

The Culture of Name-calling and shaming by Zimbabwe's Main Political Parties: A Critical Discourse Analysis

Over the past two decades, the Zanu PF party and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by the late Richard Morgan Tsvangirai, have been characterized by acrimonious relations, leading to rising political tensions and polarization in Zimbabwe. This animosity has been characterised by accusations and counter-accusations of insurgency, banditry, terror and violence by the two protagonists, Zanu-PF on the one hand, and the MDC (and its various formations after the party's several splits) on the other. While the accusations and counter-accusations by either side have been dismissed as being unwarranted, unproven and unjustified attacks on the other, political analysts have generally described them as being mere political conspiracies and grandstanding by the different political actors. In the context of this background regarding the relationship between Zanu PF and the MDC, this article aims to examine the major accusations and counter-accusations between the two parties, how the accusations have evolved over the past two decades, and how they threatened the security of certain individuals or groups and aided political contests between the two parties. Data for the study were collected from speeches by prominent political figures, newspaper articles, and reports on legal cases in which some of the accusations and counter-accusations were heard in courts of law. The collected data were analysed from the perspective of Fairclough and Wodak's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). From the perspective of CDA, the study analysed how the accusations and counter-accusations made by the two political parties could be regarded as lenses through which we can understand ideological differences and power relations between the two political parties and the socio-political challenges faced by Zimbabwe. The study therefore, contributes to the body of literature on language, politics and security issues in the context of disagreement, conflict of interests and values, uncertainty and power disparities from an African point of view.

Keywords: language, politics, name-calling and shaming, Zanu PF, MDC, CDA

Introduction

As part of the study of language and power, this article looks at the connection between politics and language as expressed in the names and naming used by political parties in Zimbabwe. The study of language and power reveals the ways in which speakers—like politicians—use language to influence our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors without resorting to coercion. According to Wareing (1991), this type of power is known as influential power because it comes from people or organizations trying to control others by influencing their attitudes and actions. The language used by politicians, either individually or in small groups, when making speeches is a blatant indication of their influential authority. This is because even while we have to follow the rules that politicians enact, we still get to choose who to vote for and what policies and viewpoints to endorse. Therefore, politicians use language in a way that increases their own and their linked parties' influence.

Given the intricate relationship between language and power as briefly explained above, this chapter investigates the relationship between the ruling Zanu-PF party and the MDC as revealed in how politicians from either party used language to accuse and rebut accusations by the other over the past two decades. The examination is motivated by the common perception among Zimbabweans that the relationship between the ruling Zanu-PF party and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by the late Richard Morgan Tsvangirai, can be described as having been acrimonious.

As a result, the relationship between Zanu PF and the MDC has led to rising political tensions and polarization in Zimbabwe. Both parties accuse each other of insurgency, banditry, terror, and violence. While these accusations are dismissed as unwarranted, unproven, and unjustified attacks, analysts view them as political conspiracies and grandstanding by different political actors. The animosity between the two parties has characterized Zimbabwe's political landscape. The accusations and counteraccusations have been dismissed as unwarranted attacks.

In the context of this background regarding the relationship between Zanu-PF and the MDC, this article analyzes the allegations and counter-allegations made by the two political parties over the past 20 years regarding insurgency, banditry, terror, and violence. It examines how these accusations, expressed through naming and shaming (a concept popularized by Hafner-Burton, 2008), have evolved and how they have impacted the safety of individuals or groups and influenced political contests. In line with prior research (e.g., Brinkman, 2004), the article argues that the allegations and counter-allegations used by political parties in Zimbabwe through various acts of names, naming and shaming, are a form of political language in times of disagreement, conflict of interests, power inequalities, uncertainty, and risk.

Background of the Study

Mashakada (2019) challenges the popular belief that the MDC was founded in 1999, stating that it was actually established in the late 1980s due to labour, constitutional, civic, and student movements. The article focuses on how the establishment, growth, and actions of the MDC led to shifting dynamics between the MDC itself and the dominant Zanu PF party. Asuelime & Simura (2014) argue that the rise of MDC in 1999 was a milestone change in Zimbabwe's political history, facilitated by socio-economic hardships and western infestation in its creation and funding. This led to widespread violence and polarization, challenging ZANU-PF's 'divine' leadership perception.

Given the above background, the relationship between the ruling Zanu-PF party and the MDC, which later split into splinter groups like the MDC-Tsvangirai, MDC Alliance, and the Citizens' Convergence for Change (CCC), was characterized by accusations and counter-accusations of puppetry, insurgency, banditry, terror, and violence. The article also examines how Zanu-PF regarded itself as 'patriots', while the MDC claimed to be 'democrats'. These discourses are revealed in speeches by prominent political figures from both the MDC and Zanu-PF; newspaper articles

reporting the accusations and counter-accusations; and reports on legal cases in which some of the accusations and counter-accusations were heard in courts of law (e.g., the 2013 Morgan Tsvangirai Treason Trial).

Research Objectives

This article sought to examine:

- (i) the major accusations and counter-accusations related to insurgency, banditry, terror and violence made by the two political parties in the past two decades;
- (ii) how the accusations and counter-accusation have evolved (or not) over the past two decades; and
- (iii) how the accusations and counter-accusations threatened the security of certain individuals or groups and aided political contests between the two political parties.

Literature on the relationship between language and politics

The study of language and politics looks at how language and linguistic tactics used in politics affect individuals. Scholars agree that language can have a variety of effects on politics (Orwell, 1946 cited in BBC, 2014; Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015). Speech language can be used to skirt specific questions, create rapport and confidence, and put a desired spin on events, and influence listeners' opinions and voting patterns (Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015).

