

Axiogeniality: Paranoia, Philosophy, and the Genealogy of Value-Creation

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Since Antiquity, the bond between genius and madness has marked a limit-problem for philosophy and psychology, revealing tensions between meaning, value, and subjectivity. In 1912, Sigmund Freud advanced decisive analogies, hysteria and artistic creation, obsessional neurosis and religion, paranoid delusion and philosophical systems, thereby situating psychopathological formations in continuity with major symbolic productions of culture. Freud's later distinction between neurosis and psychosis allows genius to be relocated on the side of paranoia, understood not as a mere pathology but as a singular mode of reorganising meaning. This article draws on Lacan's notion of the paranoia of genius (1932) as a structure that can sustain symbolic production. It also engages Nietzsche's psychological critique of morality and religious neurosis. I likewise propose an operative distinction between the philosopher as an existential figure and the professional philosopher as an academic function. Against the stabilising logic of religious neurosis, philosophy and art are analysed as potential sites of affirmative sublimation and value-creation. Within this framework, the category of Axiogeniality designates a specific mode of subjectivity. In this mode, rupture with established reality enables the creation of new axiological horizons rather than mere symbolic collapse. The article argues that philosophy, understood as a vital and clinical practice, is closely linked to axiogeniality. It functions as a space of transvaluation and as a criterion for evaluating the health or pathology of value systems.

Keywords: Paranoia; Axiogeniality; Philosophy; Religious Neurosis; Value-Creation

Introduction

Understanding the persistent, and in many respects enigmatic, relationship between genius and madness has long been a privileged concern of philosophy, psychology, and the cultural sciences. Far from an anecdotal association, the historical recurrence of this link indicates a structural affinity traversing forms of thought, artistic creation, and systems of valuation. What is at stake is not merely the coincidence of exceptional intelligence and psychopathology. It concerns the way in which certain singular configurations of meaning-production and value-creation collide with prevailing moral and symbolic orders. As I have argued elsewhere¹, many figures historically recognised as “geniuses” appear, both biographically and structurally, as

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¹The present article is the result of a process of revision, expansion, and updating of a previous study published in Spanish in 2018 in the *International Journal of Philosophical Research Aporia*. That earlier work constitutes the conceptual point of departure for the present investigation and is therefore cited repeatedly throughout the text.

subjects whose relation to the social world is marked by tension, displacement, and estrangement, often resulting in their symbolic exclusion or self-exile from dominant normative frameworks (Pacheco 2018).

From Schopenhauer's perspective, genius manifests as a rupture with ordinary forms of representation and with the utilitarian grammar of the will. This rupture enables the emergence of new configurations through which the world becomes intelligible. Yet it also entails a cost. The same gesture that opens a new horizon of meaning frequently disrupts the subject's adhesion to established regimes of recognition. Consequently, genius does not merely innovate within a stable world, but risks transforming the very coordinates by which a world is shared.² This structural tension explains why the phenomenon cannot be adequately addressed through romantic idealisation or reductive psychopathology. It requires instead a rigorous analysis of the subjective conditions under which new regimes of meaning and value emerge.

A decisive conceptual turning point occurs in Jacques Lacan's doctoral thesis (1932), where he introduces the category of *paranoia of genius* in order to differentiate historically eminent intellectual figures who display paranoid traits from ordinary clinical paranoia. In my 2018 work, I emphasised both the strength and the limit of this formulation: Lacan successfully blocks reductive pathologisation by recognising a differentiated structure, yet leaves unresolved the question of its specific etiology and internal logic (Pacheco 2018). The heuristic value of Lacan's proposal lies precisely in its refusal to reduce genius either to illness or to transcendence; however, its theoretical incompleteness calls for further clarification regarding the organisation of meaning and valuation at stake in this structure.

The methodological groundwork for such clarification had already been laid by Sigmund Freud. In *Totem und Tabu* (1912), Freud established decisive analogies between hysteria and artistic creation, obsessional neurosis and religion, and paranoid delusion and philosophical systems. Through these analogies, Freud proposed that psychopathological formations can be understood as distorted, yet structurally homologous, expressions of the symbolic systems that organise culture.³

Die Neurosen zeigen einerseits auffällige und tiefreichende Übereinstimmungen mit den großen sozialen Produktionen der Kunst, der Religion und der Philosophie, andererseits erscheinen sie wie Verzerrungen derselben. Man könnte den Ausspruch wagen, eine Hysterie sei ein Zerrbild einer Kunstschöpfung, eine Zwangsneurose ein Zerrbild einer Religion, ein paranoischer Wahn ein Zerrbild eines philosophischen Systems. (Freud 1912)

The key notion of *Zerrbild* (distorted image) operates on two analytical levels: it presupposes recognisability and formal continuity, while simultaneously marking an irreducible structural difference. (Pacheco 2015) This duality allows us to interrogate the relation between madness and genius without collapsing philosophical systems into

²Schopenhauer maintains that "wisdom stands to genius as marginal notes stand to a text (or as the planets to the sun). A wise person is one who has studied extensively; a genius is one from whom humanity has something to learn, something of which nothing was known until then." 2009, 67

³In light of the imprecisions present in the Spanish translations of Freud's works, for instance, rendering *Das Zerrbild* as caricature, without attending to the implications of the Austrian author's decision to employ this term rather than *die Karikatur*. I consider it necessary to engage directly, in German, with several of the works by Freud and Nietzsche cited here, and to provide my own corresponding translations.

delusions or idealising psychopathological formations as creative achievements (Freud 1912).

The present article radicalises this Freudian–Lacanian trajectory by shifting the analytical focus from genius as cognitive superiority to genius as axiological production. The central question thus becomes: under what conditions does a subject not merely reorganise meaning, but also institute or transform the values that confer legitimacy, weight, and orientation upon meaning itself? In my earlier formulation, I argued that the philosopher's labour is structurally proximate to that of the paranoid subject. Both engage in intensive construction of world and sense. However, philosophy operates through language as a medium of intersubjective validation, whereas ordinary paranoia remains confined to a closed circuit of certainty. (Pacheco 2018).

At this juncture, Friedrich Nietzsche's genealogical approach becomes indispensable. Nietzsche refuses the abstraction of a rational subject detached from life and instead conceives cultural productions as crystallisations of specific pulsional, affective, and axiological configurations. In my analysis of Nietzsche's pre-psychoanalytic psychology, I have shown that both art and psychology occupy a strategic position in his thought, functioning as privileged sites for understanding how values are created, embodied, and imposed (Pacheco 2021). More sharply, Nietzsche's diagnosis of modernity identifies a moral economy in which life is devalued through obedience, resentment, and the internalisation of guilt (Pacheco 2021), resulting in what he conceptualises as a form of religious neurosis⁴.

