The positivist theories of foreign policy are not taking resistance and social movements in the account. Neorealism, for instance, ignores the effects of nonmaterial elements, i.e. norms, values, emancipation claims, political identities, the aspirations of the Arab peoples, socioeconomic changes, the failure of economics policies, the political will to establish the rule of Law and social media networks. By emphasising these elements and others, the critical theory provides a wider, more comprehensive and accurate explanation, not only to the foreign policy of revolutionary and non-revolutionary countries but also of the construction and formulation of domestic policy and how it determines foreign policy, and vice-versa. Moreover, how small states act in the international system that neorealism can't explain accurately. This study tries to elucidate why the hardcore realist security considerations (interests, survival, and regime stability) prevail over democratization, development, and emancipation attempts in the region, in contrast with the usual wisdom that dominates the field of Middle Eastern studies. Furthermore, the critical theory, the study argues, provide a wider, more comprehensive, and rigorous explanations, not only to the foreign policy of revolutionary and non-revolutionary countries, but also the construction and formulation of domestic policy and how it determines foreign policy, and vice-versa, and how small states act in the international system that neorealism can not explain it accurately. Yet, shockingly, most of the critical theorists are still neglecting the study the Arab Spring adequately even after seven years of its eruptions.

Keywords: International Relations, Arab Spring, Middle East, Revolutions.
Introduction

There is a huge difference when the revolution’s success in removing the political regime and replaced it with a new one, and when it fails to replace it. At the former, the differences between the post-revolution period and the pre-revolution becomes clear. While in the latter time, the view is unclear and cloudy. It becomes difficult (if not impossible) to observe or shows the differences between the situation conditions before and after the revolution. At this time, the philosophical questions and debates are starting to rise, i.e., why the revolution occurrence? What is the revolution?

Despite the current backlash outcomes of the popular Intifada that occur in the Middle East at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011, no one can deny that the Arab Uprising was an attempt tried to deconstruct authoritarian structures in the Middle East through emancipatory project of the Arab citizens that didn't succeed. By emancipation I mean what Ken Booth defined as "the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (Booth, 1991, 319). When the Arab citizens rebel against their authoritarian regimes, and against foreign (regional and international) supremacy and intervention in their internal affairs on the other hand, these regimes and powers consider these revolutions as a source of threat to its security and interests. In order to protect and preserve their interests and security it seeks to spoil, foiling, and vanquish these revolutions through many tools and means, i.e., foreign aids, military intervention, political manipulation, and economic sanctions in order to prevent these revolutions from achieving its emancipatory goals. In summary, since 2011 there were two conflicting tendencies in the Middle East, the cult and resurgence of the authoritarian state and the emancipatory movements of the people.

For many reasons this emancipatory attempt never completed. These "incomplete revolutions" failed to achieve people’s goals and hopes. The main reason behind this fail was the traditional authorities and regimes, either within the revolutionary countries or the neighbourhood regimes. On one had, the domestic regimes "counter-revolution forces" obstruct peoples from being ruled by civil and democratic governments, fair and just construct institutions that respect their rights and enhance their freedoms and sustain their rights. The other major reasons behind the filing of Arab Uprising was the Status-quo conservative regimes and monocracies, especially in Arabian Gulf region (Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries), who prevent the revolutionary countries from being independent and sovereign countries. These monarchies consider the popular uprising as a source of threat and instability in the region that threaten its security, stability, prosperity and even its own survival.

For example, as a result of the Arab Uprising, the groups of rich and small monarchies in the gulf region, known as Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, are facing a new kind of threat that is considered the most dangerous since the fall of the Saddam’s regime in 2003. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the popular intifada reached Bahrain and Oman in the mid of 2011, the
Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rose violently in Syria, Iraq and through the region, and the regional landscape becomes more chaotic and violent. These challenges and threats forced GCC countries to alert their foreign policies orientations and their approaches to deal with regional crises and conflict.

On theoretical spectrum, instead of trying to contain or prevent the spread of the revolutions, as the neorealism theory argues, these countries acted in contrast to that claim. They intervened deeply in the Arab Uprising countries in order to stave-off the revolutionary fervour, buttress the decay institutions and reconstruct the society and delay the attempt of emancipate from the authoritarian regimes that monopolized power since the creation of the modern Arab states after the end of World War II. While neorealism totally ignored the effects of non-material elements, i.e. norms, values, emancipation claims, political identities the aspirations of the Arab peoples, the socioeconomic changes, the failure of economics policies, the political will to establish, the rule of law, and social media networks. On the other hand, the critical theory emphasizing on these elements (and others) provide a wider, more comprehensive, and accurate explanations, not only to the foreign policy of GCC countries towards countries like Egypt, it also can answer the question of why emancipatory attempts failed, and how small states act in the international system that neorealism can't answer it.

