

Aquinas's Claim: Love of Neighbor as Oneself is Self-evident

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Thomas Aquinas has affirmed that love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident. We shall distinguish for Aquinas three forms of self-evidence: (a) evident in itself but not to people, (b) self-evident in itself and to all human thinkers, and (c) self-evident in itself but only to expert thinkers. We shall consider only (b) and (c). (b) We shall develop an analysis attempting to show that love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident in itself and to all human thinkers, however, in evaluation we shall argue that the principle is not self-evident to all human beings since not all people love themselves wisely. Further, we shall consider arguments from Kant that some maxims of the will are self-contradictory to affirm and hence immoral whereas the denials of other moral commands are not self-contradictory to deny. (c) However, we shall develop an argument affirming that love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident to expert thinkers, namely, self-evident to some human beings who have made the wise decision to live by the Aristotelian Principle. Finally, we will consider two objections to the self-evidence of love of neighbor as oneself and answer them, noting the importance of wise love of others as one wisely loves oneself. Such wise loving of oneself and others avoids simplistic misinterpretations of love of neighbor as oneself.

Keywords: *Thomas Aquinas, self-evidence, Aristotelian principle, love of neighbor as oneself, morals*

Thomas Aquinas writes in the *Summa Theologiae* that love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident and that the commandments from “Honor thy father and mother” to “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods” are self-evident as basic conclusions of the command to love one’s neighbor as oneself (Aquinas. I, II, Q. 100).

Aquinas identifies three forms of self-evidence: (a) A statement can be self-evident in itself but not to humans such as the statement that God necessarily exists. God knows with certitude that the predicate, necessary existence is included in the concept of the subject, God as the Perfect Being. However, since humans have identified many corporeal things such as animals as Divine, humans do not have the concept of God clearly in their minds; and so they do not know that God necessarily exists. (b) A statement can be self-evident in itself and also to humans such as the statement that a being cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect, or more simply, being cannot be non-being. Knowledge of the principle of non-contradiction is self-evident to all thinking human beings. (c) A statement can be self-evident in itself such as the Pythagorean Theorem, that the square upon the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of

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the two legs of that triangle, but only known as such by experts with advanced knowledge. Only those with knowledge of geometry know the self-evidence of the Pythagorean Principle (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Part One, q. 2, a. 2.). We shall examine whether love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident as (b) or as (c).

Is Love of Neighbor as Oneself Self-Evident to all Humans?

Aquinas is affirming that love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident in the format of the second kind, that is, (b) self-evident in itself and also to all thinking human beings. Let us assume that we can formulate love of neighbor as oneself in both a negative way and in a positive way. We shall turn to very early religious formulations of the love of neighbor as oneself since Aquinas himself is commenting on the religious background of love of neighbor. A formulation in a negative way was stated by Rabbi Hillel, "That Which Is Hateful to You, Do Not Do to Your Fellow! That is the Whole Torah; The Rest is Interpretation" [Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a]. A formulation in a positive way was stated by Jesus, "So whatever you wish that others would do to you, do also to them, for this is the Law and the Prophets (Matthew 7:12)." In the light of these two formulations, negative and positive, of the Golden Rule, we shall be reflecting in this paper upon whether both the negative and positive versions of love of neighbor as oneself are self-evident in the consciousness of all human beings. We will not engage in argumentation about whether the negative formulation or the positive formulation is better but only reflect on whether or not each version is self-evident to all thinking humans.

Here is a first analysis of whether the negative and positive versions of the Golden Rule, "Do not do to others what is hateful to yourself," and "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," are self-evident. It is self-evident that if one wishes to love one's own self by not doing things that harm one's own life and well-being and by positively doing things that affirm and develop one's own life and well-being, then one should not in those efforts do things that harm others. For if one would allow own's own self to harm others, then those others could reasonably be willing to harm that original self, and thus harming others would have the consequence of thwarting the protection and overall development of oneself. So just as one should not harm oneself directly and should advance one's own development, so also one should not harm others and should assist in the proper development of others, for example, when children and teenagers need help in learning basic mathematics and also in learning advanced mathematics such as algebra, geometry, trigonometry and calculus.