This Nietzschean framework acquires renewed urgency when examined in light of contemporary secular moral economies. In a more recent, as yet unpublished work on Transvaluative Psychology and the formulation of the Neurosis of Herzl, I argue that late capitalism operates as a religious structure that reorganises guilt, sacrifice, and redemption around productivity and performance. This structure not only intensifies depressive and anxiety-related pathologies, as well as those associated with burnout, but also neutralises their axiological causes through an internalised form of dogmatism. In this context, the problem of genius and madness can no longer be understood solely in terms of exceptional individuals; rather, it must be situated within a broader conflict between value creation and a moral regime that demands adaptation to an objectively pathological order.

It is within this triangulation, Freud's analogical method, Lacan's differentiated structure, and Nietzsche's genealogy of values, that the category of Axiogeniality is introduced and positioned. As first formulated in my 2018 article, axiogeniality designates a mode of value-production in which genius manifests not as technical brilliance or social recognition, but as the capacity to institute new axiological hierarchies beyond prevailing moral normativity (Pacheco 2018). The concept thus names neither a psychological trait nor a sociological label, but an operative structure through which meaning and value are simultaneously reconfigured.

⁴Nietzsche highlights the relationship between Religious Neurosis and three perilous dietary norms: solitude, fasting, and sexual abstinence. The genealogy of these three norms, as well as the construction of their categorisation as 'dietetic', are tasks which he undertakes in his work from 1885 onwards. Several of his principal observations on the subject can be found in: (NF-1885, 122), (NF-1885, 23), (JBG-1986, 47), (GM 1887, 21).

Methodologically, the article is organised in three parts. The first examines the structure of paranoia through key Freudian formulations, focusing on its relation to meaning, reality, and the psychic economy (Pacheco 2018). The second outlines philosophical activity by distinguishing the philosopher as an existential figure from the professional philosopher as an academic function, thereby framing philosophy as a vital practice of value-production rather than a purely institutional discourse (Pacheco 2018). The third section examines the relation between paranoid delusion and philosophical systems. It shows how axiogeniality clarifies philosophical genius as transvaluation.

In sum, the guiding thesis of this article is that philosophy, when conceived as a vital rather than merely academic practice, bears a privileged affinity with axiogeniality insofar as it operates as a space of transvaluation and genealogical critique of values. The aim is neither to pathologise genius nor to romanticise madness, but to render intelligible the structural conditions under which value-creation emerges as a clinically and culturally conflictual process, particularly within moral regimes that convert the will to power into guilt and suppress aesthetic reorganisation. In this sense, axiogeniality names a differentiated configuration of subjectivity in which the creation of meaning and the institution of values converge in a historically decisive form of life.

In light of the foregoing considerations, this article is guided by three explicit research questions. First, under what structural conditions does a rupture with consensus reality lead not to symbolic collapse, but to a productive reconfiguration of meaning and value? Second, how can Lacan's notion of the "genius" in paranoia be understood as a structural modality of sense-production rather than merely as a pathological deviation? Third, can philosophy, especially in its genealogical form, be interpreted as a paradigmatic instance of axiogeniality, that is, of value-creation emerging from a break with the given order? The first question will be addressed in the opening section through a structural clarification of paranoia in Freud and Lacan; the second will be examined in the subsequent section through the conceptual articulation of the paranoid genius; and the third will be developed in the final section, where the genealogical practice of philosophy is interpreted as a privileged site of axiogenial creation.

Methodologically, this article adopts a theoretical and conceptual approach. It proceeds through close textual analysis and argumentative reconstruction of key psychoanalytic sources (primarily Freud and Lacan) alongside philosophical texts, with particular attention to the genealogical method of value-analysis grounded in Nietzsche's psychological account of value-creation. The analysis operates through structural comparison and analogical differentiation between clinical paranoia, the Lacanian figure of genius, and philosophical practice. Axiogeniality is not derived from empirical data, but is constructed as an operative concept. It clarifies the conditions that make it possible for a rupture with consensual reality to lead either to symbolic closure or to the creation of values. The aim, therefore, is not to describe empirical psychopathology, but to elucidate the logic of sense-production involved in paranoia, genius, and philosophical creation.

General Considerations on Paranoia

The philosophical and medical tradition has long tended to conceive madness as a simple withdrawal from reality, understood as an objective, shared, and stable order. From this standpoint, the “mad” subject appears as one who loses contact with a world that remains intact for others. As Foucault has shown, what counts as “madness” is historically constituted within regimes of rationality rather than simply discovered as deficit.⁵ Psychoanalysis introduces a decisive rupture with this naïve conception by situating madness within the field of psychosis, alongside structures such as paranoia, schizophrenia, and autism. This shift allows for an inquiry not into the abstract loss of reality, but into the specific modes through which each subjective structure relates to reality, language, and meaning.

From 1911 onwards, Sigmund Freud laid the foundations for a critical revision of this tradition. In his early writings on paranoia, Freud demonstrates that the loss of reality is not an exclusive feature of psychosis, but a condition that also traverses the neurotic subject and, more broadly, the “normal” individual integrated into the social order. The subject who submits to norms, conventions, and cultural demands, at the cost of repressing instinctual drives, does not preserve an intact relation to reality; rather, this relation is transformed through defensive mechanisms that secure symbolic adaptation. Reality thus appears not as a given, but as the result of a complex psychic operation.

From this perspective, neurosis does not constitute the opposite pole of psychosis, but rather a specific mode of compromise with reality, sustained by repression and instinctual renunciation. Paranoia, for its part, does not entail a simple disconnection from the world, but a radical reorganisation of meaning, through which the subject reconstructs reality according to an internally coherent logic. It is precisely this capacity for meaningful reorganisation, rather than a mere cognitive deficit, that renders paranoia particularly relevant for thinking its structural affinity with certain forms of philosophical and cultural production. Freud articulates this position clearly in 1911:

The neurotic is estranged from reality⁶ because he finds it, either in its entirety or in certain parts, unbearable. The most extreme type of this detachment is shown in certain cases of hallucinatory psychosis, in which the event that provoked the madness is denied.

⁵On the historical constitution of madness as exclusion rather than simple cognitive deficit, see Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), especially the Preface and Part I, where madness is analysed as a limit-experience structured by the episteme of classical reason rather than as mere loss of reality.

