

The Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations (Ingos) on State Compliance with Environmental Regulations: A Critical Analysis

This paper critically examines the impact of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) on the compliance of states with environmental regulations. In the face of urgent global environmental challenges, the role of INGOs in shaping state behavior and ensuring adherence to regulatory frameworks becomes crucial. The central research question guiding this study is: To what extent are INGOs successful in engaging with states to influence the formulation of environmental policies and ensuring compliance with regulations? The increasing need for robust environmental regulations to address sustainability concerns is evident worldwide. States, acknowledging the urgency of these issues, have implemented comprehensive regulatory frameworks. Acknowledging as influential entities, INGOs play a pivotal role in advocating for environmental protection and influencing states to comply with these regulations. This research aims to critically analyze the impact of INGOs on state compliance, focusing on both positive contributions and potential challenges within international environmental governance. Relying on existing scholarly literature, scholars like Marcelo Dias (2013) underscore the significant advocacy role of INGOs in shaping environmental regulations. Studies by Thomas and Mirko (2023) conduct comparative analyses across regions, evaluating the varied influence of NGOs over INGOs in contributing to environmental regulations. Faradj Koliev's work (2023) explores prospective future directions for INGO-state collaborations in advancing environmental regulation. This literature review emphasizes the multifaceted role of INGOs in shaping state compliance and identifies challenges, offering a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics between INGOs and states in environmental governance. Acknowledging a research gap about the long-term effects and sustainability of INGO-driven initiatives, this paper aims to address this deficiency. While existing research provides valuable insights, there is a prevalent focus on short-term impacts and immediate policy changes. The research design adopts a comparative case study approach, examining a chosen sample of countries representing diverse geographical regions and regulatory contexts. Employing a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods, the study leverages primary and secondary resources, including documents, reports, policy materials, and interviews. In summary, this research proposal presents a critical analysis of the role of INGOs in influencing state compliance with environmental regulations, guided by a central research question. The study seeks to contribute insightful perspectives, filling gaps in existing research and offering valuable knowledge for policymakers and environmental advocates. By scrutinizing the intricate dynamics between INGOs and states, the research aims to enhance our understanding of effective strategies for promoting global environmental governance.

1 **Introduction**

2
3 In today's world, where we face significant global issues like
4 environmental damage, poverty, and political instability, international non-
5 governmental organizations (INGOs) play a crucial role. These organizations
6 work across borders to push for policy changes, protect human rights, and
7 tackle pressing problems such as environmental decline and social injustice.
8 One key strategy they use is called "naming and shaming," where they publicly
9 call out individuals or groups for unruly behavior to pressure governments into
10 following rules and agreements set by the international community. This study
11 aims to fill that gap by looking at how INGOs' naming and shaming strategies
12 influence governments to pass environmental laws. This paper will use both
13 theories and real-life examples to understand how INGOs' public criticism
14 affects what governments do about environmental issues. By looking at how
15 environmental shaming campaigns interact with government actions and the
16 introduction of environmental laws, we hope to learn more about how global
17 environmental policies are shaped.

18 Using a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods, this paper
19 will explore how INGOs' actions influence governments, what factors affect
20 how governments respond to environmental shaming, and what this means for
21 creating environmental laws. By understanding how naming and shaming
22 drives government action on environmental problems, it can be better
23 understood that the role INGOs play in global environmental efforts and find
24 ways to make those efforts more effective. In summary, this study highlights
25 the importance of INGOs in tackling environmental challenges and calls for
26 further research to understand how they influence governments' compliance
27 with environmental rules. By uncovering how INGOs' actions shape
28 environmental policymaking, we can develop better strategies for protecting
29 the environment and promoting sustainability worldwide.

30
31
32 **Background**

33
34 Now, the global governance system is fractured, and our political
35 landscape is characterized by populism, skepticism, and partisan competition.
36 Conversely, the challenges we confront have reached unprecedented levels,
37 including issues such as widespread poverty, environmental deterioration,
38 terrorism, unchecked population growth, and global economic instability.
39 Jeffrey Sachs contends that the fate of our global society in the 21st century
40 depends on our ability to unite common objectives and practical strategies for
41 achieving them (Ronalds, 2012). International non-governmental organizations
42 (INGOs) are poised to play a pivotal role in addressing these challenges. While
43 there are ongoing debates about the rightful role of INGOs in tackling global
44 problems, they are rapidly expanding their involvement across various
45 vulnerable sectors.

