

1 **A Lesson from UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon**
2 **— What should we expect from UN peacekeeping**
3 **operations? —**
4

5 *The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed in*
6 *southern Lebanon for 48 years. Despite its consistent and significant contribution*
7 *to peace in southern Lebanon, the UN Security Council decided to terminate*
8 *UNIFIL at the end of 2026. Therefore, this article will review UNIFIL, and give*
9 *the negative and positive aspects and evaluations as a UN peacekeeping*
10 *operation. As a result, the negative aspects are; failure of implementing the*
11 *mandate on its early stage; failure of preventing Israeli invasion of Lebanon; and*
12 *inability of disarming Hezbollah. The positive aspects are: enhanced effectiveness*
13 *of the operation; humanitarian assistance; and assistance of the Lebanese Armed*
14 *Forces. Despite several criticism of UNIFIL from the international community,*
15 *this article points out the vulnerability of UNIFIL to limited performance due to*
16 *lack of proper conditions in establishing UN peacekeeping operations, such as*
17 *local consent and political backing. With the inevitable establishment of UN*
18 *peacekeeping with such severe conditions, one should recognize that*
19 *peacekeeping is not a panacea, and then expect UN peacekeeping to contribute*
20 *to fragile peace with slow and sustainable development.*

21
22 **Keywords:** *UNIFIL, UN peacekeeping operations, Lebanon, Israel, Hezbollah*
23
24

25 **Introduction**
26

27 Since 1978 the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has played
28 a significant role in monitoring security situation in southern Lebanon where one
29 has identified the continuously belligerent tensions between Israel and Muslim
30 armed elements and militias such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
31 and Hezbollah.

32 However, international criticism of UNIFIL intensified after the breakout of the
33 exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah and the following Israeli destruction
34 of Gaza in October 2023. UNIFIL was incapable of stopping Israeli aggression and
35 had done little to help the Lebanese authorities maintain control over their southern
36 territory and protect the civilian population. This failure raised important questions
37 about the presence of UNIFIL in Lebanon. UNIFIL has also been criticized of its
38 incapability of implementing its mandate of disarming the militias in Lebanon,
39 especially, Hezbollah. In particular, the US, Israel’s ally, criticized UNIFIL of being
40 both too expensive and ineffective, adding that UN peacekeeping operations on the
41 whole offer little value for money. In June 2025, when the UN General Assembly
42 approved the same budget for UNIFIL as was allocated in 2024, the US cast the
43 dissenting votes.¹

¹David Wood “Helping UNIFIL Restore Stability in Southern Lebanon”, International Crisis Group, Commentary, 14 August 2025.

1 As a result, the US and its close ally Israel strongly demanded UNIFIL to
2 withdraw from southern Lebanon. Finally, on 28 August 2025, the UN Security
3 Council voted unanimously to terminate the UNIFIL at the end of the next year.

4 On the one hand, it is true that UNIFIL has had several criticism for its failure
5 of implementing mandate and for its ineffectiveness of the operations since its
6 establishment in 1978. On the other hand, however, UNIFIL has provided
7 significant contribution to the maintenance of security in southern Lebanon, which
8 would be worse without the deployment of UNIFIL. Especially, it should be
9 questionable to argue that UN peacekeeping operations should be terminated and
10 withdrawn simply because they failed to implement the mandates or they failed to
11 prevent major warfare. In other words, UN peacekeeping did contribute to the
12 maintenance of peace and did work properly even if it could not happen to prevent
13 the warfare which occurred sporadically.

14 This article will provide the historical analysis of UNIFIL, the effectiveness of
15 UNIFIL, and the appropriateness of the decision of the termination of UNIFIL in
16 August 2025. Finally, this article ask a simple question, “what should we expect
17 from UN peacekeeping operations?”.

20 **UNIFIL as a failure? The historical analysis as a negative aspect**

22 *Failure of implementing the mandate of UNIFIL on its early stage*

23
24 As it is said that “Lebanon was primarily a victim of other people’s war²”, the
25 origin of UNIFIL stems from the animosities among many factions in Lebanon.
26 Lebanon in the 1970s had two separate but related conflicts; Israel vs, the PLO, and
27 the Christian militia vs. Muslim factions, which compounded the intractable
28 political situation.³ Moreover, the main three militias in Lebanon; the PLO, the
29 Christian militia and Syrian forces have legitimacy for basing themselves in
30 Lebanon. It was one of the main problems in establishing the mandate of UNIFIL.
31 By the late 1970s when UNIFIL was established, the Lebanese government had
32 already lost its authority to control almost all militias in the state.

33 The ultimate catalyst for UNIFIL happened when a PLO command raided an
34 Israeli bus near Tel Aviv on 11 March 1978 and in the following shoot-out, 37 killed
35 and 76 wounded. In retaliation, the Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on the night of
36 14/15 March, and in a few days occupied the entire region south of the Litani River
37 except for the PLO base of Tyre. In this situation, UNIFIL was established according
38 to Security Council Resolution 425(1978), which, as the mandate, called for:

²Bjorn Skogmo *UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 69

³As an article written in 1999 mentioned, “Lebanon became a land of death and unimaginable destruction, a country without a government, a fertile ground for the development of militant Shi’ite politics and Iranian influence, a background of Muslims and Christian militias, Israeli and Palestinian forces and a land of hijacking, kidnapping and attacks on Western embassies and personnel”, Nitza Nachmias “UNIFIL: When Peace is Non-Existent, Peacekeeping Is Impossible”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1999, p. 96

- 1 1. Confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces;
- 2 2. Restoring international peace and security; and
- 3 3. Assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective
- 4 authority in the area.

5
6 However, it can be accepted that UNIFIL could not implement the mandate
7 satisfactorily in its early years, especially, in 1978-1982. Most of the critics who
8 claim that UNIFIL was a failure point out the poor performance of UNIFIL as
9 peacekeepers on its early stage. Each of the three mandates in Resolution 425 (1978)
10 can be discussed regarding implementation.

