic*, 548b-c: o $\acute{\omicron}$ c Φ peiq $\acute{\alpha}$ j ϵ l $\acute{\iota}$ ' Φ b.a.j pepaideun $\acute{\sigma}$ noi di $\acute{\iota}$ t $\acute{\omicron}$ t $\acute{\alpha}$ j ϵ l hqhn $\acute{\alpha}$ j Mo $\acute{\upsilon}$ s hj t $\acute{\alpha}$ j met $\acute{\iota}$ l $\acute{\omicron}$ wn te ka $\acute{\wedge}$ fil os of .aj \circ mel hk $\acute{\sigma}$ nai ka $\acute{\wedge}$ pres but $\acute{\sigma}$ rwj gumastik $\acute{\alpha}$ n musik $\acute{\alpha}$ j tetinhk $\acute{\sigma}$ nai.

120. Ibid, 439d: o $\acute{\upsilon}$ d' ϵ l $\acute{\omicron}$ wj ... ϵ xi $\acute{\epsilon}$ somen ... t $\acute{\omicron}$ m $\acute{\epsilon}$ n $\acute{\upsilon}$ l og.zetai l ogistik $\acute{\omicron}$ n pros agore $\acute{\upsilon}$ ntej t $\acute{\alpha}$ j yuc $\acute{\alpha}$ j.

(the appetitive).¹²² If we take into account that *logistikon* had to be omitted simply due to the fact that it could in no way be associated with Alexander's perverted ways of living, what remained at Dio's disposal in his attempt to formulate a theory of bad and destructive ways of lives, were the two other parts from Plato's division of the soul, namely *thymoeides* and *epithymetikon* with the following types of daemons corresponding to them in Dio's subdivision: *philedon*, *hedypathes* or *trypheros* (luxurious, self-indulgent),¹²³ *philochrematos* or *philoploutos* (acquisitive, avaricious),¹²⁴ *philotimos* or *philodoxos* (desirous of honour and glory).¹²⁵

Only after a close reading of the entire eighth book of the *Republic* shall we be able to unravel the hidden meanings of the terms used by Dio and thus be in a position to fully understand his skill in combining, elaborating and fusing the patterns of Platonic philosophy, resulting in the fact that the key message of the mentioned book of *the Republic* is even more emphasised when it comes to ascertaining where neglect of music and reasoning actually leads as far as a ruling class is concerned.

We will attempt to clarify the issue by proceeding in reverse order, i.e. by first trying to shed light on the appearance of the term *philotimos* in Dio's division, since it allows us to better comprehend not only the alarming proportions which Alexander's personality deviation assumed in the eyes of Diogenes, but also a destructive force which, almost unnoticeable and undetectable, undermines the best type of government bringing about its decline, as demonstrated in the mentioned book of the *Republic*. Plato, or rather Socrates points to both neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and the preference for gymnastics over music¹²⁶ as the principal cause of the decline of an aristocratic form of government, with the love of contentiousness (*philonikia*) and covetousness of honour (*philotimia*)¹²⁷ thus casting a baneful spell upon it. Plato speaks in more detail about it in the passage dealing with the transformation of the youth of aristocratic origin into the timocratic boy, unfolding not without some kind of a "split of personality," with the father of the lad "watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle (*logistikon*) in his soul and the others, members of

121. Ibid, 440e: $\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \dots\ \text{f a n e n}$, (sc. $\kappa\upsilon\mu\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota$) $\tau\eta\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \gamma\ \upsilon\kappa\acute{\alpha}\ \sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \tau\ \kappa\epsilon\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\ \acute{\alpha}\ \rho\acute{\iota}\ \alpha\ \pi\acute{\rho}\ \tau\ \acute{\omicron}\ \lambda\ \omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\ \nu$.

122. Ibid., 439d: $\dots\ \tau\ \acute{\omicron}\delta\ \acute{\upsilon}\ \tau\ \mu\ \text{te ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{pein}\acute{\iota}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{diy}\acute{\iota}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{per}^{\wedge}\ \text{t}\ \acute{\iota}\ \text{j}\ \tau\ \mu\ \text{iqumaj}\ \tau\ \mu\ \acute{\omicron}\ \tau\ \alpha\ \iota\ \epsilon\ \lambda\ \omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\ \text{te ka}^{\wedge}\ \tau\ \mu\ \text{iqunhtik}\acute{\omicron}\ \nu$, $\text{pl hr}\acute{\epsilon}\ \text{s}\ \epsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\ \text{n}\ \text{tinwn}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{don}\acute{\iota}\ \text{n}\ \sim\ \text{ta}\ \langle\ \text{ron}$.

