

Parmenides on Naming True and Right Names of Being

Parmenides as a knowing mortal (F I. 3) writes a philosophical-poetic account of a travelogue in which distinctive voices (F .2) that are a mixture of myth and logos come out of an unnamed goddess (F I. 23) who didactically speaks with an unnamed young man as her direct listener and addressee (FII.1) in order to reveal for him different spheres and routes (FII.2) of inquiry about a specific referent. In the hybrid and tailored account of the Immortal about a specific subject-matter such as being, we can read different approaches of the thoughtful mortals through the narration of the goddess, and the idea of the immortal herself. And exactly when thoughtful mortals want to introduce their thinking and understanding of the “referent” in human lingual terms they appeal to the act of naming and making names, though there is no explicit account by the Immortal about her approach for lingual expressing of the referent. Such an account gives us some useful and distinctive hints about Parmenides’ conception as a mortal about naming/names which makes his conception in a specific position in regard to the other pertinent and close words (such as επος/επεα; ρηεμα; εργον; πηραζο; καλειν; πηρατον; λογοσ and the like) and Presocratics (such as Homer; Hesiod; Heraclitus; Democritus; Herodotus; Empedocles; and the like). According to the Immortal’s account, in relation to naming and names thoughtful mortals can be classified mainly into two groups: a- Those who are in Aletheia, they are informed of the distinctive features of the referent that is a “totality” and should be able to make “true” names for it but fail (F8. 38-39). If they succeeded then their naming and names are true/alethe; and b- Those who are in Doxa, they think to know the features of the referent that is a “dual” and accordingly thoughtful mortals make names. Though all of names that are made are not unacceptable but one set is acceptable / khray (F8. 54). As a result, we can infer that if Parmenides as a thoughtful mortal wants to express his thought about eon in lingual terms, he should appeal to naming and making names for they have specific dynamis (F IX.2 - a term that appears in Plato’s Cratylus) in communicating the nature of any specific referent. The first best situation or Aletheia is where on the basis of his “knowledge” he can communicate the distinctive features of eon in names and thereby make “true” names. Besides, there is the second best or Doxa, where he can communicate his “beliefs” about the essence and essential features of eon in names and make “acceptable” names.

Keywords: *Parmenides; Poem; Name; Naming; True; Right*

Introduction

Within the framework of his philosophical poem, Parmenides writes a travelogue in which a kouros narrates the speech of a Goddess who addresses him. Before considering the topic of this paper, which is our account of the mortals’ approach to and engagement with the subject-matter of the goddess in the form of naming on two levels, we will pause initially to consider the texture and different manifestations of voice that are produced by the immortals and mortals.

In the first fragment and initial lines of Parmenides’ Proem, we face with the specific utterance πολύφημον that primarily appears in the specific textures of Homer (Od.2. 150;22. 376); Pindar (Isthmean 8.58) and Herodotus (Book 5 section 79 line 4) too:

1
2 --- , ἐπεὶ μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι [Fr.1,2]
3 δαίμονος [δαίμονες], ----- [Fr.1,3]
4

5 Grammatically, in this line Πολύφημον as a common adjective can qualify
6 ὁδὸν or δαίμονος, although we take it with daimon. Lexically, this word is
7 compounded from πολυ-, πολὺς + φήμη and the core of its meaning as a whole
8 lie in the meaning of the noun φήμη / speaking. The essence of the φήμη as a
9 specific kind of speaking returns to its “origin” that is basically beyond human
10 field and resides in the sphere of gods, goddesses, dreams and the like. For this
11 reason it has specific meaning and importance for its receiver. In other words,
12 such a speaking is basically oral and is prompted by god/goddess. It has a
13 divine significance, apart from its meaning, that makes it somehow mysterious,
14 private and awesome for its recipient. At the same time, alongside this initial
15 religious-laden connotation, φήμη has a general meaning that applies for any
16 speaking that is not exclusively private and mysterious in its origin and for its
17 receiver. And as a derived meaning, we have the term for an individual who is
18 “much spoken about” and it means that he is “famous (see Mourelatos 2008, 41
19 note 93. Camille Semenzato 2017, 294 - 295).

20 With regard to this background and the context of the second verse, if we
21 consider the referent of φήμη to be δαίμων it means that δαίμων, as a divinity
22 or supernatural being that is between gods and humans, can produce specific
23 divinely inspired utterances.

24 In later lines of the same fragment, in the general texture of anonymity we
25 face with the second specific formation of utterance by identified entities. We
26 can see this in relation to the previous passage too:

27
28 τὴν δὲ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν [Fr.1,15]
29 πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα [Fr.1,16]
30

31 In order to understand the meaning of the expression μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν
32 in Parmenides' Proem, we should consider some comparative textual and
33 philological points. First of all, we can read the same combination with one
34 more adjective in Odysseus too: αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοῖσι καὶ αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισι (Od.
35 1. 56). The combination of μαλακοῖσι with the plural noun ἐπέεσσιν is more
36 frequent than μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν (among example see Hom., *Od.* 10.70;
37 Hes., *Theog.* 90; Hom. Hymn Dem. 336; and Orph. *Argonautica*, 1093).
38 Accordingly, it seems a good idea to compare λόγος and ἔπος, which in most
39 English translation are translated with the same word, in order to see their
40 distinctions and similarities. It seems that the essence of the ancient Greek
41 word logos in the field of speech, denotes to a set that choosing and putting
42 together pertinent words of any subject-matter in order to say something is
43 crucial. This core meaning can be detected in Parmenides' use of λόγος.

44 In comparison with λόγος, in the word ἔπος, that will appear in the
45 following verses from the narrator and the mouth of the Goddess herself, the
46 conception of the speaker who utters words of a speech or song are prominent.

1 As a result, the meaning of this word is dependent on the context in which it
2 appears (R. J. Cunliffe 1924, 152-153).

3 After our philological minutiae, one factor that can help us for figuring out
4 the sense of λόγος is the existence of the μαλακοῖσι. This adjective qualifies
5 λόγος, and as we said before, also appears in Odyssey 1. 56. It is first used for
6 the things that are subject to touch and means mostly soft things; then it is
7 transformed for other entities too (such as individuals, ways of life, style,
8 music, reasoning) that literally are not subject to touch. With respect to its
9 subject it takes appropriate meaning that implies softness and gentleness in
10 favorable or unfavorable and biased connotations (Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-
11 English Lexicon, 1843, 1076-1077.) Therefore, when μαλακός qualifies λόγος
12 it can mean speeches that are not hard and harsh but gentle, soft, and fair. But
13 such a conclusion not sufficient, for according to the place and state of λόγος
14 there are three other words that add their special flavor and color to it. We
15 begin with the word παρφάμεναι in verse 15. It is noteworthy that
16 μαλακοῖσι together with παραιφάμενος and in relation to the words of speech
17 appear for example, in H0m. Hymn Dem. 336; Hes. *Theog.* 90; and Orph.
18 *Argonautica* 1093. We also encounter the second combination with – φημι
19 after the first one that is, πολύ- φημιον in the second line of the first fragment.
20 With regard to our former philological points about this word, here too we are
21 faced with a specific utterance about which we know only the result, and not
22 the content. We know that the utterance of the κοῦραι impresses its hearer and
23 induces her to do a specific action: opening the gates. The Combination of
24 παρά- with -φημι in metaphorical sense give to this verb a crucial twist in
25 sincere or insincere (both meanings have evidences in: Pindar, Nemean 5.32;
26 Olympian 7.66 ; Pythian 9.43 ; Hesi. *Theog.*b90 ; Hom. Il. 12.249, and Od.
27 2.189), and as a result the whole compound denotes to an utterance that wants
28 to induce an action from a specific hearer by making a change and turning in
29 the mind of his or her hearer – we can consider it is a kind of speech-act (LSJ
30 1843, 1304).