The relationship between language and politics is part of the study of language and power, which recognizes how people can use words to shape human behavior without resorting to physical force. One technique to provide insight on the manner in which language is used to influence a large number of people is to examine Zimbabwean media that publish in English and politics. This is important because it may clarify historical events such as the establishment of opposing political parties, governments, and elections, as well as the circumstances surrounding the usage of political language.

George Orwell (1946) cited in BBC (2014) clarified in his well-known article Politics and the English Language that the study of language and power is what encompasses the relationship between language and politics. Politicians can therefore use language to further their own and their connected parties' agendas and increase their own influence. Furthermore, political rhetoric, pragmatics, personal pronouns, and political spin are linguistic strategies frequently employed by politicians.

Speeches are among the most frequent settings in which we witness politicians employing linguistic strategies. Speeches are frequently compelling and captivating oral writings intended to sway public opinion and convince listeners to support particular political and social viewpoints or vote in a particular way. When making

public appearances—such going on TV, like the News—talking to journalists, and responding to inquiries from the public, politicians can also use words to garner influence. The idea of parliamentary speech—the vocabulary politicians employ when conversing with one another in legislative settings—is a last point to address.

Given the above-mentioned examples of how politicians use language, analyzing a political speech involves considering the entire text, including the speaker's audience, goals, and methodology. It is crucial to consider the speech's emotive, persuasive, or informative nature, as well as its historical context and allusions. Additionally, one should consider how political rhetoric is used, addresses given, and what is mentioned or left out, as well as whether the speaker intentionally leaves out details or viewpoints. Political rhetoric is the persuasive language strategies used by politicians, derived from the Greek term for professional speaker (Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015). It involves repetition, rhetorical questions, allusion, and hyperbole, among other language devices, as noted by Crystal in 2020 (Crystal, 2020).

Pragmatics is another crucial aspect of understanding the relationship between language and politics. Crystal (2020) highlights Grice's maxims as essential for comprehending language and politics. These maxims include the maxim of quantity, which advises providing as much information as necessary, the maxim of quality, which emphasizes presenting true information, the maxim of relevance, which emphasizes providing relevant information, and the maxim of manner, which emphasizes precision, succinctness, and avoiding ambiguity.

However, Crystal (2020) points out that politicians have different goals than the average person when it comes to upholding successful conversations, such as influencing others, thus they do not adhere to the maxims in the same way. This implies that politicians frequently do not think that other politicians are being truthful, providing only pertinent information, or staying clear of ambiguity.

Political spin is another issue that highlights the connection between language and politics. Political spin refers to the propaganda used by politicians to present facts as they see fit, rather than providing the full truth. This concept is often seen in awkward journalist-politician interviews, highlighting the connection between language and politics (Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015).

Based on Halliday's systematic functional linguistics, Sharififar and Rahimi's study on linguistic spin in Obama and Rouhani's UN speeches analyzed transitivity and modality. They found that politicians use language to express their authority, prowess, and policies. Common strategies include prevarication, factual misrepresentation, false information, information withholding, repetition, and tautology. These strategies help politicians combine power and ideology in their speeches, highlighting the importance of understanding and utilizing linguistic strategies in political communication (Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015).

Therefore, this article examines the relationship between language and politics in Zimbabwe, focusing on two political parties. It examines the names used by these parties to accuse and counter-accuse each other. The article acknowledges the elusive definition of politics but emphasizes the inextricable link between politics and language. It suggests that our political and legal reality is constructed by language, but it also periodically defies it.

Methodology

This article uses qualitative media content analysis to collect data and analyse the data in respect of the study's research questions. Media content analysis emphasizes the researcher's reflexivity and interaction with materials to arrive at meaningful conclusions. The approach involves identifying a theoretical problem, finding documents like political speeches and newspaper reports, developing a protocol, collecting, coding, organizing data, data analysis, and reporting the findings.

To this end, the study analyzed 14 newspaper articles from nine newspapers from 2003 to 2022, including political speeches by Zanu-PF and MDC politicians and political news articles covering accusations and counter-accusations. The data was recorded using various criteria, including the article's headline, byline, newspaper name, date, page, column, and retrieval location. The corpus of the collected speeches and articles spanned 9,325 words and included independence speeches, heroes' day/defence forces day speeches, heroes' acre speeches by the Zimbabwean President, and newspaper reports on Zimbabwean politics. Accurate record-keeping was essential for accurate data collection. The 9 articles listed below are a sample of the 14 articles analysed in this chapter which were collected over a period of one month covering the period 2003-2022 as tabulated below:

Table 1. *Newspaper articles analysed in the study*

Newspaper's name	Date article published	Title of article	Category
Mail and Guardian	2 December 2003	Tsvangirai's treason trial resumes	Report on Zimbabwean politics
The Insider	8 August 2011	Don't bastardise Heroes Day	Report on Zimbabwean politics
Bulawayo24 News	13 August 2013	President Mugabe's Heroes Day Message	Political speech
Nehanda Radio	9 August 2015	Tsvangirai's Heroes and Defence Forces Day Message	Political speech
The Newsday	13 April 2016	Live-Updates: Mugabe's speech at the Heroes Acre	Political speech
iHarare.com	7 November 2018	Defiant MDC scoffs at Zanu-PF's accusation that it is plotting insurgency, says no one can take away its rights	Report on Zimbabwean politics
ZimLive	27 July 2020	Zanu-PF labels MDC-Alliance a "terrorist organisation", tells supporters to fight	Report on Zimbabwean politics
The Zimbabwean Mail	13 September 2020	Biti rubbishes Zanu-PF banditry training claims	Report on Zimbabwean politics

Business Times	12 November 2020	Sell-out tag rocks Zanu-PF, MDC-Alliance	Report on Zimbabwean politics
----------------	------------------	--	-------------------------------

Theoretical Framework

The collected data were analysed from the perspective of Fairclough and Wodak's (1997) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). By the end of the 1970s, CDA had become a recognized area of discourse studies research (Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015). It is referred to as an approach that combines social theory and language studies (Fairclough, 1992).

