The Problem of Returning to the “Things Themselves” in the IR Theorisation: Phenomenology’s Possible Use in the Study of the Pre-Theoretical, Immediate Givenness of the IR Phenomena and Events

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International relations constitute a purely intersubjective field. Its actors, objects and meanings have no self-standing “objectivity” in a narrow sense. As such, the IR theorisation for conducting studies on the IR phenomena and events lacks the anchor of the independent objectivity which the positive sciences enjoy. The IR theorisation consequently relies on its own preceding world-views, interpretative frameworks and narratives, which become genetic acts, creating an ontological complication. In doing so, the IR theorisation tends to bend, alter and occasionally omit the pre-theoretical, immediate and intersubjective givenness of the IR phenomena and events. Also, the theory’s narrative on the phenomena and events needs to include the narrative of their genesis, which are imposed upon their immediate, therefore post-genetic givenness, causing a temporal distortion. Still, there might be a possibility to study them as they are given, avoiding these complications. The Husserlian phenomenology provides this endeavour with fundamental concepts and tools that are related to intersubjectivity, temporality and access to the immediacy of the givenness of the phenomena and events. However, the Husserlian phenomenology itself has also a tendency to relapse into the complications of theorising, in particular due to its “genetic” proposals. Yet, these are “remediable” under the light of the Heideggerian criticism on the matters of intersubjectivity, temporality and the nature of the immediate, “innerworldly” givenness. In other words, the phenomenology, with contributions of the Heideggerian phenomenological-ontology, may effectively provide the IR studies with ways to approach the IR phenomena and events in their pre-theoretical, immediate, intersubjective, authentic givenness.

Keywords: phenomenology, international relations, international relations theory

Introduction

International relations studies reside on co-constituted and co-assumed actors, objects and meanings without direct correspondence in the “objective” reality. In contrast to the matters of the positive sciences, this is a purely intersubjective field with no self-standingly present, independently existing objects. Here, the co-constitution and the co-assumption of them replace objectivity in narrow sense. No

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one has ever “seen” a State or a nation. Agency or agent exist only through appresenting an entity - a State, a nation, a governmental institution, an intergovernmental or a non-governmental organisation- which also are co-constituted/co-assumed. And yet, the non-objective, not self-standingly present IR actors, phenomena and events do “exist”, add meaning to and thus expand and shape, to a considerable extent, the lived-in reality. The study of their nature and their interaction therefore becomes legitimate and necessary.

Such a study requires the discovery of the common denominators among manifold events, logical and empirical patterns from which a defining framework for the field as well as explicative bases/proposals for other real/possible events emerge. Still, such a framework may not emerge without fundamentals brought or adopted by the researcher: The discovery is not a passive, purely receptive state but an intentional act. Some precise thing is searched for according to something that precedes and defines the study. The study, at least at the first glance, needs theorising.

Positive sciences deal with things that are objectively, independently, self-standingly present. Theorisation in this sphere has correspondence in objective, independent, self-standingly present things, be they accurately or inaccurately interpreted. The validity of a theoretical construct may be determined through this correspondence that may be accessed to, observed and assessed independently from the construct itself. As regards the IR field, however, its purely intersubjective nature brings complications of its own into the effort. Here, the intentional act of theorising is, to an extent, “liberated” from the limiting and self-imposing independency of the objectivity and operates in the quite vaguer intersubjectivity of the otherwise non-present things, which is much more open to interpretation of the researcher at a fundamental level. As an example, the nature, substance and behaviour of the State is much more open to proposals that would define the fundamentals of its study in the field of interstate interactions than those of a physical thing in the study of a physical event or phenomenon. As such, the lack of the independent, self-standing anchor of objectivity changes the nature of theorising, makes it assume a genetic function in order to create explicative and interpretative frameworks for actors, events and phenomena that are co-constituted and co-assumed with no self-standing existence. Theorising in the IR sphere thus becomes -at least relatively- more open to the researcher’s preceding, subjective world-views (Weltanschauungen) and to filling these frameworks with according narratives on the phenomena and events (see Husserl 1970, pp. 130–132, 379–383)

On the other hand, if the IR actors, phenomena and events lack an objective ground, they exist as “given” intersubjectively in the immediacy of the everyday life, also shaping it through being added to and thus expanding the lived reality. Their “being given” as such temporally differs from their genesis. In this sense, their givenness is post-genetic. However, the theoretical effort in the field may be but genetic, in order to create its own fundamental definitions for its own interpretative/ explicable frameworks. In consequence, theorising in the IR field does not only need to produce fundamentals as world-views, but also to carry the genetic frameworks into the narrative of the post-genetic time, therefore to take the
immediate, lived givenness of the phenomena and events as malleable material. The multiplicity of the IR theories and their narratives stems from the multiplicity of the pre-postulated world-views and their being carried into the post-genetic temporality of the givenness of the events and phenomena. Here the lack of an independent, self-standing objectivity ensures the IR theorisation’s alienation from the immediate givenness. By pre-postulating a world-view, The IR theorisation inherently lacks access to its subjects in a non-genetic way, “as they appear/ are given”. It therefore alters the givenness, not only because of lacking the anchor of objectivity in narrow sense but also because of the immediate consequence of this lack, which is the relative immunity to the intervention from an independent reality ground since the IR theorisation replaces it, to an extent, in assuming its own world-view and in making its own fundamental definitions.

