Oedipus’s Responsibility: The Problem of Moral Luck

Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel

In mythology, Oedipus is determined by destiny or fate to a set of actions. If he is not responsible for his fate or luck, will he be responsible for his crimes? Can moral judgments be independent of luck, chance or fortune? Following an example proposed by Nagel: two agents (with the same intention, desire, belief, etc.) shoot someone. The first agent hits his target. The second agent does not hit, because, luckily, a bird crossed the path of the bullet fired. Both agents wanted to hit the target, but by chance or luck interference only one hits. Do we judge both agents in the same moral way? The moral responsibility of an agent over his actions seems inseparable from a principle of control of the agent over his actions. However, when we analyse the object of the moral judgment (agent, actions) the evaluation over it varies according to elements of luck (constitutive, circumstantial, resulting, causal fortune). Does luck introduce a paradox into the core of moral judgments (Nagel’s thesis), which limits any conception of morality (as Williams argues)? In this paper we defend the need to consider morally agents and actions, regardless of whether they are or are not subject to luck.

Keywords: Bernard Williams, luck, moral, Thomas Nagel.

Introduction: The Tension between Morality and Luck

Can moral judgments be independent of luck? The moral responsibility of an agent for his actions seems inseparable from a principle of control of the agent over his actions. However, when we analyse the object of moral judgment (agent, actions) the evaluation about it varies according to elements of luck.

Let us clarify the problem of moral luck, with an example from Thomas Nagel. Two agents¹ shoot another person. In the case of the first — having intended to shoot the person and kill him — the bullet hits a bird, thus failing in its intention. This agent is thus prevented from reaching his target. The second agent has the same intention, the same motivation, and performs an action similar to that of the first agent. However, unlike the previous agent, he shoots

¹For the purposes of the argument, in the present paper, we consider agents to be those who act. That is, without problematizing the concept of action and agent, we attribute to an agent an intention, a desire and a relevant belief (belief-desire model), considering the intention as the conductor of actions. Cf.: Sofia Miguens and Susana Cadilha, Ação e Ética: Conversas sobre a Racionalidade Prática (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2011), 83-84; Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12-24.
and nothing stands between the bullet and his victim. This second agent manages to hit his target and kills him.

The moral judgment about these two agents is distinct. We do not consider "attempted murder" and "homicide" to be incorrect on the same level (as is the case from the Law point of view different penalties are assigned for different crimes). If this is so, we admit that moral judgment varies according to luck, something that is not controlled by the agent. The intention and action of the agents does not vary from the first agent to the second (both have the intention to kill and act according to this intention). What does vary from one case to the other is the circumstance and the consequences. In this sense, we apparently do not judge only what is under the control of the agent in an action. Nothing that directly depends on the agents' control is different: they have the same intention, belief, and motivation to kill a person. However, one is effective and the other is not. That difference does not depend on something that was under the agents' control. In one of the cases, the trajectory of the bullet is intercepted by the passage of a bird, by chance or luck.²

What can luck have to do with moral reflection? Bernard Williams, in associating these two terms — moral luck — thought he was using an oxymoron³, because it is about expressing a dilemma or a confrontation. On the one hand, the principle of control, the agent has moral responsibility for what he controls in his action. And, on the other hand, luck is something which escapes human control. Thus, prima facie, morality is distinguished from luck. Morality has to do with judgments about the agent's responsibility. The agent may be justified in acting as he did, he may be worthy of praise or censure. Luck, on the other hand, consists of elements that are outside the realm of human freedom. However, the agent is usually the object of a moral judgment, without distinguishing and removing from this moral judgment elements that escape the agent's will. Can the agent and his actions be the object of moral judgment, if substantively subjected to fate?

We consider the mythological case of Oedipus. Oedipus is determined by fate to a set of actions. If he is not responsible for his fate, is he responsible for his crimes? In this paper we argue that fate interferes with moral judgments. However, it is necessary to morally evaluate agents and actions regardless of whether they are determined by luck. We begin by defining moral luck and categorizing different types of moral luck (resultant, circumstantial, constitutive, and causal); we analyse the interference of luck on judgments we make about others (considering Nagel's proposal); and the interference of luck on the agent's self-evaluation of his own actions (in Williams' philosophy). We conclude this article by arguing that, even if we can accept the interference of

³Sergi Rosell, La Suerte Moral (Oviedo: KRK Ediciones), 121.
chance in life projects, we cannot admit the interference of luck in moral judgments (at the risk of luck completely eliminating the object of moral judgment). Oedipus cannot escape moral judgment by claiming the force of circumstances that transcend him — fate or his luck.

