

1 Legal Gaps and Challenges in Prosecuting Cyber Fraud 2 in Thailand's Online Banking System 3

4 Thailand's rapid digitization of financial services has created both
5 opportunities for inclusive access to banking and growing vulnerabilities to
6 cyber-enabled financial crime. This conceptual research study examines the
7 direction of justice in cyber fraud cases within Thailand's online banking
8 environment through the lenses of procedural justice theory and institutional
9 theory. Drawing on empirical reports, legal and regulatory documents, and
10 academic literature, the study identifies gaps in victims' experiences,
11 institutional responses of banks, and law enforcement practices and sets
12 research objectives. It proposes a qualitative triangulated study in three
13 phases (victims, bank managers, and police officers) to probe how legal
14 processes, institutional incentives, and perceptions of fairness shape case
15 outcomes and victims' trust. The analysis discusses the implications for theory
16 and practice, proposes actionable interventions, and outlines limitations and
17 directions for future research. Throughout, the study situates the Thai case in
18 global debates about the governance of online financial crime and the
19 legitimacy of justice institutions in the digital age.
20

21 **Keyword:** *cyber fraud, online evidence, admissibility, online banking, access*
22 *to Justice*
23

24 **Introduction** 25

26 Online banking and mobile financial services have become central to
27 everyday economic life in Thailand. The convenience of digital payment
28 channels and fast interbank transfers has substantially expanded access to
29 financial services, but they have also created new attack surfaces for fraudsters
30 and organized scam networks (Taeratanachai and Wiriyakitjar 2025). Recent
31 governmental and civil society reports indicate that online and digital scams are
32 a significant and growing problem in Thailand, with thousands of incidents
33 reported and aggregate losses running into the billions of baht annually (Nation
34 2023). National-level responses, including draft guidelines by the Bank of
35 Thailand (BOT), enforcement actions to freeze accounts suspected of use as
36 mule accounts, and public campaigns, indicate recognition of the problem, but
37 systemic difficulties in prevention, detection, victim redress, and cross-
38 institutional coordination remain salient (Jenweeranon 2020). Empirical
39 assessments show that scam operators often move stolen funds within minutes,
40 while victims frequently do not realize losses for many hours, which complicates
41 recovery and law enforcement action. These dynamics expose both technical and
42 institutional weaknesses in Thailand's systemic response to financial cybercrime
43 and raise important questions about the direction of justice, including how
44 victims navigate formal legal pathways, how banks can balance regulatory
45 compliance, customer protection, and operational constraints, and how police
46 interpret and implement legal rules in the digital environment (Stefan 2025).
47

1 Recent policy interventions by the Bank of Thailand and related authorities
 2 signify a shifting landscape, but scholarly understanding of the interplay among
 3 victims' experiences, bank institutional behaviour, and law enforcement
 4 practices in Thailand's online banking environment remains limited and
 5 fragmented (Thongmeensuk 2025). Existing documentation and reporting
 6 provide robust descriptive accounts of the scale and patterns of online fraud in
 7 Thailand, as well as policy responses such as draft online fraud management
 8 guidelines and account-freezing operations. However, essential gaps remain in
 9 scholarly and policy-oriented research. First, much reporting is aggregative and
 10 statistical, offering limited insight into victims' lived experiences with reporting,
 11 bank remediation, and justice outcomes (such as restitution, criminal
 12 prosecution, or administrative relief). Second, although literature on procedural
 13 justice and institutional theory offers powerful frameworks for understanding
 14 perceptions of legitimacy and organizational behavior, these frameworks have
 15 not been systematically applied in the Thai online-fraud context to integrate
 16 micro-level perceptions (victims), meso-level institutional practices (banks), and
 17 macro-level legal structures (law enforcement and regulators). Third, there is
 18 limited qualitative research that triangulates perspectives across victims,
 19 banking professionals, and police officers within a single research design to
 20 illuminate procedural bottlenecks, institutional incentives, and normative
 21 expectations that shape justice trajectories in cyber fraud cases. Finally, the legal
 22 and administrative reforms that Thailand has introduced in recent years
 23 (including central bank guidelines and tactical enforcement measures against
 24 mule accounts) raise novel institutional dynamics and compliance pressures that
 25 require empirical investigation to evaluate their effect on procedural fairness and
 26 institutional isomorphism in the financial sector. Addressing these gaps is
 27 necessary to generate evidence-based reforms that strengthen both the
 28 effectiveness and legitimacy of justice processes for online-fraud victims
 29 (Tilleke & Gibbins 2025).

