

The Divine Animal. Denaturalisation of the ‘Human’ and the Construction of the Animal ‘Other’

*By Jorge Hernando Pacheco Gómez**

Some pre-psychoanalytic proposals by Friedrich Nietzsche describe cruelty and fear as the Western principles of humanisation. Consequently, through negation, the identity of an animal ‘Other’—non-human, feared, and devalued—is constructed. Within this animal are represented the natural and instinctual values from which the human being distances itself. Through the ‘material and symbolic’ death of that animal, the human is constructed and exalted. According to the German thinker’s psychological formulations, a transvaluation of the Western principles of humanisation is necessary in order to preserve that which, as life, reveals to us the Real and divine dimension of our animality.

Keywords: *forgetting, memory, drive, culture, animal.*

Introduction

Human beings have often been defined as animals—whether rational, political, or metaphysical. However, each of these attributes that accompany and distinguish the ‘human-animal’ are in fact expressions, manifestations, or elaborations of what we call ‘culture’. Thus, if we are to reduce the human to a ‘cultural animal’, the following questions arise: What can we understand by culture? What does it mean for an animal to have culture? And in what way can animality generate culture?

The German philosopher and writer Vanessa Lemm revisits Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought to address these questions. According to the author:

In contrast to the Western traditions of Humanism and the Enlightenment, Nietzsche sets out to investigate culture not as a rational and moral phenomenon, but as a phenomenon of life. From this perspective, culture is not interesting because it serves as a means through which humanity separates or emancipates itself from animality, as these traditions often assume, but because it is permeated by animality.¹

This inversion, present in Nietzsche’s work and highlighted by Vanessa Lemm, allows us to understand ‘reason’ and ‘morality’ as phenomena of culture, not as its origin. Likewise, culture appears to be permeated by an animality that overflows and surpasses it.

*PhD Candidate in Philosophy, University of Chile, and Prospective Doctoral Student, Pedagogy and Educational Sciences at Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation, Chile.

¹Vanessa Lemm. *La filosofía animal de Nietzsche, Cultura, política y animalidad del ser humano.* (Santiago de Chile: Universidad Diego Portales, 2010), 16

Distancing himself from both biologist and spiritualist perspectives, Nietzsche seeks to overcome the anthropocentric rationalism of religion, morality, and science—frameworks from which culture has been conceived as detached from animal life. This point of view, referred to by Margot Norris as “biocentric,”²; This perspective promotes, in the German thinker, an antagonistic differentiation between ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’.

The inversion that Nietzsche proposes as “his great work” was announced in 1882 as “the death of God,” in the voice of the madman, *Der tolle Mensch*, in aphorism 125 of *The Gay Science*. A year later, it would be Zarathustra, the prophet of God's death, who would proclaim this death and the beginning of his path of transvaluation.

The isomorphism between that announced purpose and his biocentrism should not be seen as a mere inversion of values that preserves the same structure, merely reversing its direction or meaning. Nietzsche does not deny the greatness of human reason, nor of the achievements of culture and civilization. While the Enlightenment tradition and positivism regard the human being as legislator and judge of nature, Nietzsche seeks to dissolve this dualism, observing and describing the human—all too human—as driven by instinct, with his animal nature speaking politely through him.

I have divided this essay into three main parts, each corresponding to the three questions posed at the end of the first paragraph of this introduction. Thus, in the first part, I address the question of what we can understand by culture, presenting Nietzsche's antagonism between culture and civilization. The second part aims to analyze what it means for an animal to have culture, seeking to understand and overcome the aforementioned antagonism. The third part aims to explain how animality can generate culture. Here, the concept of the ‘divine animal,’ as formulated in the title, is introduced, in the context of the genealogical interrelation between animality, forgetting, and memory.

This research is inscribed within a broader dialogue with the intellectual currents of the nineteenth century, acknowledging that Nietzsche's critique of the denaturalization of the human has profound antecedents in idealist philosophy as well as in the romantic sciences of the period. Although Nietzsche's project of transvaluation stands as singular, it is nevertheless rooted in a rich tradition that had already inaugurated the search for the “divine animal” in the interplay between soul and nature.