Revolution and Theories of International Relations

International Relations (IR) theories keep neglecting study the causes, consequences and the effects of revolutions despite its importance, both on state behaviour (unit level) and on the international structure (system level). It causes radical changes and correlate with the main issues in international politics, like war, the balance of power, security, stability, cooperation, identity, and even emancipation. Major theories of international relations (i.e., realism, neoliberalism, constructivism, and critical school) still give little attention to the study of revolutions (Walt 1997, Holsti 1992, Halliday 1997, Goldstone 1998, Roach 2013). What drives and determine states’ foreign policy in the post-revolution period? Is it national interests, security considerations, emancipatory trendies, or all of the above? The neorealist theory argues that because of fears from revolution, the spread of instability, the rise of extremist and violent radical groups; non-revolutionary countries always try to contain the revolution within their borders, By balancing against it (allies) or confronting (Walt, 1997). Furthermore, some other studies (Goldstone, 2011) show that there was another "friendly" strategy employed by these countries designed to be an attempt to assist the revolutionary regimes to overcome social and economic crises. These strategies are done in order to contain the conflict as much as possible and prevent its escalation.

The positivist theories of foreign policy are not taking resistance and social movements in the account. Neorealism, for instance, ignores the effects of
nonmaterial elements, i.e. norms, values, emancipation claims, political identities, the aspirations of the Arab peoples, socioeconomic changes, the failure of economics policies, the political will to establish the rule of Law and social media networks. By emphasizing these elements and others, the critical theory provides a wider, more comprehensive and accurate explanation, not only to the foreign policy of revolutionary and non-revolutionary countries but also of the construction and formulation of domestic policy and how it determines foreign policy, and vice-versa. Moreover, how small states act in the international system that neorealism can't explain accurately.

Theories, such as Neoliberalism and Constructivism, argue that the growing impact of interdependence, globalization, the spread of democratic, liberal ideas and human rights, shared collective norms, values, and identities among Arab societies drive countries to concentrate on improving living standards, expanding freedom and democratization. As we enhance mutual cooperation as opposed to self-security interests through the mobilization of national resources for defence objectives (Moravcsik, 2008). However, if Neorealism ignores the effects of foreign policy's non-material variables such as norms, values, emancipation claims, political identities, the socioeconomic changes, the failure of economic policies, political will, the rule of law, and social media networks, the critical theory emphasizes the aforementioned variables providing a wider, more comprehensive, and accurate interpretation. In fact, critical theory highlights the relevance of foreign policy's construction process as well as that of the formulation of domestic policy.

On the one hand, the Neorealist theory argues that because of the fears caused by the expansion of revolutions and the subsequent instability, non-revolutionary countries often try to contain revolutions beyond their borders, either by advancing a balance against it or by bandwagoning. On the other hand, different studies show that other non-revolutionary countries employed different strategies aiming to assist states undergoing a revolution by overcoming their social and economic struggles. Ultimately, the vicissitudes that have occurred as a result of the Arab Uprising cannot be disentangled from the wider context of the global political economy and of globalization (Talani, 2014).

This study tries to elucidate why the hardcore realist security considerations (interests, survival, and regime stability) prevail over democratization, development, and emancipation attempts in the region, in contrast with the usual wisdom that dominates the field of Middle Eastern studies in the West (Keck, 2012).

The Critical School: A Background

Critical theory finds its roots in the early writings of enlightenment philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Hegel, and their theories on dialectics and consciousness, while the modern version of the school emerged in the late 1920s and the beginning of the 30s of the 20th century in Frankfurt,
Germany. The Frankfurt school was a reaction to the positivist theories supporting authoritarian European regimes in the first half of the twentieth century. The research agenda of the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists concentrates on the negative critique of the metaphysical, ideological, and social origins of authoritarianism. The theory relies on aesthetic and cultural critiques to understand the pervasive tendencies and/or influences of authoritarianism and conformism in the capitalist societies (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972; Roach, 2013: 172) in order to produce an emancipatory project in social science (and later in international relations field) that seeks to prevent the reemergence of these kinds of social systems.