Furthermore, the IR theory’s narrative on (temporally) specific events and phenomena creates a temporal distortion, as the preservation of the theory’s consistency in the study requires it. Here the theory juxtaposes its own narrative of the genesis of the actor, phenomenon or event upon the immediate, lived, therefore post-genetic givenness, which does not necessarily equate to its narrated “genetic moment”.

How these ontological and temporal problems appear in the current IR theories? On which bases it might be possible to study the IR phenomena and events pre-theoretically, in their immediacy of givenness?

The first section of this paper shall be reserved to a brief description of the forms that these problems take within the theoretical constructs of representative nature, to be followed by the main proposals of the Husserlian phenomenology and the Heideggerian “phenomenological ontology” on the matters of the intersubjectivity and the givenness. In the first sub-section, as “representative examples”, the realist/structural realist theorisation and the constructivist understanding of the intersubjectivity as related to the IR field shall be debated, and a parenthesis shall be opened for the post-structuralist approaches’ de-centering. In the second sub-section, the Husserlian understanding of intersubjectivity shall be debated as to its “relapses” into the complications of the theorisation despite the Husserlian phenomenology’s search of the pre-theoretical. Here, Heidegger’s notions of Mitsein and Mitwelt, which are inherent to the Dasein or the Dasein-like entity/IR actor in its post-genetic givenness, shall be put forward in order to describe the nature of the intersubjectivity as related to the IR phenomena and events.

The second section shall attempt to answer to the second question above. In the first sub-section, we shall propose the phenomenological/ phenomeno-ontological notions and tools for a pre-theoretical IR study, in order to discern and describe the phenomena and events in their immediate givenness. These will be the universal and in particular the eidetic reductions for putting into perspective the theoretical attitude as attitude, the construct as construct and the narrative as narrative in order to display the phenomena’s and events’ generic way of presenting themselves, yet in accordance with the particularity of the givenness at hand. However, these Husserlian concepts shall be debated in the light of the Heideggerian terms for intersubjectivity in order to deal with Husserl’s
overemphasis on the consciousness (of something) instead of the immediate givenness (of something), which causes the Husserlian relapse into the general theorisation’s genetic function and even temporal distortion.

The temporality of the givenness shall be debated in the last sub-section, as condition sine qua non of meaningfully achieving a pre-theoretical description of the purely intersubjective phenomena and events. Temporality shall complete the ontological grounds reached through the reductions. Here the Husserlian concepts of retention-protention, recollection and anticipation shall be explained and opted for their practicality in our proposed IR study, yet following a debate and subsequent re-evaluation under the light of the Heideggerian temporal concepts (the three “extases”) in order to deal with the Husserlian “relapse” in the temporal field. The Husserlian terms shall thus be grounded on the mutual inherence of the “things” and the Dasein (or the Dasein-like entity/the IR actor) within the framework of the latter’s being as being-involved-with.

The Ontological and Temporal Problems of the IR Theorisation

Representative Examples to the IR Theorisation’s Fundamental Complications

The IR theorisation follows two general routes at the ontological level: One resides on a general, if not total, assumption of “objectivity”, the other takes into account the intersubjective nature of the IR field. There also exists a third “way” which opts for a generally critical approach toward both. The realist/structural realist approaches constitute a good example to the first one, as they take the power-relations as the objective “substance” of the IR and narrate on this basis. The second route may be exemplified by the constructivist thought, where the theorisation takes the intersubjective nature of the IR field into account but defines intersubjectivity as a product of social/psycho-social processes and proceeds into a narrative in accordance with them.

In the realist/structural realist thought, international (interstate) interactions become explainable on the basis of power-relations, which define threat and interest (Morgenthau 1948, pp. 137–157, Waltz 1979, pp. 114–128, 165–167, Liska 1962, pp. 26–27, Walt 1987, pp. 17–50, Snyder 1997, Fedder 1968, Schweller 1994). Their preceding proposals/a prioris are employed on the malleable substance of interstate interactions in building their narratives of causality. As such, they eclipse the immediate givenness of the phenomena and occurrences, “fitting them” into the framework brought by the theorisation, transforming them into the parts of the narrative. Other approaches stemming from more or less similar fundamental proposals add to the narrative by postulating a community based on a supposedly “objective” interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1989, Nye 2002)–even quantifying the interdependence through transactions as indicators (Deutsch 1957)–or introducing the institutional “identity”–next to the state as actor–as a self-preserving and promoting “entity pour soi” (Keohane and Martin 1995, Keohane 1998, Wallander and Keohane 1995). The narrative therefore consists of “filling in” the theory’s postulates with the specific, given,
“lived” phenomena and events in accordance with the former. In other words, the theoretical postulates become the ontological/genetic ground of the phenomena and events within the narrative.

Here, it should however be noted that the realist/structural realist understanding of the IR is assumptive on one fundamental issue in transcendence of its own “objectifying” nature: The state is the subject of the international politics. In contrast to the constructivism for example, the ontology of the state is not deliberated upon. It is not among the main debates of the theoretical construct such as those about power-relations or the (anarchic) nature of the international environment. It is not “explained” like them but it provides them with ground, it precedes them. In other words, the state-actor’s immediate and intersubjective “givenness” constitutes the basis of an otherwise objectifying, explicative theorisation. The alignment with the pre-theoretical, immediate givenness at the fundamental level of “subject” asserts itself onto the subsequent narrative. This is also observable in the structural realist polarity terminology (Waltz 1979) as the intersubjective reference to multi-or-bipolar shape of the interstate environment precedes its objectification through the parameters brought by the theorisation.