1 INGOs have emerged as prominent actors on the global stage, extending
2 their reach across various regions and sectors to address critical issues
3 (Mitchell, 2018). The significant growth in the number of INGOs over the past
4 fifty years is commonly attributed to factors such as decolonization,
5 globalization, and the rise of global challenges (Edward, 2010). Their
6 contributions to advocacy for policy changes, promotion of human rights, and
7 mitigation of global challenges like poverty, inequality, and environmental
8 degradation are widely acknowledged (Carpenter, 2017). INGOs have become
9 indispensable partners in worldwide initiatives, significantly advancing
10 sustainable development goals (Smith, 2019).

11 In their multifaceted approaches, INGOs have demonstrated remarkable
12 effectiveness in tackling diverse issues, ranging from environmental
13 degradation to social injustice and humanitarian crises (Keck & Sikkink,
14 1998). International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) operate within
15 intricate networks of relationships spanning various actors such as NGOs,
16 activists, experts, and sometimes governments across borders. Together, these
17 networks form Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), which collaborate
18 to advance specific causes or issues globally. TANs harness their combined
19 resources, knowledge, and influence to enact change (Barnett &
20 Finnemore, 2004).

21 One notable strategic approach employed by TANs is the Boomerang
22 Model. In this model, local NGOs or activists facing challenges in directly
23 influencing their own government due to limited resources or political
24 constraints seek support from international NGOs or foreign governments.
25 These external actors then advocate on behalf of the local NGOs or activists,
26 effectively “boomeranging” their influence back to the local government. The
27 Boomerang Model proves particularly effective in scenarios where domestic
28 political conditions hinder local advocacy efforts, offering a means to navigate
29 obstacles through external assistance and pressure (Keck & Sikkink,
30 1998).

31 A notable example of the boomerang model in action occurred in
32 Argentina during the 1970s and 1980s. Under military rule, widespread human
33 rights abuses, including disappearances, prompted domestic outcry and the
34 emergence of grassroots human rights organizations. Responding to domestic
35 pressure and international scrutiny, Amnesty International documented these
36 abuses in 1976, leading to increased pressure from governments like the United
37 States, Sweden, Italy, and France on Argentina to cease human rights
38 violations. This combination of domestic and international pressure contributed
39 to a significant improvement in human rights practices, with a notable decrease
40 in disappearances by 1979 and the eventual democratization of the country in
41 1983 (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 103–110). Another example is of
42 Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF), a renowned INGO
43 recognized for its medical humanitarian efforts, which has made significant
44 contributions during health crises in Europe. Amidst the refugee influx,
45 particularly in nations like Greece, MSF delivered vital medical care, mental
46 health services, and humanitarian aid to migrants and refugees facing dire

1 circumstances. Through the deployment of mobile clinics, establishment of
2 shelters, and extensive outreach activities, MSF ensured that vulnerable
3 populations received timely assistance despite the challenges posed by the
4 crisis and strained healthcare systems (Doctors Without Borders, n.d.). Oxfam,
5 an international NGO dedicated to combating poverty and injustice has played
6 a significant role in Latin America. In countries like Guatemala, Oxfam has
7 initiated projects focusing on enhancing agricultural methods and ensuring
8 food security among marginalized communities (Oxfam International, n.d.).
9 These instances exemplify how INGOs contribute to addressing a wide array of
10 challenges and fostering positive change across different regions, including
11 Latin America and Europe. These examples illustrate how INGOs employ the
12 Boomerang model, utilizing their skills, connections, and resources to tackle
13 local issues through collaboration with local actors and governments. (Risse,
14 Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999).

15 Another potent strategy employed by INGOs is naming and shaming,
16 which involves publicly exposing instances of misconduct or violations of
17 international norms (Simmons, 2009). In the norms model of foreign policy,
18 INGOs play key roles in both norm creation and the subsequent cascade of
19 norms. Acting as norm entrepreneurs, INGOs continue to exert influence by
20 publicly denouncing non-conformity through this method, thereby encouraging
21 greater adherence to established norms. By publicly identifying and
22 condemning individuals or entities responsible for undesirable behavior,
23 INGOs aim to pressure governments to adhere to established standards and
24 commitments (Florini, 2017). This approach seeks to tarnish the reputation of
25 offending actors and compel them to take corrective actions to avoid further
26 scrutiny and condemnation (Hafner-Burton, 2008).