Basically, the core elements of critical theory are, 1) scepticism of existing traditions and all absolute claims; 2) interdisciplinary in nature; 3) thought must be emancipatory and open a new possibility for liberation arises from changing historical circumstances; 4) thought must respond to new challenges confronting humanity; 5) exploring the underlying assumptions and purpose of competing theories and existing forms of practice; 6) a refusal to identify freedom with any set of institutions or fixed system of thought (Bronner, 2011: 1-2). Consequently, critical theory "involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality derive from particular social/historical conditions" (Booth, 2008: 78).

In the field of international relations there are two branches of critical school, Critical International Relations and The Critical Theory of International Relations (Roach, 2013; Samhat and Payne, 2004). The former is also known as the "Frankfurt School of International Relations" because it adopts the ideas, concepts, and assumptions of the Frankfurt Schools regarding international relations. The latter tries to overcome the shortcomings and the pitfalls of the Frankfurt school's negative dialectics of the origins of social authoritarianism by adopting many concepts and assumptions from liberal and institutionalism theories in order to understand how the institutions work and how (and when) their processes create authoritarianism and prevent it (Roach, 2013: 174). It emerges in the late 1960's, Jürgen Habermas tried to develop the Frankfurt school by arguing that a negative dialectic of authoritarianism was not enough, and it did not add further knowledge that can help us to understand the society. Instead of that "negative" dialectic, he suggests what is calls a "progressive" dialectic, which focuses on the aspects of communicative reason and social actions that expand our understanding, and empower the emancipatory project through democratic procedures that can achieve mediation between the facts and norms of law (Habermas, 1966; Linklater, 1998).

One of the main differences between Critical International Relations and the Critical Theory of International Theory in the matter of emancipation is that the latter is trying to enforce the emancipatory project within the current system by focusing on the possibilities of the deliberative and communicative discourse power mechanism. The Critical International Relations theory is trying to establish and execute the emancipatory project through changing the system itself (Anievas, 2005).
For many reasons (which shall be mentioned in detail later) this study will rely on the concepts, assumptions, ideas, and the explanations of the Frankfurt Critical International Relations rather than the Habermasian critical theory of IR. In the post-revolutionary Arab World, the study argues Habermasian emancipatory project cannot be implemented due to many reasons, such as: 1) the authoritarian nature of the social system itself; 2) the long record of failed reform-from-within attempts; and 3) the growing power of anti-emancipation forces.

One of the problems with the critical school, especially the Critical Theory of IR version, is that when it tries to explain the behaviours of non-Western countries it presumes (like neoliberalism and constructivism) that all countries (societies) are civilized, peaceful, and progressive in a European (enlightenment) way. All these societies are seeking to achieve emancipationary goals and ends. It constrains and ignores the role and the effects of material variables, which makes emancipation goals unattractive and an undesirable option. On the other side, the critical school prejudicially accuses other countries that by not seeking these goals that they are "unprogressive".

Why Critical School is more appropriate than Realsim?

The positivist theories (i.e. realism and liberalism) concentrate on material structures in explaining and interpreting international and foreign policies. They do this by focussing on power (realism) and interest (liberalism) where the anarchic character of international structures and the formulation process of the nation-state (as the main actor) were inevitable, and there is a small chance to adjust or modify this order. Critical theory, on the other hand, sees international and foreign policy as a historical phenomenon, shaped by social forces and intersubjective social structures like norms, values, ideas, images, language, discourse and common meaning (Cox, 1986; Linklater, 1989; Weber, 2001; Abadi, 2008).

Critical school critique of realism deliberately separates between facts and values, and arguing that realism ignores the social genesis and the social contents of these facts. This means that it fails to liberate people from oppression, deprivation, and suppresses the meaningful engagement with open-ended possibilities of social and political change, while preventing individuals and nation’s emancipation in the final analysis.

Despite the majority of scholars and students of international relations and foreign policy tending to employ mainstream positivist theories in order to explain and explore the nature and the behaviours of foreign policy, these theories suffer from many shortcomings and misconceptions when it deals with topics like revolution, revolutionary foreign policy, third world countries actions and behaviours. Nation-states outside the Western hemisphere are a historical phenomenon, shaped and evolved through intersubjective social and structures, i.e., values, norms, rules, images, language, discourse and common
meaning (Abadi, 2008), which means that we need to not only reconsider the
nature of the state itself, but also to understand the motivations and how these
states act in the first place (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry 1989; Keohane,
1969; Elman, 1995; Hinnebusch, 2015; Bayat 2010, 2017). Studies show that
positivist theories like classical and structural realism are not the appropriate
approaches to study third world countries' foreign policies and post-revolutions
external behaviours with because they lack the capacity to explain the
behaviours of other non-Western countries that do not share their history,
culture, and values, and neglect numbers of essential variables that construct
and formulate state's behaviours (Smith, 2002; Elman, 1995).