30 This study sets out to conceptualize how justice is directed in cyber fraud
 31 cases in Thailand's online banking environment by synthesizing the literature on
 32 procedural justice and institutional theory. Secondly, to identify institutional and
 33 legal features that shape victims' experiences and case outcomes. Third, to
 34 propose a robust qualitative, triangulated research design to probe victims, bank
 35 managers, and police officers empirically. Fourth, to derive theoretical and
 36 practical recommendations for improving justice direction, meaning the
 37 allocation, accessibility, and perceived fairness of remedial, investigative, and
 38 prosecutorial responses to online financial crime.

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40

41 Literature Review

42

43 *Online Banking and Cyber Frauds Worldwide*

44

45 Recent global literature emphasizes that fraud in digital payments, online
 46 banking, and related financial technologies has been rising and that institutions
 47 are responding with technological, regulatory, and behavioural measures

1 (Laxman et al. 2024). A prominent recent work in the global domain explained
2 by Vanini et al., (2023), this study analyzes transaction data spanning three
3 years, proposing a combined framework of machine learning-based detection,
4 economic optimization of machine learning decisions, and a risk model that
5 considers countermeasures. The study shows that their machine learning model
6 alone reduces expected and unexpected losses by about 15%, and when
7 combined with optimization and risk modeling, up to 52%, while maintaining
8 very low false positive rates (0.4%). This reflects how more sophisticated
9 detection methods are necessary to manage fraudulent behavior in the digital
10 banking (Vanini et al. 2023). Also relevant study is the explored by Aschi et al.,
11 (2022), which discusses the limitations of classical rule-based systems and
12 describes how AI/machine learning based systems are increasingly used to
13 detect risky transactions in real-time, with streaming architectures, data
14 preprocessing, and continuously updated models. This work underscores that
15 even small improvements in fraud detection rates can generate significant
16 savings, given the scale of digital transactions (Chiarella and Borgese 2025).
17 This review synthesizes three aspects: (a) empirical and policy research on cyber
18 fraud and digital financial crime in Thailand; (b) procedural justice and
19 legitimacy in policing and regulatory contexts; and (c) institutional theory as it
20 applies to organizational responses in regulated environments, such as banks and
21 police forces. Further, the objectives of this study are to map and analyze the
22 procedural steps followed by Thai banks when customers report cyber fraud,
23 including reporting, freezing, investigation, decision, and appeal processes.
24 Additionally, the study aims to measure and compare outcomes for victims
25 across a representative sample of Thai banks by examining reimbursement rates,
26 time to resolution, and the proportion of cases requiring police reports.
27

28 *Cyber Fraud and Digital Banking in Thailand: Patterns, Impacts, and Institutional 29 Responses*

30
31 Thailand has experienced an acceleration of online financial crime in line
32 with global trends of increased online financial transactions. Studies and
33 financial reports document a wide spectrum of fraudulent modalities, including
34 online purchase scams, investment frauds, fake job and call-center scams, and
35 account takeovers that exploit both technological vulnerabilities and social-
36 engineering tactics to trick victims into transferring funds (Ingkathawornwong
37 2020). Literature on Thailand's perspective indicates significant psychological
38 and social effects on victims, including shame, financial loss, and reduced trust
39 in formal institutions. At the systemic level, the speed with which scammers
40 launder funds through mule accounts and quickly move money across accounts
41 complicates recovery and prosecution (Chayanon, Phoraksa, and Thitalampoon
42 2025). The Bank of Thailand and related agencies have recognized the scale of
43 the problem; in recent years, they have published guidelines and executed large-
44 scale interventions to close suspect mule accounts and propose new online fraud
45 management frameworks for financial institutions. These interventions have
46 included technical measures, regulatory guidance, and operational collaboration

1 with law enforcement, but their effectiveness depends on timely detection,
 2 information-sharing, and the willingness of banks to freeze and reverse
 3 transactions under legal and reputational constraints (Bank of Thailand 2023).
 4 Academic and practitioner reports stress that prevention and victim recovery
 5 require coordination across banks, regulators, and police, but empirical evidence
 6 on how these actors actually coordinate and how victims experience those
 7 processes is limited (Lertsatitpirote and Kanyajit 2023).