To the second route one may give the constructivist thought as an example. Whereas the realist/structural realist thought allows some perspective as regards the pre-theoretical, “given” state of the interstate politics, it is difficult to state the same for the constructivist thought despite its seemingly more rigorous ontological effort. The intersubjective nature of the IR field constitutes the fundamental constructivist proposal (Onuf 1989, pp. 35–64, Onuf 2013, pp. 3–20, Wendt 1999). Yet this very proposal becomes the object of the constructivist theorisation with re-design/ alteration as consequence. Here the intersubjectivity becomes the “social construct” to be studied through sociology/socio-psychology, therefore the malleable material of a preceding theoretical attitude. However Wendt drew attention to the “legitimacy” of referring to a constructed entity as “actor” (Wendt 1999, pp. 193–245), the study concentrates on the social dynamics in their “construction” of their “object”. This makes the constructivist narrative more “comprehensive” in detriment of the immediacy of the givenness in the IR field, as it does not repeat the “omission” of the realist/structural realist thought. While emphasising the intersubjective nature of the IR field, the constructivism tends to replace the realist parameters with social/ socio-psychological dynamics without altering the narrative-building. In other words, the constructivist theorisation repeats, at ontological level therefore more comprehensively, the altering/ creating tendency of the realism, this time not assuming objectivity but redesigning intersubjectivity in accordance with its preceding proposals.

How does the temporal distortion appear in the two main routes of the IR theorisation? As regards the realist/ structural realist understanding, the distortion is more limited for two reasons: Firstly, the realist axioms of “survival”, “anarchic environment”, “power as means and as aims at the same time” tend to devise a quite uniform state-actor akin to the microeconomic agent (see Waltz 1979) where the genesis of the individual state-actor is reduced to its relationship with these axioms. Secondly, the structural realism’s differentiation between the theorisation of international politics and the theory of foreign policies –based on the actors’
internal compositions- further mitigates the distortion since the theory limits itself to the first through its “systemic” approach and transfers the individualities of the state-actor that are incompatible with it to the vague sphere of the second, which answers the question why the actors “similarly placed in a system behave in different ways” (Waltz 1996). This arguably artificial separation of the state-actor’s individuality from the research field reduces the state-actor’s as well as phenomena’s and occurrences’ geneses (of which the subject is the state-actor) to a few parameters that are acceptable in the delimited study field of the theory. As an example, the alliance and the security-community as forthcoming phenomena and occurrences on which the realist/structural realist school particularly concentrates its attention, find their explanation first and foremost through the pre-defined parameters of the international environment and of the uniformised state-actors’ power-relations. Here the temporal distortion is mitigated since the geneses’ imposition onto the post-genetic immediacy come forth only secondarily: The vague area of the actors’ “internal compositions” constitute a middle ground that absorbs the theory’s genetic imposition upon the theory-incompatible, post-genetic, individual givenness.

However, for the constructivist thought, the geneses’ imposition upon the living/lived actuality, therefore the temporal distortion, is much more immediate. The intersubjectivity in this thought, therefore the phenomena and occurrences pertaining to the intersubjective field of the IR, stem from the social/socio-psychological/communicative processes. As such, the theory covers what the realist/structural realist thought rather “assumes” on the one hand and what it “evades” by transferring to the sphere of the “internal compositions” on the other hand. Consequently, the constructivist narrative resides on defining the geneses in every subject of study, assuring that the actuality of a phenomenon or occurrence fits to its precedingly defined/narrated genetic foundation, at the least eclipsing the post-genetic, immediate nature of the givenness. This includes narratives of a state-actor’s foreign policy or an intersubjectively “constructed” entity’s such as an alliance/security community where the genetic acts, the dynamics and the process of its construction, become “perpetual” (see Wendt 1999, pp. 201–233, Kratochwil 2011a, p. 161, Kratochwil 1989, pp. 24–25, Kratochwil 2011b, Adler and Greve 2009, Kratochwil 2018, Pouliot 2008¹, Adler 2008²). As such, the post-genetic givenness is submitted to its narrated genesis, the living/ lived actuality is submitted to a theoretically devised past and re-shaped accordingly, not being dealt with as the givenness in its own temporality but as the temporal continuation of the preceding narrative.

The current IR theorising’s “ontological problem” therefore engenders a “temporal problem” in the study of the immediately given phenomena and occurrences, which is the imposition of their genesis, the theoretical construct’s narrative about their coming-into-being, upon their givenness. As an intentional act inherent to it, the theory “explains” its object in every lived moment of its givenness in accordance with its “substance” as it had already defined, more intensely in the constructivism and in a more mitigated form in the realism/
structural realism. As such, the theoretical attitude risks to distort its subject’s actuality (or past-actuality), its immediate givenness (or its immediately given state in the past), as it needs to fit it into its construct which is founded not only on the past but on a past moment, specifically on the subject’s coming-into-being and the occurrences which made it come-into-being. The genesis —and the theory-proposed substance— does not necessarily equate to the givenness in a purely intersubjective field: This does not mean to deny the linkage of what is immediately “given” to its past genetic moment either, yet that linkage, the “genetic reference” is but inherent to givenness itself at the moment when it is “given”. However, the act of theorisation needs to reverse this temporal feature in attributing, through the construct it devises, its genetic narrative, to the living/ lived, post-genetic moment of its subject. The temporal distortion consequently adds to the re-designing/ altering facet of the theorisation within the intersubjective field of the IR.