Field of Analysis

Luck, fate or fortune — the things that escape the control of the human agent as a contingency, good or bad, advantageous or harmful — is a recurrent theme, both for moral reflection in ancient philosophy and in tragic poetry. Hellenic culture could express the term fate in twenty-five different ways (25 different words for destiny). Contemporarily, the echo of the problem about "luck", circumscribed to morals, is essentially due to Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel. The article entitled “Moral Luck” by Thomas Nagel is a response to Bernard Williams' article of the same name. In the late seventies, both participated with a reflection on "Moral Luck" in a Symposium dedicated to Aristotelian thought (1975). These articles are the central motor/engine of contemporary discussion.

Martha Nussbaum analyses the influence of luck or fortune on ethical life (particularly in The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 1986). His argument recovers not only the philosophers (mainly Plato and Aristotle), but also the Greek (tragic) poets given the urgency of this theme for both poets and philosophers. Nussbaum recalling that the tragic poets were considered "important sources of ethical insight" with whom philosophers directly competed. Nussbaum follows Bernard Williams' philosophical exercise of returning to Greek thought and Tragedy. The Oedipus myth has multiple facets in contemporary culture (Carlos João Correia, 2003, pp. 147-160). In this line, we refer to the case of Oedipus as someone who internalizes the guilt of murder although he was destined to it. Oedipus would be a centralizing example of the paradox introduced by the moral fate we want to analyse.

Methods and Categories

In the present section, we will focus on both the definition and the characterization of the types of moral luck proposed by Thomas Nagel, trying to systematize them. At the end of this section we will make a brief comment on the cases of luck analysed by Bernard Williams. We will start by considering Nagel's definition of moral luck:
"Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck".

In the present reflection, we consider this definition of moral luck, according to which the object of moral judgment integrates external factors to the will. That is, character and action are also evaluated according to good or bad luck. Thus, the elements of luck that interfere with moral judgment can be distinguished and typified into different categories: resultant luck; circumstantial luck; constitutive luck, causal luck. The different types of moral luck help clarify what is the issue, and although Thomas Nagel has listed these forms of moral luck, the designations are not explicitly of his making.

**Resulting Luck**

The case of attempted murder, which we have previously presented, fits this type of resulting moral luck. Each member of the pair ("murderer" and "murderer in the attempted form") had the same intentions, plans, motives. Yet, the action differed in the outcomes. The different outcomes (of the murder and the attempted murder) trigger different moral judgments, depending on their outcome. Another example formulated by Nagel is the case of the Russian revolutionaries, known as the Dezembrists, who, like all revolutionaries, risked a coup and depended on the success of this action to justify a military uprising or *coup d'état*. In the case of the Dezembrists the outcome is nefarious. In failing the coup, the consequences were severe for the participating soldiers who were convinced to follow through with the coup.

The Decembrists were a revolutionary group in Russia that contested Tsar Nicholas I, and whose fate was a painful one, after the dismantling of the military uprising. As we analyse later, it should be noted that the consideration of a "retroactive justification" based on future success does not imply that this justification eliminates the consideration of evils that occurred. For example, Serguei Volkonski, one of the few Dezembrists who survived the Siberian punishment, was Tolstoy’s distant cousin. He inspired the character of Prince Andrei Bolkonski in *War and Peace*, and it is not assumed that any literary and artistic success supersedes, in all cases, a moral evil. We will return to this topic when discussing the *Gauguin’s problem* presented by Bernard Williams.