8 Several documents highlight the urgency and scale of the problem,
 9 including investigative reporting and NGOs' daily reports of hundreds of online
 10 fraud incidents, bank supervisory reports note the prevalence of mule accounts
 11 and deliberate laundering conduits, and the BOT has circulated draft guidelines
 12 for digital fraud management aimed at harmonizing banks' prevention and
 13 response protocols. Nonetheless, statistics also reveal a troubling time-lag
 14 problem. Scam operators often complete fund transfers within minutes, while
 15 victims may take many hours to detect fraudulent transactions. The asymmetry
 16 between attacker speed and institutional response time underscores structural
 17 obstacles to recovery and prosecution (Titus and Gover 2001). The literature,
 18 therefore, frames cyber-fraud challenges not only as technical or criminological
 19 issues but as institutional coordination problems requiring legal clarity,
 20 operational capacity, and procedural fairness to maintain public trust (Zayas
 21 2023).

22

23 *Cyber-Fraud Complaint Handling Issues in Thailand*

24

25 Thailand-specific studies confirm these general patterns while adding local
 26 institutional detail. Qualitative work involving Thai police investigators and
 27 victims found that common fraud types (sale scams, account takeovers via social
 28 messaging platforms, and romance and investment scams) are widespread, and
 29 that victims' inexperience, over-optimism, and acquisitiveness were repeatedly
 30 identified as drivers of victimization. Importantly, interviews with officers
 31 revealed they perceive resource and technical gaps when managing high
 32 volumes of online fraud complaints, a situation that contributes to victim
 33 dissatisfaction and discourages reporting (Lertsatitpirote and Kanyajit 2023).

34

35 From the policing side, international policing literature emphasizes two
 36 interrelated problems affecting complaint handling: (1) organizational capacity
 37 (skills, digital forensics, case backlog) and (2) procedural legitimacy (how
 38 victims experience police response). The study shows that when police lack
 39 cyber expertise or show procedural indifference, victim satisfaction falls and
 40 future reporting declines, creating feedback that weakens official statistics and
 41 hampers prevention efforts (Stephan, 2025). These findings explain why victims in
 42 Thailand, facing similarly strained cyber units, may opt for bank dispute channels
 43 or third-party recovery efforts rather than lodging police complaints (Curtis and
 44 Oxburgh 2023). Banks in Thailand have responded with a mix of detection/
 45 monitoring technologies, customer-notification systems, and coordination protocols
 46 with law enforcement and central authorities, such as the anti-online scam
 operation center and central fraud registry initiatives. Industry and government

1 reports show banks improving automated transaction monitoring and customer
 2 outreach. However, academic analyses note tensions between rapid fraud
 3 containment, such as account freezes and transaction holds, and consumer rights,
 4 including mistaken freezes and delays in customer redress, which damage trust
 5 and prompt formal complaints to both regulators and, in some cases, the police.
 6 This operational friction the bank's dual role as gatekeeper and service provider
 7 shapes how and whether customers escalate incidents to police (Tilleke &
 8 Gibbins 2025).

9

10

11 Theoretical Background

12

13 This study integrates procedural justice theory and institutional theory as
 14 complementary lenses for understanding the direction of justice in cyber fraud
 15 cases. Procedural justice provides the micro-level account of how victims
 16 perceive fairness and legitimacy in the handling of their cases. Institutional
 17 theory provides meso- and macro-level explanations for why banks and police
 18 organizations adopt particular policies and procedures and how coercive,
 19 mimetic, and normative forces shape these.