Lastly, it should be noted here the existence of an attempted “third route”, which is the post-structuralism’s critical approach to the “metanarrative”, which becomes itself an attitude equivalent to theorisation with its alternative and equally selective a priori through which the de-centering is performed as a narrative with similar complications. Here it is not easy to state that the existing “anti-narrative” attitude in the IR field resolves the ontological problem of the IR theorisation. The post-structuralist understanding has its preceding, pre-determinedly critical – almost moral- position in deconstructing the narrative, with the result of building an alternative one, if not as construct then certainly as consequence of “attitude” which but repeats, from another angle, the redesign/the alteration of the immediate givenness of the IR phenomena and occurrences. Not only the narrative but also the givenness becomes the malleable material of the de-centering/deconstruction here, since the “attitude” acts upon it (see for example Bartelson and Teorell 2018, pp. 218–232, Ashley 1984, Ashley 1996, Der Derian 2009, pp. 43–62, Bartelson 1995). This critical, anti-narrative understanding of the IR consequently produces the temporal distortion as well, since its equivalent-to-theorising and equivalent-to-genetic approach repeats the theorisation’s very substance through a critical attitude, also bending the givenness in line with its own preceding “critical” worldview, also creating a (critical) narrative, therefore also imposing its own genetic formula upon the post-genetic, immediate givenness.

Phenomenology’s and Phenomenological Ontology’s Dealing with the Problematic of Intersubjectivity

Then how to deal with the intersubjectivity and the intersubjective givenness? What is intersubjectivity which characterises the IR field?

As mentioned before, the constructivist theorisation takes the intersubjectivity as the lived “reality” produced through social/ psycho-social/communicative dynamics and processes. Here the genetic mechanism and the constant reproduction of the intersubjective knowledge/recognisance are depicted. This understanding of intersubjectivity is directly or indirectly supported by the works of Schutz, despite his notion of the fundamental awareness of the intersubjectivity, and certainly of
Habermas’ communicative action (Habermas 1987, Schutz 1967, pp. 198–201, 229–236).

As such, the intersubjectivity and the intersubjective recognisance of things are not directly taken into consideration but are dissected with the aim of revealing their genetic mechanisms. Neither this theoretical approach nor the study of the intersubjectivity’s genesis are “erratic” by nature. However the theory’s tendency to impose itself to the study of the immediacy of the intersubjective knowledge, to the living moment of the givenness, engenders the ontological and temporal problems we have described within the previous sub-section. The pre-theoretical and post-genetic givenness of a phenomenon and/or an event is then taken into the sphere of a preceding theoretical construct that pre-defines, in accordance with –by nature- selective a prioris of the researcher, and is explained in line with the genetic proposals of its coming-into-being. The study’s product appears as a narrative of the givenness which differs from its meaning in its living immediacy, because of the study’s extension of the preceding theoretical construct toward the immediacy of the given phenomenon or event. The narrated meaning thus replaces the immediate one and the genetic construct is temporally juxtaposed upon the post-genetical time of the givenness.

This does not mean that the givenness is independent of a genetic reference. The givenness is meaningful only as it incorporates a reference to its substance which needs to have the element of its coming-into-being. However this is an appresentaion (On the Husserlian notions of appresentation and apperception, see Ferencz-Flatz 2012; Dwyer 2007) of the givenness of its past-self, therefore of its substance at the time of its coming-into-being, which is temporally and ontologically not identical to its immediate self. The appresentative character of the genetic reference of the immediate givenness shall be debated, briefly, in the next section. Yet it should be noted here that the study of the intersubjective givenness in its immediacy needs to be aware of this temporal and ontological separation between the genesis and the post-genetic appearance, where the genetic reference can be but a component of the meaningfulness of the living experience of the phenomenon or event. This component, therefore, needs not to be privileged over the immediacy of the phenomenon or event, but be dealt with as is, in ontological and temporal terms within the totality of the givenness.

The phenomenology proposes tools to overcome the complications of the theoretical attitude in order to return to the “things themselves”. These tools are the reductions and the temporal grasp of the givenness, in order to make possible a descriptive study of the consciousness of the things that are dealt with. We shall debate them in the next section. At that stage however, it is useful to state that the phenomenology studies subjectivity/intersubjectivity as related to things-with-meanings through putting into perspective the mental acts/processes that make them appear as they appear. The purely intersubjective nature of the IR field requires such a study in order to put the assumption, the theoretical attitude/construct, the preceding world-view and the temporal distortion in perspective to make the IR phenomena and events accessible “as they are”, in their intersubjective, immediate givenness and temporality.
And yet, Husserl’s understanding of the intersubjectivity becomes questionable when it faces his phenomenology’s ultimate endeavours. It resides, first and foremost, on not devising a world-view that would precede the access to “the things” that would alter their givenness. Still, Husserl also makes a genetic narrative of the intersubjectivity in particular in his Vth Cartesian Meditation. The narrative is based on communicative processes at the very fundamental level of the experience of the Other and of its irreducibility to mine-ness, to proceed into the intersubjectivity (Husserl 1982, pp. 92–105, 108–116, Husserl 2001a, pp. 27–29, 63–87, 382–383).

Husserl’s late work, the Crisis, however it attempts to define a transcendental and pre-given intersubjectivity, remains “communicative” as to its genesis and focuses on the genetic process of co-constitution of the givenness rather than dealing directly with the substance of what is “given” (Husserl 1970). There, the intersubjectivity belongs to the immanence of the subject apparently as pre-given but this pre-givenness is still a kind of “communicative heritage” (Husserl 1970, also see Gander 2017, p. 138), therefore does not radically differ from the building schema of the intersubjectivity of the Cartesian Meditations.