31 With regard to this conception, when we refer to the verse 15 we can say
32 that κοῦραι by their speaking and through soft and gentle arrangement of their
33 utterances want to make a change in the mind of Dike in order that she will
34 perform a specific action. And it is natural that this brief persuasion demands
35 that they have rhetorical and deliberative convincing skills [16] that they have
36 and apply them successfully (see Mourelatos 2008, 146, 147).

37 Thereby, we reach to the warm and friendly reception of the narrator by
38 goddess and her address to him, presented in direct quotation. However, the
39 goddess's speech is not homogenous and as a result before starting her two-
40 level speech, she informs and even warns her listener about the specific quality
41 of her utterances. But before we consider these two specific levels it would be
42 better to have a general picture of the quality of her speech. When we consider
43 her speech, we are faced with a set of words such as: ἐρέω; μῦθον; φράζω;
44 πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον; ῥηθέντα; πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα; and κόσμον --- ἐπέων
45 πατηλὸν. Putting these words together as a cluster shapes an overall image of
46 her account. I want to consider these words and their specific identity in order

to reach to their appropriate equivalents and at the same time form an organic image of goddess's speech, for it is exactly here that the necessity of human naming and names and their power and standard of being true and right becomes the concern of this paper.

Features of Goddess' Speech

Before beginning our examination of the words mentioned above, it is necessary to say that goddess is speaking to a human being who has specific qualities. This is one of the criteria that she observes in presenting her speech to him. On the one hand, indirectly the narrator introduces himself as a "εἰδότης φῶτα", and on the other hand, the goddess addresses him as a "κούρος" and we know there are different translations of and interpretations about this word (for a concise literature review see: M. R. Cosgrove 1974). Now with regard to the core of these words and their textures in the proem and the poem as the whole, let us try to find some equivalents. If we take the derivation of the noun κούρος from the verb κείρω we should consider three interconnected features of the verb: there is a supposed specific purpose for an unformed thing with specific qualities that can be transformed or worked upon and; which it brought of its indeterminate state; and becomes ready for its new function and role. In connection with the triad of purpose – potentiality – actuality in the noun κούρος, when we read the verses and stand back we can see that κούρος is not a blank slate but has specific actualities which connects him as a human being with the other men; but he is more than common people for he can go beyond them and become companion/συνήγορος of special immortals/κούραι (both have close lexical homonymy though different in the essential nature [Fr.1, 24]). By their guidance he becomes the only and sole addressee of an unnamed goddess. Then the goddess forms her direct and unmediated utterances in a form that is suitable for an addressee with specific capabilities, possessions and purpose and she can guide him in order to develop and reach to his goal. This point demands to see the narrator's understanding of himself besides the conception of goddess. In this relation, we should consider εἰδότης φῶτα [Fr. 1, 3] as the lonely explicit initial self-understanding of the narrator. Then, the issue is exploring the meaningful shared idea between the conception of the narrator of himself as εἰδότης φῶτα and the goddess's appellation of him as κούρος. For according to the texture of the proem verses and the word philology, it seems that goddess wants to speak with to a young boy who seems unsatisfied with what has reached and has "passion" to journey the unexplored "paths". At the same time, our narrator conception of himself in the compound epithet of εἰδότης φῶτα is heuristic to get a picture of what he is and what he aspires and expected to acquire through his journey. The singular masculine noun φῶτα, which appears only once in Parmenides' poem, has a great frequency in earlier and contemporaneous ancient Greek writers. For example, if we consider it in comparison with ἀνὴρ, this word denotes to a kind of vagueness, so that its suitable English equivalent is "somebody" who is

1 alive. Here in the third verse, due to the gender of the noun -adjective pair, we
 2 say that this anybody is a “man” in contrast with any “immortal”, “animal” and
 3 “woman” (compare with Jean Frere 2011, 136). But philosophically, such a
 4 specification is not enough and we should go further. Interestingly, according
 5 to the structure of the sentence we see that φῶτα participates and is involved in
 6 εἰδῶτα and not only this word plays a crucial role in Parmenides conception of
 7 himself; but also points to the necessity of initiating his serious and purposive
 8 imaginative journey. Thus, εἰδῶτα works as a necessary springboard that bring
 9 “somebody” out of his indistinction and make him distinctive and concrete by
 10 putting him in another stage and grade – journey as a transformative process.

11 In the related literature, there are many diverse and even opposite
 12 understandings of the four appearances of εἰδῶτα in Parmenides’ poem. By
 13 considering the other three occurrences of this word we can reach an
 14 understanding of its meaning in relation to φῶτα. Initially, whether we connect
 15 it with the knowledge by reflection and understanding (A. H. Coxon 2009,
 16 272); knowledge derived from observation (M. R. Cosgrove 2011, 31, 32), or
 17 knowledge by inspiration, according to the context of poem and common
 18 sense, it should be a specific kind of knowledge. The specificity of the
 19 knowledge is necessary because if the φῶτα has no knowledge he will have no
 20 interest in and motivation for journey. If, on the other hand, the φῶτα considers
 21 himself perfectly wise and knowledgeable he has no need for a journey; and if
 22 he speculates on a journey it will not be serious but something for amusement
 23 and play. Therefore, he has some kind of knowledge that is necessary but not
 24 sufficient and he need to make a journey to acquire sufficient knowledge. This
 25 means that Parmenides as the poet - philosopher knows that he does not know
 26 something that he should know. And it is exactly here that our understanding of
 27 the goddess’ speech plays a vital role for the nature of what he knows and what
 28 he does not. The importance of speech will become clear when we consider the
 29 nature of the goddess’ utterance and her instruction that he should “hear” – this
 30 action is emphasized in many places without any mentioning “to see” - and
 31 “think” about it. To consider this issue we should explore the words that
 32 goddess uses to describe what she is going to deliver to the young boy.

33 On the basis of the wording of goddess as it comes through the mouth of
 34 the young-boy narrator, we have extracted these basic words describing the
 35 nature of goddess’ didactic speech and the have and have-not of her
 36 addressee too: ἐρέω; μῦθον; φράζω ; πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον; ῥηθέντα; πιστὸν
 37 λόγον ἢ δὲ νόημα; and κόσμον --- ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν.

38 We begin with the word φράζω which is simpler than in comparison with
 39 the other words of this group. In the two occurrences in the second fragment
 40 (Lines 6 and 8), this word has a simple (not complicated) and concrete (not
 41 abstract) meaning of “to show something by finger” before “to say or declare
 42 something” (Mourelatos 1965, 261). The next simple word, ῥηθέντα (Fr. 7,5)
 43 does not have an established and distinctive meaning according to lexicons. For
 44 understanding its meaning we should consider it under other more customary
 45 and usable words such as λέγω, εἶπον, εἶρω and the like.