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Circumstantial Luck

It refers to the environment in which one acts, or the time and place in which one finds oneself, and how this fact determines how one is evaluated. Consider the case of two Germans, one of whom, before the rise of the Nazi party in Germany, travels to Argentina and the other remains in Germany. Both sympathize with the ideology of the rising Nazi party. The agent who remains in Germany will eventually become an officer in a concentration camp, and the other does not effect his support for the Nazi party because he is not, at that time, on German territory. With this example, Nagel gives an account of circumstantial luck, and according to this, he concludes, we would not be willing to evaluate equally the two agents. This speculative case seems problematic, since we would have no way of gauging how circumstance was the element of luck that conditioned a partisan sympathy towards an action. The judgment would presuppose an epistemic (omniscient) condition that we do not have access to. In Oedipus' case, we would also not know whether he would kill his father knowing that he was his father (and commit parricide anyway).

Constitutive Luck

One considers "one's luck to be who one is [...] one's inclinations, talents, and temperament." An agent's response to the requirements of morality is not indifferent to the agent one is. Thomas Nagel points to character's traits (sympathy, cowardice, coldness, envy, etc.) that are the background from which one responds morally (although one can counteract those same character traits). Williams begins his article (Moral Luck) by presenting the sage in classical antiquity as someone immune to luck, autonomous from whatever might disturb his tranquillity and happiness (think of the Stoic sage), however, he adds that this would already be an example of constitutive luck, since not all agents would be willing to be wise in these ways, able to accept certain demands, inclined to take this path that would not be accessible to all. We add that to the agent's constitutive character predicates can be added predicates that can also unfairly influence the life and moral treatment of an agent, such as gender, skin colour, etc.

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Causal Luck

"The luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances." The debate about determinism versus free will falls under this category of moral luck. On one hand, it is understood that our actions are a consequence of what we do not control, yet if so, they are not free actions, and freedom is, we would admit, a requirement for a moral act. On the other hand, admitting the agent's freedom, it is as if the agent inserted into the causal world, which he does not control, a certain spontaneity indeterminate by biological, physical, psychological luck, etc.9

For the purposes of categorization we prefer Thomas Nagel's work since it is a more detailed one. Nagel uses Bernard Williams' term "constitutive luck", but for Williams, the category of constitutive luck is a broader one as it encompasses not only "constitutive luck" (as we called it before), but also "circumstantial luck" and "causal luck". Williams would distinguish "constitutive luck" from "incident luck", understanding the latter as "resultant luck", within the types we have presented.10

Results: Limits, Justifications, and Regret

First. The boundaries of moral luck are interdependent on the conception of morality that we may have. If we think Kantian, moral responsibility excludes the idea of luck. If we agree with Kant - the "good will" (guter Wille) — the will whose goodness is intrinsic (since it expresses duty or has the moral law as its motive) must dominate over "talents," "temperament" (which we referred to earlier as constitutive luck) and over "its luck" (circumstantial, etc.) as a condition for being moral. According to Kant, luck does not or cannot interfere with morality and moral judgments. Kant would represent the paradigm of the denial of moral luck, since moral duty — to act according to good will — excludes from its horizon the different elements of "luck", "fate" or "fortune", as diverse elements that escape the exercise of the determination of the will by duty.

Contrary to the wise man referred to by Williams (whom we mentioned earlier), inclined to his sagacity by his constitutive luck, for Kant, the possibility of the agent morally determining his will is universal, regardless of

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9 Thomas Nagel will return to this problem in The View from Nowhere, cf.: Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 110-137.
inclination. Bernard Williams recognizes in this thesis — of conceiving
morality as independent of luck — an enticing aspect: a consolation, in a
certain sense, for the injustice of the world.\footnote{11} Morality would restore a certain
equality that does not simply derive from luck (constitutive, circumstantial,
etc.).\footnote{12}

Second. Luck imposes limitations on morality. According to Bernard
Williams, morality (contemporary and otherwise) aims to “deliver good news”
by reaching harmonious conclusions to practical dilemmas. This ambition
would be betrayed at every turn by the circumstantial contingency of human
life. Williams is mindful of Greek tragedy because in it he recognizes man
(even the hero) as \textit{irreconcilable} with the world. The difference and
confrontation between \textit{individual desires} and \textit{imposed reality} occurs regardless of
whether we call this “fate,” “gods,” or “social reality.”\footnote{13} In this sense, the agent
could have acted well and feel regret. Rationality and morality are not a
guaranty of any evaluative harmony, nor a safe conduct inhibiting luck and
circumstantial (or other) chance. Williams is sceptical of the ability of morality
to solve practical dilemmas.