In both cases, the Husserlian phenomenology seems to have built, despite itself, a preceding world-view of genesis for the intersubjectivity. Thus it distances itself from the immediacy of the intersubjective givenness, as it subsequently needs to export the intersubjectivity’s genetic narrative to the given thing at hand, forming the given things’s genetic narrative accordingly. An important example to this tendency is his “personalities of higher order” which includes the State in the Cartesian Meditations. There, the intersubjectivity of “personalities of higher order” is described only as a genetic process, again eclipsing their living, immediate, post-genetic givenness or subduing it to the preceding genetic narrative (Husserl 1982, pp. 128–135). As such, the Husserlian intersubjectivity “relapses” in two different fashions into the ontological and temporal problems of the theorisation, on a similar line with the constructivism in the IR studies. Still, as to its tools and terminology, the Husserlian phenomenology remains central to this paper’s proposal about the conduct of the IR studies, again for reasons to be given in the next section.

Then what may be proposed about the nature of the intersubjectivity, if the Husserlian version, if adopted in our field of study, would tend to repeat the problems of the IR theorisation?

The Heideggerian phenomenological ontology’s approximate terms for the intersubjectivity, the being-with (Mitsein) and the with-world (Mitwelt), define a fundamentally, existentially interactional state-of-being rather than a genetic process (Heidegger 1996, p. 117). As inherent to being, the intersubjectivity precedes any possible narrative of its own genesis or co-constitution (Heidegger 1985, pp. 238–239, Heidegger 1996, pp. 111–112, Heidegger 1982, pp. 266–267). The intersubjectivity thus appears as the pre-form, pre-content yet “common” innerworldliness of the Dasein and Dasein is not even equivalent to a particular subject, “ego”, but expresses a state-of-being, naturally “inauthentic” even, opening itself to authenticity only temporally, -toward future self- (Heidegger 1985, p. 248, Heidegger 1996, pp. 111, 302, also Mansbach 1991). In this sense,
the intersubjectivity as *Mitsein* and *Mitwelt* is not something produced through *a posteriori* to a specific experience of the subject (encounter with the Other) but it appears as the *Dasein*’s pre-given, immediate mode of being (Heidegger 1996, p. 116, pp. Heidegger 1985, p. 238), to the point that *being-alone* gives the *deficient mode* of, therefore referring to the *being-with* (Heidegger 1996, p. 113, Heidegger 1985, p. 239) and not vice-versa.

The Heideggerian understanding of the intersubjectivity thus places the validity of the intersubjective world, therefore that of the intersubjective knowledge/recognition at the innerworldliness and everydayness of the conscious being at a pre-theoretical and pre-genetic level. As such, it does not need to juxtapose upon the immediate givenness of phenomena and events a co-constitutive act or process to “make it” meaningful, as meaning is immediate and inherent to the intersubjective givenness, which makes the givenness possible at the first instance.

On this basis, the immediate givenness of the IR phenomena and events may be separated, ontologically and temporally, from the complications of the (IR) theorisation. Furthermore, a phenomenological study of the purely intersubjective IR field may be conducted without the Husserlian genetic narrative akin to theorisation, which contradicts with the very endeavour of the phenomenology in ontological and temporal terms.

**Back to Things Themselves in the IR Studies**

The first section was centred on why the IR studies, as they operate in a purely intersubjective field, would need to make an effort to return “to things themselves”, in particular face to the complications of the IR theorisation. This was not because of the inaccuracy of particular theoretical constructs, but due to the nature of theorising within the intersubjectivity. Then the nature of the intersubjectivity itself has been debated in the said section and the need to overcome the disharmony between the Husserlian phenomenology’s aims—which coincide with our aims in the field of the IR studies- and its understanding of the intersubjectivity which tends to relapse into the fundamental complications of theorising. Here we proposed the Heideggerian approach to the intersubjectivity as a fundamental approach to the intersubjectivity, for the reason that it focuses on the immediate, innerworldly, pre-theoretical nature of the givenness as inherent to being itself and offers ground for the study of such a study also in the IR field.

Still, the conduct of such a study needs tools and conceptualisation that would not “relapse” on the ground of the mentioned complications of theorising. How one may approach the givenness as givenness without a preceding world-view and a self-imposing genetic narrative? How one may describe the immediacy of givenness while avoiding the temporal distortion, therefore describing the givenness *in its temporality*? These questions shall be dealt with in the following sub-sections.
The Reductions

Universal and eidetic reductions constitute the phenomenology’s tools in approaching the consciousness -of things- and in doing so, in approaching the givenness as is given to consciousness -intersubjectively- (Husserl 1983, pp. 57–59, 220–221, Husserl 1982, pp. 71–81, also Brainard 2002, pp. 68–74). With the term universal reduction, it is meant the suspension –and not erasure-, the bracketing of the naive believe in the self-standing- existence of the world-as-experienced, which equates to the “natural attitude” in Husserl’s terms (Luft 1998, Luft 2004, Husserl 1983, pp. 51–59, Brainard 2002, pp. 68–74). This means being able to put into perspective, layer by layer, the beliefs as beliefs, assumptions as assumptions, predications as predications, emotions as emotions (Husserl 1983, pp. 211–233, Morriston 1976). This also includes bracketing the theoretical attitude as theoretical attitude (Husserl 1970, Appendix VII, pp. 379–383), as the reflective effort to attribute a meaningful framework to the things being encountered in the world and in attributing meanings to them individually or in conjunction with one another. The universal reduction aims at making visible the immanence of the subject who acts/experiences/ attributes meanings, where these fundamental “mechanisms” as well as their objects are, as noetic-noematic (Kersten 1973) unities and thus “nothing is lost” through this reduction. Ipso facto, it also means that the immanence is the field of theorising, narrating as well as of the narrative itself in “transcendental” terms, whereas the objects and occurrences of the world constitute their “transcendent” counterparts (also see Zahavi 1997). At the first glimpse, this may be seen as the validation, from an unexpected angle, of theorising as to its genetic and even temporal aspects or as the invalidation of the possibility of the non-immanent yet intersubjective and immediate givenness of a “transcendent” phenomenon or event. Even with Husserl’s transcendental intersubjectivity of the Crisis, the givenness becomes meaningful-therefore-possible only immanently, its meaningful appearance is generated immanently, where intersubjectivity itself belongs.