1 Therefore, we begin with the word ἐρέω (Fr. 2,1) with which the goddess
 2 says she wants to tell a tale. On the basis of Homeric corpus, the “verbal and
 3 relatively detailed account about anything” (R. J. Cunliffe 1924, 114)
 4 comprises the core of this verb in distinction of the other Greek verbs related to
 5 facets of “saying”. The same meaning is applicable to Parmenides poem, for
 6 we anticipate the goddess telling us a rather detailed verbal account about a
 7 specific topic which addressee can hear. Such an account of something cannot
 8 be in the form of few words or incomplete sentences, and one who wants to
 9 receives such a saying should listen to it, for ἐρέω has relation to ἀκούω /
 10 hearing and not ὁράω/seeing.

11 Therefore, we should expect that goddess tells a detailed tale (Fr.2,1). The
 12 goddess says that what she wants to present to the young-boy is a μῦθος, which
 13 should be told by her and heard by a hearer. With regard to the etymology of
 14 μῦθος as a type of speech (R. Barthes 1972, 107), this means that she and her
 15 addressee are basically within the field of orality. It is natural that she delivers
 16 something verbally to an interested and apt hearer, who should listen
 17 thoughtfully. Therefore, the core of goddess’ μῦθος in Parmenides (although
 18 the word is also as problematic in relation to human beings), is the oral
 19 deliverance of anything by a speaker that is received by a hearer.

20 According to this background, after the goddess brings her account under
 21 the title of μῦθος, we expect her narration to follow as a specific kind of
 22 speech, as it does [in F2,1; F 8,1]. In other words, when we take Homer as
 23 stating-point, we can say that for understanding μῦθος it is necessary to have a
 24 conception of its very general etymon, and then to bring out its contextual
 25 sense with regard to specific context in which it appears. It means that, when
 26 we read Homer, μῦθος has specific lexical meaning of saying and speaking,
 27 while in different contexts it acquires different colors (Kathryn Morgan 2000,
 28 17; R. J. Cunliffe 1924, 274).

29 But it seems that Parmenides use of μῦθος is different from poet’s for here
 30 the young-boy listens to the saying of goddess as authoritative μῦθος not as a
 31 passive receiver who speculates about the complete identity between what is
 32 said and the reality but as a possessor of λόγος who uses it in order to assess
 33 the μῦθος of the goddess. Nevertheless, μῦθος has no negative connotation for
 34 Aletheia for it is expressed through μῦθος - in other words, it is embedded
 35 within it. This issue again emphasizes the orality of the entire poem, which is
 36 only written afterwards.

37 Speaking of μῦθος leads us to consider λόγος. In addition to the previous
 38 sweet words of the Kouroi, the goddess also mentions λόγος in her μῦθος.
 39 From her position as goddess, she uses λόγος as a common thing between her
 40 and the young - boy [F 7, 5] and then connects it with νοεῖν [F 8,50] which
 41 both have a share in the adjective “πιστός”, and on the whole she considers that
 42 her tale has this quality of trustworthiness. According to goddess’ self-
 43 understanding, her oral account or μῦθος is composed of a mixture of λέγειν
 44 and νοεῖν and has the quality of being πιστός. Thus, we should consider λέγειν
 45 in its connection with νοεῖν (the oral context justifies the priority of the former

over the latter) and then consider their common adjective to see what all these as a complexity mean on the level of Aletheia (Fr.8, 50).

In other words, within the context of orality that poem is performed, μῦθος is a kind of specific “speech” with signification and message that should be delivered by “λόγος” as discourse. We will consider the different manifestations of this discourse in the goddess’ account. One manifestation is the integration of λέγειν and νοεῖν with their participation in πίστις. With an emphasis on orality and speaking it is natural that λόγος have priority, but νοεῖν comes after it as a compound of intuition and reasoning (von Fritz 1974, 51, 52) in order to give specific color to λόγος. But there is not complete assurance yet and as a result goddess links both of them to πίστις. It means that on the level of Aletheia the goddess’s narration, which is a composition of her speaking and thinking (as a relatively appropriate equivalent for νοεῖν), takes its specific identity from the qualification of her saying and thinking as πίστις [Fr. 8,50].

Here is one of the seven or eight places that we see a derivation of πεῖθ- in the form of an adjective. With a view to pre- Parmenides background, we can say that πίστις contains six components that interplay with each other and shape an organic whole. In analytical terms this word is basically performative or perlocutionary (Mourelatos 2008, 144, n. 27). It means that if we suppose two A and B parties there is (1) an initial promise, offer, proposal, or invitation by A to B; (2) B’s endorsement or acceptance of that promise; (3) B’s counter promise or pledge; (4) the continued maintenance of the relationship to the benefit of B and as the responsibility of A; (5) the continued maintenance of the relationship to the benefit of A and as a responsibility of B; (6) the continued maintenance of the relationship as the responsibility of, and to the enjoyment of, both parties (Mourelatos 2008, 139-140, 143). With regard to this account and genealogy of πίστις in the fields of theology and rhetoric, the equivalents of this adjective can be both “persuasive” or “faithful”. It means that the goddess, in telling the tale or her oral performing, passes the young-boy through a mixture of religious initiation and reason, and as a result demands the examination by her direct and unmediated addressee. This creates a mutual responsibility and benefit for both the goddess and young-boy (and the other readers of the poem too). It is a mutual equal movement from persuasion to faith and from faith to persuasion, which occur on the level of Aletheia as we read.

Another related phrase that the goddess uses on the Aletheia level is πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον:

--- , κρῖναι δὲ λόγοι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον (Fr 7. 5)

Here the combination of πολύδηριν and ἔλεγχον is the subject of our discussion. With a view to the thumb-nail historical sketch of the well-known words ἔλεγχος and ἐλέγχω in Homer and Hesiod and especially Pindar and Bacchylides, we can say that the core of this word in pre-philosophical meaning denotes to a kind of test and examination of things or humans in order to bring out their true nature. We examine ἔλεγχος in Parmenides’ poem it

1 means orderly examination and testing of the available ways of thinking or
 2 options for enquiry (J. H. Lesher 1984, 9, 16,17). And with regard to the word
 3 πολύ.δηριν we recognize that such a testing is full of strife and contention. This
 4 means not only that ἔλεγχος is not something acceptable, commonsensical,
 5 consensual. and for-granted but also that it has many divisions, aspects and
 6 dimensions (J. H. Lesher 1984 ,29). With such an understanding of the phrase
 7 πολύ.δηριν ἔλεγχον we can say that goddess is using dialectic in its
 8 Parmenidean version; as a result one aspect of his speaking is dialectical. More
 9 concretely, I mean that the ways of thinking or options of inquiry and the
 10 quality of the fragments before (with the exception of the first fragment) and
 11 after (Fr 7. 5) up to the level of Doxa - by using positive and negative and
 12 sometimes mixed combinations of them - forms a specific pattern and form that
 13 can be called dialectic (Scott Austin 2007, X; 3; 23;).

