

1 **Media Polarization, Manipulative Practices and**
2 **Democratic Vulnerability in Small States**
3 **(The Case of Georgia)**

4
5 *This article examines how media polarization relates to manipulative*
6 *communication practices and how this relationship may be understood as a*
7 *contributing condition of democratic vulnerability in a small state, using Georgia*
8 *as a case study. The analysis focuses on the period from April 3 to May 28, 2024,*
9 *when the reintroduction of the draft law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence”*
10 *was followed by parliamentary debates, street protests, international reactions,*
11 *the Venice Commission’s opinion, and the override of the presidential veto. The*
12 *study adopts a qualitative comparative media-analytical design, combining*
13 *structured qualitative content analysis with discourse analysis. The research*
14 *corpus consists of 48 texts drawn from four Georgian online platforms:*
15 *ImediNews.ge, TVPirveli.ge, ITV.ge, and Netgazeti.ge. The analysis shows that*
16 *polarization extends beyond the coexistence of different political positions. It*
17 *operates as an active communicative process that constructs the same event*
18 *through different labels, frames, emotional tones, and logics of legitimation.*
19 *Particularly salient are selective agenda construction, interpretive bias,*
20 *emotionalization, narrative fragmentation, the blending of fact and evaluation,*
21 *and platform-specific transformations of the journalist’s role. In a small-state*
22 *digital media environment, such practices weaken shared interpretation,*
23 *reinforce camp-based perceptions, and erode the deliberative common ground of*
24 *the democratic public sphere.*

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26 **Keywords:** *media polarization; manipulative communication practices;*
27 *democratic vulnerability; small states; Georgian online media*

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30 **Introduction**

31
32 Digital transformation has significantly altered the role of the media. In the
33 contemporary online environment, media no longer functions only as an
34 institutional channel for selecting, verifying, and disseminating information; it also
35 operates as a space in which political meanings are produced, circulated, and
36 contested. Journalism, political communication, platform visibility, algorithmic
37 dissemination, and emotionally intensified public discourse are increasingly
38 intertwined. As a result, media participates not merely in transmitting events, but
39 also in interpreting political reality, naming problems, and structuring public
40 perceptions.

41 In this context, media polarization acquires particular significance. In digital
42 media environments, polarization no longer denotes only the coexistence of
43 different political positions. More often, it appears as an active communicative
44 process through which the same event is presented across different platforms
45 through different frames, moral logics, and emotional tones. This increases the
46 likelihood that different audience segments will interpret the same political process

1 as fundamentally different realities. Such fragmentation weakens the shared
2 interpretive basis on which reasoned debate and democratic deliberation depend.

3 The deepening of media polarization is closely linked to manipulative
4 communication practices. In this study, the concept refers to selective emphasis,
5 interpretive bias, emotionalization, the blending of fact and evaluation, the
6 delegitimation of opponents, and the reduction of complex political processes to
7 simplified narratives. These practices do not necessarily depend on explicit
8 falsehood. More often, they operate through the selective organization of meaning
9 and the prior framing of events. In this sense, manipulation in contemporary media
10 is better understood not as an isolated deviation, but as a recurring discursive logic.

11 These dynamics are further intensified by the conditions of digital
12 communication. Online visibility, engagement, shareability, and speed of reaction
13 shape headlines, source selection, thematic priorities, and textual tone. Competition
14 for attention encourages the circulation of sharp, conflict-driven, and affectively
15 charged narratives, while fragmented patterns of media consumption reinforce
16 exposure to content that aligns with pre-existing views and group identifications.
17 Under these conditions, polarized communication is reproduced not only through
18 editorial choices, but also through broader platform and audience dynamics.

19 This problem is particularly visible in small states. In the present study, a small
20 state is understood not only in demographic or territorial terms, but also as a
21 communicative context marked by a limited media market, relatively scarce
22 economic resources, concentrated political and institutional influence, and
23 heightened sensitivity to external factors. In such environments, media outlets are
24 often more vulnerable to both domestic political pressure and external discursive
25 influence. At the same time, financial instability and a narrow audience base may
26 intensify the formation of sharply differentiated editorial identities, thereby
27 reinforcing the conditions under which polarization deepens.

28 The Georgian case is especially significant in this respect. For years, the
29 Georgian media environment has been characterized by high political tension,
30 sharply opposed editorial frames, personalized political communication, and
31 intensified discursive fragmentation across digital platforms. At the same time,
32 Georgia is a small state in which media plays a particularly important role in shaping
33 political legitimation, institutional trust, and debates over sovereignty and Western
34 aspirations. This makes Georgia a productive analytical setting for examining how
35 media polarization, manipulative communication practices, and democratic
36 vulnerability interact.

37 The so-called draft law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” first appeared
38 on Georgia’s political agenda in March 2023, but was soon withdrawn amid mass
39 protest and strong international criticism. The issue returned to parliament in April
40 2024 and developed into a more prolonged and conflictual political process. Its
41 reintroduction was followed by parliamentary hearings, intensified street protests,
42 international reactions, the opinion of the Venice Commission, and, ultimately, the
43 override of the presidential veto. While the 2023 episode serves here as necessary
44 prior context, the main analytical focus of this article is the period from April 3 to
45 May 28, 2024, when polarized frames, discursive division, and manipulative
46 communication practices became especially concentrated.

1 Against this background, this article examines how media polarization relates
2 to manipulative communication practices in the digital media environment and how
3 this relationship may be understood as a contributing condition of democratic
4 vulnerability in a small state, using Georgia as a case study. More specifically, it
5 asks how selected Georgian online media texts construct polarization through
6 framing, emotionalization, selective emphasis, narrative simplification, and the
7 blurring of information with interpretation. The article does not claim a direct causal
8 relationship between media polarization and democratic crisis. Rather, it analyzes
9 the communicative conditions through which polarized media practices may
10 intensify distrust, binary perceptions, mutual delegitimation, and the fragility of the
11 democratic public sphere.
12
13

14 **Literature Review**

15
16 Research on media polarization has developed along two closely related lines.
17 One approaches it as a structural feature of the relationship between media and
18 political systems, most clearly captured by Hallin and Mancini's concept of political
19 parallelism, which links media to political actors, ideological blocs, and broader
20 social cleavages (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The other treats polarization as a
21 communicative process through which political reality is selected, framed, and
22 stabilized in divergent ways. This second perspective makes framing and agenda-
23 setting especially relevant. Media do not simply reflect events; they privilege certain
24 aspects of them, increase their salience, and shape the terms through which they are
25 publicly understood (Scheufele, 1999; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In digital
26 environments, these dynamics are further intensified by platform logics of
27 circulation, visibility, and repetition, though their democratic effects remain
28 contingent on wider political and institutional conditions (Lorenz-Spreen et al.,
29 2023).