This reduction returns us to Husserl’s egology problem, where solus ipse is attempted to be overcome firstly in the Cartesian Meditations where the “otherness of the other” is declared to be irreducible to mine-ness with admittedly little justification (on the genesis of the “monadological intersubjectivity”, Husserl 1982, pp. 92–105, 108–116, Schnell 2010) and secondly by the Crisis’ pre-givenness of the transcendental intersubjectivity where solus ipse is made, in a way, “collective” and not overcome. However, the universal reduction is highly important as what it primarily is, a method of putting into perspective³ the acts of the mind in dealing with the encountered, the given. In a field of pure intersubjectivity where the anchor of the self-standing objectivity is lacking, this becomes indispensable (see also Marion 1998).

What is however more interesting and useful for our purpose is the eidetic reduction. This is related to the study of the experience of something, of the actor, phenomenon, occurrence, by reaching to its “generic way of presenting itself, its

³And as such making them discernible.
Erscheinen” (See Taminiaux 1988, p. 62; also Bernet 2016, Heidegger 2005, pp. 210–211, Marion 1998). In the intersubjectivity of the IR, this “generic way” becomes the specific entity’s, phenomenon’s, occurrence’s intersubjectively meaningful, immediate appearance/ givenness which is not preceded, pre-defined or generated by the theoretical attitude and construct. The bracketing here would mean putting into perspective the a priori genetic narrative of the object, phenomenon, event, actor with its theoretical attitude, construct and its preceding Weltanschauung as well as the ensuing temporal distortion. However, this Husserlian reduction should be understood differently from the Husserlian understanding(s) of the intersubjectivity and therefore, of the givenness, not simply for the sake of our study but for avoiding Husserl’s impasses as regards the genetic (constitutive) act in the immanence which borders solus ipse, be it purely egological or defined-as-collective (transcendental intersubjectivity) and quite ironically, themselves being depicted as “generated”, therefore a posteriori, which is no different than importing the constructivist approaches into the sphere of the subject’s immanence.

On the other hand, as is in the case of the universal reduction, the eidetic reduction as a method is indispensable for putting into perspective the preceding genetic elements, including the theoretical attitude and its narrative as they are related to the immediate givenness of the phenomenon or event. Yet, it becomes workable with only when the intersubjectivity is taken as the Heideggerian Mitsein and Mitwelt that are inherent to innerworldly everydayness, therefore differently from the Husserlian egology or transcendental intersubjectivity that are confined to the intersubjectivity’s own genesis and its “generating facet”.

Now how to describe, through the eidetic reduction, the intersubjective givenness of an IR phenomenon or event? What is our immediate study object’s, a phenomenon, an actor or an event, “generic way of presenting itself”? In Husserl’s thinking, it is the consciousness, through experience, for example, of a particular chair as it is given, in connection with the generic “chair” (Taminiaux 1988, pp. 59–62). Here the consciousness of what is given meaningfully appears with that basic, immanent, noetic-noematic act. Here the question is no other than the “purity” of this process itself, replicating Husserl’s concern: Does the “grasp” of the (IR) phenomenon, actor or event, reflect, after all, its givenness as is or do in this very process a preceding world-view, “theoretical” therefore genetic and temporally distorting attitude come into play? As a purely subjective act, it would remind of the solus ipse. In terms of the transcendental intersubjectivity, it would be the manifestation of importing theorisation with all its aspects into the “immanence”, also in temporal meaning since Husserl anchors this to historicity in the sense of a communicative heritage. In other words, the heritage of a world-view and ensuing acts of bestowing meaning to the givenness, again akin to constructivism, would be made “immanent”, whereas they are by nature “constituted” beforehand, as the transcendental intersubjectivity itself was constituted beforehand according to Husserl. On the other hand, the integration of the Heideggerian understanding of the intersubjectivity to the eidetic reduction would ensure its workability for reaching to the “thing itself”.

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Still, for the sake of purity, don’t we suspend through this reduction, where the intersubjectivity is *Mitsein* within *Mitwelt*, all the meaning bases that should in fact precede the immediate givenness of the phenomenon, actor or event? What then would remain of the study object to describe meaningfully? What is then the “thing itself” that we wish to reach through the eidetic reduction, as we also distance ourselves from the Husserlian framework?

Along with the Heideggerian understanding of the intersubjectivity, the meaning should perhaps be looked for within the immediacy of the givenness and not within the processes of bestowing it to what is encountered, which would repeat the ontological and temporal complications we have described before. The inherence of the *Mitsein* and of the *Mitwelt* to the innerworldly, everyday being of the *Dasein ipso facto* bypasses the genetic processes that are devised both by the IR theorising and the Husserlian thought. The givenness appears here as a part of the *Dasein’s* being-in-the world, in fact becomes possible as such, its immediate meaning becoming an integral part of how the *Dasein* exists (Heidegger 1985, pp. 303–304, criticising the Husserlian understanding of intentionality on that point).