The study of CDA looks at the abuse of social power and the ways that language is used to depict, reproduce, and challenge inequality and dominance in social and political contexts. The most famous person in this field is Norman Fairclough, who created a three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis. This paradigm seeks to incorporate three dimensions into a different language text analysis. Stated differently, it pertains to the examination of discourse practices, which include the creation, dissemination, and utilization of texts, as well as the examination of discourse events.

Public speech, including political speeches, advertisements, newspaper articles, official documents, and so on, is the main emphasis of CDA. The goal of CDA is to investigate the interplay among language, ideology, and power. It also seeks to determine how linguistic dominance is evaluated and utilized in texts. Halliday's systematic functional grammar is one of the key linguistic ideas associated with a critical discourse approach. Some linguists (e.g., Kress, 1985; Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999) who have employed it for text analysis have endorsed it because systematic functional grammar plays a vital role in the critical interpretation of linguistic expression in diverse discourses.

The researchers examined how the charges and denials made by the two political parties against each other might be seen as prisms through which to view ideological divisions and power dynamics between the two parties as well as Zimbabwe's sociopolitical struggles from the standpoint of CDA.

Analytical concepts from CDA applied to this article

According to the range of CDA that the researchers employed in this article, discourse can be seen as social practices at the level of discourse orders - the discursive component of how various social practices are networked together (Fairclough, 2003). There are three distinct aspects within discourse orders on which to focus analysis: styles (ways of being), discourses (ways of representing), and genres (ways of acting) and the linkages that these may regularly form (Fairclough, 2003).

These analytical categories, such as genre, are crucial in understanding practice. Genres are actions language performs, such as in press releases and speeches. Writers must adhere to a recognizable format to meet expectations and achieve

goals. The relationship between government, political organizations, media, and end users is established through the creation, dissemination, and consumption of messages, which depends on the use of both discursive and extra-discursive resources. This understanding helps in analyzing and analyzing various aspects of practice.

CDA can help understand the genres of political arena action, their relationship to other practices, and their impact on political action. News stories, speeches, and press releases often work together to entrench government practices, ideologies, and agendas. CDA can explain how genres build linkages, but it would need to explore political theory and media studies to fully understand the implications for a political system. Understanding who is acting under what conditions and how these genres influence political action is crucial for effective policy-making (Fairclough, 1995; 2003).

Style is the second primary analytical area of CDA (Fairclough, 2003). Style is the essence of one's identity when writing or speaking, conveying authority, humility, arrogance, and other qualities. One can assert authority as the principal actor, setting a clear agenda for others to follow. However, criticism may follow if one appears to be not the principal actor or if they exhibit objectionable traits, or if they do not have a clear agenda.

Discourse analysis (CDA) is the third fundamental analytical idea in understanding how utterances are interpreted or misinterpreted. Thus, CDA raises questions about hyperbolic and factual interpretations of utterances, as well as whether they require specific actions. CDA provides in-depth analysis of real texts, offering new issues for democratic actions that ordinary citizens may need to consider.

Findings and Discussion

From the newspaper articles collected and analysed, the following words and phrases were found to be recurring in the messages by both Zanu-PF and MDC politicians. These words and phrases were then used to:

- (a) frame the major accusations and counter-accusations made by the two political parties expressed through different names, naming and shaming; and
- (b) frame the declarations made by each party regarding its identity as revealed in the newspaper articles; and
- (c) Explore how the accusations and counter-accusation changed over time and threatened the security of certain groups and members of the rival political parties.

The culture of naming, shaming and identity declarations by the political parties

In the section below, the researchers present a synopsis of the articles I analysed. From these articles, the researchers extract and discuss the accusations and counter-accusations made by the two political parties against each other. The

researchers also present the declarations made by each party regarding its identity as revealed in the newspaper articles. The researchers' focus is on how each party used language as a strategic resource for political gain and outmaneuvering opponents.

Naming and shaming related to Morgan Tsvangirai's treason trial

The first article appeared in the politics section of the *Mail & Guardian* newspaper of 2 December 2003 titled, *Tsvangirai treason trial resumes*. The article reported the resumption of the treason trial of Zimbabwe opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai after a four-month recess. Tsvangirai was on trial for *plotting to assassinate President Robert Mugabe and arrange a military coup ahead of the 2002 presidential elections*.

However, defence lawyers opposed the application of amendments to trial the Movement for Democratic Change leader, Tsvangirai, on different charges. Tsvangirai was charged with treason shortly after the 2002 presidential elections and denied the charges, which carry the death penalty. He claimed they were set up by Ari Ben Menashe, a Canadian lobbyist working for Mugabe's government. The trial began after a court order was sought to allow public and press access to the courtroom.

