

The Casting and Recasting of Reality: From *Mythos* to *Historia* to History and Myth

When Hesiod wrote his epic poem, *Theogony* (“*The Birth of the Gods*”) in ca 700-650 BCE, he and presumably his audience understood that he was offering an absolutely true account of creation, both because he invoked the divine muses for assistance—spending the first 114 verses of his poem doing so—and because, as a practical matter, the knowledge of these events could only have been in-spirited within him by divine sources. He obviously cannot have been present to witness the pre-time moments that he describes, and “imagination” was not an option that his audience would have considered as a source for his details—and it would have been dangerous to make up false things about divinities. Making things up about the gods can get a poet into a good deal of trouble. They therefore understood the *mythos* that he recounted—and its verbal sibling, *mythein*—to be a “gods’ truth account” for whom the gods themselves (or rather, their divine handmaidens, the muses) were the truth-bearing source.

By the time Socrates was discussing diverse issues—like immortality, justice, and love, as well as truth—ca 440-400 BCE, he distinguished *mythos*, as an account that was not factually verifiable, albeit offering important truths, from *logos*, a fully reasoned out account.¹ A generation later, Thukydides, in presenting his account of the Peloponnesian Wars (ca 385 BCE), argued that his incontrovertibly fact-based *historia* should be distinguished from prior accounts—he implies that he has particularly Herodotos in mind, his teacher and the one whom we call the “Father of History”—that failed to distinguish *historia* from fact-suspect *mythos*.² By contrast, he, Thukydides, promises us what constitutes real history, marked by absolute *akribeia* (precision) in what he will report. But his presentation to the reader of his method (in Bk I:22) makes it clear that the line between absolutely fact-reliable *historia* and fanciful, fact-deficient *mythos* is a thin, blurry one. He writes:

In this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were delivered just before and others during the war. *I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself* and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used, *to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation* [emphasis added].

And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of the war, I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at the events

¹We see him articulate this contrast, while using both forms of exploration/explanation, each with its own *raison d’être* with respect to the truth regarding whatever the subject at hand, in the *Republic*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedo*, among others.

²Okay, I admit to a touch of snobbery with my transliterations: I prefer them to be closer to the Greek than to the Latinate versions we typically use, hence Thukydides and Herodotos and not Thucydides and Herodotus, etc.

1 that I have described or else *I heard of them from eye-witnesses whose reports I*
 2 *have checked with as much thoroughness as possible* [emphasis added]. Not that
 3 even so the truth was easy to discover: different eye-witnesses gave different
 4 accounts of the same events, speaking out of partiality for one side or the other or
 5 else from imperfect memories.³

6
 7 It doesn't take much to see the problem here, where the boasts of *akribeia*
 8 and incontrovertible fact are concerned. He chose what actions to judge as real,
 9 since he did not and could not see them all—and it is probably fair to say that
 10 even when he was present, in the midst of battle, his ability to see everything
 11 everywhere precisely happening as it was happening would have been
 12 compromised by the inherently limited sight-lines of being a human in the midst
 13 of battle and not a god calmly watching the battle from above. And as for the
 14 magnificent speeches—most famously that very long speech of Perikles at the
 15 time when the Athenian dead were celebrated at the end of the first year of war
 16 with a state funeral (430 BCE)—while we might imagine the possibility of his
 17 having been there, Perikles' speaking style is remarkably Thukydidean, with
 18 characteristic features of Thukydidean writing style rampant throughout
 19 Perikles' oration.⁴ But he admits to a less than perfect memory and to having
 20 manufactured speeches as he thought appropriate. And who, reading
 21 Thukydides' narrative, had been present and/or would remember Perikles' words
 22 from half a century earlier to contradict the account of those words?

23 One wonders, therefore, whether this is a case of relying on “reliable
 24 witnesses”—and what constitutes their “reliability”—or of his “placing in the
 25 speaker's mouth the words I know that he would have spoken under the
 26 circumstances.” One might add that Thukydides was removed from his position
 27 as a general and exiled for 20 years early in the war—after the defeat at
 28 Amphipolis (424 BCE) for which he was held responsible—so he sat out most
 29 of it from his study, writing about it without having participated on the field or
 30 in the discussions that comprised it: a war that he announces at the outset of his
 31 narrative as the most overwhelming ever to have transpired within the ambit of
 32 Hellas and its world. This last point, of course, means that his account is intended
 33 to be recognized by his readers as more important, even, than the *Iliad*, since the
 34 conflict about which he is writing is even greater than that known as the Trojan
 35 War. But—lest we forget our point—how much of his account is reliably
 36 *akribos*?

