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# The Athens Journal of Social Sciences



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ATINER is a *World Non-Profit Association* of Academics and Researchers based in Athens. ATINER is an independent **Association** with a **Mission** to become a forum where Academics and Researchers from all over the world can meet in Athens, exchange ideas on their research and discuss future developments in their disciplines, **as well as engage with professionals from other fields**. Athens was chosen because of its long history of academic gatherings, which go back thousands of years to *Plato's Academy* and *Aristotle's Lyceum*. Both these historic places are within walking distance from ATINER's downtown offices. Since antiquity, Athens was an open city. In the words of Pericles, *Athens "... is open to the world, we never expel a foreigner from learning or seeing"*. ("Pericles' Funeral Oration", in Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*). It is ATINER's **mission** to revive the glory of Ancient Athens by inviting the World Academic Community to the city, to learn from each other in an environment of freedom and respect for other people's opinions and beliefs. After all, the free expression of one's opinion formed the basis for the development of democracy, and Athens was its cradle. As it turned out, the Golden Age of Athens was in fact, the Golden Age of the Western Civilization. *Education* and *(Re)searching* for the 'truth' are the pillars of any free (democratic) society. This is the reason why *Education* and *Research* are the two core words in ATINER's name.

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# Athens Journal of Social Sciences

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Before you submit, please make sure your paper meets some [basic academic standards](#), which include proper English. Some articles will be selected from the numerous papers that have been presented at the various annual international academic conferences organized by the different [divisions and units](#) of the Athens Institute for Education and Research.

The plethora of papers presented every year will enable the editorial board of each journal to select the best ones, and in so doing, to produce a quality academic journal. In addition to papers presented, ATINER encourages the independent submission of papers to be evaluated for publication.

The current issue of the Athens Journal of Social Sciences (AJSS) is the fourth issue of the sixth volume (2019). The reader will notice some changes compared with previous volumes, which I hope is an improvement. An effort has been made to include papers which fall within in one of the broad disciplines of social sciences.

This volume includes papers which their common denominator is education from the perspective of sociology, anthropology, politics and Criminology. In total, four papers are included. The first paper deals with the issue of building the infrastructure for globalization and neoliberalism. The second paper deals with Family Organization and Administrative Functionality. The next paper is a criticism to the US American case of populism. The last paper explores crime rates in Cyprus during the period 2003-2013 and identifies the main factors causing crime tendencies.

The AJSS is truly an international journal; this is also reflected in this issue. The four papers refer to different countries and regions of the world: Cyprus, Germany, Norway and USA.

Gregory T. Papanikos, President  
Athens Institute for Education and Research



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- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **27 April 2020**

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# Megaprojects, Development and Competitiveness: Building the Infrastructure for Globalization and Neoliberalism

By Gerardo del Cerro Santamaria \*

*This paper argues that megaprojects are inherently tied to the logic of growth, development, urban qualitative transformation, wealth creation, competitiveness and prosperity. Megaprojects constitute the infrastructure of globalization and neoliberalism and they actively contribute to a situation of increased planetary urbanization. The causal context of megaprojects – the logic of development and competitiveness – has consequences for the planning and management of megaprojects. In order to meet the goal of contributing to urban and national growth and development, megaprojects are usually shaped as public-private institutional arrangements participated by elites and pro-growth coalitions at various spatial scales that are able to provide the necessary funding and expert knowledge to implement these complex structures. The close links between megaprojects, development and competitiveness, and the increasing role of megaprojects in the configuration of megaregions worldwide, have an architectural reflection in the prominent importance of iconicity in megaproject design and construction. Thus, the paper analyzes megaprojects in a dual, interconnected way: as spatial settings and infrastructure units that obey specific planning, design and management priorities, and also as reflections or expressions - as consequences or crystallizations - of larger socio-economic forces. Megaprojects have multiplied around the world as an urban response to pressures for development, competitiveness and innovation in a context of globalization and neoliberalism.*

**Keywords:** iconic megaprojects, megaprojects, megaproject management, megaregions, public/private partnerships.

## Introduction

Megaprojects - urban regeneration schemes, transport and energy infrastructure, industrial corridors, city clusters, new towns, innovation districts, science and technology parks, sports infrastructure - are reconfigured and reterritorialized spaces in which the role of the local, regional, and national elites, as well as the role of national and sometimes transnational capital, is usually prominent. Megaproject design and implementation often meet the need of bringing together and harmonizing several scales of power, not only because increased urban competitiveness and global visibility are perceived as essential outcomes in the development of these projects, but also because, in diverse socio-political contexts, the configuration of political power exhibits different and distinct relationships between the local, regional, national, and global domains of social action.

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It is important to note that, in a context of planetary urbanization (Brenner and Schmid 2011), virtually all megaprojects are urban in nature and location or are built to have a direct effect on cities and the urbanization process, particularly urban development and competitiveness, because megaproject construction has been a major response to adapt to neoliberalism and globalization in the urban realm, as discussed below. In fact, megaprojects actively contribute to a situation of increased planetary urbanization. Hirschman (1967a: vii, xi) calls megaprojects "privileged particles of the development process" and points out that often they are "trait making," that is, they are designed to ambitiously change the structure of society, as opposed to smaller and more conventional projects that are "trait taking," i.e., they fit into pre-existing structures and do not attempt to modify these.

Urban megaprojects present themselves in many different packages and resist easy definitions, but the close link between megaprojects and development is evident. One could conceptualize UMPs as *large-scale urban development projects that sometimes have an iconic design component, that usually aim at transforming or have the potential to transform a city's or parts of a city's image, and are often promoted and perceived by the urban elite as crucial catalysts for growth and even as linkages to the larger world economy.* In an era marked by the shift in urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989), and one in which cities are thought of as nodes in a global network of relationships, the urban elite often perceive linkages to the global economy as fundamental to ensure sustained local economic development. Regaining global visibility (a concept discussed by Grubbauer 2013) is not only a quintessential economic strategy, it also serves the purpose of symbolic or representational transformation, which is especially useful for regions and cities with distinct political identities. Both objectives – the material and the symbolic – are present in many cities' recent, concerted attempts to regain status as globalizing metropolises through the use of urban megaprojects in urban revitalization (Bunnell 2013). Revitalization itself is a political strategy that questions approaches stressing the exclusively economic and financial character of globalization.

The causal context of megaprojects – the logic of development and competitiveness – has consequences for the planning and management of megaprojects. In order to meet their goals of contributing to urban and national growth and development, megaprojects need to be shaped as public-private institutional arrangements participated by elites and coalitions at various spatial scales that are able to provide the necessary funding and expert knowledge to implement these complex structures. By "development" we understand both the infrastructural development epitomized by megaprojects as well as the neoliberal context of globalization (fostered by developmental states turned entrepreneurial states) within which megaprojects take place and are implemented (Mazzucato 2014, Castells and Himanen 2015).

The paper addresses the planning, design and project management aspects of megaprojects (institutional arrangements and financing at various spatial scales and executed locally) as well as the larger causal context of neoliberalism, globalization and competitiveness that explains the rise and development of

megaprojects and its linkages with socio-economic development worldwide. The paper is organized as follows. **Part One** of the paper analyzes the socio-economic causal context of megaprojects. This Part One has three sections: (1) *Development and Competitiveness*, which looks into the global socio-economic changes due to neoliberalism and globalization that help explain the role of infrastructure and the rise of megaprojects all over the world; (2) *Megaprojects and Megaregions*, which explores the important role of megaprojects in the rising socio-spatial configuration of the global economy around megaregions and their impacts on development, growth and prosperity; (3) *Challenges and Obstacles*, which describes some of the socio-economic, institutional and civil society obstacles and problems faced by many megaprojects, due to their highly complex and highly controversial features, in the planning, design and construction phases. **Part Two** of the paper zooms up to analyzing megaprojects within the planning and management frameworks. Part Two has three sections: (4) *Financing and Management*, which describes the magnitude of the megaproject phenomenon worldwide, focusing on the rise of private financing and the management of megaprojects for sustainability; (5) *Planning and Partnerships*, which looks into the public-private institutional arrangements that have been created in most cases to enable and foster the development of megaprojects.; (6) *Iconic Megaprojects*, which shows how iconicity in design contributes to city visibility on the global map and therefore helps the overall goal of using megaprojects as infrastructure tools to foster development and competitiveness. At the end of the paper, the **Conclusions** section summarizes the findings presented in the paper.

## Part One

### *Development and Competitiveness*

In order to understand the links between megaprojects, development and competitiveness we need to briefly discuss the processes of globalization and neoliberalism as causal contexts within which the recent wave of megaprojects came about. Megaprojects have arisen from a complex set of geographic, economic and, above all, political processes of restructuring occurring throughout the world since the late 1970s and early 1980s. This period has seen the widespread ascendancy of globalization, neoliberalism, and as an urban manifestation of these processes, the megaprojects, which are inherently tied to a global logic of development and competitiveness.

Globalization and neoliberalism have manifested themselves in four global processes that motivate megaprojects: (1) city-based international competition; (2) the mobility and growth of knowledge economies; (3) the redirection of global investment from physical to human capital; and (4) the dominance of market-rule ideology and politics (Harris 2017).

Megaprojects are a product of political and economic changes rhetorically framed around a lesser state intervention. However, these projects are "clearly, and almost with no exception, led by the state and often financed by the state"

(Moulaert et al. 2003: 551). This degree of state participation symbolizes the tensión between the ideology and the practice of neoliberalism, which is crudely revealed in megaprojects.

A complex reorganization of the relations between the State and the economy is generated under neoliberalism. The State actively enables and promotes market-based regulatory agreements that favor the private sector (often in the form of "public-private partnerships"), and so urbanization depends on this peculiar and perverted form of mobilization of state power to a greater degree than in previous stages (Brenner and Theodore 2005). In a way, this is a clearly neoliberal version (the "entrepreneurial state") of the formerly called "developmental state", whose paradigmatic example in the world is the Chinese government, controlled by the all-powerful Communist Party of the People's Republic of China.

The Chinese entrepreneurial State began to demonstrate when the teams of the Corps of Engineers of the People's Army started the construction of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEEZ) once they concluded their work in the reconstruction of Tangshan after the 1976 earthquake. The first skyscraper in the SEEZ, the International Foreign Trade Center, opened its doors in 1985, and it was at the time the tallest building in China. The IFTC was inspired by the Hopewell Center of Gordon Wu in Hong Kong and rapidly became a widely replicated type of building throughout China. From that skyscraper Deng issued his historic call to the free market in January 1992.

On the other hand, the increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) during the last decades of globalization are an indicator of the impact of the mobility of financial and human capital on urban space. These increases in FDI have occurred in a context of massive economic change, from the centrality of manufacturing industries to the preponderance of the service sector, and particularly information and knowledge, beginning in the second half of the 20th century. This is the central historical turn that has transformed the global geoeconomic landscape. The changes during this period demonstrate the extent of the increase in global mobility of capital. Global FDI in services has continued to grow steadily, while it has declined in primary products and raw materials. Megaprojects developed with the aim of capturing a share of the world's mobile wealth. The narrative of international competitiveness to ensure economic survival is common to most megaprojects (del Cerro Santamaría 2013).

Harris (2017) argues that productivity, quality of life, infrastructure development, cost of living, location of housing, recreational services, to name a few variables, influence the perception of urban prosperity. In addition, Harris argues that the efficiencies of the most populated cities depend, to a large extent, on the degree of accessibility:

"This requires that certain patterns of land use and transportation be coordinated to achieve broad scale benefits. The premises may be, in principle, correct, but it has been shown that the relationship between urban growth and prosperity under urban policies guided by neoliberalism favors certain groups and places while harming others, accumulating benefits that are geographically, and in terms of socio-economic status, very unequal " (Harris 2017: 65).

However, here are many variables at play: productivity, quality of life, infrastructure development, cost of living, conveniently located housing, recreation, and services, to name a few. The efficiencies of more populous cities are reliant on a degree of accessibility. This requires certain landuse and transport patterns to be coordinated in order to achieve broad benefits of scale. The premises can be, in principle, correct, but the relationship between city growth and prosperity under urban policies guided by neoliberalism has been shown to favor certain groups and places while disadvantaging others, accruing benefits that are geographically highly uneven.

It is necessary to point out two aspects in the development of megaprojects that are of particular relevance. First, the ideology behind the megaprojects offers the promise of growth, development, competitiveness, wealth generation and prosperity, directly for the protagonists and indirectly for the public; however, there is often no mechanism to guarantee that the benefits will materialize. Second, the similarities in objectives and results in the projects that occur in different geographical, political and social urban contexts are significant: they all show, to varying degrees, a clear model of competitive urban entrepreneurship that seems to be copied from one place to another, overlooking the necessary adjustments to specific contexts (Siemiatycki 2013).

From a typological point of view, the majority of urban megaprojects, particularly the mixed-use ones, can be categorized as a globally active model of urban development. This is enhanced by the fact that this mode of urban development is lucrative for capital markets, which benefit from public financing. Paradoxically, however, public-private partnerships are driven by the desire to reduce public spending (Zimmerman and Eber 2014). Capital markets are an underlying driver of megaprojects, with powerful urban growth coalitions that defend and benefit from their existence and performance.

The rhetoric from megaproject protagonists will always embrace a globalization discourse in which international economic competitiveness is paramount for the prosperity of the city and the state. In both times of genuine bust, or times of obvious boom, this rhetoric dominates public discourse, frames objectives, and guides decision-making processes, despite rarely being operationalized into official project management processes. The structural change that these projects are aiming to bring about, who precisely stands to benefit, and more importantly, what alternatives might be available all remain shrouded in a generic "glossy globalization" discourse that glorifies potential investment and growth while obscuring real urban displacement and socio-spatial polarization (Marcuse 1997).

In times of real failure, or times of evident boom, this global rhetoric dominates public discourse, frames objectives and guides decision-making processes, although it is rarely operationalized in official project management processes, which obey other types of priorities. Megaprojects represent a globally embedded approach to city making, development and competitiveness spanning cultural and geographical contexts. It has become the hegemonic approach to growth, development, competitiveness, wealth creation and prosperity advocated by urban pro-growth coalitions and elites.

*Megaprojects, Megaregions and Competitiveness*

As the urbanization process develops relentlessly around the world and global city-regions become economic units of development and competitiveness in their own right, the role of megaprojects (particularly transport and energy infrastructure, innovation districts, industrial corridors, city clusters, new towns) in providing the infrastructure of development expands.

These megaprojects, and the megaregions where they are built, obey a simultaneous logic of dispersion-concentration of economic activity. The combined action of technology and trade favor the global dispersion of economic activity. In turn, the benefits of mutual proximity of innovation activities and decision-making centers promote economic concentration in large mega-regions, which thus exemplify the extension and intensification of the functional relationships of global cities in large megaregional spaces. Recently, 40 megaregions were identified around the world, representing 18% of the world's population, two-thirds of the world's economic activity and 86% of patented innovations (Florida 2007). From this point of view, megaregions are the new urban form of globalization (Harrison and Hoyler 2015).

In the United States there are several differentiated super-regions, defined by economics and demography: the northeast corridor, from Boston to Washington, D.C. (Bos-Wa); Northern California, around San Francisco; Southern California, around Los Angeles; the Great Lakes area, with Chicago as its epicenter; the Arizona Sun Corridor, from Phoenix to Tucson; the Front Range Corridor, from the city of Salt Lake to Denver and Albuquerque (New Mexico); the Cascadia Belt, from Vancouver to Seattle; the Piedmont Atlantic group, from Atlanta, Georgia, to Charlotte, in North Carolina; the Gulf Coast area, between Houston, Texas, and New Orleans; the Texas Triangle area, with Houston, Dallas, Austin and San Antonio; and Florida, which includes Miami, Orlando and Tampa. It is estimated that the aggregate population of these megaregions will reach 277 million people in 2025, equivalent to 80% of the projected U.S. population for that year. The gross product of two of these regions (Bos-Wa and Southern California) added is equivalent to one third of the gross product of the United States.

Federal policy can focus on helping these nascent archipelagos thrive and help others to emerge, in places like Minneapolis and Memphis, by collectively forming a grid of metropolitan productive regions efficiently connected through infrastructure megaprojects, better roads, railroads and fiber optic cables. Although the 50 states continue to be the basic organization of the political system, the country is reorganizing itself around regional infrastructure lines and metropolitan clusters that ignore state and even national borders (Khanna 2016). These city-regions are more economically relevant than most American states, and the connectivity, through infrastructure megaprojects, of these urban groups determines the long-term economic viability of Americans to a greater extent than the state in which they live.

In the coming decades, more than half of the population growth of the United States and almost two-thirds of the economic growth measured in terms of output will take place in the US megaregions. These demographic and

economic concentrations will be increasingly connected by their economies, population patterns and land use, infrastructure systems, topography, environmental systems and by a common culture and history. As they consolidate, they will experience great governance and decision-making challenges that can not be resolved at the urban or metropolitan level.

Bruce Katz, of the Brookings Institution, has pointed out that of the 350 major metropolitan areas in the United States, cities with more than three million people have recovered much better from the financial crisis (Katz 2018). Meanwhile, smaller cities, such as Dayton, Ohio, are faltering and have been losing economic power, as have innumerable small disconnected towns across the country. The problem is that while economic reality is on one side, the 50-state model means that federal and state resources are concentrated in a state capital - often a small isolated city - and assigned with little sense of the whole.

The US Congress was once a world leader in regional planning. The Louisiana Purchase, the Pacific Railroad Act (which funded Iowa's railroad expansion to San Francisco with government bonds) and the Interstate Highway and Highway System are examples of the federal government's action on economic development on a continental scale. The Tennessee Valley Authority was an agent for the renewal of post-Depression infrastructure, job creation and industrial modernization across six states. What is needed, in some way, is a return to this way of thinking that is more flexible and with an overall vision.

Efforts are already underway to coordinate metropolitan planning and investment in the United States, as Khanna reports. Quasi-governmental entities such as the Western High Speed Rail Alliance aim to link Phoenix, Denver and Salt Lake City with next-generation trains and the industry. There are groups such as CG/LA Inc. that promote public-private investment in a new national infrastructure project. Regional cooperation and planning is a major issue in the National Association of Governors. But Congress still thinks in terms of states (Khanna 2016). To be sure, the challenge of megaregional governance presents no easy solution, due to the extreme complexity in the demands of changing geographical patterns coupled with the political challenges tied to inter-regional competitiveness and socio-spatial rescaling.

The Trump administration, and those who follow it, must implement a serious policy of making use of new investments in infrastructure and support the change towards a new urban political economy based on the construction of megaprojects in transport engineering, alternative energy, digital technology and other advanced sectors. In any case, this is not a task only for federal policy, given the geographic size of the country, the decentralized nature of US policy and the multilevel power structures that are required to plan and implement complex projects at the regional level. States must also operate across borders and be able to replace the logic of competition (by attracting activity and employment to the detriment of neighbors) by another logic of coordination, planning and supra-state cooperation.

One can find transformations towards megaregionalization throughout the world. Despite the millenary history of its cultural and linguistic provinces, China is transcending its traditional internal borders to become an empire of 19 megacity groups with populations of up to 100 million inhabitants each. The

three main Chinese megalopolises, centered around the Pearl River delta, the Yangtze River and around Beijing (Jing Jin Ji), stand out for their huge scale (more than double the population of Tokyo, the largest mega region today) , its massive development through numerous high-speed rail lines, and its top-down and unopposed planning in an authoritarian political context. Despite the possible fragility of the Chinese model of massive investments in infrastructure (Ansar et al. 2016), these groups of cities, whose borders fluctuate in terms of population and economic growth, will be, over time, the nuclei around which the central government allocates subsidies, designs supply chains and builds connections with the rest of the world (Wu 2017).