27 The impact of naming and shaming on important security issues, such as
28 human rights violations and environmental degradation, has been substantial
29 (Zacher & Keefe, 2016). Through this strategy, INGOs contribute to the
30 deterrence of harmful practices and the promotion of accountability and
31 transparency (Goodman & Jinks, 2004). Naming and shaming during the
32 Saffron Revolution in Myanmar (Burma) in 2007 had a notable impact. As
33 protests erupted against the military junta's oppressive rule, international
34 condemnation from INGOs and governments intensified, focusing on human
35 rights abuses. This scrutiny resulted in heightened global pressure on
36 Myanmar's government, leading to economic sanctions and diplomatic
37 isolation. Consequently, the regime was compelled to implement some political
38 reforms and release political prisoners, highlighting how naming and shaming
39 can effectively influence change in certain situations (Esarey & Demeritt).
40 Again, the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh in 2013 exemplifies the impact
41 of naming and shaming by INGOs. After the tragedy, INGOs like Human
42 Rights Watch and Clean Clothes Campaign pressured multinational
43 corporations like H&M, Walmart, and Gap to improve working conditions,
44 leading to significant reforms in the garment industry.

45 INGOs naming and shaming is not limited to human rights violations, in
46 recent years, environmental security has emerged as a priority area for INGOs,

1 reflecting the increasing global urgency to address environmental challenges
2 (Haas, 2002). While there has been notable progress in terms of state
3 compliance with environmental regulations, further research is needed to assess
4 the specific impact of INGOs; naming and shaming strategies in this context
5 (Gulbrandsen, 2007). This paper aims to address this gap by analyzing the
6 effectiveness of INGOs; advocacy efforts in promoting state compliance with
7 environmental regulations and fostering sustainable development.

8 9 10 **INGOS Naming and Shaming and State Compliance with Environmental** 11 **Regulations**

12
13 INGOs are international groups of people from various countries who
14 unite to tackle global issues. While they aren't linked to any government, they
15 still wield considerable influence on governmental decisions. Historically, they
16 have prioritized safeguarding human rights worldwide, contributing to positive
17 changes for everyone's well-being and safety. Today, these organizations are
18 playing a significant role in addressing environmental challenges, crucial for
19 the future of our planet. They are dedicated to preserving the environment,
20 ensuring clean air and water, and fostering a healthy ecosystem for current and
21 future generations (Koliev, Duit, Park, 2023). For example, Greenpeace has
22 been working on protecting the environment by focusing on climate change,
23 deforestation, and ocean conservation. The Worldwide Fund for Nature's
24 impactful work in conservation spans from establishing protected areas to
25 fostering sustainable practices among businesses, contributing significantly to
26 the preservation of endangered species and habitats. Both the Nature
27 Conservancy and The Environmental Defense Fund have been working for
28 land and water conservation (Turner, 2010).

29 Firstly, INGOs strategy of naming and shaming involves publicly
30 exposing the shortcomings of government leaders, especially democratic
31 leaders, through media campaigns, particularly concerning widely accepted
32 environmental norms or formal international agreements like the Paris
33 Agreement (Swed, 2018). Instead of relying solely on economic sanctions, this
34 approach primarily focuses on inflicting reputational costs. For example,
35 environmental INGOs like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Greenpeace, and
36 Conservation International consistently advocate for proper regulations and
37 openly criticize governments that fall short of fulfilling their international
38 obligations. This method has been documented to cause reputational damage to
39 state leaders, potentially resulting in consequences such as the loss of foreign
40 aid, decreased foreign direct investment, and pressure from multinational
41 corporations (MNCs). One study supporting the effectiveness of INGOs;
42 naming and shaming approach is Koliev, Park and Duit, 2023.

43 Secondly, in addition to the reputation damage at international level and
44 losing all the incentives, when state leaders are publicly named and shamed by
45 INGOs, it often provides an opportunity for domestic opposition parties to
46 leverage this information to exert pressure or mobilize public sentiment to

1 advance their own objectives. This can manifest in various forms, such as
2 utilizing the information to fuel their political campaigns, rallying public
3 support behind specific policy agendas, or criticizing the incumbent
4 government for its perceived failures on the international stage. Environmental
5 INGOs like International Rivers and Amazon Watch played a pivotal role in
6 rallying global opposition against the construction of the Belo Monte Dam in
7 Brazil, citing environmental and social concerns. Through advocacy campaigns
8 and media outreach, they spurred both international condemnation and
9 domestic opposition, showcasing their significant influence in shaping
10 environmental discourse (Stroup, S. S. “Authority, Strategy, and Influence:
11 Environmental INGOs in Comparative Perspective”).