37 On such foundations, in any case, the edifice of western history-writing has
 38 been built for more than 24 centuries. The discipline should indeed be called
 39 “historiography”—the “writing of history,” not “history”—since every historian
 40 so-called, (in a manner analogous to theologians who write about divinity and
 41 the revelations believed to emanate from God/the gods), interprets the data that
 42 are presumed to be factual as they offer accounts of events, their causes and
 43 consequences, that have been significant in the course of human experience. And
 44 there are variant shapes to this issue, of course, as one follows it across history.

³Thukydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 24 (Book I, chapter 1, section 22).

⁴Ibid, 116-23 (Book 2, chapter 4. sections 34-48).

1 If we might easily and obviously ask what the historical versus mythological
 2 realities underlying the 11th-12th- century French epic poem *Chanson de Roland*
 3 might be, questions directed toward accounts regarding the Norman victory at
 4 Hastings in 1066 would be differently angled.

5 In the first case the most fundamental distinction between fact and
 6 imagination—history and myth—is in large part a function of the fact that three
 7 centuries separated what might have been the events of August 15, 778 that were
 8 gradually carried down through generations of oral poets (troubadours), from the
 9 oldest surviving somewhat complete written manuscript account of those events.
 10 Thus most obviously, whatever it was that transpired at the pass of Roncevaux
 11 in the Pyrenees Mountains to Charlemagne’s rear guard was almost certainly
 12 accomplished by the Gascons—aka the Basques—who refused to be subsumed
 13 into the expanding Carolingian empire, rather than by the Muslims (so-called
 14 Moors) depicted in the poem. But the latter, by the 11th-12th-centuries, had
 15 become the obsessive direction of Euro-Christian martial focus, from the surging
 16 *Reconquista* of ca 1031 through 1212 that would see Christians wrest so much
 17 of Iberia back from the Muslim control to which most of it had been subject
 18 between ca 750 and 1031, to the beginning of the Crusades at the other end of
 19 the Mediterranean, beginning in 1095.⁵

20 In the second case, how often do we read anywhere of the specifics that
 21 enabled William to defeat Harald’s forces: to wit, that the former was delayed
 22 by contrary winds for three weeks in his intended invasion. Harald’s forces—
 23 having recently won a significant battle against the Danes—had then hurried
 24 down to Hastings to meet what rumor had it was going to be a significant
 25 invading force of Normans. But the three-week delay, coming during the harvest
 26 season, meant that Harald lost a substantial part of his army to desertion, caused
 27 by their need to return to their farms lest the crops be ruined and their families
 28 starve in the winter to come. The so-called Bayeux Tapestry—not in fact a
 29 tapestry at all, technically,⁶ apropos of myth and history—may associate
 30 William’s victory with the celestial sign of a comet, but the comet would not
 31 have been positioned as it needed to be and Harald’s troops *would* have been
 32 positioned as they needed to be had it not been for those contrary winds.

33 How much *akribeia* of perspective and details may we attain so many
 34 centuries after these events took place? But long distances in time between
 35 events and the writing about them doesn’t necessarily disappear with

⁵From the time when the Muslims, under Tariq, began to take control of much of the Iberian peninsula, dispossessing the Visigothic Christians of political control, between 711 and 720, Christians beyond the Pyrenees hoped to reconquer it—hence, the “*Reconquista*.” The Umayyad dynasty, with its capital in Cordova, solidified control of most of the peninsula by about 750. When the dynasty finally collapsed, around 1030, the *Reconquista* began to achieve some success. By the end of the 11th century—at around the same time that the First Crusade began—Christians controlled about 65% of the peninsula; by 1212, after the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, Christian control rose to about 85%. The entire Peninsula succumbed to the Christians in January 1492, when King Ferdinand of Aragon conquered Granada. And so on.

⁶Beautiful as it is as a visual chronicle of the events leading up to the Norman victory at Hastings, the 230-foot-long co-called Bayeux Tapestry is actually an embroidered, wool-on-linen needlework masterpiece, and not a woven tapestry.