⁶There are differences between this quotation and the translation of it found in the majority of official Spanish editions. In those, a loss of objective reality is mentioned; yet the use of the term ‘objektive’ (objective) is not frequent in Freud. He introduces two distinct terms to refer to reality: one is ‘Wirklichkeit’ (effective reality, in the Scholastic sense) and the other ‘Realität’ (reality proper). This distinction was formulated by Hegel in the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit.’ The neurotic distances himself from efficient, immanent, material reality, ‘Wirklichkeit.’ The paranoid distances himself from reality understood as conventional, formal, intersubjective, psychic, and social—or reality ‘per se’, ‘Realität.’ To illustrate this distinction, we might hypothetically say that if one were to raise a coin before an audience, display it, and ask what that object is, the neurotics would answer that it is a coin, even though it exists only as a metaphor and is therefore not observable. The psychotic, responding literally to the

Der Neurotiker ist von der Realität abwendet, weil er sie in ihrer Gesamtheit oder in einigen unerträglichen Bereichen vorfindet. Den extremsten Typus dieser Abwendung von der Realität zeigen uns gewisse Fälle von halluzinatorischer Psychose, in denen jenes Ereignis verleugnet werden soll, welches den Wahnsinn⁷ hervorgerufen hat. (Freud 1911c)

By positioning neurosis and psychosis as differentiated, and in a certain sense opposed, modes of relating to reality, Freud initially seeks to clarify the specificity of the neurotic subject's relation to the external world. This inquiry is crucial for determining the psychological status of reality in the constitution of the "normal" subject, and only subsequently for delimiting the singularity of the paranoid relation to the world and its structuring function.

Freud posits the existence of an originary phase in psychic life in which unconscious processes alone are operative. He terms these primary psychical processes; whose defining feature is their submission to the pleasure principle. As Freud states: "These processes strive to obtain pleasure; mental activity withdraws (repression) from acts that may arouse unpleasure" (Freud 1911a). Dreams, the avoidance of painful impressions, and fantasy attest to the persistence of this principle.

The reality principle emerges when expected satisfaction fails to occur, giving rise to frustration. This compels the psychic apparatus to abandon immediate satisfaction and instead to represent the real constellations of the external world with a view to their possible modification. Psychic activity thus ceases to be governed exclusively by pleasure and begins to organise itself around reality, even when reality is unpleasurable.

As a consequence of this shift, perception, attention, and memory develop. Freud describes this transformation as follows: "In place of repression, which excluded from investiture some of the emerging representations because they generated displeasure, there arose the impartial judgement⁸ that would decide whether a given representation was true or false, that is, whether or not it was in accord with reality; and it did so by comparing it with the mnemonic traces of reality." (Freud, 1911a, pp. 225–226). This operation introduces a structural distance between subject and reality, a distance that, in the neurotic, is stabilised through repression and instinctual renunciation.

From a genealogical perspective, this operation can be read in continuity with Nietzsche's analysis of the internalisation and domestication of drives in Western culture. As I have argued elsewhere, morality and culture do not emerge as expressions of a higher rationality, but as technologies of obedience, indignation, and

question and renouncing metaphor, would say that the object is merely a flattened circular piece of metal with an exchange and consumption value within social conventions. The neurotic does not see material reality; he sees the conventional one created by norms and social canons—he sees what he has been taught to see: 'Realität', the metaphor, the representation. The psychotic, on the other hand, sees with his own eyes, renouncing social conventions. He observes for himself; he perceives 'Wirklichkeit.'

⁷The term 'Wahnsinn' in Freud's works has been translated into Spanish as 'insania.' 'Wahnsinn' is composed of the noun 'der Wahn' (mania or delusion) and 'der Sinn' (sense or meaning). The combination of both yields "delusion of the senses." 'Wahnsinn' is also commonly used to mean 'madness.' In German, 'Wahn' is also synonymous with 'delusion', for example, 'Größenwahn' (delusion of grandeur), 'Wahnbildung' (formation of delusion), etc. We can thus see that 'Wahnsinn' is not a simple 'insanity'.

⁸'Urteilsfällung' is related to 'Urteilsverwerfung' (rejection by judgement), which had already appeared in the first edition of the book on the joke ('Der Witz', 1905c) and was later examined in greater detail in 'Negation' (1925b).

uprising that organise, hierarchise, and repress instinctual life (Pacheco 2021). In this sense, the neurotic's loss of reality is not a defect, but the structural cost of inscription within a symbolic order that privileges stability, predictability, and obedience.

This logic reaches its paradigmatic form in what Nietzsche diagnoses as religious neurosis: a configuration in which suffering is not denied, but moralised, fixed, and justified through transcendent values. Against this reactive economy, Nietzsche situates art as a privileged path of transfiguration, not as an escape from reality, but as an affirmative reworking of conflict, capable of transforming pain into form, style, and creation. This distinction proves decisive for understanding why certain subjective configurations, particularly those proximate to paranoia, do not merely adapt to a given reality, but tend to reorganise it axiologically.

At this point, the central problem guiding the present article can be anticipated: if neurosis implies a costly adaptation to the symbolic order, and paranoia entails a radical reorganisation of meaning, under what conditions can such reorganisation become a creation of values rather than a delusional closure? Addressing this question requires a conceptual framework capable of articulating psychic structure, meaning-production, and axiological configuration. It is at this threshold that the groundwork is laid for the notion of axiogeniality, understood as a singular mode of value-creation that will be developed in the sections that follow.

In contrast to neurosis, paranoid psychosis is not defined by a renunciation of reality, but by a radical reorganisation of meaning. As developed in *The Divine Animal*, a rupture with dominant cultural normativity does not necessarily result in pathological disorganisation; it may also give rise to productive configurations of meaning, in which subjectivity is compelled to generate new systems of value in response to the collapse of existing ones (Pacheco 2025). It is at this juncture that the category of Axiogeniality begins to take shape, understood as a specific mode of axiological production in which the relation to reality is sustained not through repression, but through creation.

Freud provides a decisive foundation for this reading when he describes the transition from the dominance of the pleasure principle to the increasing importance of external reality. In 1911, he writes:

The increasing importance of external reality also heightened the importance of the sense organs directed towards that external world and of the consciousness attached to them, which learned to perceive sensory qualities in addition to the pleasure and unpleasure qualities that had hitherto been its sole concern.

Die erhöhte Bedeutung der äußeren Realität hob auch die Bedeutung der jener Außenwelt zugewendeten Sinnesorgane und des an sie geknüpften Bewußtseins, welches außer den bisher allein interessanten Lust- und Unlustqualitäten die Sinnesqualitäten auffassen lernte. (Freud 1911a).

According to this formulation, thinking adapts in order to enable the psychic apparatus to withstand high levels of instinctual tension during the postponement of libidinal discharge, or to operate through the displacement of smaller quantities of cathexis. Thinking thus functions as a technique for regulating psychic energy, allowing immediate gratification to be deferred in favour of delayed satisfaction. Freud identifies religion as a paradigmatic example of this process, insofar as it bears

the endopsychic imprint of such substitution: the renunciation of immediate pleasures in exchange for the promise of future, more secure ones. As Freud states, “The doctrine of reward in the afterlife for renunciation, whether voluntary or enforced, of earthly pleasures is nothing other than the mythical projection of this psychical subversion” (Freud 1911a).

