

## Anytime, anything, anyone – Forms of Apparent Reality in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and the Phenomenon of Deepfakes –

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*David Ross characterizes the Greeks as politically engaged and highly litigious, where mastery of speech functioned as a passport to influence (2005, 284). In Aristotle’s account, rhetoric is the capacity to identify available means of persuasion in any case. Persuasion rests on argument, the speaker’s character, and the audience’s emotions. Rhetoric addresses matter open to deliberation rather than certainty, relies on concise reasoning, and proceeds from premises audiences already accept. Modern speakers often depend on talent and experience, yet rhetoric still dazzles and can mislead. Audiences persuaded by such means may feel shame rather than curiosity about the techniques that influenced them. These dynamic illuminates the phenomenon of deepfakes. A central issue is the relation between falsehood and credibility: arguments can be framed while concealing causes and methods, allowing false conclusions to appear convincing. Deepfakes exemplify a dangerous form of rhetorical persuasion, blurring the boundary between fact and fiction. Their feasibility and difficulty of detection enhance credibility and reduce vigilance, even inviting participation in the deception. Whereas Aristotle analyzes authenticity in communication, deepfakes simulate authenticity through technological systems. When perceived truth is supported by trusted data within familiar media environments, it is accepted as real, threatening democratic processes and broader social cohesion.*

**Keywords:** *rhetoric, persuasion, deepfakes, politics, democracy*

### Introduction

“The Greeks were both a politically minded and a litigious race, and the arts of speech were as useful a passport to influence with them as they are in a modern democracy” (Ross 2005, 284). This is how David Ross begins his analysis of the chapter on rhetoric and politics in Aristotle’s work. He himself recognises the part played by the appeal to emotion, but insists that the emotion must be produced by the speech itself (Ibid.). Rhetoric is “the power to see the possible ways of persuading people about any given subject” (Ross 2005, 285). The components of persuasion are the argument, the character of the speaker, and the emotions of the audience.

Aristotle knew how to play with the strings of the human heart. *Rhetoric* deals with themes that are open to discussions and subject to consideration, and it addresses people who are unable to follow a lengthy argument. Therefore, it deals with probable things (since certainties are not subject to deliberation), uses short conclusions, and, when it uses premises that are likely to be accepted by its audience, it considers them

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accepted rather than deriving them from primary principles. Many of Aristotle's observations apply exclusively to the circumstances of Greek society; however, many of his theories are eternal truths as well (Ross 2005, 289.). Today, speakers may rely more on their own natural talents and experiences, although rhetoric can still dazzle audiences just as it did in the past. These people, who were persuaded in such manners, are more ashamed of this outcome than to be interested in finding out what tricks were used to deceive them (Ross 2005, 289–290). This is also the secret of the 'deepfake' phenomenon.

Additionally, there is another essential element in the art of persuasion, which is the question of falsehood and credibility. We can very easily formulate our arguments by concealing their cause, purpose, and method (omissive arguments). Thus, although the argument becomes false, this remains unnoticed by the recipient. Based on the above-described processes, we can also establish that deepfake is a probable and very dangerous method of rhetorical persuasion, as the line between fact and fiction becomes blurred. The political idea of Athenian democracy is very different from the functioning of modern democracies or so-called political entities. Despite this difference, however, deepfakes can have profound negative consequences to democracies (Meskys et al 2020, 8). My paper analyses ancient and modern parallels of the manifestations of apparent reality and thus serves as a warning of the dangers of accepting apparent probabilities without common sense and critical thinking.

### **Forms of Apparent Reality in Aristotle**

Reality that we perceive is not equivalent to the Real that is behind our perception and experience. In other words, 'apparent reality' is the concealment of reality that is the falsification of reality (the Real) through various tricks and processes, which are often also unconscious. First of all, let us examine what Aristotle means by enthymeme and apparent enthymeme. As Ross also argues, the latter has three distinct types (Ross 2005, 285). The first comprises those characteristics that are inherent in or originated from the speaker, such as the "devices of speech by which he induces his hearers to form a favourable opinion of his character" (Ibid.). The second consists of the emotions that arise and awake in the audience (Ibid.). And the third is the produced "proof or its appearance by sheer force of argument" (Ibid.). The third type of apparent enthymeme is considered first by Aristotle regarding the process of persuasion, and as Ross further explains, it has two main subcategories. The first one is 'example' that is the "rhetorical counter-part of induction," and the second one is 'enthymeme', which is the "rhetorical counterpart of syllogism" (Ibid.). As Ross quotes Aristotle, "[o]f these, the latter is the rhetorical method par excellence, 'the body of persuasion.' 'Arguments by example are no less persuasive, but enthymemes win more applause'" (Ibid.).