Man: A Sick Animal? What does it mean for an Animal to have Culture?

In the first part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883), Nietzsche presents a situation in which his prophet, out of love for mankind, descends from the mountain to announce the overman; however, faced with the scorn and laughter of the people, he preached:

²Vanessa Lemm takes up several arguments from the book *Beasts of the Modern Imagination*. In it, Margot Norris refers to this new approach to culture—one that begins from the perspective of life—as “biocentric”; a biocentric tradition of thinkers, writers, and artists (including Nietzsche), who do not create by imitating the animal, or in the manner of the animal, but rather create as animals themselves, with their animality taking the floor, giving voice.

Must their ears be broken first, so that they may learn to hear with their eyes? Must one thunder like kettledrums and preachers of penance? Or do they only believe those who stammer? They have something of which they are proud. What do they call that which fills them with pride? They call it ‘culture’—it is what distinguishes them from goatherds. That is why they do not like to hear the word contempt applied to them. So I will speak, then, to their pride.³

At the time when Zarathustra was born, Nietzsche speaks of a revelation, through which his previous approach to biology and positivism was overshadowed by the brilliance of his idea of the ‘eternal recurrence’. From this new perspective, the image of unity and law that religion and science aimed to find in nature is lost in the face of a chaotic nature, filled with multiple emanations of the will to power, which Nietzsche calls *Trieben* (drives) and *Instinkt* (instincts).

These emanations, as expressions of the will to power, strive to become more, to affirm and increase their power through the domination of other emanations; this view of nature presents it as a stage of constant struggles and confrontations among all forms of life, leading to a continuous pluralization of substantially singular ways of life. As a result, for Nietzsche, every cell of every organism is a living memory of the struggles and dynamics that preceded it. In this way, in his conception of ‘culture’, Nietzsche distances himself from spiritualism, avoiding the anthropomorphic references of science and religion; but also from materialism, avoiding a biologicism that would reduce culture to a mere means of species preservation. In both cases, the German thinker highlights a disconnection between culture and animal life.

Nietzsche’s concern with the “denaturalization of the human” does not arise in an intellectual vacuum; rather, it is inscribed within a critical dialogue with the philosophical and scientific currents of the nineteenth century. Although the radicality of the *Umwertung aller Werte* is singular, the problem of the relation between the human and the animal had already been explored by German Idealism and the Romantic sciences. For instance, the work of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and of theorists of the unconscious such as Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert and Carl Gustav Carus had already laid the foundations for a conception of the human psyche not confined to consciousness. Carus, in particular, regarded the unconscious as the great “mystery” underlying being and life.

This approach had already generated a worldview which, as Albert Béguin underscores in his work *The Romantic Soul and the Dream*, sought the laws that “govern the outer world and the inner life of consciousness,” thereby creating an “analogical conception between universe and soul” so fully elaborated that it even “preceded the lyrical adventure” (Béguin, 2015, 2). This Romantic intuition of a profound unity between cosmos and soul, and of the imagination’s capacity to access transcendent truths, resonates with Nietzsche’s proposal. In this sense, Nietzsche’s wager is not that of a creator *ex nihilo*, but rather that of a continuator who radicalizes

³Although for the works in German I rely on the most accepted Spanish translations, I also refer, preferably, to the editions in their original language. In this case, Nietzsche’s quote in German does not speak of culture in the literal sense of the word *Kultur/Cultura*, but rather of *Bildung*, formation, as a process, cultivation, related to the word *Bild*, image.” Friedrich Nietzsche. “Zarathustra’s Vorrede, 5” en *Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen. [Erster Teil]* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 6.

the Romantic legacy, reorienting the notion of the unconscious and of the Dionysian toward a genealogical critique of those values that obstruct vitality.