30 This communicative perspective also draws attention to the interpretive and
31 discursive mechanisms through which polarization is produced. Goffman's frame
32 analysis emphasizes that meaning is organized through interpretive structures rather
33 than through facts alone (Goffman, 1974). More recent work similarly shows that
34 polarization develops through interpretive divergence across platforms and through
35 recurrent performances of antagonism in communication itself (Kligler-Vilenchik
36 et al., 2020; Revers, 2023). Discourse-oriented scholarship deepens this view by
37 showing how ideology operates through the construction of "us" and "them," the
38 normalization of some actors, and the stigmatization of others (van Dijk, 2013;
39 Wodak, 2011). In more affectively charged contexts, such processes may also
40 involve threat construction, moral alarm, and intensified antagonistic vocabularies
41 (Wodak, 2021). From this perspective, delegitimization, strategic naming,
42 emotionalization, and the blending of fact with evaluation are not peripheral stylistic
43 features, but central mechanisms of polarized communication.

44 Another key dimension of the literature concerns the audience side of
45 polarization, especially selective exposure and trust. Garrett (2009) argues that
46 audiences tend to prefer information that reinforces prior views, though not

1 necessarily to the extent of avoiding all counter-attitudinal content. Comparative
2 research suggests that such reinforcement is more pronounced in fragmented and
3 polarized information environments, whereas strong public service media may
4 broaden exposure to more heterogeneous viewpoints in some contexts (Bos et al.,
5 2016; Steppat et al., 2022). Trust in journalism is also shaped not only by
6 perceptions of factual reliability, but by perceived ideological proximity between
7 audiences and media actors (Curini et al., 2024). Polarization therefore emerges
8 through the interaction of media structures, communicative practices, and audience
9 orientations, with important implications for the shared interpretive ground required
10 by democratic contestation.

11 These issues become particularly acute in small states and transitional
12 democracies. Small states are not only demographic units; they are structurally
13 specific media environments marked by limited markets, scarce resources, small
14 audiences, and heightened sensitivity to external influence (Puppis, 2009). Related
15 research has linked media sustainability and professional autonomy in small
16 European countries to the resilience of democratic public spheres (Kõuts-Klemm et
17 al., 2024). In politically fragile or post-socialist contexts, these vulnerabilities are
18 compounded by institutional instability, political capture, and blurred boundaries
19 between journalism and politics (Voltmer, 2013; Bajomi-Lázár, 2014). In such
20 settings, media polarization cannot be understood solely as textual divergence; it is
21 closely tied to broader forms of structural and democratic vulnerability.

22 The Georgian case is increasingly discussed in these broader terms. Research
23 links polarization in Georgia to pressures on professionalism, safety, and editorial
24 autonomy, while also situating it within a wider condition of entrenched political
25 antagonism and democratic fragility (Gersamia, 2021; Gegeshidze & de Waal,
26 2021; Nodia, 2021). The identity dimension is also significant, as political conflict
27 in Georgia is shaped not only by policy disagreement but by symbolic struggles over
28 legitimacy, belonging, and the country's political trajectory (Wheatley, 2021). This
29 helps explain why Europeanization occupies such a prominent place in Georgian
30 political and media discourse. It has been shown to function as a strategic resource
31 of legitimation and delegitimation, while competing discourses of sovereignty,
32 external influence, and democratic direction continue to structure public debate
33 (Tsuladze et al., 2016; Tsuladze et al., 2021; Tsuladze & Abzianidze, 2025; Schmidt
34 & Radaelli, 2004; Pérez-Escoda & Lokot, 2023). Institutional and survey-based
35 materials reinforce this picture by describing Georgia's media environment as
36 simultaneously pluralistic and sharply polarized, with persistent concerns about
37 journalist safety, politically motivated pressure, segmented media consumption, and
38 the stigmatization of critical outlets (United Nations Development Programme,
39 2021; Georgian Institute of Politics, 2024; ISET Policy Institute, 2024; Silagadze,
40 2023; Atchaidze & Fabos, 2024; Human Rights Center, 2024).

41 Taken together, the literature clarifies the structural logic of political
42 parallelism, the interpretive force of framing and discourse, the importance of
43 selective exposure and trust, and the specific vulnerabilities of small-state and
44 Georgian media contexts. What remains less fully integrated is how these
45 dimensions converge at the level of digital media texts: how competing platforms
46 organize divergent political realities through framing, selective emphasis,

1 emotionalization, delegitimization, and the blurring of information with
2 interpretation. It is this analytical gap that the present article addresses.

3 4 5 **Methodology**

6 7 *Research Design and Corpus*

8
9 This study is based on a qualitative, comparative media-analytical design and
10 examines media polarization and manipulative communication practices in
11 Georgian online media in the context of the political and public debates surrounding
12 the 2024 so-called Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. It combines
13 structured qualitative content analysis with discourse analysis in order to examine
14 the thematic and formal organization of texts, their interpretive frames, and the
15 mechanisms through which different platforms position actors as legitimate or
16 delegitimized.

17 The unit of analysis is the individual online media text. The corpus was selected
18 through purposive sampling and includes four Georgian online platforms:
19 ImediNews.ge, TVPirveli.ge, 1TV.ge, and Netgazeti.ge. These outlets were chosen
20 because they covered the same political process from different editorial,
21 institutional, and discursive positions, making them analytically suitable for cross-
22 platform comparison. The selection took into account media type, audience
23 visibility, political significance, and discursive influence on the ongoing debates.
24

Table 1. Corpus Map of the Analyzed Media Texts

Media	P1 (3–5 Apr)	P2 (16–17 Apr)	P3 (30 Apr–1 May)	P4 (13–14 May)	P5 (21 May)	P6 (27–28 May)
ImediNews.ge	IM-01, IM-02	IM-03, IM-04	IM-05, IM-06	IM-07, IM-08	IM-09, IM-10	IM-11, IM-12
TVPirveli.ge	TVP-01, TVP-02	TVP-03, TVP-04	TVP-05, TVP-06	TVP-07, TVP-08	TVP-09, TVP-10	TVP-11, TVP-12
1TV.ge	1TV-01, 1TV-02	1TV-03, 1TV-04	1TV-05, 1TV-06	1TV-07, 1TV-08	1TV-09, 1TV-10	1TV-11, 1TV-12
Netgazeti.ge	NG-01, NG-02	NG-03, NG-04	NG-05, NG-06	NG-07, NG-08	NG-09, NG-10	NG-11, NG-12

25 *Source: Author's coding of the media corpus.*

26
27 The study covers the period from April 3 to May 28, 2024, divided into six
28 analytical phases: the reintroduction of the draft law (April 3–5), the first hearing
29 (April 16–17), the intensive phase of protest (April 30–May 1), the third hearing
30 (May 13–14), the publication of the Venice Commission's assessment (May 21),
31 and the override of the presidential veto (May 27–28). This phase-based structure
32 makes it possible to compare media responses across equivalent political moments.