Naturally, from the above types and methods, the most convenient mode of argument is both determined by and chosen on the basis of the prevalent conditions that defines the orator's context of speech (Ibid.). As Ross presents, the characteristics of the audience is one of the most important contributing factors of these conditions (Ibid.) Therefore, as he phrases it, "the subjects he has to deal with are the sort of things we deliberate about, in so far as these fall outside the scope of the definite arts

and sciences; and the people he has to address are people who cannot follow a long train of reasoning” (Ibid.). The orator, as a result, has to deal with different possibilities and developments, especially, “since certainties are not matters of deliberation”; for instance, the speaker thus opts to utilize “short trains of reasoning,” while assuming certain premises, because they will probably be accepted, instead of deriving them from foundational principles (Ibid.).

Enthymemes, as Aristotle tells us, fall into two broad categories. On the one hand, there are specific arguments, those that arise from the subject matter of a particular discipline—such as ethics, philosophy and physics, among many (Ross 2025, 285–286). On the other hand, there are general arguments, derived from the Greek term “τόποι”—literally, the “places” or conceptual regions, where lines of reasoning naturally reside and from which they may be drawn (Ibid.). Therefore, a speaker who relies heavily on specific arguments moves away from the proper domain of rhetoric and toward that of the specialized sciences. Yet, as Ross underlines, Aristotle recognizes a practical limitation, namely, the stock of general argumentative forms is relatively small (Ibid.). For this reason, he permits the orator to employ specific arguments when necessary and even chooses to examine these first. Consequently, given the circumstances in which rhetorical discourse typically occurs—public deliberation, civic persuasion, moral evaluation—such specific arguments will most often be taken from the fields of ethics and politics (Ross 2025, 285).

This demonstrates the characteristic feature of rhetoric that Aristotle correctly described as “drawing opposite conclusions” (Freese 1926, 458). As it is quoted and translated by Freese, “Or, if men are in the habit of gaining credit for false statements, you must also admit the contrary, that men often disbelieve what is true” (AR, II.23.1397a; 1926, 297). “Another topic, appropriate to refutation, consists in examining contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words, [...]” (AR, II.23.1400a; Freese 1926, 319) which quote is one of the arguments of the demonstrative enthymeme deriving from its opposite. “It is clear that it is possible to produce the stating of a counter-deduction on the basis of the same topics [as a deduction]. For the deductions are based on reputable beliefs, and many things that seem to be so are contrary to one another” (Rh. II 25 1402 32–34; Reeve 2018, 67). “The refutation of enthymemes based on paradigms is the same as that of likelihoods. For if we have one case that is not so, there is a refutation, because the argument is not a necessity, even if more cases on more occasions are otherwise, but if more cases or more occasions are that way, we should contend that his present one is not like them, or not like them in the relevant way, or at least has some differentiating feature (diaphora)” (Rh. II 25 1402 36–10; Reeve 2018, 76). Moreover, the enthymeme includes the ‘gnome’ (cf. gnomic poetry), that is, the general moral opinion which is either the upper premise or the conclusion of a syllogism, the rest of which remains unstated, these are so-called arguments of omission, because we can very easily formulate our arguments by omitting the reason, the purpose, and the method. Thus, although the argument becomes false, the recipient does not notice this (Ross 2025, 287).

“Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers, first, because of the vulgarity of the hearers, who are pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially hold” (AR, II.20.1395b; Freese 1926, 287). Amplification and depreciation are not topics of enthymemes, but are themselves

enthymemes, intended to show that a thing is great or small. Refutative and constructive enthymemes are of the same kind, for each infers the opposite of what has been demonstrated by another. An objection is not an enthymeme, as it consists in stating a generally received opinion, from which it appears either that the argument is not strictly logical or that a false assumption has been made (Freese 1926, Book II: xxvi).

Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one is that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, as in Dialectic, consists in ending with a conclusion syllogistically expressed, although there has been no syllogistically process, “therefore it is neither this nor that,” “so it must be this or that”; and similarly in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical statement is supposed to be an enthymeme; for such a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This fallacy appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state the heads of several syllogisms: “He saved some, avenged others, and freed the Greeks”; for each of these propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a fresh conclusion. (AR, II.24.1401a; Freese 1926, 325)

Aristotle discusses homonymy, a fallacy arising from the ambiguity of language, where the same word has multiple meanings, thus there are multiple interpretation present at the same time among the members of the same audience. Thus, for instance, the example of the “mouse” plays on the shift from animal to sacred symbol, exploiting an accidental association rather than a genuine causal or logical connection (Ibid.). The fallacy works because listeners unconsciously slide from one meaning to another without noticing the shift. “The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy. For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important animal, since from it is derived the most honoured of all religious festivals, namely, the mysteries” (AR, II.24.1401a; Freese 1926, 325–326). Therefore, just as verbal homonymy confuses meanings, on this premise deepfakes collapse the distinction between appearance and identity. The viewer mistakes a representation for the thing represented. Therefore, Aristotle’s concern with linguistic ambiguity anticipates today’s problem of representational ambiguity, where digital likeness stands in for reality and borrows its authority.

Additionally, Aristotle identifies a fallacy based on exaggeration, especially when emotional intensity replaces evidence. The exaggeration does not establish facts but manipulates perception: outrage makes guilt appear obvious, while minimization makes wrongdoing seem implausible. The truth becomes secondary to emotional framing. As Aristotle puts it in Freese’s translation: “Another topic is that of constructing or destroying by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker, without having proved that any crime has actually been committed, exaggerates the supposed fact; for it makes it appear either that the accused is not guilty, when he himself exaggerates it, or that he is guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a rage” (AR, II.24.1401b; Freese 1926, 329). In parallel, a fabricated video of a public figure expressing rage, hatred, or criminal intent can bypass rational evaluation and trigger immediate moral judgment. The viewer feels they have seen the crime itself, even though no such event took place.

Furthermore, the fallacy of consequence involves mistaken inference, mainly, because a certain trait often accompanies a virtue, the presence of that trait is taken as

proof of the virtue itself. In the example of Aristotle, Paris lives alone like a noble-minded person; therefore, he must be noble-minded. The reasoning confuses correlation with cause or essence. “Another fallacy is that of the Consequence. For instance, in the Alexander (Paris) it is said that Paris was high-minded, because he despised the companionship of the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself; for because the high-minded are of this character, Paris also might be thought high-minded” (AR, II.24.1401b; Freese 1926, 331). For instance, deepfakes exploit the audience’s habitual reasoning, in a similar manner one could claim that “if this were fake, it wouldn’t look like this.” Thus, Aristotle shows how such reasoning is logically invalid, even though it feels persuasive.

In political life, it is particularly common to present something that is not a cause as a cause, e.g., if one thing happens at the same time as another, or follows it, we perceive the sequence as a cause. “Or, if one should say that it is wanton outrage to beat a free man” (AR, II.24.1402a; Freese 1926, 333). And this is what making the worse appear the better argument means. Next to what has been said we must speak of refutation. “An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection” (AR, II.24.1402b; Freese 1926, 333). Here, the omission of “when” and “how” is essential. After all, it is only disorderly conduct if, for example, we do not do it in self-defence. Among other things, these are the basic rhetorical principles on the basis of which the audience can examine whether something happened or not. To do this, they must carry out the following analysis: “In the first place, if that which is naturally less likely has happened, then that which is more likely will most probably have happened” (AR, II.19.1392b; Freese 1926, 269). Consequently, modern people should also undertake this analysis in order to navigate the jungles of deepfake videos and ensure that their internal compass works correctly when they have to decide between reality and apparent reality.

### **The Phenomenon of Deepfakes as Apparent Reality**

Based on the above, I argue that deepfake is a possible and very dangerous method of rhetorical persuasion, which is a semblance of reality, a version of reality falsified by technological tricks. As van der Sloot and Wagenveld put it, “[i]mage, sound, or other material that is wholly or partly fabricated or existing image, sound or other material that has been manipulated with the help of advanced technical means and that is impossible or difficult to distinguish from the authentic material” (2022, 4). Therefore, Aristotle rightly warns us that “[i]f it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies equally to all good things except virtue, and above all to those things which are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm” (AR.I.1.1355b; Freese 1926, 13). In the case of deepfakes, the argument becomes very complex and widespread with the help of technology. This is not as simple as photoshopping, because it also affects the ear, and unsuspecting viewers are easily deceived by what they see and hear, especially because the creators change small parts, faces, and voices in what is otherwise a largely real series of images.