The Western countries are following the example. As of 2015, the most important political actors in Italy are no longer their dozens of provinces, but fourteen "metropolitan cities" such as Rome, Turin, Milan and Florence, each of which has merged economically with the municipalities of the surroundings, forming viable subregions in economic terms. This Italian mega-region is the third in importance in Europe and the seventh in the world. Britain is also in the midst of an internal reorganization, with the government leading investments towards a new corridor extending from Leeds to Liverpool known as the "Northern Powerhouse", which can become an additional economic anchor to London and Scotland. Together with the London region, it is the second European mega-region, behind the huge economic and population conglomerate (60 million inhabitants) that includes Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the Ruhr area and Cologne, Brussels and Antwerp and the Lille region, which has an output higher than that of Canada.

The connectivity that underpins the growth of megaregions is not exclusively a matter of building more megaprojects; it is a question not only of infrastructures, but of strategy. It is not just about more roads, railways and telecommunications, manufacturing plants and data centers, but to carefully define where to locate them, in order to maximize public investment without limiting regional or state borders. The megaregional strategies would begin by focusing not on the state lines, but on the existing lines of infrastructure, supply chains and telecommunications, routes that remain remarkably faithful to the borders of the emerging super-regions. In this context, the links between megaprojects and development could not be clearer and more dependent on carefully planned national strategies to promote growth and competitiveness.

On the other hand, the concept of "mega-region" needs to be much more precise, not only to better understand the dynamic relationships among its components, but also to accommodate differences due to the variation of geographical and socio-political contexts. It is necessary to avoid taking the US megaregion model as a globally applicable functional unit without variations, and it is also necessary to include in the analysis richer data sets that provide information on the mobility, connectivity and flow functions of some elements (for example, the location of economic activity) that are usually interpreted statically.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, competition for efficient connectivity is likely to drive the evolution of activity and economic processes. To some extent, this competition

has already begun with the ambitious Chinese project of the Belt and Road Initiative. The connectivity and strategic connection of cities and regions would allow the United States, China and other countries to win the battle of world trade, investment flows, and supply chains. It is possible that the result of these efforts will determine the rivalry around which country stands as the world's first superpower in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Ross and Amekudzi 2009). In this megaregional connectivity strategy, megaprojects will play a fundamental role in maintaining the global competitiveness of nations in the future.

### *Challenges and Obstacles*

Megaprojects have spread in urban areas around the world and have frequently caused the displacement of the original inhabitants of these areas and generated strong criticism from civil society. We are heirs to the globalized city, in which it is not possible to conceive anything but the regeneration of areas adjacent to rivers and bays, the recovery of zones previously dedicated to storage and manufacturing, the construction of new transportation infrastructures or the extension of existing ones, as well as the renewal of historical centers. However, the Manhattanization of the world – and the urban political economy that sustains it – also presents difficulties and can create several structural obstacles with direct consequences for the design and implementation of megaprojects in globalizing cities and regions.

A case in point is Dubai, a megaproject set in crisis after the recession that started in 2008. After years in which one could regularly find news about the new architectural marvels of the world constructed in Dubai (including sets of artificial residential islands), the situation has been one of hypertrophy for this onetime urban vision. The bubble burst, and the model of Dubai became yesterday's news. Beginning in September 2008, real estate prices fell, and those who had gotten accustomed to positive news on the emirate were rubbing their eyes in disbelief. The glowing reviews about a permanent acceleration in megaproject construction – when Dubai was considered to be the dynamic and innovative center of the Arabic Peninsula – had turned into disbelief, first, and an admission of defeat not exempt of irony, later. The Emirate was bailed out by Abu-Dhabi, and the economic situation has improved in recent years, but a big weakness for Dubai remains: the city lacks a consistent concept of society, with more than 90% of its immigrants having very limited rights and unlikely to reside there permanently (Elsheshtawy, 2013).

Situations of economic recession are only one of many obstacles faced by megaproject construction. Another is of a political nature, in particular the lack of strong metropolitan governments provided with the necessary instruments to undertake big projects that can transform the urban image and the urban fabric. Such is the case of Mumbai, which is determined to "Shanghaize" itself, although major challenges loom. Unlike in China – where the redistribution of local, regional, and national power has not been a zero-sum game in which the local governments have gained power at the expense of the central government – the deliberate "Shanghaization" of Mumbai has seen the competition between

different scales of government result in the concentration of power and resources at the metropolitan level, creating a power gap for the development of urban megaprojects. In China, the redistribution of power has taken place between the different levels, enabling the country to proceed with UMP construction and generally to better adapt to the requirements of the global economy (Ye, 2017).

The organizational obstacles in megaproject development are not minor. Bent Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) already warned of these problems in *Megaprojects and Risk* with examples of big infrastructure projects in Europe. The development of an urban megaproject is usually completed in various phases, and therefore many rearrangements, corrections, additions, and errors occur, not to mention the usual incapability by developers to limit the final expenses to the initial budget (so-called "cost overruns"). All this produces a lack of transparency that is increasingly difficult to support in view of the increasing activity of civil society, which organizes itself to face the ambitions of the political and economic elites. To cite some examples, megaprojects under construction in Budapest, New York, Paris, and Sao Paulo all illustrate the idea that, in the absence of clear and diaphanous planning – and although the state and the promoters try to explain the genesis and the impacts of the megaprojects – the whole process is perceived as dark and secret. Sometimes, this circumstance is used by the state to violate agreements and contracts of public interest and to reverse previous decisions, as has happened with the National Theater of Budapest, according to Judit Bodnar and Judit Veres (2013).

We cannot forget either, that sometimes UMPs develop in conflict situations – as shown by Alexandra Miller's work on the Afghan Ring Road (2013) – and that organized resistance to megaprojects can be of such a caliber that the state and the promoters fail to carry them out. This happened to Mexico City's proposed international airport project, which has been defeated because of the divisions between and within the political class and citizens initially triggered by the progressive democratization, decentralization, and globalization of the country. Diane E. Davis and Onésimo Flores Dewey (2013) argue that, in the Mexican case, it is also necessary to bear in mind the increasing power of the local state, which favors the civil opposition. The authors also underscore the importance of factors such as cultural identity, historical allegiances, and the geographical location in the mobilization of a wide array of local, national, and international allies against the airport. A lesson of the Mexican case can be that bureaucratic ambiguities and tensions exist with regard to who is responsible for the principal projects of infrastructure in countries that experience a democratic transition. Such ambiguities and tensions can debilitate the proponents of a project and reinforce its opponents. This political and institutional baggage can also prevent urban planning authorities from learning how to respond to past experiences with citizen participation and civil opposition. Thus, the authors argue that the defeat of the airport megaproject in Mexico City was as much a reflection of a precarious moment in the political and economic development of the country as it was of the validity and legitimacy of the protests against the project itself.

It is important also to look at the social and socio-cultural context most conducive to the development of UMPs. It seems clear from the evidence we have that it is essential to have widespread social and political support, or perhaps even a degree of acquiescence, for these grand schemes to prosper. Their magnitude and consequent effect on large areas of a city, their enormous economic costs and their massive environmental impacts could create civic mistrust. Nevertheless, movements against UMPs, although not wholly absent, are not as intense as those of decades ago. In many cases, projects are successfully marketed as promoting economic development from which all will benefit. The fact that public funds are diverted from projects that might better benefit a larger number of people is actively obscured. In addition, when relatively few people are indeed affected, it will be difficult to mobilize opposition, a proposition directly questioned in the work on the failed Mexico City airport by Davis and Flores (2013). UMPs sometimes must face internal strife and obstacles that may ultimately modify, delay or immobilize global megaprojects.

## Part Two

### *Megaproject Financing and Management*

As Bent Flyvbjerg argues, in spite of all of their complexities, challenges and shortcomings,

"megaprojects are not only large and growing constantly larger, they are also being built in ever greater numbers at ever greater value. The McKinsey Global Institute (2013) estimates global infrastructure spending at USD 3.4 trillion per year 2013-2030, or approximately four percent of total global gross domestic product, mainly delivered as large-scale projects. *The Economist* (June 7, 2008) similarly estimated infrastructure spending in emerging economies at USD 2.2 trillion annually for the period 2009-2018" (Flyvbjerg 2014: *passim*).

Flyvbjerg continues:

"In the five years from 2004 to 2008, China spent more on infrastructure in real terms than in the whole of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. That is an increase in spending rate of a factor twenty. Similarly, from 2005 to 2008, China built as many kilometers of high-speed rail as Europe did in two decades, and Europe was extraordinarily busy building this type of infrastructure during this period. Not at any time in the history of mankind has infrastructure spending been this high measured as a share of world GDP, according to *The Economist*, who calls it "the biggest investment boom in history" (Flyvbjerg 2014: 45).

If we include not only infrastructure but also the many other fields where megaprojects are a main delivery model – oil and gas, mining, aerospace, defense, ICT, supply chains, mega events, regeneration schemes, transport and energy infrastructure, industrial corridors, city clusters, new towns, innovation districts, science and technology parks, sports infrastructure etc.

"then a conservative estimate for the global megaproject market is USD 6-9 trillion per year, or approximately eight percent of total global gross domestic product. For perspective, consider this is equivalent to spending five to eight times the accumulated US debt to China, *every year*" (Flyvbjerg 2014: *passim*).

Some 50 years ago, the American economist Albert Hirschman (1967b) proposed the principle of the hiding hand: projects end up being viable because unexpected events or setbacks that cause cost overruns also spur project managers to be more creative in overcome the adversity, and even increasing benefits. The vested interests of coalitions of stakeholders are posited by Bent Flyvbjerg as driving the global boom in megaprojects:

"The subliminal rapture experienced by engineers and technologists from building large and innovative projects is reinforced by the attraction to politicians of large ribbon-cutting events attended by the media, while financiers and trade unions expect to gain in profits and jobs. Aesthetes who appreciate good design and enjoy viewing iconically beautiful structures such as the Bilbao Guggenheim, the Golden Gate Bridge or the Sydney Opera House also influence the funding of ever more monumentally grand projects. While cost overruns are the 'iron law' of megaprojects, Flyvbjerg also postulates a paradox. On the one hand, public and private megaprojects are increasingly in demand, but their management in terms of cost overruns, schedule delays and benefit shortfalls has not improved over the century for which comparable data are available." (Flyvbjerg 2014: *passim*).

Private finance in megaprojects has been on the rise over the past twenty years. This means that capital funds, pension funds, and banks are increasingly gaining a say in management.

"Private capital is no panacea for the ills in megaproject management, to be sure; in some cases private capital may even make things worse. But private investors place their own funds at risk. Funds and banks can therefore be observed to not automatically accept at face value the cost and revenue forecasts of project managers and promoters. Banks typically bring in their own advisers to do independent forecasts, due diligence, and risk assessments, which is an important step in the right direction" (Flyvbjerg 2014: 61).

Project managers and promoters are getting used to the healthy fact that different stakeholders

"hold different forecasts and that forecasts are not only products of data and mathematical modeling but also of power and negotiation. Why is this more healthy? Because it undermines trust in the misleading forecasts often produced by project promoters" (Flyvbjerg 2014: *passim*).

The ideal situation would be one where a method of *reference class forecasting* (RCF) is used. RCF achieves accuracy in projections by basing them on actual performance in a reference class of comparable actions and thereby

bypassing both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). According to Flyvbjerg,

"research on how to reform megaproject management is beginning to positively impact practice. Such research has recently made great strides in better understanding what causes the many failures in megaproject delivery, and how to avoid them. For instance, we now understand that optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation are significantly better explanations of megaproject outcomes than previous explanations, including Hirschman's Hiding Hand and Sawyers creative error" (Flyvbjerg 2014: *passim*).

Managing megaprojects for sustainability is one of the biggest challenges ahead. Sustainability normally refers to environmental practices. In megaprojects, a broader definition, including concepts of economic, social, and institutional sustainability, is appropriate. The San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge, which was damaged during the 1989 earthquake and reopened in 2013, was \$5 billion over budget and took ten years longer than originally projected. But the bridge was built to last for 150 years—much longer than the typical 50 years of service—and to withstand earthquakes and seismic activity of the highest magnitude. Both factors will support substantial savings down the line. Although determining the bottom line on the Bay Bridge as constructed is difficult, the point is that cost and schedule are not the only ways to judge success. Other factors must be incorporated into the project's cost-benefit analysis. There needs to be a framework to help governments—and the public—understand the larger benefits of a project and to include the impact of economic and social development in the final analysis. That doesn't mean that residents will be less irritated at the daily disruptions of projects that never seem to end. But perhaps, looking at the bigger picture, they will consider them worth the trouble.

The report "Mega-Projects: Lessons for Decision-Makers," by The Omega Centre at the Bartlett School of Planning at University College London, discusses 30 case studies of \$1 billion-plus mega-projects worldwide. The report shows that most mega-projects were actually close to being on time and on budget. But the team looked well beyond the "iron triangle" of fulfilled schedule, budget, and specifications — and indeed that is the major takeaway from the report. Big projects need to be judged for how they meet objectives over time, amid shifting societal, political, and environmental values. Measuring the success of a mega-project is not linear. There are twists and turns not only in terms of engineering and the emergence of new technology, for example, but in the moving target of public expectations. New problems always crop up that such projects are expected to solve, long after the first blueprints were approved. The long time frame of megaprojects remains problematic, of course. The biggest plans tend get started under political leaders who are almost always gone by the time of completion (Omega Center 2012).

*Planning and Partnerships*

We must note the structures and processes of political-economic coalition-building taking place around UMP development. In *Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment* by Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff, the authors draw attention to the fact that the role of the federal government in infrastructure provision in the United States has increased significantly since the 1960s and that "in all areas, the megaprojects that survived are the ones for which winning political coalitions could be formed, those that worked when Congress divided the spoils. Cost-effectiveness and consumer sovereignty play essentially no role. In this milieu, what gets built matters less than that *something* gets built – with nonlocal taxpayers' money" (p. 53). The federal role expands in any event, with rearrangements of pro-growth coalitions being developed as needed.

A central aspect to urban megaprojects is the nature of public-private partnerships connecting public officials and private investors as they continue to be the principle vehicles by which the new urban megaprojects are being elaborated and implemented throughout the world. Such type of structures engage in activities that apply private and public resources to carry out specific ambitions that could not be completed by public officials or private developers alone. Mutually beneficial goals motivate pooling resources and risk-sharing, resulting in products that are jointly owned even after the project is completed and operating.

Contemporary public/private partnerships (PPPs) began to be adopted by city officials in the United States in the 1970s for downtown redevelopment projects, setting in motion a policy shift that has since had a profound effect on the practice of planning at home and abroad (Sagalyn 2007). Although its origins can be traced back to the patronage partnerships of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century in the US (Beauregard and Pierre 2000), its modern roots lie in the previously discussed changes in global relations that transformed urban economics and increased interurban competition and to remedy problems with federal urban renewal efforts (Fainstein 2001). Since the earlier widely publicized flagship projects such as Baltimore's Inner Harbour (Harvey 1989) and Boston's Faneuil Hall Marketplace (Sagalyn and Frieden 1989), public private partnerships increasingly became the vehicle of choice for public agencies looking to engage with the private sector in redeveloping urban sites in American and Western European cities.

Earlier studies by political scientists focused on the imbalances of power within the new joint ventures, and the favorable treatment given to developers to the detriment of communities and other social necessary uses (Logan and Molotch 1987). Commenting on the American and British experiences, and particularly the new waterfront and inner-harbour development in Baltimore, Harvey argued that such public-private partnerships were inherently speculative in execution and design as the risk was to a large extent borne by the public sector. Thus they amounted to little more than a subsidy for affluent consumers and corporations at the expense of local collective consumption for the working poor (Harvey 1989). Such type of criticisms betrayed an ideological aversion to market based solutions and lacked analysis of detailed case studies able to systematically

assess risk/return or cost/benefit relationships, or whether projects actually performed as their initial financial projections predicted.

Susan Fainstein's detailed study of public/private partnerships in London and New York City in 1980-2000 provides a more balanced analysis of the role of public and private sector in the projects and the usefulness of such structures under certain conditions. Nevertheless, in an overall evaluation, the author tends to side with those arguing that the public-private partnerships were unequal and tended to over-rely on property development as an economic growth strategy while leaving unpursued other strategies that would develop worker skills and directly spur job creation and placement (Fainstein 2001: 218). As an alternative, Fainstein argues that public redevelopment programs and assistance to the private sector can form part of a sensible program, but they need, however, to be within the context of economic planning aimed at creating space to support the industry without glutting the market, including control of price levels and participation in development profits (Fainstein 2001: 220).

Focusing on the redevelopment of Times Square district in New York City during the 80's and 90's, Sagalyn points out that the essence of public/private development is inherent asymmetry in the reduced degrees of freedom that private investors and public officials have to bear in the partnerships. Private developers benefit from greater manoeuvrability because they face few political risks. For city and state officials, however the combined economic and political costs of severing ties are often unpredictably high, so new compromises must be found in revised deals. The political imperative is the bottom line and forces a solution. Thus the challenge is to find forms of engagements that afford some protection for the taxpayer while taking on enough risk as to allow its political goals to be implemented (Sagalyn 2003: 377).

One of the most comprehensive studies done within the European context is Moulaert et al. edited volume of thirteen large-scale urban development projects in twelve European Union countries (Moulaert et al. 2003). The project focused on the way in which globalization and liberalization articulate with the emergence of new forms of governance and on the relationship between large-scale urban development and political, social and economic power relations in the city. Amongst its findings, the authors argue that in contrary to their market-led and entrepreneurial activity and despite their predominantly privatized management structures, urban development projects are decidedly and almost without exception state led and often state financed.

Also, the actual configurations of the project based institutions created to implement the projects reveal an extraordinary degree of selectivity. There is a significant deficit with respect to accountability, representation and presence of formal rules of inclusion or participation. Most importantly, participation is rarely statutory and tends to happen through ad hoc co-optation and invitation, usually by the key power brokers within the institutions. In a general evaluation, the authors decry the lack of democracy and social policy in the new urban development policies and the poor integration of large urban projects in wider urban processes and planning systems (Moulaert et al. 2003: 250).

In a more recent study, Fainstein argues that public-private partnerships can be a vehicle for the provision of public benefits, including job commitments, cultural facilities and affordable housing. However, such projects are risky for both public and private participants, must be primarily oriented toward profitability, and typically produce a landscape dominated by bulky buildings that do not encourage urbanity (Fainstein 2008: 783). Comparing recent megaprojects in New York, London and Amsterdam, the author concludes that they represent a convergence between American and European approaches to government intervention as embodied in private sector involvement and market orientation.

In *The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management* (2017), Winch states that a 'project stakeholder is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the project misión.' The key conceptual issue that he identifies is the absence of stockholders with a fiduciary claim on the project or organisation, though he ends up only recommending more research on political and social aspects. Ahlers *et al.* note that dam financiers usually have no obligation to share information with the public. Many megaprojects rely on public-private partnership (PPP) structures, so Hodge and Greve ask what problems are solved by their use, and how well. Because PPPs are effectively mega-credit cards for government, they can address budget constraints by drawing on private finance, although the UK government was forced to rescue projects financed by bank loans during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. A common rationale for megaproject PPPs is that private sector expertise and discipline can ensure efficiency, timeliness and expenditure accuracy, but Hodge and Greve note that there has been "precious little rigorous and independent empirical work" in the area.