In the aforementioned quote from Zarathustra, 'culture' is a source of pride in men, and is referred to with the term *Bildung*, showing its formative character, as a process, the image of oneself that is constructed and cultivated. The impulses from which culture has emerged are not sympathy, compassion, or benevolence; there are two principles or impulses that operate in the emergence or rise of morality. The first impulse is fear—it belongs to the primitive phase of morality, the longest stage of our development; from this stage, fear is imprinted as a mark and remains throughout the subsequent development. Fear appears in two of man's relationships: first, in relation to nature, and second, in relation to other individuals. Fear arises in the face of the unknown, that which cannot be foreseen or controlled, that which presents itself as a threat.

Nietzsche explains that this persistence of fear in our later development is due to the fact that it acts as a fundamental instinctive mechanism, aimed at preventing variations or changes regarding situations that have already been dominated and stabilized, both in relation to nature and to others. These controlled and stabilized situations are customs; therefore, they constitute the primitive content of morality and culture. It is common to find a primitive tendency in morality, still widespread, that seeks to avoid or even fight against anything that deviates from custom, from the norm, from the rule, from traditional values. Thus, fear is one of the main affective sources of herd morality; which is a morality of weakness, of rejection of high, independent spirituality.

Accordingly, it is possible to observe that fear of one's neighbor is more original than love of one's neighbor. Nietzsche states in *Beyond Good and Evil* that:

'Love of one's neighbor' is always something secondary, partly conventional and seemingly arbitrary in relation to fear of one's neighbor. Once the structure of society as a whole seems to have been established and secured against external dangers, it is this fear of the neighbor that creates new perspectives for moral evaluation."⁴

Supposing danger—the cause of fear—could be eliminated, this morality would also be abolished, since it would no longer be necessary! The author adds, a few lines after the previous quote: "Anyone who examines the conscience of today's Europeans will always have to extract the same imperative from the fear of the herds: 'We want that one day there be nothing left to fear!'"⁵

In this sense, the imperative upon which this morality is founded leads to homogenization, to the rejection of difference, to the safeguarding, preservation, and protection of customs, and to a distrust of that with which we are unfamiliar.

Culture functions as memory, which is reproduced through the customs and traditions that shape morality; thus, it becomes inscribed in individuals through a process of training and domestication into the norms and customs of society. This is made possible by instilling spontaneous and instinctive feelings of rejection toward what is bad or different, and spontaneous and instinctive acceptance of what is good, customary, and familiar.

⁴Friedrich Nietzsche. *Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft*. JGB 1886., § 201, <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/JGB> (Accessed February 11, 2022)

⁵*Ibidem*.

Therefore, this process of moralization or enculturation is constructed without ideas, without theorizing, or concepts. It is common to observe that we are not drawn to the good through moral concepts; our actions and reactions of attraction or repulsion toward a moral fact occur more swiftly through feelings and affects, in an instinctive and immediate way, than through reflection or reasoning.

The second principle that, according to Nietzsche, allows us to understand how this training takes place, is cruelty. Niemyer explains that “Nietzsche, before making a moral judgment of this principle, seeks to understand it ‘beyond good and evil’, that is, psychologically. Cruelty, for him, is a fundamental characteristic of human nature that can be found in all eras of human history and in all aspects of human culture everywhere.”⁶

In the second book of *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (GM, 1887), Nietzsche offers a set of examples and situations in which the exercise of cruelty has been viewed with pleasure, satisfaction, and exuberance, adorned with picturesque and harmless names. It is not the infliction of pain and suffering itself that generates this attraction to cruelty, but rather the capacity to experience power and dominance over other people, over our surroundings, and even over our own inclinations and instinctive reactions.

Cruelty, together with fear, lies at the foundation of the so-called ‘moral instincts’, which are imprinted and serve as stimulants of memory—from which moral systems and culture emerge. Through cruelty, Nietzsche states: “die Kultur und die Civilisation haben auf die Zucht eines Raubtiers, eines interessanten Tierchens, des Menschen, hingewirkt.” - “Culture and civilization have aimed at the breeding and taming of a predator, an interesting little animal: the human.”⁷ In *Daybreak* (*Aurora*), Nietzsche notes in passing: “A slap to the child, and he will not repeat the action. . .”—pain and cruelty are intense and effective stimulants of memory.