1 chronological proximity (it didn't with Thukydides!). Much closer to us and yet
 2 as or more pressing with respect to myth and history is the narrative of John F
 3 Kennedy's assassination in Dallas on November 22, 1963—with a substantial
 4 official report: 10,000 pages under the signature of the Chief Supreme Court
 5 Judge, Earl Warren, and thus with an emphatic US government imprimatur—
 6 that claims to offer the facts and the truth, but that would seem to include a large
 7 series of fact-and-truth deficiencies.

8 Any number of written accounts—such as Josiah Thompson's *Six Seconds*
 9 *in Dallas*, as well as some film footage of the key moment famously and almost
 10 accidentally shot by Alexander Zapruder—show rather emphatically how devoid
 11 of facts the Warren Report may well be.⁷ The alleged lone gun man, Lee Harvey
 12 Oswald, was a notoriously poor shot (he had served in the US army, which is
 13 when and where he demonstrated his singular lack of talent as a marksman) and
 14 yet, according to the report, managed to be extraordinarily accurate, shooting at
 15 a moving (albeit slow-moving) target 265 feet away and with his third, fatal shot,
 16 hitting Kennedy in the head—and in fact is supposed to have fired three shots
 17 (the first “missed” and the second hit the president in the back—with the old gun
 18 and its slow re-loading mechanism that was said to have been found up on the
 19 sixth floor of the Book Depository from where Oswald is said to have committed
 20 the assassination.⁸

21 Of course, when, two days after Oswald had been captured—and strenuously
 22 denied having killed the President, insisting that he had been set up as a patsy—
 23 and he was being transferred to the county jail, it is astonishing that security was
 24 lax enough to allowed him to be killed by Jack Ruby at close range, so nobody
 25 in a court of law ever heard or cross-examined his account of what he did or
 26 didn't do and under whose aegis if anyone's. Ruby himself died, apparently of a
 27 pulmonary embolism, not too long thereafter—and, forensically speaking, what
 28 was left of JFK's heavily damaged skull quickly disappeared, remarkably, from
 29 the Parkland Hospital to which the dying president had been rushed, so that
 30 should anyone capable of doing a forensic analysis, say, of bullet angles and the

⁷Dallas-based clothing manufacturer Abraham Zapruder was filming the Kennedy motorcade as it passed through Dealey Plaza, and thus happened to capture the assassination—from a relatively clear, slightly elevated position on the side from which the president's fatal head wound is visible. In spite of its importance as a piece of eye-witness testimony that helped shape the Warren Commission Report, the footage of the third shot in particular has been viewed by a number of analysts as proving that Oswald was not the killer or at least not the lone shooter, since that third shot seemed to come in rapid succession from two different angles. Other details picked up by Zapruder's camera added to that theory.

⁸For more details—and there are quite a few—that reinforce the unlikelihood of the account presented in the Warren Commission Report, see *Six Seconds in Dallas*. Moreover, after nearly 50 years of further research, Thompson produced a second book, *Last Second in Dallas*, in which he again concluded, this time based on more recent technological possibilities for analyzing, among other things, the Zapruder footage, that—as Kennedy's head could be seen knocked *backward* and then quickly again *forward*—he was shot from the front and then the back: meaning that there was a second shooter who hit him first from the “grassy mall”... In other words: two shooters, even assuming that Oswald was one of them.

1 like, wanted to do so, that became and remains impossible.⁹ We might wonder
 2 whether we have an accurate—*akribos*—historical account in the official report
 3 that is the basis for our understanding of the history of that event.

4 One might sandwich the historiographic truths or facts regarding JFK's
 5 assassination between two very different events, the willful falsifying of the
 6 essential historical details of which served very specific political purposes.
 7 Adolph Hitler came to power as the German Chancellor in January 1933 with an
 8 ambition rather clearly articulated in the autobiographical tract, *Mein Kampf* (*My*
 9 *Battle*) that he had penned a decade earlier while in prison in the aftermath of his
 10 failed attempt to overthrow the democratic Weimar government in what is
 11 known as the Beer Hall Putsch. Barely a month in power, and in February his
 12 National Socialist (aka Nazi) thugs set fire to the Reichstag.