Something’s being given is synonymous with the *Dasein’s* being-involved-with it, it is possible in this involvement, as such is part of the *Dasein’s* immediate existence with the immediacy of the givenness. As such, the givenness, already, *en sot* “intersubjective” as *Mitsein* and within *Mitwelt*, is not bestowed a meaning but is meaningfully inherent to being in its immediacy, innerworldliness, everydayness. The genetic act of theorising, but also the noetic-noematic processes, operate *a posteriori* to the already meaningful, pre-theoretical givenness as *a prioris* and distances it, at different degrees, from “itself”. Therefore, the eidetic reduction’s aim becomes suspending these processes, not to build a narrative on how they “generate” the givenness.

Then how may it be possible to speak of the study object’s generic way of presenting itself? Does not the “generic” state precede the givenness of the particular phenomenon, actor, event, as prerequisite to their recognisance, therefore its meaningful appearance? Or may the generic state of the thing, still a prerequisite, be inherent to and simultaneous with its immediate givenness?

Here it may be useful to refer to the first section’s debate on the genetic reference of the givenness. The *appresentation* of the genetic reference of the given thing is of the same nature with, if not necessarily identical to, its generic state. The *appresentation* is from the immediate givenness toward the “immanence” and not from immanent noetic-noematic processes toward the “transcendent” as a genetic act of experiencing. On the contrary, what the givenness inherently -and according to itself- appresents, generates a noetic-noematic process. This therefore precedes them, ontologically/“genetically” as well as temporally. The “meaning” as such appears with the givenness, precedes other, *subsequent* processes that are based on a world-view, a theoretical attitude and construct that build narratives with the complications we described. The immediacy of givenness is also the immediacy of what it apprises, in line with the immediacy of the living, actual, innerworldly “intersubjectivity” that is “immanent”. In other words, it displays the

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*In the sense of bestowing meaning.*
Heideggerian *Mitsein* and *Mitwelt* in the Husserlian phenomenology’s terms, preceding the genetic and as such the noetic-noematic processes based on the otherwise “pre-postulated” yet “made immanent” data and attitudes which produce theorisation and narrative. The eidetic reduction’s usefulness reside here, with the condition of the strict pursuance of Husserl’s motto of the “disinterested/indifferent spectator attitude” (Averchi 2015), in a way to include this differentiation within his immanent processes, therefore as a “Heideggerian” criticism and possible correction of Husserl himself.

Lastly, it should be noted that the givenness is “individual”. The individually given thing, such as the “war in Ukraine” appresents its own “generic state” within the lived, inherent-to-Dasein intersubjectivity as *Mitsein* and *Mitwelt*. As such, the said individuality, the war in Ukraine, is given in a meaningful way directly, pre-theoretically, intersubjectively. Here the generic state is inherent to and limited by the individual, immediate givenness of the event or phenomenon. It precedes as such any genetic act and source, as the individuality and the immediacy of the givenness imposes this ontological and temporal differentiation between itself and genetic acts which are but subsequent. Consequently, we may state here that the appresentation of the generic state is inherent to/delimited by the givenness’ individuality and immediacy within the *Mitsein* and the *Mitwelt*, and constitutes the aim of the eidetic reduction in the pursuit of returning to “things themselves” in our proposed study.

*The Temporality*

The eidetic reduction is related to the ontological part of our study, to the search of the “what” of the given phenomenon, event or actor in *Mitsein* and *Mitwelt*. Still, it may but give a “picture” of an otherwise “streaming” display which has preceding and upcoming parts. The temporality of the phenomenon, the event, the actor needs to be dealt with in line with its immediate givenness, in order to make the phenomenological description possible.

Husserl’s main concepts on the temporality (of the consciousness of something) are the retention-protention, recollection and anticipation (Husserl 1964, pp. 39–50). Here, his example of a music piece bears importance. The piece is not experienced through the isolate givennesses of the individual notes. A note is “given” with the previous one being retained and the next one being continually expected in “protention”. This “temporal thickness” is inherent to the experience, the consciousness of the thing. The basic temporal thickness of the immediate givenness may thus be depicted through the retention-protention (also see Carr 1991, pp. 40–45, Kortooms 2002, pp. 177–179; Rodemeyer 2006, pp. 73–176). On the other hand, Husserl does not see the recollection and the anticipation as elements that are inherent to the temporal “now” which is described with the retention-protention (Carr 1991, p. 24, Marion 1998, pp. 77–97). The recollection and the anticipation become here –almost- self-standing acts, which are attached to the present time through a subsequent ego or collective act. This appears to be the (at least under-debated) case despite their being intentional acts and Husserl’s statement on the nature of the intentionality as where the subject (ego) lives in its
purity (see Bernet 1994, Husserl 2001b, pp. 94–97, 347–349). We shall return to these points later.

The Heideggerian understanding of time consists of the three extases of the Dasein: Having been, dwelling-with and to be-with (Heidegger 1985, pp. 238–239, Heidegger 1982, pp. 266–267, Heidegger 1996, pp. 111–112). They temporally express the being-as-Mitsein within the Mitwelt in a state of involvement-with as mentioned before. As such, the Dasein is depicted as temporally “merged” with the innerworldly, immediate givenness at a very fundamental level, as it is the case in ontological terms. The givenness, in other words, provides the Dasein with its temporality as well as its substance. Equally, the Dasein in its being-as-Mitsein and its being-involved-with in the forms of the three temporal extases, makes the givenness possible-as-givenness.