By virtue of this process of enculturation, we incorporate—meaning, we introduce into our bodies—the acceptance and rejection of the values and criteria that society requires of us in order to be part of it. This training, through which we internalize instinctive reactions, operates independently of our will and of our conscious knowledge. Hence the earlier quote, where not even the most refined and hypocritical conscience suspects this process.

This culturally formative function of cruelty and fear operates as a regulatory institution of our good and bad behavior—such as penal punishment. It serves to organize the chaos of other *Trieben* (drives) in the name of collective well-being, through a particular system of customs, so that punishments and new sufferings do not need to be reproduced. The suffering inflicted upon the author of a transgression is a concrete way in which society reminds the individual of the memory of what ought and ought not to be done. In all societies, access to culture—the exit from animality—consists in giving form to chaos, in shaping the chaos of vital impulses and instinctive reactions. Where such impulses remain unshaped and unordered, there is no culture. This shaping occurs in many ways; the coercive method typical of the West is only an error.

⁶Christian Niemyer. *Diccionario Nietzsche*. (Madrid, España: Siglo XXI, 2012), 123

⁷Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche. *Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift*. (Leipzig, Deutschland: Verlag von C. G. Neumann. Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 1887), I-§11

Nietzsche considers that the fundamental error of the West lies in identifying moralization with denaturalization. What Western morality has done is to separate us from our nature, to oppose—on the basis of Christian and Platonic dualistic prejudices—nature and morality as enemies, conceiving reason, spirit, and morality as a telos, and nature as something to be rejected. Western morality incites denaturalization, the concealment and encryption of instincts. As a result, the modern Western man appears as a divided being, incomplete, unanchored, neurotic, and delusional.⁸

Nietzsche defines man in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* as: “kranker, unsicherer, wechselhafter, unbestimmter als jedes andere Tier, es steht kein Zweifel daran: er ist das kranke Tier” — “sicker, more insecure, more changeable, more indeterminate than any other animal; there is no doubt about it: he is the sick animal.”⁹ Fear, cruelty, along with this denaturalization, turn man into an animal that represents its animality through lack and deficiency, one that condemns its instinct and denies its potential. His sickness presents man as a divided being, a being who represses and buries much of his vitality. Unlike other animals, man feels called to give himself a destiny; he is also an unfixated animal.

Nietzschean Antagonism between Culture and Civilization

Jaspers, despite the disdain that the German philosopher claimed to feel toward human beings, finds it rich and fruitful that man is an unfixated animal. Precisely for that reason, he has the possibility to give himself an origin and a meaning—to produce himself. (Cf. Jaspers 1950, pp. 136–161). It is precisely the use man has made of that faculty which provokes Nietzsche's deepest revulsion. Instead of making something greater of himself, he submits to norms and criteria grounded in the absolute and the ethereal.

The analysis of the possible uses of that faculty leads Nietzsche to affirm, in the words of Vanessa Lemm, that “the formations and transformations of culture and of human-animal life are defined in terms of the fundamental antagonism between culture and civilization.”¹⁰ In one of his notes from the spring–summer of 1888, Nietzsche writes:

“Die Gipfel von Kultur und Civilisation liegen weit auseinander: man hüte sich, über den abgründlichen Antagonismus von Kultur und Civilisation sich zu täuschen. Die grossen Cultur-Momente waren immer, moralisch geredet, Zeiten der Corruption; dem entgegen waren die Zeiten der aufgezwungenen Thierzähmung des Menschen (“Civilisation”) immer Zeiten der Intoleranz gegen die geistig kühneren Naturen. Die Civilisation will etwas anderes als die Kultur: vielleicht etwas Umgekehrtes.”