In effect, this proposed defense of the self-evidence of love of neighbor as oneself is similar to Kant's defense of his first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the Universalization Principle, "So act that the maxim of your will may be a universal law for all rational beings (Kant, Part II)." Kant's defense of this principle is that it is self-contradictory to give yourself one maxim, "You may hurt others," and also a contradictory maxim to others, "Others may not hurt

me.” Here is how Kant’s argument would proceed. As a rational being, reason obliges a person, argues Kant, to act in a self-consistent way. If I say to myself that I will act in a specific way towards others although I would not want others to act that way towards me, Kant would say that such a maxim of the will is not self-consistent, but is irrational and immoral. For I am treating myself as a rational being in a way different than I am treating other rational beings. If I ask what is wrong with being inconsistent in my treatment of myself and others, Kant would reply that there is something in every human being that makes him resist and resent being treated as a thing instead of a person. Just as I as a reflective and therefore free being resent being treated as unreflective and unfree, so also do all other persons as reflective and free beings resent being treated as things. When I claim for myself a dignity as a reflective and free being I am thereby asserting a claim to dignity. Therefore, inconsistency in the way I would treat myself and others in effect destroys any rational claim I make for myself as someone valuable for my own sake. If I can deny to others their value for their own sake in the maxims of my actions, then I am logically denying to myself any right to claim value for my own self as rational and free. Consequently, the best formulation of the basic value or moral law is the formulation of the Second Categorical Imperative: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end, never as means only (Kant, Part II).”

So, Kant has claimed that that the maxims, “I may hurt others, and others may not hurt me,” are self-contradictory. But a closer analysis here would reveal that instead these maxims, “I may hurt others,” and “I may not hurt others,” constitute a true self-contradiction and actually paralyze oneself from any action. However, the maxims, “I may hurt others, and others may not hurt me,” would lead to conflict between self and others, but not involve the self in being self-contradictory. For a person could say rationally without self-contradiction that the self who is a robber baron may hurt others because the robber baron believes he would be victorious in any battle between the self as a robber baron and the other who are the victims of the robber baron. It is not self-evident that the robber baron is self-contradictory. John Stuart Mill offers a similar evaluation of Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, writing that when Kant:

begins to deduce from this precept [the Categorical Imperative] any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the *consequences* of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur (Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. 1).

The maxims, “I may hurt others” and “Others may not hurt me,” are not logically self-contradictory and also not a physical impossibility. The adoption of such contrary rules can lead to physical difficulties, what Mill calls consequences

that people would strive to avoid. These consequences are not a physical impossibility, but they are dreadful, leading to horrible conflicts between people¹.

We noted above that Kant's defense of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is dependent upon his second formulation since the reason for not harming others is precisely that it is self-contradictory for the self to claim value for oneself and not for all other persons. Here is a defense of why we must value all others as we should value ourselves. If we grant that we each value ourselves, why should we value all other selves? Kant affirms that the only way in which I can fully appreciate my own value for myself is if I also value all other selves if the conception of the value of self is to have its full effect upon me. As Kant has written,

The natural end which all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it, but after all this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if everyone does not also endeavour, as far as I him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to have its full effect with me (Kant, *Metaphysic of Morals*, Part II).

Well, we could grant that point of Kant that we first can learn of the value of ourselves for our own self in some intimate family community in which we have a richer effect of the value of our shared humanity in our small community, but why should I value all the selves in another country? Of course, what would happen if the people in another country valued only themselves but not the people in my country? It seems highly probable that this narrow valuing of selves only in my own family or nation could lead to terribly destructive effects that could come back to harm myself, my family, and my nation because other people in other countries would not respect my value as a person and neither the value of my family members nor the value of my fellow citizens in my country (Kant, *Metaphysic of Morals*, Part II).

In evaluation of this proposed defense of Kant's second Categorical Imperative, we may note that we only affirmed the probability of terrible effects coming back to the self or country that only valued itself. It is not self-evident that one who values oneself must also value others in a similar way.