11
12 a) Confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces

13 The Israeli forces' withdrawal from southern Lebanon was to be completed in
14 three phases. The first withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) was
15 completed on April 11, 1978, when the north-eastern sector and part of the eastern
16 sector were transferred to UNIFIL. The second IDF withdrawal from the south-east
17 of the Litani River followed on April, 1978.

18 However, when the IDF withdrew from its remaining positions in southern
19 Lebanon as the final phase on June 13, 1978, it transferred them to the command of
20 Major Saad Haddad of the Christian militias, which were called the De Facto Forces
21 (DFF). The areas which were

22 occupied by the DFF was 30% of the whole area in which UNIFIL was
23 expected to operate. Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in March 1978 was aimed
24 at establishing a 10-kilometer zone along the border. Therefore, Israel succeeded in
25 the de facto establishment of the "security belt" in southern Lebanon by turning the
26 area over to its subordinate militia. Israel's security belt was to play a major part in
27 preventing UNIFIL from carrying out its mandate to the full in late years.⁴ UNIFIL
28 managed to establish some positions there as an enclave. However, UNIFIL was not
29 in control of the enclave and met with many problems, including restrictions on its
30 freedom of movement during the next several years.⁵

31
32 b) Restoring international peace and security

33 UNIFIL was established in southern Lebanon without either the PLO's or
34 Israel's full consent. In the early years of operations, UNIFIL was faced with
35 numerous operational difficulties, especially, with harassment from the DFF.
36 According to the report of the Secretary General to the Security Council in January
37 1979, incidents involving the DFF occurred almost daily in those days. UNIFIL
38 installations had been harassed by firing including motor fire. The DFF also
39 threatened the inhabitants of the villages with further firing if they did not support
40 them. These actions prompted a number of civilians to leave their homes for safer
41 areas.⁶

⁴Emmanuel A. Erskine *Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989), p. 17

⁵Alan James "Painful Peacekeeping: the United Nations in Lebanon 1978-82", *International Journal*, Vol. 38, No. 4, October 1983, p. 620

⁶UN Document S/13026, 12 January 1979, paras. 27-28

1 Meanwhile, a number of Muslim armed elements, especially, the Palestinian
2 guerrillas continued their attempts at infiltration into the UNIFIL area of operation.
3 During the period from June to December 1979, 110 infiltration attempts, involving
4 785 armed persons, were recorded by UNIFIL. In August 1979, Nigerian and Fijian
5 patrols were ambushed by armed elements, when three Fijian soldiers were killed.
6 A Senegalese soldier was fired upon and wounded while on check-point duty in
7 October 1979. Furthermore, there were frequent exchanges of fire across the
8 UNIFIL area between DFF in the enclave. On a number of occasion, IDF personnel
9 joined the DFF in the firing.⁷

10 The highly tense and volatile situation in the local area also caused UN
11 casualties. The Secretary General reported to the Security Council on 10 June 1982
12 that since UNIFIL was established, 75 members of the Forces had died, 34 of them
13 as a result of firing and mine explosions, 31 in accidents and 10 from natural causes,
14 and that some 115 had been wounded in armed clashes, shelling and mine
15 explosions.⁸

16
17 c) Assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective
18 authority in the area

19 This mandate was essentially difficult to implement due to the fact that the
20 Lebanese state had not enjoyed sovereign rights over all of the country since the late
21 1960s. A first step to implement this mandate was to re-establish some symbols of
22 civilian authority in the UNIFIL area. This was achieved during June and July 1978
23 through the stationing of a civilian administrator in Tyre and that of approximately
24 100 gendarmes based at five different stations. The gendarmes gradually assumed
25 some of the regular police functions in the area.⁹ A second step was a Lebanese
26 army presence in the southern Lebanon. Despite assurances from Israeli Defence
27 Minister Weizman that the state would not interfere with the move, the advancing
28 Lebanese battalion was bombarded by the DFF and was prevented from advancing
29 any further when it reached the town of Kawkaba in the north western sector of the
30 UNIFIL area in July 1978 (Kawkaba incident).¹⁰

31 Despite intense shelling by the DFF as hostile measures, a Lebanese army
32 battalion of 500 men was deployed in the UNIFIL area in April 1979, and in June
33 1981, a second Lebanese battalion was brought to the operational area, which raised
34 the total strength of the Lebanese army presence in southern Lebanon to 1,350 all
35 ranks. However, this achievement by the Lebanese Government was insufficient to
36 restore its authority over the local factions basing themselves in Lebanon, such as
37 the PLO, the DFF, and over the presence of Syria. The deployment of the Lebanese
38 Army was “little more than a token gesture, either in its own right or as a symbol of
39 the existence of an authoritative government in Beirut.”¹¹

40 On the whole, in its early years, UNIFIL could hardly implement its mandate

⁷UN Document S/13691, 14 December 1979, paras. 36-37

⁸Bjorn Skogmo p. 59

⁹Ibid. p. 63

¹⁰Naomi Weinburger “Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Summer 1983, p. 353

¹¹Alan James p. 631

1 given in Security Council Resolution 425 (1978). In his report on UNIFIL to the
 2 Security Council, the Secretary General Kurt Waldheim on 13 September 1978
 3 accepted that “the present situation ... is unacceptable”¹², or “... little further progress
 4 (in UNIFIL operation) has been achieved so far”¹³, and he continued making almost
 5 the same comments in his reports in the sequel.