This activity of thinking also entails a specific capacity for organising libidinal cathexis, which becomes possible only through the binding of small quantities of energy. At this point, Freud anticipates what will later be articulated as a structural conception of object representations, as well as the decisive role of language in processes of thought and in the modification of the external world. He formulates this as follows: “It is possible that thinking was originally unconscious, insofar as it rose above mere ideation and directed itself towards relations between object-impressions; it then acquired new qualities perceptible to consciousness only through its linkage with word-residues” (Freud 1911a).

This insight allows us to return to the problem of clinical structures, and in particular to paranoia, which runs transversally throughout the present article. If, as Freud maintains, neurosis and psychosis fundamentally concern differentiated modes of relating to the external world (*Außenwelt*) and its psychological significance, it becomes essential to emphasise the role of education as a cultural mechanism of social inscription. Freud describes education as a systematic incitement to overcome the pleasure principle and to replace it with the reality principle (Freud 1911a). In this sense, the cultural demand to renounce pleasure entails not only a reorganisation of libidinal economy, but also a renunciation of a fragment of reality itself.⁹

From a genealogical perspective, this renunciation can be understood as part of the broader process of domestication and moralisation of instinctual life characteristic of Western culture. As I have argued through a Nietzschean framework, education and morality function as formative technologies that regulate not only enjoyment, but also the horizons of meaning and value available to the subject (Pacheco 2021). Within this framework, religious neurosis appears as a paradigmatic form of reactive stabilisation of suffering, in which instinctual renunciation is morally justified and converted into virtue.

Against this structural renunciation, paranoia, and in a singular way, paranoia of genius, does not merely reject an imposed reality, but attempts an alternative reorganisation of meaning, thereby opening a space for axiological production not subordinated to prevailing normativity. It is within this fissure, between neurotic adaptation and paranoid reorganisation, that the category of Axiogeniality begins to emerge with greater clarity: not as an exaltation of rupture for its own sake, but as the name of a specific mode of value-creation capable of sustaining a relation to reality through invention rather than repression.

When this substitution, namely, the replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle, becomes possible and establishes itself with sufficient strength and predominance, we enter the domain of neurosis. Conversely, when this substitution

⁹It must be clearly understood here that speaking of reality is not the same as speaking of the reality principle. This section points out that in the neurotic there is a fragment of reality that is lost—namely, a fragment of ‘*Wirklichkeit*’, the effective and natural reality that precedes the subject. In the face of this loss, the subject assumes a new reality that is intersubjective and cultural, a second nature: ‘*Realität*’.

fails, is rejected, or becomes inverted, and the pleasure principle regains primacy, we find ourselves within the field of psychosis. As Sigmund Freud argues in *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning* (1911a), the transition from the pleasure principle to the reality principle entails a structural renunciation that makes symbolic substitution possible and secures the subject's mediated relation to shared reality. When this renunciatory function collapses, libido withdraws from external objects and reinvests internal constructions, a mechanism Freud explicitly associates with psychosis in his analysis of paranoia.

In Lacanian terms, this failure corresponds to foreclosure: the fundamental signifier that would guarantee symbolic mediation is not integrated into the symbolic order and therefore returns in the Real. The consequence is not mere confusion but a structural reorganisation of meaning. Within this framework, a decisive feature of paranoid psychosis, resulting from this inversion of substitutive regularity, is the emergence of delusion. Freud already describes delusion not as simple disintegration but as an attempt at reconstruction, a secondary effort to restore coherence and consistency after libidinal withdrawal from consensual reality.

Freud defines delusion not as a merely deficient symptom, but as an attempt at cure (*Heilungsvorgang*). Insofar as the paranoid subject rejects the social demand to renounce the fulfilment of desire, a demand that, in the neurotic, is translated into repression and compromise with reality, that desire is realised in a concealed manner through a particular reconstruction of the world. Delusion thus appears as an active operation of recomposing meaning, aimed at restoring a viable relation between the subject and reality.

The specific function of delusion is to cover (*decken*) the fulfilment of desire. This function is achieved through projection, which should not be understood as a simple displacement of a repressed sensation from the interior to the external world (*Außenwelt*). Rather, projection implies that what the subject lacks internally, the regulation of *jouissance*, symbolic castration, the limitation imposed by the social order, is experienced as coming from outside. What has been annulled internally returns from the exterior as an instance that addresses, imposes itself upon, and often persecutes the subject. Freud formulates this process succinctly: "What has been annulled internally returns from the outside. - Wir sehen vielmehr ein, daß das innerlich Aufgehobene von außen wiederkehrt." (Freud 1911c).

This return does not constitute a mere repetition of the repressed, but a reconfiguration of the world in which the subject reinscribes desire under new coordinates of meaning. From this perspective, paranoid delusion should not be understood solely as a loss of reality, but as a meaning-producing operation, endowed with internal coherence and oriented towards the restoration of order where the reality principle has been rejected.

This understanding of delusion as a productive operation makes it possible to articulate paranoid psychosis with certain exceptional forms of symbolic creation. As I have argued through a Nietzschean framework, when rupture with cultural normativity does not lead to mere disorganisation, it may open a space for axiological creation, in which the subject not only reconstructs the world but also institutes new values (Pacheco 2021, Pacheco 2025). It is at this threshold that paranoia of genius ceases to be conceived exclusively in clinical terms and begins to emerge as a singular mode of meaning-production, a condition of possibility for Axiogeniality.

As observed above, both the path of projection and the work of delusion result from the withdrawal of libido from people and objects. However, this withdrawal cannot be considered the pathogenic agent of paranoia. Many individuals in ordinary psychic life renounce (lossagen) persons and objects without thereby falling into a paranoid state. On this basis, Freud maintains that a specific distinguishing feature must exist that differentiates the libidinal withdrawal (Ablösung der Libido) proper to paranoia from other forms of libidinal withdrawal.

With regard to the withdrawal specific to psychosis, Freud writes in *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence* (1892) that the ego may defend itself against an intolerable representation through a far more radical mechanism than repression: rejection (Verwerfung). He states:

The intolerable representation remained in consciousness, albeit isolated and weakened. But there is yet another form of defense, far more forceful and effective, which consists in the ego rejecting, dismissing (Verwirft)¹⁰, the intolerable representation together with its affect, and behaving as if the representation had never reached it. At the moment this is accomplished, the subject succumbs to a psychosis that must be described as hallucinatory madness. (Freud 1892).

Freud immediately clarifies that “the ego detaches itself from the intolerable representation, but this representation is inseparably bound up with a fragment of reality, and in detaching itself from it, the ego also detaches itself, wholly or in part, from reality” (Freud 1892). This detachment appears in Freud’s later works as a withdrawal or estrangement of libido (Unbesetztheit), as in the Schreber case (Freud 1911c), or as a loss of reality (Realitätsverlust), as explicitly formulated in his writings of 1924.