Here is how Kant could reply to the analysis that respect for the value of all other persons is not necessarily included in the concept of respect for the value of oneself in six steps:

1. If I value myself as a male, then logically I should value all other males.
2. If I value myself as of a specific ethnic descent, then logically I should value all others of a similar ethnic descent.

¹This paper has been deeply influenced by Mill's evaluation of Kant and is essentially a development of Mill's analysis of Kant's argument as failing to establish any self-contradiction in outrageously immoral rules of conduct.

3. But it is not my gender or ethnic descent that is at the heart of my being, rather it is my humanity, my consciousness in reasoning and making free choices that makes me a human being. (Valuing myself primarily for my gender or for my ethnic descent would be a valuation based on mere accidents or non-essential characteristics, whereas valuing myself for my rationality and freedom would be a valuation based on my essential characteristics without which I could not function as a human person. To say this point in another way, gender and ethnic descent are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for being self-conscious as a human being, but rationality and freedom are both necessary and sufficient conditions for being self-conscious. It is important to recognize that one needs to make a commitment to one's abilities of rationality and freedom as central to one's identity and full development; in doing so one is living by what John Rawls has called the Aristotelian Principle which we analyze later in this paper (Rawls, p. 427).)
4. So, if I value myself as a human being, then logically I should value all human beings (and any other mammals who have self-consciousness, rationality, and freedom).
5. I necessarily value myself, my consciousness, rationality, and freedom, whenever I consciously choose to value anything, for example, like basketball or tennis because conscious valuing which is rational and free is the necessary condition for making any choices.
6. So, I should logically value all human beings and other beings with precisely such attributes of consciousness, rationality, and freedom just as I necessarily value my own consciousness, rationality, and freedom.

Over against this line of argument on behalf of Kant for the self-evidence of respect for others being included in the concept of self-respect, a contrary argument may be made. Is it really necessary that every self must value itself? Could we not find evidence in the fact that there are people who do not respect themselves at all? For example, Rachel Bachner-Melman, a clinical psychologist at Hadassah University Medical Center in Jerusalem who specializes in eating disorders, has seen the impact of extreme selflessness on the anorexic young women who populate her ward. "They are terribly sensitive to the needs of those around them," she said in an interview. "They know who needs to be pushed in a wheelchair, who needs a word of encouragement, who needs to be fed." Yet the spectral empaths will express no desires of their own. "They try to hide their needs or deny their needs or pretend their needs don't exist," Dr. Bachner Melman went on. "They barely feel they have the right to exist themselves." They apologize for themselves, for the hated, hollow self, by giving, ceaselessly giving (Angier, "The Pathological Altruist . . ."). These spectral empaths are, admittedly, out of the realm of normal behavior. Consequently, if we were to omit consideration of such people and if we were to defend Kant's universal valuation of rationality and freedom for all normal selves, perhaps Kant's argument might be accepted as based on a hypothetical imperative in the following way: If a person loves oneself, that is, respects one's rationality and freedom as having inner dignity, then

logically one should love all other selves, that is, respect all others in their rationality and freedom as having dignity. If I were to attempt to live out the choice that I have value but others do not, these others would not logically have to adopt an attitude of valuing me. So, avoiding this negative consequence of others not valuing me would be a good pragmatic reason for me to value others as I value myself.

The problem, however, still remains that mere consciousness of one's own rationality and freedom is insufficient to establish in these people who are outside of normal behavior the deep valuation of their own rationality and freedom and that of others. So, Kant's argument from rationality and freedom of the self does not establish with certitude that the valuation of others is founded necessarily in the concept of self-respect of one's own value. Yes, many people may combine such valuation of self with a similar valuation of others, but it is not logically necessary that one must value others as one values oneself.

In accord with Kant's attempt to show that self-valuation has a necessary connection with valuation of others for their own sake, Kant offers a solution to this following ethical problem that he raised for himself:

A fourth [person], who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: "What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!" (Kant, *Metaphysic of Morals*, Part II).