33 From each phase, two texts were selected for each outlet, resulting in a final
34 corpus of 48 media texts. The main selection criteria were direct thematic relevance
35 to the event under study, interpretive density, representational significance for the

1 phase, and analytical relevance to the research questions. The aim was not to provide
 2 a quantitative representation of the entire media flow, but a comparative reading of
 3 analytically salient texts through which competing frames, discursive confrontation,
 4 and different modes of organizing political meaning could be examined.
 5

Table 2. Phase Key of the Analyzed Political Process

Phase	Period	Description
P1	3–5 April	Reintroduction of the bill
P2	16–17 April	First hearing
P3	30 April–1 May	Intensive protest phase
P4	13–14 May	Third hearing
P5	21 May	Venice Commission opinion
P6	27–28 May	Override of the presidential veto

6 *Source: Author's phase-based corpus desig*

7
 8 *Analytical Framework and Coding Procedure*
 9

10 The first stage of analysis consisted of structured coding based on a unified
 11 analytical matrix. Each text was coded according to the following categories: main
 12 frame or central claim; whom the text privileges; whom it criticizes or weakens;
 13 degree of emotionality; balance between factual and evaluative components; and
 14 the presence of a camp-based “us” versus “them” division. These categories enabled
 15 systematic comparison across platforms in terms of thematic emphasis, legitimation
 16 and criticism, emotional tone, and factual-evaluative balance.

17 The second stage employed a discourse-analytical reading framework focused
 18 on communication mechanisms significant in a polarized media environment.
 19 Particular attention was paid to agenda emphasis and selective visibility, frames and
 20 interpretive bias, emotionalization, narrative fragmentation and simplification, the
 21 blurring of the boundary between informing and interpretation, and forms of
 22 performing the journalistic role. This framework made it possible to examine not
 23 only which themes dominated, but how they were organized, which actors were
 24 given voice, how symbolic advantage was distributed, and how cross-platform
 25 interpretive asymmetry was produced.

26 The combination of content analysis and discourse analysis was selected
 27 because the research problem requires both structural comparison and interpretive
 28 reading. A purely quantitative description would not capture the discursive
 29 mechanisms through which different media transform the same event into different
 30 political realities, while an exclusively open-ended interpretive approach would
 31 weaken the consistency of cross-platform comparison.
 32

1 *Reliability, Comparability, and Research Limitations*

2
3 In this study, reliability is understood primarily as analytical consistency and
4 cross-platform comparability. All texts were processed using the same coding
5 matrix, reducing the risk of arbitrary reading and strengthening internal coherence.
6 The phase-based selection logic further increased comparability by ensuring that
7 texts from different platforms were examined in relation to equivalent political
8 moments. At the same time, the formal categories were interpreted within their
9 specific political context through discourse-analytical reading rather than applied
10 mechanically.

11 The study has several limitations. First, the corpus was selected purposively
12 and does not represent the entire Georgian media system; accordingly, the findings
13 do not claim quantitative generalizability. Second, the analysis focuses on textual
14 production and does not separately examine visual material, platform algorithms,
15 comment dynamics, or audience reception. Third, the selection of two texts per
16 phase was intended to support comparative analysis of analytically salient material
17 rather than comprehensive coverage of the full information flow. Fourth, the study
18 does not measure direct audience effects; its purpose is to analyze the discursive
19 construction of polarization and manipulative communication practices in media
20 texts.

21 Despite these limitations, the methodological framework is adequate to the
22 purpose of the study. It makes it possible to examine, through a relatively small but
23 analytically focused corpus, how polarized political communication is formed
24 across different types of Georgian online media and how this process relates to
25 media framing, interpretive bias, and discursive confrontation.

26 27 28 **Results**

29
30 The selected corpus of Georgian online media shows that polarization in this
31 material is expressed not simply through the coexistence of different political
32 positions, but through editorial choices involving topic selection, the naming of
33 actors, emotional tone, and the interpretive treatment of factual material. Across the
34 four platforms, the same legislative process is organized through different meanings,
35 so that readers encounter not only different evaluations, but different versions of the
36 process itself. These differences are visible across phases, with shifts in both
37 dominant themes and the actors granted interpretive centrality. The full map of the
38 corpus and its phase structure are presented in Tables 1 and 2, while the coded
39 platform profiles are presented in Appendix Tables A1-A4.

Table 3. Comparative Discursive Profile of the Four Media Outlets

Outlet	Dominant frame	Main beneficiaries	Main targets	Emotional tone	Fact / evaluation balance	“Us / Them” logic	Overall discursive profile
ImediNews.ge	Sovereignty, transparency, foreign interference, anti-state threat	Government, parliament, police, church	Opposition, NGOs, protesters, foreign actors, critics	High	Largely evaluative / mixed, with strong legitimizing interpretation	Strong	Pro-government legitimizing discourse centered on sovereignty, security, and delegitimization of protest
TVPirveli.ge	“Russian law,” democratic backsliding, repression, European future	Protesters, opposition, civic actors, European orientation	Government, “Georgian Dream,” police / special forces	High	Mixed, but strongly interpretive and oppositional	Strong	Anti-government mobilizing discourse centered on repression, democratic risk, and European choice
1TV.ge	Institutional conflict, transparency, security, international criticism	Mixed; often gives room to official institutional actors while also relaying external criticism	Varies by text; critics, protesters, or government opponents are more indirectly weakened	Medium	Mixed; more formal and institutional in tone	Partial / moderate	Semi-institutional discourse that appears more balanced stylistically, but still reproduces polarized interpretive asymmetries
Netgazeti.ge	Legal critique, democratic standards, human rights, European incompatibility	Critics of the law, civil society, international and legal-democratic frames	Government, the law, official justificatory discourse	Medium to high	Mixed, with stronger explanatory and legal framing	Partial	Critical watchdog / explanatory discourse centered on legal incompatibility, democratic regression, and European standards