“The peaks of culture and civilization lie far apart: one should beware of being deceived about the abyssal antagonism between culture and civilization. The great moments of

⁸Friedrich Nietzsche. *Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift.* (Leipzig, Deutschland: Verlag von C. G. Neumann. Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 1887), III § 21

⁹*Ibidem.*, III § 13

¹⁰Vanessa Lemm. *La filosofía animal de Nietzsche, Cultura, política y animalidad del ser humano.* (Santiago de Chile: Universidad Diego Portales, 2010), 39

culture were always, morally speaking, times of corruption; by contrast, the times of imposed animal taming of man ('civilization') were always times of intolerance toward the more daring and spiritual natures. Civilization wants something different from what culture wants—perhaps even something opposite [etwas Umgekehrtes]."¹¹

Nietzsche mentions a set of characteristics in which Kultur and Zivilisation stand in opposition to one another; they diverge at their peaks, in their aims, and in their grand historical moments. The triebhafte Dynamik previously discussed also allows for a clearer understanding of this antagonism. Kultur and Zivilisation impose themselves upon one another—the culmination of one marks the weakening of the other. Zivilisation regards animality and the boldest and most spiritual natures as its enemies; this intolerance toward their freedoms coincides with the forced domestication of the animal within the human being.

Kultur is defined by Nietzsche as immoral and corrupt; it is free from the "imposed and forced animal domestication" that characterizes Zivilisation. In the great moments of Kultur, it asserts itself over Zivilisation, enabling the freedom of both the animal and the spirit. The opposition between Kultur and Zivilisation positions the latter as the error of an imposed moralization, while Kultur represents the truth in which animal freedom returns within the human. If we revisit this relationship in triebhafte terms, Zivilisation signifies the dominance of the Apollonian—the narcotic, the accepted, the norm, and the dream-state of the animal. Kultur, by contrast, aligns with the Dionysian—the exuberance of life and the intoxication of the animal.

How Animality can Generate Culture. The 'Divine Animal'

Since his well-known lecture of February 1869 in Basel, Nietzsche makes use of the terms Instinkt (instinct) and Trieb (drive or impulse)¹². Instinkte are presented there as natural impulses, inherent in nature, which animate human activities. There is virtually an instinct for every human activity. Reality, in this framework, is attributed to the conflicting diversity of instincts, wherein unity appears as an artificial mixture—a conventional rank of subjective appearance.

In contrast to the minor forces or impulses that constitute instincts, Triebe are presented in Nietzsche's discourse as true foundations and driving forces of universal history; they are, so to speak, the 'great' instincts. As Assoun clarifies:

The defining characteristic attributed is Tiefe (depth). The Trieb is associated with a force that operates subterraneously within the unconscious of peoples. The Instinkt is the calm and continuous form that acts with the perennial rhythm of life; the Trieb, by contrast, is the force of dynamic eruption. Both are Träger und Hebel— supports and levers— of

¹¹Friedrich Nietzsche. *Samtliche Werke in 15 Bänden. Kritische Studienausgabe*, Giorgio Colli yazzino Montinari. (Berlin: De Gruyter Verlag, 1988), 10

¹²Trieb and Instinkt are semantically close and similar concepts, yet they are not identical. I consider that their differentiation has been, to a large extent, underestimated and overlooked by many translators. This is particularly significant given that Nietzsche's foundational training was in philology, and one of the central concerns in his work is the genealogical analysis of language and its relation to education, culture, and morality.

appearances. It is philology that turns or makes Nietzsche into a psychologist; what defines his psychology is the ability to perceive the Sprachinstinkt (instinct of speech) as the deepest of all.¹³

This same distinction between Instinkt and Trieb is present in Freudian work from its beginnings; in particular, starting in 1905, it became one of the fundamental concepts of psychoanalytic doctrine. In order to avoid confusion and to highlight the psychic specificity of the human being, Freud distinguished between 'instinct' understood as a tendency, 'an inclination,' 'a primitive and preformed impulse'; and the term Trieb, 'drive,' chosen to designate that libidinal charge which mobilizes the motor and organic activity of man, and which is, in turn, at the source of his unconscious psychic functioning.