12 Besides domestic opposition, INGOs naming and shaming amplify the
13 affect and as a result other actors in the target states get engaged in pushing
14 state to comply with environmental regulations. For instance, in 2021,
15 Germany’s Constitutional Court deemed the federal Climate Action Law
16 inadequate, prompting immediate government action to amend the legislation.
17 Prior to this ruling, environmental NGOs like Greenpeace and German watch
18 had initiated legal proceedings against the German government and publicly
19 voiced criticisms of German climate laws.

20 Ultimately to evade both international and domestic scrutiny, leaders are
21 inclined to adhere to environmental regulations. Failure to do so may result in
22 their removal from power. Consequently, this pressure motivates leaders to
23 shift their stance on environmental issues and actively advocate for
24 environmental security. Based on this discussion, I formulate the hypothesis:

25 Hypothesis: **INGOs naming and shaming significantly influence state**
26 **compliance with environmental regulations.**

27
28


29 **Research Design**

30
31

The Dependent Variable

32
33

34 The dependent variable, environmental laws, captures whether
35 governments enact environmental laws (=1) or otherwise (=0) each year. This
36 paper utilizes data from the Climate Change Laws of the World (CCLW)
37 database, covering 1990–2020 and spanning over 190 countries (CCLW 2022).
38 The database includes laws related to various environmental concerns, such as
39 energy reduction, low-carbon energy promotion, and deforestation. This
40 sample consists of many environmental law events. The trend shows a rise in
41 laws until 2015, peaking in 2014 with 150 laws passed, followed by a decline.
42 Top adopters include Germany, Italy, Brazil, Spain, and Ireland. Some
43 countries, like Kuwait and Sudan, have fewer laws, while others, such as
44 Burma and North Korea, have none. The database's limitations include a lack
45 of qualitative distinctions among laws, such as strictness. This study provides a
46 preliminary analysis of the link between environmental shaming and laws, with
future research needed to explore the impact further.

1 **Figure 1.** *Number of environmental laws passed per year*

2
3 Source: CCLW database 2022

4 The overall data is stated below:

5
6 This data is collected from the CCLW database 2022.


Region	Average Environmental Laws	Percentage (%)
Asia and Pacific	293	22%
Western Europe & North America	271	21%
Sub Saharan Africa	247	19%
Latin America & the Carribean	2391	18%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia	162	12%
Middle East & North Africa	103	8%

8
9 *The Independent Variable*

10
11 In order to assess the hypotheses, an original dataset that captures the
12 overall environmental naming and shaming by environmental INGOs have
13 been used. To compile the dataset, two-step process is followed. First,
14 identification of environmental international non-governmental organizations
15 (INGOs) is done by using the Yearbook of International Organizations (YBIO),
16 resulting in a sample of organizations focused on environmental issues
17 (Hadden & Bush, 2021). Secondly, to identify environmental shaming events

1 by INGOs, environmental shaming events across 176 countries from 1990 to
 2 2020 has been used. Notably, the number of countries targeted by
 3 environmental shaming has increased over time. Descriptive statistics reveal
 4 that wealthier and more populous countries, such as the US, Brazil, and China,
 5 are most frequently targeted. This paper also incorporates a variable
 6 representing the number of international environmental agreements signed by
 7 governments to examine how this interacts with environmental shaming. It is
 8 anticipated that countries with more international environmental agreements
 9 ratified may be more responsive to environmental shaming due to reputational
 10 risks and their commitment to environmental issues.

11
 12 **Figure 2.** *Number of shamed countries per year*



13
 14 **Source:** CCLW database 2022

15
 16 The list of topmost and least 10 named and shamed countries that has been
 17 collected from CCLW database 2022 is stated below:

18

Top 10 most shamed	Top 10 least Shamed
USA	Tongo
UK	Moldova
Australia	Mauritania
Germany	Uzbekistan
France	Slovenia
Poland	Djibouti
India	Uzbekistan
Brazil	Yemen
Urgentina	Serbia
China	Gabon

19
 20

1 *Control Variables*

2

3 To assess the hypotheses, control variables like GDP per capita,
 4 environmental vulnerability, presence of domestic environmental NGOs are
 5 taken into consideration. A country's economic status may affect its capacity
 6 and inclination to enact environmental laws. Wealthier nations might allocate
 7 more resources to environmental protection or face different economic
 8 pressures influencing their environmental policies. Besides, those countries that
 9 face heightened environmental vulnerabilities, such as susceptibility to natural
 10 disasters or possession of fragile ecosystems, may accord higher priority to
 11 environmental protection. This variable captures the unique environmental
 12 challenges countries face and their impact on policymaking. On top of this the
 13 existence and strength of domestic environmental NGOs can independently
 14 influence a country's environmental policymaking. Strong domestic advocacy
 15 may complement or bolster the pressure exerted by INGOs.