Source: Author's structured qualitative coding and comparative interpretation of the corpus

Dominant Indicators of Media Polarization in the Selected Georgian Media Texts

On ImediNews.ge, the draft law is framed primarily as an instrument of transparency, sovereignty, and the protection of national interests, while its opponents are portrayed as radical, externally driven, or anti-state actors. TVPirveli.ge presents the reverse pattern: the draft law is framed almost entirely as a “Russian law” associated with democratic backsliding, repression, and obstruction of Georgia’s European future. 1TV.ge retains a comparatively more institutional tone, but still presents a clear tension between frames favorable to the government and those of its critics, often organizing the issue as a conflict between sovereign choice and external pressure. Netgazeti.ge most consistently develops a legal-critical and pro-European line, presenting the draft law as a mechanism of democratic regression, the restriction of media and civil society, and damage to the European perspective. As Appendix Tables A1-A4 show, these differences are reflected in distinct discursive profiles: security and sovereignty on ImediNews.ge, repression and European choice on TVPirveli.ge, institutional confrontation on 1TV.ge, and legal incompatibility and international criticism on Netgazeti.ge. The main indicators of polarization are therefore the competing naming of the draft law, different rules of legitimizing and delegitimizing actors, and the division of the same political process into alternative realities.

Manipulative Practices in Polarized Communication

The manipulative practices identified in the corpus are expressed less through explicit falsehood than through selective emphasis, interpretive distortion, the intensification of emotional tone, and the reduction of complex processes to simplified schemes. These practices are visible across all four platforms, though in different political directions.

1 *Agenda Emphasis and Selective Visibility*

2

3 On ImediNews.ge, the agenda centers on foreign influence, the role of NGOs,
 4 actions against the Church, destabilization, and external interference, while the legal
 5 content of the draft law remains relatively backgrounded. On TVPirveli.ge, the
 6 dominant lines are the legitimacy of protest, government violence, criticism from
 7 international partners, and the threat to European integration. On 1TV.ge, priority
 8 shifts toward international statements and official government responses, with the
 9 direct experience of civic protest receiving less attention. Netgazeti.ge concentrates
 10 on legal comparisons, human rights standards, the Venice Commission’s opinion,
 11 international reactions, and the use of police force. As reflected in Appendix Tables
 12 A1-A4, agenda selection predefines the central question of the process on each
 13 platform.

14

15 *Frames and Interpretive Bias*

16

17 The clearest divergence appears in the naming of the draft law itself. In texts
 18 loyal or protective toward the government, the dominant formulation is
 19 “transparency law,” whereas on critical platforms it is “Russian law.” The same
 20 pattern applies to descriptions of the protest: on ImediNews.ge, it is often framed as
 21 violent, externally directed, or radical; on TVPirveli.ge and Netgazeti.ge, it is
 22 presented as a pro-European civic movement and often as a victim of repression.
 23 On 1TV.ge, both lines are present in a more institutionalized form. The same
 24 contrast extends to international actors, who appear either as sources of interference
 25 or as carriers of legitimate warning and European standards. Interpretive bias in the
 26 corpus therefore operates not only through evaluation, but through the distribution
 27 of actors’ political roles.

28

29 *Emotionalization and Affective Intensity*

30

31 The highest emotional intensity is visible on ImediNews.ge and TVPirveli.ge,
 32 though in different directions. On ImediNews.ge, affect is tied to the lexicon of
 33 threat, betrayal, external interference, radicalism, and national defense. On
 34 TVPirveli.ge, it is generated through narratives of regime violence, pro-European
 35 struggle, and historical choice. 1TV.ge is formally more restrained, but its coded
 36 texts also contain moments of heightened emotionality, especially where blackmail,
 37 “Ukrainization,” a “second front,” or political threat become central. On
 38 Netgazeti.ge, emotional intensity is strongest in coverage of protest dispersal, the
 39 Venice Commission’s opinion, and the override of the veto, though it more often
 40 relies on legal and international framing than on directly mobilizational language.
 41 Emotionalization thus operates differently across platforms and serves different
 42 political functions.

43

44

1 *Narrative Fragmentation and Simplification*

2
3 The corpus frequently reduces complex political and legal processes to sharply
4 oppositional schemes. On ImediNews.ge, the conflict is often condensed into
5 formulations such as “state vs. radicals” or “sovereignty vs. external interference.”
6 On TVPirveli.ge and Netgazeti.ge, the more common schemes are “people vs.
7 regime” and “European future vs. Russian regression.” On 1TV.ge, a softer but still
8 simplified model appears in the form of “sovereign choice vs. international
9 criticism.” Individual events-hearings, street confrontations, the Venice
10 Commission’s opinion, and the override of the veto-are rarely presented as
11 interconnected elements of a longer process; more often, they are transformed into
12 symbolic episodes that reinforce each platform’s central thesis. Narrative
13 fragmentation therefore emerges as a recurring means of reducing political
14 complexity. Taken together, these mechanisms suggest that manipulative effect in
15 polarized communication is produced through the interaction of selective emphasis,
16 framing, emotional tone, and simplified narrative schemes.

17
18 *The Blurring of the Boundary between Information and Interpretation*

19
20 A major finding of the corpus is the coexistence of factual reporting and prior
21 interpretation within the news text. In headlines, opening paragraphs, and
22 sometimes even in the selection of quotations, texts provide not only a description
23 of events but an interpretive frame in advance. Formulations such as “Russian law,”
24 “transparency law,” “attempted coup d’état,” “special forces brutality,” “blackmail
25 through the EU theme,” and “repressive legislation” shape the political meaning of
26 the event before factual detail is presented. This tendency is strongest on
27 ImediNews.ge and TVPirveli.ge, though in opposite political directions.
28 Netgazeti.ge maintains a more explanatory style, but its interpretive framing
29 remains visible in naming and editorial qualification. In 1TV.ge, the same effect
30 appears more through source selection and sequencing. The news text in this corpus
31 therefore often performs two functions at once: it reports what happened and pre-
32 structures how the event is to be understood.