From the above summary of the newspaper article, it is clear that the Zanu-PF led government accused Tsvangirai of two things; *plotting to assassinate President Robert Mugabe and plotting to arrange a military coup ahead of the March 2002 general elections*. Tsvangirai faced a very serious charge according to Zimbabwean law and the charge carries the death penalty if one is convicted. However, Tsvangirai denied the charge counter-accusing the Zanu-PF led government of *setting a trap for him* through a Canadian based political lobbyist, Ari Ben Menashe.

Naming and shaming related to accusations of banditry

Five years later, an article appeared in the *Zim News Live* newspaper of Friday, 7 November 2008 titled, *Zimbabwe's President Mugabe and Zanu PF are refusing to hand over the Ministry of Home Affairs to the MDC*. The newspaper reported that Zimbabwe's President, Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF, were refusing to hand over the Ministry of Home Affairs to the MDC due to allegations that *the opposition party is plotting to destabilize the country*. Zanu PF claimed that the MDC faction, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, *was training militias in Botswana to destabilize the country*.

The article also reported that political tensions between Zimbabwe and Botswana escalated ahead of the SADC summit on the crisis in Zimbabwe. President Ian Khama was calling for fresh elections in Zimbabwe to resolve the political stalemate in the country. Zanu PF's claims of the MDC's subversive plot were contained in a document presented to regional leaders in Harare in the previous week. The meeting was called to resolve the deadlock over the allocation of key ministries, particularly the Ministry of Home Affairs. The MDC reported that it was the allocation of 10 ministries that the parties disputed. Sources said Zanu PF would provide documents to prove their claims of the MDC's plot of *subversion and*

1 *insurgency* to justify their refusal to hand over the Ministry of Home Affairs. MDC
 2 spokesperson Nelson Chamisa dismissed the allegations as *incredibly ridiculous*
 3 *and preposterous* to claim Tsvangirai and the MDC want to be like Savimbi and
 4 Unita.

5 Just like in the treason article the researchers first referred to, in the article cited
 6 above, Zanu-PF also accused the MDC of plotting to destabilize the country through
 7 a violent take-over. The MDC was accused of *plotting to destabilize the country*
 8 *through subversion and insurgency*. Zanu PF also claimed that the MDC faction,
 9 led by Morgan Tsvangirai, *was training militias in Botswana to destabilize the*
 10 *country*. However, the MDC denied the accusations as *incredibly ridiculous and*
 11 *preposterous*. Nevertheless, Zanu-PF's accusations need to be understood in the
 12 context of the power-sharing process that was ongoing at the time. The Home
 13 Affairs Ministry, just like the ministries of State Security and Defence, is one of the
 14 power ministries in Zimbabwe and giving it away to the opposition easily was not
 15 an option for Zanu-PF as it would weaken its power base.

16 17 *Naming and shaming during national events*

18
19 Fast-tracking events to the Heroes and Defence Forces holidays of 2011, on 8
 20 August 2011, the *Insider* newspaper published an article titled, *Don't bastardise*
 21 *Heroes Day- Tsvangirai*. The article was a Heroes and Defence Forces Day message
 22 from Prime Minister Tsvangirai. In the article, Tsvangirai urged Zimbabweans *to*
 23 *avoid bastardizing Heroes Day by making it a day of cheap rhetoric, sloganeering,*
 24 *name-calling, and politicking*. He argued that this day should be a day of sober
 25 reflection and deep introspection on whether Zimbabwe has achieved true
 26 independence and freedom. Tsvangirai stated that it was never the intention of true
 27 revolutionaries to *privatize this day and make it a party event*. He also pointed out
 28 that the selection of Zimbabwean heroes and heroines should not be the exclusive
 29 preserve of any political organisation.

30 Tsvangirai also emphasized that true heroes transcend genre, as there are many
 31 Zimbabwean heroes in sport, business, social sector, arts, and various facets of life
 32 whose contribution needs national celebration. He urged Zimbabwe's defence forces
 33 to be at the epicentre of *defending and protecting the people, not attacking and*
 34 *brutalizing them*. Tsvangirai argued that it is international best practice for *the army*
 35 *to confine itself to the barracks and leave politics to the politicians*.

36 Tsvangirai further expressed umbrage at the *militarisation of Zimbabwe's*
 37 *politics and the politicisation of the military*. He emphasized that the heroes' event
 38 was a national day whose lustre and importance can be eroded when politicians
 39 make it a *partisan event*.

40 Although Tsvangirai's message was highly sarcastic, he accused Zanu-PF of a
 41 number of wrongdoings, albeit indirectly. While the message was purportedly
 42 directed to all Zimbabweans as shown in the opening paragraph, a closer look
 43 reveals that it was directed to those in the echelons of power, Zanu-PF to be specific.
 44 Among other things, Zanu-PF was accused of *bastardizing the heroes' holiday,*
 45 *making it a day for cheap rhetoric, sloganeering, name-calling, and politicking*.

Tsvangirai further accused Zanu-PF of militarisation of Zimbabwe's politics and the politicization of the military.

In the context of Zimbabwe's body politic, on many occasions, Zanu-PF has been accused by the opposition and ordinary people alike, of treating national events such as the Heroes and Defence Forces' holiday, the independence day and others as partisan events and hence belonging to Zanu-PF. In the same speech, Zanu-PF was also accused of using these events as platforms for cheap rhetoric, sloganeering, name-calling and politicking. In addition to this, Zanu-PF is also often accused of militarisation of Zimbabwe's politics and the politicization of the military. All these accusations are captured in Tsvangirai heroes' day message. Nevertheless, Zanu-PF denies these accusations.

