

Integral Federalism and Degrowth: Comparative Perspectives on Regionalization and Localization

Integral federalism and degrowth are two currents of thought that share remarkable intersections. This study explores their similarities and differences concerning regionalism and localization. On one hand, the emphasis on regions within integral federalism stems from its opposition to nation-state building, with European integration viewed positively in this process. On the other hand, the degrowth movement's advocacy for open relocation arises from its struggle against the environmental degradation brought about by globalization. Despite their differences, both currents share a strong commitment to decentralization. Rooted in Proudhonian anarchism, integral federalism and degrowth share similar conceptions of humanity, community, and the relationship between humans and nature.

Introduction

Integral federalism and degrowth are two radical intellectual movements that emerged in the 20th century, approximately thirty years apart. Both propose normative approaches that encompass political, economic, and social spheres, envisioning a better world. It can be argued that while integral federalism moves from politics towards economics and ecology, degrowth evolves from ecological and economic concerns towards political action.

This study focuses on a particular point of convergence between federalism and degrowth: the emphasis on regionalization and localization. Decentralization is central to both perspectives. The aim of this paper is to identify the similarities and differences between integral federalism and degrowth concerning their approaches to regionalization and localization.

Integral federalism belongs to the European federalist tradition. Developed predominantly after World War II, particularly in France, Belgium, and Switzerland, it conceptualizes federalization as the decentralization of power, differentiating it from American-style constitutional (or Hamiltonian) federalism. According to integral federalism, nation-states are unsuitable forms of governance due to their authoritarian structures and inadequate scale for addressing local needs and problems. In contrast, federations are envisioned as alternative—and even opposite—forms of organization compared to nation-states. Anarchist philosophers such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, and Pyotr Kropotkin proposed federation as an alternative to the nation-state (Grimaldi, 2012: 308). Proudhon's *Du Principe fédératif* (1863) stands as the founding document of integral federalism. He writes:

“The contract of federation, the essence of which is to reserve always more for citizens than for the State, for municipal and provincial authorities more than for the central authority, could only put us on the path to truth.” (Proudhon, 1863: 77)

1 Proudhon opposed the unitary and standardizing nature of the nation-state,
2 considering it contrary to human nature. For him, human life and identity are
3 naturally rooted at the regional level, rather than the national level. The
4 imposition of a centralized, abstract national identity appeared to him as a form
5 of oppression. Instead, he proposed:

6
7 “Let us be ourselves, if we want to be something; let us form, if necessary, with
8 our adversaries and rivals, federations, never fusions.” (Proudhon, 1863: XV)
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10 Integral federalists adopted the ideas of Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin,
11 and developed a coherent school of thought, particularly in the French-speaking
12 world. Scholars such as Henri Brugmans, Alexandre Marc, and Guy Hérauld
13 contributed to the theoretical debate on European integration while actively
14 participating in the federalist movement under the Union of European
15 Federalists from the late 1940s onward.

16 Henri Brugmans, founding rector of the College of Europe in Bruges and a
17 leading figure in the integral federalist movement during the 1950s and 1960s,
18 shared Proudhon’s understanding of human nature. Brugmans stated:

19
20 “Federalism does not envision a society of philosophers or a republic of virtuous
21 citizens. But neither does it share the pessimistic view of some, such as Hobbes,
22 who saw humanity as a monstrous failure. Federalism places blind trust neither in
23 rulers nor in the ruled. It does not seek to create a ‘new man,’ but merely to better
24 organize life as it already exists.” (Brugmans and Duclos, 1962: 21)
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26 Denis de Rougemont, another founder of the integral federalist movement,
27 argued that, increasing economic inequalities, and fostering social alienation.
28 The movement’s initial roots lie in ecological sciences, particularly in the work
29 of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, who argued that unlimited economic growth is
30 impossible within a closed thermodynamic system such as our planet
31 (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). Only a year later, the Club of Rome published the
32 report *Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al., 1972), further reinforcing the
33 ecological critique of growth.

34 Leading degrowth scholar Jason Hickel argues that reducing material use
35 and emissions can only be achieved through a deliberate decrease in production
36 (Hickel, 2020). Hickel and other proponents of degrowth do not oppose basic
37 production and consumption; instead, they advocate for their reorganization on
38 a local scale. The concept of “relocalization” stands at the heart of degrowth
39 thinking, both in terms of reducing production and minimizing carbon emissions
40 associated with global supply chains.