Mainly, realism (classical and structural realism) focuses on explaining
and analysing the behaviours and actions of great "Western" powers, and rarely
gives attention to small "non-western" developing states like Middle East
countries. Moreover, realism is a static theory. It assumes that all units (states)
in IR (nation-states in particular) are essentially identical and act in their own
self-interest (Waltz, 1979: 54) and seek the same objectives and adopt the same
policies. It wrongly assumes that all political entities are "power-oriented"
actors who solely pursue selfish, materialistic interests. Furthermore, it neglects
the influence of non-material structures and sources of power, like ideology,
identity, religion, revolutions etc., and underestimates its independence and
contribution in shaping and construct nation-state's external behaviours.

Furthermore, realism is a unilateral, inevitable, and closed-ended-
possibilities framework. As a "traditional" theory, in Horkheimer's definition,
realism relies on an instrumental rational choice approach and forcefully
separate between facts and reality, based on pregiven and unexamined
conception of social reality, realism failed to liberated humans from oppression
and deprivation (Horkheimer, 1992). By neglecting topics like revolution,
emancipation, global citizenship (cosmopolitan) governance and social
movements, realism has not engaged with the open-ended possibilities of social
and political change and emancipation project that aims to liberate humanity
from any kind of hegemony and oppression.

Critical School and the Arab Uprising

Andrew Linklater defines emancipation as "powers of self-determination
and the ability of initiate actions". (Linklater, 1990: 135), while Richard
Ashley defines it as "[A]n interest in securing freedom from unacknowledged
constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication
and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through
full will and consciousness" (Ashley, 1981: 227). Another scholar defines it as
"autonomy, freedom of action, security and freedom of individuals and nations
from domineering and repressive structures and elimination of restrictive social
grounds and contexts which are conducive to injustice, and redefinition and
reconfiguration of justice and equality in the international system" (Abadi,
2008). According to these definitions, it is clear that emancipation is
considered a revolutionary-revisionist concept, requires not only changing
domestic and internal oppressed structures, but also international structures,
simply because these hegemonic and oppressed structures, norms and values
are the main source of injustice, inequality and authoritarianism in the world.

Although the Arab Uprising outbreaks six years ago, the critical
international relations did not appropriately engage with it. Until now, there
were only a few studies that tried to explain and investigate the causes,
consequences and the outcomes of the Arab Uprising, despite the fact that the
roots of these Intifadas find their genesis in the early writings of the Frankfurt
school. The CIR can provide more rigor and lucid understanding to the Arab
uprising either by focusing on the social genesis of authoritarism, Neo-
Gramscian studies on the role of hegemony and the power structure within the
global political economy order and social forces (such as ideas, ideologies,
institutions and material capabilities) in determining frames for individual and
collective action and state's formation process. Likewise, Habermas and
Linklater writings on the discursive power of democratic norms, values, and
promoting global rule of Law, through dialogue and deliberation that enhances
people's participation in political institutions that boost democratization, human
rights, equality, and justice (Cox, 1983, 1986; Linklater, 1990; Habermas,

In order to explain the Arab Uprising, some critical theorists argue that we
need to consider four political and social dynamics of these uprisings (Roach,
2013: 181). These dynamics are: the political identity and consciousness of the
Arab peoples, the failure of neoliberal policies, the political will to instantiate
the rule of law, and the social media.

Political Identity

The Arab Uprising was a crucial moment in the revival of Arab collective
political identity after decades of political acedia (atonality). It provides a
common framework for the solidarity that the dictators had sought to suppress
(Roach, 2013: 181). The Arab Uprising movement was not identical to the
1950s and 60s movements of pan-Arab nationalism, where leaders like Nasser
and Assad employed collective identity and sentiments to achieve regional
unity and independence from colonial and imperialism, through domestic
mobilization and development, and nonalignment and external solidarity with
external solidarity with other third world countries.

The Arab Uprising moment was the opposite. While the previous moment
of collective identity completely overlooked the demands of democratization
and the rule of law and human rights, the current wave was about democracy,
freedom and human rights. In other words, the post-independence moment of
collective identity was against external enemies, such as imperialist and
capitalist powers, while the Arab Uprising moment is against the local enemies
(the authoritarian regimes). The pan-Arabism moment was against external
enemies and for the interests of the ruling regimes/elites, while the Arab
Uprising moment is an attempt by the people against these internal dictators to
demand new democratic political leaders and the rule of law (Roach, 2013; Gause, 2011).