Kant responds to this problem, affirming that we have a moral duty to help others in great need because there is a contradiction between saying that a person need not now help others and saying later that when the self, as a person, is in great need, that others ought to help that person (Kant, *Metaphysic of Morals*, Part II).

However, Kant's solution of this problem has the following internal flaw. For Kant acknowledges that a person could make a universal maxim that everyone must solve their own problems, and there is no inner contradiction in that universalization. However, Kant believes that one would regret such a maxim most probably in the future when one is drowning or one's house is threatened by a fire because then one could not solve the problem by one's own efforts and would want to have the help of other. Here Kant in appealing to the bad effects of such a maxim in relying upon consequences, as John Stuart Mill has pointed out, whereas he wants to hold that that universal maxims are to be held because they are inherently not contradictory, not because of bad consequences (Kant, *Metaphysic of Morals*, Part II).

Kant's solution of this problem is not consistent with his concept of humanity as an end in itself. Kant acknowledges that a person might refuse to help such others and that this refusal does not violate humanity in one's own person as an end in itself. However, Kant says that action should not only not violate humanity as an end in itself; action should also advance this end. Hence, it is immoral not to help others when they are in immediate and great need and cannot save or protect themselves. This solution by Kant violates his own guideline that moral decisions

should not be based on the consequences of action.¹ Kant had said that an act should not be judged in the light of its consequences or ends to be effected. Kant had said that the principle of humanity should not be used as a positive goal but as a negative principle which prohibits actions against the value of the human being because the inherent valuing of oneself rejects any actions which would harm other selves. Kant has failed to show that in acting for one's own benefit that one must act to help others in great need. We can imagine that one person might join with 99 others to work together to help each other when in great need but there is no inner contradiction in their joining of this group of 99 other people that would require them to act to prevent great harm to others outside their own special group of 99 people.

In summary, so far, we have presented analyses rooted in Aquinas and Kant that love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident to all thinking human beings, but we have argued against Aquinas and Kant that these analyses have failed to show this self-evidence. We can now take up the question of whether the love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident to the expert thinker just as the Pythagorean Theorem is self-evident to the expert geometrician.

Is Love of Neighbor as Oneself Self-evident to the Expert Thinker?

We shall reflect on what John Rawls has identified as the Aristotelian Principle to see if all who live by that principle see the self-evidence of love of neighbor being included in the concept of self-love².

John Rawls has identified a principle implicit in Aristotle's analysis of human nature and behavior which he calls "The Aristotelian Principle" (Rawls, p. 427). This principle of deep motivation affirms that "other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and [that] this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity" (Rawls, p. 427). Although it is not necessarily true for all people, generally we may say that most people will prefer to express in action those abilities which are more challenging to realize and that people will enjoy that expression even more, the more difficult that those activities are to realize. For example, a biologist will enjoy doing advanced research on cloning more than simply repeating the experiments of Pasteur which established that spontaneous generation of life from rotting organic matter could not occur. Rawls further notes the importance of self-respect as a primary good for the self in the expression of the Aristotelian Principle in our behavior. To understand this point, we may offer an analysis of someone who is a wastrel, a good-for-nothing, as contrasted with someone who exemplifies the Aristotelian Principle. A wastrel has no challenging goal to realize, such as contributing to the advancement of biology and also has no effective work habits of having learned inorganic chemistry, organic chemistry and fundamental field of biology and many other disciplines of advanced biology which would enable a person to be able to make a lasting contribution to this

²The analysis that follows is similar to my analysis in O'Meara (2015). The application to the self-evidence of love of neighbor as oneself is completely new.