33
34 *The Transformation of the Journalist’s Professional Role in a Polarized Media*
35 *Environment*

36
37 The analysis also shows that the classical role of the journalist as neutral
38 intermediary, interpreter, and verifier does not operate uniformly across platforms.
39 On ImediNews.ge, journalistic practice often approaches political-institutional
40 legitimation, reinforcing the government’s frame and weakening its opponents. On
41 TVPirveli.ge, it appears more as a mobilizational-oppositional intermediary that
42 heightens the emotional and moral sharpness of the conflict. On 1TV.ge, the role
43 leans toward institutional curation, presenting opposing positions in parallel but less
44 often synthesizing them analytically. On Netgazeti.ge, the role comes closest to a
45 watchdog and critical-explanatory model, with clear editorial positioning supported
46 by legal, rights-based, and international sources. The journalist’s professional role in

1 the corpus is thus not uniform, but changes together with the editorial position of the
2 platform.

4 *Recurring Discursive Strategies across Different Media Platforms*

6 The comparative analysis reveals several recurring strategies across all four
7 platforms: the politics of naming, the delegitimation of the opponent, the targeted use
8 of authoritative sources, the existentialization of conflict, the transformation of
9 procedural events into symbolic battles, and the reinforcement of “us” and “them”
10 divisions. These strategies vary in intensity and form, but together they show that,
11 during the period under review, Georgian online media functioned less as a unified
12 informational arena than as a space in which several competing narratives operated
13 simultaneously. In this sense, media polarization appears as one of the principal
14 mechanisms through which political division is expressed and symbolically reinforced.

17 **Discussion**

19 The material examined in this study suggests that, in the selected Georgian
20 online media between April 3 and May 28, 2024, polarization functioned not simply
21 as a reflection of pre-existing political divisions, but as an active communicative
22 process through which the same political event was organized across platforms
23 through different symbolic, moral, and institutional meanings. In this sense, the
24 findings support approaches that link media polarization to framing, agenda-setting,
25 selective exposure, and trust erosion (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; McCombs & Shaw,
26 1972; Garrett, 2009; Steppat et al., 2022). The Georgian case adds an important
27 small-state dimension to this discussion: in a digitally intensified, resource-
28 constrained, and politically high-temperature environment, polarization may
29 become not only a feature of political competition but a property of the
30 communicative infrastructure itself.

Figure 1. Analytical Model of Polarized Communicative Production



Source: Author's analytical model.

1 *Media Polarization as a Communicative Process Rather than Only a Political*
2 *Outcome*

3
4 The findings indicate that cross-platform divergence operates not only at the
5 level of political sympathies and antipathies, but through naming, thematic
6 prioritization, the legitimation of actors, and the distribution of emotional tone. This
7 observation is consistent with Hallin and Mancini’s concept of political parallelism,
8 while also suggesting that, in the digital environment, such parallelism is enacted in
9 a particularly textual and dynamic form (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The significance
10 of this result lies less in the mere existence of competing viewpoints than in the
11 weakening of a shared interpretive basis: audiences are not simply evaluating the
12 same events differently, but increasingly encountering differently constructed media
13 realities. From this perspective, media polarization should be understood not only
14 as an expression of political confrontation, but also as one of the mechanisms
15 through which it is reproduced.

16
17 *The Relationship between Manipulative Practices and Democratic Vulnerability*
18

19 The manipulative practices identified in the findings—selective emphasis,
20 interpretive bias, emotionalization, the blending of fact and evaluation, and narrative
21 simplification—should not be understood as isolated stylistic deviations. Their
22 repeated presence suggests that they shape the conditions under which the
23 democratic public sphere operates. When interpretation precedes description,
24 audiences receive less information for independent assessment and are more readily
25 drawn into already framed narratives. This weakens one of the foundations of the
26 deliberative public sphere: a shared factual basis on which competing positions can
27 be compared.

28 The same logic applies to legitimation and delegitimation. When opponents are
29 systematically constructed as “radical,” “externally directed,” or “anti-state,” or
30 when governments are consistently framed as “regimes,” “repressive forces,” or
31 blockers of the European future, political competition shifts from the contestation
32 of arguments toward the moral and institutional exclusion of adversaries.
33 Emotionalization and narrative simplification further intensify binary perceptions
34 by reducing the space in which intermediate, compromise-based, or nuanced
35 positions might emerge. This is consistent with research showing that crises of trust
36 and political interpretation intensify when information is delivered through high
37 affective intensity and sharp moral division (Curini et al., 2024). The findings do
38 not establish a direct causal relationship between such practices and democratic
39 crisis; rather, they indicate that these practices can create communicative conditions
40 conducive to democratic vulnerability by increasing the likelihood of distrust, camp-
41 based self-identification, and mutual delegitimation.

42
43

1 *Digital Platforms, Visibility Pressures, and the Transformation of the Journalist's*
2 *Role*

3
4 The variation in journalistic roles across platforms suggests that the
5 transformation of the journalist cannot be explained solely by editorial preference.
6 In online media, visibility, engagement, shareability, and speed of reaction shape
7 headlines, emphases, and emotional tone, making it increasingly difficult to sustain
8 the position of a purely neutral intermediary. The agenda-setting tradition has long
9 shown that media participate in selecting salient topics (McCombs & Shaw, 1972),
10 but in digital environments this function is intensified by competition for visibility,
11 which favors sharp headlines, conflict-driven pairings, personalized confrontation,
12 and emotional intensification.

13 Within this setting, the journalist's role appears to shift in different ways across
14 platforms: toward legitimizing institutional positions, mobilizing civic resistance, or
15 curating competing statements without fully synthesizing their broader context. This
16 helps explain why classical journalistic professionalism, understood as balanced
17 verification and explanation, may be partially displaced by more positional or
18 narrative-reinforcing functions. The Georgian case also aligns with research
19 suggesting that trust in journalism is shaped by perceived ideological proximity
20 between media actors and audiences (Curini et al., 2024). Under conditions of
21 digital competition, the political recognizability of a journalistic brand may
22 therefore become a mechanism of audience retention as well as a marker of editorial
23 identity. In this sense, the journalist's changing role is best understood at the
24 intersection of political polarization, platform visibility pressures, and fragmented
25 audience expectations.