In this context, pan-Arabism was a liberation attempt, not interested in or trying to free the Arab citizens from domestic sociopolitical authoritarian structures, while the Arab Uprising is an emancipatory attempt that interested and tried (in Richard Ashley’s words) to secure people’s freedom from all kinds of constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness (Ashley, 1981: 227).

The Failure of Neoliberal Policies

The failure of neoliberal policies is an essential factor for any attempt to understand and explain the Arab Uprising and the post-revolution policies in the Middle East. Neoliberal assumptions about the relationship between the liberalization of political and economic regimes on one hand, and democratization and stability on the other hand, proved to be wrong. Even with the massive amount of economic aid, political and military support from Western powers (especially from the United States, European Union, and GCC countries) to these regimes, they fail to liberate and achieve stability and democratization. The reasons behind this failure revolve around several economical and sociopolitical factors: Economically, due to the massive level of corruption of these regimes, the continuation of structural deficit in balance of payments, the deterioration of developmental conditions, the lack of strong industrial productivity. Sociopolitically, because of the systematic violation of basic human rights and the spread of torture, the blocking of political sphere and the unwillingness of the growing number of super-wealthy elites to support the authoritarian regime (Gause, 2001: 86; Roach, 2013; Goldstone, 2011).

During the last five decades, and specifically after the setback of the pan-Arabism ideology in the June 1967 war, the authoritarian Arab regimes started to swap the political freedom goal for economic liberalization. The majority of these regimes abandoned socialism and started to adopt restricted versions of capitalism and liberalization of their economic system without fully democratizing the political system. Such as: "sovereign democracy", "managed democracy", "Islamic constitutionalism": or "adaptive authoritarianism" and other hybrid regimes (Rutherford, 2008; Zakaria, 2007).

For many critical theorists, especially the neo-Gramscians, the failure to materialize the alliance between the authoritarian regimes and the wealthy elites wasn’t an isolated or insignificant event (Roach, 2013: 181). For them, this was more than a clash-of-interests between the two actors. It was a reflection of the changing norms, values, dynamics and the nature of social forces in Arab societies. Neo-Gramscians argue that the real reason behind the failure of establishing these kinds of allies was due to their inability to enhance and legitimize elite control, especially in the economic field, and the rising historical bloc of unemployed, marginalized workers and students who united together to counteract elite control (Roach, 2013: 181).
These authoritarian regimes assumed that achieving economic growth, expanding the margin of freedom, opening the public sphere, reforming economic institutions and achieving high developmental levels will guarantee stability and sustain their power on one hand, and keep the flow of support and aid from Western and other countries on the other hand. Many studies have tried to prove that the second generation of Arab dictators, in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Morocco and elsewhere, planned to reform the economic and political system. Young men like Gamal Mubarak in Egypt, Saif Al-Gaddafi in Libya, and Bashar Al-Assad in Syria were the strongest supporters of economic liberalization and permissive with political freedom (Roach, 2013: 180-181).

Eventually, these attempts failed for many reasons. Firstly, due to the absence of political freedom, the liberalization of the system is unable to prevail or succeed in the long term. Like their predecessors, the second generation of Arab dictators were anti-democratic leaders. There was no effective oversight and the rule of law was restricted, which led to increased volume of grievances, the violation of the social contract and the overstatement of the Arab states at the end (Ayubi, 1995; Owen, 2012). Secondly, these regimes still drown in rampant corruption; the reforms were not able to fight and confront organized crime and the deeply corrupted elites (Roach, 2013). Lastly, both the people and the economic elites saw these attempts as unpopular. The absence of social aspects in economic policies, neglected people's demands and had the inability to satisfying their basic needs urge them rebel against these policies for many years before the revolution of 2011. Moreover, these policies were biased and intransigent. The growing super wealthy elites become unwilling to support the authoritarian regime, which prevented formulate or materialize the economic alliance between the new wealthy elite and the state (Gause, 2001: 86; Roach, 2013).

The Political Will

Since the creation of the modern Arab states in the late 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, the Arab countries gained their independence from the Western Imperial powers, but the Arab people never got their own autonomy from the authoritarian regimes, both externally and internally. They continuously suffered from lack of freedom and low standard of living. Much of what is known as "the Arab Uprising States" including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Tunisia, were in the bottom of the U.N. Human Development Index, World Bank development indicators and Freedom House reports. Due to the non-democratic political system, corrupted economical system, and the over-stated of the Arab States in the last three decades, the citizens of these countries rose-up against their governments in order to emancipate themselves from fear, poverty, torture and dependency seeking freedom, integrity, justice and equality.