The Sydney Cross City Tunnel and Melbourne's Southern Cross Station are instances of failure due to underestimation of traffic volumes and construction difficulties, respectively. The study of urban megaprojects must be positioned in a context of urban institutional change. In the authors view, processes of decentralization and recentralization in the post-administrative state are producing a continuous rescaling of inter-relationships in the metropolitan arena. Thus, large urban projects can no longer be considered as local projects since their size is embedded in frames of multi-actor and multilevel governance. Such conditions call for new multi-level frames of analysis able to grasp with complex relations between the new projects and the multilayered networks in which they are embedded.

### *Iconic Megaprojects*

As mentioned earlier, capturing a share of the world's mobile wealth is foundational to the justification of megaprojects. From an urban-spatial and design perspective, this entails that cities need to become "visible" and attractive to international capital. The "icon project" (Sklair 2017), that is, the widespread construction of architectural icons in globalizing cities around the world, accomplishes these goals. The construction of iconic urban megaprojects (IUMPs) has grown into a standard policy choice by urban and regional elites in globalizing

cities. Politicians, business leaders and others in local and regional growth machines fulfill their personal and professional ambitions by investing in and promoting iconic urban megaprojects, aspiring to reach global status and positive economic change for their cities.

Many urban elites worldwide have been greatly influenced by the so-called "Bilbao effect" – the perception that the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao resulted in a "Cinderella transformation" of the Northern Spanish city and economic capital of the Basque Country. In the dominant discourse concerning architecture's surrender to capitalism's commercial goals, the Guggenheim Bilbao has been and remains to be mistakenly and repeatedly portrayed as the "catalyst" for the city's radically successful transformation from industrial powerhouse to regional service center.

However, many cases around the world suggest (not too surprisingly) that just building a terrific museum is not enough to ensure success. For example, the new Ordos Art Museum in Inner Mongolia, beautifully designed by MAD, a prestigious firm of Beijing architects, has been a failure. The city of Ordos has sprung up fast and is relatively wealthy, thanks to discoveries of oil and gas, but the museum has no collections and precious few plans for exhibitions. No wonder it is devoid of visitors.

As Michael Kimmelman put it:

"The truth is, the Bilbao effect is largely a myth. Frank Gehry's museum alone didn't turn around that city. It capped decades of civic renewal. Flashy, even brilliant buildings rarely rejuvenate neighborhoods or guarantee crowds and cash just by virtue of their design [...] Sadly, museums, like cities, have squandered fortunes praying to this false idol. They still do." (Kimmelman 2012).

As I have shown elsewhere (Del Cerro 2017), the Guggenheim Bilbao has been a positive addition to the city, but far from the "miracle" that would be able to turn Bilbao into a successful urban economy.

The debate on the "Bilbao effect" (how iconic megaprojects can successfully bring about urban transformation, development and competitiveness), however, continues. The Guggenheim in Abu Dhabi, scheduled to open in 2017, but delayed, will be twice the size of the museum in Bilbao, twelve times the size of the Frank Lloyd Wright Guggenheim in New York. Carol Vogel in *The New York Times* refers to this Gehry design as "a graceful tumble of giant plaster building blocks and translucent blue cones" (Vogel 2014). The outcome of the Guggenheim Helsinki's international competition was known in June 2015, with the winning project going to the Paris-based firm Moreau Kusunoki Architectes (by Fall 2016, the city of Helsinki voted against the project and construction never started).

These two projects have attracted significant criticism; they have been questioned along three main lines: (1) iconic architecture is no longer the hegemonic visual discourse in urban revitalization; (2) the franchise model imposed by the Guggenheim means that local officials have no autonomy to

make major decisions on matters from exhibition calendars, to budgets and investments; and (3) local cultural identities are usually neglected under a foreign global arts model. In addition, the environmental impacts of the projects may not be negligible. The Abu-Dhabi project has also been controversial around issues of workers's rights and labor conditions. In spite of mounting criticism, if the new Guggenheim Museum in the United Arab Emirates results in even half the impact of that of Bilbao's, the term "Bilbao effect" will continue to carry weight on both sides of the debate.

To be sure, the Bilbao effect faced significant criticism and skepticism among numerous architecture and art connoisseurs. Chicago Tribune critic Blair Kamin noted that the rise of "starchitects" poses a broad set of questions about the impact of globalization on an art that is ultimately local. The critic located the beginning of the trend in the 1976 Houston Pennzoil Place, dubbed by the residents "the milk cartoons." He noted that the fashion spread to other cities such as Chicago in the 1980s, where architects were put in charge to,

"design eye-catching creations that would enhance a building's marketability [...] There is something [...] to be gleaned from starchitects, but only if they are willing to look deeply at [a city] and to adapt their work to the city's essence and its economics" (Kamin 2002).

Architectural critic Witold Rybczynski asked whether the cities commissioning new museums by starchitects can become the next Bilbao in terms of visitors. He noted that attendance at the Experience Music Project in Seattle, designed by Frank Gehry for Paul Allen in 1996, decreased by a third eighteen months after the museum opened, while the number of visitors to the local art museum increased by more than a third during the same period. Recently a portion of the building was converted into a science-fiction museum. Despite its unusual architecture, consisting of colorful, rounded forms said to be inspired by electric guitars, the museum of rock music and Jimi Hendrix memorabilia, the Experience Music Project has not proven to be a success. Rybczynski was "skeptical that designing in the full glare of public competitions encourages architects to produce better buildings. The charged atmosphere promotes flamboyance rather than careful thought, and favors the glib and obvious over the subtle and nuanced" (Rybczynski 2002).

More recently, Rybczynski has argued that "perhaps the Bilbao effect should be called the Bilbao anomaly," since "the iconic chemistry between the design of a building, its image and the public turns out to be quite rare, and somewhat mysterious" (2008).

"Herzog & de Meuron's design for Beijing's Olympic Stadium is ingenious, for example, but instead of the complex engineering, it was the widely perceived image of a 'bird's nest,' a nickname that did not originate with the architects, that cemented the building's international iconic status. The woven steel wrapper seemed to symbolize both China's ancient traditions and its rush to modernization. However, for every bird's nest there are scores of building failures that are not only costly, but fail to spark the public's imagination. Failed icons do not disappear though, which is

indeed problematic. Since the Bilbao effect mistakenly teaches that unconventional architecture is a prerequisite for iconic status, clients have encouraged their architects to go to greater lengths to design buildings that are unusual, surprising and even shocking. The shock, however, will inevitably wear off, and 100 years from now most aspiring iconic constructions will resemble a cross between a theme park and the Las Vegas strip." (Rybczynski 2008)

Despite the media success of the Bilbao Guggenheim, the Bilbao effect has proven to be difficult to replicate in most places, even for Frank Gehry. On the other hand, some architectural icons, such as Gehry's Stata Center at MIT, work well with no Bilbao effect - most MIT scientists working in the building praise its playful and inventive feel (Campbell 2007). Cooper Union alum Daniel Libeskind's jagged edges, sharp angles and complex geometries (the extension to the Denver Art Museum, the Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto or the Danish Jewish Museum in Copenhagen) have not had the universal acclaim of his Jewish Museum Berlin, an illustration that success, impact and visitor attraction are not necessarily a function of a building's spectacular design. Many works by Shigeru Ban or Tadao Ando are excellent examples of highly admired and successful architecture in the antipodes of iconic buildings designed to stun.

The jury is still out in 2019 regarding not only Gehry's highly anticipated Guggenheim Abu-Dhabi but also the massive West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD) in Hong Kong, which stand among the most prominent cultural megaprojects in recent years. The WKCD is a project of such scale and ambition that it could "define the nature of the public realm in the 21<sup>st</sup> century," according to a rather hyperbolic statement by Rem Koolhaas (Koolhaas 2013). The WKCD has met significant criticism from the planning to construction phases. Though a Guggenheim is not part of the project, the WKCD replicates all the expected controversies associated with IUMPs, including cost overruns, negative environmental impacts, gentrification risks, drawbacks of top-down cultural engineering, neglect of local cultural identities, and uncertain economic success. None of these externalities bode well for cities that are counting on instant icons to salvage them during times of economic malaise.

In sum, UMPs often rely on iconic architecture to succeed. Iconic UMPs (IUMPs) have come to play a central role in the standard urban policies designed to gain global visibility and attract visitors and investments to cities. Widely considered a successful case of image reconstruction via iconic architecture, however, the Guggenheim Bilbao, as many other urban icons, presents lights and shadows when the focus of the analysis is on economic and cultural impacts. The Guggenheim Bilbao triggered an immediate and lasting worldwide interest among tourists, artistic circles, the architectural profession, journalists and the educated public, based on the iconic architectural style of the building as well as local, contextual economic and political conditions. Far from being the trigger for, and prime mover of, revitalization, the museum postdated it. Up to now it has not generated substantial foreign investment in the Basque city, nor significant positive outcomes in the job market.

Bilbao's economic performance after the opening of the Guggenheim broadly follows the ups and downs of economic cycles, a clear indication of both the

embeddedness of cities – and IUMPs – in multiple scales of socio-economic action and the limited power of architectural icons to explain development, competitiveness and urban economic change. In the hypothetical case that the star of the Bilbao Guggenheim begins to dim and visitors cease to arrive in Bilbao in large numbers, the consequences for the Basque city would not amount to significant economic decline, as the museum represents just 2.2% of the Bilbao economy. Cities are complex formations, and a spectacular building alone, even if projected by experts and the media on a worldwide scale, is not usually capable to shift their fortunes in fundamental ways.

Urban context matters in megaproject planning and implementation. Urban leaders, managers and entrepreneurs in cities worldwide ought to remember that it was not the local government that backed a Guggenheim Foundation in financial trouble, but rather the regional Basque government, with substantial resources of its own and with complete discretion to make decisions about the use of their funds. Furthermore, not every city is well positioned to be "put on the map," especially second or third-tier cities that are comparable to Bilbao in terms of size but are located off main routes and flows of people and commerce. Bilbao is located in one of the top three tourist destinations in the world (Spain), which has been a factor in the museum's spectacular ability to attract visitors. Spain receives about 75 million visitors annually, of which approximately 2.5 million tour the Basque Country, with around one million visiting the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao.

To be sure, cities should not expect to be able to replicate the success of Bilbao just by implementing fashionable urban policy and appropriate global media discourses. Each city has a local history, a region within which it develops, and a specific political make-up that influences local decision-making processes. Cities and regions around the world partially adhere to their own specific logic of development. Each city shows particular features that contribute to explaining decline, and each may need localized strategies for redevelopment. Applying the standard elements in the revitalization mix, including IUMPs, to cities around the world may be unavoidable due to rapid and acritical adoption of policy discourses from center to periphery. However, expecting to replicate a city's success by merely adopting such strategy often is a recipe for disappointment.

Overall, the place of Bilbao on the world stage has irreversibly changed after the Guggenheim, which unequivocally shows the power of IUMPs to transform a city's image in times of globalization. Moreover, the worldwide media impact of the Guggenheim Bilbao represented a turning point that significantly enhanced the debate about commodification, commercialization and replicability of IUMPs in large-scale redevelopment schemes. As a result, the post-Bilbao dramatic increase in the interest by urban elites to surrender to the promise – and discontents – of IUMPs has become one of the keys to explaining prominent aspects in the deployment of contemporary globalized urbanization. In this context, the traditionally overlooked synergies between research-based evidence, management and governance of IUMPs in globalizing cities ought to become a priority area for urban and regional policy-makers to address (Del Cerro 2017).

In sum, institutional contexts, specific policy instruments and territorially grounded social dynamics give rise to distinct patterns of IUMP development and help explain the degree to which IUMP succeed or fail. Nevertheless, all initiatives of megaproject planning and construction constitute an urban response to the logic of development, competitiveness, neoliberalism and globalization, as this paper has tried to show. Megaprojects are inherently tied to the logic of growth, development, urban qualitative transformation, wealth creation, competitiveness and prosperity.

These mega-constructions constitute the infrastructure of globalization and neoliberalism and they actively contribute to a situation of increased planetary urbanization. The close links between megaprojects, development and competitiveness, and the increasing role of megaprojects in the configuration of megaregions worldwide, have an architectural reflection in the prominent importance of iconicity in megaproject design and construction. We see that megaprojects invite a dual, interconnected approach: they are spatial settings and infrastructure units that obey specific planning, design and management priorities, and they are also reflections or expressions – consequences or crystallizations - of larger socio-economic forces.

## Conclusions

Megaprojects have multiplied around the world as an urban response to neoliberalism's and globalization's pressures for development, competitiveness and innovation. Megaproject protagonists embrace a narrative of international competitiveness. It is clear, then, that megaprojects are inherently tied to the logic of growth, development, urban qualitative transformation, wealth creation, competitiveness and prosperity. Megaprojects constitute the infrastructure of globalization and neoliberalism and they actively contribute to a situation of increased planetary urbanization. Virtually all megaprojects are urban in nature and location or are built to have a direct effect on cities, city-regions and the urbanization process, particularly urban development and competitiveness. The paper has shown that megaprojects have multiplied around the world as an urban response to pressures for development, competitiveness and innovation in a context of globalization and neoliberalism.

Del Cerro (2013), Flyvbjerg (2014) and Harris (2017) have discussed the main characteristics and criticisms of megaprojects, based on the study of large number of cases around the world in their respective work. The main conclusions of their work are listed here:

1. Urban megaprojects are not just "local" projects designed to enhance particular cities. The visibility and image aim of these projects is often national and international, thus reflecting the ambitions of urban elites. (Del Cerro 2013).
2. Widespread adoption of policy formulas from center to periphery has been crucial for the expansion of the megaproject model of urban growth. The

limited success of many megaprojects is a consequence of overlooking the importance of contextual forces and patterns when implementing policy. The need to pay attention to context may represent a structural obstacle for the successful development of urban megaprojects in globalizing cities (Del Cerro 2013).

3. In the absence of a clear planning framework, and although both the state and the developer make attempts to clarify the design, planning and implementation of megaprojects, these big developments are still perceived by civil society as filled with secrecy and this contributes to mounting opposition to the development and implementation of UMPs (Del Cerro 2013). One observes "introverted modes of governance that circumvent local planning frameworks, traditional democratic channels of participation, and accountability" (Harris 2017).
4. There is a tension between plans and vision in UMP development, the actual realization of branded megaprojects and the political pressure exerted by the economic and financial interests behind the megaprojects. The positive or negative urban effects of big development plans is significantly dependent on the ability of strategic actors and participants to anticipate or at least adapt to and successfully manage ad hoc problems and side-effects that are frequent in long implementation processes (Del Cerro 2013).
5. Technology and designs are often non-standard, leading to "uniqueness bias" amongst planners and managers, who tend to see their projects as singular, which impedes learning from other projects. Frequently there is overcommitment to a certain project concept at an early stage, resulting in "lock-in" or "capture," leaving alternatives analysis weak or absent, and leading to escalated commitment in later stages (Flyvbjerg 2014).
6. Most megaprojects are physically and socially self-contained, isolated, and disconnected from the context of the host city; they thus promote a similar urban form regardless of the host city that encapsulates a narrow definition of urban life and culture (Harris 2017). The resemblance of most UMPs to conventionalized global city images is suited for some - but clearly not for all - purposes of city marketing. The star-architect paradox is that they aim at creating unique places and yet we witness the multiplication of similar, aesthetically striking cultural facilities and corporation headquarters all over the world with the effect of homogeneizing urban places. Ultimately, there is always the question of how to distinguish the UMP from other projects and of how to make it uniquely identified with the particular city where it is built (Del Cerro 2013).
7. Land use plans can play a role in guiding real estate markets and ensuring an adequate allocation of public resources as an important contributor to the ability of cities to promote growth through urban megaprojects and equitably distribute its costs and benefits (Del Cerro 2013).
8. In most megaprojects, global economic positioning and marketing toward a globally mobile elite prevails over the concern of local issues (Harris 2017). Members of the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) and their

local affiliates can be both particularly innovative in creating enclaves that shield them and their families from the worst effects of UMP and in propagating the culture-ideology of consumerism on which new forms of global urbanity rest. Urban megaprojects and iconic buildings, according to this view, are a powerful tool in transmitting the consumerist values and practices that sustain capitalist globalization (Del Cerro 2013).

9. The local-global logic, or the tensions between place-specificity versus global uniformity, are extremely influential in the design and implementation of UMPs. In this process, contextual elements such as local histories and cultures are important factors to interpret architecture and to ascribe specific meaning (local, regional, national, global) to architectural practices used to build UMPs and make them visible (Del Cerro 2013).
10. In many instances, UMPs are not financially sound projects. They are driven by ostentation and use economics as a mask for completely economically unproductive enterprises built in urban areas that are often ill able to support or withstand them. Due to the large sums of money involved, principal-agent problems and rent-seeking behavior are common, as is optimism bias (Flyvbjerg et al. 2012).
11. Often projects are led by planners and managers without deep domain experience who keep changing throughout the long project cycles that apply to megaprojects, leaving leadership weak. Decision-making, planning, and management are typically multi-actor processes involving multiple stakeholders, public and private, with conflicting interests (Flyvbjerg 2014).
12. Urban megaprojects are usually developed as public-private partnerships with major impacts in the de facto privatization of planning; and they tend to be oriented towards growth and competition rather than socially progressive ends. In general, there is a "minimal commitment to public benefit or socially just policies arising from a primary focus on profitability" (Harris 2017). From this viewpoint, UMPs epitomize the paradigm of the entrepreneurial city and present most of the problems of this urban governance model.
13. Dissent, protest and resistance against urban megaprojects does not happen frequently, but it may be successful when it happens, with the effect of immobilizing the megaproject and defeating the plans of promoters and officials. While the ambitions of urban elites contribute to presenting big projects as indispensable, global networks also help explain why anti-megaproject movements might evolve from localized village protests about an unwanted land use into major social movements with transnational linkages (Del Cerro 2013).
14. While the notion of multiple success factors and success criteria is not new to the field of project management and, in fact, constitutes one of the most widely discussed topics in the area, it seems more important than ever. It is therefore becoming increasingly important to assess projects and their impacts at different times and based on different criteria to be able to fully

evaluate their performance. Success is often driven by political and/or power-related factors. This relates particularly to the topic of how megaprojects are managed. Seeing the highly political nature of stakeholders across the supply chain with different underlying objectives, the hard success factors do not seem to be enough anymore. This unique setup calls for innovative governance solutions that align stakeholder interests in a complex environment with a large number of key players (Harris 2017).

15. There are examples of megaprojects where broader benefits have been achieved, pairing international economic positioning with wealth distribution strategies. These show traces of a Keynesian state model, aiming to counter the cycles and damaging effects of the market, to ensure collective "well-fare" and to reduce inequalities. Two areas offer perhaps the most transferable opportunities, which will be further expanded. They are (1) housing, where significant portions of residential floor space is dedicated to affordable housing; and (2) transport, where the site's rezoned land value is leveraged to finance public transport infrastructure for other parts of the city, as well as for the project itself (Harris 2017).
16. One of the main themes in relation to the future research on megaprojects are the challenges of sustainability and how megaprojects will cope with external industrial influences such as digitization and automation. Sustainability normally refers to environmental practices. In megaprojects, a broader definition, including concepts of economic, social, and institutional sustainability, is appropriate. A megaproject can be defined as sustainable if it is planned and executed to account for the capacity, fitness, resilience, diversity and balance of its urban ecosystem. We take the view of sustainability as an organic process including environment, economy and community: form and efficiency, that is, environmental factors in design, architecture, engineering and construction, as well as policy, i.e., urban plans and practices that explicitly aim at maintaining and improving the social and economic well-being of citizens (Del Cerro 2018).