20

21 *Procedural Justice Theory: Fairness, Legitimacy, and Cooperation*

22

23 Procedural justice theory argues that individuals' perceptions of the fairness
 24 of processes used by authorities, rather than instrumental assessments of
 25 outcomes or deterrence, substantially influence their acceptance of decisions,
 26 willingness to cooperate with authority, and compliance with rules. Classic
 27 contributions from Sunshine & Tyler, (2003) show that when citizens perceive
 28 authorities (police, courts, regulators) as procedurally fair through respectful
 29 treatment, neutrality, voice, and trustworthy motives, they are more likely to
 30 view the institutions as legitimate and to cooperate voluntarily with legal
 31 processes (e.g., reporting crimes, providing information, complying with
 32 requests) even if outcomes are unfavorable.

33 Procedural fairness matters in policing because legitimacy can substitute for
 34 costly enforcement and fosters trust and information-sharing, which are crucial
 35 in complex investigations. In the context of cyber fraud, procedural justice
 36 suggests that victims' willingness to report incidents, engage with bank
 37 investigation teams, and cooperate with police may be strongly conditioned by
 38 how fairly they are treated during complaint intake, the transparency and
 39 timeliness of investigation updates, and perceptions of whether institutions
 40 prioritize victim welfare. Conversely, experiences of bureaucratic indifference,
 41 blame, or opaque processes can erode trust and discourage cooperation, reducing
 42 the likelihood of successful investigation and restitution. Thus, understanding
 43 victims' perceptions of fairness and legitimacy is essential to explain case
 44 trajectories and designing reforms that incentivize cooperative behavior (Tyler,
 45 Goff, and MacCoun 2015). Applied to the Thai context, procedural injustice can
 46 exacerbate underreporting, impede cross-institutional coordination, and hinder

1 asset recovery, producing both social harms (loss of trust) and operational
 2 inefficiencies. Empirical work on procedural justice in policing and regulatory
 3 interactions emphasizes the causally significant role of perceived fairness. This
 4 emphasis transfers readily to digital-fraud contexts where cooperation is crucial
 5 to tracing funds across accounts and jurisdictions (Sroeurn and Kohsuwan 2025).

6

7 *Institutional Theory: Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative Pressures*

8

9 Institutional theory explains organizational behavior as a response not
 10 merely to efficiency considerations but to pressures for legitimacy and survival
 11 in an institutional field. Applied to banks and policing organizations,
 12 institutional theory explains why financial institutions might adopt similar
 13 compliance and fraud-risk management practices in response to central bank
 14 guidance, peer practices, or professional norms among risk managers. It also
 15 explains how law enforcement agencies may converge on investigative models
 16 due to resource constraints, the diffusion of training programs, or national policy
 17 directives. In the digital fraud domain, coercive pressure from regulators,
 18 mimetic pressure arising from peer banks' implementation of advanced
 19 transaction monitoring, and normative pressure from legal-professional
 20 communities can produce isomorphic responses that shape the availability and
 21 quality of victim remediation. However, institutional theory also warns that such
 22 isomorphic convergence does not guarantee substantive effectiveness.
 23 Organizations may adopt similar rituals to signal compliance or legitimacy
 24 without materially improving outcomes (Chiarella and Borgese, 2025). In
 25 Thailand, institutional theory helps analyze how banks and police might align
 26 their practices with regulatory templates while facing resource, technical, and
 27 legal constraints that blunt effective action. It further illuminates potential
 28 conflicts such as banks' risk-avoidance incentives versus customer-protection
 29 duties and the legitimacy consequences of formal compliance that do not
 30 translate into victims' perceived fairness (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

31

32 *Procedural Justice Theory Applied to Cyber Fraud*

33

34 Procedural justice theory foregrounds four core elements of fair process:
 35 voice (opportunity to be heard), neutrality (impartiality in decision-making),
 36 respect (dignified treatment), and trustworthy motives (perception that
 37 authorities act with benevolent intentions) (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). In cyber-
 38 fraud cases, victims' access to timely information (voice) during complaint
 39 intake and investigation, consistency in bank and police procedures (neutrality),
 40 respectful communication by bank officers and police investigators, and the
 41 perception that institutions prioritize victim welfare over institutional
 42 convenience shape whether victims report incidents, persist with investigations,
 43 and cooperate with evidence collection. Procedural justice affects both
 44 subjective outcomes (victims' trust, satisfaction) and objective outcomes
 45 (cooperation necessary for investigations). Applied to the Thai context,
 46 procedural injustice can exacerbate underreporting, impede cross-institutional

1 coordination, and hinder asset recovery, producing both social harms (loss of
 2 trust) and operational inefficiencies. Empirical work on procedural justice in
 3 policing and regulatory interactions emphasizes the causally significant role of
 4 perceived fairness. This emphasis transfers readily to digital-fraud contexts
 5 where cooperation is crucial to tracing funds across accounts and jurisdictions
 6 (Sroeurn and Kohsuwan 2025).