Plato articulates strong ethical criticisms of the sophists, particularly targeting their tendency to embellish deceptive ideas through elaborate rhetorical techniques. He argues that they attempt to render falsehoods persuasive by cloaking them in attractive and misleading language, effectively making what is untrue appear credible (Adamik 1982, 266). Such stylistic sophistication, however, serves primarily to influence and mislead audiences rather than to convey genuine knowledge. Plato extends this critique by asserting that any speaker who lacks a grounding in objective truth cannot be said to practice a true art. In his view, those who prioritize shaping public opinion over engaging with reality produce a form of rhetoric that is fundamentally hollow—lacking both intellectual integrity and authentic artistic merit (Adamik 1982, 274). If we compare the creator of deepfake to a painting forger, we can say that while the former's work is unique and, in its own way, irreproducible, the latter then is a mass production method. However, deepfakes have become as much a part of our lives as painting forgery, which has been commonplace for centuries and tacitly accepted by the public (Aczél 2023, 33).

Nevertheless, the contemporary information environment is increasingly shaped by rapid technological developments that challenge traditional distinctions between truth and falsehood. In particular, advances in artificial intelligence have enabled the creation of highly realistic synthetic media—commonly referred to as deepfakes—which can depict individuals saying or doing things that never occurred. These technologies leverage machine learning techniques to fabricate convincing audio-visual content, thereby significantly lowering the threshold for producing persuasive misinformation (Chesney–Citron 2019, 1758–1759). At the same time, the networked structure of digital communication platforms facilitates the rapid dissemination of such content, often amplifying its impact through mechanisms such as information cascades and the viral spread of emotionally charged or novel material (Chesney–Citron 2019, 1762–1764). As a result, deepfakes do not merely introduce new forms of deception; they intensify pre-existing vulnerabilities within the epistemic landscape, including cognitive biases and the erosion of trust in authoritative sources. In this context, the manipulation of appearances through sophisticated technological means can be understood as a modern extension of longstanding philosophical concerns about rhetoric, persuasion, and the distortion of truth.

Aristotle presents us with correct models of quantity, quality, and manner in *Rhetoric* in order to expose the many ways in which deception can be used. Deepfakes violate every model, because they employ the entire arsenal of information manipulation. The messages are not vague or ambiguous, of course; on the contrary, they are completely clear and simple so that a wide audience can understand them. In every other respect—in terms of relevance, informativeness, and distortion of the truth—they are completely deceptive. We believe in the authenticity of the simulated person based on our prior knowledge, and the larger the context and the environment of the information, the more likely we are to fail to recognize that this simulated person is in fact a deepfake (Aczél 2023, 40). In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, he reveals the attributes of authenticity in communication between people, while deepfake creates authenticity through technological systems. As a result, if the truth perceived by the recipients is supported by technology with facts and data in a medium, situation, and

perception (both sensory and cognitive) that the recipients currently trust, then they will consider it authentic (Keleti 2023, 64).

Although we do not expect authenticity from technology in our personal interactions (Keleti 2023, 65), we have seen in Aristotle that the receptive audience tends toward easier resistance: they do not draw conclusions themselves, but applaud conclusions that have been made clear to them (III. 10.1410.b)<sup>1</sup>, so that “comfortable truths,” truths that are easy to accept with little thought, and our lack of sufficient motivation caused by our trust in technology that does the thinking and reasoning for us, make us vulnerable to fake news (Keleti 2023, 68). Therefore, it is no coincidence that politics is the favourite arena for the use of deepfake videos.

For instance, some politicians like to discredit their political opponents with deepfakes, or they use them to their own advantage by stirring up political scandals, or they can label real information that negatively affects their reputation as fake news. This is referred to in the literature as “The Liar’s Dividend,”<sup>2</sup> which refers to the paradox that someone creates a fake video to refute a real video, claiming that the real video is a deepfake, i.e., profiting from the fact that the falsification cannot be verified (Herke 2023, 161). The fact that falsification is relatively easy to conceal and technically feasible, and that detection is difficult, makes content modification convincing, credible, and reliable, which reduces our vigilance. Moreover, by contributing to the interaction during communication, the recipient actually approves the lie (Aczél 2023, 32).