26
27 *The Georgian Case in a Comparative International Framework*

28
29 Placed in comparative perspective, the Georgian case shares several broader
30 tendencies identified in the literature on media polarization: competitive naming,
31 the moral classification of actors, emotionally charged narratives, and fragmentation
32 of the shared information space (Scheufele, 1999; Garrett, 2009; Steppat et al., 2022;
33 Curini et al., 2024). At the same time, it retains distinctive features. In Georgia,
34 polarization is closely intertwined with the language of Europeanization,
35 sovereignty, and external interference. Tsuladze's research on Europeanization as a
36 strategic resource of legitimation and delegitimation is particularly relevant here
37 (Tsuladze, 2025). The findings support this view by showing that, in Georgian
38 online media, Europe functions not only as a geopolitical orientation but also as a
39 symbolic boundary separating democratic legitimacy from competing
40 interpretations of sovereignty.

41 The case also supports broader descriptions of Georgia's media environment
42 as simultaneously pluralistic and polarized (United Nations Development
43 Programme, 2021; Georgian Institute of Politics, 2024; Gersamia, 2021), while
44 suggesting that this formula is insufficient if treated as merely descriptive. The
45 material indicates that polarization operates at the level of communicative
46 architecture: it shapes how news is produced, how emotional tone is distributed,

1 who is recognized as a legitimate actor, and how political process is symbolically
2 interpreted. The case of the public broadcaster's digital platform further complicates
3 the assumption that formally institutional style necessarily mitigates polarization.
4 Although public service media can in some contexts reduce selective exposure (Bos
5 et al., 2016), the Georgian material suggests that institutional style alone does not
6 guarantee neutral or depolarized discourse when the broader ecosystem is shaped
7 by strong political pressure and platform competition.

8 Taken together, the Georgian case can be read as a particularly clear example
9 of a polarized digital media ecosystem in a small state, where political confrontation,
10 platform visibility, the internal politicization of external factors, and the
11 transformation of journalistic roles are closely intertwined. For that reason, it is
12 important not only for understanding local media dynamics, but also for broader
13 comparative debates on the relationship between polarized communication and
14 democratic vulnerability.

15 16 17 **Conclusions**

18
19 This study shows that, in the selected Georgian online media between April 3
20 and May 28, 2024, media polarization functioned not merely as a reflection of pre-
21 existing political divisions, but as an active communicative process through which
22 the same political event was constructed across platforms through different labels,
23 frames, emotional intensities, and logics of legitimation. In this sense, the study
24 argues that media polarization is best understood not simply as an indicator of
25 political conflict, but as a communicative condition that can contribute to
26 democratic vulnerability. This is particularly evident where selective agenda
27 construction, interpretive bias, emotionalization, narrative fragmentation, the
28 blending of fact and evaluation, and platform-specific transformations of the
29 journalist's role work together to organize divergent political realities.

30 The article's theoretical contribution lies in bringing together analytical strands
31 that are often treated separately: media systems and political parallelism, framing
32 and agenda-setting, selective exposure, the transformation of the journalist's role,
33 and the vulnerabilities of media in small states. The Georgian case is analytically
34 significant because it shows how, in a resource-constrained and politically
35 intensified digital environment, polarization may become not only a feature of
36 political communication but a property of the communicative infrastructure itself.
37 More broadly, the study suggests that the relationship between media polarization
38 and manipulative communication practices becomes especially pronounced where
39 external factors, internal political conflict, and platform visibility pressures are
40 closely intertwined.

41 The study also has practical relevance. For journalism and media ethics, it
42 indicates that the erosion of professional neutrality often occurs not only through
43 overt distortion, but through naming, headline construction, source distribution,
44 emotional tone, and the fusion of information with interpretation. From the
45 perspective of democratic resilience, the findings suggest that polarized media
46 environments weaken the significance of a shared factual space, reinforce camp-

1 based perceptions, and intensify asymmetrical patterns of legitimation and
 2 delegitimation. These patterns point to the importance of strengthening contextual
 3 explanation, balanced sourcing, interpretive transparency, and forms of professional
 4 self-regulation capable of reducing affective escalation.

5 Future research would benefit from extending this analysis across longer time
 6 periods, broadening comparison to other small states, and integrating audience
 7 research in order to assess more directly the relationship between polarized media
 8 environments, trust, and selective information consumption. Further work is also
 9 needed on the relationship between editorial choice and the algorithmic visibility of
 10 digital platforms. In this respect, the Georgian case offers a productive basis for
 11 linking textual and discursive analysis more closely to institutional, audience-
 12 related, and platform-based dimensions of media polarization and democratic
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Appendix Table A1. ImediNews.ge Coding Matrix

Code	Phase	Date	Title	Dominant Frame / Main Claim	Privileges / Favors	Criticizes / Weakens	Emotional Tone	Fact / Evaluation Balance	Us / Them
IM-01	P1	03.04.2024	Parliamentary majority: NGOs are actively involved in spreading pseudo-liberal ideology and so-called LGBT propaganda, the aim of which is to undermine public trust in the Georgian Orthodox Church	Foreign influence / anti-state campaign / moral-civilizational threat	Government	NGOs / civil society / foreign actors / critics	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
IM-02	P1	03.04.2024	Representatives of the radical opposition and the NGO sector launched a disinformation campaign about the transparency law. What the radicals say and what the bill actually says, in detail	Transparency / countering disinformation / legitimization of the bill	Government	Opposition / NGOs / critics	Medium	Mixed	Yes
IM-03	P2	17.04.2024	Irakli Kobakhidze: NGOs are trying to attack the Church and damage its reputation — if there had been a transparency law over the years, NGOs would have had greater accountability to their donors	Foreign influence / campaign against the Church / necessity of transparency	Government	Opposition / NGOs / critics	High	Mixed	Yes
IM-04	P2	17.04.2024	Father Davit Rukhadze: What is happening near the Government Administration is an attempted coup d'état — I once again ask and urge young people to distance themselves from these selfless politicians	Attempted coup d'état / delegitimization of protest / threat of destabilization	Government	Opposition / NGOs / critics	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
IM-05	P3	01.05.2024	Irakli Kobakhidze: At 23-20 radical youth groups were instructed to throw heavy objects at police officers, verbally abuse them, and physically push them, which made the use of tear gas and water cannons necessary	Violent protest / legitimization of police action / protection of security	Government / police	Protest participants / radical groups	High	Mixed	Yes
IM-06	P3	01.05.2024	Mikheil Kavelashvili on the protest rally: All of this was planned in advance by external actors — these actions committed by the protesters are written in their instructions	External interference / pre-planned destabilization / delegitimization of protest	Government	Protest participants / external actors / critics	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
IM-07	P4	13.05.2024	Nino Tsilosani: The protest has an unequivocally violent character. There is effectively a scripted scenario whereby one day the rallies are meant to appear very peaceful, while on the next day violent actions continue	Violent protest / pre-scripted scenario / legitimization of police and institutional order	Government / police	Protest participants / opposition	High	Mixed	Yes
IM-08	P4	14.05.2024	Archil Gorduladze: Yes, the Church stands guard over the Georgian people, just as the national government will stand guard over the sovereignty and independence of the Georgian people	The Church and the national government as defenders of sovereignty / delegitimization of external criticism	Government / Church	External actors / critics	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
IM-09	P5	21.05.2024	The Venice Commission's opinion once again confirmed that there is not a single legal or any other kind of argument against the Georgian transparency law — Georgian Dream responded to the Venice Commission's opinion	Delegitimization of the Venice Commission / legitimization of the law / justification of the demand for transparency	Government	Venice Commission / NGOs / critics	High	High	Yes
IM-10	P5	21.05.2024	Gia Abashidze on the Venice Commission's opinion: This structure, composed of independent experts in constitutional law, is not a political party that should disseminate political, and moreover distorted, messages	Delegitimization of the Venice Commission / legitimization of the law / justification of the demand for transparency	Government	Venice Commission / NGOs / critics	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
IM-11	P6	27.05.2024	Mikheil Kavelashvili: As soon as the European Union and the United States stop interfering in Georgia's internal affairs and the political community concentrates on local issues, this artificially created "Georgian Charter" will collapse	External interference / external control of the opposition / delegitimized opponents of national politics	Government / Parliament	Opposition / President / Western actors	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
IM-12	P6	28.05.2024	Irakli Kobakhidze: I want to thank every member of Parliament who supported the law on the transparency of foreign influence and thereby remained loyal to Georgia's national interests, its independence, and its sovereignty	Defense of national interests / sovereignty / final legitimization of the law	Government	Critics / forces supporting "revolution" and a "second front"	High	Mixed	Yes