123. *Fourth Discourse on Kingship*, 84 ... $\acute{\Delta}\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\ \nu\ \text{dupa}\ \kappa\acute{\alpha}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{truf}\ \epsilon\ \rho\acute{\omicron}\ \text{per}^{\wedge}\ \text{t}\ \acute{\iota}\ \text{j}\ \text{to}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \text{s}\ \epsilon\ \text{ma}\ \text{toj}\ \text{don}\ \acute{\epsilon}\ \text{j}$.

124. Ibid: $\dots\ \acute{\Delta}\delta\ \text{a}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \text{fil}\ \text{ocr}\ \rangle\ \text{matoj}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{fil}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{pl}\ \text{outoj}\ \dots$

125. Ibid: $\dots\ \acute{\Delta}\ \delta\ \epsilon\ \text{tr}\ \text{toj}\ \epsilon\ \text{nf}\ \text{ot}\ \acute{\sigma}\ \text{rwn}\ \tau\ \mu\ \text{ifan}\ \acute{\sigma}\ \text{ter}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{te ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{n}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{l}\ \text{on}\ \text{tetaragn}\acute{\sigma}\ \text{noj}$, $\acute{\Delta}\ \text{fil}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{im}\ \text{oj}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{fil}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{loxoj}\ \dots\ \tau\ \mu\ \text{dhl}\ \text{ot}\ \acute{\sigma}\ \text{ran}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{s}\ \text{fodrot}\ \acute{\sigma}\ \text{ran}\ \tau\ \mu\ \text{ideikn}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{nenoj}\ \text{t}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \text{n}\ \text{tarac}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{t}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \text{n}\ \text{an}\ \dots$

126. Cf. n. 119.

127. *Republic*, 548c: $\text{diafan}\ \acute{\sigma}\ \text{taton}\ \tau\ \mu\ \text{a}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \acute{\iota}\ \text{(sc. polite.v.)}\ \rangle\ \text{n}\ \text{ti}\ \text{n}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{non}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{p}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{to}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \text{qum}\ \text{eido}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \text{j}\ \text{krato}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{ntoj}$, $\text{fil}\ \text{onik}\ \text{ai}\ \text{ka}^{\wedge}\ \text{fil}\ \text{otim}\ \text{ai}$.

his company, “the appetitive (*epithymetikon*) and the passionate” (*thymoeides*), which is why he, “under these two solicitations, comes to a compromise and turns over the government in his soul to the intermediate principle of ambition (*philonikos*) and high spirit (*thymoeides*)¹²⁸ and becomes a man haughty of soul (*hypselophron*) and covetous of honour (*philotimos*).”¹²⁹

In Plato’s description of the transition of timocratic society into oligarchy, we come across the second term appearing in Dio’s subdivision of daemons highly destructive to state and society, namely *philochrematos*, a transition that unfolds with the son of the timocratic man thrusting “headlong from his bosom’s throne the principle of love of honour (*philotimia*) and high spirit (*thymoeides*),” and turning to accumulating money and little by little collecting property “with thrift and hard work”¹³⁰—something that will result in both his establishing on the mentioned “throne the principle of appetite (*epithymetikon*) and avarice” (*philochrematon*)¹³¹ and setting it up “as the greatest king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold.” Socrates’ attitude that the oligarchical man never turns his thought to true education,¹³² given his tendency towards “prizing wealth above everything” and “satisfying his own necessary appetites and desires” by “subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable,”¹³³ can be adduced as yet another instance of Dio’s skill in assembling the concepts of Platonic philosophy. The same is true for Socrates’ view that the oligarchical man, despite all his thrift, is not yet immune from various desires and appetites, with the consequence that he ends up being some sort of a double man¹³⁴—something that is described in more detail in Dio’s discourse (91-100).