7 From these theories, the study derives several integrative practices to guide
 8 empirical inquiry. First, higher perceived procedural fairness in bank and police
 9 interactions predicts greater victim cooperation and higher rates of case
 10 escalation to formal investigation. Second, coercive regulatory pressure without
 11 adequate resources or clear operational protocols produces isomorphic but
 12 superficial compliance among banks, which may not translate to improved
 13 victim outcomes. Third, discrepancies between institutional narratives of
 14 compliance and victims' experiences would predict reduced trust in both banks
 15 and law enforcement and lower reporting rates, thereby creating a negative
 16 feedback loop that impedes effective justice.

17
 18 *Integrative Observations and Need for Triangulated Qualitative Research*
 19

20 The literature above converges on several analytical points. First, victims'
 21 perceptions of procedural fairness are central to whether they seek and persist
 22 with formal justice channels. Second, institutional responses are shaped by
 23 regulatory pressure, peer imitation, and professional norms, which may lead to
 24 formalized yet uneven practices. Third, the rapid pace of technological change
 25 in digital banking creates timing and evidentiary challenges that complicate both
 26 institutional responses and perceptions of fairness. A triangulated, phase-based
 27 qualitative approach is therefore necessary to illuminate the micro-meso-macro
 28 dynamics that determine the direction of justice in cyber fraud cases. The
 29 following theoretical framing and proposed methodology respond directly to this
 30 need (Lertsatitpirote and Kanyajit 2023).

31
 32
 33 **Methodology**
 34

35 This study proposes a qualitative, triangulated research design to generate
 36 in-depth, contextualized knowledge about how justice is administered in cyber
 37 fraud cases. A qualitative approach is suited to exploring perceptions, meanings,
 38 and institutional logics that quantitative methods may not capture. The research
 39 goal is exploratory and interpretive, seeking to understand how procedural
 40 fairness is experienced and enacted and how institutional pressures shape
 41 organizational responses. Semi-structured interviews allow open-ended exploration
 42 while maintaining comparability across respondents. Document analysis of bank
 43 policies, BOT guidelines, and police manuals complements interviews by providing
 44 background to stated practices and revealing formal institutional frames. The study
 45 aims to use thematic analysis to code interview transcripts and documents,
 46 iteratively developing categories that reflect procedural-justice dimensions (voice,

1 neutrality, respect, trustworthiness) and institutional-theory constructs (coercive,
2 mimetic, and normative pressures). The design foregrounds purposive sampling,
3 semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and thematic content analysis across
4 three phases corresponding to the study's core populations, which are victims, bank
5 managers/staff, and police officers. The research employs a multi-phase, qualitative
6 case study design that triangulates data from three distinct but interconnected
7 stakeholder groups.

8 Phase 1 involves in-depth interviews with victims of digital banking fraud
9 to capture experiences of victimization, reporting decisions, interactions with
10 banks and police, satisfaction with processes, and perceived barriers to justice.
11 Phase 2 engages bank managers and frontline staff to elicit institutional policies,
12 decision rationales, perceived legal constraints, and inter-organizational
13 coordination practices. Phase 3 interviews police officers assigned to cybercrime
14 and economic crime units to explore investigative practices, legal
15 interpretations, evidentiary challenges, and perspectives on cooperation with
16 banks and victims. Each phase includes purposive sampling to ensure diversity
17 of experiences across urban and provincial sites, bank types (large commercial
18 banks and regional banks), and law-enforcement units. The interview would be
19 conducted face-to-face to avoid ambiguity, and it is expected to last 30 to 40
20 minutes with each interviewee. Firstly, to identify the actual victims, the
21 screening questionnaire will be distributed to the interviewees. Secondly, before
22 data collection, the bank's managers and police officers will be asked to provide
23 the meeting time. Triangulation across stakeholder groups enables the study to
24 identify convergent and divergent accounts, procedural bottlenecks, and
25 institutional incentives shaping case trajectories.