14 By considering this quality of goddess expression, we come to another and
 15 final quality of her speaking to the young-boy. On the level of Doxa, we find
 16 characteristic that it is on the level of “seeming” things. As a result the
 17 knowledge comes from thinking about such things is “uncertain and probable”.
 18 It is analogous to the level of Alētheia that belongs to Being and certain
 19 knowledge and which, as we can noted, roots in πίστις. As a result of this
 20 characterization, we will expect the goddess to reflect and manifests the
 21 specific ontological / epistemological quality of Doxa level in his speaking and
 22 thinking, in parallel with the former sphere Alētheia:

23
 24 μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. (F 8. 53)
 25

26 Here the goddess explicitly speaks of the quality and arrangement of her
 27 performative poetic speaking/ἔπος on the Doxa level through the adjective
 28 ἀπατηλὸν that means deceptive, deceivable, illusionary and tricky (LSJ 1843,
 29 181). Moreover, the content of the doxai is emphasized too, for here we see an
 30 ambiguity and intermingling that cannot permit us to infer absolute bright/
 31 positive/true (Alēthēs) or dark/negative/false (pseudēs) images but rather a
 32 mixture (M. Detienne 1996, 134). The goddess informs her hearers of such a
 33 quality in order that they feel it in her narration and be aware of it. In other
 34 words, it means that through *apatē* of the goddess we are witnessing a
 35 mysterious transfer of meaning from thought to expression in the play of
 36 signification that leads to probable, apparent, and likely speaking (S. Jarratt
 37 1991, 55) in comparing with her certain, genuine, definite speaking and
 38 thinking (F 8.50).

39
 40

41 **Parmenides Anonymity and Time Framework**

42

43 In reading the poem we see there is no explicit mentioning to Parmenides;
 44 he is voiceless, silent and doesn't speak for himself. It seems that being
 45 anonymous in name and speaking has some relation with Parmenides'
 46 conception of the philosophy manifest in the form of his poem. In other words,

1 for understanding the rationale of his anonymity it is necessary to make
 2 connections between his conception of philosophy and performance of such a
 3 conception in the oral and written forms, while remembering the specific and
 4 common characteristics of the didactic epic poem, as it is considered by
 5 Osborne (1998. 24,26, 31).

6 Initially, I think through his elaborate anonymity (I have taken the idea
 7 from Elinor J. M. West 2000, 99), Parmenides wants to introduce “knowledge”
 8 as a kind of “listening” to oral presentation (in comparison with “speaking”), in
 9 which the listener reflects on what hears by his or her own thoughts and then
 10 send it to memory. As a result, it is necessary that Parmenides shows and
 11 actualizes his idea about knowledge as listening. We can see that he does it
 12 through creating a friendly and personal relation between the goddess and any
 13 hearer like himself. It means that as a didactic performance, Parmenides
 14 himself experienced it in the past, or experiences it at any time and that the
 15 performance will be repeated by any reader of his poem in the future. In other
 16 words, in the mutual correlation of listening and anonymity what Parmenides
 17 says and replies is not important. Instead, it is crucial to provide and facilitating
 18 such a cordial individual connection for any addressee, so that each individual
 19 undergoes a live, internal, practical and personal journey. The experience is
 20 perceived as “oral”, because during her speech the goddess speaks repeatedly
 21 and exclusively of n alive “hearing” in relation to her “voice”, because
 22 “knowledge” resides in “listening” and not “seeing”. We may understand this
 23 in relation with Parmenides poetical writing in space, because it is transmitted
 24 and narrated by the other intellectual authorities not himself and should be read
 25 aloud in order to be heard (E. J. M. West 1995. 47, 48 49).

26 We can say that Parmenides inheritance of oral performance from Homer
 27 enhances this issue and negates any distance and gap between what the goddess
 28 says/does and what we try to think /say/ act because she is speaking directly to
 29 her audience without any mediation by Parmenides; in such a context the
 30 important issue is presenting and communicating the truth about the intended
 31 subject-matter. And it is exactly the purpose of Parmenides that provide a
 32 favorable and suitable context so that truth easily transported to the interested
 33 individual in the future rather than to account for his own idiosyncratic ideas,
 34 reactions, questions and answers - although I do not negate this fact that
 35 goddess speaking is double (Harold Tarrant 2000, 79 – 80, though this is said
 36 in relation to ancient conceptions of mouthpieces in Plato’s dialogues).

37 Although, we and Parmenides are equally the target group of the “goddess”
 38 speaking, here in this paper we are searching for Parmenides’ reflections. As a
 39 result we should look for Parmenides’ own hints that can be explored and
 40 thought about. It seems that the places in which we see two explicit, distinctive
 41 and discontinuous interventions (in fragment 8: 39, 51) of “human” ideas into
 42 the goddess’ speech and performance are exactly those places that we should
 43 seriously attempt to extract Parmenides’ thought. From grammatical point of
 44 view, the qualities of these interventions are very complicated, for both of them
 45 are presented in the simple past tense.

1 The Aletheia level denotes to a truth that should be a norm, and as long as
 2 other people do not hear it, they cannot shape their true ideas and decisions.
 3 Thus, after the communication such an idea to the other people by Parmenides,
 4 the use of future tense is more acceptable. But how using simple past tense can
 5 be justified because it means that they have heard it in the past and goddess is
 6 accounting a passed issue.

7 In comparison with Aletheia, Doxa level denotes to the common ideas of
 8 the people either before or after revelation of goddess, so using past tense is
 9 justifiable. But in both cases, people are reacting to the thought of Parmenides
 10 after he has communicated the idea. That is, unless we think that the time
 11 frame is not pertinent to the discourse of the goddess and what she says to
 12 Parmenides individually is revealed for the other people too. In other words, if
 13 this journey is something personal, how are the other people simultaneously
 14 informed of its content and reacting in the form of naming? Unless we say that
 15 the past and future time frames are intermixed or unrelated in the goddess
 16 speech or, that she mentions the future because her path has not been
 17 communicated to the other human yet, we cannot speak of their responses and
 18 reactions unless we delete time and conclude that all things are present for the
 19 goddess.

22 Who Speaks for Parmenides?

24 Although such a question is normally considered in relation with Plato's
 25 dialogues but we can trace Plato imitation back to Parmenides poem (for more
 26 see: M. Miller 1999, 259-264). In the case of Plato, both the internal
 27 differences between what Plato has Socrates say to different interlocutors and
 28 the differences between Socrates's comportment and the comportments of
 29 other protagonists ("Parmenides," the Eleatic Visitor, Timaeus and Critias, the
 30 Athenian Stranger) make evident that we cannot assume that any one of these
 31 protagonists, Socrates included, may be identified with Plato; this is of course
 32 reinforced by the fact that at least twice he has his interlocutors mention
 33 "Plato"; once explaining why he is absent from the group (*Phaedo*) and once
 34 referring to him as present and ready to pay a fine in Socrates's behalf
 35 (*Apology*). What is more, within single dialogues Plato has Socrates speak
 36 differently in different parts of the same dialogue, that is, in different phases of
 37 his educational encounter with his interlocutor. All of this means that as
 38 readers interpreting the dialogues, we are faced with the task of reading
 39 between the lines, that is, of distinguishing the surface or explicit meaning of
 40 the protagonist's words, recognizing the dramatic context to which his speech
 41 belongs and understanding the way it is attuned to that context, and identifying
 42 the inexplicit commitments and insights that guide Plato in designing both this
 43 context and the protagonist's speech.