6
 7 *Failure of preventing Israeli invasions of Lebanon*
 8

9 One can witness the Israeli invasions or a large scale of military offensives
 10 against southern Lebanon several times even after the establishment of UNIFIL in
 11 1978. First, in June 1982, the IDF conducted a large military offensive, crossing the
 12 border of Lebanon in order to attack the military base of the PLO in eastern Beirut.
 13 It is called *Operation Peace for Galilee*. It aimed at preventing the rocket missiles
 14 from the PLO targeting northern Israel by demolishing the fortress of the PLO and
 15 establishing the safe zone. The invasion was a human tragedy, with some 18,000
 16 people killed and about 30,000 injured.¹⁴ By 8 June 1982, UNIFIL became the first
 17 UN mission operating in a country occupied by a foreign army.¹⁵ However, UNIFIL
 18 was powerless against the Israeli invasion. Or it should be said that in the
 19 circumstances, UNIFIL had little choice but to stand back. In fact, not a single
 20 statement could be heard in the Security Council criticizing the order not to take
 21 active military measures against the Israelis as they pushed through UNIFIL lines.
 22 Meanwhile, arguments that UNIFIL should have taken more preventive steps were
 23 often heard from officers and soldiers of UNIFIL who did not particularly appreciate
 24 being reduced to the role of spectators of advancing Israeli troops.¹⁶

25 Following Israel’s launching *Operation Accountability* against Hezbollah in
 26 July 1993 when 300,000 civilians were displaced, the IDF again shelled the
 27 Hezbollah’s position in southern Lebanon for three weeks in retaliation to the latter’s
 28 rockets attacks to northern Israel (*Operation Grapes of Wrath*) in April 1996.
 29 Thousands of Lebanese left the homes. On 18 April, IDF shelled UNIFIL’s base at
 30 Qana, killing more than 100 civilians seeking shelter there (“Qana massacre”). The
 31 tragic incident highlighted the futility of UNIFIL’s mission and responsibilities.¹⁷

32 In July, 2006, the IDF launched a large scale of air strikes to southern Lebanon,
 33 demolishing 30 public facilities including roads and bridges. The Israeli government
 34 announced that the state’s military offensives and the following ground battles
 35 against Lebanon were caused by the abduction of three Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah.
 36 Meanwhile, it would be highly probable that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006
 37 was virtually due to the retaliation of IDF’s humiliatingly complete withdrawal from
 38 southern Lebanon in May 2000. The response of the UN to the newly emerged
 39 security crisis was to strengthen the size and the capability of UNIFIL. In

¹²UN Document S/12845, 13 September 1978, para. 60

¹³UN Document S/13384, 8 June 1979, para. 20

¹⁴Nitza Nachmias p. 98

¹⁵ Andrzej Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 58

¹⁶Bjorn Skogmo, p. 99

¹⁷Nitza Nachmias, p. 105

1 accordance with Security Council Resolution 1701(2006), the total strength of
2 UNFIL significantly increased from about 2,000 to 15,000.

3 In October 2023, Hezbollah fired rockets at Israeli garrisons, proclaiming
4 solidarity with the Palestinian people, after Israel began its assault in Gaza. On 13
5 October 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called on UN Secretary General to
6 move the UNIFIL soldiers out of “human’s way” since he claimed UNIFIL had
7 become “human shields” for Hezbollah. UNIFIL did not comply with the order,
8 reaffirming their support for the mission. As a result, some UNIFIL troops were
9 injured and damaged by the following Israeli attacks to Hezbollah. UNIFIL’s
10 presence did not prevent Israel from pressing advantage. For another two months,
11 Israel demolished Hezbollah and the community.¹⁸

12 On the whole, as Paul Diehl pointed out as follows: “... the UNIFIL
13 deployment in southern Lebanon is regularly cited as an example of a clear failure.
14 The operation was helpless as rocket fire from Palestinian camps rained over the
15 heads of peacekeepers into Israel, followed by Israeli retaliatory raids. ...”¹⁹

16 *Inability of disarming Hezbollah*

17
18
19 There are in total five international agreements and resolutions concerning the
20 disarmament of Hezbollah. The first one is the Ta’if Agreement. This agreement was
21 designed to end the civil war in Lebanon and reassert Lebanese authority in southern
22 Lebanon occupied by Israel. This agreement was negotiated in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia,
23 in September 1989, and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989.
24 The Ta’if Agreement also demanded the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-
25 Lebanese militias. However, it is to be noted that Hezbollah was allowed to stay
26 armed in its capacity as a resistance force rather than a militia for fighting Israel in
27 southern Lebanon. It means that Hezbollah was exceptionally expected to be
28 committed to ending Israel’s occupation as an Islamic resistance group.²⁰ In fact, in
29 the early 1990s, most Lebanese militias were disarmed, except Hezbollah.

30 From the entire view of the UN policy, peacekeeping operations in the 1990s
31 became multi-functional, departing from the traditional type of operations. As a
32 result, many UN peacekeeping operations including ones in Asia and Africa, such
33 as Cambodia, Somalia, and the DRC and Mali, emphasized the complete
34 demobilization of all armed militias. This was not the case for Lebanon and
35 Hezbollah. Chen Kertcher argued that, in the 1990s, the UN Secretariat focused only
36 on the strategic goal of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in the UNIFIL
37 areas. He continued that it negatively affected Lebanon’s sovereignty, resulting in
38 Syrian military dominance and the increase in Hezbollah activity in Lebanon.²¹

39 In 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1559 was authorized. It was the

¹⁸David Wood “Helping UNIFIL Restore Stability in Southern Lebanon”, the working report, International Crisis Group, 14 August 2025.

¹⁹Paul F. Diehl *Peace Operations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. 124

²⁰Augustus Richard Norton *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 71

²¹Chen Kertcher “UNIFIL and ‘Security Zone’ in South Lebanon, 1985-2000: traditional operations in the Post-Cold War Era”, *Israel Affairs*, published on line: 5 November 2025

1 second international agreement or resolutions concerning Hezbollah's disarmament.
 2 Resolution 1559 (2004) called upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from
 3 Lebanon, and also called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and
 4 non-Lebanese militias.

5 On 18 April 2006, Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted his third semi-
 6 annual report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559
 7 (2004). The report stated that Lebanon was still in a fragile and vulnerable state.
 8 This led to the adoption of the supporting resolution, UN Security Council
 9 Resolution 1680 (2006). It was the third international agreement or resolution
 10 concerning the issues of Hezbollah's disarmament. Resolution 1680 (2006)
 11 expressed regret over Lebanon's failure to implement the disarmament of all
 12 Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias per Resolution 1559. Therefore, Resolution
 13 1680 reiterated the call for full implementation of 1559.