41 The second source of degrowth lies in its critical economic perspective.
42 According to degrowth theory, dependence on economic growth is the primary
43 driver of economic inequalities. D’Alisa and colleagues note: “From a degrowth
44 perspective, the current economic crisis is the result of systemic limits to growth.
45 It is not a cyclical crisis or fault in the credit system” (D’Alisa et al., 2015). Since
46 neoliberal capitalism is inherently dependent on continuous economic growth,
47 degrowth is fundamentally incompatible with it. As a solution, degrowth

1 envisions a type of state intervention that diverges sharply from neoliberal
2 principles.

3 The third intellectual foundation of degrowth is its critique of consumer
4 society. According to Ivan Illich (1973), neoliberalism has weakened local social
5 ties while strengthening global market connections. Instead of purchasing
6 handmade goods from local producers, consumers increasingly turn to distant
7 factories, leading to alienation among consumers and labor exploitation among
8 producers. Degrowth scholars, particularly Serge Latouche, combine this social
9 critique with third-worldist thought, emphasizing the need to free societal
10 imagination from the ideological grip of growth (Latouche, 2005).

11 Integral federalism and degrowth are two normative approaches aiming to
12 solve the political, social, environmental, and economic challenges of
13 contemporary societies. Although they share common roots in traditions like
14 Proudhonian anarchism, it must be noted that they each also incorporate
15 elements from different intellectual streams. The emphasis on regionalization is
16 not universal among all federalists; for instance, Hamiltonian federalists
17 consider federalism a centralizing rather than decentralizing process. Similarly,
18 within the degrowth movement, some scholars are closer to anarchism, while
19 others are critical of it. The similarities between integral federalism and
20 degrowth are most evident in their anarchist strands.

21 It is important to note the difference between federalist “regionalization”
22 and degrowthist “localization.” A “region” typically refers to a geographical area
23 larger than a city but smaller than an entire country, serving as an intermediary
24 governance level between the central government and the citizens. In contrast,
25 “localization” often refers to even smaller units, such as neighborhoods, where
26 economic activities are envisioned to be scaled down. Nevertheless, federalist
27 regionalization and degrowthist localization share important principles, which
28 will be analyzed under three headings: their political, economic, and social
29 aspects.

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32 **Political Aspects of Regionalization and Localization**

33

34 *Integral Federalism*

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36 As stated in the *Ventotene Manifesto* (Spinelli et al., 1941), all currents of
37 European federalism blame the nation-states for the devastation of the Second
38 World War. According to integral federalists, regions were the historical and
39 natural building blocks of Europe, which were marginalized by the rise of
40 nation-states in the 18th and 19th centuries (Yıldırım, 2016: 95). Newly drawn
41 national borders divided regions and reshaped their status based on centralist
42 criteria, making some regions appear either “close” or “distant” relative to the
43 national center.

44 Henri Brugmans noted, “Since the Medieval Age, European regions were
45 interconnected independently from national borders” (Brugmans, 1950: 83). For
46 integral federalists, European integration, by diminishing the importance of

1 national borders, offers a historic opportunity to reverse the damages inflicted
2 upon regions.

3 Alexander Langer—a federalist, peace activist, and former president of the
4 Greens parliamentary group in the European Parliament—believed that
5 European integration should be fundamentally based on localism. According to
6 Langer, nation-states are “too big and too small at the same time” (Grimaldi,
7 2005: 167): too big for participatory democracy to function properly, and too
8 small to address global challenges such as securing peace or combating climate
9 change.

10 Integral federalists’ vision for European integration focuses primarily on the
11 subnational level. They see globalization and supranational integration as
12 strategic tools to weaken the grip of nation-states and thereby liberate the
13 regions, considered the authentic political units. For integral federalists, other
14 levels of governance—national and supranational—are secondary in importance
15 compared to regions. As De Rougemont put it:

16
17 “It seems that political federalism (...) finds its most original expression in the
18 reality among regions, rather than being boiled down to inter-state or international
19 alliances.” (De Rougemont, 1969: 78)

20
21 De Rougemont’s contribution lies not only in emphasizing regions but also
22 in connecting federalist and ecological struggles through a regionalist-localist
23 perspective. Surprisingly, this tendency intersects with an early critique of
24 growth-centered policies. As Grimaldi observes:

25
26 “De Rougemont [had] ecological concerns signaled by the fact that the federation
27 of regions had to simultaneously develop concrete and local solutions to ecological
28 problems in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and build a level of
29 European and global governance capable of tackling environmental issues through
30 incisive, sustained, and radically alternative action to the methods that had
31 characterized growth policies. (...) Environmental policy could only take place on
32 a local and regional scale, while continental and global problems required the
33 intervention of continental authorities created on a regional basis.” (Grimaldi,
34 2020: 255)

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36 Thus, for integral federalism, political regionalism represents not the
37 creation of new units but the restoration of historical and natural governance
38 levels. From this perspective, regions have never truly disappeared; they
39 continue to exist within the underlying political reality.

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1 *Degrowth*

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3 Emerging from the ecological movement, the degrowth perspective initially
4 lacked a strong political dimension compared to its environmental and economic
5 critiques. During the 1970s and 1980s, political disengagement was a common
6 feature of many ecological movements. However, from the early 1990s
7 onward—especially by the time the degrowth movement gained momentum in
8 the late 2000s—ecological activists became increasingly politically engaged,
9 particularly in Europe.

10 Thinkers like Serge Latouche contributed to strengthening the political
11 outlook of degrowth by linking it with anti-globalization thought. Unlike integral
12 federalism, degrowth is critical of globalization, viewing it as a force that fosters
13 excessive value chains and dependency relationships between the Global North
14 and South. Similarly, degrowth critiques the nation-state, associating it with
15 growth-oriented economic policies that it fundamentally opposes. In contrast,
16 degrowth envisions a new way of life organized at the local level, not merely as
17 an economic shift but as a profound political transformation.

18 Romano explains the political dimension of degrowthist localism as
19 follows:

20

21 “Re-localizing does not only concern the economic field. It also includes the ‘local
22 political utopia.’ For degrowthers, in general, the local dimension is not only a
23 space for the reconstruction of social ties and lost DIY (‘do it yourself’) production
24 practices; it is the main ‘institutional’ container and the preferable scale of
25 application of the degrowth alternative.” (Romano, 2020: 40)

26

27 Another political ambition of degrowth is to revive democracy in its most
28 participatory form (Yıldırım, 2024). As Fitzpatrick and others note:

29

30 “Most degrowth theory rests on the assumption that the local level is the optimal
31 scale for societal transformation because it is there that direct democracy is more
32 easily exercised.” (Fitzpatrick et al., 2022: 9)

33

34 Latouche similarly affirms his belief that “Democracy can only really work
35 at the local level” (Latouche, 2005: 69), reminding readers that Plato once
36 considered 5040 the ideal number of citizens for a functioning democracy (see
37 also Papanikos, 2017 and Papanikos 2022).

38 For degrowth, democracy is not merely desirable but essential for achieving
39 social and economic autonomy. Once communities secure local democratic
40 control, it is expected they will naturally adopt the values associated with
41 degrowth—such as sobriety, moderation, and community-centered living.
42 Romano describes this expectation:

43

44 “Anyway, consistently with the goal of relocalizing, political action is more often
45 staged in the local arena. (...) The underlying trust is that a specific political–
46 territorial frame (the ‘localist’ one) necessarily generates and reproduces a specific
47 political agenda: once a local community is democratized and autonomous, it will

1 spontaneously choose the ‘good’ values of sobriety, measure, ‘small is beautiful,’ etc.”
2 (Romano, 2020: 42)

3 4 5 **Economic Aspects of Regionalization and Localization**

6 7 *Integral Federalism*

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9 The territorial limitation of authority, a central goal of integral federalism,
10 naturally leads to a vision of economic decentralization. Integral federalists
11 advocate for scaling down both political and economic organization to human-
12 scaled levels, a perspective that strongly resonates with the degrowth emphasis
13 on localized production and consumption. Remarkably, many integral federalist
14 thinkers had already begun advocating for a model of localized and ecologically
15 balanced economies long before the degrowth movement gained momentum.

16 Denis de Rougemont, for instance, referred to the findings of the *Limits to*
17 *Growth* report by the Club of Rome and described the ideology of economic
18 expansion as a kind of “growth religion” (De Rougemont, 1977: 15). His critique
19 of economic growth did not arise from ecological theories but from a federalist
20 political position: he saw the nation-state as an “industrial aggression unit” that
21 drove economic growth at the expense of both regional diversity and ecological
22 balance (De Rougemont, 1979: 103).