44 I think that the case of the poem of Parmenides is both the same in some
 45 ways and different in others. The narrator is, I take it, the kouros whom the
 46 goddess addresses near the end of fragment 1. But he puts the goddess's speech

1 to him in direct discourse, and this seems designed to give us the strong
 2 impression that we hear her words directly, with no framing or distortion by the
 3 kouros, from the end of the first fragment through the rest of the
 4 poem. Nothing I can find in the text suggests that the kouros alters her words
 5 either intentionally or unintentionally in his report of them. This means that we
 6 needn't read between the lines of her speech in order to try to identify a
 7 meaning deeper than what the kouros reports that she says to him — with one
 8 important exception. When at the end of the eighth fragment she declares that
 9 she will “end her trustworthy speech and thought concerning truth” and teach
 10 the kouros “the opinions of mortals,” she warns the kouros that, since from
 11 “now on” she will be presenting not the truth but only the best of what we
 12 mortals think (why the best? because to learn it will prevent him from being
 13 “outstripped” by any other “thought of mortals” [8.60] — so this is as close to
 14 the goddess's standpoint as mortals can come without her intervention), he
 15 must “pay heed to the deceptive order of [her] words” (8.50-52); accordingly,
 16 from 8.50 on, hence in all of the fragments from nine to nineteen, we do have
 17 the task of distinguishing what the goddess explicitly says and the truth that she
 18 knows but withholds.

19 If these thoughts are correct, then there is nothing in the text of the poem
 20 that suggests that we should distinguish what the goddess is reported as saying
 21 in the so-called “Truth” section of the poem (fragment 1.24 through 8.49) from
 22 what Parmenides regards as the truth. In this sense, it is safe to say that, “the
 23 goddess speaks for Parmenides” in B1.24-8.49. In reading fragments 8.52-19,
 24 however, we should qualify this. Here, though the goddess still speaks for
 25 Parmenides, she — and he — speak not what they regard as the ultimate truth
 26 but only the best of mortals' opinions (Personal correspondence with Professor
 27 Mitchell Miller. See also: R. Cherubin 2001, ft. 5 P. 279).

28

29

30 **Human Naming**

31

32 During her speech, goddess pauses in two places in order to mention to the
 33 approach of the distinctive group of fallible-in-thought mortals/βροτός (J. Frere
 34 2011, 137 in distinction of two other family words φώς and ἄνθρωπος) to
 35 naming on the both levels of Aletheia and Doxa. Therefore, response of the
 36 intellectually fallible mortals to the subject-matter of Being on the levels of
 37 necessity and contingency is narrated by the action of naming and its result,
 38 names. The presence of being and its properties prompts naming on the side of
 39 those group of human beings who are neither wise men/ φώς nor mortal living
 40 beings/ἄνθρωπος but some intellectually fallible mortals/βροτός. According to
 41 this classification, naming is not a shared concern of all men but a section of
 42 human beings who think in a specific way/βροτός. If, in this vein, we take
 43 Parmenides as the reference of the phrase “εἰδότες φῶτα” at the third line of the
 44 first fragment, it means that naming is not his concern too!

45 For considering naming by the intellectually fallible mortals/βροτός, we
 46 will consider the narration of goddess about a pre-language substantive subject

on one hand, and then the lingual reaction of the aforementioned mortals when they are on the way of Aletheia and Doxa on the other hand. As it is, goddess' speech and human receptions denotes the existence of an pre-linguistic Ursprung, which functions as a foundation for any thinking; speaking and naming that comes after and over it. Interestingly, such a conception of Being leads and calls on *physis*. Up to this section of our paper *physis* has not been mentioned, but here is the exact place that it should be come on the scene: being that is the end result of its becoming. In this vein, while the root of the word denotes to grow the word as a whole denotes what is. Because on the one hand and at the core, goddess and Parmenides are speaking of Being as an immaterial that emerges of itself and has abiding sway. On the other hand, if we take *physis* in its broad initial immaterial meaning of what comes-out-in-itself-from-itself (Heidegger 2000. Xiii,15,16,64) and thereby all other beings come into being after it, then the emergence of all other things is dependent on this unique-conclusive *physis*. Thus, we see that there is an analogy between Being and physis (that is not concealed in Heidegger: G. R. Vick 1971, 145, 146) and it is according to such a conception that we should consider Parmenides as an unusual poet-philosopher of *physis/physiologos*.

When particular human beings hear or read about to be that takes multiple phonetical appearances and linguistic modalities such as πλήθω, τέλεθω, and the like through the mouth of goddess, we expect that they say something to themselves or others as their receptions and conceptions of these different forms. Although silence has the virtue of making the continuation of the goddess narration possible, this is not the norm. Thereby, some thoughtful mortals break their silence by saying something after learning of a being that comes into being and is revealed through speaking as a specific being. Therefore, it is through true speaking (as a being) that thinking about being becomes manifest. Being then in turn becomes the subject of true speaking and thinking. But it is like our usual way of speaking and thinking and it is not limited to the goddess and Parmenides.

At the same time, in reading the poem, we see that within Aletheia level in Fr.8. Line 17 for the first time in the whole of poem, goddess, in a specific road of inquiry and not generally and unconditionally (Cherubin 2001,294) speaks of being unthought/ἀνόητον: being unnamed/ἀνόνημον. In the initial phase of introducing such an order between thinking and naming (in their positive forms) any alternative is possible, and it would be better to consider them in paratactic form (for this as a form of composition in the whole of the poem see: Mourelatos 2008 3 - 4). The relation between two words is very important for our paper; it is also an enigma that should be worked on in its own terms in human beings and Parmenides. In the goddess' first mention of naming she brings it both in a paratactic relation with thinking in a negative form. Accordingly, she has in her mind a specific relation between νοεῖν:νεμεῖν that makes them distinct of the other pairs and then in affirmative terms we can say, if thinking/conceiving/knowing: naming.

Thereby we should consider the paratactic form of thinking: naming" in order to figure out perception of goddess and specific groups of intellectually

1 fallible mortals who make names in the both spheres of Aletheia and Doxa.
 2 From our perspective, different modalities of “to be” in the Greek syntax can
 3 be the beginning block for anyone who wants to speaks of them. In hearing and
 4 reading them the listeners and readers face problems they have never
 5 confronted, as a result, it is a new experience for them (otherwise there is no
 6 valuable novelty). It means that the speech of the goddess/Parmenides about
 7 the modalities of “to be” leads its listeners to think and then have conceptions
 8 about them. We, in turn, read and see both their thinking and speaking in the
 9 form of written words in a specific language. Thus, where there is nothing or
 10 when nothing is said by the goddess/Parmenides about modalities of “to be” it
 11 is unthought and unnamed. But when it is said in order to show conceptions of
 12 these linguistic forms, thoughtful though fallible mortals are mainly divided
 13 into two specific groups, although both of them recourse to *onoma* as a general
 14 word, far away from Plato and Aristotle conceptions, for giving phonetic
 15 manifestation (Heidegger 2000.61) to what is in their thoughts.