14 The 2006 war led to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701
 15 (2006), which was the fourth international agreement or resolution concerning
 16 Hezbollah's disarmament. UNIFIL was strengthened with the advent of many
 17 European troops in accordance with Resolution 1701. The Resolution restricted
 18 Hezbollah's presence south of the Litani River and asserted the authority of the
 19 Lebanese army in South Lebanon. This resolution also asserted that there shall be
 20 no weapons in Lebanon without the consent of the Government of Lebanon.

21 The fifth international agreement or resolution concerning Hezbollah's
 22 disarmament was the Baabda Declaration in 2012. It was issued by the National
 23 Dialogue Committee on 11 June 2012. This agreement was virtually between the
 24 various Lebanese political groups. The agreement essentially demanded to distance
 25 Lebanon from the Syrian conflict across the borders in order to avoid the negative
 26 spillover of such tensions into the country. In addition, the agreement enforced and
 27 respected the Ta'if Agreement and Resolution 1701.²²

28 On the whole, one can identify five international agreements and resolutions
 29 concerning the disarmament of Hezbollah. It is to be noted, however, that among
 30 them Ta'if Agreement in 1989 and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006,
 31 which were both the influential and significant agreement and resolution in the
 32 peace process in Lebanon, had a conciliatory stance with Hezbollah. Both of them
 33 virtually accept the deployment of Hezbollah forces in South Lebanon.

34 Nevertheless, UNIFIL has been criticized to be the main organization which
 35 failed to disarm Hezbollah. According to Sarit Zehavi, UNIFIL did not play a useful
 36 role, and in fact, it was detrimental to the mission of disarming Hezbollah in
 37 southern Lebanon. He continued that UNIFIL's mandate allowed it to patrol freely
 38 in open areas to search for weapons caches, but it had done nearly nothing to
 39 confiscate these weapons or eliminate Hezbollah's military infrastructure.²³ The
 40 US administration, which had sought to terminate UNIFIL as soon as possible,
 41 regarded the operation as a waste of money that was merely delaying the goal of

²²Rita Naoum, "Constructivism and Lebanon's Foreign Policy Following Syria's Uprising", MA Thesis, School of Arts and Science, Lebanese American University, December 2014, pp. 86-88

²³ Khalil Helou, Sarit Zehavi, and Assaf Orion, "The Future of UNIFIL and Hezbollah Disarmament" The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Analysis, 18 August 2025

1 eliminating Hezbollah’s influence.

2

3

4 **UNIFIL has worked: the positive aspects of UNIFIL**

5

6 *Enhanced Effectiveness of UNIFIL in the Operational Areas*

7

8 Major General Apurba Bardalai, retired at the Indian Army, conducted the
9 extensive research on the effectiveness of UNIFIL as a peacekeeping operation. In
10 his article “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: Assessment and Way
11 Forward,” he conducted the extensive interviews and questionnaires with the former
12 military peacekeepers of officer ranks serving in UNIFIL. In the interview, a former
13 senior French General and Chief of Staff at UNIFIL HQ stated that the absence of
14 war is due to the enhanced efficacy of UNIFIL. Others attribute the current stability
15 to the role of the UNIFIL and its rapid response to the crisis. In the book, 41
16 UNIFIL officers answering the questionnaires indicated that there have been
17 occasional incidents with the potential to trigger major conflicts since 2006. They
18 agreed that the presence of UNIFIL prevented the escalation of violence.
19 Furthermore, a majority of 29 respondents among them indicated the view that
20 UNIFIL had been able to take effective control of such incidents in time. It is an
21 invisible effect.²⁴

22 Bardalai argued that preventing another war which could result from possible
23 changes in the bilateral relationship between Israel and Iran will be beyond the
24 control of UNIFIL. At the same time, he continued that preventing a conflict from
25 recurring because of minor incidents near the Blue Line (BL)²⁵ should be within
26 the reach of UNIFIL. Such minor incidents include: BL violations because of
27 accidental or deliberate land crossings, the firing of a rocket by armed elements from
28 southern Lebanon into Israel, hunting by local Lebanese near the BL provoking IDF
29 soldiers on duty, smuggling of arms and other arsenals into southern Lebanon, an
30 attack on IDF posts near the BL by Hezbollah operatives, protests by Lebanese near
31 the BL against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, throwing stones at IDF soldiers,
32 and provocative actions by either side near disputed areas.²⁶ As Vanessa Newby
33 pointed out, these minor issues result in significant risks to the region since “they
34 are sparks that can light the fire of a larger existential conflict”.²⁷ In other words,
35 the less frequency of the trivial or minor issues indicates the effectiveness of the
36 operations of UNIFIL as an invisible effect. The frequency of throwing stones, the
37 pointing weapons by the IDF and LAF, and the incidents of firing rockets by

²⁴Major General Apurba Bardalai, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: Assessment and Way Forward,” p. 166

²⁵The term “Blue Line” refers to the semi-defined border between Israel and Lebanon. It was published by the UN on 7 June 2000 for the purpose of determining whether Israel had fully withdrawn from Lebanon.

²⁶Major General Apurba Bardalai *Keeping the Peace: UN Peace Operations and their Effectiveness: An Assessment* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2022), pp. 121-127

²⁷Vanessa F. Newby *Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: Credibility and Local Cooperation* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2018), p. 81

1 Lebanese armed groups, for example, had decreased in the 2010s. which was
2 presumably due to some strict control measures by UNIFIL.²⁸

3 Lise Howard, in her book *Power in Peacekeeping*, supports the arguments of
4 Bardalai and Newby. She concluded in the book that UNIFIL has been effective for
5 the following reasons. First, the situation in southern Lebanon would be even worse
6 without UNIFIL. In fact, UNIFIL has prevented accidental outbreaks of armed
7 confrontation from escalating into war. Second, violence in southern Lebanon has
8 arisen in areas where UNIFIL is not deployed, when there are changes in troop
9 rotations, and/or when UNIFIL is low numbers. Therefore, UNIFIL has created a
10 predictable security environment that has helped to create peace for local citizens.
11 Third, UNIFIL has been deployed in southern Lebanon largely because the
12 government of Lebanon does not appear capable of assuming responsibility from
13 UNIFIL. Therefore, UNIFIL has been contributing to relative stability for the
14 political, security and economic aspects in southern Lebanon. For the above reasons,
15 Howard argued that UNIFIL has proven effective at reducing violence and restoring
16 peace and security in areas where it is deployed.²⁹

