

The United Kingdom's and United States' Role in the Occurrence of Violence in Cyprus

Cyprus used to be under occupation of the foreign states for many centuries and sovereignty usually with few exceptions was not transferred peacefully. As it is well known, in the 19th century, use of force in international relations was seen as normal. In 1878 however, transformation of sovereignty in Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to the United Kingdom (UK) was by peaceful means. The UK ruled Cyprus mostly in peace until the uprising in 1931. The upheaval of the Greek Cypriots against the UK was to unite Cyprus with Greece (Enosis). The uprising was settled by violence and the constitutional rights were suspended immediately. In 1955 when the riot of the Greek Cypriots occurred again this time the UK was successful to get the support of Türkiye¹ and the Turkish Cypriots and converted the anti-colonial struggle to ethnic strife. Although the United States (US) refrained from direct involvement in the Cyprus problem it assisted in the formation of the Republic of Cyprus by 1960s. During the Cold War conditions, the US had to involve in the Cyprus problem because of two reasons: Firstly, to prevent a war between Türkiye and Greece, the two "motherlands" of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots; secondly to stop the violence between two local communities. In Washington DC the US leadership met with Greek and Turkish prime ministers in 1964 and they decided to solve the Cyprus problem forever. In Geneva, the US representative had several meetings with the officials of Greece and Türkiye. There, the US former secretary of state offered his plan that included the use of violence for the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus. The US plan could not be implemented at the time but after 10 years, its spirit became the source of the violence in Cyprus.

Keywords: Violence, Cyprus, United States, United Kingdom, Cold War, EOKA and TMT.

Introduction

To understand the US role of violence in Cyprus shortly we have to understand the meaning of statehood and means of using coercion. According to Max Weber, the state is a political entity that holds the legal monopoly of exercising physical power over a particular territory.² This was not different for the colonial powers. When the colonial states began to have colonies they extended their sovereignty to that region and established the mechanisms for using physical power. Many indigenous people in the colonies actively served in the colonial administration and the security forces. These forces which can be called "local troops" were used as cheap labor by the European colonial powers and facilitated

¹The Republic of Turkey is known as Republic of Türkiye at the United Nations from June 2023 after formal request of Ankara.

²Waters T. & D. (eds), (2015), *Max Weber in Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*, Palgrave, London.

1 the control of the empire.³ These troops were also used by the colonial powers
 2 against “freedom fighters” in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, where the
 3 insurgency was in question.⁴ Nevertheless, the colonial powers needed other
 4 means besides open violence. Their main tool was the colonial laws. Colonial
 5 governments using the laws that they produced, defined those who oppose their
 6 regime as criminals. Walter Benjamin explains the relationship between the law
 7 and the use of force by saying, “To make the law is to make power”.⁵ In this
 8 context, colonial administrations tried to suppress the rebels by applying martial
 9 law in cases where the normal rules of law did not work and the UK did not act
 10 differently in Cyprus. The US in 1964 had to involve the Cyprus issue as being the
 11 leader of the Western World and found two fragmented societies that were
 12 affecting the interests of the West by leading Türkiye and Greece to confront each
 13 other. This threat would make the US involve more in the problem and prepare a
 14 plan that would have consequences for Cyprus.

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17 **The Source of Violence in Cyprus after the World War II**

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19 The theorists who may best describe the structural relationship between
 20 colonialism and violence after World War II are Frantz Fanon and Aimé Cesaire.
 21 According to them, the main element of establishing and maintaining colonialism
 22 is violence.⁶ For them, violence also was an important tool used against the
 23 independence movements in the colonies. However, Niall Ferguson does not agree
 24 with the evaluations of these theorists. Ferguson argues that the positive aspects of
 25 the British Empire in terms of modernization and development outweigh the
 26 negative ones.⁷ We have to remember that before World War II, the UK was seen
 27 as the hegemon power of the world and its legacy continued to be influential in
 28 international relations during the following period. It is undeniable that the UK
 29 carried its own “civilization” with its socio-economic structure from colonial
 30 imperium to its colonies. However, it is also clear that the UK did not hesitate to
 31 use excessive violence when it was necessary. For example, the UK killed 100,000
 32 people while suppressing the “First Mutiny” in India in 1857.⁸