The third term, i.e. *philedon*, in Dio’s division of harmful daemons dwelling in man’s soul, seems to originate from Plato’s expression *pantodapai hedonai* appearing in an account of how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type in the mentioned book of the *Republic*, with the son bred in his oligarchical father’s ways first “controlling by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters of wealth,”

128. Ibid, 550a-b: ... ἢ κῶρεnoj (sc. ἔνσoj) ὀφ' ἐνφ' ot ḡrwn toÚ wn, toà mèn patrĶ aÚoà tŌl ogis tikŌn ἡ τÍ yucÍ ṼrdontĶ te ka^ aÚkontoj, tî n dè Ṽll wn tŌte ἡμικνhtikŌn ka^ tŌqumœidšj ...

129. Ibid: ... ka^ t³n ἡ ἄutù çrc³n paršdwe tù ... fil on.kJ ka^ qumœide< ka^ ἡgneto Øyhl Ćrwn te ka^ fil Ōimoj çn»r.

130. Ibid, 553b-c: ... çpol šsaj (sc. paçj) t! Ōnta ... eÚqÝj ἡ^ kefal³n çqe< ἡ toà qrŌnou toà ἡ τÍ ἄautoà yucÍ fil otiman te ka^ tŌqumœidèj ... ka^ tapeinwqe^j ὀŌpen.aj ... gl .s.crwj ... cr»mata sul l šgetai.

131. Ibid: ... tŌn toioàton tŌe e,j mèn tŌn qrŌnon ἡe-non tŌ ἡμικνhtikŌn te ka^ fil ocr»maton ἡkaq.zein ...

132. Ibid, 553b-c: khfhnè dej ἡμικmaj ἡ aÚù di! t³n çpaideus .an ... ἡg.gnes qai ...

133. Ibid, 554a: : ... t! j çnagka .aj ἡμικmaj nŌnon tî n par' aŌù çpopinpl Èj, t! dè Ṽlla çnal èmata n³parecŌreno, çll! doul oÚreno, t! j Ṽllaj ἡμικmaj ...

134. Ibid, 554d-e: ... ἡ n eḡn çstas .astoj Ḍtoioàtoj ἡ ἄutù, oÚdè eÇ çll! dipl oàj tij ...

namely those denominated unnecessary,¹³⁵ and, after associating “with fierce and cunning creatures, who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind, getting a taste of the honey of the drones,”¹³⁶ as a result of which the pleasures “seize the citadel of” his “soul finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honourable pursuits, which are the best guardians in the minds of the men dear to the gods.”¹³⁷ This is why he, like the city itself, becomes a manifold, many-coloured man¹³⁸ “stuffed with most excellent differences” with his “torn and distracted” soul thus being “ever in battle and ceaseless strife with itself”¹³⁹—something that makes him unfit for the exercise of the ruler’s authority, as depicted by Dio not without taking pleasure in highlighting the details concerning Alexander (133 - 136).

In spite of reliable results obtained by taking a closer look at both the transposition and elaboration of Platonic patterns in Dio’s fourth discourse, we would still be only halfway to achieving our goals, if we could not shed light on the short final passage assuming characteristics of a solemn *parainesis* and giving an impression of being composed by the author to compensate for the caustic and at times utterly sarcastic tone of polemics.

But appearances are deceptive in so far as what seemed a common stylistic device turned out to be an emblematic image of Platonic philosophy, well-disguised and therefore hard to notice because of the sudden shift in the meaning of *daimon* from “malign spirit” to “Socrates’ good inner voice,” i.e., his attendant spirit, being in this short final passage from Dio’s discourse presented as a driving force for acquiring all Alexander desperately needed, i.e. true education and an almost divine art of reasoning of paramount importance for every well-ordered society.

All this pointed to the fact that the whole passage is laden with meaning that can be deciphered only on condition that Dio’s models are identified. Just due to the fact that it is a hymnal tone we are dealing with here, namely tones and tunes

135. Ibid, 558c-d: ... b.v. δ%ka^ oátoj ¥rcwntî n TM aQù 1 donî n, Ósai çnal wtika^ nšn, crhmatistika^ dè m»: a%d%oÜk çnagka.ai kškl hntai.

136. Ibid, 559b: Óan nšoj ... çpaideÚ wj ka^ feidwl î j, geÚshta ikhf »nwn nšl itoj ... TM aàç pou oçou einai çrc%an aÜù metabol Áj ... NígarcikÁj tÁj TM ~ autù e,j dhnookratik»n.