Third. Let us consider, in the context of luck, the \textit{retrospective justifications}
for action, starting with the case presented by Bernard Williams (known as the
\textit{Gauguin problem} \footnote{14}): imagine that Gauguin has to decide whether to live
according to certain expectations (he continues with his family) or to travel to
the South Pacific, where he can evolve as an artist and become a great
painter.\footnote{15} The only \textit{justification} he could give for his decision to leave his
family and travel to perfection as an artist would be his success as a painter.
However, the justification based on his success would be retrospective,
therefore \textit{a posteriori}. Retrospective justification depends on the \textit{consequences},
therefore, it depends on \textit{luck} in the process.\footnote{16} Williams goes further and wants
to show how Gauguin’s decision reveals that morality does not prevail in all
cases. To \textit{take a risk} as an artist in \textit{progress} would be, for his \textit{identity}, more

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\begin{enumerate}
\item\footnote{12} In the Kantian tradition, consider the case of the philosophy of John Rawls whose
choice of \textit{principles of justice} would presuppose blindfolding the contingencies of
\item\footnote{13} Bernard Williams, \textit{Shame and Necessity} (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993), 164-165.
\item\footnote{14} Simon Blackburn, \textit{The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy} (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005): "Gauguin problem".
\item\footnote{15} Bernard Williams, \textit{Moral Luck} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 22.
\item\footnote{16} Sergi Rosell, "Nagel y Williams acerca de la suerte moral", \textit{Revista de Filosofía}, vol. 31,
\end{enumerate}
structuring than certain moral obligations. And that is Williams’ dilemma —
either moral value is not supreme or it incorporates elements of luck.¹⁷

Fourth. One might think that if the agent has no control over a particular
action, then he is not truly an agent, but a spectator of an event. However, this
does not seem to be true. If a truck driver runs over a child who jumps into the
road, the driver, although prudent, has no control over the outcome, and yet
he is not a mere spectator of an event.¹⁸ The driver can be expected to regret
the event even if he is exempt from moral responsibility. Thus, the agent’s
participation in a misfortune is not indifferent, even without responsibility for
the resulting fate.¹⁹

Williams proposes a concept that helps clarify what is at issue: agent-
regret. That is, to the general idea of regret, according to which: “it would have
been better if things had been otherwise” if we had deliberated differently,
there is added the agent’s participation in an action (not restricted to
deliberative agency) and the evaluation that the agent exercises about
himself.²⁰ This regret presupposes that the agent participates in an act, even if
he is exempt from moral responsibility for it, as in the example of the truck
driver who runs over a child who throws himself/herself on the road. If the
truck driver was not sorry for what had happened, even though he had no
responsibility, it would be, we would admit, morally wrong. Although the hit-
and-run was not intentional and the perpetrator had committed no negligence,
the example reveals that not only consequences matter for moral judgment.
Reactions to misfortune also play a relevant role to morality (regret would
understandably be present even if no misfortune occurred). Thus, even if one
tries to focus moral evaluation on the agent’s “motive” and “intention,” first,
these do not escape moral fate, and second, they are not the only elements to
consider morally, it is important to consider (moral) reactions in the wake of
unintentional acts.

¹⁹On the debate around the “egalitarianism of luck”, whether or not, in the name of
justice, a more egalitarian distribution of goods should correct certain inequalities
arising from constitutive luck (natural talents), on the grounds that it is unjust for
people to have advantages for which they are not responsible, cf: Nelkin, Dana K.
Discussion: The Paradox of Moral Luck or a Hybrid Position

Thomas Nagel will object to Gauguin’s case by arguing that it does not constitute a moral case. For Nagel, the problem of moral luck consists of a paradox formed at the core of morality or our moral judgments. Let us analyse two corollaries of Nagelian’s philosophy applied to this problem.