That comparison which philological exercise enables Nietzsche to make reveals to the contemporary European his condition as a nihilistic animal, devoid of meaning, metaphysical, estranged from life and the earth, uprooted, fatigued, weak, fragile. In contrast with the ideal of man that prevailed among the Greeks. However, as has already been explained, for Nietzsche, there is nothing innate in the individual; there are only energies that are molded, shaped through a fragile process of enculturation. Both intellect and behavior are the fruits of education. Likewise, both the domestication and imprisonment of Instinkt, and the liberation of its immorality, are formative processes. In 1878, in paragraph 219 of the second volume of *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, Nietzsche writes:

On the acquired character of the Greeks. – We are easily seduced by the celebrated brilliance, transparency, simplicity and order, the crystalline naturalness and at the same time the crystalline artificiality of Greek works, into believing that everything was simply given to the Greeks [...] But nothing could be more hasty or unsustainable. The prose history from Gorgias to Demosthenes reveals labor and struggle to emerge from obscurity—chaotic, tasteless, and disordered—into light, in a process reminiscent of heroic labor: paving the first roads through forests and swamps. The dialogue of tragedy constitutes the true creative act of the dramatists, due to its uncommon brilliance and precision, within a popular structure inclined toward symbolism and suggestion, and it was especially educated by the great tradition of lyric poetry.¹⁴

In this work, we observe Dionysus as the prefiguration of the will to power, as the highest prototype of the affirmative exercise of forces. The Dionysian is presented as an affirmation of the general character of life, as that which is equally powerful, equally blessed in all its transformations. The great perfection and compassion of the Greek gods was capable of approving and sanctifying even the most terrible and questionable qualities of life, in the service of an eternal will to procreate, to fecundity, to eternity.

This passage also speaks of the transition the Greeks experienced—from that culture of Homeric or pre-Olympian religiosity, to the Apollonian and civilizing

¹³Paul-Laurent Assoun. *Freud y Nietzsche*, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984), 80

¹⁴Friedrich Nietzsche. *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. Ein Buch für freie Geister* 1878, zwei Bänder. § 219. Leipzig: Verlag von E. W. Fritzsche. 1886. En: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/MA-I>

(Accessed in October and November 2020)

configuration achieved with the Olympian gods. There is a kind of Apollonisierung, in which it became necessary to educate and prefigure the tragic, the dark, and the horrifying aspects of life through rigor and discipline. Nietzsche seeks to decipher why Greek Apollonism had to emerge from a Dionysian clandestinity; he writes in a posthumous fragment from the period of *The Antichrist*:

The Dionysian Greeks needed to become Apollonian—that is, to liberate their will from what is monstrous, manifold, uncertain, and terrible, turning it into a will of moderation, of simplicity, of adjustment to rules and concepts. At the core lies the excessive, the desert-like, the Asiatic: the courage of the Greek consisted in his struggle against his Asiaticism; beauty was not given to them as an inheritance, nor was logic, nor the nature of their customs. All of that they conquered, they desired, they wrestled for—it is their victory.¹⁵

Thus, Nietzsche's transvaluation project, through which he seeks to overcome European nihilism, attends to an increasingly refined and purified understanding of Greek culture, taking it as a point of reference for such overcoming. This understanding is not achieved by Nietzsche through an exclusively philological exercise; the forms of Greek art are, at the same time, reflections of forms of morality—that is, they are ways of evaluating, judging, valuing, acting, and making decisions; they are also attitudes toward life.

In his effort to explore these aspects of the past, Nietzsche identifies the Apollonian and the Dionysian as forms of confrontation and complementarity within Greek art. These are categories constructed by Nietzsche to associate them with two states of the human body: dream and intoxication. By dream, Nietzsche refers here to dreaming—that is, the production of images and representations, appearances, the imaginary. For Nietzsche, those appearances are Apollonian. It must be remembered that Apollo, nicknamed Φοῖβος, is the god of φῶς (light), the god of the Delphic oracle, of the Muses, and, above all, of civilization. Apollo is the creator of juridical and moral systems, of the sciences in general. The Apollonian, therefore, refers to order, clarity, the production of measured elements; and its function is to represent individualized forms or images, as well as to contribute to order and culture.