13 This act provided a key moment in facilitating Hitler's path of removing the
 14 last substantive alternative political party and thus the last political impediment
 15 to his rapid seizure of total power and his successful subversion of the republic.
 16 For in the aftermath of the fire, he shaped the lie that would galvanize so many
 17 Germans to support him unequivocally, convincing the public that the
 18 perpetrators of this crime were the Communists and their associates, the Jews.
 19 The extra-legal mechanism for dealing with these newly-pronounced enemies of
 20 the state and of the German people was to concentrate them in camps designed
 21 precisely for this unique purpose: incarcerating groups of people when prisons
 22 were neither sufficient nor appropriate because they could not simply all be
 23 found guilty of a given "crime."

24 In the long run, the Communists would all but disappear from the German
 25 political map—Hitler would even sign an important pact (that he would abrogate
 26 when it suited him to do so) with the premier Communist state, the USSR, and
 27 its totalitarian leader, Joseph Stalin. As for the Jews—residents of Germany
 28 since at least the year 324, but having found themselves first religiously
 29 emancipated in the early 19th century and then gradually re-marginalized based
 30 on new concepts of race, as "Semites," one and two generations later—they
 31 found themselves swallowed by a perfect storm. They were racial outcasts who
 32 could never be "German" and also presumptive traitors through the nineteen-
 33 century-old Christian view of their association with Judas—to serve as the go-to
 34 scapegoat for anything and everything that went wrong in Germany, going back
 35 retroactively to the defeat in World War I.

36 So the outcome of a false flag event—turning the mythologized moment of the
 37 Reichstag burning into a readily embraced historical datum—would offer a
 38 treble consequence (for starters): the transformation of the German democracy,
 39 the Weimar Republic, into a vicious dictatorship that prided itself on its
 40 successful use of the Big Lie to gain and maintain its power; the Holocaust that
 41 came gradually into focus—between the publishing of the first Nuremberg Laws
 42 in 1935 and the opening of the first Death Camps in 1941—as a campaign to

⁹Two further notes may be of interest: one: that the Warren Commission Report was not able to make any sort of determination regarding Oswald's motives for his alleged killing of JFK; and two: three of the Commission members—Hale Boggs, Sherman Cooper, and Richard Russell, Jr.—disagreed strenuously with the lone killer/single bullet theory advanced by the report.

1 exterminate all Jews and Judaism itself; and the unprecedented destruction of
2 World War II, beginning with Germany's invasion of Poland in September 1939.

3 The second event that flanks the JFK assassination, five decades *after* his
4 murder in Dallas, echoes the Reichstag debacle—and seems in fact to have been
5 modeled on it; as its perpetrator is an admirer of Hitler and an apparent student
6 of *Mein Kampf*. I refer to the alleged coup attempt against the government of
7 Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye in July 2016. Everything about it smells of
8 the Big Lie, coming in a country in which, prior to Erdogan's rise, there was a
9 coup practically every decade for the last third of the twentieth century: Turks
10 seem to know how to do coups. They are done in the middle of the night, not
11 during rush-hour; the key political figures one seeks to take down are the first to
12 be rounded up; one doesn't have the number one figure, Erdogan, free and out
13 on the main bridge in Istanbul, broadcasting with his cell phone to call for
14 support on social media—for starters.

15 His goal to finalize the removal from influence of the *Hizmet* Movement,
16 inspired by the Imam, Fethullah Gulen, who had by then been living in
17 Pennsylvania for 17 years, succeeded—and the British, with listening access,
18 could overhear him asserting that it was most important that *Hizmet* be blamed
19 for the event—in removing the last potential obstacle to the finalizing of the
20 demolition of the Turkish democracy and Erdogan's assumption of complete
21 control of the country. If the *Hizmet* Movement initially played the role for
22 Erdogan that the Communists did for Hitler, they evolved to become his version
23 of the Jews, the ever-reliable scapegoat for whatever is going wrong—and
24 remain so to this day, even after Gulen's death. As ordinarily reputable an
25 American publication as *New Yorker* Magazine and its prize-winning reporter,
26 Dexter Filkins,¹⁰ recounted the event with complete lack of journalistic ethics,
27 clearly doing little research beyond relying entirely on Erdogan's sources to
28 recount a so-called "failed coup" managed from afar by a nefarious Gulen and
29 foiled by a heroic Erdogan—rather than the fake coup orchestrated by Erdogan
30 that had transpired.