As Meskys et al. argues “[d]eep fakes can have profound negative consequences to democracies: deep-faked news reports could be aimed at targeting the reputation of certain individuals, portray fake events (e.g., faked terrorist attack) or impact such democratic processes as electoral campaigns or other socially significant events” (2020, 8). Furthermore, they also add that “[o]n April 17, 2018 BuzzFeed published deep-faked video of President Obama to demonstrate how easy it is to put words in someone else’s mouth. In that video, President Obama was speaking his own voice and “mimicking” the video creator’s words, some of which were unlikely to be said by the real Obama” (Meskys et al. 2020, 7), which was created with the aim of drawing attention to the real danger of political disinformation and deception (Freelon and Wells 2020, 151–152). Deepfakes may be used as catalyst to erode trust in political institutions, deepen division among social groups (Meskys et al. 2020, 8).

One notable example was the circulation of an altered video of an American politician, Nancy Pelosi on social media. In the video, she appeared intoxicated while mispronouncing her words. The American President Donald J. Trump shared the video on his “Twitter” account to alter public perception of his opponent, Nancy Pelosi. Consequently, the video had been viewed and shared over 2.5 million times on Facebook. (Buo 2020, Ch. 4.2.)

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<sup>1</sup>“Of necessity, therefore, all style and enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. This is the reason why superficial enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, and those which, when stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only those which are understood the moment they are stated, or those of which the meaning, although not clear at first, comes a little later” (III. 10.1410.b).

<sup>2</sup>Further suggested reading on “Liar’s Dividend”: <https://www.newsweek.com/when-photographs-lie-206894>.

Therefore, if this technology is used by hostile governments, deep-fakes could even pose threats to national security or impair international relations (Meskys et al. 2020, 8).

The potential to sway the outcome of an election is real, particularly if the attacker is able to time the distribution such that there will be enough window for the fake to circulate but not enough window for the victim to debunk it effectively (assuming it can be debunked at all). [...] The 2017 election in France illustrates the perils. In this variant of the operation executed against the Clinton campaign in the United States in 2016, the Russians mounted a covert-action program that blended cyber-espionage and information manipulation in an effort to prevent the election of Emmanuel Macron as President of France in 2017. The campaign included theft of large numbers of digital communications and documents, alteration of some of those documents in hopes of making them seem problematic, and dumping a lot of them on the public alongside aggressive spin. The effort ultimately fizzled for many reasons, including: [...] mismanagement of the timing of the document dump, which left enough time for the Macron team and the media to discover and point out all these flaws. (Chesney–Citron 2019, 1778)

Consequently, public discourse, as framed by political parties, lacks the virtue of moderation. According to Aristotle “Self-control is a virtue which disposes men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the law prescribes; the contrary is licentiousness” (I.1366b). Those who control political discourse: “Men act voluntarily when they know what they do, [...] The motives which lead men to do injury and commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence,” until then, the masses on social media “do not act under compulsion” (I.1368b). “What is done voluntarily is not always done with premeditation but what is done with premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does with a purpose” (Ibid.) This provides ammunition for those who control political discourse, who can then make it seem as “[f]urther, it should be clear that this is the opinion” (I.1396a). This development can be contributed to the fact – as Aristotle claims – that “an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely probable but only in particular cases,” (II.1402a) so only in the manner as the entity or person, who controls public discourse, had argued. And that is a lie, not real, but apparent probability.

The above-presented examples illustrate that the dangers posed by deepfakes are not confined to isolated incidents of deception but are embedded within broader structural transformations of the contemporary information ecosystem. As recent scholarship emphasizes, the rapid advancement and diffusion of deepfake technology, combined with the affordances of digital communication platforms, enable malicious actors to weaponize synthetic media at scale, targeting political processes, public opinion, and institutional legitimacy (Buo 2020, Ch. 1, Ch. 2.). In particular, the capacity to fabricate convincing audio-visual evidence introduces novel challenges for democratic societies, as it becomes increasingly difficult for citizens to distinguish authentic content from manipulated material. This erosion of epistemic reliability is further intensified and worsened by the speed at which such content circulates in online the online spheres, often outpacing efforts of verification or debunking (Chesney–Citron 2019, 1762–1764). Consequently, deepfakes operate not merely as instruments of isolated misinformation but as catalysts that intensify polarization,

undermine trust in political actors, and destabilize the conditions necessary for informed public deliberation (Buo 2020, Ch. 1, Ch. 2.). In this sense, the phenomenon of deepfakes exemplifies a convergence between technological capability and rhetorical manipulation, wherein the persuasive force of fabricated appearances acquires unprecedented political significance.