33 The Greek Cypriots after realizing that they could not get their goal at the
 34 United Nations (UN) through Greece, planned to realize Enosis by employing
 35 violence. On April 1, 1955, the Greek Cypriots established a secret organization
 36 namely EOKA for Enosis. This uprising had different consequences for Greek

³Dwyer, P. & Nettelbeck, A. (eds.), (2018), *Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World*, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Serie, Cambridge, p. 7.

⁴Thomas, M., Moore, B., & Butler, L. J. (2018). Thomas, M., Moore, B. & Butler, L. J. (2018). *Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States, 1918–1975*, London: Hodder Education, p. 414; Waters T. & D. (ed. and trans.), (2015). *Max Weber in Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society*, Palgrave, London.

⁵Dwyer, *opcit*, p. 11.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Ferguson, Ferguson, N. (2002), *Empire: The rise and demise of the British world order and the lessons for global power*, Basic Books, New York.

⁸David, S. (2003), *The Indian Mutiny: 1857*, London: Penguin.

1 Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots in the colonial security forces
 2 who did not want to clash with EOKA resigned en masse. To fill the gap created
 3 by the Greek Cypriots the British administration recruited the Turkish Cypriots to
 4 the security forces instead of them. Now EOKA's target became the Turkish
 5 Cypriots concentrated in the UK security forces. Asmussen argues that the main
 6 reason for the colonial administration to recruit the Turkish Cypriots in its police
 7 forces was that the British did not trust the Greek Cypriots because of their
 8 possible tie with EOKA.⁹ Gülboy approaches differently and associates the
 9 preference of the Turkish Cypriots with the colonial policy of the UK.
 10 Accordingly, the colonial administration used to use another group to suppress a
 11 social revolt, and in this case the British aimed to construct a conflict between the
 12 societies for their own interest.¹⁰ Both views had some truth. It was clear that the
 13 colonial administration could not trust the Greek Cypriots because of the
 14 possibility of an EOKA connection and these troops were used by the colonial
 15 powers against "freedom fighters." In this context, it was under the general
 16 policies of the UK to use the Turkish Cypriots against the rebellion initiated by the
 17 Greek Cypriots. During the British colonial period, the Cypriots became familiar
 18 with use of force and coercion.

19 One other dimension of the UK's efforts to prevent Enosis was its success to
 20 involve Türkiye in the Cyprus issue. The UK called a tripartite conference, which
 21 was held in London in August 1955. Accordingly, the participants would only
 22 discuss the problems in the Middle East.¹¹ However, contrary to the plan the
 23 Cyprus issue was mainly discussed at this meeting. The UK's effort to bring
 24 Türkiye to the meeting was aiming to balance the Greeks claim with the Turks.
 25 The London Conference failed due to the 6-7 September Events against the Greek
 26 minority in Istanbul.¹² The 6-7 September Events further strained the relations
 27 between the two communities in Cyprus which would affect the relations between
 28 Türkiye and Greece. As long as the established order was not opposed, the
 29 colonial administrations did not prefer the use of violence. However, the fact that
 30 the EOKA began to use violence against the British prompted the UK to take
 31 action on both Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots against the Enosis policy. The British
 32 getting the Turks in the Cyprus issue would change the perception of the
 33 international community on Cyprus and the anti-colonial struggle between EOKA
 34 and the UK could be shown as a Turkish-Greek conflict.¹³ When EOKA started its
 35 actions, it tried not to specifically target the Turkish Cypriots. However, as some
 36 Turkish Cypriots were in the colonial security forces, this created the conditions
 37 under which they would also be subjected to the violence of the EOKA. According
 38 to Hitchens, Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan thought that the way to neutralize
 39 the Greek Cypriots was to mobilize the Turkish Cypriots. As expected, when the

⁹ Asmussen, J. (2011) "Conspiracy Theories and Cypriot History: The Comfort of Commonly Perceived Enemies", *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 23. No. 2, Spring, p. 130.