17 UNIFIL has also been contributing to normality as well as stability in the
18 society of southern Lebanon. In fact, the resistance is necessary for the political and
19 security reasons in the minds of the people in southern Lebanon. Normality might
20 be the opposite conception to resistance, although the people in southern Lebanon
21 are striving for the both simultaneously. The normal life in southern Lebanon can be
22 created by “everyday peace” with routinized practices used by individuals living
23 there. Episodic violence, trivial fighting and resistance have been frequently
24 identified in the BL, and normality in the minds of the people in southern Lebanon
25 has been disrupted by such events. However, since the frequency of the events has
26 been reduced by the operations by the UNIFIL personnel, and normality has been
27 increasingly brought to southern Lebanon, one can conclude that UNIFIL has been
28 effective. While the UNIFIL operation is unable to influence political actors to
29 generate a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict, it has created conditions
30 conducive to normality.³⁰ Newby argued that by getting to have a normal life for a
31 protracted period, the local community will gradually lose interest in war and will
32 be more difficult to mobilize in support of war. Therefore, the normalization of
33 peace in everyday life will change normative ideas about the value of war versus a
34 peaceful life.³¹

35 What are the causal factors of enhanced effectiveness of UNIFIL as
36 peacekeepers? Fonta gave the key functions for traditional peacekeeping to be
37 effective: i) serve as investigators to document and prevent unwanted escalations
38 and resumptions of war, ii) serve as impartial referees to relay the intentions of
39 parties to the other side, and iii) serve as an interposed physical barrier that can raise

²⁸ Major General Apurba Bardalai *Keeping the Peace: UN Peace Operations and their Effectiveness: An Assessment*, pp. 130-131

²⁹Lise Morje Howard *Power in Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 100-108

³⁰Vanessa F. Newby p. 172

³¹Ibid. p. 173

1 the cost of invasive activities.³² Zachary Myers and Walter Dorn argued that these
 2 functions successfully applied to the three traditional UN peacekeeping operations
 3 in the Middle East, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO),
 4 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and UNIFIL. In terms of
 5 UNIFIL, as this article stated before, UNIFIL could not prevent the major wars
 6 between Israel and the armed groups in Lebanon including Hezbollah. However,
 7 Myers and Dorn concluded their article on the UN peacekeeping operations
 8 including UNIFIL as follows:

9
 10 *Certainly, the United Nations could do more to mitigate conflict and promote peace*
 11 *and security, but the current missions (including UNIFIL) have had success. The long-*
 12 *term view shows how war and conflict have not emerged for the majority of the time;*
 13 *the mere presence of these peacekeepers, with their ability to observe, report, inspect,*
 14 *mediate, and investigate, has served as a deterrent to many forms of spontaneous*
 15 *escalation.*³³

16
 17 “Perceived security” among people in southern Lebanon by the simple
 18 deployment of UNIFIL also has contributed to the total effectiveness of UNIFIL.
 19 People said “I feel that UNIFIL are good to be here. That they give a sense of
 20 security”.³⁴ UNIFIL has been perceived by the Lebanese population as a positive
 21 security factor. For example, during the attack in 2006, UNIFIL itself suffered
 22 casualties during rescue missions for Lebanese civilians, which gave a basis of trust
 23 in UNIFIL among populations. It also recognizes the deterrent effect of the
 24 mission.³⁵

25 26 *Humanitarian Assistance*

27
 28 UNIFIL has traditionally provided humanitarian assistance to local population
 29 in the area of operations. In fact, humanitarian missions have been consistently
 30 demanded since the early periods of UNIFIL. According to Skogmo, the
 31 humanitarian tasks became even more important in the period between the second
 32 Israeli invasion on 6 June 1982 and the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon
 33 in February-June 1985, when UNIFIL could do very little to implement any of the
 34 three parts³⁶ of the original mandate. In this situation, it became essential to give
 35 UNIFIL meaningful tasks, both to justify its continued presence and keep up the

³²Virginia Page Fonta “Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects”,
World Politics, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2004, pp. 481-519

³³Zachary Myers and Walter Dorn “UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East: Twenty-
 First Century Review”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2022, p. 20

³⁴Paul Malte Behne “UN Peacekeeping and the State: An Impact Analysis of UNIFIL in
 Lebanon”, *Young Academics, Politikwissenschaft*, Vol. 16, 2025, pp. 104-105

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶The three parts of UNIFIL’s original mandates in Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) are:
 1) to confirm an immediate Israeli cease-fire and withdrawal from Lebanese territory, 2) to
 restore international peace and security; and 3) to ensure the restoration of Lebanese
 governmental authority and its territorial integrity etc.

1 morale of UNIFIL's troops.³⁷ In the mid 1980s, UNIFIL cooperated with the United
 2 Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
 3 (UNRWA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International
 4 Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in extending assistance to the local people.
 5 Humanitarian assistance was extended to refugees as well as local populations in
 6 Lebanon. For example, in 1985, a number of Christian refugees sought safety in
 7 UNIFIL, where they received shelter, food and other provisions. The confidence-
 8 building value of these tasks became an important asset for UNIFIL.³⁸

9 In the late 1990s, the advent of the norm of "protection of civilians"³⁹ in armed
 10 conflicts was broadly advocated in the international community. The newly
 11 advocated norm promoted the legitimacy of humanitarian assistance in UN
 12 peacekeeping operations. In fact, many troop contributing states to UNIFIL have
 13 also valued a humanitarian aspect in their mission in UNIFIL.