137. Ibid, 560b: tel eutî sai (sc. Tpiqumai) d%oímai katšl abon t%an toà nšou tÁj yucÁj çkrÇpol in ... ken%an na qhn£twn ... kal î n ka^ l Çgwn çl hqî n, o%dè ¥ristoi frouro.... TM çndrî n qeofil î n e,s i diano.a.ij.

138. Ibid, 561e: oímai dšge ... ka^ pantodapÇn te ka^ ple.stwn °qî n mestÇn, ka^ tÇn kal Çn te ka^ poik.l.on, é s per Tke.nhn t%an pÇ in, toà ont Çn ¥ndra einai.

139. This Platonic concept is further elaborated by being subjected to the visualisation and personification in Dio’s discourse (136-138). All of the above mentioned gives rise to the assertion that A. Brancacci, *Rhetorikē Philosophousa: Dione Crisostomo nella cultura antica e bizantina*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1985 (Collana Elenchos, 11) is right when he says that in Dio’s teaching philosophy and rhetoric became fused in an original and unique synthesis—something for which he coined the telling expression *rhetorikē philosophousa*.

inspired by patterns in both the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*, we can rightly assume that the philosopher's prayer to Pan at the very end of the former as well as Agathon's discourse (as far as the form is concerned) in the latter were Dio's mysterious models, something that might shed a new light on the phenomenon of the Second Sophistic.

Surprisingly enough, if we may judge by this newly deciphered meaning of the final passage from Dio's fourth discourse, the philosopher's prayer at the very end of the *Phaedrus* turned out to be a hymn of both Platonic philosophy and the Second Sophistic, namely a hymn which unravels the truth of the last mentioned phenomenon no matter what its exponents say of it in their attempts to disguise the essence of things.

Concluding Thoughts

As shown above, Dio's fourth discourse provides valuable evidence as to what the Second Sophistic actually is and therefore guidelines for how we should read the works of its major exponents. After careful analysis of the text, we were able to arrive at the preliminary conclusion that, no matter what Philostratus says about it, the Second Sophistic is quite a different phenomenon from the ancient one since it is, contrary to what was previously thought, essentially determined by philosophy as distinguished from the latter basically characterized by rhetoric. In order to grasp the essence of the problem, it was necessary to compare Dio's understanding of the sophistic to Isocrates' classical view of the phenomenon which appeared at first sight to be diametrically opposed to that of the former. This initially created false impression could have been corrected if only a carefully concealed detail in Isocrates' self-interpretation in the *Antidosis*, i.e. *epimeleia*, had been noticed and recognized as the author's key term in his definition of his own art of speaking as elaborating and working out patterns found in literary and, above all, philosophical texts—something that is also true for Dio and all the major exponents of the Second Sophistic.

This opened up new perspectives due to the fact that *epimeleia* and *sophia*, or rather *enkrateia* constitute key terms of both Xenophon's *Memorabilia* as a legend of Socrates and Socrates' political testament in the *Alcibiades*, something that led to the conclusion that the Second Sophistic itself is essentially determined by the mentioned legend, no matter what Philostratus says about the phenomenon in an attempt to disguise the essence of things. All this gave rise to the final conclusion that Dio's and Isocrates' understanding of the sophistic were not diametrically opposed, as previously thought, since it turned out that in the latter's conception of the sophistic there was still room for the legacy of the old sophistic, something to which the former was fully opposed, as can be inferred from the invective he heaped on it.

Thus, unlike the thought of von Arnim and the majority of scholars, the *supposed* bitter struggle between the rival spiritual currents in the course of the last four centuries BC resulted in a landslide victory for philosophy or, to be more precise, philosophical *plasma* essentially based on the principles set forth in the *Phaedrus*. Now the question arises as to what wider lessons we need to learn from these findings. From the above, it is clear that future research should focus on the philosophical poetics of the Second Sophistic rather than make a futile effort to explain everything by referring to the omnipotence of rhetoric. Only thus shall we gain a deeper understanding, not only of the new sophistic, but also of post-classical Greek literature in its entirety. Otherwise it all becomes a pile of sundry facts—some of them curious and interesting but making no meaningful picture as a whole.

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