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# Construction and Validation of the First Scale that Measures Family Organizational and Administrative Functionality

By Sandra Vélez-Candelario<sup>1</sup>

*Construction and validation process of the first scale that measures Family Organizational and Administrative Functionality aims to identify the administrative styles applied during the young human capital development in their household setting within their family. The test frequencies scale uses always (4), almost-always (3), sometimes (2), and never (1), in thirty-four reactivities. Two areas have ten reactivities each (Organizational Culture and Leadership), and the other two areas have seven reactivities each (Communication and Environment). Twenty judges that evaluate the reactive judge the scale. After the judges' analysis, they select 38 reactivities from 61 (just 34 from 38 are in the scale) using Lawshe's (1975) formula. This group selected 34 of the 61 reactivities giving that 90% of general value. The internal consistency and the factor analysis are calculated after submitting the test to a group of a hundred children. These samples showed a consistency of .89 (Cronbach Alpha). In addition to that, the Factor Analysis shows that every area that the Family Organizational and Administrative Functionality Scale pretends to measure can be recognized like independent factors aligning most items as the judge's did during the reactive process validation. During this process also tabulated the results to calculate the percentage of the general level of FOAF in two different groups: 50 children with low GPA (2.49 to down) in school and 50 with High GPA (2.50 to up) in school. The young human capital with lower academic GPA identify their family without or low FOAF percentage and the young human capital with high academic levels identify their families with moderate or high FOAF percentage. This result assumes that the administrative and organizational functionality in the family have influences in the levels of academic productivity of their young human Capital.*

**Keywords:** Administrative, Construction, Family, Functionality, Measure, Organizational, Scale, Validity.

## Introduction

The notion of human capital includes individual intangible assets, seen as something valuable that an organization or country can make use of it. Otherwise, it is clear that the human capital has an infinite and varying set of properties (Cornali 2018). Most research regarding this subject has mainly explored things such as Intelligence Quotient (IQ), academic achievement, and work outcomes without exploring other key domains in the so-labeled, "vulnerable population" (Chawla and Trejos 2018). The measurement of intangibles and human capital, important for both the goods-producing and service-producing industries, has always been a difficult challenge for the statistical system. Therefore, the growth

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of the new economy has made responding to this challenge even more urgent. Both are trying to understand how such inputs affect the value chain of productivity, growth and firm value, which now surpasses the need to measure the impact of bricks, mortar, and equipment. Yet, the changes that have brought the new economy into existence have simultaneously highlighted the need for improvements to traditional measures of input and output; this is particularly true for human capital. Finding new measures of human capital and quantifying them in such a manner that they can be introduced into a production function and produced on a scale that provides sufficient sample size for use in official economic statistics is a formidable challenge (Abowd et al. 2002). The household organizational functionality and the environmental circumstances where the young human capital grow up and develop their physical conditions, social skills and productive behavior, are also a measurement challenge (Vélez-Candelario 2011).

Measuring the organizational behavior during the household administration is easier in order to understand how the young human capital is affected or influenced in their emotional, productive and physical health by their household management activity (Vélez-Candelario 2011). The World Health Organization defines health as a state of complete physical, mental, and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. They also exposed that smoking, is the most common teenage experiment, and has serious long-term consequences such as disease and premature death. Over 480,000 annual deaths are attributable to tobacco use. Nearly 90% of smokers start smoking by age 18. In addition to that, alcohol is the most common psychoactive substance used during adolescence. Alcohol use tends to be connecting with motor vehicle accidents, injuries and deaths; problems in school and in the workplace; and fighting, crime and other serious consequences (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics 2017).

Although in the contrary, binge drinking declined from the most recent peaks of 13% in 1996 to 3% in 2016 for 8th-grade students, 24% in 2000 to 10% in 2016 for 10th-grade students, and 32% in 1998 to 16% in 2016 for 12th-grade students. Marijuana use presents both cognitive and health risks, particularly damage to pulmonary functions resulting from chronic use. Moreover, hallucinogens, such as MDMA, can affect brain chemistry and may result in problems with memory and learning new information. From 2015 to 2016, reports of illicit drug use in the past 30 days decreased for 8<sup>th</sup>-graders (from 8% to 7%) but remained in the same level for 10<sup>th</sup> and 12th-grade students at 16% and 24%, respectively (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics 2017).

Otherwise, the influence is the ability to exercise power over someone, on the part of a person, a group or an event in particular. Among the factors influencing the social and emotional development of the child and the teenager, there are biological factors, which refer to the cognitive system, involving many structures of the nervous system, responsible for the collection and sending of information. The environmental factors (which refer to the environment) must take into account the stimulation of emotional standards of breeding, from an early age. Equally importance, the cultural and socio-economic factors refer to the place where each child is, influenced and belongs to, according to the culture of their family, the

social and religious values (Garcia 2018). Consequently, the first years of life are essential, as they are an influence in the health and emotional development of the person life. According to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, many problems during early childhood development early are link to emotional, physical and intellectual health in adulthood. It is also important to note, that specifics topics such as nutrition, economics, community and social environment of the child during the first years of life will have a permanent impact on them (Jameson 2016).

Family, considered as an informal organization and exclusive human factory, not only has the assignment of reproducing the human race, it also has a significance challenge to develop healthy and competitive human beings in accordance to their community's socio-economic needs. The family also has the assigned goal to letting them out of a high-risk behavior and poor physical and psychological health (Vélez-Candelario 2018). Thus, more physical and emotional ailments are also contributing to create intra-family conflicts; such as less mental wellness, low productivity, and more risky behavior between adolescents that often have a link to divorced families (Bleidablick and Meland 1999: as cited in Valdes 2018). The teenagers from divorced parents show more relations that are social issues and unemployment experiences than others who come from intact and stable families (Spruijt and Goede 1997: as cited in Valdes 2018). That is why contemporary changes in the family only need to seek new perspectives; thought, the new successive reforms and the proposed changes in this area have not yielded the expected results. Otherwise, these changes do not include many essential aspects such as the principle of subsidiary, the empowerment of families, economic changes (especially in the labor market) and the mutual implications of family policy and the economy (Szczepaniack-Sienniack 2014).

### **Young Human Capital School's Productivity Issue**

Human Capital has as one of the crucial determinants of growth and development of every nation (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992, Benhabid and Spiegel 1994, Knowles and Owen 1995, Obialor 2017: as cited in Dauda 2018). In the modern economy, the Grade Point Average (GPA) is a primary determining factor in order to have the possibility to dominate new scientific creations. Furthermore, this is not working because the dysfunctional social environment is affecting the productivity levels in educational settings, as well as decreasing the academic productivity (Rosende 2008).

As a considerable dilemma the transformation and disintegration of the family, manifested in such phenomena as the decrease of married population, mainly as a result of divorces or postponing decisions of married woman and men. These indicators are manifestations of de-institutionalization (de-traditionalization) of the family, standing for the devaluation of the traditional family consisting of spouses and children as a basic social unit (Szczepaniack-Sienniack 2014). An example of that is today's divorce rate which seems to be rapidly increasing causing more illness, emotional issues, poor school adjustment, low productivity,

and high risk behavior in teenagers (Bleidablick and Meland 1999: cited in Valdés 2018). Hence, the young human capital from this specific family composition presents a lot more human relationship problems and unemployment issues than those with stable and intact families (Spruijt and Goede 1997: as cited in Valdes 2018).

The human relationship and emotional matters (self-regulation) are what help to increase or decrease productivity in school and work (Bar-On 2004). It is also important to note that self-regulation includes impulse control and the management of short-term desires. That is why one of the routes for such people to find their way to jail as many criminal acts, occur in the heat of the moment. For non-violent people, it can lead to losing friends through careless outbursts, or financial problems caused by making too many impulse purchases (Changingminds 2017). The self-regulation is considered a system process, supporting relevant to the conditions, changeability, and flexibility of a person's life activity (Sedova 2014). Some researchers suppose that forms of self-regulation are not the beginnings of this ability, they are based on the previous stages (Bezrukhih and Loginova 2002: as cited in Sedova 2014). Sedova (2014) explained that the development of regulatory systems starts during the prenatal period (inside their household environment).

### **Organizational Psychology a Science for the Household Functionality**

Industrial-organizational psychology is the branch of the psychology that applies psychological theories and management principles to organizations. Often referred to as I-O psychology and this field focuses on increasing workplace productivity and related issues such as physical and mental well-being. Industrial-organizational psychologists perform a wide variety of tasks, including studying worker attitudes and behavior. But, It is also important to note that it has two major sides: the industrial side, which involves looking at how to match the individuals to specific job roles, and the organizational side, which is more focused on understanding how organizations affect individual behavior, organizational structures, social norms, management styles, and role expectations. These are all factors that can influence how people behave within an organization (Cherry 2017). This specialization is scientifically defined as the study of human behavior in organizations and the workplace. The specialty focuses on deriving principles of individual, group and organizational behavior and applying this knowledge to the solution of problems at work. It is a specialized knowledge and requires in-depth understanding of organizational development, attitudes, career development, decision theory, human performance and human factors, consumer behavior, small group theory and process, criterion theory and development, job and task analysis and individual assessment (American Psychological Association 2018).

Otherwise, the Industrial Organizational Psychology is currently a practice foreign to informal social organizations properly known in the social sciences as those not created in a systematic and intentional to achieve a particular purpose

(Guillen and Guil 2000). This science was managed to work within formal organizations where it can talk about objectives spontaneously not planned with rigid structures and relations among members designed beforehand. In this way, it can meet the goals of the organization, in definitive in these organizations there is an institutionalization of tasks, spheres of activity and authorities (Pugh 1973: as cited in Guillen and Guil 2000). It is for this reason that it has maintained its Industrial District, which was defining the place of practice. According to the literature (Muchinsky 1997: as cited in McCarthy 2007), it has been award for a spelling error. Even so, there is arguably the critical thing that was and has been applying psychology to the new system of economic development industry during the end of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century up to the present. Opening the doors, as a result, of the exhibitions of the early exponents of the Industrial Organizational Psychology to psychological practice aimed at business and enterprise development.

Hannan (2018) exposed that contemporary organizational analysis and management science, owe much of their early development to the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) who originated the scientific study of organizations. For Weber, the term authority applies to situations in which one person willingly accepts the direction of another. He also affirms that until modern times, authority was inherited. Weber identified the institutional structure of a new "rational-legal" authority, observing that rights of control increasingly derived from expertise rather than lineage. He documented how this development, which he called rationalization, underlaid the rise of the modern state bureaucracy. According to him, organizations were able to develop unparalleled calculability and efficiency by combining two structures: (1) *a system of explicit rules*, upheld by clearly marked jurisdictions between offices and by permanent files documenting the processing of cases and (2) *a unique division of labor*. the latter structure gave rise to the modern bureaucrat—a person who was required to be an expert in the relevant rules and who had to be shielded from inappropriate influences to guarantee fairness and objectivity.

In the area titled organizational, it refers to the study and application of knowledge about the way in which people (both individually and in groups) act in organizations, formal and informal ones (Newstrom and Davis 2002). This area incorporates into the industrial vision, with the collaboration of observations and research conducted by other experts of the time such as sociologists (McCarthy 2007). Those made their contribution in expanding the areas of expertise of the Industrial psychologists at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to one that would measure and develop skills, personality, and the members of group psychosocial skills. They use this training and information to locate and organize them making it possible to improve the functionality and productivity in both in the individuals and the organization. The organizational analysis in management science is the study of the processes that characterize all kinds of organizations, including business firms, government agencies, labor unions, and voluntary associations such as families, sports clubs, charities, and political parties. Any organization is a social unit with three properties: (1) *it is a corporate* (or group) actor; (2) *it claims a special and limited purpose* and (3) *its creators intend it to last beyond the*

*accomplishment of a single action, if not indefinitely* (Hannan 2018). Industrial/Organizational psychology is the organization of working groups with common goals for the training of their members for the good development of the organization to which they are affiliated, influencing its human capital with tools of psychosocial category, and broadening their possibilities of management and success toward achieving their goals as an organization (Muchinsky 1997: as cited in McCarthy 2007).

Vélez et al. (2009), in Vélez, dissertation research applied by first time the I/O psychology skills and tools to the informal organization named family. This study was title *Development of the human capital from family organization with the intervention of the I/O Psychology in a group of families in south and north of Puerto Rico*, published by Interamerican Journal of Psychology on April, 2016. It is a qualitative study that observed the administration style and organizational behavior of the human capital within their household setting. In this research could be possible found that families with adult and young human capital with high productivity levels in work and school are being administered and organizing how administrative and organizational theories recommend, even when they do not do this consciously. Otherwise, the families that have a low productivity in school and work are not administering and organizing according with the administrative and organizational theories recommend even when they do not do this consciously either.

Vélez et al. (2009) observed the Human Capital Theory exposed by Gary Becker. This theory explained that the capabilities of the individuals are not innate. Instead, they are mostly at school or inside the family, by learning or by experience. Knowledge acquired by education is an investment not a consumer (Oliver 2008). It allows improving wages, better consumption habits, healthy lifestyles and adequate appreciation of the resources that we have. From the economic point of view we will not take on education if this does not provide benefits more significant than their cost. Education or training cannot be separate from the individual who acquires it (Oliver 2008).

### **Administrative, Organizational and Others Management Theories Definitions and Tools**

Administration or management is a daily human activity. We all practice it, regardless of our condition of school education. It does not have the same character of mathematics, biology or anthropology, which you can live well without being a regular practitioner of those or other sciences; it is not as well with the administration. Since we wake up until we go back to sleep you need administrate optimizing our resources, beginning with the time, i.e. you need manage always all (Torres-Hernández 2014). The General Administration Theory is the rational conduct of the activities of an organization, with or without profit. It involves *planning*, *organization* (structure), the *direction* and *control* of all activities differences by the division of labor, running on an organization. The Administration Theory is the field of human knowledge that works with the

general study of administration, regardless of whether this applies to organizations for-profit or not. The TGA (for its acronym in English), studying the administration of organizations (Chiavenato 2000). The Human Relations theory speak about motivation, leadership, communication, group's dynamic organization within other essential subject and harshly criticized the old classical concepts of authority, hierarchy, rationalization of work, departmentalization and general principles of management. Suddenly, it begins to explore the other side of the coin; engineers and technicians yield the place to the psychologist and sociologist (Chiavenato 2000).

Otherwise, the Organizational Development theory is the practice of planned, systematic change in the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the human capital, through the creation and reinforcement of long-term training programs (OD is action oriented). It starts with a careful organization-wide analysis of the current situation and future requirements, and employees techniques of behavioral sciences such as behavior modeling, sensitivity training, and transactional analysis. Its objective is to enable the organization in adapting-better to the fast-changing external environment, new markets, regulations, and technologies (Business Dictionary 2018). A movement brings together several authors seeking applied sciences (especially the theory of behavior) behavior management. This theory was born from the evolution of developing organizational (DO), focused on organizational change and flexibility (Chiavenato 2000). It is the systematic application of knowledge of the behavioral sciences at various levels; *group*, *intergroup*, and *organizational* for the practical realization of a planned change. Its objectives are a higher quality of life, productivity and efficiency. It also, pursues the use of your behavioral knowledge for modification of opinions, attitudes, values, strategies, structures, and practice so that the organization can better adapt to their competitive actions, technological advances and the accelerated pace of other changes in the environment (Newstrom and Davis 2002).

Likewise, to analyze groups it is necessary to understand that the group is not only a group of people, but they are also people who are integrating between it and are psychologically perceive themselves as members of a group (it is named Group's Dynamic). The members of a group communicate directly face-to-face, the reason which each member, influence others and as these influence them. The group has the following characteristics: purpose (i.e., a common goal), dynamic structure of communications, and internal cohesion. Meanwhile, the administrative function depends on the planning, direction, and control to form the regulatory process (Chiavennato 2000).

Otherwise, the human capital groups having a formal organization are based on the rational division of labor, which specialized organs and people in certain activities. Therefore, the planned organization defined in the organizational structure, instituted by the Directorate and communicates to everyone through the craft of organization (Chiavennato 2000). The groups as an informal organization emerge spontaneously and naturally among the people who occupy positions in the formal organization, from human relationships established to perform in their areas (pairs, families, associations, and clubs). They are configuring from the relations of friendship (or antagonism) and the emergence of informal groups

(acquaintances or friends, coworkers, among others) that do not appear in the organization chart or any other formal document (Chiavenato 2000). The network of personal and social relations not established or required by the formal organization, arises spontaneously as a result of the association between individuals. The emphasis and the purpose of these organizations lie in people and relationships, while the formal organization emphasizes official positions regarding authority and responsibility (Newstrom and Davis 2002). Family posse's informal and formal characteristics. The family organization applies the informal characteristics that include the spontaneous actions and behavior in their first formations stages, making these actions the main reason to be constructed. But at the same time, when the group is already formatted and organized as a formal social group acquired the formal characteristics as the rational division of labor, which specialized organs and people in certain activities with specific goals, vision, and mission to achieve (Vélez et al. 2015).

The family organization is a set of people living under the same roof, arranged in fixed roles (father, mother, and brothers) with consanguineous ties or not, with a mode of existing economic and social standards, and powerful feelings that unite them and stick together. Naturally, it goes through birth, then growth, multiplication, decadence, and transcendence. The life cycle of family life is this process called. It also has a purpose of generating new individuals to the society. They are an organization or system because they have a set of rules and principles on a matter, related among if a set of things neatly linked to contributing to a particular purpose, it is characterized by the interaction and the order to a goal (Inter-American children's Institute 2008). Becker (1992) exposed that the human capital is the one that exhibits all those skills at the person's birth, which accumulates during life and qualities that help to carry out its work efficiently increasing productivity. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (1992) explained that Gary Becker applied economic theories and approaches to areas that had previously only being address in sociology, demography, and criminology. His starting point was that actors act rationally to maximize specific goals, like advantage or wealth. In the 1950s and 1960s, he applied his models in several areas: investments in people's competence (or human capital), behavior in households and families, crime and punishment, and discrimination in labor and other markets.

The Inter-American Children's Institute (2008) recognizes two types of functions in the family: the *nutritious* and *regulations*. The nutritious include satisfaction of primary needs of rewarding survival by one or both parents, are more unstable and abdicable, have greater permissiveness and reduce the authority and hierarchy of the parents. Regulations have secondary needs that are frustrating for parents and children, are limiting pulse, create habits and self-control, rules/regulations, agreements between parents with differentiation, mutual responsibility and respect among the members (by age, features, location, and interests). Then there is dysfunctional there must be the absence of these features or characteristics of each of the primary functions of the family. In the nutritional purposes must be blocking the process of emancipation or individualization, overprotection, confusion between authority and difficulty to say no. Also, in the case of the

regulatory function should be there; rigidity and blockage in the process of emancipation and autonomy, overprotection or authoritarianism and difficulty to say if. Concerning dysfunctional communication, maybe give in the severe disruption type of established exchanges, double messages, lockups, displacement and dual link (Inter-American Children's Institute 2008).