23 De Rougemont associated nation-states with the pursuit of unsustainable
24 industrialization, whereas he saw regions as the natural loci of more balanced
25 and sustainable economic activities. It is also important to note that he was not
26 only a federalist philosopher but also a pioneer of ecological activism, being one
27 of the founders of the *Action Ecologique Européenne*.

28 Alexander Langer, writing in the early 1990s, similarly envisioned a simpler
29 lifestyle characterized by reduced consumption and waste:

30
31 “(...) our civilization, as it appears, is not compatible with nature because, if we
32 continued only with this production of waste, the planet we have would not be
33 enough. The same thing could be said for energy and for all other fields. (...) There
34 are some things that can already be said, though. One is the strong revaluation and
35 revitalization of local communities.

36 (...) Even small choices like riding a bike instead of driving a car have
37 consequences for everything, not just our lungs.” (Langer, 2019: 150)

38
39 Thus, Langer’s vision aligns with degrowth in promoting the principle of
40 self-limitation. As Grimaldi notes, quoting Langer:

41
42 “a Europe intent on paving the way for that self-limitation, both *consumerist and*
43 *productive*, which today is the condition for the planet to have a future” (Grimaldi,
44 2023: 120; quoted from Langer, 1991: 146) [emphasis is mine]

45
46 In addition to these integral federalist figures, Murray Bookchin deserves
47 mention as someone who, though outside the European federalist tradition,

1 combined federalist principles with ecological thinking. Bookchin criticized
 2 American-style federalism as overly centralized and instead proposed a model
 3 of confederalism based on regional and municipal autonomy. His project of
 4 democratic confederalism aimed to promote direct democracy and ecological
 5 sustainability at the local level. Bookchin explicitly opposed growth-centered
 6 capitalist economies and argued for “limiting growth” to preserve ecological
 7 systems (Bookchin, 1996: 44).

8 Thus, both European integral federalists and thinkers like Bookchin
 9 independently contributed to the conceptual foundations that would later
 10 converge with many ideas central to the degrowth movement.

11 *Degrowth*

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 13
 14 The degrowth perspective on the economy is rooted primarily in its critique
 15 of globalization. Degrowth thinkers argue that globalization has extended
 16 economic activities beyond ecologically sustainable limits, leading to
 17 unsustainable supply chains, environmental degradation, and socioeconomic
 18 inequality. Consequently, they advocate for a significant scaling-down of
 19 economic life through the principle of “relocalization.”

20 The concept of “relocalization,” first widely popularized by Serge Latouche,
 21 calls for reversing the globalization process and rebuilding local economies.
 22 Latouche states:

23
 24 “We must revitalize the local fabric. This is not only necessary because we live locally even
 25 in a virtual world, but also because we need to escape the ideologies of development and
 26 economic growth and actively resist globalization.” (Latouche, 2005: 116)

27
 28 The first reason why degrowthers advocate for localization is
 29 environmental. According to degrowth theorists, business organization at the
 30 global level is closely tied to the “exchange value” of goods and is inherently
 31 driven toward continuous growth. This growth process depletes natural
 32 resources and generates waste and environmental degradation. In contrast, local
 33 economic activity operates within natural limits, focuses on the “use value” of
 34 goods, and involves entrepreneurs who are content with maintaining stable
 35 operations over time. Hickel illustrates this difference by comparing a local
 36 restaurant, where “the owners are content with the same profit year after year,”
 37 to global corporations that are “putting local shops out of business” and exhibit
 38 “no identifiable end point to the process of accumulating exchange-value”
 39 (Hickel, 2020: 82). Similarly, Liegey and Nelson argue:

40
 41 “Degrowth is about localizing production and consumption, which often means
 42 'relocalizing' in practice. It is clearly desirable in ecological terms to minimise the
 43 transport of people, goods and services. It is totally absurd to have to travel to shop
 44 for goods and services that could be produced and consumed locally.” (Liegey &
 45 Nelson, 2020: 217)

46

1 The second major reason for supporting localization is socioeconomic.
 2 Degrowth theorists believe that the global neoliberal economy has exacerbated
 3 inequality. Local economies, by contrast, provide more equitable access to
 4 resources and foster democratic control. As Kallis explains:

5
 6 “Those of us who write about degrowth envision a future wherein societies live
 7 within their ecological means, with localized economies that distribute resources
 8 more equally through new forms of democratic institutions.” (Kallis, 2011: 10)
 9

10 Thus, the degrowth economic model is rooted in both environmental
 11 sustainability and social justice, achieved through the relocalization of
 12 production and consumption.
 13

14 **Social Aspects of Regionalization and Localization**

15 *Integral Federalism*

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 17 From the perspective of integral federalism, regions are not merely
 18 administrative units; they are the historical and natural environments in which
 19 human societies have evolved. According to Denis de Rougemont, the nation-
 20 state building process inflicted significant damage upon these original social
 21 ecosystems. As an example, he cites Lille—a French city geographically distant
 22 from Paris but historically closer to Belgium and the North Sea. Within the
 23 framework of the nation-state, Lille was marginalized and relegated to a
 24 peripheral status. Yet, historically, it served as a dynamic hub linking Britain,
 25 France, and Belgium. Today, as national borders lose some of their significance,
 26 Lille has once again become a regional center.
 27

28 Nation-building not only disrupted political and economic balances but also
 29 undermined social and cultural identities. Nation-states attempted to forge
 30 national identities by suppressing or even erasing regional ones. As De
 31 Rougemont explains:
 32

33
 34 “Nationalism attempted to recreate community from above... But we see it clearly
 35 today: we cannot decree a feeling, a life, or community vitality... So it is with the
 36 social community: it is rooted in the very condition of man and not elsewhere, in
 37 his fundamental needs and his most personal ends. It pre-exists the individual in
 38 the sense that each one is born from a union formed in the network of social
 39 relations, and it lasts beyond the person.” (De Rougemont, 1977: 220)
 40

41 Federalist thinkers such as Guy Hérauld and Alexandre Marc built upon this
 42 understanding, emphasizing the deep social and ecological grounding of
 43 federalist thought. Hérauld described integral federalism as the political-legal
 44 dimension of what he termed “realistic humanism.” Referring to Marc’s famous
 45 phrase, “Become what you are” (*deviens ce que tu es*), Hérauld stressed the
 46 importance of respecting both human individuality and the natural environment
 47 (Hérauld, 1969: 40).

1
2 Similarly, Luigi Zanzi views human communities as an integral part of
3 nature. According to Grimaldi, Zanzi offers “an autonomous and systematic re-
4 evaluation of the history of nature in a local key from which he draws specific
5 and operational indications that permeate his proposal for a federal Europe”
6 (Grimaldi, 2005: 112). Zanzi argues that the genuine historical regions of Europe
7 were actually “environmental regions,” encompassing multiple nations and
8 transcending the borders of today’s nation-states. These regions included both
9 human communities and natural ecosystems. One example Zanzi provides is the
10 Alpine region, which forms a vast cultural and environmental ecosystem but is
11 now divided by numerous national frontiers. Zanzi’s aspiration is to revive these
12 environmental regions through the European integration process and to build a
13 European federation based upon them. According to Zanzi, as Grimaldi notes,
14 “it should be the ‘natural nations’ founded in the Middle Ages and at the dawn
15 of the modern age on ethnic-linguistic-cultural communities, that constitute the
16 fundamental substratum of European unification” (Grimaldi, 2023).

17 Thus, integral federalism views regionalism not merely as a political ideal
18 but as the natural and historical framework for authentic human community life.

19 20 *Degrowth*

21
22 The degrowth movement’s emphasis on localization also finds a strong
23 expression in the social sphere. Like integral federalism, degrowth critiques
24 modern development for eroding meaningful social ties and alienating
25 individuals from their communities and environments. In *Survivre au*
26 *développement* (Latouche, 2004), Serge Latouche argues that the ideologies of
27 development and economic growth have disrupted people’s natural relationships
28 with both their social and ecological environments.