26

27 *Data Collection Methods*

28

29 Semi-structured interviews will be conducted in Thai or the participant's
30 preferred language by trained interviewers. Interview guides will be tailored to
31 each population. Still, they will include core modules aligning with the
32 theoretical framework, perceptions of fairness (voice, neutrality, respect, trust),
33 procedural experiences (reporting, timelines, information flows), institutional
34 responsibilities and constraints (legal duties, resource limitations), inter-
35 organizational coordination, and suggestions for reform. Interviews will be
36 audio-recorded (with consent), transcribed verbatim, and anonymized for
37 analysis. Document analysis will include both guidelines and public statements
38 from the Bank of Thailand, internal bank policy documents (where accessible),
39 police procedural manuals, and relevant legal statutes governing money
40 transfers, bank secrecy, and cybercrime procedures. Where possible, observation
41 of complaint-intake processes at bank branches or call centers will be conducted
42 to cross-validate self-reports.

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44

45

1 **Analytical Strategy**

2

3 Transcripts and documents will be coded using NVivo software for
4 qualitative analysis, following an iterative coding procedure. Initial codes will
5 derive from theory (procedural-justice elements and institutional pressures),
6 while inductive coding will allow emergent themes (e.g., time lags, technical
7 evidentiary constraints, and fear of reputational harm). Cross-case matrices will
8 be constructed to identify patterns across victims, banks, and police. Special
9 attention will be paid to temporal sequences (when victims report relative to
10 transaction timing), information asymmetries (what banks and police can access
11 and share), and institutional narratives that justify certain practices. The analytic
12 objective is to map the causal pathways by which institutional structures and
13 perceived fairness produce particular justice trajectories ranging from successful
14 recovery and prosecution to stalled investigations and victimization. Further,
15 validity will be enhanced through triangulation, reliability through transparent
16 coding schemes and inter-coder checks, and reflexivity through the
17 documentation of researchers' positionality. Participants will be informed of the
18 study purpose, use of data, and their right to withdraw.

19

20

21 **Discussion Based on Documented Literature**

22

23 The proposed triangulated qualitative study promises to yield a nuanced
24 picture of how justice is directed in Thailand's cyber-fraud cases. Several likely
25 themes emerge from integrating existing literature, policy documents, and the
26 study's conceptual understanding advanced here.

27

28 *Timing and Evidence Asymmetry: A Cross-Sector Challenge*

29

30 One pervasive theme is the temporal asymmetry between attacker speed and
31 institutional response. Scammers often move funds within minutes, victims
32 commonly detect loss hours later, banks and police must then act in a
33 compressed time window to freeze and trace funds. This timing challenge creates
34 an asymmetry in evidence. Perpetrators exploit speed and use mule accounts or
35 cross-jurisdictional transfers that fragment transaction trails. Victims and
36 investigators face an uphill battle to produce timely, actionable information.
37 Institutional reforms such as BOT guidelines on digital fraud management and
38 system-level controls on rapid transfers seek to mitigate this but face
39 implementation and legal hurdles (e.g., privacy and transaction confidentiality).
40 The literature and policy reports underscore that without tighter technical and
41 operational coordination and clearer legal channels for rapid data-sharing, many
42 cases will remain unresolved (Zayas 2023).

43

44 *Procedural Fairness as an Operational Asset, Not Only a Normative Ideal*

45

46 Applying procedural justice theory reframes customer service and victim

1 outreach as instrumental to effective investigations. When victims are given a
 2 voice, transparent timelines, and respectful communication, they are more likely
 3 to provide corroborating information (multiple device logs, conversations, and
 4 screenshots) and to remain engaged throughout lengthy investigations.
 5 Conversely, bureaucratic indifference or blaming victims for carelessness can
 6 lead to underreporting, withdrawal, and loss of evidentiary leads. These
 7 dynamics suggest that improving procedural fairness is not merely normative
 8 but operationally productive. It increases cooperation, which in turn raises the
 9 probability of successful tracing and recovery. This insight supports investments
 10 in victim-facing processes (fraud hotlines, dedicated case managers) as part of
 11 the broader anti-fraud architecture. The procedural justice literature supports this
 12 causal channel between fairness, legitimacy, and cooperation (Tyler, Goff, and
 13 MacCoun 2015).