### **The Four Basics: Communication, Leadership, Environment and Organizational Culture**

To learn how to develop self-control during the childhood by decreasing a high-risk social behavior, the leader in charge should work hard to teach their trainee. In addition to that, the family leader (or leaders) should know how to apply a healthy subordination process using the management and organizational theories in the four basics: *communication, leadership, environment* and *organizational culture*. Also, the organizational and administrative process has to be according to the lesson that the leaders pretend to use, in order to build the rapport between them and their human capital or human intelligence management (Vélez 2018). To reach this goal (the rapport) the communication is very relevant. Communication is considered to be the sharing of meaningful information between two or more people with the goal of the receiver understanding the sender's message (Business Dictionary 2018). The word communication also means pooling, communion, participation, and mutual interaction etymologically. It refers, therefore, to a process involving all components of a system. Its main elements are (a) transmitter/receiver, which through feedback, continuously alternate their roles; (b) message, channel and code; (c) context and interference (Guillen and Gil 2000). On the other hand, Bateson and Ruesh (1984: as cited in Guillen and Gil 2000), indicate that the concept of communication includes all the processes through which people influence each other.

On the contrary, Werther and Davis (2000) number three communications types. Those are: *upward* communication (originates in medium or low hierarchical levels of organization and aims to object to the top), *downward* communications (is the information that begins in some medium or high point of the Organization and it spreads to lower hierarchical levels or any structured communication style), and *lateral* communication (is what passes through the chains of command). This last communication type is less formal and occurs through networks, which, in turn, are groups of people that establish and maintain contact with each other for the informal exchange of information; usually on a shared interest. A participant alert network can have access to influential people and centers of power based on a shared history, friendships, complementary organizational roles or community relations (Weither and Davis 2000).

Another management basic process is the leadership. It includes individuals who are leaders in an organization, regarded collectively. It is the activity of leading a group of people, an organization or the ability to do this. Leadership also involves establishing a clear vision, sharing that vision with others (influencing), so that they will follow willingly, providing the information, knowledge, and

methods to realize that vision, and coordinating and balancing the conflicting interests of all members and stakeholders. A leader steps up in times of crisis and can think and act creatively in stressful situations (Business Dictionary 2018). Leadership is also defined by González (2008) as: *instrumental* and *expressive* administration (the group expects the leader to organize tasks to meet their objectives), *demonstrative* leadership (is it exercised taking into account the welfare of the collective, the leader focuses on maintaining joined the group and reducing tensions or internal differences). Besides, Chiavenato (2000) defined three types of leadership; *authoritarian*, *democratic*, and *Laissez Faire*. According to Chiavenato (2000), an authoritarian leadership is purely instrumental; the leader makes decisions, and subordinates must obey without question, so he believes that it will keep the respects. Here the leader assigns tasks, an unpredictable mode for the group; it's the dominant praises and criticizes the individual duty of each member of the organization that determines the steps to follow and the techniques to be used in the execution (Chiavenato 2000). He also exposed that democratic leadership is expressive because it tries to involve all members in the decision-making; participatory deliberations strengthen the Group expected. However it has also observed that this kind of leadership has its limitations to make urgent decisions (González 2008). The Group outlines the steps and techniques to achieve the goal and requests technical Council leader when it is necessary, exposes two or more alternatives, and they choose bone gives direction. Meanwhile, the Laissez Faire leadership has the full liberty in an individual or group decision, with minimal participation from the leader. In this case, the leader does not attempt to evaluate or regulate the course of events and sticks to only making sporadic comments on the activities of the members when asked to (Chiavenato 2000).

Otherwise, the environment consists in the total of all surroundings of a living organism, including natural forces and other living things, which provide the conditions for development and growth, as well as of danger and damage (Business Dictionary 2018). Chiavenato (2000) defined environment as an equals social and physical characteristics of the one room or place. The environment generates a climate and is it the set of attributes that describe an organization (Forehand and Gilmer 1964, cited in Guillen and Guil 2000). The environment is also a relatively long-lasting quality of the overall atmosphere that is experienced by its occupants. It can describe concerning values of a particular set of characteristics of the environment (Tagiuri 1968: cited in Guillen and Guil 2000).

The Business Dictionary (2018) defined organizational culture as the values and behaviors that contribute to the unique social and psychological environment of an organization. It includes an organization's expectations, experiences, philosophy, and values that hold it together. It expresses in its self-image, inner workings, interactions with the outside world, and future expectations. Therefore, it is based on shared attitudes, beliefs, customs, and written/unwritten rules that have been developing over time and are considered valid. The organizational culture, according to with Guillen and Guil (2000) is the regulatory and social glue that allows its members to have an identity and be able to communicate and cooperate around a joint project. The conceptual fields covering organizational

culture are values, ethics management, ideology, and behavior systems. These values function as lighthouses and regulations that guide the conduct of group members in certain situations. It designates what is right or is right for the organization, and that is not good for it. For example, an organization could take as value respecting the environment. Concerning ideology, it refers to the set of implicit assumptions, even when they're not aware in regards to the nature of the person and their place in the world that operates in the organization and determines such aspects as leadership, management styles and systems of reward, among other mechanisms of development and organizational performance.

On the other hand, Newstrom and Davis (2002), define it as a set of assumptions, beliefs, values, and standards shared by members of an organization. It can be created consciously or unconsciously by its leading members or may merely have evolved. That culture cannot see it or touch it but its present, and very penetrating.

Communication, leadership, environment and organizational culture are a human being continuous creation and expression, while organizing their formal and informal organizations. Those areas are the ones that make possible to develop human capital with regulated behavior that permits them become successful or not in their socio-economic goals (Vélez 2011). That is why today's economy makes it urgent to redirect the research and the intervention to the informal organization calls families. For that reason, it is necessary to develop functional family leaders, attractive domestic environment, a better internal communication system and a defined organizational culture within an informal organization that has the prime responsibility of developing human capital from their first live stages. The data collected by this scale makes possible a better understanding of the family's organization member abilities, influences, and development possibilities. This data will also get closer to the disrupted administrative and organizational functionality tendency, according to the theories, inside the household setting. The mathematic results make possible identifying a specific family leader behavioral tendencies to administer their family group and their leadership strengthens and weaknesses to manage human intelligence (Vélez 2011).

## **Objective**

The objective of this project is to present the construction and validation process of the first scale that measures mathematically in the informal organization named family, and their organizational and administrative functionality. Using the observations of Vélez et al. (2016) and the Administrative and Organizational theories recommendations, this instrument will be used as a calibrator to quantify the quality of the four essential management areas during intrafamiliar human being intelligence management. Therefore, those areas include: communication, leadership, environment, and organizational culture. This scale also works as a mathematical guide to quantify the quality of the family's leader administrative skills. It also can help to manage their internal physical and social environment; preventing a high-risk social behavior in their household subordinated young

human capital. The FOAF Scale also can make able to become assertive during this organize human being group organizational development (DO).

## Method

The FOAF Scale (Family Organizational and Administrative Functionality) was created to measure the functionality of the four primary administrative and organizational areas within the family organization: leadership, environment, organizational culture, and communication. It currently has 34 reactivities and a frequency scale from one (1) to four (4) as options. For the reactive selection, a validation document is created and later submitted to 21 judges, with 61 items to evaluate using the Lawshe (1975) formula. After the judge's analysis, they select 38 reactivities. Finally, only 34 are used, considering 10 in each area of Leadership and Organizational Culture, and 7 in the areas of Communication and Environment. In addition to that, using the Statistical Package of Social Science (SPSS), 2003, version, it was confirmed that the internal consistency validity is that of .9 (Cronbach Alpha); meanwhile, the Factor Analysis had adequacy of .8, Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO by the English acronyms) measure. This test can be administered to the young human capital from the age of 6 to 17 years old, under supervision of an adult leader. It also can be administered to adults 18+ years. Finally, six different percentages of quality categories that define Family Organizational and Administrative Functionality are created to name the families administrative and organizational functions. With this categories, is possible to clarify the administrative and organizational tendency styles of family leaders during their family's organizational and administrative process; Effective Functionality (100% to 90%), Adequate Functionality (89% to 85%), Moderate Functionality (84% to) (80%), Moderated Low Functionality (79 to 70%), and Low or Any Functionality (69 to 25%).

Meanwhile, during the validation process, the sample selected counts with unique characteristics that help visualize the percentage of the FOAF scale in different situations. The size of the study is divided into two categories: 50 children with a low GPA in school (2.49 and down) and 50 with high GPA (2.50 and Up). In the group of children with a GPA below 2.49, the FOAF scale shows that 64% of the sample tended to a Low Functionality, dividing the results into three categories of Low tendency: Moderately Low (20%), Too low(20%) and Not Functional (24%). The not functional trend was the majority. Only 10% of the sample have a practical tendency of functionality, 12% have an adequate, and 16% have a moderate feature.

In the sample of children with a GPA of 2.50 and up, the results show a different percent of functionality tendency in the FOAF scale. This sample showed fewer results in the three categories of Low Functionality: Moderately Low (18%), Too Low (4%), and Not Functional (6%). The majority of this group displayed a high tendency of functionality: Effective Family Functionality (44%), Adequate Functionality (18%), and Moderate Functionality (10%).

**Table 1. Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.891	34

**Table 2. KMO and Bartlett Complete Test**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy	.755
Bartlett's test of Sphericity approx... Chi-Square	1454.875
Mexico City GIS.	561 .000

**Table 3. General Percent of the Family Organizational Functionality Test**

Family Organizational Functionality Categories	Sample of 50 Children's (6 to 18) Low GPA 2.49 and down	Percent
Effective	5	10%
Adequate	6	12%
Moderate	8	16%
Low Moderate	10	20%
Too Low	10	20%
Not Functional	11	22%
Family's Organizational Functionality	Sample of 50 Children's (6 to 18) High GPA 2.50 and up	Percent
Effective	22	44%
Adequate	9	18%
Moderate	5	10%
Low Moderate	9	18%
Too Low	2	4%
Not Functional	3	6%

## Conclusions

During this FOAF scale construction and validation process, the functionaries have demonstrated an accurate measurement process. The sample results are corroborate the finding of the qualitative research created by Vélez et al. (2016) published as *Family, Human Capital and I/O Psychology* on 2016. This study observed a low productivity level of the young and adult human capital from the families without a strong organizational characteristics according with the administrative and organizational theories. Some of those observations include poor communication or non-communication, an authoritarian or laissez- faire

leadership, poor household hygienic and many un-common organizational culture characteristics as members of the same organization, within others. Otherwise, they observed in the families with better productivity and healthier organizational characteristics, according with the administrative and organizational theories that include; open communication styles, a household hygienic and a lot of common characteristics, as members of the same organization within others. On the other hand, they observed that families with better productivity and healthier organizational features according to the administrative and organizational theories include: open communication styles, a hygienic household, and more common characteristics as members of the same culture, within others. Those results are also constantly confirming the findings of the first stage of this scale construction, in which a group of 18 children with low academic GPA was measured (Vélez-Candelario 2009) and demonstrate the same tendencies of low functionality. This instrument is making possible evaluate mathematically using a percent as a metric to analyze the family's leader management skills to organize and administer, their income, their daily live, their social interactions, their house physical environment, their goals and their human resources intelligence management under their charge.

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## What's Wrong With Populism? Basic Modules for an Immanent Critique

By Sophia Obermeyer<sup>\*</sup>

*Donald Trump, the Alternative for Germany and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: These movements and leaders seriously threaten the positive connotation of populism as a movement which aims at representing the political underdog. At the very same time, the European left pinned their hopes on, for example, Podemos or Syriza, which also are labeled as populist. This confusion about the normative evaluation of populism is duplicated within political philosophy. Concerning the normative conceptualization of populism, this field is marked by a crucial split: While one tradition of theories connected to Ernesto Laclau conceives of populism as the democratic movement per se, the other, younger school of thought envisages populism as a major threat to democracy. Focusing on this second wave of philosophical engagement with populism, I will argue that these argumentations are restricted in their scope as they use liberal values for a merely external critique. Introducing an immanent mode of criticism, the persuasiveness of the conclusion -that there is something wrong with populism- should be expanded. As an outlook, I will sketch an application of this kind of criticism to the US American case of populism.*

**Keywords:** *Critical Theory, Immanent Critique, Liberalism, Populism, USA.*

### Introduction

In huge red letters the self-made sign reads as: "*Make Racism Wrong Again*". It is August and in Bergen, Norway, protesters gathered together in order to counterfight another political march which is happening today. *SIAN* (whose acronym stands for *Stopp Islamiseringen av Norge*) is in town and wants to warn the public of an assumed "islamization of Norway". Also in Norway, right-wing populism is not only a social movement. Forming the coalition in government responsibility, the *Fremskrittspartiet* (Progress Party) together with the conservative party, cuts formerly existing gender-equalizing policies such as "liberalizing" parental leave and pushes forward a more and more restrictive immigration and asylum-policy (Bjerkem 2016). In Germany, the *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany) polarizes the society and runs a revisionist ideology towards the Shoah and devastating views on gender equality. In Eastern Europe as well as in Turkey, ultra-nationalist populist governments cancel the rule of law. And not to be silent about the one whose name nowadays better is launched with a trigger warning, the president of the United States of America holds alliances with the white supremacist *Militia* movement. But also as a rather new research field for normative political philosophy, populism gains attention. Populism, as it is argued here, poses a threat or a boost to democracy: An exclusively defined "people" is

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confronted with an outlandish elite, the political opposition is delegitimized, minority rights disrespected and patterns of democratic ways to communicate violated (Urbinati 2013, Müller 2016, Stanley 2016). By stark contrast, others claim that in bringing the underdog back in the political sphere and debate, in setting a radically other political agenda, in publicly pointing out to recent shortcomings of the governmental parties in charge, populism can indeed revitalize democracies (Laclau 2005a, 2005b). Regardless of the theories' own rhetorical frames, I think one can indeed identify a consensus here: Plurality and equality are key political values which are at stake. As I will argue, taking these liberal values as the normative horizon of an external critique, both strands of argumentations fail in addressing the relevant agents as well as the inner tensions of populism itself. My hypothesis is: Populism does not need to be contrasted with idealized democracy in order to be criticized. A much thicker criticism can be derived when using another strategy, namely an immanent or reconstructive critique. In the end, my hope is that these insights can contribute to constructing a both more complex description and convincing critique of populism. Then, these insights can sketch the way out of the populist age: If there is something inherently wrong with populism, promoting a left-wing populism as a counterpart for right-wing populism does not seem attractive. Due to the character of the question I am interested in, also my approach is interdisciplinary: both normatively inspired and empirically informed. In the first part of this paper I want to overview the contemporary landscape of philosophical evaluations of populism in reconstructing Müller and Urbinati as two dominant theories. Uniting these theories in one more formalized argumentation, I will show the strengths and weaknesses. In the second part of my paper, I want to tackle one of the weaknesses. As I will argue, this restricted scope of argumentative force is based on an external mode of criticism, which I aim to overcome by presenting a contemporary model of immanent critique. In the third part of this paper I will sketch an application of this mode of critique to the US American case of populism.

### **Populism and Democracy – Beloved Enemies?**

In contemporary normative political theory, I think that one can see two major waves of engagement with the phenomenon of populism. The first is heavily influenced by Ernesto Laclau's theory of populism. Here, populism is able to unite unsatisfied political demands in a stronger chain or set of unsatisfied demands – which thereby become powerfully articulated political battle cries. This conception of populism carries a positive connotation when Laclau writes: that "the end of populism coincides with the end of politics" (Laclau 2005b: 67). Without doubt, his occupation with populism as a real world phenomenon derives from political developments of these days, namely the uprising of various leftwing political governments in Latin America. I think also in his theory one can identify normative values, even though the theory is not openly normative. Plurality of political demands, counterfighting political interests I think can also be articulated as liberal values. However, in what follows I will focus on two other philosophers, who established very potent, if

not to say popular, theories of populism, Nadia Urbinati and Jan-Werner Müller. These two philosophers belong to the second wave of contemporary philosophical investigations of populism, which critically accompanies right-wing populist up springs in the political West since 2010. Here, populism is compared to western liberal democracies.

Normative political theory typically asks questions like: Is populism a desirable political style? Why is it or what makes it superior to other political forms of government, of designing policies – both in a process or output-oriented way? But to finding thesis directing to answering these questions, one needs to know what populism actually is in the first place. I am aware that this poses a major epistemological problem. This is so, because every historically informed attempt to identify populism must be biased in the sense that it already needs distinctive assumptions about what populism is and "where to look at in history" in order to developing a concept of it. Because of this epistemic and methodological difficulty, I will stick to a minimal definition of populism. It is minimal in the sense that it does not conceive of populism as a holistic political agenda or ideology, but rather shows two necessary conditions for a political ideology to be populist. Even if, taken together, they are also sufficient conditions for a political ideology to be populist, "populist" then is no complete description of the political agenda itself. However, the minimal definition I take as a basis for this paper states a fundamental split between the people and the elites. The people, imagined as a homogenized political subject, is thought of as somehow betrayed by the – possibly outlandish – elites. This ideology, where the people is thought of as a unified, homogeneous social arrangement, is however thin as "there is limited potential in these core concepts for populism alone address 'the famous who gets what, when, how' question that is seen to be central to politics" (Stanley 2008: 106). Now it is time to go one step further and ask the normative question: If this is what populism is, or what is the populist part of a specific political agenda or ideology, what, if anything is wrong with populism? In what follows I will present and reconstruct in more detail Jan-Werner Müllers influential view on populism as well as Nadia Urbinatis illuminating and historically sound account.

### *Populism as a Threat for Democracy*

"Think of Victor Orbán claiming after losing the 2002 Hungarian elections that 'the nation cannot be in opposition'; or think of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, arguing, after his failed bid for the Mexican presidency in 2006, that 'the victory of the right is morally impossible' (...); or think of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insisting in the face of rather strong empirical evidence that Turkish citizens were protesting against his policies in Gezi Park that the protesters did not belong to the Turkish people. In short, the logic of populism is not: we are the 99%. It is: we are the 100%." (Müller 2014: 487)

Using these quotes as empirical starting points, Müller argues that populism in a nutshell is "a particular moralistic imagination of politics" (Müller 2014: 485). This imagination of politics, articulated in typical populist statements, is

in more detail characterized through the following features: Firstly and most importantly, it dismisses the claim to political power of every other party; when it is assumed that "we", namely populists and their supporters are "the 100%", then it is impossible to have a legitimate opposition. Interestingly, the German party "Alternative für Deutschland" makes the move of describing itself on twitter as the only oppositional party.<sup>1</sup> This anti-pluralistic tendency is not only directed towards possible parties forming a government, but also applied on the actual political subject, which ought to be represented by politicians – the people. This assumption at least holds true for representative democracies. According to Müller, populists refer in a normative, yet contra-factual way to the political constituent, the people (Müller 2016: 19f.): They do not conceive of the people in the legal manner as the amount of people who actually are entitled to vote within a specific territory. Rather, they construct the people as a very specific group of persons, which is already associated with specific political and religious claims – most often related to conservative, nationalist imaginations of authentic inhabitants of the country (Müller 2014: 485f.). One especially illuminating example for this is the controversy about Barack Obama's birth certificate: "in the eyes of the 'birthers', the president is in fact a usurper, a foreigner, someone who has appropriated office under false pretenses" (Müller 2014: 486). What is crucial here is that populists have a certain image of the people, which is insofar moral or normative, as it must be extracted from within the people. At the very same time, this real people is constructed as a victim: of foreign nation's interest or of corrupt elites (Müller 2015: 489). These elitist and/or foreign powers hindered in a populist narrative the real will of the people to come into presence. Along with the – imagined – uniform social identity of the people comes also its political will:

"(...) Populism crucially relies on the notion that there is a distinct common good, that the people can discern and will it, and that a politician or a party or, for that matter, a movement, can unambiguously implement such a conception of the common good as policy." (Müller 2014: 486)

Müller explains that the common good for populists is so obvious, no democratic participation is needed: Who the people is and what it wants is given as a pre-political factum (Müller 2015: 84). Now, this only needs to be realized through the right representative (see *ibid.*). Who this person is, again in a populist self-conception (identified by Müller) is independently from democratic elections: Due to Müller's understanding of populists, the right representative is just a matter of fact, as the real will of the real people is given (recall, for example, Donald Trump's announcement before the official outcome of the counts in 2016 was declared, that he would not accept the election if it was not him to win the presidential election).