First, Thomas Nagel will not give up the principle of control as a structuring element of morality. However, his philosophy views various philosophical problems from a reading key, which is also true for moral luck: the individual is capable of a double viewpoint. On one hand, the internal (or first-person) viewpoint, from which the individual conceives him/herself as an "agent acting in the world"; and, on the other hand, the external (or third-person) viewpoint, from which the individual conceives him/herself as an "event" in a given causal nexus, from which the agent is absent. Nagel’s argument is that we would be incapable of continually looking at ourselves from an external point of view, as mere events in a causal nexus. In a sense, this external point of view would eliminate the point of view from which we see ourselves as agents.

Second. Luck threatens intuitive and habitual moral judgements, since attributable responsibility seems reduced to a ‘point without extension’. However, at the same time, the paradox clarifies relevant aspects of the agent’s conception of himself:

21 CF.: Thomas Nagel “Subjective and objective”, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 196-213. «The power of the impulse to transcend oneself and one’s species is so great, and its rewards so substantial, that it is not likely to be seriously baffled by the admission that objectivity has its limits. While I am arguing for a form of romanticism, I am not an extremist. The task of accepting the polarity without allowing either of its terms to swallow the other should be a creative one. It is the aim of eventual unification that I think is misplaced, both in our thoughts about how to live and in our conception of what there is. The coexistence of conflicting points of view, varying in detachment from the contingent self, is not just a practically necessary illusion but an irreducible fact of life.» Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 213.

22 «The problem arises, I believe, because the self which acts and is the object of moral judgment is threatened with dissolution by the absorption of its acts and impulses into the class of events. Moral judgment of a person is judgment not of what happens to him, but of him. It does not say merely that a certain event or state of affairs is fortunate or unfortunate or even terrible. It is not an evaluation of a state of the world, or of an individual as part of the world. We are not thinking just that it would be better if he were different, or did not exist, or had not done some of the things he has done. We are judging him, rather than his existence or characteristics. The effect of concentrating on the influence of what is not under his control is to make this responsible self seem to disappear, swallowed up by the order of mere events.» Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 36.
«I believe that in a sense the problem has no solution, because something in the idea of agency is incompatible with actions being events, or people being things. But as the external determinants of what someone has done are gradually exposed, in their effect on consequences, character, and choice itself, it becomes gradually clear that actions are events and people things. Eventually nothing remains which can be ascribed to the responsible self, and we are left with nothing but a portion of the larger sequence of events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or praised.»

The analysis of the agent from an external point of view, scientific-natural point of view, eliminates entirely a free and responsible subject, submerging him or her in a causal chain, which can be happy or unhappy, without being able to praise or morally censure the agent. In a causal nexus, who would be the subject who responds or who is responsible? In a flow of events, which actions may be the object of moral judgment? In Thomas Nagel there are no limitations to morality of the same order as those presented by Bernard Williams, such as scepticism regarding the capacity of moral values and practical rationality to definitively influence practical decisions with autonomy vis-à-vis other inputs and other values.

Nagel's and Williams' analysis have different focuses: (a) Nagel is interested in the interference of luck in the judgments we make about others. (b) Williams seeks to understand the interference of luck in the agent's self-evaluation of his actions (agent-regret; Gauguin's problem), the problem of retrospective justification for self and others. (c) Nagel discusses moral responsibility from an external or third-person point of view (one judges the agent from an "objective" point of view). (d) Williams reflects on the agent from an internal or first-person point of view (one is interested in the agent's self-evaluation). (e) Nagel is primarily concerned with non-circumstantial justification. (f) Williams highlights the agent in his surrounding circumstance with irresolvable or morally undecidable practical conflicts. (g) For Nagel, the problem of moral luck connects to our conception of action, on the one hand, the internal "moral" (actions) point of view. And, on the other hand, the external "factual" viewpoint (events). (h) For Williams it is not just a problem of the nature of action, but of the limits of the voluntary, the field of what can be blameworthy and praiseworthy. One can censure the driver who runs someone over without regret, even if he has no responsibility for the running over. That is, the agent is not limited to the strictures of morality in a legalistic sense, moral reactions and feelings also play a relevant role.