¹⁰ Gülboy, P. E. (2015), s. 224. Gülboy, P. E. (2015), *Sömürgeci Devlet Kibris Cumhuriyeti* [The Republic of Cyprus from Colonial to Nation State], Khora Yayınları, Nicosia, p. 224.

¹¹ Holland, R. F. (1985), *European Decolonization 1918-1981: An Introductory Survey*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, p. 254-255.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 255.

¹³ Kızılyürek, N. (2016), *Bir Hınç ve Şiddet Tarihi*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, İstanbul, p. 103-104.

1 colonial administration included the Turkish Cypriots in their security forces, it
 2 caused them to be the target of EOKA. The policy implemented by the UK was
 3 successful and the anti-colonial struggle turned into an internal ethnic conflict.
 4 Also as mentioned above in the international arena it was presented as “the
 5 Turkish-Greek” conflict.¹⁴ Reddaway stated that the number of auxiliary police
 6 reached 1,770 in 1958 and 1,700 of them were Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵ Meanwhile, it
 7 was a well-known but unspoken fact that Turkish Cypriot leaders encouraged
 8 Turkish Cypriot youth to join the UK security forces as part of their policies.¹⁶
 9 Accordingly, Turkish Cypriot policemen would help the Turkish Cypriot
 10 leadership while fighting against EOKA by taking part in the security forces.¹⁷
 11 Sadrazam also supported this view and stated that the Turkish Cypriots, who were
 12 the auxiliary police, contributed greatly to the distribution of weapons brought to
 13 the island from Türkiye.¹⁸ As a result, Turkish Cypriots in the UK security forces
 14 died during the fight against EOKA and they were not perceived as British
 15 casualties but as Turkish. The perception was that EOKA was killing the Turkish
 16 Cypriots. When the Turkish Cypriots began to attack the Greek Cypriots in 1958,
 17 the relations between the two communities deteriorated and ethnic violence
 18 gradually increased. As can be seen, ethnic violence in Cyprus was organized by
 19 the leadership of the two communities and the foreign powers.
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22 **US Policies after the Collapse of the Bi-communal Republic and Violence in** 23 **Cyprus**

24
 25 The conflict in Cyprus in the 1950s resulted in the involvement of the US in
 26 the issue. While the republic was established, three NATO members, the UK,
 27 Türkiye and Greece became the guarantors of the new state. The UK ceded the
 28 island to the Republic of Cyprus, while it had two sovereign military bases. Since
 29 the relations between the two communities became tense in the 1950s, the survival
 30 of the state in Cyprus depended on mutual goodwill and working together. The
 31 most important problem was that the leaders of the new state adhered to the
 32 policies of Enosis and Taksim (partition) and did not protect the Republic of
 33 Cyprus sufficiently. The problems regarding the constitution and municipalities
 34 could not be overcome. On December 21, 1963, with the first bullet fired the
 35 island began to experience war and violence once again. While the “motherlands”
 36 Türkiye and Greece supported their communities, they abandoned their global task
 37 of the Cold War, containing the USSR and they focused on their national interest.
 38 The US and the USSR had to make a deal at the UN to stop the violence in

¹⁴Hitchens, C. (1994), *Cyprus*, Quartet Books, London, p. 43.

¹⁵Reddaway, J. (1986), *Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection*, K. Rustem and BRO & Weidenfield and Nicolson Ltd, London, p. 90.

¹⁶For the explanations of one of the Volkan leaders Şakir Özel is in Keser, K. (2016), *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* [Underground Activities in Cyprus and Turkish Resistance Movement], IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, p. 166.