31 One might recognize how the media, beyond a single *New Yorker* article,
32 have so successfully adopted and adapted the mental technology of *historia* and
33 *mythos* to the needs of the state, particularly when the state is enthralled to one
34 party or one individual. Part of Erdogan's path to dictatorship was to eliminate
35 the most successful newspaper in Turkiye, *Zaman* (and its English-language
36 sibling, *Today's Zaman*)—published by *Hizmet*—and assuring that anything
37 provided to the Turkish and world public was produced and vetted by his own
38 loyalists. The long-time Soviet Newspaper that provided Erdogan's model for
39 this aspect of his rulership was called *Pravda*—meaning "Truth" in Russian.
40 Established on May 5, 1912, *Pravda* began as an underground workers' daily in

¹⁰See Dexter Filkins, "The Thirty-Year Coup," *The New Yorker*, October 17, 2016. The article more broadly paints an extremely tainted image of Fethullah Gulen and the *Hizmet* Movement that could hardly be more mythological. "*Hizmet*," it might be noted, is the Turkish word for "service" and the Movement bearing that name exists to do just that, by way of interfaith and multi-cultural programs, social services, and building schools in places where they are most desperately needed. See Soltes, *Between Thought and Action*.

1 St. Petersburg. It was frequently suppressed by the Tsarist police, but eventually
 2 emerged as the major print-media mouthpiece for the regime under Lenin, Stalin,
 3 and their successors. The patent mythology of its historiography provoked an
 4 underground press, *samizdat*, for many decades in desperate response to its
 5 fictions-as-fact.

6 Of course the American democracy's media cannot be accused of always
 7 providing the truth, either, alas. The *New York Times* comes much closer to
 8 historical truth and its facts, perhaps, than *Pravda* does, for it prints "All the
 9 News That's Fit to Print," but clearly not always facts or truth, and a bit too often
 10 news that *fits the print*—because it sells. Thus alternative publications assert
 11 their role in counter-reporting, particularly in the past decade—beginning later
 12 in 2016, when Donald Trump found himself in the White House for the first
 13 time.¹¹

14 Indeed, one might extend this question of myth as history versus history as
 15 history forward to 2024, when an alleged assassination attempt against then
 16 would-be Republican Presidential candidate, Donald Trump, with its
 17 extraordinary irregularities in its reported narrative sequence, offers emphatic
 18 possibilities for a rather recent confusion between historical fact and
 19 mythological fantasy.

20 The event to which I refer is the alleged attempt on Mr. Trump's life made
 21 by a shooter, 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Cooks, on July 13, 2024, at a
 22 campaign rally in Butler, PA. It was perhaps the fakest assassination attempt the
 23 world has ever seen. The most compelling evidence isn't that the presumed
 24 victim's ear magically healed basically instantly (debates over whether it was a
 25 scrape or a graze or a bit of debris or whatever are all irrelevant distractions), or
 26 that the blood running from that alleged wound—and an awful lot of it, given
 27 that the wound was supposedly only to the ear—was flowing in the wrong
 28 direction, given the presumed position from which Trump's ear would have been
 29 hit.

30 It isn't that the secret service ignored several warnings about the man on the
 31 roof that it is difficult to imagine they did not see until no less than eight shots
 32 were fired by the assailant—and then promptly gunned him down, shutting off
 33 the most obvious source of a possible counter-story to what was being spun. Or
 34 that they parted like the Red Sea for a perfect photo op, exposing Trump's head
 35 and chest, as, instead of being kept on the ground and covered with agents, he
 36 ducked but then rose to his feet and gestured defiantly—things that no real secret
 37 service reaction would allow. Oh, and he managed to gesture fiercely in the
 38 precise direction of the shooter—650 feet away—in spite of what one can
 39 imagine as a chaotic, terror-filled moment when he should not have been able to
 40 discern what was coming from where.

41 It isn't that the man who got five draft deferments to stay out of armed
 42 combat decided to roar unarmed defiance into the face of a gunman (and then
 43 campaigned for the rest of the year on how we don't need gun control—from
 44 behind a protective sheet of bulletproof glass and a strict no-guns policy at his

¹¹Thus, for example, *Quora*, *Reader Supported News*, and *Truthout*—all of which are accessible on-line.

rallies; so I guess his newfound ‘courage’ didn’t last long). What also didn’t last long was, to repeat, the ear-wound, which disappeared so quickly, with not a scintilla of damage in evidence from that day to this.

The most compelling evidence is that Trump actually stopped talking about it so very quickly.