What was said so far referred to populism on the level of self-conception and ideology. But Müller goes one step further and also provides an account on what populist will do, connected to their rhetoric and self-image, once they have to power to govern. This populist practice can be summed up in three

<sup>1</sup>See: Alternative für DE, Twitter, <https://bit.ly/2ASB72J>, [accessed 09.08.2018].

steps: colonize the state and judiciary with their partisans; engage in clientelism in exchange for broad political support, suppress opposition within civil society to maintain the illusion of a unified people (Müller 2016: 44ff.). All these patterns of populist policies can be directly linked with the very core of populist ideology on Müller's terms: I and only I represent the people in pursuing its real and authentic will. Therefore, other representatives or other parties need to be dismissed, opposition is theoretically impossible and morally disqualified due to the assumption of the one, real and authentic people.

To sum up Müller's characterization of populists, on an ideological level we can say the following: Populism is a moralistic imagination of politics. Moralistic in that sense, that the people, the will of the people and their representatives are conceived of as a given fact and that there is only one legitimate political subject – the real, uniform people. On the more practical level, Müller predicts populist to "occupy" the state as well as the media and suppress its opponents.

Now, how can we conceive of the relationship between populism and democracy? If these three patterns of policies which are attributed to populists by Müller, were to put into radical praxis, it seems to be clear that the outcome would be undemocratic: An omnipotent government, which rules or suppresses the media and its opponents. As stated above, these forecasted populist policies relate to the main ideological claim of populists, in that they and only they are the legitimate representatives of the people. Given this radicalness, one does not even have to ask to which precise concept of democracy one is sympathetic to: acceptance of other opinions and parties as well as the outcomes of votes are necessary conditions of deliberative, republican or liberal concepts of democracy.

#### *Populism: Internal and Parasitical to Democracy*

Populism as a tendency, rather than a pathologicalized alter ego of the idealized democracy – this pattern can be found in Nadia Urbinati's research on populism. Nadia Urbinati concludes that populism is both: parasitical on and internal to representative democracy (Urbinati 2013: 137). Her theory of populism therefore situates itself in a rather transverse position towards Müller and Laclau. Albeit they differ in the normative judgment on populism, the other two strands of theories take democracy and populism in their cores as different phenomena. At the same time, one can identify clear similarities between those critiques of populism and Urbinati's conception of it, when she gives the characterization of populism:

"(...) A populist movement that succeeds in leading the government of a democratic society tend to move toward institutional forms and a political reorganization of the state that change, and even shatter constitutional democracy, like centralization of power, weakening of checks and balances, disregards of political oppositions, and the transformation of election in a plebiscite of the leader". (Urbinati 2013: 137).

So the question of interest is again: How does she conceptualize populism? It is important to keep in mind that this question itself is twofold: The way she derives a concept of populism and the content of this conception. Urbinati conducts an historical perspective (Urbinati 2013: 137). She focuses on US-America and Europe as spheres of her historical investigation. She does not start with rather recent populist phenomena, but undertakes a long travel backwards in history, 2,500 years back: She traces the birth of the phenomenon back to the Roman republic. Here, the idea of the people as *populus* was born: At the Romean Forum, the people as a crowd could cheer or boo towards politicians who seek support for their power plans in front of them (Urbinati 2013: 151). From this starting point, she then follows historians in the identification of various moments in history, which are classified as populist. Napoleon Bonaparte as the first populist leader who skillfully used media as means of promoting his own ends of imperial ambitions and his politics of reconciliation with catholicism; the spread of Christianity in North America during the "Great Awakenings" as popular movements, challenging interpretations of the bible which has been conceived of as elitist; the rise of the People's Party as in its core critical to the financial sector and holding alliances with the labor movement; the fascism of Benvito Mussolini and his aim of mobilizing the masses; until she arrives at the present. Interpreting these populist phenomena along the lines of history, Urbinati presents populism finally as a political phenomenon with the following set of features:

"a) the exaltation of the sovereignty of the people as a condition for a politics of sincerity or transparency or purity against the quotidian practice of compromise and bargaining that politicians pursue; b) the appeal to, or affirmation of the correctness and even the right of the majority against any minority, political or otherwise (in Europe, populism feeds strong discriminatory ideologies against cultural, gender, religious and linguistic minorities); c) the idea that politics entails oppositional identity or the construction of a 'we' against a 'them', and d) the sanctification of the unity and homogeneity of the people versus any parts of it." (Urbinati 2013: 147)

Now, two further questions have to be asked to understand her argument: In what sense is populism inherent to, and in what sense parasitical on, representative democracy? I will start to outline the ideological and structural patterns of populism which justify the conclusion: Populism is parasitical on representative democracy.

In order to answer this question, one needs an account of what representative democracy is. Albeit Urbinati is not entirely explicit about that in her own essay, one can extract key patterns of representative democracy when reading that "populism holds the multi-party system in great suspicion; hence, it is a denial of electoral representation, which is the main institution or set of institutions through which procedural democracy is implemented" (Urbinati 2013: 147). Besides political pluralism in the sense of a multi-party system and representation through the means of elections, Urbinati emphasizes the role of minority rights in a representative democracy (Urbinati 2013: 137) as a key characteristic that "democratic procedures intrinsically presume and promote"

(Urbinati 2013: 138). Crucial to the protection and realization of those minority rights, but obviously also for the other core patterns of the form of democracy Urbinati contrasts populism with, are democratic institutions, above all, strong and independent legal institutions (Recall Trumps attack on the judges here.). I understand strong in that they successfully can defend the constitution, even if a majority of the people at a time does not support it, and independent its autonomy towards the executive strand of government. Representative democracy, thus, is only what it is when it pays sufficiently attention to suffrage, independent legal institutions, and the plurality of politics – both in the sense of a heterogeneous people in terms of minority rights and plurality in the spectrum of political parties.

Now, it is easy to see the enemitical feature of the relationship between representative democracy and populism as they are sketched here: Populism's ideology is one of a united people, by means of unification and exclusion of unwanted groups of the people or minorities. This ideology stands in stark contrast the ideology/idea and prerequisite of democracy which emphasizes plurality of the people, minority rights and plurality of political parties. If populism sets the will of the majority on the top of politics to be sincere and authentic, the idea of restricting forces such as legal institutions and a constitution is unnecessary and in fact poses a hindrance to "the real will of the real people". And due to the sharp and unsolvable distinction in identities and interests regarding who belongs to the real people and who should be set apart, populism denies the inclusive forces of political institutions that can mediate conflicts.

Now I will turn to elaborating on the second part of the conclusion Urbinati draws: Even though populism is opposed to core values of representative, constitutional democracy, she calls it inherent to this interpretation of democracy. How can we get a more substantial grasp on this? Her argumentation is twofold: Both in a systematical manner, populism only can develop in such democracies and in a historical manner, we can see that populism was born first of all within a republican democracy – the Roman republic. In a broad sense, one can relate populism and democracy in saying that both are "playing the same game" for the goal of identification of representatives and represented and in that sense populism is a member of the family of democracy (Urbinati 2013: 143). The metaphor of the family also can be used when saying that it only can exist, once its parents offer a fruitful environment to develop:

"Populism is not a revolutionary force. Because: it does not create people's sovereignty, but intervenes once it exists and its values and rules are written in a constitution. Populism represents an appeal to the people within a political order in which the people is formally already the sovereign. (...) Populism does not create democracy." (Urbinati 2013: 146)

Drawing on Aristotle's theory of the circle of governmental forms of rule, she points out to populism as a permanent possibility of representative, constitutional democracy in that both – democracy and demagoguery in Aristoteles' terms – rely on public speech and opinion, as well as majoritarian-

nism (Urbinati 2013: 145). To conclude: Populism is parasitical in Urbinati's account. This framing of populism as a parasite already hints to two opposed patterns – it is inherent in and opposed to democracy in the sense of its representative and constitutional features. Historically, populism's rise was connected to the first democracy – the Roman Republic. In a systematic manner, it can be understood as a permanent possibility in democracies in their use of majoritarianism and a party system.

*United against Populism: Urbinati and Müller in one Key Argument*

Taken together, I think one can rationally reconstruct those two dominant theories of populism – Jan-Werner Müller and Nadia Urbinati – in one line. This is not to say, that this argument as such can be found in one of the respective texts in the form I present it here. But this is to say, that, taken together, such an argumentation can grasp the essence – both in the content of the premises as well as their argumentative procedure – of contemporary normative philosophies on populism. What the argumentation borrows from Urbinati is its focus on minority rights (see first and second premise), what it includes of Müller the emphasis of legitimate opposition (see premise 1. and 2.). Heterogeneity and plurality as normative frames is present in both theories.

1. Populist ideology is anti-pluralistic respectively the composition of the "people" and its political interests and pursues the rule of the (manipulated) public opinion over suffrage and the authoritative will as well as denying the possibility of legitimate opposition.
2. In order for a political unity to be a representative democracy, it has to emphasize minority rights, a diarchic structure and an electoral system as well as embrace opposition.
3. If populists occupy representative institutions and become governmental parties, they will implement their ideology in concrete policies.
4. These policies (see premise 1.) undermine the main characteristics of representative democracies (see premise 2.)
5. Conclusion: (Governmental) Populism undermines representative democracy.

This argument, even if it cuts off interesting insights and details, aims to be stronger than every single argumentation within one of the theories – directed towards the same conclusion – for it tries to counteract shortcomings of one theory with strengths of the others. I want to elaborate on the conclusion of the forwarded argumentation. This is no objection in a strict sense, as it does not challenge one or more premises. But even though the argument shown above is formally valid, an uneasy question remains open: Is this conclusion really innovative? How is it informative and in which manner? And: To whom is this argumentation directed to? My answer to these questions can be sketched like this: The argument reconstructed above is clearly located in a liberal political tradition. This is limits to scope of its force to convince people – both theorists and actual populists or populist supporters – drastically: If you are a (leftist)

liberal, you accept the argument and hold the conclusion as true. At the same time, this conclusion might leave you somewhat unsatisfied because it is not in itself action-guiding – and this is what I conceive of the aim of practical respectively political philosophy. Now, if you are a socialist or communist, this argumentation would hold true for you but you probably would pose another set of norms that constitute another political system as a milestone for contrasting populism, and in the argumentation as a second premise; therefore, this argumentation might simply not be of great value for you. Now, what if you are a populist? My guess here is that you would accept every single premise (despite the pejorative wording when it comes to populism, populists and their supporters) and therefore the conclusion, too. But would you be convinced that populism is something which needs to be thought of critically, which needs to be fought against by parliamentary and non-parliamentary means of politics, whose ideology is highly problematic, to put it frankly, or neo-fascist? Probably not: Populists do not want to support the rights of refugees, of migrants, of women, of transgender people. Populists do not claim to support the established institutions of representative democracy. Populism, taken as a social movement, is not about celebrating suffrage. Populists can happily embrace the conclusion shown above. This is why we need another philosophically sound and politically convincing strategy to say what is wrong with populism.

### **Another Mode of Criticism**

"Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."  
(The English Standard Version Bible 2009, Luke 23:34)

The approach of this paper is to develop a criticism of populism which not only speaks to liberal democrats: Even if only as a possibility, the developed approach shall be sound to persons holding sympathies with voting for populist parties or joining populist marches. Also on more strategic grounds, such an approach is needed: In the US-American case, an array of CEOs and billionaires like Apple's Tim Cook have spoken out against Donald Trump and emerged as surprisingly strong champions of an inclusive US society: at least when it comes to immigration, race and gender (see Callahan 2017). The problem in terms of the scope of liberal criticisms expands also through this performative act: If exactly parts of the "elites" who are typically accused for being corrupt and simply elitist then blame populists for exactly the same reasons liberal philosophers blame them, the criticism might also be rejected on this ground.

The path of the immanent critique, so I will argue, is superior to other ways of criticizing populism. Due to this overall ambition, this section of my paper has to provide answers to the following three questions: What is immanent criticism or which kind of immanent criticism is it that I want to use? How and why is this, as I stated before, superior to other ways of criticizing populism? And finally, how does it work in a more practical manner, how can it be applied to the field of interest here?

*Historical and Systematic Overview*

To understand the critical drive of the school of theories which use "immanent criticisms", a systematic and historical overview is helpful. After that, I will present one version of the by no means homogeneous stream of immanent criticisms. In the broader picture of this thesis, this theory of immanent critique will then be used in practice when identifying the socio-political context in which populisms arise with the US American case. In what follows, I draw heavily on Robin Celikates' classifications of the two opponent methods of political or social theory formation (Celikates 2009: ch. 1 and 2).

When it comes to criticism directed towards social or political phenomena, until the 1980ies one could speak of two major camps within philosophy. What unites theories committed to immanent criticisms, in my view, is their identification of shortcomings of these formerly dominant streams of theories. In other words, immanent criticisms can be conceived of as an attempt of overcoming the failures of this dichotomous split in either external or internal criticism.

One very influential stream of theories can be labeled as "orthodox criticisms of ideology". This approach seeks to answer the questions of what is and what is wrong with and within a society broadly speaking in such a manner: How the people act is due to them being in grip by a false ideology. They cannot know about this mechanism, because they are trapped within the practical. In this picture, the members of the group or society which is to be criticized are constructed as "judgmental dopes", as Celikates puts it. Their actions, which then can imply: establishing policies and institutions, vote for political parties, joining marches, to name some possible actions on the macro-level, but also the way they behave within smaller units such as the family or peer-groups, can be explained entirely through a description of their ideologies. The role of the external scientific sociologist, political theorist or philosopher, in this picture, is then to make visible what must remain unseen from the involved actors' point of view.

They, particularly because they are not involved in the social and political happenings, are not distracted or blinded by the flashing lights of false ideologies. What the judgmental dopes themselves offer as their interpretation of what, if anything, is wrong at a given situation does not contribute to developing a criticism of the respective social arrangement, because it is necessarily wrong, misguided through false ideology.

Now, directed to this strong version of external critique, one can at least articulate four concerns (again, here I follow Celikates 2009: 76): a normative concern, a strategic objection, an empirical question and a major methodological shortcoming. Here, I will only sketch the normative and methodological objections. If we accept to respect each other as equals, as autonomous and politically mature counterparts, downgrading the objects of political studies or philosophical analyses in such a way that the object of the respective study, which happens to be humans in these disciplines, is not permitted. This is the normative concern. Now, one could argue that this is true but for reasons of scientific reasoning it is necessary and in this sense unavoidable, if we want to

continue with the project of scientific research in the social sciences and humanities.

But here comes the methodological objection: Societies and groups of people are a different kind of object than stones or those kinds of objects natural sciences are interested in: There is no social or political reality without prior interpretation of what is the case by the people actually involved, and that is to be done by the judgmental tropes themselves. That is to say that there cannot be such a thing as a political theory without including in one way or another, the self-description and self-conception of the people and groups one investigates and their interpretation of the phenomenon in question. The role of the theorist then, is a second-order hermeneutics: Interpreting the already interpreted social and political reality (Celikates 2009: 82).

For all that has been said about an orthodox way to criticize ideologies and societies, it may not come as a surprise that methodology in political theory and sociology underwent a major shift in the 1980's: the pragmatic or interpretative turn. While the orthodox criticism of ideology can be imagined as an uninvolved bystander of society, the theorist of the pragmatic turn can be imagined more like a journalist, interviewing the social actors for their interpretations and normative evaluations of the social situation, institution or dynamic which is in question. Obviously, the assumptions about these actors differ radically: The judgmental dope is substituted by a politically mature person, whose self-conception and (normative) interpretation about what is questioned is taken for granted.

We can also try to direct the objections raised against the orthodox view to evaluate this approach: The normative concern of not regarding the social actors as equals does not hold; but what about the methodological shortcoming? This was raised against the orthodox approach in pointing to the assumption that any theory-building concerned with societies or groups of human subjects necessarily needs to take into account – in some form – their self-conception and normative evaluation of the social complex in question. Again, this can be a social dynamic between different actors, the performance of some institutions of the mere description of them as a group.

So this is the first level of the second-order hermeneutics a social or political theory has to rely on. In this picture of pure adaptation of the interpretations of the social actors themselves, it seems that the second order misses. Of course, this is only a valid objection to this method if one shares the assumption that social and political theory indeed needs to proceed in this form of second-order hermeneutics, which theorists of the pragmatic camp might deny. Before making the case for the relevance of further theorizing the interpretations of the actors themselves in constructing a variation of immanent criticism suited for my approach here, I want to briefly recapture the two positions.

In a nutshell, the orthodox critic of ideology claims: "What is wrong with this or that situation can be seen, from an exclusively external standpoint. As soon as one gets involved, one gets blinded by ideologies and neither can conceive of the situation, nor put forward a valid criticism of it." The pragmatic critic, would reply, then: "Just go and ask them what is wrong with the social

situation or system you are interested in, then they will tell you!". These slogans are mutually exclusive. The actual objects of research differ: Orthodox critics of ideology are accused of holding them as "judgmental dopes". They, the persons or groups, who are at stake here, act in a manner that contradicts their actual, their real interests. By stark contrast, the pragmatic theorist only needs to have a close look at the actual statements, self-understandings or interpretations of the situations of the involved actors in order to get to know what, if anything is wrong. Closely connected to these characterizations of the actors involved, also the standpoint of the one who is asking: What is wrong with this social or that political situation, shifts: While we can imagine the orthodox as an interested bystander of the – possibly problematic – social context, the interpretative theorist gets involved in the event and enthusiastically reports and rephrases the criticisms and problematizations of the affected actors. Also in terms of the status of the normative judgments, values and evaluations of the situation both camps hold divergent views. The orthodox critic normatively measures the situation independently, and possibly contradictory to self-descriptions of the involved actors or participants. To stick to the image of the interested bystander, they seemingly can pull the norms to evaluate the situation, which can also have systemic patterns, out of their pockets; whereas the pragmatic pretends to be a *tabula rasa* when it comes to normative biases and own moral judgments, only reporting what the participants said to be the case or the problem at stake. Here, only the norms which are already present in the social game can serve as normative guidelines.

#### *Why Internal Critique is Not Exhausting*

A second alternative – given that one was to formulate a critique in the first place – is to judge populists by their own statements and in that sense pursue a strategy of internal critique. If external critique would be the only other possibility to say something critical about populism, an internal approach seemed to be promising: Internal critique is interested in identifying open self-contradictions between articulated normative values and their realization. And not only individuals, but also institutions, corporations and whole political systems can be evaluated through this internal perspective: Institutions might embrace the value of gender equality and then only hire men, corporations might formally admit safe working conditions in their codes of conduct and then trade with firms violating those workers rights throughout their supply chain, nation-states can include the freedom of press in their constitution and censor journalists. Applied to my field of interest, one would then take populists and their supporters up on their own words, assumptions and goals. This clearly bears the advantage of affiliate directly to the already given convictions. In other words, the danger of talking past each other is not given.

But still, I think there are general disadvantages of this sort of criticism, which I will elaborate on now.