¹⁷Kızılyürek, *op.cit.*, p. 105.

¹⁸Sadrazam, H. (2013), *Kıbrıs'ın Savaş Tarihi* [War History of Cyprus], Cilt 2, Söylem Yayınları, Lefkoşa, p. 581.

1 Cyprus. The Resolution 184 of March 4, 1964, made the Greek Cypriots the sole
 2 owner of the state until the problem would be resolved. With this decision, the
 3 parties accepted the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

4 It soon became clear that the UN resolution could not solve the problems.
 5 Türkiye did not find the solution of the UN satisfactory and began to express it
 6 more loudly.¹⁹ To reach an acceptable solution Ankara would like to make a
 7 military intervention to Cyprus. Athens on the other side demanded to “solve the
 8 problem through Enosis” and started a new debate at the US State Department. As
 9 a result of the discussions, the US plan for Cyprus took shape.²⁰ The plan was
 10 proposing a NATO country to rule Cyprus instead of a “wolf in priestly dress.”
 11 While the US was discussing the possibility of this scenario, on June 4, 1964,
 12 Prime Minister İsmet İnönü informed the US ambassador to Ankara that the
 13 government of Türkiye decided to intervene in Cyprus as a result of the pressure of
 14 the Turkish Cypriots, the opposition parties and the public.²¹ Meanwhile, the
 15 “Johnson Letter,” which would damage the relations between Türkiye and the US
 16 was delivered to Prime Minister İnönü on 5 June. This letter would push Türkiye
 17 to have a rapprochement with the USSR and be closer to Non-Aligned countries.²²
 18 The US officials were thinking according to the “Western” interest and the NATO
 19 members had common obligations in defense. Also, with the decision taken within
 20 NATO in 1956, it was agreed that the problems between the allies should be
 21 resolved by peaceful means.²³ The Johnson Letter opposed intervention in Cyprus
 22 and declared that US weapons could not be used for this purpose. This letter
 23 prevented Ankara’s intervention but the existing influence of the US on Türkiye
 24 was also eroded.

25 In the following period, the US continued trying to solve the problem by
 26 Türkiye and Greece and proposed a plan in which non-peaceful methods could be
 27 used. George Ball, the US Under-Secretary of State, who is the most experienced
 28 person in Cyprus, has been appointed head of the new US initiative.²⁴ Until mid-
 29 June, Ball met with the leaders of the UK, Türkiye and Greece to clarify his
 30 thoughts.²⁵ According to Ball, Greece realized for the first time that the Cyprus
 31 problem was dragging Athens into the war, and started to talk about a negotiation
 32 process in which Cypriot President Makarios did not participate. Having received
 33 the support of Türkiye for a US initiative after Greece, Ball presented his report on

¹⁹CH JUSMMT Ankara, 12.3.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2082, NARA.

²⁰Ball to Rusk at the Hague TOSEC 27, 10.5.1964/TOSEC: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2084, NARA.

²¹Bahçeli, T. (1990), *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, WestPoint Press, Boulder, San Francisco & London s. 63.

²²Rusk to Ankara 1290, “Message from Johnson to İnönü”, 5.6.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, 2085, NARA.

²³Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, 13 December, 1956, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm?, [Access 6.7.2023]. Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation of the Turkish Ambassador and the Secretary, 4.6.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA.

²⁴Telcon between Johnson and Rusk, 9.6.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2081, NARA.

²⁵Rusk to Ankara 1337, 11.6.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA; Ball, George, W. (1982), *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, pp. 352-355.