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Appendix Table A2. TVPirveli.ge Coding Matrix

Code	Phase	Date	Title	Dominant Frame / Main Claim	Privileges / Favors	Criticizes / Weakens	Emotional Tone	Fact / Evaluation Balance	Us / Them
TVP-01	P1	03.04.2024	Georgian Dream is bringing back the Russian law	Russian law / threat to democracy and the European course	Kremlin directive / sabotage of the European future / political mobilization	Government / Georgian Dream	High	Mixed	Yes
TVP-02	P1	03.04.2024	Khazaradze to Ivanishvili: We will not let you drag Georgia into Russia	Russian law / threat to democracy and the European course	Opposition / European choice	Government / Georgian Dream	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
TVP-03	P2	16.04.2024	You should listen to the Georgian people, who firmly tell you "No to the Russian law!" — Tina Bokuchava	You should listen to the Georgian people, who firmly tell you "No to the Russian law!" — Tina Bokuchava	Russian law / defense of the European future / the people's choice	Opposition / the Georgian people / European choice	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
TVP-04	P2	17.04.2024	EU reaction to the Russian law — Dream's decision may be discussed in Brussels	EU reaction to the Russian law — Dream's decision may be discussed in Brussels	International reaction / European frame / the foreign policy cost of the law	Critics / the European frame	Medium	Mixed	Yes
TVP-05	P3	30.04.2024	Special forces have begun hunting activists	'Georgia is at a crossroads, it must remain on the European path' — Ursula von der Leyen	European future / international condemnation of violence / Georgia at a crossroads	Activists / protest participants	High	Mixed	Yes
TVP-06	P3	01.05.2024	'Georgia is at a crossroads, it must remain on the European path' — Ursula von der Leyen	European future / international condemnation of violence / Georgia at a crossroads	Protest / European choice	Government / violent crackdown	High	Mixed	Partially
TVP-07	P4	13.05.2024	New evidence of Ivanishvili's special forces' brutality (video)	Police brutality / regime violence / portrayal of protesters as victims	Protest participants / detentions	Government / special forces	High	Mixed	Yes
TVP-08	P4	14.05.2024	The Georgian government is moving away from the Euro-Atlantic path — John Bass	Departure from the Euro-Atlantic path / government responsibility / demand to investigate violence	Critics / protest / Western frame	Government / Georgian Dream	Medium	Mixed	Partially
TVP-09	P5	21.05.2024	According to the Venice Commission, Dream's law resembles the Russian law, not the U.S. one	Legal delegitimization / similarity to the Russian law / threat to human rights	Critics / European-legal frame	Government / Georgian Dream	Medium	Mixed	Partially
TVP-10	P5	21.05.2024	If the Russian law enters into force, EU accession talks with Georgia will not be opened — final warning to Dream	Threat to the European future / foreign policy consequence / final warning	Critics / European choice	Government / Georgian Dream	High	Mixed	Yes
TVP-11	P6	27.05.2024	What will the EU's response to Dream's actions be? — Foreign ministers in Brussels discuss Georgia	Threat to the European future / possible international response measures / the foreign policy cost of the government's decision	Critics / European choice	Government / Georgian Dream	Medium	Mixed	Partially
TVP-12	P6	28.05.2024	State Department spokesperson: Dream has moved the country even farther away from the path of European integration — we will take this into account	Moving away from the path of European integration / international condemnation / possible responsive measures	The Georgian people / critics / Western frame	Government / Georgian Dream	High	Mixed	Yes

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Appendix Table A3. ITV.ge Coding Matrix