The category of the Dionysian is entirely different. Dionysus is the god of wine, sexuality, and intoxication. What characterizes him is the state he provoked during the festivals, through music, dance, exuberance, and frenzy. In those states, one experiences the dissolution of the ego, its disintegration, its loss or confusion. Because of this, the Dionysian can give rise to artistic forms different from the Apollonian—such as music, dance, theatre, or mime: non-individualized forms of art.

The Dionysian and the Apollonian, for Nietzsche, are two distinct states that are nevertheless joined. Apollonian and Dionysian creations arise from the same force—a power to create, which is also a power to destroy and disintegrate. It is the same force of life and nature that simultaneously produces beings and causes them to perish. The Greeks, in their pre-Olympian religions—as found in Homer—recognize suffering, pain, and tragedy as fundamental parts of life; in their narratives, the horrors of human

¹⁵Friedrich Nietzsche "Geburt der Tragödie, III" Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühjahr 1888. 14 [14], en: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/eKGWB/index#> (Accessed in February, 2022)

existence are neither hidden nor silenced. From this period, one finds stories of Minotaurs, Gorgons, Cyclopes, and Chimaeras.

To overcome those horrors, the Greeks invented the Olympian religion, providing a transfigured, beautified, and pleasing vision of life. What the Apollonian spirit does is to transfigure human existence, through the Olympian gods, in an artistic and poetic manner—so as to make it acceptable and desirable. The Olympian religion does not cloud, silence, or deny precarity; on the contrary, it exalts it. The Dionysian is as necessary for the Greeks as the Apollonian. The tragedies represent the horror of life—but transfigured and beautified.

The ability to achieve such unity, and to become aware of this complementarity, resides in the fact that—for the German thinker—in the primitive layers of our psyche there exist not only destructive impulses and desires. There also exists what Nietzsche called the “divine animal”: ancient instincts that regulate unconscious and inevitable impulses. These allowed our ancestors not only to survive, but even to flourish amid adverse, unknown, and hostile environments.

The body is one of the central features of Nietzsche’s psychological formulations. His conception is not Körper, but Leib. In it, the body is not an organic, biological entity, but a pulsional one—charged with will and vital impulses. The body is characterized by its material, animal, and earthly nature, in which thoughts, feelings, and emotions intervene—elements that are in constant struggle and superposition. Behind these struggles, unifying those forces, is the body itself; it constitutes a great Self, a Great Reason, and within the body dwells an even greater wisdom.

This pulsional conception of the body is present in psychoanalysis from its origins; it allows Freud to propose a distinction between two notions of reality in German: Wirklichkeit and Realität. The loss of reality to which Freud refers in psychosis is not of effective reality (Wirklichkeit), but of reality as such (Realität). The libido that the psychotic has withdrawn from the world (Realität) is used instead to cover his ego—in his own desire, in effective reality (Wirklichkeit). Because of this, the symptom for the psychotic is delusion and hallucination—that is, where he has deposited his libido, what appears is precisely what he has renounced: the Norm, the order of language, of form—Realität. The neurotic, on the other hand, has deposited his libido into Realität—the reality of language and culture—which has been extracted from the material reality of his own body, from his instincts, his biological nature—Wirklichkeit. That is why it is there, in the place of lack—in his body and in his emotions—that the neurotic later deposits the symptom.¹⁶

In contrast to the foregoing, we find that, for Nietzsche, the modern individual has lost contact with these ancestral instincts—with his own animality and corporeality. His trust has been placed solely in his consciousness, his weakest and most fallible organ. Because of this, the human being stumbles blindly through unconscious life. Yet, as previously mentioned, in the deepest layers of the mind dwell our archaic helpers—those drives of animality and vitality; if he learns how to use them, they may assist him in many of life’s situations where consciousness proves incapable.