Two years later, on August 13, 2013, President Robert Mugabe gave his Heroes Day speech, which was published in the Bulawayo 24 newspaper of the same day. The speech which was presented in both Shona and English, made a number of scathing accusations and attacks on the opposition, the MDC.

In the Shona part of his speech, President Mugabe labelled the MDC as *n'yan'ya* (very stubborn people), when he says:

"...n'yan'ya, hedzo dzotungamira dzichitungamidzwa sezvimwasungata. Kuti vaye vatakamborwisa vachitorazve nhaka iyi, kuti vagotigovera ivo" (...very stubborn people, now take the lead like puppets. So that those we fought in the past, come back and retake our heritage, so that they can redistribute it themselves)

While making the above accusations against the MDC, Mugabe, also portrays his Zanu-PF party as the champions of democracy when he says in English, "We are delivering democracy on a platter, do you take it?" This statement by Mugabe re-affirms their identity as the champions of democracy, who fought for and brought democracy to Zimbabwe. He goes on to label the MDC and their so-called western allies as "*mbavha*" (thieves) when he says "*...mbavha hadzitorere*" (...the thieves will not take it away from us).

In the same speech, Mugabe further portrays his Zanu-PF party as the custodians of Zimbabwe's land when he says:

"Saka izuva ratinoti rutivi tiri kuyeuka magamba, rutivi tiri kuvavimbisa kuti nhaka yavakatisiyira tinoramba tichiirwira tichiichengeta" (So it is the day we remember the gallant fighters on the one hand, and a day to assure them that we will continue to safeguard the heritage they left us on the other hand).

On 9 August 2015, the politics section of *Nehanda Radio*, published Morgan Tsvangirai's Heroes and Defence Forces day message. In the message, Tsvangirai remembers the gallant sons and daughters of Zimbabwe who fought a brutal war to bring about self-determination in their country. He reiterated that Zimbabwe stands proud on their shoulders, aware that their determination and fortitude made the difference between subjugation and political independence.

In addition, Tsvangirai claimed that the MDC is a proud post-liberation movement, not opposed to the sanctity of their previous struggle but formed merely to complete the unfinished business that remains outstanding to this day. Tsvangirai

1 further said that the MDC **respects** the heroes of Zimbabwe's war of liberation and
2 he had resolved to attend to the welfare of those who are still alive. He also indicated
3 that the MDC Congress had committed to supporting the constitutional rights and
4 welfare of genuine war veterans as enshrined in the new constitution, ensuring they
5 get assistance for rehabilitation, education, health, and pension rights among others.

6 The opposition leader further said that the MDC salutes the heroic people of
7 Zimbabwe for supporting the MDC and the broader democratic movement in the
8 fight for a new Constitution, which the MDC had to force down the throat of
9 reluctant colleagues in Zanu- PF. Tsvangirai also mourned what he referred to as a
10 national tragedy that the sacred Constitution made by Zimbabweans as a sovereign
11 people remained unimplemented, despite its overwhelming authorship and
12 endorsement by millions of Zimbabweans.

13 Tsvangirai also reminded Zimbabweans to think about luminaries such as the
14 great Masotsha Ndlovu, Joshua Nkomo, Edgar Tekere, Sheba Tavarwisa, Josiah
15 Tongogara, Margaret Dongo, Wilfred Mhanda, and Solomon Mujuru. He
16 encouraged them to do so with a deep sense of reflection. However, *he questioned*
17 *rhetorically whether the dead among them would be proud of what has become of*
18 *the country for which they waged a brutal and protracted war if they were to*
19 *resurrect.*

20 Tsvangirai also paid tribute to Zimbabweans who continued to work hard and
21 toil to make an honest living rather than a life of crime. He referred to vendors who
22 survived through selling various good on the streets. He also paid tribute to small-
23 scale miners; uneducated graduates for which *the Zanu-PF government has failed*
24 *to provide jobs* but have instead chosen restraint are a venerable generation of
25 heroes! He also paid tribute to the few remaining workers that were losing their jobs
26 every week following the controversial ruling by the Supreme Court which ruled in
27 favour of employers. He described those workers as a new crop of national heroes.

28 In the same speech, Tsvangirai also referred to those in the opposition in various
29 political parties from the early 80s to the era of the MDC who were brutally killed
30 in *State-sponsored violence* as heroes. He said the heroes who perished at the hands
31 of our former saviours also deserved to be remembered during the heroes' day
32 celebrations. In relation to those who died so that democracy could take root,
33 Tsvangirai made reference to Tonderai Ndira, Rebecca Mafukeni, Isaac Matongo
34 and others *who were brutally killed by Zanu PF.*

35 In addition, Tsvangirai also paid tribute to the hard working Zimbabwean
36 citizens in the diaspora who were working very hard for their families. He also called
37 Zimbabweans in the diaspora as national heroes.

38 Finally, Tsvangirai also appreciated the soldiers, the brave and patriotic men
39 and women in uniform who defend us every day. Tsvangirai expressed great respect
40 for the men and women in uniform. In his words own words to those in the
41 uniformed forces, Tsvangirai said:

42
43 We have great **respect** for you and pray that you have *utmost respect and abide by the*
44 *provisions of the new Constitution in which Zimbabweans set out clear guidelines in*
45 *which the security sector should interact and protect the interests of the citizens.*
46

1 He concluded his speech by reiterating that what some members of the
2 uniformed forces did in 2008 remained a shame beneath the dignity and mandate of
3 a national Defence Force. He further said, “Loyalty to the country and the zeal to
4 serve the country should reign supreme *rather than any political or partisan*
5 *interests*”.