Code	Phase	Date	Title	Dominant Frame / Main Claim	Privileges / Favors	Criticizes / Weakens	Emotional Tone	Fact / Evaluation Balance	Us / Them
ITV-01	P1	04.04.2024	Peter Stano: The European Union expresses concern that the bill on the transparency of foreign influence is again being considered, despite the strong public and international reaction in March 2023	International concern / risk to EU integration / freedom of civil society	Critics / European frame	Government / the bill	Medium	Mixed	Partial
ITV-02	P1	05.04.2024	Shalva Papuashvili: The tone of international reactions regarding the transparency bill is very mild, we had timely communication, including regarding the idea of the bill	National security / legitimization of transparency / the sovereign right of the Georgian people	Government	NGOs / critics / foreign commentators	Medium	Mixed	Partial
ITV-03	P2	16.04.2024	Charles Michel: The bill on the transparency of foreign influence does not correspond to Georgia's European aspirations and accession trajectory	Threat to European aspirations / incompatibility with the accession trajectory	Critics / European frame	Government / the bill	Medium	Mixed	Partial
ITV-04	P2	16.04.2024	Shalva Papuashvili to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights: The main aim of the bill is to improve transparency, which is one of the pillars of both the Council of Europe and Georgian democracy	Legitimization of transparency / argument of compatibility with European standards / proportionality	Government	Critics / international actors expressing concern	Medium	Mixed	Partial
ITV-05	P3	30.04.2024	Ministry of Internal Affairs: The rally fully exceeded the limits of demonstration, became violent, and the Ministry is initiating measures provided by law to restore public order	Violent rally / restoration of public order / state legitimization	Government / police	Protest participants / organizers	Medium	Mixed	Partial
ITV-06	P3	01.05.2024	Givi Targamadze: We are identifying every police officer; very bad days await you	Radicalization / threat against police officers / intensification of confrontation	Government / police (indirectly)	Radical opposition figures / authors of threats	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes
ITV-07	P4	13.05.2024	Annalena Baerbock: Tens of thousands of Georgians are showing that Europe's heart does not beat only between Warsaw and Lisbon; this democratic civil society has brought it into the streets of Tbilisi as well	European future / legitimization of civil society / accountability of the government's choice	Protest / civil society / European choice	Government / the bill	Medium	Mixed	Partial
ITV-08	P4	14.05.2024	Vedant Patel: The final decision must be made by the Georgian government, but we say that such a law not only does not correspond to their aspirations, but also resembles repressive legislation	Conflict with European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations / frame of repressive legislation / government	Critics / the Georgian people's European choice / Western frame	Government / the bill	Medium	Mixed	Partial
ITV-09	P5	21.05.2024	Marija Pejčinović Burić: I call on the Georgian authorities to implement the Venice Commission's recommendations in order to bring the transparency law into conformity with European standards	European standards / implementation of the Venice Commission's recommendations / international institutional pressure	European institutional framework	The law in its current form	Medium	Mixed	Partial
ITV-10	P5	21.05.2024	Salome Zourabichvili: The Venice Commission's opinion once again confirmed that there is no legal or any other kind of argument against the Georgian transparency law	Delegitimization of the Venice Commission / legal legitimization of the law / frame of defending transparency	Government	Venice Commission / critics / NGOs	High	Mixed	Yes
ITV-11	P6	27.05.2024	Irakli Kobakhidze: No one should be allowed to use the topic of the European Union for blackmail and speculation aimed at the Ukrainization of Georgia and opening a second front here	Blackmail through the topic of the European Union / threat of Ukrainization / avoidance of a second front	Government	Critics / external actors / the 'global war party'	High	Mixed	Yes
ITV-12	P6	28.05.2024	Davit Kirkitadze: The ruling team ignored neither the Georgian people's request nor that of any partner, thereby breaking the hearts of our many partners and pleasing our sworn enemy	Damage to national interests / ignoring partners / defense of the European future	Opposition / Georgian people / international partners	Government / ruling team	High	Predominantly evaluative	Yes

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Appendix Table A4. Netgazeti.ge Coding Matrix

Code	Phase	Date	Title	Dominant Frame / Main Claim	Privileges / Favors	Criticizes / Weakens	Emotional Tone	Fact / Evaluation Balance	Us / Them
NG-01	P1	04.04.2024	Why the "Russian law" is not similar to the American and Australian versions — OSCE/ODIHR explanation	Russian law / comparative-legal delegitimization / difference from Western analogues	Critics / legal-critical frame	Government / the ruling party's argument	Medium	Mixed	Partial
NG-02	P1	05.04.2024	Members of the European Parliament do not rule out the possibility that the European Commission may revert to the pre-candidate-status position	Threat to the European future / risk to candidate status / incompatibility with EU values	Critics / European frame	Government / the bill	High	Mixed	Partial
NG-03	P2	16.04.2024	Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights urges Parliament not to adopt the Russian law	Incompatibility with human rights standards / protection of media and civil society / European institutional criticism	Critics / civil society / European legal frame	Government / the bill	Medium	Mixed	Partial
NG-04	P2	17.04.2024	We urge the Government of Georgia to heed the warnings — United States	International warning / risk of stigmatizing civil society and the media / negative impact on the EU path	Critics / Western frame	Government / the bill	Medium	Mixed	Partial
NG-05	P3	30.04.2024	The Ministry of Internal Affairs began dispersing the protest on Rustaveli — tear gas and water cannons were used	Use of police force / dispersal of the protest / escalation in the streets	Protest participants / critical frame	Police / government	High	Mixed	Partial
NG-06	P3	01.05.2024	Parliament passed the Russian law on second reading	Institutional advance / adoption of the law despite protest / democratic backsliding frame	Critics / the protest side	Government / the ruling team	Medium	Mixed	Partial
NG-07	P4	13.05.2024	Kobakhidze places responsibility on the President if she does not use the veto to reconcile positions	Shifting responsibility onto the President / politicization of the veto procedure / legitimization of the government's position	Government	President / critical side	Medium	Mixed	Partial
NG-08	P4	14.05.2024	If the law is not changed, there will be restrictions on specific individuals and their family members — O'Brien	International pressure / threat of personal sanctions / incompatibility of the law with European standards	Critics / Western frame	Government / the bill	High	Mixed	Partial
NG-09	P5	21.05.2024	The Venice Commission assesses the Russian law negatively and urges Georgian Dream to withdraw it	Legal and institutional delegitimization / call for repeal of the law / incompatibility with democratic standards	Critics / European legal frame	Government / the Russian law	High	Mixed	Partial
NG-10	P5	21.05.2024	Georgian Dream criticizes the Venice Commission's professional reasoning and accuses it of bias	Delegitimization of the Venice Commission / government counter-frame / rejection of criticism	Government	Venice Commission / critical assessments	Medium	Mixed	Partial
NG-11	P6	27.05.2024	We have begun discussing an appropriate EU response in the event the law enters into force — Borrell	Possible EU response measures / risk to the European path / foreign policy cost of the law	Critics / European frame	Government / the ruling team's decision	Medium	Mixed	Partial
NG-12	P6	28.05.2024	"A shameful day for Georgia" — international reactions to the adoption of the Russian law	International condemnation / obstruction of European integration / political cost of overriding the veto	Critics / the Georgian people's European choice / international frame	Government / the Russian law	High	Mixed	Partial

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