1 11 June to President Johnson.²⁶ Johnson invited İnönü and Greek Prime Minister
2 George Papandreou to Washington DC and he received consent from them to
3 discuss the US Plan in Geneva.²⁷ The talks would be within the UN initiative but
4 under the auspices of Dean Acheson, the former US secretary of state. The
5 proposed document was called the Acheson Plan, which suggested a kind of
6 Enosis, while giving Türkiye a sovereign base, it also ensured the security of the
7 Turkish Cypriots. A great part of the island would be given to Greece and the
8 Turkish Cypriots would gain autonomy at the local level.²⁸ According to the US,
9 this plan was a solution that the Greeks could accept as Enosis and the Turks as
10 Taksim. As can be seen, the US plan aimed to effectively eliminate the Republic
11 of Cyprus. The fact that the Cypriots were not represented in the talks in Geneva
12 showed that the plan was aimed to be imposed on them. While preparing the plan,
13 the US thought that the agreements between Türkiye and Greece would be
14 sufficient and assumed that they would persuade their communities in Cyprus. As
15 can be seen, one of these methods was the use of violence, if necessary, against
16 those who opposed the plan.

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19 **The US Plan**

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21 Acheson started the negotiations with the Turkish representative Nihat Erim
22 on 9 July. Apart from that, he continued his contacts with the UN mediator.²⁹ After
23 Acheson presented his proposals, Erim “presented the partition plan of the Turks”
24 as a counter-suggestion. Acheson thought that a Turkish base could be established
25 on the Karpaz peninsula and “Türkiye’s need for security” would be met. Acheson
26 claimed that the security and welfare of Turkish Cypriots could be solved within
27 the scope of Enosis. Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots would have a local and
28 autonomous administration under the control of the Greek government. In
29 addition, one or more regions with a Turkish Cypriot majority would be created
30 and these areas be administered by the Turkish Cypriots. In this/these region/
31 regions, the Turkish Cypriots would have their police, courts, water
32 administrations and powers to build regional roads, apart from levying taxes.³⁰ In
33 short, the US plan essentially gave the majority of the island to Greece, while the
34 Karpaz peninsula was presented to Türkiye as a sovereign territory. Türkiye found
35 the US plan positive and stated that it could accept it.

36 The US wanted the plan to be discussed in secret and to inform the Cypriots
37 after the agreement of the parties. However, the contents of the talks were leaked
38 outside and Makarios became aware of the details of the plan. Makarios

²⁶Memorandum from Ball to Johnson, Subject: The Cyprus Problem, 11.6.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA.

²⁷Memcon between the US and the Turkish Delegations, 22.6.1964 & Memcon between the Greek and American Delegations, 24.6.1964, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA.

²⁸Acheson to Ball, Embtel 114, 14.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA 2087.

²⁹The report of the NSC meeting, 4.8.1964: Records of Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus 1 Contingency Plans to Cyprus VI Miscellaneous, box 12, NARA.

³⁰Acheson to Ball, 92, 11.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2087, NARA.

1 immediately went to Athens to reject the plan and tried to get the support of the
 2 Greek people. The prediction of the US that “Greece decides and Greek Cypriots
 3 accept it” did not come true and Makarios managed to gain the support of the
 4 Greek public. The US ambassador, Labouisse, reported the success of Makarios in
 5 Athens on July 31st: “Yesterday, Archbishop Makarios was at the center of Greek
 6 policy, pushing the Papandreou government behind the scenes. [...] The center of
 7 Hellenism was Nicosia, not Athens.”³¹ During his meetings with the Greek
 8 government in Athens, Makarios also received a promise from Prime Minister
 9 Papandreou that the US plan would be rejected.

10 Despite Papandreou's promise to Makarios, he gave up on his promise as a
 11 result of the great pressure exerted by the US on Greece and Athens decided to
 12 continue the talks in Geneva.³² Hearing this decision of Papandreou, Makarios
 13 restarted the military attacks against the Turkish Cypriots. According to
 14 Drousiotis, this military attack was intended to collapse the talks in Geneva.
 15 Because the continuation of the conflicts in Cyprus would strain Turkish-Greek
 16 relations and the negotiations would fail.³³ The UK's past plans for Cyprus have
 17 fueled increased violence on the island. In the same way, the US plan of 1964
 18 caused a re-experience of ethnic violence in Cyprus from the very beginning.