6 Tsvangirai indirectly accused Zanu-PF of betraying the sacrifices of those who
7 fought for Zimbabwe's liberation and failing to provide for youths and university
8 graduates. He also accused Zanu-PF of state-sponsored violence against the
9 opposition, leading to the death of some opposition cadres mentioned in his speech.
10 Indirectly, he also accused Zanu-PF of disrespecting the Constitution of Zimbabwe
11 through the *militarisation of Zimbabwe's politics and the politicisation of the*
12 *military*. For their involvement in brutality against civilians and involvement in politics,
13 Tsvangirai also indirectly shamed the actions and choices of some members of the
14 uniformed forces.

15 On the other hand, he reasserted their identity as the MDC. In terms of the
16 MDC, Tsvangirai identified his party as “... a proud post-liberation movement, not
17 opposed to the sanctity of their previous struggle but formed merely to complete the
18 unfinished business that remains outstanding to this day”. While asserting the
19 identity of the MDC as a proud post-liberation movement, Tsvangirai also subtly
20 accuses Zanu-PF of failing to finish the business of the liberation struggle. One can
21 only infer that the unfinished business could be related to issues about democracy,
22 equality and equitable distribution of economic resources.

23 A year later, Mugabe gave a speech at the Heroes' Acre on 13 April 2016 as
24 reported by the *News Day* of 13 April 2016. In his speech, President Robert Mugabe
25 addressed the burying of Vivian Mwashita and Victoria Chitepo at the Heroes' Acre.
26 Mugabe discussed the contributions of Mwashita and Chitepo during the liberation
27 struggle, mentioning that Chitepo accommodated his late wife Sally.

28 Zimbabwe's President Mugabe criticized the colonial enemy's brutal actions,
29 stating that no country suffered more loss of life during their liberation. He praised
30 Chitepo for her courage and nationalistic spirit, influenced by her father, an ANC
31 cadre, and her husband, Herbert, the first Zanu chairperson. Mugabe's speech
32 indirectly called on Zimbabweans to cherish the work of those who sacrificed for
33 the country while reminding them of the brutal actions of the colonial regime. By
34 invoking this past, Mugabe indirectly asked Zimbabweans to reconsider their
35 support of the opposition.

36 37 *Naming and shaming related to accusations of insurgency* 38

39 As with the 2003 Tsvangirai treason trial and the 2008 banditry accusations
40 against the MDC, in 2018 Zanu-PF once again, accused the MDC of plotting
41 insurgency. The accusations were published in the *iHarare.com* newspaper of 7
42 November 2018 barely a year after President Emmerson Mnangagwa had seized
43 power from President Robert Mugabe through what some regarded as a military
44 coup. The article was titled, *Defiant MDC Scoffs at Zanu-PF's Accusations That It*
45 *Is Plotting Insurgency, Says No one Can Take Away Its Rights*.

1 The opposition MDC denied allegations by the ruling Zanu-PF party that the
 2 opposition was plotting an insurgency. MDC National Spokesperson Jacob Mafume
 3 stated that their party was rather focused on peaceful protests. Minister of Home
 4 Affairs and Culture Cain Mathema warned the opposition that security forces were
 5 on high alert for any acts of insurgency and that anti-government protests would be
 6 crushed. The MDC on the other hand accused Zanu PF *of attempting to close the*
 7 *democratic space* in Zimbabwe and claimed that through the Zimbabwe
 8 Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), they intended to intensify a *clampdown on their*
 9 *leaders*.

10 In the winter of 2020, an article was published by Zim Live.com on 27 July and
 11 carried the heading, *Zanu PF labels MDC-A a 'terrorist organisation', tells*
 12 *supporters to fight*. In the article, Zanu PF urged its supporters to use any means at
 13 their disposal and disrupt anti-opposition-led government protests which were
 14 planned for July 31 2020. Zanu-PF labelled the main opposition party, the MDC
 15 Alliance, *a terrorist organization*.

16 Although the protests were expected to be peaceful demonstrations against
 17 *corruption and misgovernance*, Zanu PF acting spokesperson Patrick Chinamasa
 18 claimed the plan of the demonstrations was *to violently oust President Emmerson*
 19 *Mnangagwa on behalf of neo-colonial interests*. The main organizers, Jacob
 20 Ngarivhume and journalist Hopewell Chin'ono, were held and detained without bail
 21 after being accused of inciting violence. Zanu PF called on its supporters, cadres,
 22 and sympathisers to remain alert and ready to defend themselves, their people, their
 23 property, and peace in their communities against the opposition *malcontents*.

24 The MDC Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa said they supported the protests,
 25 although his party was not involved in the organization of the demonstrations.
 26 Chinamasa further accused western embassies of using the media to control the
 27 national narrative in this country and he warned journalists not to be *agents or*
 28 *conduit pipes of the narrative of countries that imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe*.

29 From the above article, the accusations and the counteraccusations between the
 30 two protagonists are very clear. While Zanu-PF's Chinamasa accused the opposition
 31 of being a terrorist organisation, instigators of violence, malcontents, agents of neo-
 32 colonial interests, agents or conduits of other countries and for having intentions to
 33 violently oust President Mnangagwa, the opposition on the other hand, accused
 34 Zanu-PF of two things; corruption and misgovernance. However, Chinamasa's
 35 message

36 About twelve years later, Zanu-PF once again, went back to its 2008 narrative
 37 that the MDC was planning banditry activities to take over the country. In an article
 38 titled *Biti rubbishes Zanu PF banditry training claims* published in the Zimbabwe
 39 Mail of 13 September 2020, Zanu PF's acting national spokesperson, Patrick
 40 Chinamasa, has accused MDC Alliance youths *of undergoing banditry training to*
 41 *destabilize Zimbabwe*.