On the other hand, our proposed IR study is not centered on the “life of the Dasein” but on returning to “things themselves” in a descriptive manner. It is certainly legitimate and in fact necessary to focus on the IR actor as a co-constituted/given Dasein-like entity in its being-as-Mitsein. This would provide our proposed IR study with a more elaborate descriptive ground for example about the nature of the states’ interactions on the Heideggerian ontological/temporal bases. And yet, it depicts only another angle of approach to the same ontological/temporal ground of study, a change of focus, from the “things themselves” to the “actor” in its being-involved-with the “things themselves”. The Heideggerian time terminology could be more operable when the study’s focus is on the “actor”-in-interaction. When, however, the same IR study deals with the “things themselves”, the phenomena and the events in their immediate, pre-theoretical givenness, the Husserlian time-terminology may prove to be more useful as it focuses on the “things” due to its more experience-oriented nature. The Heideggerian terminology would otherwise require a continuous return to the Dasein/ Dasein-like entity and the description of its “being-involved-with in Mitsein” within the study, rather than the givenness of the thing which the Dasein is involved-with. Still, the Husserlian time-terminology needs to be re-evaluated in our proposed IR study in accordance with the Heideggerian emphasis on the mutual inherence of the “things” and the Dasein through the latter’s being as being-involved-with as Mitsein within the Mitwelt to be able to describe, in temporal terms, the givenness in its pre-theoretical, immediate, intersubjective state.

Now returning to the Husserlian terminology of the temporality in this light, it becomes necessary to think of the recollection and the anticipation in their relationship with the retention-protention, which is the very temporality of the “immediate” givenness. The recollection and the anticipation may not be considered as independent intentional acts when they are related to something’s retentional-protentional actuality (also see Rodemeyer 2006 for a separation between recollection, “far-retention”, “near-retention”). Here, once again, the Husserlian concept of appresentation emerges as the descriptive phenomenon of this relationship. In dealing with the givenness, we had previously debated the ontological aspect of the appresentation. In a way, here appears the appresentation’s

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5 As such, “having been-with” would be more correct, in accordance with the two other extases.
6 IR phenomena and events.
temporal aspect, also on the basis of the inseparability of the ontology from the temporality. Our previous example of the genetic reference that should be inherent to and presented by the givenness in its immediacy finds here its “inseparable” temporal expression.

Consequently, the givenness’ “temporal thickness” needs to extend from the simple retention-protentional actuality toward the recollection and the anticipation (see also Rodemeyer 2006, pp. 12–13 on defining the anticipation as reverse-recollection), as in the case of the genetic reference. The appresentation constitutes here the mechanic of the extension. Here the recollection and the anticipation may not be free and self-standing acts, they are defined by the substance of the immediate/retentional-protentional givenness and by the intersubjectivity as Mitsein/Mitwelt of the “past” and the “future” as related to it. The “recollected” and the “anticipated” are incorporated, through appresentation, to the retentional-protentional actuality. This equates to the full temporal expression of the immediacy of the givenness.

Lastly, a fundamental difference between the recollection and the anticipation should be noted. The recollection is linear: It is the appresentation of the “relevant” past which is intersubjectively and already “happened” in relationship with the immediacy of the givenness. As such, this extension toward the past is also subject to the eidetic reduction in order to put into perspective the theoretical/genetic attitude and the subsequent narrative. On the other hand, the anticipation is horizontal: This is the appresentation of a horizon of contingencies that are “likely” to happen in relationship with, therefore delimited by the immediacy of the givenness. These are eidetically reducible to a limited horizon on that basis, putting into perspective the theoretical/genetic attitude and the subsequent “predictive” narrative.

Conclusion

Phenomenology aims at defining a “rigorous science” for studying the things as they are given to consciousness, as the consciousness grasps them. Husserl formulates this endeavour as “back to things themselves”. The researcher aims at reaching clarity in approaching the phenomena, objects and events. This means being able to describe and to distinguish the mental processes of the consciousness of something. From here stems a challenge, that is returning to “things themselves”, since they are constantly blurred by the fundamental/natural/spontaneous human attitude toward the world, which is assumptive and naive on the one hand and genetic/constitutive on the other as it bestows meaning, from its assumptions or world-views that precede the givenness. The said challenge requires therefore an “unnatural” attitude and tools. A phenomenological attitude is put forward “against” the natural attitude that includes the theoretical one. The reductions are devised for displaying the layers of consciousness toward the original givenness (and consciousness) of something. The intersubjectivity and the temporality are

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7Therefore retentional-protentional actuality of the givenness.
dealt with as the grounds of the givenness with and within the common world. As such, the phenomenology emerged as a particularly useful -if not indispensable- way of studying the phenomena and events of purely intersubjective nature, since it proposed ontological (and temporal) grounds in a sphere where the study objects, in contrast to those of the positive sciences, have no correspondence in the objective reality which are accessible independently.

Such a purely intersubjective field is that of the IR. The IR theorising displays the fundamental complications of the natural/ theoretical attitude, which are the assumption of a genetic function and the subsequent temporal distortion. Yet the Husserlian phenomenology occasionally hampers itself by relapsing into these complications as well, mainly due to its “genetic” interpretation of the intersubjectivity. Still, the Heideggerian proposals on the intersubjectivity with impacts on the reductions and the temporality constitute remedies to the relapse and enables the phenomenology to pursue its aims of returning to “things themselves” at least in the field of the IR.

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