19 The increase in violence in Cyprus caused Acheson to intensify his work even
 20 more. Acheson's initial goal was to reduce the differences between the positions of
 21 Greece and Türkiye and prevent the talks from collapsing. According to the US
 22 representative, progress on Turkish Cypriot rights and Papandreou's attitude
 23 towards the transfer of UK military bases to NATO under Turkish command had
 24 to be seen as positive. Thus, both Türkiye's security would be ensured and its
 25 prestige would be preserved. Acheson also claimed that it would be possible to
 26 transfer the sovereignty of Meis (Kastellorizo), a Greek island to Ankara.³⁴
 27 Acheson's philosophy was to satisfy Ankara by meeting Türkiye's security needs
 28 and ensuring the rights of Turkish Cypriots. However, Acheson, who was thinking
 29 within the framework of global policies, could not understand why Türkiye was
 30 giving more importance to “double Enosis” as he was waiting for Ankara to show
 31 its satisfaction.³⁵ Türkiye's expectation of a sovereign base ended with Greece's
 32 response to Acheson. Although Greece accepted the base proposal in its reply to
 33 Acheson on 10 August, it insisted that the base would be leased, not sovereign.³⁶
 34 For the US, the bases being sovereign or leased meant practically the same thing
 35 and Türkiye should have understood this point.³⁷

36 In this process, Prime Minister Papandreou worked on the plan and decided
 37 that by Enosis the problem could finish. The Enosis decision however should be

³¹Labouisse, for Acheson, Embtel Athens 187, 31.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2087, NARA.

³²Labouisse to Acheson, Embtel Athens 197, 2.8.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2089, NARA.

³³Drousiotis, M. (2008), *The First Partition: Cyprus 1963-1964*, Alfadi Publications, Nicosia, pp. 234-235.

³⁴Labouisse, Embtel Athens 116, 14.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2088, NARA.

³⁵Acheson to Ball, Embtel Geneva 168, 21.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2090, NARA.

³⁶Labouisse to Acheson, Athens 260, 11.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis - Athens Telegrams 1 to Cyprus Crisis - Geneva Telegrams 1, box 14, NARA.

³⁷Labouisse, Embtel Athens 327, 17.8.1964: 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2090, NARA.

1 taken in the (Greek Cypriots) House of Representatives of Cyprus. Papandreou
 2 sent Defense Minister Petros Garoufalias to Cyprus to get Makarios consent on
 3 Enosis. While Makarios said he could accept Enosis, he wanted the “impossible”
 4 and brought up the condition that the UK should remove its bases from the island
 5 and not give any base to Türkiye.³⁸ While the aforementioned process was going
 6 on in Cyprus, accepted Papandreou’s proposal for a parliamentary decision and
 7 said that if the Parliament could not take a decision, the coup route could also be
 8 tried. According to the US representative, all that was needed was a secret
 9 agreement between Greece and Türkiye.³⁹ As can be seen, the US plan, which
 10 came to the fore for peaceful purposes, also left the door open for a coup when
 11 necessary. The problem for the US was that Türkiye did not trust Papandreou and
 12 that the Greek Prime Minister was not strong enough to control Makarios.⁴⁰

13 Makarios' uncompromising stance caused the United States to play its cards a
 14 little more openly. When US State Department officials offered Greece to play the
 15 leading role and it should contact directly with the Greek Cypriot National Guard
 16 Commander General Yorgo Grivas. On August 20, Ball sent the new “American”
 17 plan to Athens to be conveyed to Papandreou. What had to be done for the US was
 18 clear, and Greece could not be told how to achieve Enosis. Responsibility was on
 19 Greece and Papandreou had to strive to achieve success.⁴¹ However, due to
 20 Greece’s refusal to give land to Türkiye from Cyprus⁴² and Türkiye’s refusal to
 21 give consent to anything less than a sovereign base on the island,⁴³ Acheson
 22 announced on 22 August that the plan was rejected by the parties and the Geneva
 23 talks failed.⁴⁴