14

15 *Institutional Isomorphism and the Risk of Ritual Compliance*

16

17 Institutional theory warns that banks and law-enforcement agencies may
 18 adopt similar anti-fraud measures in response to regulatory pressure or peer
 19 imitation without necessarily solving root problems. For instance, banks may
 20 publicize state-of-the-art monitoring tools to signal compliance while failing to
 21 integrate processes across customer-facing units and law-enforcement liaison
 22 offices. Similarly, police units may adopt cybercrime rhetoric and create
 23 specialized units without sufficient training or interagency data-sharing
 24 protocols in place. Such ritual compliance can create the appearance of activity
 25 while victims continue to experience procedural unfairness and poor outcomes.
 26 This critique suggests that regulators and policy-makers should emphasize
 27 substantive performance metrics (timeliness of freeze actions, proportion of
 28 funds recovered, and victim satisfaction) rather than mere adoption of standard
 29 operating procedures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

30

31 *Legal and Regulatory Complexity: Privacy, Liability, and the Need for Clear* 32 *Protocols*

33

34 Legal frameworks governing bank secrecy, personal data protection, and
 35 evidence rules can create friction between the need for rapid data sharing and
 36 obligations to protect privacy. Banks may be reluctant to release logs without
 37 explicit legal authorization. Police may be uncertain about the admissibility of
 38 certain digital traces, and victims may be deterred from cooperating due to
 39 stigma or fear of retribution. BOT draft guidelines and recent policy measures
 40 indicate awareness of these legal tensions, translating guidance into operational
 41 protocols requires explicit legal clarifications (e.g., emergency data disclosure
 42 mechanisms under judicial or administrative fiat) and safe harbors for banks that
 43 share data in good faith with authorized investigators. Without clear legal
 44 instruments that balance privacy and investigatory needs, interinstitutional
 45 cooperation will remain ad hoc and inconsistent (Tilleke & Gibbins 2025).

46

1 *Organizational Incentives and Victim-Centered Metrics*
2

3 Banks' incentives rooted in reputational risk, operational efficiency, and
4 regulatory compliance can sometimes conflict with victim-centered practices
5 that demand time-consuming case management. For example, immediate
6 freezing of accounts can reduce short-term transaction volumes and lead to
7 customer complaints in wrongful-freeze cases. Conversely, delaying freezes to
8 obtain higher surety can reduce the chances of recovery. Designing incentives
9 that align institutional self-interest with victim outcomes is therefore crucial.
10 Possible mechanisms include regulator-mandated victim-recovery KPIs,
11 supervised central registries to expedite tracing, and liability frameworks that
12 protect banks acting in good faith to freeze funds. The institutional literature
13 implies that coercive regulation (clear rules), normative professionalization
14 (training and standards), and mimetic diffusion (sharing examples of effective
15 models) can jointly encourage substantive improvements rather than token
16 compliance (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).

17
18 *Information Asymmetry and the Role of Trust*
19

20 Trust emerges as a cross-cutting factor. Victims need to trust banks and
21 police to report and cooperate; banks need to trust that sharing data with police
22 will not create regulatory or reputational liabilities; police need to trust that
23 banks' technical traces are reliable and timely. Building inter-institutional trust
24 may require formal mechanisms memoranda of understanding, joint task forces,
25 and legal frameworks that create predictable pathways for collaboration.
26 Procedural fairness contributes to trust by making processes transparent and
27 accountable; institutional reforms can anchor trust by specifying roles and
28 liabilities. Together, these mechanisms can shorten response times, increase
29 cooperation, and improve justice trajectories.