science. In contrast, one who lives by the Aristotelian Principle in the study of biology will have a challenging goal, perhaps that of contributing to the advancement of human knowledge, and will also have developed the difficult means of practicing the mastery of biology. In contrast with the good-for-nothing who has no challenging goal and no challenging means to that goal, the biologist has both a challenging end and a continuing mastery of the difficult means appropriate for achieving this end (Rawls, p. 440). Most importantly, this biologist's self-respect, founded in both a challenging end and a challenging means, occurs best in a community of fellow biologists who themselves can appreciate both the true difficulty of a great contribution to biology and the difficult means of developing the mastery of biology hitherto which sets the groundwork for the possibility for a new contribution to the field. The fact that other biologists value both one's own goal of contributing to the advancement of the biological sciences and the difficult means of striving towards that goal helps to contribute to one's own valuation of the worthwhileness of one's goal and of the difficult means. No person's estimate of the person's own self-respect is an island unto itself, but people can be all intertwined in this community, for example, of biologists, and their mutual appreciation of each other's contributions reinforces our own appreciation and valuation of our selves. In summary, the conditions for persons respecting themselves and one another require that the fundamental goals of our actions be well thought out and complementary to each other so that, for example, the contributions of various members of the community can fit together in such a way that one scholar advances knowledge of cell division, another brain chemistry, a third new medicines for treating various cancers, and a fourth who teaches beginning students of chemistry and biology to high school students. These goals would fit together well and not thwart various goals of other scholars. Each one in the community of scholars both would appreciate the worthwhileness of the various goals sought in the field of study and also would appreciate the challenging means practiced by all as required to achieve their valuable goals (Rawls, p. 441).

Assuming that a person has made the inner decision to live by the Aristotelian Principle, should we say that this person's decision to love oneself, for example, as a biologist, who strives not only to avoid harm to the science of biology, but also to advance the science of biology through new discoveries, necessarily involve love of other biologists, essentially in the form of respect for them and, indeed, of anyone who strives to know the truth? This love for others is not an emotional love, but the love of respect in which one does not do harm to others and in which one strives to be of assistance to others when it is reasonably appropriate. For example, should one biologist not do damage to another biologist's experimental data, and should one biologist also point out to another that a mathematical error has been committed by the second biologist if such is the case? The answer to these two questions is: Yes, definitely yes! For respect for oneself as a biological scientist necessarily involves respect for all scientists and all who seek to know the truth. As we have affirmed in our summary for Rawls above: "No person's estimate of the person's own self-respect is an island unto itself, but people can be all intertwined in this community, for example, of biologists, and their mutual

appreciation of each other's contributions reinforces our own appreciation and valuation of ourselves."

In objection to this claim that the commitment to the Aristotelian Principle necessarily links valuation of the self as an end in itself with the valuation of all others who can be ends in themselves, we may develop another example. Imagine that a person has made a commitment to the Aristotelian Principle by choosing the difficult goal of becoming a master of the criminal arts by a careful development of the difficult means of learning all kinds of accounting fraud and of avoidance of justly due taxes. In this imagined case, one's valuation of oneself as a criminal would necessarily involve respect for other criminals, creating honor amongst thieves, in one's criminal syndicate, but there would be no valuation of others who would be the victims of their criminal activity. Consequently, the Aristotelian Principle would not appear to show that love of all others is necessarily involved in love of self.

However, here the argument of Kant could be offered that one who would commit to joining such a criminal syndicate would later regret such a choice when that person has been caught and offered the chance to turn state's evidence against the leaders of a criminal syndicate. If Kant's argument against one who would adopt the principle of not helping others who are in great distress as involving a contradiction with what a person would will later when that same person would be in desperate need, then we may also argue as follows about the community of those who live by the Aristotelian Principle that the only consistent choice without contradiction, both now and later, for affirming the value of oneself as an end in itself is to join the community of all rational beings who also affirm the value of all rational and free beings as ends in themselves. So, if we accept Kant's argument about adopting now and in the future consistent maxims of the will for all and any who might be in desperate need, we may conclude that for the person who has made the deep commitment to live by the Aristotelian Principle, love of oneself, that is, respect for oneself, necessarily involves love of neighbor, respect and appropriate assistance when reasonable to another, as the only consistent choice which will not be contradicted by a later choice, regretting one's original but inadequate choice of love of oneself. Consequently, love of neighbor, respect for and reasonable assistance to neighbor as oneself, is self-evident, not to all humans, but to the expert thinkers who live by the Aristotelian Principle. The great insight of Aristotle that the ethical mean lies between the two extremes of too much and too little needs to be kept in mind. A person could have too little love of and respect for oneself or too much. So also, a person could have too little love of and respect for oneself, as the spectral empaths do, or even too much as person might do when suffering from hyper-empathy disorder [Hyper Empathy Disorder, internet]. The person who has achieved or come close to the Golden Mean of proper love of and respect for oneself will necessarily understand that the Aristotelian Principle requires one to live with wise love of and respect for others. It is important to note that wise self-love and wise self-love of others cannot be precisely defined with an abstract formula. Wise love needs a practical learning in which one learns from mistakes in loving oneself too much as the social deviant narcissist does and in loving oneself too little as the pathologically dependent