Conclusions: Oedipus' Responsibility

First. Where does the debate leave us? Either we deny the principle of control, admitting the contamination by luck of every object of moral judgment, whether agents or actions. Or we deny luck, believing in the immunity that morality would allow (following Kant). One of the determining aspects introduced by the philosophical problem of moral luck is the requirement to define more clearly the field of "action" and "agent", considering the possible interference of luck and chance. "Does thinking that I act is acting?" That is, can one imagine an "evil genius", like Descartes', or an "evil neuroscientist" who makes me believe that it is I who act, when in fact everything I do is controlled by him?24

Second. Returning to the tragic conception of life, which inspires Bernard Williams' reasoning as we have argued, and going back to classical tragedy, we may ask: what, in Oedipus' action, is entirely his responsibility, since it seems determined by his fate or luck?25 Or, in another case, can Ajax (the one that participated in the Trojan War), after being defeated and erring by killing false enemies, return to his home? Or does his integrity leave him no other way out but suicide? As if something in the way the agent sees himself overcomes moral or other values. The case of Ajax reveals the (tragic) connection between a life project (of the warrior hero), luck, and the identity of the agent (self-respect), which is not exclusively moral.

Third. The definition of moral luck and the argument around distinct moral judgments on the same evaluated object, whose only variable depends on luck, presupposes certain apparently intuitive moral feelings and reactions (repudiation of the assassination attempt, etc.). If these reactions are not presupposed it is difficult or infeasible to recognise moral luck. Furthermore, if we admit that the agent who missed the target (murderer in the attempted form) and the agent who hit the target deserve equal moral judgement (treatment), then we do not in fact validate the interference of luck in moral judgements. That is, both (murderer in the attempted and actual form) are guilty, regardless of the resulting luck.

However, even if we are not strictly consequentialist, the resulting luck seems to have to be weighable, otherwise it also seems to us that we would be forced into other absurd conclusions, or inferences that are hardly defensible, prime facie, namely: if we did not need the results to evaluate a drunk or reckless driver and evaluated both the one who runs someone over and the one who does not, equally, we would admit to condemning all reckless

24Sofia Miguens e Susana Cadilha, Ação e Ética: Conversas sobre a Racionalidade Prática (Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2011), 70.
drivers in the same way, regardless of the outcome. We admit that this conclusion is counterfactual, since they are not both the subject of an equidistant moral judgment. Or imagine a virtuous man who, by luck, never manages to put his virtue into practice, would we admit, nevertheless, to attribute merit to him for it? Would we consider an agent virtuous even if he has no actions or only morally correct intentions and motivations? Symmetrically, would a vicious agent who, by luck, never acts morally wrong (a hypothetical agent continually thwarted in his murderous intentions), be morally judged only by his malicious intention or motivation? If we admit to negatively evaluating (censuring) the murderer regardless of whether he was successful or not (murder in the attempted form or murder in fact), it does not seem symmetrically permissible to positively evaluate (praise) a virtuous agent who carries out his virtuous intentions and a virtuous agent who does not carry out his noble intentions (or, in extremis, a malicious agent whose actions are benign as to consequences).

*Fourth.* Going back to the Greek horizon, even Zeus, having sympathy for Hector, had to accept the fatal fate of the Trojan prince, after weighing the fates of the latter and Achilles. It may be that even the gods are doomed to fate. Yet, as far as morality is concerned, perhaps we cannot be so resigned. We cannot benevolently understand Oedipus’ statement - "I did not err" after the prophesied crimes have been committed. In conclusion: we cannot accept, *prima facie*, that luck interferes decisively in moral judgment.

Finally, the rereading of the Oedipus tragedy marks Western culture since Freud with psychoanalysis; or Oedipus as a “scapegoat” who, being sacrificed, allows the re-establishment of justice in Thebes and to end the plague of which he becomes the only culprit (René Girard), as argued by Carlos João Correia, the myth accounts for this cut between life and thought. In this case, we highlight the gap between the chaos of chance, fate, the circumstances of life that escape the will of the agents and moral thought and judgement. If, on the one hand, we designate destiny as the vital circumstance that has uncontrollable elements, on the other hand, moral thought cannot abandon its critical, evaluative and guiding purpose of right action. It is this responsibility for moral errors shrouded in fate that Oedipus bears.

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References