30
31 *Implications and Contribution of the Study*
32

33 This study proposes several theoretical contributions. By integrating
34 procedural justice and institutional theory in the context of digital financial
35 crime, the research extends procedural justice scholarship beyond traditional
36 policing and court settings to financial institutions and hybrid regulatory
37 environments. It demonstrates that perceptions of procedural fairness apply
38 equally to corporate actors (banks) when they act as gatekeepers to legal redress.
39 The study also expands institutional theory by showing how rapid technological
40 change interacts with institutional isomorphism. Under uncertainty, mimetic
41 pressures may favor the adoption of similar technical solutions (e.g., transaction-
42 monitoring algorithms) even while organizational routines, customer service,
43 police liaison, and legal disclosure remain heterogeneous. Finally, by
44 emphasizing the temporal dimension (attacker speed vs. institutional response
45 speed), the study adds a dynamic element to both theories, including procedural
46 justice and institutional isomorphism, which must be understood in their

1 temporal contexts, where timing affects both legitimacy and the efficacy of
 2 isomorphic practices.

3 The research suggests several practical recommendations for policymakers,
 4 banks, and law enforcement. Establish legally authorized rapid-data pathways
 5 and emergency disclosure mechanisms that balance privacy with investigatory
 6 needs. Clear statutory instruments or emergency administrative orders can
 7 reduce banks' fear of liability when sharing transaction logs with authorized
 8 investigators. Further, institutionalize victim-centered complaint processes
 9 within banks, such as dedicated fraud case managers and standardized
 10 communication protocols that operationalize procedural-justice principles
 11 (voice, respect, neutrality, and transparent motives). Empirical evidence
 12 suggests that procedural fairness increases victim cooperation, which is
 13 operationally critical. More, develop inter-organizational performance metrics
 14 focused on substantive outcomes (time to freeze, proportion of funds recovered,
 15 victim satisfaction), and publish aggregated performance indicators to create
 16 accountability and drive improvement beyond superficial compliance. Another
 17 recommendation is to create joint task forces or liaison units with clear roles and
 18 standard operating procedures between banks and police to reduce time lags and
 19 evidentiary frictions. These units should include technical specialists who can
 20 translate bank logs into usable investigative leads. Further, to provide targeted
 21 training for police and bank staff on digital evidence, conversational
 22 interviewing of victims (trauma-informed methods), and legal frameworks to
 23 reduce procedural injustice arising from victim-blaming and misinformation.
 24 The other recommendation is to encourage the central bank to continue and
 25 refine its digital-fraud guidance through stakeholder consultation, emphasizing
 26 both technical measures and victim-protection obligations, and to consider a
 27 central fraud registry to expedite tracing and pattern detection measures,
 28 consistent with BOT draft initiatives already in circulation.

29 Implementing these recommendations requires coherent governance and
 30 political will. However, combining legal clarifications, procedural reforms, and
 31 institutional incentives increases the probability that victims will experience
 32 timely, fair, and effective justice.

33

34 *Limitations and Future Research Directions*

35

36 This conceptual study proposes a qualitative, triangulated empirical design
 37 but also acknowledges limitations that future research should address. First, the
 38 proposed qualitative design emphasizes depth over breadth, and findings would
 39 be richly contextual yet not statistically generalizable. Complementary
 40 quantitative studies, large-scale victim surveys, administrative data analyses of
 41 complaint outcomes, and cross-bank performance benchmarking would
 42 strengthen external validity and enable causal inference about the effectiveness
 43 of specific reforms. Second, access constraints may limit the availability of
 44 internal bank documents or in-depth police case studies due to confidentiality
 45 and reputational concerns. Building partnerships with banks and law-
 46 enforcement agencies, including data-sharing agreements that protect privacy

1 while enabling research access, will be necessary. Third, the rapidly evolving
 2 nature of technology and criminal tactics means that any empirical snapshot may
 3 quickly become dated. Longitudinal research that tracks changes over time,
 4 particularly following policy interventions such as BOT guidelines or legislative
 5 reform, would provide stronger evidence on reform efficacy. Fourth, cross-
 6 jurisdictional dynamics (offshore mule-account networks, international money
 7 movements) are increasingly central to digital fraud. Future research should
 8 incorporate comparative and transnational perspectives, including regional
 9 flows and cooperation with foreign law enforcement. Finally, while this study
 10 focuses on Thailand, comparative work across jurisdictions with different legal
 11 traditions and banking sectors would illuminate how institutional configurations
 12 shape the direction of justice in varied contexts, thereby refining theoretical
 13 generalizations.

14

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16 **References**

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