## Conclusion

Plato raises serious ethical objections against those sophists who dress deceitful content in colourful forms (for their use of elaborate and deceptive rhetoric), as they “strive to make the false appear true by dressing it in a cloak of colourful lies” (Adamik 1982, 266). This ornate but misleading language is thus used to manipulate their audience and present falsehoods as if they were the truth. Plato deepens his critique by arguing that a speaker who lacks a foundation in objective truth is incapable of practicing a genuine craft. He suggests that those who focus only on manipulating public opinion, rather than understanding reality, produce a form of oratory that is both absurd and devoid of real artistic value (Adamik 1982, 274). The emergence and proliferation of deepfakes in the 21<sup>st</sup> century only deepens existing divides in beliefs, identity, and political commitment; this polarization increases the likelihood that opposing political adversaries and social groups will believe only negative things about one another and, to this end, their members will be willing to spread lies as well. Therefore, the diffusion of the capacity to produce high-quality deepfakes will erode that limitation, empowering an ever-widening circle of participants to inject false-but-compelling information into a ready and willing information-sharing environment (Chesney–Citron 2019, 1779).

Taken together, these developments underscore the profound implications of deepfake technology for the integrity of democratic discourse and the stability of epistemic trust. As the preceding analysis has shown, deepfakes represent not merely a technological innovation but a paradigmatic shift in the production and dissemination of persuasive content, one that amplifies longstanding concerns articulated by classical philosophers regarding the manipulation of truth through rhetoric. The capacity to fabricate highly realistic audio-visual material enables actors to present falsehoods with unprecedented credibility, thereby intensifying the persuasive power traditionally associated with deceptive speech. This technological capability is further compounded by the structural features of the contemporary digital environment, in which information circulates rapidly, widely, and often without sufficient verification, allowing misleading content to achieve significant reach and influence (Chesney–Citron 2019, 1764–1766).

Moreover, the accessibility of deepfake tools ensures that such manipulative practices are no longer confined to elite or specialized actors but are increasingly available to a broad range of participants, including individuals, organizations, and state actors (Buo 2020, Ch. 1, Ch. 2.). The consequences of this diffusion are evident across multiple domains: in politics, where deepfakes can distort electoral processes and public perception; in legal contexts, where they threaten the reliability of evidentiary standards; and in broader social interactions, where they erode trust between individuals

and institutions. At the same time, the psychological dynamics of information consumption—such as the tendency to believe and share emotionally resonant or novel content—further exacerbate the impact of such fabricated media, contributing to polarization and the entrenchment of ideological divisions (Chesney–Citron 2019, 1766–1767). In this regard, deepfakes do not simply introduce new forms of deception but magnify existing vulnerabilities within the information ecosystem, creating conditions under which falsehood can more easily masquerade as truth. Consequently, the challenge posed by deepfakes is not solely technical but fundamentally epistemological and ethical, raising urgent questions about the preservation of truth, accountability, and rational deliberation in an increasingly mediated public sphere.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* attained an enormous authority; his doctrines of rhetorics appear over and over again in the works of Greek, Roman, and even modern writers on the subject. Much of what he says applies only to the conditions of Greek society, but very much is permanently true (Ross 2005, 289). The speakers nowadays (and rightly so) are inclined to rely on natural talent and experience rather than on instruction, and because hearers, though as easily swayed by rhetoric as ever, are rather ashamed of the fact and not much interested in knowing how the trick is done (Ross 2005, 290). People in the modern age tend to forget the correct models of quantity, quality, and manner that Aristotle presents to us in *Rhetoric* in order to expose the many ways of deception. We believe in the authenticity of the simulated person based on our previous knowledge, and the larger context and environment of the information presented to us, thus the more likely we are to fail to recognize the deepfake (Aczél 2023, 40). Therefore, in order to maintain our own reality, relying on our common sense, awareness, and instincts is perhaps more important today than ever before. I believe that this is Aristotle's most important message for the people of today.

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