In *The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis*, Freud argues that neurosis arises because the ego represses a fragment of the reality of the id, whereas in psychosis the ego withdraws from a fragment of external reality (Realität). Thus, “what is decisive for neurosis would be the predominance of the influence of reality (Realeinflusses), and for psychosis, the superiority of the id.”¹¹ (Freud 1924). From this perspective, both neurosis and psychosis involve a disturbance in the relation to reality; however, the reality that is lost is not the same in each case.

This distinction is decisive, as it prevents an undifferentiated understanding of psychopathology as a mere deficit in reality-testing and instead requires an analysis

¹⁰It is interesting to observe the term Freud chooses to explain this process. Verwerfung is a noun that literally translates as “rejection” and is the nominalization of the verb verwerfen, which means “to discard.” Accordingly, what is it that is rejected or discarded? Many authors have attempted to answer this question. If we turn to a genealogy of the concept and to the context of its use in Freud, Verwerfung is related to Verweis, which means “rectification” or “correction,” and to Werfung, which refers to “servilism.” It is known in Freudian theory that the psychotic presents a lack, a hole at the level of the symbolic, in meaning itself, and therefore lacks the rectification and subjectivization of what is correct and incorrect made possible by the order of language. Together with Lacan, one could say that the psychotic inhabits language but remains outside the discourse that regulates it.

¹¹The terms Freud employs in this passage are „die Psychose die des Es maßgebend“ and „die Neurose wäre also die Übermacht des Realeinflusses“. Through them, he refers to the predominance of the id in the case of psychosis, and to the superiority of the influence of the real in the case of neurosis. Here Freud makes no reference to hyperpotencies or to objectivity, as some translations suggest.

of the mode, level, and function of the disruption. It is precisely within this differential analysis that it becomes possible to conceive a paranoid reorganisation that does not culminate in delusional closure, but instead opens onto value-production, thus preparing the ground for the full conceptual articulation of Axiogeniality.

From the very outset of his 1924 paper *Neurosis and Psychosis*, Freud explicitly states his intention to investigate what he considers the most important genetic difference (*genetische Differenz*) between these two structures. This difference consists in the following: whereas neurosis is the outcome of a conflict between the ego and the id, psychosis is the analogous outcome of a disturbance in the relations between the ego and the external world (*Außenwelt*) (Freud 1924a).

This formulation is particularly significant insofar as it situates the divergence between neurosis and psychosis not at the level of symptomatology, but at the structural level of the ego's relation to reality. Freud thus avoids reducing psychosis to a mere intensification of neurotic mechanisms and instead conceives it as a distinct mode of subjective organisation, governed by a specific logic.

Freud further clarifies this distinction by means of a clinical example intended to show how neurosis and psychosis diverge in their responses to an identical conflictual situation. In *The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis*, he presents the following case:

(...) a young woman in love with her brother-in-law was moved, at her sister's deathbed, by the thought: "Now he is free and can marry me." This scene was immediately forgotten, and thus began the process of regression that led to hysterical pains. What is instructive here is to observe the paths by which neurosis attempts to work through the conflict. She devalues the objective alteration (*die reale Veränderung*) by repressing the instinctual demand in question, namely her love for her brother-in-law. The psychotic reaction, by contrast, would have been to deny the fact of the sister's death (Freud 1924c).

This example makes it possible to specify a decisive point: in neurosis, the conflict is resolved through the repression of instinctual demand while preserving objective reality, even at the cost of the symptom; in psychosis, by contrast, the ego withdraws from a fragment of reality itself. Yet this withdrawal does not necessarily entail a collapse of meaning. Rather, it may give rise to an alternative reorganisation of the world, oriented towards restoring a form of instinctual satisfaction where the previous order rendered it impossible.

At this juncture, it becomes possible to introduce a conceptual nuance that Freud himself describes but does not fully develop: the loss of reality in psychosis should not be understood solely as a deficit, but also as an operation with a function, whose meaning depends on the psychic and axiological economy reorganised through that loss. Drawing on this indication and articulating it with Nietzsche's psychological thought, I have proposed elsewhere the category of Axiogeniality to account for those structures in which the rupture with conventional reality (*Realität*) enables the production of a new horizon of values rather than a mere negation of the symbolic order (Pacheco 2018).

This perspective distinguishes pathological foreclosure from structural displacement. In the latter, the subject resists the influence of reality (*Übermacht des Realeinflusses*), and establishes an alternative configuration of meaning. This reading finds strong

support in Nietzsche's conception of psychological subversion as a condition for the creation of new values. In the movement from obedience to indignation and finally to subversion, Nietzsche describes the process through which both individuals and cultures transform their relation to suffering, meaning, and life itself (Pacheco 2021).

Accordingly, the Freudian distinction between neurosis and psychosis may be reread not only in terms of loss versus preservation of reality, but also in terms of the function that such a loss fulfils within the subjective economy. While neurosis remains bound to the dominance of the influence of reality and to the instinctual renunciation it demands, psychosis may, in certain exceptional configurations, open the possibility of an axiological re-foundation, in which the subject relates to reality not through adaptation, but through creation.

In a manner analogous to neurosis, Freud observes that the genesis of psychosis unfolds in two stages. In the first, the ego detaches itself from reality; in the second, it attempts to remedy this loss by reinventing and restoring its relation to the world, even in the face of the id. This attempt at satisfaction is achieved through the creation of a new reality, a new order of things in which the source of displeasure that triggered psychosis can be resolved. In other words, the psychotic attempt at cure consists in creating a new world, a new *Realität*, in which the instinctual desire previously rejected by the former order can finally find satisfaction.

When such a creative reorganisation does not collapse into delusional closure, it constitutes the structural point of articulation between psychosis, philosophical production, and the creation of values, thereby preparing the ground for a rigorous conceptualisation of Axiogeniality.

In both neurosis and psychosis, the second moment of the structural process involves the evocation and representation of the power of the id. The id does not submit to reality; it rebels against the external world and expresses this rebellion actively. In this sense, the id reveals its constitutive incapacity to adapt to the pressure of reality, to *ananké*¹². Freud clarifies that the differences between neurosis and psychosis are far more visible in the first moment than in the second; nevertheless, this initial difference is clearly expressed in the final outcome of each structure. Freud formulates this distinction with precision in 1924:

In neurosis, a fragment of reality is avoided by a kind of flight, whereas in psychosis it is reconstructed. In other words, in psychosis the initial flight is followed by an active phase of reconstruction; in neurosis, the initial obedience is followed by a later attempt at flight. Or again: neurosis does not deny (*verleugnet*) reality; it merely does not want to know anything about it; psychosis denies it and reconstructs it (Freud 1924c).