14 It is to be noted that compared to Resolution 425 (1978), Resolution 1701
 15 (2006) has mandate adding the humanitarian tasks, "extending its assistance to help
 16 ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return
 17 of displaced persons".⁴⁰

18 For example, Ireland is a typical contributing state which has a consistent and
 19 positive policy towards humanitarian assistance in UNIFIL. Despite the constraint
 20 of their location between the IDF and the South Lebanese Army (SLA) to the Islam
 21 Resistance emerging from the north, Irish battalions did not stop offering
 22 humanitarian aid to the local people. McDonald cites the example of the 64th
 23 battalion, which suffered the biggest number of casualties in Lebanon but provided
 24 various forms of humanitarian assistance: donating \$1,700 to buy diesel oil for the
 25 Tibnin hospital; setting up medical clinics in Ayta Az-Zutt, Brashit and Tulin; buying
 26 glass for a damaged mosque in Quabrika, etc.⁴¹ In 2008, at the International
 27 Conference for Support to Lebanon, the Irish Minister for Education Affairs Noel
 28 Treacy announced that the Irish contribution will reach 5 million Euros in bilateral
 29 humanitarian and recovery assistance in the aftermath of the 2006 war over one
 30 million displaced, and large-scale destruction.⁴²

31 During the author's interviews in the Irish Headquarters in UNIFIL in August
 32 2019, a number of Irish soldiers and officers referred to humanitarian missions as a
 33 core task in Lebanon. One officer stated that UNIFIL has been evolving its
 34 peacekeeping missions since his first deployment in the 1990s. When he was first
 35 deployed in the 1990s, UNIFIL was regarded as a pure operational mission which

³⁷Bjorn Skogmo p. 91

³⁸Ibid. p. 94

³⁹In February 1999, the first debate on the protection of civilians was held in the UN Security Council, which adopted a presidential statement expressing grave concern over the civilian toll of conflict casualties. Then the UN Secretary-General was requested by the Security Council to submit annual reports with recommendations on how it could improve both the physical and legal protection of civilians in situation of armed conflicts.

⁴⁰UN Document S/RES/1701 (2006), 11 August 2006, para. 11

⁴¹"Irish Peacekeeping in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): A Historical, Political, and Socio-Cultural Study", *UN in the Arab World*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, Research Study, June 2013, p. 17

⁴²Ibid. p. 18

1 supervised peace in the BL between Israel and Lebanon. Currently, the officer stated
2 that the first priority is to support local people, the second is to train the Lebanese
3 Armed Forces, and the third priority is the operational mission. His statement might
4 be rather exaggerated although he implied that the evolution of UN operations
5 means the enhancement of local peace and the more focus on humanitarian
6 activities.⁴³

7 According to Vanessa Newby, most battalions in UNIFIL provide some form
8 of medical and dental care for the local population living in their areas. Some have
9 a hospital that local residents can visit twenty-four hours a day, and all medical
10 services and medication provided by battalion are free. In addition, many battalions
11 also operate an outreach service whereby they visit the villages in their area on a
12 rolling basis and set up a medical center to provide care locally.⁴⁴ The Spanish and
13 the Indian contingents in UNIFIL uniquely offer veterinary care in Sector East. This
14 service appears more popular than the medical services. Local farmers, who are
15 shepherds, said that the veterinary service is an incredible advantage in Lebanon
16 where there are few veterinarians, who charge high fees for their services. Newby
17 described that the veterinarians service by UNIFIL helps to improve the economic
18 environment of the region, as it enables farmers to continue to function and produce
19 goods for sale on the market.⁴⁵

20 After the 2006 war, UNIFIL innovated the new humanitarian project, the so-
21 called “Quick Impact Project (QIP)”. QIPs are funded by UNIFIL headquarters with
22 a total annual budget of US\$500,000. Each battalion in UNIFIL is allowed to submit
23 proposal for spending the fund in order to meet local needs with the maximum of
24 US\$25,000 for each project. The projects vary, from providing the solar system
25 lights to teaching computer or yoga.⁴⁶

26 For example, Spain has attached great importance to QIPs. 53.8% of the
27 Spanish troops interviewed in 2015 answered that they had engaged in humanitarian
28 assistance in Lebanon. Between 2006 and 2016, Spain carried out a total of 645
29 QIPs, serving 54 villages and towns and a total population of 99,000. The social
30 activities there included ones related to gender equality, children and women and
31 ones in the field of cultural relations involving teaching Spanish language to about
32 5,500 students in 10 years.⁴⁷

33 One can also identify the research result in the National Defence University of
34 Malaysia that there is a positive relationship between economic activities and local
35 acceptance in UN peacekeeping operations. In other words, the results of the
36 questionnaires to about 500 Lebanese citizens indicated the respondents who
37 enjoyed enhanced economic activities provided by the Malaysian peacekeepers
38 including QIPs tend to enhance accepting their presence as the UN operation in the

⁴³Interview with an Irish officer, Irish Battalion Headquarters, UNIFIL, 26 August 2019

⁴⁴Vanessa Newby p. 142

⁴⁵Ibid. p. 143

⁴⁶Ibid. pp. 145-146. For example, Taekwondo instruction was provided by the South Korean component, and Tai Chi tuition was provided by the Chinese contingent.

⁴⁷Marien Duran and Alberto Bueno “Gained local legitimacy in stabilization operations: the Spanish peacekeepers case in Lebanon-UNIFIL II”, *Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2024, p. 508

1 southern Lebanon.⁴⁸

2 The QIPs affected positively the economy of UNIFIL’s area of operation and
3 led to economic growth. Most of the developmental projects were executed by
4 Lebanese labor hands, which contributed to the local employments. All the projects
5 facilitated life such as better roads for transportation, training farmers and ranchers
6 to increase productivity, and improving the quality of education. Above all, it is
7 estimated that UNIFIL annually contribute with approximately US\$ 40 million to
8 the Lebanese economy.⁴⁹