¹⁶Pacheco Gómez, Jorge. (2015-04-13) Lectura psicoanalítica de las inmediaciones de lo indecible. Colecciones Escuela de Estudios en Psicoanálisis y Cultura. (Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sede Bogotá), 60. En: <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/53352>

This type of man has existed throughout history, having emerged in different places and times as the fruit of luck or fortune. Nietzsche posits that: “There is no linear or unified evolution of humanity; what exists is the evolution of each culture in a becoming marked by interruptions, regressions, and discontinuities—a becoming that pursues no predetermined end, nor obeys any metaphysical purposes.”¹⁷ Therefore, one may indeed find individuals who, within the framework of their respective cultures, constitute higher individuals. The Nietzschean experiment consists in taking that which has appeared as isolated cases, and making it the objective of an educational project.

Bibliography

- Assoun PL (1984) *Freud y Nietzsche*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Beguín A (1978) *El alma romántica y el sueño* (Trans. Monteforte Toledo M). México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Brooks C (2024) The practicality of the theory of the good: An interpretative reconstruction. *Athens Journal of Philosophy* 3(2): 79–94. <https://www.athensjournals.gr/philosophy/2024-3-2-3-Brooks.pdf>
- Desta D (2023) Genealogy of ancient philosophy in view of the “great quarrel”: Towards an expository essay. *Athens Journal of Philosophy* 2(2): 83–100. <https://www.athensjournals.gr/philosophy/2023-2-2-2-Desta.pdf>
- Engelhardt D von (2023) *Medicine in Romantik und Idealismus: Gesundheit und Krankheit in Leib und Seele, Natur und Kultur* (Vols. 1–4). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog Verlag.
- Jaspers K (1950) *Nietzsche: Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.
- Lemm V (2010) *La filosofía animal de Nietzsche: Cultura, política y animalidad del ser humano*. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales.
- Mora Z (2015) *Filosofía Mapuche*. Santiago de Chile: Cerro Manquehue.
- Niemeyer C (2012) *Diccionario Nietzsche*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.
- Nietzsche F (1878–1886) *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches: Ein Buch für freie Geister*, 2 vols. Leipzig: Verlag von E.W. Fritsch. Available at: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/MA-I>
- Nietzsche F (1882) *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*. In: *Psychoanalyse Historische Texte & Wörterbücher*. Available at: <http://www.textlog.de/nietzsche-wissen.html>
- Nietzsche F (1883 [1968]) *Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen. Nietzsche Werke*, Erster Band. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.
- Nietzsche F (1886) *Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft*. Leipzig: Nietzsche Source, Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe (eKGWB). Available at: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/JGB>
- Nietzsche F (1887) *Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift*. Leipzig: Nietzsche Source, Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe (eKGWB). Available at: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/GM>

¹⁷Nietzsche, Friedrich. Der Antichrist, Fluch auf das Christenthum 1888. § 219. En: Nietzsche Source. Digital Critical Edition (eKGWB). <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/AC> (Consultado en marzo 2022)

- Nietzsche F (1888) *Der Antichrist: Fluch auf das Christenthum*. Leipzig: Nietzsche Source, Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe (eKGWB). Available at: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/AC>
- Nietzsche F (1888) *Geburt der Tragödie, III: Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühjahr 1888*. Leipzig: Nietzsche Source, Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe (eKGWB). Available at: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/GM>
- Nietzsche F (1988) *Sämtliche Werke in 15 Bänden: Kritische Studienausgabe*, eds Colli G, Montinari M. Berlin: De Gruyter Verlag.
- Pacheco Gómez JH (2015) Lectura psicoanalítica de las inmediateces de lo indecible: Análisis de la analogía freudiana entre delirio paranoico y sistema filosófico. *Colecciones Escuela de Estudios en Psicoanálisis y Cultura*. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Sede Bogotá. Available at: <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/53352>