24 During his time in Geneva, Acheson was in constant communication with the
 25 US missions in Washington DC, Athens and Ankara. After the parties rejected the
 26 plan the State Department requested Acheson to continue his task and determined
 27 how Enosis could be implemented in practice. According to Acheson, both Greece
 28 and Türkiye had sufficient strength to achieve their aims. The US preferred
 29 Greece’s Enosis plan and not Türkiye’s Taksim plan. For this reason, Greece had
 30 to take more responsibility and work on Enosis. For this, Greece should assure
 31 Türkiye that the security and well-being of the Turkish Cypriots would be
 32 protected so that it could prevent Ankara’s military intervention. After the
 33 agreement with Türkiye, Enosis had to be carried out by the Commander of the
 34 National Guard Grivas and the Greek troops on the island.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, in

³⁸Drousiotis, *opcit.*, p. 279.

³⁹Acheson to Rusk, Embtel 426, 19.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis - Athens Telegrams I to Cyprus Crisis - Geneva Telegrams I, box 14, NARA.

⁴⁰Acheson to Rusk, Embtel 425, 19.8.1964: *Ibit.*

⁴¹Ball to Labouisse, Deptel Flash 327, 20.8.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2091, NARA.

⁴²Labouisse for Acheson, Flash Deptel 366, 21.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box 2089, NARA.

⁴³Acheson, Embtel Geneva 445, 21.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box. 2091, NARA.

⁴⁴Acheson, Embtel Geneva 461, 22.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams II to Cyprus Crisis-Dept’s Outgoing Telegrams II, box 15, NARA.

⁴⁵Acheson for Ball, Embtel Geneva 462, 22.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams II to Cyprus Crisis-Dept’s Outgoing Telegrams II, box 15, NARA.

1 practice the US should encourage Greece and Türkiye to agree before and after
2 Enosis. The third version of the US plan was conveyed to Papandreou and the
3 Prime Minister invited Makarios to Athens to persuade him before responding to
4 the US request. When Makarios accused the Greek Prime Minister of treason in
5 Athens, all the plans changed. According to Labouisse, Makarios' accusation of
6 Papandreou of treason against Cyprus completely shook the Prime Minister's
7 position.⁴⁶ Moreover, Türkiye did not trust Papandreou, and the Greek Prime
8 Minister would not act in Cyprus without Türkiye's guarantee. The US had to
9 consider its plan after Makarios' unequivocal rejection of any foreign base
10 including NATO on the island in response to Enosis. Clearly in this stage the
11 agreement between Türkiye and Greece was considered impossible.⁴⁷

12 The plan, which was shaped for the 4th time on August 26, aimed to achieve
13 Enosis in Cyprus without an agreement between Türkiye and Greece, but with the
14 help of the US.⁴⁸ Acheson's latest plan gave Greece and Türkiye more
15 responsibility. Accordingly, Türkiye and Greece would avoid fighting among
16 themselves and Makarios would be removed from his post. For this, Greece had
17 enough power on the island and the US would help it if necessary. The last step
18 was the inclusion of Türkiye in the Cyprus case. To this end, the US would direct
19 the Turks to create their military strategy on the island, top secretly and indirectly.
20 Türkiye would occupy the Karpas peninsula, which it specifically aimed to own
21 but would not go beyond it. When Türkiye landed troops on the island, the Greek
22 media would announce that the landing was not intended to attack any part of the
23 island, but to re-establish the constitutional order on the island under the Treaty of
24 Guarantee.⁴⁹ As can easily be understood, according to the final version of the US
25 plan, Greece and Türkiye would not enter into any conflicts with each other while
26 taking the previously agreed areas under their control. On the other hand, both
27 sides would be free in their movements while maintaining control of their
28 territories. This understanding paved the way for both sides to use violence in
29 Cyprus during the present period and in the following period.