9 According to the Secretary-General report, from 21 October 2024 to 20
10 February 2025, UNIFIL coordinated 1,578 civilian or humanitarian activities,
11 including the transportation of medical supplies, the notification of funerals, the
12 repair of civilian infrastructure, the movement of civilians rescue and recovery
13 operations, as well as the clearance of road. During this period, UNIFIL approved
14 11 QIPs, 8 of which were in support of crisis response efforts, including in support
15 of the Lebanese Red Cross in Tyre and the provision of food parcels, blankets,
16 hygiene kits and winter clothing.⁵⁰

17 The above humanitarian activities and personal outreach have been effective in
18 broader context. Jan Daniel and Marketa Wittichova conducted the extensive
19 research on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in UN peacekeeping, including
20 UNIFIL, and counter-insurgency operations. In their research many interviewed
21 CIMIC officers in their operations in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Afghanistan (International
22 Security Assistance Force: ISAF) or Iraq (War on Terror) said while many outreach
23 projects serve humanitarian and development purposes, they are closely aligned
24 with the military priorities and contribute to achieving the goals of operation. It
25 means that such activities serve to enhance the effectiveness of military operations
26 through engaging in a more people-oriented military practice.⁵¹ Whether
27 peacekeeping or counter-insurgency operations, humanitarian actions are now
28 considered standard army actions.⁵²

29

30 *Assistance of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)*

31

32 As mentioned before, Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) was adopted
33 following the heavy airstrikes of the IDF against Hezbollah and the citizens of
34 southern Lebanon. One of the mandate required UNIFIL to assist the LAF in taking
35 steps towards the establishment of the areas.⁵³ For example, UNIFIL has been

⁴⁸Nordin N. N. H., Wan Husin W. N. Salleh M. Z. and Harun A. L. “The Role of Economic Activities in Enhancing the Acceptance of Lebanese Towards Malaysian Peacekeepers Through Good Governance as Mediator Variable”, *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 18, No. 7, 2022, pp.9-19

⁴⁹Hassan Saad “The Success of UNIFIL: An Important Role in Security and Development Despite The Doubts”, POL 499 Senior Study, Department of Political Science and International Affairs, Lebanese American University, 24 May 2021, pp. 17-18

⁵⁰UN Document S/2025/153, 12 March 2025, paras. 29-30

⁵¹Jan Daniel and Marketa Wittichova “Forging Civil-Military Cooperation: Domestic and International Laboratories of CIMIC Knowledge and Practice”, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2020, p. 608

⁵²Marien Duran and Alberto Bueno p. 509

⁵³UN Document S/RES/1701 (2006), 11 August 2006, para. 11

1 expected to help the LAF disarm non-state actors in southern Lebanon, chiefly
 2 Hezbollah, and monitor ceasefire violations. The mandate would be necessary and
 3 appropriate due to the fact of the inevitable dependence of the Lebanese government
 4 on Hezbollah instead of the LAF in the maintenance of security of southern Lebanon.
 5 It means that the LAF needs to enhance its military capability and ability to assert
 6 its authority and defend the security of the state on its own. At the time of writing, a
 7 total of 8,985 personnel of the LAF are deployed in the area south of the Litani River
 8 in southern Lebanon.

9 UNIFIL assists the LAF in building the latter's capability in two main ways: by
 10 supporting financial donations among the contributing states to UNIFIL and other
 11 states to improve its military equipment, and by helping make improvements at the
 12 operational level. More is needed to be done in terms of the financial support. There
 13 is a shortage of basic materials, fuel and money to pay the LAF soldiers. In reality,
 14 the LAF soldiers have to do other jobs simultaneously to finance themselves, which
 15 means that many soldiers only work part-time.⁵⁴

16 Meanwhile, relations between UNIFIL and the LAF are good in terms of
 17 operational activities, according to the interviews with the military officers of troop
 18 contributing states.⁵⁵ In the area of operations, the LAF and UNIFIL conduct daily
 19 joint patrols to prevent violations of the BL and to search for unexploded ordinance
 20 and unauthorized weapons. When some Lebanese violate the BL during joint patrols,
 21 UNIFIL plays the role of observers, and LAF plays a key role in deciding what
 22 measures to be taken regarding Lebanese citizens. When some incidents happen
 23 between UNIFIL staff and Lebanese citizens, UNIFIL staff stand back and the LAF
 24 defuses the situation.⁵⁶ When unauthorized weapons are identified by UNIFIL, they
 25 are removed by the LAF. According to the report of the Secretary General on
 26 UNIFIL in November 2025, UNIFIL identified unauthorized weapons on 117
 27 occasions including 75 unguarded arms caches as well as individual carrying rifles
 28 or pistols on 6 occasions during the reporting period. The LAF was successful in
 29 removing 96 per cent of the caches referred to them by UNIFIL.⁵⁷

30 UNIFIL also supports the LAF in strengthening diplomatic relations with the
 31 IDF. After the war in 2006, UNIFIL has organized the monthly "tripartite meetings"
 32 among representatives of the LAF, IDF and UNIFIL itself. In fact, UNIFIL has been
 33 the only forum through which the LAF and IDF officially meet. The meeting
 34 consists of the UNIFIL force commander, 14 senior UNIFIL staff, and 6 or 7 senior
 35 officials from the LAF and IDF each. According to the Secretary General report in
 36 2013:

37
 38 *These meetings are the most significant stabilizing factor within the framework of*

⁵⁴Paul Malte Behne p. 90

⁵⁵Major General Apurba Bardalai *Keeping the Peace: UN Peace Operations and their Effectiveness: An Assessment* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2022), pp. 168

⁵⁶Vanessa Newby *Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: Credibility and Local Cooperation* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2018), p. 127

⁵⁷UN Document S/2005/738 "Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701(2006) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2025: Report of the Secretary-General", 11 November 2025, para. 25

1 *resolution 1701(2006), serving to build confidence between the parties and defuse*
 2 *tension in potential flash points, as well as providing a platform through which UNIFIL*
 3 *can facilitate practical arrangements on the ground between the LAF and IDF.*⁵⁸
 4

5 Among the tripartite mechanism, a “hotline” was established between the
 6 UNIFIL Force Commander and the IDF to report BL violations and any other
 7 emergency issues, and a similar mechanism was also established with the LAF in
 8 Tyre and in the Defense Ministry headquarters.⁵⁹