This passage allows us to specify a fundamental distinction: while neurosis preserves objective reality at the cost of repression and symptom formation, psychosis

¹²Freud revisits a Greek concept which, in the early theogonies, designates, together with the notion of 'moira' (fate), the inexorable necessity inherent in 'physis'. It refers to necessity in the Aristotelian logical sense: necessity as that which is in one way and cannot be otherwise. From this perspective, it is possible to state that the necessary being 'par excellence' (in the logical sense of necessity) is God, who is, in turn, the creator of order, norm, and natural law. Thus, while the neurotic conforms ('anzupassen') to the norm, obeying destiny and its decrees, the psychotic, on the contrary, rebels against necessity and the absolute, consecrates himself as God, and becomes a creator, thereby animating God.

assumes the risk of a rupture with reality in order subsequently to reconstruct it actively. This reconstruction is not arbitrary, but follows a precise libidinal logic.

Through Freud's analysis of the Schreber case, it becomes clear that in paranoia libido is withdrawn from objects and persons in the world and redirected towards a particular mode of use. Most clinical cases of paranoia indicate that one of the most frequent destinies of this withdrawn libido is its reconduction to the ego in the form of a narcissistic fixation. Freud notes:

We recall that most cases of paranoia show a fragment of delusions of grandeur, and this delusion may constitute a paranoia. (...) This clinical observation allows us to suppose that the paranoiac has contracted a fixation in narcissism, and we say that the regression of sublimated homosexuality indicates the degree of regression to narcissism characteristic of paranoia (Freud 1911c).

In this way, the reality withdrawn in psychosis is rebuilt through the creative function of delusion. For this process to occur, libido invested in reality must first be withdrawn, leading to its collapse, and then return to the ego in the form of narcissistic libidinal fixation. This dynamic allows delusion to be understood not as mere disorganisation, but as an attempt at cure, oriented towards restoring a relation to the world.

In the Schreber case, the origin of the illness is located in a conflict generated by the recognition of a desire that was subsequently rejected with indignation. This desire was experienced by Schreber as incompatible with the norms and values that, as a magistrate, he was obliged to embody, defend, and represent. The delusion persistently reiterated this repudiated desire and sustained the course of the illness until that desire eventually found a form of acceptance within the new world-order that Schreber constructed through his delusion.

The delusion of persecution enabled Schreber to remember that, beyond himself and his voluptuousness¹³, a world still existed: a reality populated by external beings and persons. This libidinal return towards successive persecutors reintroduces libido into an external object, albeit under the negative sign of repression. On the one hand, the contested object, the physician Flechsig, represents the patient's link with the external world and attracts the totality of libido. Delusion thus functions as the link that prevents a total rupture with the external world.

On the other hand, the concentration of libido in a single object generates an extreme struggle. The battle against this object is experienced as a cruel confrontation, in which the triumph of repression is felt as the total annihilation of the object and, with it, as a destruction of the world (*Weltuntergang*) and of its sublimations. Yet this destruction is never complete. The delusion of grandeur enables the paranoiac to assume the role of redeemer and to reconstruct the world from the ruins of its destruction.

In this new order, the delusion of persecution is no longer required. The delusion of grandeur reforms and remodels reality from the psychic sediments of

¹³The German term for voluptuousness is *Die Wollust*. This word is related to *Wollen*, which is the verb "to want", and *Lust*, which means lust. When Schreber begins to speak of the cultivation of his voluptuousness, he refers to a lustful pleasure that he himself demands from God, as compensation for subjecting him to the sufferings of his illness and the pains he experiences in his emasculation.

previous relations with it: memory traces, representations, and judgments that had previously structured psychic life. Delusion thus appears not merely as a symptom, but as a productive operation, capable of reorganising the world where neurotic adaptation to reality becomes untenable.

This point is decisive for the general hypothesis of the present article: where neurosis remains bound to obedience and renunciation, paranoid psychosis, in its exceptional configurations, may open a path towards the creative reconstruction of the world. It is at this threshold that delusional reorganisation ceases to be mere pathology and approaches a logic of symbolic and axiological creation, thereby preparing the ground for the conceptual articulation of Axiogeniality.

Demarcation of the Philosophical System

It has been argued that paranoid delusion constitutes a system of an interpretative nature through which the subject reconstructs the world and re-establishes a relation to reality after its collapse. The question guiding this section, however, is more precise: why did Freud specifically turn to the philosophical system as a point of comparison for paranoid delusion, rather than to other interpretative systems, religious, mythical, juridical, or scientific? What is it about philosophy that enabled Freud, as early as 1912¹⁴, to draw a structural analogy between a paranoid delusion and a philosophical system?

Freud's well-known analogy does not merely point to formal similarities between an individual delusion and an isolated philosophical construction. Rather, Freud identifies deep concordances between the major social productions of philosophy and paranoid formations, understood in both cases as systems of meaning endowed with internal coherence, a claim to truth, and the capacity to reorganise reality (Freud 1912, 45). This observation compels us to ask what should be understood, in a rigorous sense, by philosophical production.

From Antiquity, and still in Freud's time, the philosopher was not primarily defined by the possession of an academic title, but by an existential attitude towards thought and life. A philosopher was someone engaged in a radical activity of reflection, oriented towards questioning the ultimate foundations of existence, knowledge, morality, power, and meaning. For this reason, a significant number of canonical philosophers did not emerge from philosophy as an academic discipline, but from mathematics, philology, economics, politics, engineering, or the natural sciences. The philosophical gesture consisted precisely in exceeding the limits of a particular discipline in order to interrogate the principles organising the totality of experience.

This gesture is not merely theoretical. It entails a profound transformation of the subject's relation to the world. The philosopher does not simply describe reality; he or she reorders it symbolically, reshapes its hierarchy of values, and thereby transforms his or her own vital orientation (Desta 2023). Plato offers a paradigmatic formulation of this constitutive estrangement of the philosopher in the *Theaetetus*, through the well-known anecdote concerning Thales of Miletus:

¹⁴I refer to the book cited in this article's introduction, *Totem und Tabu*.

It is said of Thales that, while gazing at the heavens and absorbed in astronomy, he fell into a well; whereupon a witty Thracian maid mocked him for wishing to know what was in the sky while failing to see what lay before his feet. This jest may be applied to all who devote their lives to philosophy (Platón 1982).

This anecdote should not be read as a mere ridicule of philosophical distraction, but as the expression of a structural displacement from the immediacy of everyday life. The philosopher appears removed from the practical order of the world because his or her attention is oriented toward what is not immediately visible within shared empirical reality. Such distance is not accidental but structural: it marks a position from which the given is no longer self-evident but demands reconfiguration.

It is at this point that Lacan's formulation of the "paranoia of genius" becomes illuminating. In Lacanian terms, paranoia is not defined primarily by cognitive error but by a specific mode of symbolic consistency: the subject reorganises the field of meaning around a central interpretative certainty. When foreclosure destabilises ordinary symbolic mediation, delusion can function as a compensatory construction that restores coherence. The figure of the philosophical genius occupies a structurally analogous position, not because philosophy collapses into psychosis, but because both operate through a rupture with consensus reality that seeks to rearticulate the coordinates of meaning.