16

17

18 **Empirical Analysis**

19

20 Since this paper is interested in whether governments introduce
 21 environmental laws or not, the nature of the dependent variable is binary. So,
 22 the estimated model will be employing logistic analysis. To control aggregate
 23 changes in both dependent and independent variables, year-fixed effects
 24 variables are determined. The findings from the logistic regression models are
 25 given below. This is a generated model done by Faradj Koliev, Andreas Duit
 26 and Baekkwon Park in the article, The Impact of INGO Climate Shaming on
 27 National Laws.

28

Independent variables	Model 1	M 2	M 3
INGO climate shaming	1.000***	1.720***	1.481***
	(0.000)	(0.138)	(0.138)
Democracy			3.110***
			(0.896)
Climate agreements			1.09
			(0.169)
Economic development			0.889
			(0.172)
Trade openness			0.999
			(0.001)
CO2 per capita			1.23
			(0.351)
Federal			0.403**
			(0.163)

Urbanization			0.998
			(0.005)
Previous number of climate laws			
Cube spline 1			
Cube spline 2			
Cube spline 3			
Constant	0.053***	0.020***	0.066*
	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.103)
Year-fixed	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed	No	No	No
Observations	3564	3564	2877

1
2 The initial two models present bivariate analyses using both the raw count
3 and the logged version of the INGO climate shaming variable. These models
4 aim to examine the relationship between INGO climate shaming and the
5 outcome variable independently, without the influence of control variables. By
6 conducting bivariate analysis in models 1-2, we can ensure that the main
7 statistical inference remains unaffected by the inclusion of control variables in
8 subsequent models. Model 3 introduces the full model, incorporating all
9 relevant control variables along with the main variable of interest. In
10 accordance with the hypothesis, the results presented below indicate a
11 significant and positive relationship between INGO environmental shaming
12 and the enactment of environmental laws by governments. These findings hold
13 consistent across various model specifications, including the inclusion of
14 country fixed-effects. To evaluate the conditional-effects hypotheses, the
15 interaction of terms between the INGO environmental shaming variable and
16 Democracy, Trade openness, and environmental agreements is done. The
17 conditional marginal effects are illustrated below. Figure 3: (a–c) Conditional
18 Marginal Effects of INGO Climate Shaming (95% confidence intervals). This
19 figure is collected from the regression analysis done by Faradj Koliev, Andreas
20 Duit and Baekkwon Park in the article, The Impact of INGO Climate Shaming
21 on National Law. The interaction between environmental shaming and
22 democracy appears to have a negligible negative influence on the likelihood of
23 enacting environmental laws as governments become more democratic.
24 Despite the individual positive effect of democracy on the probability of
25 environmental legislation, Figure 3a indicates that shaming more democratic
26 countries may have negligible impact. Figure 3b shows that INGO climate
27 shaming is more effective when governments are trade-dependent. Figure 3c
28 suggests that the influence of climate shaming is influenced by the number of
29 climate agreements a government has endorsed. This suggests that

1 governments committed to climate initiatives may face constraints both
 2 domestically and internationally, making it challenging for them to maintain.
 3 their current stance on climate action.

6 Conclusion

8 Researchers emphasize the urgency of reducing reliance on fossil fuels to
 9 combat environmental change, stressing the need for governments to enact and
 10 enforce ambitious policies. However, recent events, such as the Russian
 11 invasion of Ukraine, have clouded the European Union's path towards renewable
 12 energy. Despite calls for stronger commitments, the EU's classification of
 13 natural gas as a "green fuel" hint at continued reliance on fossil fuels. This
 14 could undermine global efforts to meet the Paris Agreement goals. A study
 15 explores the impact of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on government
 16 climate policy through shaming campaigns. (Klein and Regan 2018 Luders
 17 2010). It suggests that such campaigns can influence governments to enact
 18 climate laws, but questions remain about the effectiveness of these laws. While
 19 governments may respond to reputational pressures, they may also prioritize
 20 minimizing costs and opt for less ambitious policies. This raises concerns about
 21 potential greenwashing rather than meaningful action. Future research should
 22 delve into the ambition and enforceability of national climate laws to better
 23 understand the effectiveness of climate shaming. By examining these factors,
 24 scholars can provide insights into when and how such campaigns can truly
 25 drive government action on climate change. (Citation: Adapted from research
 26 on global climate governance.)