9 The tripartite meetings create several benefits for both sides. They are important
 10 as a confidence and mutual understanding mechanism in their daily life. In
 11 emergencies, both the LAF and IDF ensure that UNIFIL can keep the parties in
 12 communication to avoid a deterioration of relations. The meetings also provide the
 13 opportunity for UNIFIL to report the findings of its investigations into incidents on
 14 the Blue Line.⁶⁰
 15
 16

17 **Conclusion**

18
 19 On the whole, this article argued both the negative and positive aspects of
 20 UNIFIL. As the negative side, it was clearly pointed out that UNIFIL could not
 21 implement its mandate at all, especially, in its early days. UNIFIL failed to confirm
 22 the withdrawal of Israeli forces; to restore international peace and security; and to
 23 assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in
 24 the area. UNIFIL failed to prevent several Israel invasions of Lebanon. Furthermore,
 25 UNIFIL did not have the ability to disarm Hezbollah. Meanwhile, as the positive
 26 side, UNIFIL has enhanced its effectiveness in the maintenance of peace in the area
 27 of operations, especially, in the post-2006 period. UNIFIL has had its consistently
 28 remarkable records in the field of humanitarian assistance since its establishment in
 29 1978. Furthermore, UNIFIL has been successful in assisting the LAF which means
 30 that UNIFIL even partly implemented its mandate adopted by Security Council
 31 Resolution 1701 (2006).

32 Above all, it can be concluded that UNIFIL has been improving its missions as
 33 a “new UNIFIL” or “UNIFIL II” in the post-2005 period. In retrospect, Security
 34 Council Resolution 425 (1978) for an “old UNIFIL” or “the first UNIFIL” was so
 35 inappropriate and demanding for the local situation and therefore almost impossible
 36 to implement. In those days, there was no peace to keep in southern Lebanon, so
 37 UNIFIL as a peacekeeper could not have a minimum condition to implement the
 38 mandate in the area of operations. Meanwhile, after the 2006 war, the new UNIFIL
 39 extended its function and increased its military strength, and gradually enhanced its
 40 effectiveness and performance. Eventually, UNIFIL gradually helps calm high

⁵⁸UN Document S/2013/381, 26 July 2013, para. 7

⁵⁹Alexandra Novosseloff “Expanded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) in
 Joachim A. Koops, Norrie Macqueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams *The Oxford
 Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015),
 p. 773

⁶⁰Vanessa Newby pp. 96-97

1 tensions in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL has prevented numerous flare-ups from
2 spiralling into war.

3 Presumably, disarming Hezbollah, which would be included in the part of the
4 mandate of UNIFIL, the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, would also
5 be beyond the ability and capability of UNIFIL. Hezbollah currently has significant
6 military and political power and influence in Lebanese society. The issue of
7 disarming Hezbollah should continue being solved by the framework of
8 international law. On this issue, UNIFIL's presence was an imperfect but useful
9 device for discouraging Hezbollah's re-emergence in the borderlands or a new surge
10 of Israeli ground troops.

11 The current situation in southern Lebanon, where Israel and Hezbollah have
12 exchanged its fire and UNIFIL will have terminated its mission in the end of 2026,
13 would be discouraging for those who work in and with the UN and specialize in the
14 UN studies. In fact, in southern Lebanon, the violations of Resolution 1701 (2006)
15 continues and the mandate has not been fulfilled completely. However, this does not
16 mean that UNIFIL is ineffective and not important. UNIFIL would be the last
17 stabilizing buffer in an increasingly fragile region.

18 Therefore, the UN decision of terminating UNIFIL at the end of 2026 was
19 immature. Several specialists in UN peacekeeping argued that a sudden UNIFIL
20 withdrawal would create multiple risks: the possibility of a surge in Hezbollah
21 activity in the south; and increasing the prospect of another indirect conflict between
22 Hezbollah and Israel, and another Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Some of the
23 above scenarios have already happened even before the actual withdrawal of
24 UNIFIL.

25 On the whole, what should we expect from UN peacekeeping operations? UN
26 peacekeeping operations are one of the most useful instruments in conflict
27 resolutions. However, they are not panaceas. As its words indicate, we expect them
28 to keep the peace. However, real peace can be brought about only by political
29 settlement, and political settlement cannot be created by the presence of
30 peacekeepers alone but by diplomatic efforts. As this article argued, UNIFIL has
31 been contributing to fragile peace in southern Lebanon. However, concerning
32 southern Lebanon, political and diplomatic efforts by host states and the
33 international community have not been significant. Therefore, it would be
34 unrealistic to assume that peacekeeping operations can apply to the type of
35 intractable regional and international conflicts like one in southern Lebanon.

36 Furthermore, one can conclude that peacekeeping operations should be
37 expected properly when the mandates are suitable. Withdrawing the Israeli troops
38 was among the mandate in Resolution 425 (1978) and 1701 (2006), although the
39 IDF launched the retaliatory campaigns several years after the withdrawal. The
40 violations of UN resolution by parties concerned were due to unsuitableness of the
41 UN mandates, and due to the absence of the main principle of UN peacekeeping
42 operations, namely, local consent.

43 Selective nature of UN peacekeeping would be inevitable. However,
44 realistically, several peacekeeping operations, such as UNIFIL, had been inevitably
45 established without proper conditions, including proper mandates, local consents,
46 and political backing among great powers, for the emergency purposes. In these

1 situations, one should expect UN peacekeeping to maintain fragile peace, hopefully
2 with humanitarian assistance, and then to calm the situation with slow and
3 sustainable development in building the peace.
4

5
6 **Abbreviations**

- 7
8 BL: Blue Line
9 CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation
10 DFF: De Facto Forces
11 IDF: Israeli Defense Forces
12 ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
13 ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
14 LAF: Lebanese Armed Forces
15 PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
16 QIP: Quick Impact Project
17 SLA: South Lebanese Army
18 UN: United Nations
19 UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
20 UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
21 UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
22 UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in Near
23 East
24 UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
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