What distinguishes axiogenial production from pathological disintegration is not the absence of rupture, but the capacity to transform displacement into systematic revaluation rather than into rigid defensive closure.

Regardless of doctrinal differences among philosophical traditions, this relative indifference to the immediate has remained a constant. Nietzsche, a radical critic of Platonism, articulates this paradoxical condition of the philosopher in even sharper terms when he writes in *Twilight of the Idols*: "To live alone one must be an animal or a god," says Aristotle. One more thing is required: one must be both at once, that is, a philosopher (Nietzsche 1889).

The philosopher thus emerges as a liminal figure: at once embedded in the world and radically distanced from it; subjected to necessity (*ananké*) and yet capable of rising above it through the creation of meaning. This structural position, neither fully adapted nor completely withdrawn, helps to explain why philosophy, more than other symbolic systems, lends itself to comparison with paranoid delusion. Both function as total interpretative machines, capable of reorganising experience around a unifying principle.

Unlike pathological delusion, however, the philosophical system can achieve a form of symbolic stabilisation and cultural transmissibility. It is precisely at this juncture that the possibility arises of thinking paranoia of genius, and subsequently Axiogeniality, as configurations in which the rupture with established reality does not culminate in clinical isolation, but in the production of new values, concepts, and horizons of meaning. The demarcation of the philosophical system thus proves indispensable for understanding why Freud did not resort to another interpretative figure, and why philosophy occupies a privileged position in the articulation between delusion, creation, and value.

By virtue of the very nature of philosophical inquiry, the philosopher has historically emerged as a singular figure: a type of subject who pursues the exploration of fundamental questions through a solitary, reflective, and meta-interpretative practice.

Solitude, relative withdrawal from the crowd, and the suspension of social conventions are not accidental traits, but structural conditions for attaining a reflexive exteriority with respect to the world. Nietzsche articulates this demand in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, situating the philosopher, and the creator of values, in a position that exceeds prevailing moral and cultural coordinates:

I teach you the overman. Man is something that must be overcome... You have made your way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm (Nietzsche 1883–1885, Prologue, §3).¹⁵

This passage should not be read merely as a moral or anthropological proclamation, but as the formulation of an axiological requirement: overcoming the human entails overcoming the values that constitute it. Such a requirement presupposes a distance from the existing symbolic order, a capacity to situate oneself outside dominant normativity in order to interrogate, dismantle, and eventually recreate it. In this sense, philosophical solitude is not a pathological isolation, but a condition of possibility for transvaluation.

If we proceed from these characteristics of philosophical activity and from the classical understanding of philosophy, it becomes legitimate to claim that every genius has been, in a certain sense, a philosopher. As already suggested by Schopenhauer, what distinguishes the genius is not the accumulation of knowledge, but the capacity to originate something new, to institute an unprecedented perspective on the world. Yet nothing genuinely new can emerge if the world is perceived through the same axiological and perceptual coordinates that structure social consensus. To perceive differently, one must relate to reality differently.

This insight finds strong support in contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche. Katsafanas has shown that, within Nietzschean psychology, agency and value-creation arise precisely when the subject succeeds in disrupting uncritical identification with inherited values and constitutes itself as an active source of normativity (Katsafanas 2013). In this sense, the philosopher is not merely an interpreter of the world, but an axiological agent, whose practice involves a reconfiguration of desires, affects, and evaluative standards.

Convergences and Divergences Between Paranoid Delusion and the Philosophical System

In his 1914 essay *On Narcissism: An Introduction*, Freud addresses schizophrenia (Bleuler) or dementia praecox (Kraepelin) in order to clarify the distinction between a primary, structural narcissism and a secondary, pathological form. In this context, Freud identifies two fundamental features: (1) delusions of grandeur and (2) estrangement of interest from the external world, that is, from persons and things. Subjects displaying these characteristics were initially termed paraphrenics, and later more precisely described as paranoiacs (Freud 1914a).

With regard to withdrawal from the external world, Freud draws a decisive distinction between paranoia and neurosis. Although hysterics and obsessional

¹⁵This analysis follows the 1981 Spanish translation., p. 34.

neurotics also withdraw, to some extent, from reality, they do not sever the erotic bond with persons and objects. In such cases, real objects are replaced by imaginary ones or combined with them. In paranoia, however, the operation is radically different. Freud states that paranoiacs: “seem actually to have withdrawn their libido from the persons and things of the external world, without replacing them by others in fantasy” (Freud 1914a).

The second feature, delusions of grandeur, indicates that the libido withdrawn from the world has been redirected towards the ego, giving rise to narcissism. This secondary narcissism, Freud argues, is “the amplification and unfolding of a state of affairs that had already existed previously” (Freud 1914a), and is built upon a primary narcissism that had been obscured by socialisation and the demands of reality.

When considered in relation to philosophy and philosophical systems, these observations illuminate numerous moments in the history of philosophy marked by a pronounced estrangement from the world. Yet episodes such as the anecdote of Thales suggest that this estrangement is only partial. The philosopher withdraws libidinal interest from the world in a practical and immediate sense, but does so in order to reclaim it on another plane: as an object of contemplation, reflection, and conceptual elaboration. The world does not vanish; it is symbolically reconfigured.

The consequence of this displacement is also a voluntary renunciation of full participation in ordinary social life. Socrates’ death, as narrated by Plato in the *Phaedo*, provides a paradigmatic example. Shortly before his execution, Socrates celebrates the prospect of liberation from the body, conceived as a prison for the soul (Platón 1983). The philosopher appears here as the one who approaches truth most closely precisely because he has distanced himself most rigorously from the slavery of opinion (*doxa*) and the tyranny of bodily sensibility.

This trait allows for a structural convergence between the philosophical system and paranoid delusion: both involve a partial withdrawal from immediate empirical reality and a reorganisation of meaning around an internal principle. The decisive divergence, however, lies in the outcome of this operation. While paranoid delusion may close in upon itself within an autoreferential logic, the philosophical system, at its most fertile, achieves a form of symbolic stabilisation and cultural transmissibility, enabling the production of new, shareable values.

It is precisely within this liminal zone that the problem of Axiogeniality is situated: as a category designed to conceptualise those subjective configurations in which withdrawal from the world does not culminate in the foreclosure of meaning, but in its creative reinvention, articulating solitude, estrangement, and axiological production into a higher-order relation to reality (Pacheco 2018).