29 References

- 31 Smith, J. (2018). The Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations in
 32 Global Affairs. *Global Governance*, 24(1), 125-143.
- 33 Mathews, J. T. (2009). Non-Governmental Organizations and the Future of the Global
 34 Economy. *Foreign Affairs*, 88(3), 34-45.
- 35 Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in*
 36 *International Politics*. Cornell University Press.
- 37 Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T., & Joerges, C. (2013). *The Opening up of*
 38 *International Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance*.
 39 Cambridge University Press.
- 40 Sikkink, K. (2011). *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are*
 41 *Changing World Politics*. W. W. Norton & Company.
- 42 Mitchell, R. B., L. B. Andonova, M. Axelrod, J. Balsiger, T. Bernauer, J. F. Green, J.
 43 Hollway, et al. 2020. "What We Know (and Could Know) about International
 44 Environmental Agreements." *Global Environmental Politics* 20 (1): 103–121.
 45 https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00544
- 46 Kuchler, M. 2017. "The Human Rights Turn: ENGOS' Changing Tactics in the Quest
 47 for a More Transparent, Participatory and Accountable CDM." *Environmental*
 48 *Politics* 26 (4): 648–668. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1319018>

- 1 Keck, M., and K. Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in*
2 *International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- 3 Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2011). The Regime Complex for Climate Change.
4 *Perspectives on Politics*, 9(1), 7-23.
- 5 Hannum, H., & Lillich, R. (2015). *The Environment and International Human Rights:*
6 *An Integrated Approach*. Cambridge University Press.
- 7 Carpenter, R. C. (2017). *Reputation and power: Organizational image and*
8 *pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA*. Princeton University Press.
- 9 Florini, A. M. (2017). *The right to know: Transparency for an open world*. Columbia
10 University Press.
- 11 Goodman, R., & Jinks, D. (2004). Measuring the effects of human rights treaties.
12 *European Journal of International Law*, 14(1), 171-183.
- 13 Gulbrandsen, L. H. (2007). Overlapping public and private governance: Can forest
14 certification fill the gaps in the global forest regime?. *Global Environmental*
15 *Politics*, 7(2), 12-31.
- 16 Haas, P. M. (2002). Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy
17 coordination. *International organization*, 46(1), 1-35.
- 18 Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2008). Sticks and stones: naming and shaming the human rights
19 enforcement problem. *International organization*, 62(4), 689-716.
- 20 Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in*
21 *international politics*. Cornell University Press.
- 22 Mitchell, R. B. (2018). International environmental agreements: a survey of their
23 features, formation, and effects. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*,
24 43, 429-451.
- 25 Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikkink, K. (1999). *The power of human rights: International*
26 *norms and domestic change*. Cambridge University Press.
- 27 Simmons, B. A. (2009). *Mobilizing for human rights: International law in domestic*
28 *politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- 29 Smith, J. W. (2019). *World politics and international organization*. Routledge.
- 30 Zacher, M. W., & Keefe, P. R. (2016). *The politics of global health governance:*
31 *United by contagion*. Springer.
- 32 UNEP. 2019. *Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report*. Nairobi: United
33 Nations Environment Programme. Google Scholar
- 34 Ingle, D., and M. Tomz. 2022. "The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public
35 Support for Compliance with International Agreements: An Experimental Analysis
36 of the Paris Agreement." *International Organization* 76 (2): 445–468. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000394>
- 37
- 38 Ron, J., H. Ramos, and K. Rodgers. 2005. "Transnational Information Politics: NGO
39 Human Rights Reporting, 1986–2000." *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (3):
40 557–588. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00377.x>
- 41 Risse, T., S. Ropp, and K. Sikkink. 2013. *The Persistent Power of Human Rights:*
42 *From Commitment to Compliance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 43 Pacheco-Vega, R., and A. Murdie. 2021. "When Do Environmental NGOs Work? A
44 Test of the Conditional Effectiveness of Environmental Advocacy." *Environmental*
45 *Politics* 30 (1-2): 180–201. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2020.1785261>
- 46 Murdie, A., and J. Urpelainen. 2015. "Why Pick on US? Environmental INGOs and
47 State Shaming as a Strategic Substitute." *Political Studies* 63 (2): 353–372.
48 <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12101>