16 In addition, speaking of two levels necessitates choosing an appropriate
 17 method. As a result, we use the two-level model as it is introduced and used
 18 initially by Tessleff (1999) for Plato dialogues. This ontological view, which
 19 functions as a thought-experiment, is not pointedly dualistic and includes pairs
 20 of asymmetric hierarchical contrasts which are internally complementary and
 21 mutually associative. Neither level exists in isolation from the other: there are
 22 not two separate worlds, conflicting dynamic centers, or cosmic opposites. One
 23 level is good and leading and the other is less good and oriented to the former
 24 (Tessleff 2000, 59 and 60; Tessleff 2002, 1). Therefore, modalities that are
 25 spoken by goddess work as the cause and lead some thoughtful human beings
 26 towards name-making as a revelation by means of sound (phone) in relation to
 27 and about being on the two levels of Aletheia and Doxa.

28 This interpretation are justifiable when the we are working in the
 29 framework of an organic, ordered, sequential hypotaxis but in “thinking:
 30 naming” this is not the case. In this specific and crucial spot of the poem, we
 31 observe two parallel words that are juxtaposed with each other without any
 32 punctuation marks to show their relation. Accordingly, they should be
 33 translated and interpreted paratactically. This means that the syntactic and
 34 logical relations of these two words are open and cannot be put in a tight closed
 35 box. As a result, we can say that of “the two or more things (or ideas) that
 36 might be logically or otherwise connected with each other are each viewed
 37 separately, and the beholder or narrator is aware of only one at a time -
 38 parataxis in various forms” (B. E. Perry 2016, 493. See also J. A. Notopoulos
 39 1949 ,10).

40 Before speculating about thinking in the oral performance context of the
 41 poem, we expect that specific types of saying be considered and emphasized as
 42 starting blocks before we reach thinking. For example, on the first line of the
 43 sixth fragment, we face with the word “saying” in the form of λέγειν. This
 44 opens the subject of goddess speech in relation to thinking. Besides, goddess
 45 articulates her different modalities / names of being. This signifies that she
 46 wants to articulate into names what he perceives as the *physis* of “to be”. It also

1 suggests that name and naming is not restricted only to human field (about
 2 modalities as names see: Robert Goff 1972, 77). In this regard, if we limit
 3 ourselves to the same sixth fragment, then by names of being I mean ἐὼν
 4 [Participle]; ἔμμεναι [Epic Infinitive]; εἶναι [Infinitive]; ἔστιν [Verb present
 5 indicative active 3rd singular]. Each one has its own specific syntactic/
 6 philosophical implication for what goddess perceives and thinks of the being
 7 *physis*. Therefore, in the context of orality, λέγειν lays out being open and in
 8 other words state it and as a result, it has a relatively defined relation with
 9 perceiving/thinking but the relation of thinking with naming, on the other hand,
 10 is narrated in paratactic order.

11 Apart from λέγειν, another word for saying that is used by goddess in
 12 relation to νοεῖν is φημί (F. 8 line 8). The verb φημι alone covers thirty-nine
 13 page of the first part in H. Fournier 1946 in distinction of the other Greek
 14 words for saying. On the basis of exploring its different uses and forms, its core
 15 denotes not to any kind of saying but a kind of saying that comes from a
 16 definite idea or belief. Its speaker wants to declare and disclose something
 17 important and determinate (Carl D. Buck 1915.126;127; Liddell-Scott-Jones
 18 Greek-English Lexicon 1843, 1926). Therefore, φημι is basically a statement
 19 and report in the form of saying, rooted in and analogous to the opinion of a
 20 speaker. As such, it stimulates thinking in its hearers and readers and so cannot
 21 be a trivial, unimportant, unthought, and usual saying.

22 Now, with regard to our clue in the seventieth verse of the eighth
 23 fragment, it is appropriate to consider the meaning of “νοεῖν” more deeply and
 24 then turn to its paratactic and parechesis relation with “νεμεῖν” that is the
 25 concern of both divine and thoughtful human mortals.

26 It is granted that when goddess says (equivalent for both λέγειν/φημί)
 27 different modalities of being, the mind of the young boy or any other
 28 thoughtful mortal becomes stimulated and blooms. It means that in the context
 29 of orality, thinking/conceiving/known does not have an independent and
 30 autonomous position, but derives from something external, that is, the speech
 31 of goddess about being and its modalities. Therefore, the initial feature of
 32 νόησις as verbal noun is dependent on receiving and internalizing the
 33 modalities of “to be” that are spoken/said by goddess.

34 The modalities of being which the goddess reveals for the first time are
 35 intuitive, ambiguous and unclear for human beings. They should thus be
 36 reasoned and explained in order to become clear, distinct, reasonable and
 37 understandable (Kurt von Fritz 1974, 52. Interestingly, he narrates the
 38 intermixture of these two elements in νοεῖν with the dominance of reasoning).
 39 In the initial lines of the eighth fragment, which points to the rationale and
 40 standards of human naming, we see that on the favorable and recommended
 41 route of goddess describes thinking on the divine level together with its
 42 requirements δίκη, μοῖρα, θέμις and ἀνάγκη. These function as the framework
 43 of thought and naming (f.8: 13-15; 29-32;36-38). In other words, it seems that
 44 she wants to make connection between thought with signs. The qualities of
 45 these signs (according to Nagy [36 - 44] include: plurality, diversity, the ability
 46 to be decoded, recognizable, noticeable, non-forgettable, and interpretable).

1 These qualities make them apt for the formation of thinking. As a result, the
 2 qualities work as “route signs” of Aletheia so that thinking reach its object,
 3 being. Thinking is therefore both passive and active. It is passive when it
 4 receives the right signs, and it is active when it is more cognitive and works on
 5 signs. Moreover, without any exception goddess and humans need “route
 6 signs” in order to continue their walk toward being. We should note, however,
 7 that all these distinctive signs are not suspended in the air but placed within a
 8 specific frame with four specific divine elements. And it is ideal that they have
 9 meaningful and organic relations with the route signs (Cherubin 2001, 297; Ft.
 10 24 on 298). But it is not always so. According to the goddess there can be
 11 unwelcoming relations among attributes /predications (Santoro 2011, 247, 248)
 12 and between the rout signs and the elements that according to her give an
 13 elenchic quality to her speaking within Aletheia πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον
 14 ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα (F 7 .5). The young boy and any listener or reader should be
 15 aware of these relationships.

16 According to the core (Fr.8) of the Aletheia level, the thoughtful mortal
 17 walkers should internalize the signs of being which are given on the way and
 18 spoken out through the catalogic/categorical speech of the goddess when she
 19 informs receivers of the attributes and predicates of all-inconclusive being: that
 20 is both the beginning/subject and ending/object of speaking-thinking-speaking.