Examples such as Heraclitus, Rousseau, and Wittgenstein, figures separated by centuries and radically different contexts, reveal a striking convergence: a recurrent tendency to withdraw from large urban centres in order to inhabit isolated, mountainous, or marginal spaces. This gesture cannot be reduced to mere biographical eccentricity. Rather, it suggests a partial withdrawal of interest from persons and things, not in order to deny them, but in order not to be absorbed by them, thereby enabling a more fundamental understanding of social structures, of the foundations of the human world, and of the historical formations of meaning.

Such withdrawal, however, is not sufficient to establish an analogy with paranoia. It is necessary to examine whether the second characteristic identified by Freud in *On Narcissism* (1914), namely, delusions of grandeur, is also present. In this regard, it suffices to consider the chapter titles of Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo*, the previously cited passage from *Twilight of the Idols* concerning the capacity to live in solitude, or the Platonic and Socratic conception of the philosopher's soul. In all these cases, one encounters an exceptional self-attribution of meaning, a radical consciousness of singularity that, while not pathological, structurally approaches the limits of secondary narcissism.

The philosopher, however, is not a paranoiac. Yet, as Freud already suggested and as this article has argued, philosophical practice comes sufficiently close to this structure to justify the analogy. The philosopher lives, thinks, and dwells in the vicinity of the unsayable. He makes his life a constant reflection and his doctrines an attempt to access externalist perspectives, that is, viewpoints that aspire to situate themselves beyond the immediate determinations of time, space, and convention. Hilary Putnam has referred to this aspiration as the "God's Eye View" (Putnam 1988): a perspective impossible for any mortal, yet structurally constitutive of the philosophical gesture.

The philosopher seeks to be, simultaneously, observer and observed; he attempts to see himself not as a reflection, but as a totality. This tension, logically unsustainable, does not necessarily lead to psychic disorganisation, but may become a motor of symbolic creation, provided that it remains articulated within shared language.

From this standpoint, it becomes clear why Freud chose the philosophical system, rather than any other interpretative system, in his analogy with paranoid delusion. In philosophy, one observes most clearly the work of world-reconstruction that also characterises delusion. Both are total interpretative systems; both emerge from a rupture with the given symbolic order; both attempt to restore meaning where reality has become unbearable.

Yet a decisive difference remains. The philosopher is a human being, an animal among others, who, within his contingent existence, nonetheless pursues a necessary and absolute understanding of reality and of his own nature. Aristotle defined the human being as *zoon politikon*, grounding sociability in logos, language (Aristoteles 2000). Unlike the ordinary individual, the philosopher constructs the sociability of his world within the solitude of his system, just as the paranoiac reconstructs sociability through delusion. But whereas the paranoiac breaks with language, the philosopher respects and inhabits it.

This is the decisive point of divergence. As Izcovich has argued, both delusion and philosophical systems are interpretative systems (Izcovich 2011). Yet the philosopher introduces his interpretation within the common language, respecting its grammar, its rules, and its transmissibility. The paranoiac respects neither the Other nor language; his step is more radical, more extreme, and therefore clinically incommunicable.

The philosopher introduces something new into the spirit of his age, but does so with the language of others. He employs writing, inherited concepts, and discursive conventions in order to become a reformer, a censor, a cultivator of ideas, an artisan of a rectification of values, tastes, and consciences. From this perspective,

the philosopher's paranoia of genius approaches what I have termed Axiogeniality: a form of genius grounded not in accumulated knowledge, but in an attitude towards the world capable of forging a new way of seeing, valuing, and acting, in short, a transmutation of one's own values (Pacheco 2018).

In this sense, Axiogeniality articulates directly with Nietzsche's psychology. Where religious neurosis stabilises suffering through renunciation, guilt, and the promise of transcendent redemption, art, and philosophy when it becomes creative, operates as a path of affirmative sublimation, transforming suffering into formative power. As I have argued elsewhere, Nietzsche enables a conception of clinical psychology oriented not towards normalisation, but towards the evaluation of the values organising a life, distinguishing reactive configurations (religious, moral) from affirmative ones (artistic, creative) (Pacheco 2021).

Axiogeniality thus does not constitute a romantic exaltation of madness, nor an aestheticisation of suffering. Rather, it is a clinical and philosophical category designed to think those subjective structures in which rupture with the dominant symbolic order gives rise to a transmissible, shareable, and culturally productive creation of values. This horizon finally opens up the possibility of a clinical psychology of Nietzsche, in which the fundamental criterion of health or illness is not adaptation to the norm, but the capacity to create values that confer a greater meaning upon life, strengthen it, and make it more liveable, healthier, more intense, and more truthful.

Conclusion

This article has addressed three guiding questions concerning the structural relation between paranoia, genius, and philosophical value-creation.

In response to the first question, it has argued that a rupture with consensus reality does not necessarily entail symbolic collapse. Such rupture becomes destructive when it results in foreclosure and the disintegration of symbolic mediation. However, when the break with the given order is structurally accompanied by a reorganization of meaning, it may yield a productive reconfiguration of value. The decisive criterion is not deviation from shared reality as such, but the capacity to generate a new symbolic consistency.

Regarding the second question, the analysis has shown that Lacan's notion of the "genius" in paranoia designates precisely this structural possibility: a configuration in which the subject, rather than dissolving into fragmentation, constructs a new horizon of intelligibility. The paranoid genius thus represents not a romanticized pathology, but a structural modality of sense-production in which delusional logic may function as a matrix of coherence rather than mere collapse.

Finally, in response to the third question, the article has argued that philosophy, especially when understood through Nietzsche's psychological genealogy of value, can be interpreted as a paradigmatic instance of axiogeniality. Philosophical practice, in its most radical form, suspends the self-evidence of inherited values and exposes their contingent origins, thereby opening the space for transvaluation. In this sense, philosophy operates structurally in proximity to paranoid rupture, yet

differs from psychotic disintegration insofar as it sustains symbolic articulation and communicable meaning.

The concept of axiogeniality, introduced and refined here, seeks to clarify this distinction. It designates a mode of subjectivity in which rupture with the given becomes the condition for value-creation rather than for symbolic foreclosure. This proposal does not aim to romanticize psychosis, nor to blur clinical distinctions, but to articulate a structural differentiation between collapse and creation. By bringing Freud's structural insights, Lacan's formulation of the paranoid genius, and Nietzsche's psychological genealogy into a unified framework, the article contributes a conceptual tool for thinking the productive edge of rupture, where madness, philosophy, and value-formation intersect without becoming identical.

This framework also gains urgency in relation to contemporary secular moral economies. If late capitalism reorganises guilt, sacrifice, and redemption around productivity and performance, then the distinction developed here exceeds the psychological register. In ongoing work on Transvaluative Psychology and the formulation of the Neurosis of Herzl, this dynamic is analysed as a structural reconfiguration of religious logic within economic life. From this perspective, axiogeniality serves as a critical criterion. It helps distinguish emancipatory value-creation from compulsive adaptation to a performative moral order.

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