29 To counteract this alienation, degrowth advocates for “convivial
30 relocalization”—the rebuilding of genuine human relationships and ecological
31 connections at the local level. Rather than seeing individuals as isolated
32 consumers and producers embedded in global value chains, degrowth envisions
33 people as community members participating in cooperative and face-to-face
34 interactions. Liegey and Nelson define open relocalization as follows:

35
36 “Open relocalisation places humans and ecosystems at the centre, as substitutes for
37 where monetary value and capitalist enterprises stand within capitalism. Human needs
38 and ecological limits are key determinants of degrowth practices, which revolve around
39 human relations with one another and with nature, and where coexistence is central.”
40 (Liegey & Nelson, 2020: 269)

41
42 In addition to rebuilding social ties, degrowth places great importance on
43 local democracy as the political foundation for this renewal. Degrowth theorists
44 critique national and supranational institutions as overly bureaucratic,
45 technocratic, and disconnected from people’s everyday realities. Instead, they
46 advocate for grassroots democracy, emphasizing the need to embed political

1 institutions within specific cultural and ecological contexts. Romano articulates
2 this vision:

3
4 “For degrowth advocates, the local dimension provides two conditions without
5 which a democracy is unmanageable and deprived of any sense: the personalization
6 of citizens’ relations (...) and the embedding of institutions within a specific
7 cultural context, achievable only at a local scale. Of course, the proposed bio-units
8 are not supposed to be closed, autistic monads, but connected to one another within
9 bottom-up confederations.” (Romano, 2020: 40)

10
11 Romano also highlights Fotopoulos’ contribution, noting the strong
12 compatibility between degrowth principles and the model of libertarian
13 municipalism. Echoing the ideas of Proudhon and Bookchin, Fotopoulos asserts:

14
15 “It is therefore compatibility with direct and economic democracy, that is, the
16 feasibility of decision-making in face-to-face assemblies, that should be the basic
17 determinant of the size of the self-reliant community. On these grounds, the
18 municipality (the demos) emerges as the most appropriate economic unit that could
19 constitute the nucleus of an inclusive democracy.” (Fotopoulos, 1997: 244)

20
21 In his later work, Fotopoulos further argues that a confederal democracy can
22 only emerge from decentralized, local levels of organization and characterizes
23 degrowth as a natural “by-product” of such a political system (Fotopoulos, 2010:
24 3).

25 Thus, from the degrowth perspective, social reconstruction is deeply tied to
26 relocalization, participatory democracy, and the revitalization of community life
27 at the human scale.

28 29 30 **Conclusion**

31
32 As explored in this study, integral federalism and degrowth—despite
33 emerging from different historical and intellectual backgrounds—converge on a
34 central idea: decentralization, whether understood as regionalization or
35 localization. Both frameworks are rooted in a shared anarchist tradition,
36 particularly in Proudhonian thought, which envisions society as naturally
37 cooperative and decentralized.

38 Integral federalism views regional autonomy as a way to challenge the
39 authority of nation-states and promote a “Europe of Regions,” where political
40 structures are more human-scaled and culturally grounded. Degrowth, on the
41 other hand, advocates for localization to confront the ecological and social crises
42 caused by globalization and economic growth. Despite these different starting
43 points, both approaches question the dominant paradigms of governance and
44 economic organization by proposing smaller-scale, participatory, and ecologic
45 alternatives.

46

1 A key distinction between the two lies in their respective attitudes toward
2 globalization. Integral federalists often see globalization and supranational
3 institutions as opportunities to weaken the nation-state and empower subnational
4 regions. Degrowth theorists, however, perceive globalization as an extension of
5 the very growth-oriented logic they seek to overcome. For them, localization is
6 not only an ecological necessity but a path toward autonomy, democracy, and
7 community resilience.

8 Nonetheless, the potential for alignment between these two frameworks is
9 significant. Integral federalists like Denis de Rougemont and Alexander Langer
10 expressed environmental concerns and advocated self-limitation well before
11 degrowth emerged as a formal intellectual movement. Their critiques of
12 industrialization, consumerism, and centralization resonate strongly with the
13 core values of degrowth.

14 Conversely, as degrowth evolves into a more politically articulated
15 movement, it increasingly turns to the kinds of organizational principles found
16 in federalist tradition. Approaches such as democratic confederalism and
17 libertarian municipalism offer blueprints for constructing decentralized,
18 participatory political systems that are capable of realizing the goals of degrowth
19 in practice.

20 In sum, while integral federalism and degrowth maintain distinct theoretical
21 foundations, their shared emphasis on autonomy, participatory democracy, and
22 ecological responsibility points toward a common horizon. Should degrowth
23 continue to develop its political dimension, integral federalism may prove to be
24 one of its most natural allies.

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