21 Now with reference to the format “thinking: naming” in their positive
 22 terms (Fr. 8, 17), it seems natural that when the receivers of being want to
 23 communicate their conception of being to themselves or others, it is necessary
 24 to speak and use language give phonetic / verbal clothing to their mind’s
 25 conception of being. Here the main issue is solely the will of human beings to
 26 give phonetic materialization to the content of their mind (correct or wrong).
 27 Therefore, the usual antitheses that can come to our mind such as onoma-ousia;
 28 onoma-ergon; onoma-rhema and the like are irrelevant (L. Woodbury
 29 1958,145; compare with M. C. Nussbaum 1979; and Antonio Traglia 1955).
 30 Before this materialization, all-inconclusive being with its specific elements
 31 (Fr. 8, 3 – 38: unborn, impressible, indivisible, cohesive, immobile,
 32 unchanging, not incomplete) has only cognitive existence in mortal fallible
 33 minds. It will, however, take another kind of existence, realized by its phonetic
 34 formation from mortals mouths (See the later reflection of this notion in: Plato,
 35 *Sophist* 261e). Such a phonetic realization has a broad sense and cannot be
 36 restricted to phonology and the subsequent developments and restrictions of
 37 this word. What the goddess says in in elenchic format about being and its
 38 different modalities, mortals receive, consider, and then put in phonetic
 39 clothing. We should know that the goddess’ elenchic way of speaking makes
 40 name-making a very difficult and complex venture. It means that thoughtful
 41 mortal beings try to present such phonetic manifestation through making-
 42 names. We use “name” here both as a comprehensive general word (Vlastos
 43 2008, 373, 374) and in its generic sense as signifying and naming something /
 44 the named (Ademollo 2015,34) before its differentiation and distinction of the
 45 other related words, which happens on two levels.

1 It should be noted that the recourse of human being to name can be
 2 considered a basic phase in the development of the Greek thought (J. Jaynes
 3 2000, 135). Besides, against the initial and older meaning of name and naming,
 4 in Parmenides we see the transition of name as *nomen proprium* (proper name)
 5 to name as *nomen appellativum* (word); and as a result, we have the reflection
 6 of this status in the denominative verb ὀνομάζειν too. Interestingly, such a
 7 happening denotes to the conception of Parmenides of sentence as a compound
 8 and not monolithic whole consisting of some specific elements, one of which is
 9 name with a specific identity (Laura Gianvittorio 2011, 14;26). This identity is
 10 now a new factor in understanding human conception of being that will be
 11 discussed in what follows. For Parmenides, name has extension and application
 12 that is embedded and presupposed in all of the four pertinent fragments (Fr. 8,
 13 38; Fr.8,53, Fr.9,1; Fr. 19,3). In addition, when we become more specific about
 14 naming, we find that Parmenides mentions and considers another element that
 15 clarifies his conception of naming (this issue is on the second level, Doxa): the
 16 δυνάμεις: καὶ τὰ κατὰ σφετέρως δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖσι τε καὶ τοῖς, of any name
 17 (Fr. 9,5) τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ' ἐπίσημον ἑκάστωι
 18 (Fr.19,5). Accordingly, when we put these observations together, we can say
 19 that for Parmenides, a name is a phonetic/verbal construct with a specific
 20 δύναμις in relation to different named things. in light of this definition, we will
 21 now consider this specific element of name.

22 With regard to the use of the term “*dynamis* of names” (whether in the
 23 same form or by implication and indirectly with different meanings in ancient
 24 Greek thoughts on language (in Lysias; Herodotus; Plato and Aristotle. See
 25 Ademollo 2011,176 -177), what can be Parmenides particular conception of
 26 *dynamis* in relation to name? An initial hypothesis might connect the *dynamis*
 27 of names with Parmenides’ conception of being (J. Owens 1975, 22;
 28 Woodbury 1958, 154). Therefore, by *onoma* in its translation as “name” and
 29 not “noun” or “word”, we want to say that name has the capacity to take being
 30 as its referent that has also a dynamic meaning (Woodbury 1958, 149, 151).
 31 This a property unique to names and is absent in the comparable words with
 32 name.

33 Therefore, any name has a distinctive capacity /value that makes it name.
 34 In the context of classical thoughts this means that a name conveys particular
 35 information about its pertinent referent. Parmenides wants to clarify the
 36 mentioned idea by the word ἐπίσημον. this word generally refers to the
 37 specific signs and marks that come upon or after a particular object and give to
 38 it authority, formality, credit and value, otherwise they give opposite qualities.
 39 Grammatically, ἐπίσημον is an adjective here, in predicative position relative
 40 to ὄνομα, and means ‘as a sign’, ‘as a mark’. The preposition *epi-* presumably
 41 points to the relation to the object: ‘as a sign /mark for (*Epi* + dative is used in
 42 this way with such verbs as *onomazein* or *kalein*). Therefore:

43
 44 τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ' ἐπίσημον ἑκάστωι. (Fr. 19. 5).
 45 “And on them men laid down a distinguishing name for each.

46

We should consider this image of name and naming within the two level-model of Thesleff as a heuristic guide, in distinction to a sharply dualistic model. There we are faced with the asymmetric contrast of Aletheia/Doxa in a hierarchical order in which one is primary in all senses, but the latter is also necessary and prerequisite for the world as we have it. If the upper primary level is true and good, the lower secondary level is not necessarily bad or failed, but rather less good and oriented to the former.

Now we will consider naming and names on the first level / road that is the route of all-inclusive or necessity being:

---. τῶι πάντ' ὀνόμασται,

ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, (Fr.8, 38,39)

----. Of this [being] all those [names] have been named,

As the mortals laid down, trusting them to be true: (Fr. 8, 38 – 41- Considering the Greek verb *onomastai* as a double nominative: M. Burnyeat 1982, n.22 P. 19).

According to these lines, after the revelatory and elenctic narration of goddess about being through its different modalities in the divine context, some thoughtful mortals hear such an account about being and attempt the difficult task of making names for this whole, which contains specific elements (compare Diels 1910, 7) and functions as the foundation or substance for any other being in the world. More concretely, they attempt this by making different names (J. Owens 1975, 22,23; Vlastos 2008, 367 as the title of his paper denotes) in the form of four emphasized connected infinitives (by *τε καὶ*) such as: *γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ὀλλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί, καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χροῶ φανὸν ἀμείβειν* (Fr. 8, 40-41). In their initial phonetic encounter, human beings want to “refer” to and give some information about one all-inclusive unit that is “already” there (*ὑπάρχειν*). By moving on the road of Aletheia that is embedded in elenctic speech they designate it. More importantly, the vocables that human lays down in the form of names should have the power to distinguish the relevant specific “given” unit (*ὑπάρχειν*) from other comparable similar or opposite entities, otherwise they have not fulfilled their function and value as names. In this case, they would not be suitable names at all, since a name should name something – in Greek “name” as a noun and “to name” as transitive verb have close etymological relation with each other. This means that, thoughtful mortals are “on” the proper road of Aletheia, even though it is possible to make mistakes (fallibility) when devising different names to express their understandings of goddess’ account. They may make wrong though meaningful names (Vlastos 2008 ,372) with all-inclusive being as referent. In other words, it seems that the names that are made by some thoughtful fallible mortals cannot mark off all-inclusive being as is narrated by the goddess. She speaks of a whole with specific constituents or signs and the names only refer to a whole.

According to this interpretation, through the account of goddess/ Parmenides we are informed of the efforts of thoughtful though fallible mortals

1 who are on the route of Aletheia. In order to signify the Ursache that goddess
2 introduces, a group of thoughtful mortals lay down/κατέθεντο different
3 meaningful names. They consider them trustable and dependable true names
4 for distinguish this principal referent from all other referents.