This man still has a beef with Obama from when the latter roasted him at a White House dinner years ago. This man still thinks the Central Park 5 should be executed, just in case. This man still hates Scotland and Panama because they wouldn’t put up with his corrupt business practices. He holds grudges for decades and pours out venom about them again and again. But regarding the guy who supposedly actually tried to *kill* him? The guy whom he so heroically faced like Erdogan on the bridge in Istanbul—who managed to miss him with eight shots, unlike Lee Harvey Oswald, whose notoriously poor marksmanship failed to prevent his single-handed success at killing John F Kennedy? Nothing. Not a peep. No excoriating social media posts. Water under the bridge. Not even a mean nickname like “Shaky Tom.”

Because he doesn’t remember it—and why should he? He wasn’t in any real danger. It was just one of several dozen campaign stunts conducted around a man with a background in ‘reality’ television. His ear healed quickly because it wasn’t hurt. The secret service let him stay upright and pose because there was no real attack. And if you think that Trump isn’t willing to kill—not just Crooks, but the bystander who died, allegedly from one of Crook’s shots—for a half point jump in the polls, then you’ve been living under a rock for the last decade.

Of course, I could also be wrong about this, couldn’t I? I wasn’t there—and even if I had been there, like Thukydides before he left the battlefield for his writing desk, what would I know about what actually transpired amidst the chaos and confusion? But if it *was* staged, then the more confusion and chaos the better to ensure that the theatrics would play through to their intended outcome: Trump as the hero who can lead the Party and who can lead the country.

Certainty regarding so many events from the time and the world of Hesiod to our own time and world is nearly as elusive as certainty regarding the reality *beyond* our world. We believe in the actuality of certain events and the narrative that describes them, and so we refer to the narrative as *history*; narratives the facticity of which we reject we call *myths*. Analogously, we believe in a particular configuration of divinity, and we believe in a certain path of interpreting the revelation from divinity that reinforces how we understand it, and our belief system becomes what we call *religion*. A belief system that we consider false, with regard to both what divinity is and what revelations from it mean, we label *myth*—or *superstition* or *magic*.

But in both arenas, that which we consider true and fact-laden—in an *akribos* way—is typically unprovable by reason, however reasonable (or unreasonable). We weren’t in the Bay of Syracuse in 413 BCE, the pass at Roncevaux in 778 CE, the field at Hastings in 1066, Berlin in 1933, Dallas in 1963, Istanbul in 2016, or Butler, PA in 2024. And it is difficult to assert that if we had been present at any of those times and places we would have walked away with a clear idea of what had transpired.

In fact, we live in an era when we are not limited to print media like *The New York Times* or *The New Yorker* to offer us *akribos* information on events that, rather than, swelling the pages of *mythos* end up as told-again tales of *historia*—or counter-sources that reconfigure what we accept as history or reject as myth. Social Media—including Trump’s own cynically titled “Truth (*pravda*!) Social”—make up whatever news fits the news-perpetrator’s need. We live in a world where biopics and so-called reality TV constantly blur the boundary between fact and fiction—between historical fact and imaginative myth.

The rather prescient 1997 movie, *Wag the Dog*, codified what we can do with new kinds of media, by offering us, as a political satire, the account of a governmental decision to manufacture a war in Albania from scratch, in order to distract American voters from a sex scandal involving the president. The mechanism, in the hands of a Hollywood spin doctor producer, is that of creating fictional—fake—documentary footage. The outcome includes the murder of the producer when the project has been completed and its goals achieved, lest his inclination for loose lips let the truth out.

A far cry from Thukydides’ problematic reference to *akribeia* or from Socrates’ obsession with *aletheia*—truth—being sought through discussions that interweave *logos* and *mythos*. The events and the reportage of events and the consequences of both, strung out between multiple pasts and the present might cause us to wonder, however, regarding today’s events and their consequences: what will be looked back at as myth and what as history tomorrow. That wondering ought perhaps to be laced with concern and not just idle curiosity.

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- 1 *Wag the Dog*, Dir. Barry Levinson; Prod. Barry Levinson, Robert De Niro & Jane
- 2 Rosenthal; Starring Dustin Hoffman & Robert De Niro; Baltimore Picutres &
- 3 TriBeCa Productions; 1997.
- 4 *Warren Commission Report*. September 24, 1964.

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