For decades, many of the Western countries believed that in spite of the people's will, democratization and the rule of law, the dictators’ and authoritarians’ regimes represent the best opportunity to liberalize the Arab
regimes, enhance the stability of the region and protect and reserve Western
interests in the region (Roach, 2013). But for many reasons, historical
experience shows that the strategy of authoritarian-stability proves to be short-
lived and incapable of guaranteeing or sustaining stability and security in the
region (Gause, 2011). Firstly, historical records show that Western powers
cannot buy stability by selling out another peoples’ freedom on the long run.
After three decades of support for Mubarak’s regime in Egypt, the United
States failed to prevent the outbreak of the revolution, not only in Egypt, but in
others allied countries across the region. These revolutions proved that this
kind of realpolitik policies is based on unrealistic assumptions (Keck, 2012).

Secondly, the assumption that supporting unpopular authoritarian regimes
deny their citizen rights for political participation and violate their rights could
serve the interests of the Western powers was wrong. These authoritarian allies
had become a strategic burden. Authoritarian domestic policies sowed the
seeds of future upheaval and promote hostility and sentiments of hatred
towards these Western powers and their interests in the region (Gause, 2011;
Katzenstein and Keohane, 2006).

Third, the assumption that Arab and Muslim societies and culture do not
want democracy, or that there is an Arabic exceptionalism towards democracy
and liberalism also proved to be incorrect. The Arab Uprising moment shows
that Arabs were no different from any other society that seeks freedom and
democracy. The claim that the durability and the robustness of authoritarianism
in the Arab world made the region miss the previous waves of democratization
was a myth. The majority of Arab citizens in countries like Tunisia, Egypt,
Yemen, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, and elsewhere rebelled against these
authoritarian regimes, demanding and seeking for Freedom, Justice, and
Equality (Bellin, 2012).

The critical assumption on the discursive power of people's will to
instantiate the rule of law, democratic norms, values and promoting global rule
of law, through dialogue and deliberation was more appropriate and proved to
be more relevant in explaining the Arab Uprising. It also refutes the myth of
pre-given and unexamined (realist and liberal) conceptions of social reality of
the Arab World, such as the authoritarian-stability-nexus and the Arab
exppecationalism (Habermas, 1996; Linklater, 1990; Horkheimer, 1992;
Diamond, 2010; El Hamalawy, 2011; Wittes, 2008).

Conclusion

Since the aim of critical theory is "to understand how these (realistic)
socially created constraints upon the freedom of human subjects
(emancipation) could be reduced and, where possible, eliminated" (Linklater,
1990: 1). This study focused on Critical IR Theory studies of foreign policy,
revolution, and the correlations between failed revolution and the inability to
achieve human emancipation. It will try to explore the main reasons behind the
failure of emancipatory projects in non-Western societies, by showing and
explaining how anti-progressive countries use and employ emancipation as an instrument to prevent it.

According to Ken Booth, emancipation means "the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (Booth, 1991: 319). These constraints could be war, poverty, oppression and other material and normative constraints. In other word, emancipation means to concentrate on individual human beings, not the state, achieving people's ends and not the state or governmental ones. This means moving away from the neo-realist (state-centric model) perspective that defines foreign policy in term of pursuit to achieving "national" interests, which is defined in terms of power by sovereign states. A critical or emancipation-based foreign policy perspective means that foreign policy will become a tool/means to achieve people's ends in ending fear, oppression and expanding freedom and justice beyond sovereign territories, not only by the state, but through other non-state actors and members of civil society and social movements and civil society organizations.

The emancipation of foreign policy aims to adopt or create a "people-centric model" that does not recognize or make a separation between internal and external sphere of the state's action. According to Ole Waever, the territorially defined borders do not apply to foreign policy in today's world, or to emancipatory foreign policy in particular (Waever, 1994). For countries like Germany, 'emancipation' refers to "a new sense of self-esteem, independence, and follow[s] enlightened self-interest" (Forsberg, 2005), for China, emancipation is considered an anti-hegemonic attitude (Yilmaz, 2016), and for countries such as Egypt, the claims of emancipation during the first wave of the Uprising of 2011 meant both of these understandings, including seeking independence, anti-hegemonic and restoring national self-esteem.

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