30 The last plan of the US never came before the parties but the third
31 version of the plan was giving Türkiye and Greece enough hints that the parties
32 could understand their space to act freely when necessary. The fourth plan did not
33 come before the parties because of various reasons. The upcoming presidential
34 elections in the US and the need for Türkiye and Greece to take radical decisions
35 for the implementation of the plan were possible reasons why the plan was not
36 brought to the agenda. In addition, it is possible to count the possibility that
37 Makarios had a very strong position in Cyprus and Greece. Nevertheless, the

⁴⁶Labouisse, Immediate Embtel Athens 405, also for Acheson, 25.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Athens Telegrams I to Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams I, box 14, NARA.

⁴⁷Labouisse, Flash Embtel Athens 407, also for Acheson, 25.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box 2089, NARA.

⁴⁸Acheson to Ball, to Ball, Immediate Embtel Geneva 486, Subject: "Outline of Acheson Plan No. 4", 26.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams II to Cyprus Crisis-Dept's Outgoing Telegrams II, box 15, NARA

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

1 implementation of such a plan would cause more bloodshed on the island that
2 might not decrease the tension between the relevant parties in the short period
3 during the era the Western bloc needed solidarity between the members. However,
4 only ten years later firstly Greece and then Türkiye intervened militarily on the
5 island following the spirit of the US plan for their own goals.

6 7 8 **Conclusion**

9
10 The UK's and especially the US's policies towards Cyprus in the 20th
11 century had devastating effects. The Cyprus policies of the UK in the 1950s and
12 the US in the 1960s gave way to the violence on the island. The political decline of
13 the UK in the Middle East, which began after World War II put Cyprus in a
14 position to be held strategically. For this reason, the UK did not hesitate to use
15 violence as a tool to maintain its sovereignty in Cyprus. The UK aimed to gain the
16 support of Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots against the Enosis policy and it was
17 successful to get. Encouraging the Turkish Cypriots to enter the UK's security
18 forces on the island had destructive consequences. With the policy of the UK, the
19 Greek Cypriot struggle against the colonial power turned into ethnic violence
20 between the two communities. Thus, the UK was able to propagate internationally
21 that the problem was not related to colonialism, but rather the conflict between the
22 two communities.

23 The Acheson plan, which came to the agenda in 1964 but was not
24 implemented, had great repercussions in the following years. Perhaps the most
25 dramatic reflection of the US plan was in 1974. Both Greece and Türkiye
26 established the intellectual infrastructure of their plans to intervene in Cyprus,
27 inspired by the Acheson plan. The coup carried out by the Greek military junta in
28 Cyprus on July 15, 1974 was highly compatible with the coup scenario proposed
29 by Acheson. Although the US was against the Greek military junta's coup in
30 Cyprus, it could/did not prevent the coup. On July 20, Türkiye was similarly
31 inspired by the Acheson plan when landing troops on the island. Türkiye knew
32 that the US, which could/did not stop Greece, would not prevent it either. For this
33 reason, Türkiye was very comfortable and took control of the north of the island
34 by acting on its partition plan proposed in Geneva in 1964. The 1964 plan of the
35 US was based on the fact that Greece and Türkiye would not fight because of
36 Cyprus, and the parties did not enter a war at Aegean or Trace in 1974 despite all
37 the tensions. The parties during the 1974 events acted autonomously which they
38 could not do in 1964. In the 1960s the Cold War was in full speed ahead and the
39 members of NATO were completely dependent on the global policies of the US.
40 Due to the détente of the 1970s, the allied countries were freer to implement their
41 own national policies. It was the détente between Washington DC and Moscow
42 that made Greece and Türkiye freer than in 1964. Whatever the main reason was,
43 Greece and Turkey using certain elements of the US plan of 1964 in 1974 caused
44 violence in Cyprus and the result was a de facto division of the island.

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