42 However, the opposition party, the MDC Alliance, responded by claiming
 43 Chinamasa's threats are *a sign of the ruling party's decomposing state and a national*
 44 *threat to Zimbabweans*. MDC Alliance co-vice president Tendai Biti criticized
 45 Chinamasa's rants on the church, ANC, citizens, and MDC Alliance leaders as
 46 *pathological desperation and vacuous idiocy*. MDC Alliance secretary-general

Charlton Hwende dismissed Chinamasa's allegations as coming from a regime running scared. Former Zanu PF Politburo member and ex-cabinet minister Walter Mzembi criticized Chinamasa's claims, stating that *institutional schizophrenia has gripped Zanu PF and they will never rule Zimbabwe*.

Naming and shaming related to the politics of land redistribution

In an article published in the *Nehanda Radio* newspaper on 12 October 2020, Zanu PF through its acting spokesperson Patrick Chinamasa, also criticized the opposition for opposing the ruling party's ideology and claimed that the opposition will never rule Zimbabwe. Chinamasa argued that Zimbabwe is a liberated country, not a democracy, and those who oppose its liberation should never dream of ruling.

In the same article, Chinamasa further accused the MDC of *opposing the land redistribution programme*. He argued that those who oppose the land redistribution programme have no right to rule the country, as they are *sell-outs*. Chinamasa also compared the current debate on human rights to the colonial period, where there were no human rights for Africans to discuss.

In the last article I analysed, the Business Times of 12 November 2020 published a story titled, *Sell-out tag rocks Zanu-PF, MDC Alliance*. The article reported that both the ruling Zanu-PF and opposition MDC-Alliance were facing infighting *as members accuse each other of being sell-outs*. Analysts warned that divisions would cripple the two political parties' operations. Zanu PF political commissar Victor Matemadanda said members labelled others G40 members without concrete evidence, deviating from core principles and the party. The problem was more pronounced in District Coordinating Committee nominations, where Zanu PF disqualified over 3,000 members who wanted to contest in the elections. MDC Alliance, led by Nelson Chamisa, also faced accusations against each other, with some senior party members being accused of being *sell-outs* and belonging to the MDC T led by Thokozani Khupe.

How the naming and shaming have changed over time and how they threatened the security of others

As can be discerned from the presentation and discussion of the accusations and counteraccusations by Zimbabwe's main political parties and from the declarations made by each party regarding its identity, it is clear that while the ruling party generally accused the main opposition party, the MDC of being *sell-outs*, of insurgency, banditry, and terror, the MDC on the other hand, generally accused Zanu-PF of misgovernance, corruption, election fraud and violence.

In addition, the accusations made by political parties against each other have remained consistent, but the principal actors and contexts have changed over time. For instance, before the 2017 military takeover, President Mugabe and Zanu-PF leaders attacked the MDC using different accusations. However, when President Mnangagwa took over, the principal actors who made accusations against the MDC also changed. The same changes were observed in the MDC, from its Morgan Tsvangirai-led form to its current form.

Besides, what also emerged from the discussion above is that the accusations made against each party escalated just before, during and soon after general elections. For example, Tsvangirai faced treason accusations before the 2002 general elections to discredit a strong contender. Zanu PF accused the MDC faction, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, of training militias in Botswana to destabilize the country. The timing was perfect, considering power-sharing negotiations at the time. The accusations were meant to weaken the MDC's power to negotiate for more powerful ministries, such as the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP).

In addition, national events like heroes and independence gatherings were used by both Zanu-PF and the MDC to attack each other and re-assert their identities. The Heroes and Defence Forces Holidays and Independence Holidays provided opportunities for accusations and re-assertion of identity. Zanu-PF had an advantage as their leaders could address large gatherings during these events and mourners during national heroes' funerals at the National Heroes Acre. Both parties used these events to bolster their perceived identities.

However, while the accusation of sell-outs was generally used by Zanu-PF against the MDC, it is interesting to note how different Zanu-PF and MDC groupings used the label sell-outs against each other. As discussed above regarding the *Business Times* article of 12 November 2020 titled, *Sell-out tag rocks Zanu-PF, MDC Alliance*. The article reported that both the ruling Zanu-PF and opposition MDC-Alliance were facing infighting as members accused each other of being sell-outs. Zanu-PF and MDC have formed significant divisions, with G40 and Lacoste emerging within Zanu-PF, posing threats to their members' security. G40 members are still living in exile since Mugabe's 2017 removal. Similarly, MDC Alliance and MDC T, led by Nelson Chamisa and Thokozani Khupe respectively, also emerged, accusing each other of being sell-outs. Violence against rival groups has threatened the security of each splinter group.

In addition, the accusations and counter-accusations made by the two political parties in Zimbabwe have threatened the security of individuals and groups while also aiding political contests. For instance, Zanu-PF's treason accusations against Morgan Tsvangirai almost led to his imprisonment, threatening his freedom. The accusations against the MDC incited violence against opposition members, resulting in brutal attacks and death of some. Tonderai Ndira, Rebecca Mafukeni, and Isaac Matongo were allegedly killed by Zanu PF supporters, and their whereabouts are still unknown. It is clear that when a party incites violence against its supporters, the consequences are uncertain. This has escalated political tensions and polarized Zimbabwe's politics, with major political actors' messages being seen as the main source of acts of intimidation and violence against political opponents.