5 Some points need mentioning. With regard to this early introduction of the
6 verb κατέθεντο before shaping of the afterwards antitheses, it would be better
7 to translate this verb “to lay down” in order to avoid misunderstanding and also
8 to convey its compound form in Greek (Compare Diels 1910, 8). With regard
9 to the revelation of the being from the goddess and the presence of thoughtful
10 mortals on the true route, without reducing true to orthotēs/right (see Heidegger
11 1993, 447) they venture to make human names. Therefore they are not on the
12 wrong way and making wrong name, otherwise they were completely out of
13 route. More precisely, when we consider the human made names, it becomes
14 clear that the power of name has not succeeded in distinguishing τὸ ἕν from
15 its other referent rivals since these nominees do not contain the specific
16 elements of their principal referent. Thereby we say that although the names of
17 mortals on the true way of necessity signify a whole as referent, the
18 components or *Merkmalsmatrix* (Manfred Kraus 1987, 90) of these names has
19 no similarity with the signs of the goddess’ referent. If this is the case, we can
20 make a distinction between *Bedeutung* / reference and *Sinn* /sense and say that
21 the four mortal-made names are true in their referent but not in the components
22 that make its meaning. (Frege 1997, 152;181- 193).

23 According to our selected model, we consider the second level/route as
24 doxa/appearance that is oriented to the primary path and includes different
25 multiple conflictual possibilities/dia.kosmon eoikota (Fr. 8, 60. Mourelatos
26 1974, 318). And among these para.doxai we are informed of one outstanding
27 example of a dualism (Vlastos 2008, 375) in relation to name- making. In other
28 words, mortals on the Aletheia route ventured to make four names in order to
29 signify their principal referent and give some information about it. But Aletheia
30 is not the only route, for according to the Parmenides’ poem there is also the
31 route of contingency. On this road too mortals make names:

32
33 μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν· (Fr. 8, 53)

34 For they made up their minds to name two forms,

35 The sense of the verse is awkward and enigmatic, but ultimately it shows
36 how thinking happens as a human action and how any thinker should
37 manipulate names in order to set down a thought (Mourelatos 1970, 228;
38 Woodbury 1986, 2-4). In comparison with the Aletheia route, it might mean
39 that human mind/ gnomon governs and gains a basic secular role and function
40 in relation to name-making (Contra Woodbury 1986, 3) without the overall
41 divine elements and framework that functions on the first divine route. But a
42 goddess who belongs to the level of necessity wants to reveal and speak of the
43 different possibilities in the forms of *doxai* that can exist on the human level of
44 contingency (Cherubin 2005, 11). Because of this differentiation, the goddess
45 informs that her speech is deceptive / ἀπατηλὸν (Fr. 8, 52) and critical/ —
46 ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν· (Fr. 8, 53) either from herself or Aletheia-oriented

1 human beings. These qualities are in connection with the human naming and as
 2 a result, we should consider human naming on the level of doxa that is narrated
 3 by goddess within it. In comparison with the previous reference of the goddess
 4 to the quality of her speech on the divine necessity level (7.5), on the human
 5 level of contingency she mentions to the nature of human opinions and one of
 6 the prominent ones which she critically informs us of the quality of human
 7 opinions that is reflected in her narration. Thus on the human level of
 8 contingency she will resorts to one of the famous doxai / appearances of
 9 fallible mortals (Fr. 8,51). As a result, the goddess as a divine being wants to
 10 re-narrate a specific human endoxa that like any other endoxa is on the border
 11 between right and wrong and has the capacity of deceiving - although this does
 12 not mean that it is completely false (Cherubin 2005, 13 note 27), as
 13 immediately she mentions. Thus:

14
 15 ----- κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. (Fr. 8, 52)
 16 ----- hearing the deceitful order of my speaking.
 17

18 The goddess says that on the second route or level we should expect to
 19 hear human endoxa from her mouth. The evaluative aspect of the goddess
 20 narration is revealed in the negative form of the word χρεῶν (which in its
 21 positive meaning denotes a necessity that comes from within and which can be
 22 the result of interests, inclinations, ideas and appropriations) in distinction of
 23 δεῖ (which comes mostly of the external environmental and situational
 24 constraints that are outside of being) (Pace S. Benardete 1965, 285, 288). In
 25 other words, doxa or endoxa exists in an interworld. As a result it is not
 26 completely right or wrong and should be examined so that these two aspects
 27 may be distinguished and differentiated.

28 On the level of doxa/appearance, thoughtful mortals proceed in their minds
 29 to name two forms/μορφᾶς that then becomes clear that they want to name two
 30 nominees/δέμας (Fr. 8, 55;59) that each one is composed of specific signs /
 31 σήματ (Fr. 8, 55), although from the perspective of goddess and Aletheia route
 32 they are one, that is: light. Thus, on the doxa route, it is possible that human
 33 beings put their mind together and make two distinctive names as external
 34 forms in order to signify their two distinctive internal referents / constructions
 35 (like the relation of façade with a building). According to this order we read:

36
 37 τὰντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο (Fr. 8, 55)
 38 χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, -----, (Fr. 8, 56)
 39 they distinguished contraries in body and set signs
 40 apart from each other, -----
 41 μορφᾶς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν (Fr. 8,53)
 42 For they made up their minds to name two forms,
 43

44 In comparison with the first divine Aletheia level, on the second human
 45 Doxa level we are informed of two sets of which are “made” by thoughtful
 46 mortals. These forms are not given by the goddess but are human made. Each

one is imputed with specific distinctive signs, so mortals want to signify them through making two distinctive names. It seems that human beings have found something in names that can be applied to distinctive things and objects such as night and light with the expectation that these can signify one referent from its opposite. But from the perspective of goddess and humans who are Aletheia-oriented, there is no successful differentiation on doxa level between being/light and non-being/night. But mortals think that they have succeeded in making a distinction between two referents and consequently, in making a unique name for each of them. As we mentioned before, it is exactly on this level that we are informed of the power and value of any name for the first time (Fr. 9,4-5), that a name makes its referent distinct by designating unique signs for it.

But there is a problem on the doxa or contingency route that affects mortals name-making. The goddess has a specific kind of discourse that is different from mortals' doxa. However, she tries not mention to her own true ideas or mention to them as thin as possible (Fr. 8,54). Thus, she wants to re-introduce and re-represent mortals endoxa on a level that is, in comparison to the first road of necessity, the route of contingency. According to her narration, one of these mortal contingencies is the contrasting forms of light and night. According to goddess perspective, if we consider light as a reflection of being and night as a reflection of non-being the first one is thinkable and right name (meaning of *χρεών* in the context of language) but the second one is unthinkable and wrong name. From the goddess' view, thoughtful mortals have gone astray by making two names, instead of one. Therefore, the thoughtful mortals' name for light (not night) as the secondary referent on the second contingency route that reflects the being as the primary referent on the necessity route is a right (not true) name.

Conclusion

Regarding explicit textual pieces of evidence, we have explored and examined Parmenides "philosophical poem" within the context of the classical version of "name philosophy". In general terms, the basic and specific quality of "name" in distinctions of the other pertinent terms is its relation with reality in any conceivable form. Accordingly, Parmenides by using poem with all the freedom and limitations that gave him he tried through the voice of a young man to imagine and represent manifestations of being on two levels. When each recipient according to his/her intellectual abilities want to understand reality on the levels of truth and doxa and communicate it to the other human beings he or she ventures to the act of "name-making". The result is making true names for the being that is on truth level; and right names for the beings which are on the doxa level.

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