The deficits of an merely internal mode of criticism can be captured in saying that this is unable to transcend the already given social situation. So, to take a more extreme case one can ask: Why don't we criticize fascism from within, from an internal standpoint? Because then one could only argue from

within a fascist framework of ideology. The existence of human *races*, the primacy of the *white* race above others, the antiliberal and anticonservative impetus, the creation of a new mankind and the role of woman as mere reproductive forces: these are starlights of fascist ideology. Comparing fascist realities or tendencies with those ideals internal to fascist ideology, one ends up with conclusions like the following, if one was to criticize fascism from within: Frauke Petry as one of the former leading figures of the German populist party "AfD" was spending too much time in doing politics, she should have stayed at home for taking care of her family. Yet another one: it was a mistake by Italian fascism to downplay its antisemitic tendencies. I take it for granted that this is not a politically and morally sound option.

### **Immanent Critique: Suspicious and Understanding**

Introducing a contemporary version of immanent critique, two questions can serve as guidelines in presenting the theory: What is immanent in the respective theory and how is it a critique? The goal of this theory is to provide a version of critical theory which sets itself free from the dogma of epistemic asymmetry and the epistemic divide between social actor and social/political theorist in centering around the reflective social actors, without getting rid of its critical demand. In one respect it can be said that Robin Celikates shares a crucial thesis about the social actors with the school of orthodox criticism of ideology: That these actors, who are the objects also of his proposed methodology, are wrong in their interpretations of the social reality. But, at the same time he claims as to stick to a "methodological egalitarianism" (Celikates 2009: 165). So how is this possible, then?

Starting off with contrasting orthodox theories of criticism of ideology and purely interpretative social theory methods, Celikates develops his theory which can be thought of as "postpragmatic" (Celikates 2009: 35ff.). In a nutshell, this version of immanent critique holds that the social actors are not to be constructed and produced as judgmental dopes and "dumb" simply because they are involved in the social happening and, therefore, necessarily in the grip of a flawed ideology. Rather, the social or political theorist has in general the very same set of possible tools for interpreting and potentially criticizing the social or political reality.

What Celikates borrows from the previously portrayed orthodox theories is the emphasis on the influence of ideologies on the way people act and think. At the very same time, he stresses the importance of the self-conceptions of the people involved. The key to understanding this possible tension is this: There can be structural patterns which more or less systematically hinder the evolution or actualization and use of the capability of subjects to critically examine their social context and politically produced circumstances. So in this picture it is still possible, that the actors are wrong when it comes to an interpretation of a social dynamic. But this does not derive from their fundamental inability to make sense of social or political nexus, but is due to external obstacles.

Celikates wants to provide a model of critical theory which proceeds in continuity with the social practices of self-understanding. So, in what ways is it that the self-conceptions of the actors come into play? This question can also be approached in a different manner: One key assumption of Celikates is that social actors are not merely judgmental dopes, neither fully rational, emancipated and enlightened individuals, who just have to be asked for their evaluation of the social problem in question. The qualified middle position holds that specific social and political conditions can enhance or hinder, sometimes even almost block the capability to critically investigate and fully grasp the social or political complication. At this point the question arises: How do we know which abilities or capabilities are needed to identify "the real social situation"? One could also frame this as a major objection to Celikates approach in saying that in the end it relies on a substantial list of capabilities the social actor would need to have in order to get their social situations right (Celikates himself is open on that, Celikates 2009: 170). The way out lies again in connecting the set of capabilities necessary to capture one social or political understanding of a situation to the demands of the affected people and their needs of capabilities to criticize their socio-political surroundings. One key lies in the identification of the needed capabilities on a formal, rather than substantial level (Celikates 2009: 170).

Because this is a crucial point and there might be disputes when it comes to the right translation, I will cite this passage directly and then paraphrase it afterwards:

"Natürlich muss das Kriterium für die Zuschreibung von Vermögen beziehungsweise Fähigkeiten, sollen diese nicht auf metaphysische Weise hypostasiert werden, auch hier letztlich das tatsächliche Verhalten der Akteure sein: Wir sind zu einer solchen Zuschreibung nur (aber auch: schon) dann berechtigt, wenn ihr Verhalten nur so (oder: so am besten) verstanden und erklärt werden kann."

So in this paragraph Celikates clarifies under which circumstances which deliberative capabilities should be assumed to be necessary to criticize a social problem. The criteria he proposes can be captured like this: Whatever capability necessarily needs to be assumed in order to make the best sense out of the actual behavior of the respective actors and give the best understanding as well as explication of it, is to be assumed.

To recapture this brand of immanent critique, I briefly want to answer the two questions: What is immanent in this approach and in what sense is it critical? The sense in which it is critical is twofold in my understanding: It is as well askant towards the interpretations of the actors as well as it is leery towards the socio-political context in which these utterances take place. So each of both variables, the self-interpretations and the social and political context, are in this sense open for social criticism.

## Applying an Immanent Approach

Methodological egalitarianism, contradictions and tensions: How can we apply these buzzwords to an empirical phenomenon of (right-wing) populism? In this last part of my thesis I want to show the direction in which I think an immanent critique of populism has to go. Regardless if we focus more on the inner tensions of underdeveloped or misfigured normative standards within a specific ideology, or if we want to understand which social, economic, political or cultural patterns and material conditions enhance or hinder, enable or flaw the interpretations of the social or political reality – ideology –: the very first step needs to be the identification of the self-understandings and interpretations of the social actors, the political situation at stake. So what is the political situation at stake here? There are many possible layers and levels of possible investigation on such a broad political and sociological term as *populism*: Governments, parties not part of governments, single politicians, their voters, non voters, people on marches connected to populist governments – all these actors are possible choices of interviewees. In my thesis, I want to conduct the helplessly naive approach to develop a criticism of populism which is, in theory, suited to convince persons actually voting for populist parties or holding sympathies with them. This is why I take this level as an anchor of investigating populism.

### *A First Level Interpretation*

What is too huge of a task for this thesis was done in an illuminating way by Arlie Russel Hochschild – for the US-American case of (right-wing populism). Driven by the aim of bridging once the growing split between liberals and republicans and their supporters in US-America, she wanted to understand the political other – for her as a democrat, that is supporters of the Trump-administration (Hochschild 2016: ix). For her book "Strangers in Their Own Land", the American sociologist targeted sixty persons in total, 50% men and 50% women, all *white* from Lake Charles in Louisiana, a Tea Party stronghold. These people, who at the time were between 40 and 85 years old and have a middle class, lower middle class or working class background, all hold strong sympathies with the rather new US-American government.<sup>2</sup> "Targeting persons" in her approach means: Spending five years with them, as individuals or in groups, joining their meetings in churches, social come together or also marches. *Exploratory, hypothesis generating participant observation* are the academic terms to capture this approach (Hochschild 2016: 247f.). From all the interviews and experiences Hochschild made, she constructed a narrative, the "Deep Story" (Hochschild 2016: 135). As she writes, "the *Deep Story* itself removes judgment, insofar as it is a description of

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<sup>2</sup>Sticking to the idea of populism as a thin ideology, I take the US-American Tea Party as a social movement and a party to be populist, as it shows all necessary conditions: Assuming a fundamental split in the real people and elites, while politics should be an expression of the will of the real people. What is more, the modern Tea Party shows a clear anti-establishment rhetoric. See for a discussion of the Tea Parties' populism in more general: Walter Russell Mead 2011: The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism.

how things feel, the subjective prism through which people see the world" (Hochschild 2016: 135). And the reality feels like this:

"You are situated in the middle of this line, along with others who are also white, older, Christian, and predominantly male, some with college degrees, some not. Just over the brow of the hill is the American Dream, the goal of everyone waiting in line. Many in the back of the line are people of color—poor, young and old, mainly without college degrees. It's scary to look back; there are so many behind you, and in principle you wish them well. Still, you've waited a long time, worked hard, and the line is barely moving. You deserve to move forward a little faster. (...) The source of the American Dream is on the other side of the hill, hidden. Has the economy come to a strange standstill? Is my company doing okay? Will I get a raise this year? Are there good jobs for us all? Or just a few? Will we be waiting in line forever? It's so hard to see over the brow of the hill. (...) Look! You see people cutting in line ahead of you! You're following the rules. They aren't. As they cut in, it feels like you are being moved back. How can they just do that? Some are black. Through affirmative action plans, pushed by the federal government, they are being given preference for places in colleges and universities, jobs, welfare payments, and free lunches, and they hold a certain secret place in people's minds, as we see below. Women, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers - where will it end? Your money is running through a liberal sympathy sieve you don't control or agree with. (...) 'Crazy redneck.' 'White trash.' 'Ignorant Southern Bible-thumper.' You realize that's you they're talking about. You hear these terms on the radio, on television, read them on blogs. The gall. You're offended. You're angry. And you really hate the endless parade of complainers encouraged by a 1960s culture that seems to have settled over the land. (...) You are a stranger in your own land. You do not recognize yourself in how others see you. It is a struggle to feel seen and honored. And to feel honored you have to feel—and feel seen as—moving forward. But through no fault of your own, and in ways that are hidden, you are slipping backward."

(Hochschild 2016: 137ff.)

### *A Second Order Interpretation*

Now, in a second step I want to try to adapt a broader perspective, inspired by an immanent criticism of Celikates, and ask which barriers to critical engagement and catalysis for flawed ideologies could be at work here. Even though this story here does not state that it is really the case that there is this waiting in line and this line cutters, this emotionally felt-as-if-story sets the grounds for pushing forward certain policies: which are, in this case, anti-migrant, anti-tax and anti-establishment driven. So, albeit not in every case, the feels-as-if-story is directly translated into statements – which in turn can be right or wrong and do not remove judgment. This is to say that these subjective descriptions of how things feel can be put in a political perspective. In this case, luckily, some statements themselves indicate such hindrances.

"It is hard to see over the brow of the hill." I think there are epistemic hurdles which fancy the picture of women, migrants and refugees being in the problem and the actual crisis in the social situation of the waiting line, because nobody actually can see what is behind the hill. This symbolism in the deep story can be translated into: Nobody can see how the economy is working. So

the magical American Dream is hidden, maybe it does not work anymore, maybe it is absent. Another epistemic problem seems to arise when it is said that People of Color are skipping the line: This symbol can be a reference to affirmative action programs and welfare spendings. Besides these epistemic misconceptions, a less easy to determine pattern seems to be at work here: Throughout the lines the feeling of insecurity, of instability, of precarization is present. I think it is due to these emotionally shaky grounds of one own standing in the standing in line, that the attention is directed towards people who are to blame. Interestingly, when standing in this line and at the spot we are located through the lenses of these white middle or working class people, we cannot see who is at the very top of the line: So the lucky ones who happen to be the first ones, the wealthy white people, are unseen by the ones surrounding us. This holds interesting similarities with the actual invisibility of the top percentages of wealthy people.

An interesting parallel can be drawn to Germany: Every few years (depending on the delayed submission by the government) the Federal German government should publish a report on poverty and wealth. Periodically, there are huge criticisms and rumors concerning the displayed content: the objections, which are pushed forward by media and different Parties typically imply, that this is more a report on poverty – and the poor ones – than on wealth – and the wealthiest persons. Partly, this is connected to the problem of gaining knowledge about wealth: Since 1997, the property tax, albeit not legally abolished, is not longer raised. With that, an important tool to gain knowledge about actual wealth despite income, is not longer in power. At the very same time, the persons in Germany who are receiving state-funded financial support have to report their savings, properties and heritages meticulously. Therefore, there is a lot knowledge about the lower middle and working (or, more contemporary: not working) class, and huge blind spots in statistics on prosperous persons. This can also be translated to: Also in Germany, it is unclear, who is standing at the very top of the waiting line.<sup>3</sup>

The application of Celikates' version of immanent criticism on populist phenomena, supporters of the Tea-Party in the US, hints to a lack of knowledge about the functioning of economy. Another pattern seems to be the hackneyed sounding fact, that only the ones "standing next to oneself in the waiting line", less symbolically spoken, the ones having a more similar socio-economic status within a society are visible for oneself, their upgrades when it comes to their location in the waiting line, or well-being or political chances, you name it, then, seem to have an absolute character, while the whole societal context remains invisible. The mere lack of knowledge about the current state of the US-American economy, the mechanisms that create to the need of standing in line, then, can turn into ignorance. But economic precarization alone leaves open the crucial question of why people, then turn right, politically speaking, and not left.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>See for the report itself: <https://bit.ly/2W5vaIJ>, [accessed 10 January 2019]. See for criticisms: <https://bit.ly/2SZKioP>.

<sup>4</sup>See for an autobiographically inspired answer of this question in the French case: Didier Eribon 2013: *Returning to Reims*.

*Restrictions of this Critique*

Another pattern which cannot be grasped through the lenses a Celikatesean approach of immanent criticism, is the felt loss of privilege. Even if it remains a blind spot from this angle, I want to shortly elaborate on this crucial dimension. From the Deep Story of the Waiting in Line, it can be concluded that it is not a mere economic precarization that creates a populist ideology: "And you really hate the endless parade of complainers encouraged by a 1960s culture that seems to have settled over the land." Or, in another passage Hochschild herself writes:

"Meanwhile, if men like Bill were being squeezed by automation, outsourcing, and the rising power of multinationals, they were also being squeezed by greater competition from other groups for an ever-scarcer supply of cultural honor."

(Hochschild 2016: 143)

In this passage, Hochschild implicitly claims that cultural honor and I would add: social recognition is something which gets less the more it is distributed or the more people are being part of the distribution process. I think it is worthwhile to overthink this view on social recognition, which is marked by the economic view of competition. That discriminatory social behavior and policies is not only harmful to those subjected to discrimination but also the ones discriminating is argued in an empirically rich plea for gender equality and feminism by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie in *We Should All Be Feminists* (2014).

Furthermore, such an argumentation seems to entail that we already live in a world, or, to be more precise: that the US is a feminist, gender inclusive and anti-discriminatory state. Obviously, this is not the case, also it has not been the case before Trump. So, the question arises how the subjective impression of being overtaken evolves. A, however sketchy, answer is given by Laurie Penny in her *Unspeakable Things* (2014). Here, she offers the picture of the unquestioned promise given to white, Christian, heterosexual persons that they will deserve better, have a better life as well as their parents (link generational issue also in Pippa Norris 2016) as so called minorities, is not longer uncontested. And this contestation, started in the "1960's culture", now becomes visible and sensible.

**Conclusion**

The starting and ending point of this paper is driven by the political Zeitgeist. On a personal level, I was puzzled by the question of how I, both as a philosopher with academic interests and political activist with the need for action guiding statements want to relate to that. The course of this paper took the same choreography as these two driving forces: The first part recaptured normative evaluations. Opposed to liberalism, to democracy in rather idealistic forms, populism was criticized for its lack of representation of the opposition, of its denial of plurality respectively the identities and interests of a political

people. Already beginning with Urbinatis approach to populism as a permanent tendency and gradual understanding of what is populist, the mode of criticism shifted from external criticisms to immanent critiques. After a methodological intermezzo in the second part, the third part indicated a direction to go for an immanent critic of populism: Which conditions favor, if not produce in once, populist ideologies? Sticking to the image of waiting in line, a major producer or at least boost for right-wing populist ideologies seems to be the myth of an American Dream: People cannot see above the hill into the neoliberal capitalism at work, the US-American economy and the process which leads to the need of people standing in line in the first place stays a mystery. These epistemic conditions are in this image at the same time material conditions: The place where people are located in the waiting line is a metaphor for their socio-economic status. All this is not to say that if, again sticking to the image of the Deep Story, there was no waiting line, no hill, no need for affirmative actions making it seem for people to skip the line, wide spread knowledge about the persons standing on top of the line, that there would be no racism or sexism. Against the assumption of persons involved in the social world to be judged as judgmental dopes, as Celikates put it, maybe taking them seriously also means to take their racism seriously and not as a mere output of their deprived socio economic status.

Now, how should left wing politicians, citizens and activists respond to right-wing populism? Many on the left spectrum, be it during the election campaign in Germany with the SPD-politician Martin Schulz (left wing in the broadest sense possible), Bernie Sanders campaign in the USA, have been showing sympathies with the idea of left-wing populism. The reminder of the paper is not the right place to discuss the possibility and desire ability of left-wing populism in detail. But what can be added to the discussion from this paper can be summarized in three points: If it is crucial for populism to state and therefore, discursively create, a fundamental social divide and split into the elites and the people, as well as the real and the *fake* people, the question arises how the leftist political value of solidarity, understood as: Standing together, even though you cannot stand each other, could be realized. Based on the premise that left-wing politics has to focus on systemic and structural analysis of society and economy, the question arises how it at the same time could stick to the personalized split of society in we down here and them up there. Taking heterogeneity and multidimensionality both on an identity based and macro level seriously, the split of the elite vs. the people cannot be preserved. Still, it remains populism's success to overcome the normal mode of existence of the individualized, modern subject which is so much used to neoliberal competition.<sup>5</sup> Uniting different identities and social groups in one strong political movement is a task yet to be fulfilled, also for the political left.

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<sup>5</sup>See for the ability of fascism to create social ties between otherwise isolated and unconnected subjects in capitalism: T W Adorno 1952, Freudian theory and the pattern of fascist propaganda.

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## Crime Assessment in Cyprus during the Period 2003-2013 and Identification of the Main Causes

By Markianos Kokkinos\*

*This paper explores crime rates in Cyprus during the period 2003-2013 and identifies the main factors causing crime tendencies. Criminal statistics, based on official police recorded data, show divergent trends, as a result of the several events taking place concerning the economy, the political and social life, not only in Cyprus but worldwide. Apart from the legislation changes and the introduction of new laws, these events are especially the opening of the crossing points in the UN-patrolled buffer zone separating the Turkish-occupied northern part of Cyprus from the free areas of the Republic of Cyprus in 2003, the accession of Cyprus in the European Union in 2004 and the global economic crisis that appeared in 2009. Even though there are different tendencies for specific types of offences, in general recorded crime in Cyprus gradually increases reaching the peak in 2011. The patterns in crime reflected by the socio-economic factors are a warning of the change of Cyprus' small society and a challenge to policy makers in the mission of crime prevention.*

**Keywords:** Crime, Criminality, Cyprus, Factors, Trends.

### Introduction

Crime is a social problem that has long been a research concern for many scientists, including statisticians, who are trying through their work to find methods to prevent or reduce it. Due to the complex, sophisticated, technologically advanced and internationalised dimension crime is taking, the need for cooperation in order to combat crime, has already been identified in the past (Tsiamtsiouri and Panaretos 1999). The several events that take place worldwide concerning the economy, political and social life, activated a motion against the security order and particularly the European security order (Carr 1996, Sperling and Kirchner 1997, Heberton and Spencer 1999). As analysed by Aebi (2004), crime opportunities are strongly affected by numerous social and economic factors.

The various crime levels call for end results and practises, in order to promote and ensure the societies' security and safety and contribute to their sustainable development (UN 2005). Governmental authorities are greatly dependent on crime development, as a lot of pressure is put on imposing justice laws. Thus, the challenge to decision and policy makers in determining strategies and interventions is the ability to examine crime trends and understand the main factors causing crime.

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*Rationale*

Even though several governmental annual crime reports exist that present mainly data on crime trends and comparisons with previous years, it is rare to find reports with evaluated and justified results. It is essential for governmental and local authorities to have studies with recommendations and results to help them modify policies, interfere and fight crime (Blumstein 2002). As far as the case of Cyprus is concerned, apart from few individual studies, crime has not received enough scholarly attention and little is still known, since no official research has been carried out in depth. The lack of studies and sources of information on the one hand and the need for empirical data, end results and practises for preventing criminal acts on the other, have initiated this project work.