spectral empath does. So, a person has to really interact with others and receive responses that encourage the self not to love oneself excessively and not to love oneself defectively.

Two Objections to the Moral Principle of Love of Neighbor as Oneself

A first objection is that we should love others, not as we love ourselves, but as the others wish to be loved. For example, if I prefer chocolate ice cream for dessert, it does not follow with necessity that I should serve only chocolate ice cream to my guests. This objection may be easily answered because the principle of love of neighbor as oneself should not be applied blindly as a mathematical formula to all people and circumstances but with wisdom. Wise reflection upon the needs of oneself and of others reveals that needs and wants can vary from person to person and that, consequently, what may be satisfactory to oneself may not be so for the other. Negative rules are easier to generate. For example, as the self would not want to risk suffering from placing one's own hand in a fire, neither should we risk that others would burn their hands in a fire. In contrast to negative rules, positive rules are harder to generate since we may not be able to simply use our own feelings or wants as the criterion, but we must be sensitive to the feelings and wants of others. One's preference for dessert may be one thing, but other people may have their own significant preferences. So, we need to understand that we should love, that is, respect and assist when it is reasonable, others wisely as we love, that is, respect and develop, ourselves wisely.

A second objection is that a judge in a court should not sentence a convicted felon to prison since the judge would not want to be imprisoned either. Consequently, morality and law and order would fall apart if we follow love of neighbor as oneself, the challenge is. Again, here the answer is that this principle should be understood as love of neighbor wisely as one loves oneself wisely. Wise reflection discloses that adult morality requires that we hold adults to full responsibility for their moral misdeeds and that, consequently, the wise judge needs to imprison the convicted felon in accord with the punishments called for by the law. The wise judge would recognize that if the judge commits a felony, the judge should reasonably will that the judge should be punished in accord with the law upon conviction for the felony. The principle, in summary, is that we should love, that is, respect and assist when it is reasonable, others wisely just as we should love, that is, respect and develop, ourselves wisely.

Summary

Thomas Aquinas has affirmed that love of neighbor as oneself is self-evident. We have argued that the principle is not (b) self-evident to all human beings since not all people love themselves wisely. For some people such as spectral empaths who care so much for others in anorexia wards in hospitals, nevertheless have lost their own fundamental decision to care for themselves wisely. Also, the principle is not self-evident to social deviants who tragically may

never have developed the ability or perhaps who did develop this ability but have subsequently lost the ability to care for others for their own sake. However, we have developed an argument affirming that love of neighbor as oneself is (c) self-evident to some human beings who have made the wise decision to live by the Aristotelian Principle who seek self-excellence in their difficult goals and in their difficult means to those goals, thereby seeking to live in a community of respect for those seeking challenging goals through challenging means. So, we concluded, if Kant's argument about adopting now and in the future consistent maxims of the will for offering aid to all and any who might be in desperate need, that for the person who has made the deep commitment to live by the Aristotelian Principle, love of and respect for oneself then necessarily involve love of and respect for neighbor as the only consistent choice which will not be contradicted by a later choice, regretting one's original but inadequate choice of love of oneself. Finally, we considered two objections to the self-evidence of love of neighbor as oneself and answered them, especially the case of a judge sentencing a convicted felon, noting the importance of wise love of and respect for others as one wisely loves and respects oneself. Such wise loving of and respect for oneself and others avoids simplistic misinterpretations of love of and respect for neighbor as oneself.

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