Conclusion

This article sought to explore the relationship between Zimbabwe's main political parties, Zanu PF and the MDC, as depicted in newspaper reportage and through speeches by the main political actors in Zimbabwe's political arena. The article examined the accusations and counter-accusations made by two political

parties against each other, their declarations regarding identity, and whether they changed over time. It also investigated whether these accusations threatened the security of individuals or groups and aided political contests between the two parties, all conducted within the context of CDA.

The findings presented and discussed in the article showed that while Zanu-PF as the ruling party generally accused the main opposition party, the MDC of being sell-outs, of insurgency, banditry, and terror, the MDC on the other hand, generally accused Zanu-PF of misgovernance, corruption, election fraud and violence. The article also showed how the two protagonists asserted their identity and how they would want to be perceived. This finding confirms prior research by Brinkman, who argued that through war names for example, a kaleidoscope of issues may be addressed, including the relations between language and power, personal history, resurrection, self-description, labeling, legitimacy and identity (Brinkman, 2004).

Finally, the article established that while the accusations made by each political party against the other have remained the same over time, what have been found to change from time to time are the principal actors and the contexts in which the accusations are made. However, all the accusations, counteraccusations and declarations made by the political parties were understood as political actors' use of language as a political resource to strategically advance their interest, ideology and objectives in the political enterprise where the contest for power takes the centre stage. Through the deployment of CDA, the chapter showed how the analytical tools of CDA could contribute to the study of language and politics in general and to the analysis of particular texts (e.g., speeches) in the political arena. CDA can therefore, be used to analyse the order of discourse and show the ways in which different practices are linked together discursively, providing a way into examining and critiquing ways in which political practices are structured.

References

- Brinkman I. (2004). Language, Names, and War: The Case of Angola. *African Studies Review*, 47(3):143-163. Doi: 10.1017/S0002020600030481
- British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2014). George Orwell, 1903-1950. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:George-orwell-BBC>.
- Crystal, D. (2020). *Let's Talk: How English Conversation Works*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Fairclough, N. (2003), *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2006), *Language and Globalization*, London: Routledge.
- Grice, P. (1991). *Studies in the Way of Words*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Hay, C. (2004). "Taking Ideas Seriously" in *Explanatory Political Analysis*, *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 6(2), pp. 142–149.
- Hay, C. (2007). *Why We Hate Politics*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Chouliaraki, L. & N. Fairclough (1999). *Discourse in late modernity*. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.
- Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and social change*. Cambridge, UK: Policy Press.
- Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical discourse analysis*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1995). *Discourse across disciplines: discourse analyzing in researching social change*. *AILA Review*, 12, 3-17.

- 1 Farrelly, M. (2010). Critical Discourse Analysis in Political Studies: An Illustrative Analysis
2 of the 'Empowerment' Agenda. *Politics*. 30(2), 98–104.
- 3 Hafner-Burton, E.M. (2008). Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
4 Enforcement Problem. *International Organization*, Vol. 62, 2008, Available at SSRN:
5 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2686791>
- 6 Halliday, M.A.K. & R. Hassan. (1989). *Language, context and text: aspects in a social-*
7 *semiotic perspective*. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Links. Jstor.
8 [org/sici?sici=0039-8322\(198706\)21%3A2%3C353%3ALCATAO%3A](http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0039-8322(198706)21%3A2%3C353%3ALCATAO%3A)
- 9 Halliday, M.A.K. (1994). "Systematic Theory". In R.E. Asher (ed.) *Encyclopedia of*
10 *language and linguistics*, Vol 8. Pergamon Press. Reprinted in full in Halliday, M.A.K.
11 2003. On language and linguistics: volume 3 in the collected works of M.A.K.
12 Halliday. London: Continuum, 436.
- 13 Jessop, B. (2004), 'Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy', *Critical*
14 *Discourse Studies* 1(2), pp. 159–174.
- 15 Jessop, B. & Sum, N.L. (2001), 'Pre-disciplinary and Post-disciplinary Perspectives in
16 Political Economy', *New Political Economy* 6(1), pp. 89–101.
- 17 Mashakada, T. (2019). The History of the MDC: Part One, Volume 2. *Nehanda Radio*, Feb
18 16, 2019
- 19 Muleya, D. (2008). Zimbabwe: MDC Accused of Plotting Banditry. 7 November 2008,
20 *Zimbabwe Independent (Harare)*. [http://www.thezimbabweindependent.com/local/21](http://www.thezimbabweindependent.com/local/21500-mdc-accused-of-plotting-banditry.html)
21 [500-mdc-accused-of-plotting-banditry.html](http://www.thezimbabweindependent.com/local/21500-mdc-accused-of-plotting-banditry.html)
- 22 Sayer, A. (2000). *Realism and Social Science*. London: Sage.
- 23 Sharififar, M. & Rahimi, E. (2015). Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Speeches: A
24 Case Study of Obama's and Rouhani's Speeches at UN. *Theory and Practice in*
25 *Language Studies*, 5(2): 343-349. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.17507/tpls.0502.14>
- 26 Thomas, L. & Wareing, S. (1999). *Language, Society and Power: An Introduction*.
27 Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 28 Wodak, R. (2009). *The Discourse of Politics in Action*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 29 Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (eds.) (2001), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London:
30 Sage.