In fact, this project work presents, evaluates, explains and justifies crime trends in Cyprus during the period 2003 and 2013, by identifying the main factors causing these tendencies. While official police data concerning the recorded offences are being demonstrated using trend lines and descriptive statistics, the various social, political and economic factors and events taking place in Cyprus affecting crime rates are identified and validated, in respect to the divergent trends observed in crime levels. New cultural and socioeconomic characteristics reflect the patterns and distribution of criminality (Hadjidemetriou 1995). The originality of this study is supported by the recognition of these main socio-economic factors interacting with crime in Cyprus.

Despite the shift towards the fight and prevention of criminal acts, data concerning crime is still unreliable and not as accurate as expected. Even harder is the comparison of crime data among countries; sometimes it is even considered impracticable (Killias and Wolfgang 2000). Misinterpretation or misuse of police statistics is also visible and may result from the analysis of crime data, as this is based on police reports which actually do not represent the reality in total and all crimes occurring in a society, but only the crimes reported to the police and those identified by control activities of the police itself (Boba 2005). Recent wrong crime forecasts doubt the potentials to interpret official crime statistics and correctly appreciate the factors impacting crime (Buonanno et al. 2014). In addition, crime data captured by police agencies is dynamic and not static, since information about crime incidents is constantly being updated depending on the investigation procedures and availability of information. Finally, a rival factor that should also be carefully considered in the statistical interpretation of crime is the point of time an offence is committed, as it is not always possible to know the exact date or time of a criminal act. Even in cases where police recorded statistics show a decrease in crime rates, the perception of locals could be opposing (Pfeiffer et al. 2005).

As the emphasis of this article is on studying and identifying patterns of crime in Cyprus and trying to explain whether these are caused by specific factors, it is essential prior to any analysis to present the policing situation and crime recording system in Cyprus.

*Law Enforcement and Policing in Cyprus*

Among the ambitions and tasks of Cyprus Police is the implementation of strategies for preventing crime as well as other protective and legislative measures, originated from the national legislation, EU directives, international treaties and police co-operations, in order to face the various types of crime, anti-social behaviours and phenomena (Cyprus Police n.d.).

However, as a result of the illegal Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 and the unlawful military occupation of the north part of the island, counting about 37% of the territory, Cyprus Police can exercise its power only in the remaining areas (63%) under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. Additionally, after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the European Union in 2004, Cyprus Police had to undergo further administrative changes as it additionally had to work for the security and safety of Europe in general and not only for Cyprus alone.

Based upon the provisions of the law, international agreements and the relevant conventions, no organized criminal groups can be identified in Cyprus. Indeed, no criminal activities meet all four mandatory criteria as well as the secondary criteria provided by the European Union in order to be classified as "Organized Crime"<sup>1</sup>.

Offences in Cyprus, based on the Criminal Code, are firstly classified into two categories: "serious" and "minor" depending on the importance of the offence and the level of penalty, according to the Law (CYSTAT 2014). Further classification is based on the grouping of offences into several categories as it appears in the Criminal Code. The standard counting units used are the offence/case as well as the number of offenders. In cases where an offender is involved in more than one offence only the most serious case is recorded/counted.

Comparisons across countries are problematic as the offence definitions and justice systems vary. In addition, as argued by Santana et al. (2009), higher numbers of recorded crimes may also reflect the society's maturity and citizen's trust levels in reporting criminal behaviour and not only the actual crime levels. Even within a country, comparisons should be made with the assumption that the characteristics of the recording system remain fairly constant over time. However, changes in the definition of an offence and the inclusion of new offences are not rare, thus making comparison difficult. Cyprus' criminal justice system is not an exception and several changes did take place over the last years. The most important modification occurred in 2003, when a change in the recording practice of serious offences reported to the police resulted in a much higher number of cases recorded (CYSTAT 2014). Therefore, for consistency reasons, this study evaluates crime levels in Cyprus from 2003 and onwards, by carefully addressing any trend breaks.

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<sup>1</sup>The four characteristics that must be present, for any crime or criminal group to be classified as organised crime are: 1) Collaboration of more than two people; 2) For a prolonged or indefinite period of time (this criterion refers to the stability and (potential) durability of the group); 3) Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences; 4) Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power.

## **Literature Review**

One main concern for many policy makers, when evaluating a country's development, is the crime rate. In recent years, many practitioners and researchers try to appraise the impacts from a broader range of socio-economic factors. The phenomenon though is unexpectedly compound and multifaceted as the conclusions do not always concur, whereas in some cases conflicting findings or speculations have been reported. Moreover, the factors recognized in each study vary depending on the case under study, concluding that they have dissimilar impacts in different countries, whilst in some it is not possible to reach final conclusions as there is not enough evidence.

A large amount of the research concerning crime rates refer to the United States, as in the 1970's the levels of crime in the United States were much higher than elsewhere (Buonanno et al. 2011). Their analysis though pointed out that since then, the levels of crime in Europe increased to even higher levels. In their study, it was recognized that the primary factors impacting crime trends were the rates and figures on demography, immigration, unemployment, abortion, and incarceration.

As identified by many studies age, gender, and race are determinants of a potential offender's profile (South and Messner 2000, Blumstein and Wallman 2006, Hartnagel 2009). The rise or decline of the rates of several types of crime is highly related to demographic characteristics (Steffensmeier et al. 1989). In particular, it is pointed out that ageing populations are less likely to be involved in criminal acts. As explained by Steffensmeier and Harer (1991), the fluctuation of crime in the United States during the late 20th century is highly related to the changing age composition of the American and Canadian populations. As race is concerned, Sampson and Lauritsen (1997) have related homicides in the United States with race and the changes in racial composition. An examination of the relationship between socio-economic misfortunes and crime, by focusing on violent crime by African Americans, suggested that an analysis considering cultural factors will be beneficial in explaining crime trends (Latzner 2018). There is also an acknowledgement that the mechanisms underlying the development of offending may differ depending on ethnic and/or cultural backgrounds (Piquero et al. 2015, Jolliffe et al. 2016).

Apart from demographical changes, other factors and variables should be considered in evaluating crime (Fox and Piquero 2003). LaFree (1999) recognised that issues like economic stress, family and lifestyle changes, drugs, policing initiatives, incarceration, education and welfare affect the opportunities for crime. Fazel et al. (2015) have demonstrated that depression is positively related to delinquency while Jolliffe et al. (2018) concluded that depression and anxiety were outcomes of offending. An extensive amount of research pointed out the association between mental health problems and delinquency (Hein et al. 2017, McCormick et al. 2017). As mentioned by Joyce (2018), there is no single explanation of why people commit crime. Beyond the main psychological, biological and sociological explanations pointed out, elements of historical and political analysis should be considered.

Several other reports explore and focus their analysis on the interaction of economic factors with specific types of crime. It is believed that opportunities for organised crime may increase due to the economic crisis, whereas cyber crime is also expected to rise during the economic recession (ICPC 2010). An increase in unemployment could also have significant implications for increasing criminalisation. A small but statistically significant relationship was identified between unemployment rates and property crime (Donohue and Levitt 2001, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001). It is identified that crime is higher in areas with lower income people. As analysed by Merlo (2003), the inequality in wages is positively correlated to the crime rate.

Changes in policing with the implementation of new laws or strategies like "community policing" and the use of technology in crime mapping have been considered in exploring crime trends, but as discussed in Wilson (1985), it is rather difficult to measure and conclude that they have lowered crime. Even though a typical approach in fighting crime is to increase the number of police officers, the survey of Cameron (1988) could not support a relationship. On the other hand, Marvell and Moody (1996) concluded that higher numbers of police officers are linked with the drop of crime. Similarly opposing conclusions are reported for the concealed weapons laws and their appreciable impact on crime dimensions (Black and Nagin, 1998, Duggan 2001, Ayres and Donohue 2003).

The effectiveness of increased punishment to lower crime rates and in particular the use of the death penalty as a deterrent has been examined and discussed for decades, with opposing opinions and end results (Forst et al. 1978, Cameron 1994). According to Levitt (2004) the increased imprisonment to reduce crime is effective, as offenders are less able to commit further crimes while incarcerated, whereas future criminals are discouraged from committing one.

Evidence presented by some reports suggests the positive consequences of the legalisation of abortion in reducing crime rates, as the unwanted births and children who are at greater risk for crime are minimised (Dagg 1991, Stolley 1993).

As identified by the literature review, several causes are accountable for crime trends, depending on the occasion and period of time. This research study attempts to evaluate some of these factors as they appear for the case of Cyprus.

## **Research Methodology**

As identified in the literature review, the reliability of official crime statistics and the factors influencing criminal acts may be questioned (Buonanno et al. 2014), while the willingness of victims to report crime, the administrative procedures, the changes in the recording practises and definitions may also account for the unstable tendencies of crime rates (Cook and Khmivska 2005). However, a cautious approach through descriptive and inferential examination has been accepted by many researchers in this field (Aebi 2004, Dills et al. 2008, Goldberger and Rosenfeld 2009).

In an effort to get insights in the crime levels in Cyprus, the analysis of this

study is based on the official Cyprus Police statistics, while reviewing publications in key areas of criminology. The necessity of police statistics for analysing and comparing crime trends over time, as long as recording methodologies and legal definitions remain constant, is recognised (Aebi 2004). Police data used in this project refer to the years from 2003 onwards, since previously there was a significant change in the crime recording practices within Cyprus Police.

Even though crime rates are believed to be proportionate to the population rate, an in-depth analysis of crime data based on the per 100,000 population index rate is avoided in this report. Such analysis and comparison could be misleading for the case of Cyprus due to the large number of tourists visiting the island and their unspecified duration of stay, the several investors, workers and students, as well as the unknown number of illegal immigrants present. Cyprus, a country traditionally exporting migrants has been transformed into one that is hosting migrants (Trimikliniotis 1999). Likewise, the lack of any local estimates of the size of the dark figure of crime not reported to the police is an additional justification. Even though criminological and criminal justice research is a relatively new academic discipline in Cyprus, the findings on delinquency and victimization gathered from self-reported surveys suggest higher rates of delinquency than those based on official statistics (Kapardis 2013). In general, Cypriots do not report crimes and victimization to the authorities because they believe it would implicate them socially and personally (Hadjidemetriou 1995). Consistent are also the results of a victimization survey concluding that some victims in Cyprus did not report the crime to the police as they did not believe in the police's ability in clearing their case (Zalaf and Wood 2009). Therefore, since only the case of Cyprus is examined and no comparisons are made with other countries, the absolute crime figures are used instead of the rates of offences per 100,000 populations.

The best way of describing and summarising data relies on descriptive statistics (Hinton 2014). This is based on the distribution of the data and can indicate its main characteristics. The measures of central tendency, like the mean value, give a brief description and comparison of the available data. The dispersion measures, like the standard deviation (SD), provide a picture of the concentration of the observations in a data set (Agresti 2017). Along with the mean and standard deviation values, the maximum and minimum values as well as the coefficient of variation (CV) are also used in the analysis of this period under consideration, to objectively verify the findings and trends observed. Through the whole research work, quantitative data is analysed, interpreted and presented aided by graphs and charts in an effort to capture all the details and meaning of the data, while reliability and validity issues are strongly considered. The project's methodology is also based on a triangulation framework. Following the extensive literature review and investigation, crime data and information from other sources, such as Eurostat and the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (ESB), are also considered in an effort to establish the correctness of the findings.

Based on the literature review and previous studies, some of the composite factors affecting crime rates have been identified. These have been considered and carefully approached as they appear for the case of Cyprus, under the assumption

that other factors remain constant and no interactions or other effects are present. Similar to other studies, information on the demography, immigration, unemployment and incarceration were also used for determining crime development. Finally, the results are presented and discussed relating them to the reported descriptive statistics.

### Findings and Analysis


Considering that the population of Cyprus in 2013 was 858,000 (CYSTAT 2015) and only 7,089 cases of serious crime were reported, it can be suggested that criminality in Cyprus is kept at low levels. The majority of the criminal acts and behaviours concern mainly offences against property such as thefts and burglaries (Cyprus Police 2015). Indeed, according to ESB statistics (Aebi et al. 2014), while the mean number of offences per 100,000 inhabitants among 35 countries of Europe in 2011 was 4,513, the corresponding value in the case of Cyprus was only 1,003. Even though it is unsafe to fully rely on comparisons across countries, as the definitions of legal concepts differ and the recording and presenting methods vary, the difference in these values is big enough to conclude that on a comparative level the rate of crime in Cyprus can be described as low.

As seen in Figure 1, the total number of criminal offences recorded by the police in Cyprus between 2003 and 2013 (Mean=19,550, SD=1576), indicates a slow but steadily increasing trend, starting from 17,741 recorded cases in 2003 and reaching the maximum of 22,758 cases in 2011, followed by a sudden decrease to 17,893 cases in 2013. Also supported by Tavares and Thomas (2009) in a report of Eurostat, there seems to have been an increase in crime between 2002 and 2008 in Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Spain and Cyprus, opposing the downward general national trend in most countries in the EU after 2002. Additionally, according to ESB statistics (Aebi et al. 2014), while the rate of crime in 20 countries in Europe has decreased from 2007 to 2011, the rate in Cyprus is among those 13 countries that have increased. As accepted by Gruszczyńska and Heiskanen (2012), crime trends are different in various areas.

Observing separately the trends of serious and minor crime in Cyprus (Figure 1), it can be identified that the increasing trend in total crime results mainly from the upward trend in minor crime. This is explained by the fact that minor crime accounts for approximately 60% of the total crime. In particular minor crime (Mean=11,920, SD=1218), increased from 10,460 cases in 2003 up to the maximum of 14,332 cases in 2011, followed by a sudden decrease to 10,804 cases in 2013. Serious crime, which is kept at a lower level (Mean=7629) seems to be more stable, with less noticeable fluctuations along the same period (SD=486). This is also verified by the coefficient of variation (CV), which for serious crime it is estimated to be 6.4%, much lower than that of minor crime with 10.2%. The peak was again recorded in 2011 with 8426 cases. According to this result, it can be stated that the year 2011 was the one with the highest criminality rate in Cyprus. Evidence of this increase is as well the fact that the prison population (at 1 September) doubled from 355 in 2003 to 694 in 2012

(Eurostat 2014), consistent with the argument that a higher criminality rate leads to a higher rate of imprisonment (Mauer 2003).

**Figure 1. Police Recorded Offences for the Period 2003-2013**



As this study tries to evaluate and identify the possible factors which are believed to play an important role for the fluctuation in various types of crime, the several socio-political and economical changes which have occurred in Cyprus during the last decade are examined in the following subsections.

#### *Opening of the Crossing Points*


First, in chronological order, is the opening on 23 April 2003 of the crossing points in the UN-patrolled buffer zone separating the Turkish-occupied northern part of Cyprus from the free areas of the Republic of Cyprus, known as the "green line" and the potential movement of people throughout the whole island. Even though all Cypriots belong to the European Union family, its laws as well the laws of the Republic of Cyprus cannot be implemented in the occupied northern areas of Cyprus, as this part is only recognised by Turkey. That is why both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot victimisers and serious crime offenders such as murderers and rapists make full use and benefit from this situation by finding a place to hide in the occupied northern part of the island, thus escaping from justice. The increasing figures in the police statistics are considered to be related with this fact.

Moreover, various cases and media articles also support this. For instance, the persons arrested in the occupied northern areas for the triple murder on a highway in the free areas of the Republic of Cyprus on January 15, 2005, were not sent to custody but released and let free in both Turkey and the northern occupied areas of Cyprus (Cyprus Mail 2018). Referring to the five Iraqis who in 2008 were badly injured by a landmine while attempting to cross the "green line", BBC News

(2008) revealed: "The five, including a child, were in a group thought to have been smuggled to the island to claim political asylum".

As a result of the opening of the "green line" the smuggling of drugs and illegal substances from the occupied northern areas to the free areas of the Republic of Cyprus also became easier. Likewise, the number of reported cases related to drug offences (Mean=768, SD=191) increased from 475 cases in 2003 to 1001 cases in 2013, with the peak being recorded in 2012 with 1032 cases (Figure 2). Despite the strict and hard punishments for drug related offences including those of importation and sale, the quantity of drug substances seized by officials such as cannabis, cocaine and heroin keep increasing.


**Figure 2.** Police Recorded Drug Offences for the Period 2003-2013



### *Global Economic Crisis*


As of 1990, Cyprus has experienced large scale immigration mainly due to the increment of labour opportunities (Gregoriou et al. 2010). Despite the benefits gained from migrant workers and the increasing trend of moving across within international borders, the impact of migration on safety and crime has been under serious concern. Specifically, the number of illegal immigrants arriving from the occupied northern area is a phenomenon that troubles the country's society in general. The rates, though, as displayed in Figure 3 tend to decrease, especially from 2009 onwards, indicating a drop in the motivation of foreigners to immigrate to Cyprus for employment. The big change in figures before and after 2009, resulted in SD value (1,157) higher than the mean value (1,012). The overall drop in the trend line could be attributed to the global economic crisis that appeared in 2009, resulting in a rapid increase of the unemployment figures from 21,000 in 2009 to 69,000 by the end of 2013 and hence fewer opportunities for work (CYSTAT 2016).

**Figure 3.** Number of Illegal Immigrants from the Northern Occupied Area Applying for Asylum for the Period 2003-2013



The global economic crisis with the above mentioned consequences on migration and unemployment, as appeared in 2009, could also be among the main causes for the fluctuation in several types of crime (Figure 4). For this, the absolute values and trend lines of the most common serious offences are examined. Specifically, the crimes of burglaries and housebreakings, thefts of items with a value of more than € 1000 and forgeries are considered.

**Figure 4.** Tendency for the Most Frequent Serious Offences for the Period 2003-2013




Concerning the most frequent serious offences in Cyprus, which are burglaries and housebreakings (Mean=2,941, SD=312), as well as thefts of items with a

value of more than €1,000 (Mean=1450, SD=206), these incidents peaked after 2009 reaching the maximum in 2011 with 3,379 and 1,687 cases respectively. In both cases, these recorded values in 2011 are approximately 15% higher than their mean values. Differently, for forgeries (Mean=904, SD=278) there is a gradual fall from 1,308 cases in 2004 to 374 in 2013. Comparing the trend lines and dispersion among the three above mentioned serious offences, it is found that the highest variability is in forgeries with a CV of 30.8%, compared to 14.2% for thefts and 10.6% for burglaries and housebreakings.

As for other equally important, but less frequently committed serious crimes, like robberies, an upward shift is also reported, from 69 cases in 2003 to 149 in 2013, recording an increase of 116% (Cyprus Police 2015). For homicides, the variation in the pattern throughout the years is high and unstable, ranging from 7 to 19 murders per year.

**Figure 5.** Tendency for the Most Frequent Minor Offences for the Period 2003-2013



Concerning minor crime though (Figure 5) and the most frequently committed offences, those against property like theft (value up to €1,000) and offences against public in general like "common nuisance, idle and disorderly persons", no interaction has been identified with the factor of the global economic crisis, even though there is a steady decrease. Specifically, for thefts (value up to €1,000), the maximum was recorded in 2004 with 3102 cases, followed by a gradual decrease reaching the minimum in 2013 with 1035 cases. For the overall period, the mean number of thefts is calculated to be 2135 with a SD of 623 and a CV of 29.2%. As for "common nuisance, idle and disorderly persons", the pattern is unstable. The evolution recorded in the period 2006-2008 was followed by a temporary drop to 2112 cases in 2009, increased again to 2782 cases in 2012 and declined again to 2106 cases in 2013. These frequent fluctuations resulted in a very high CV of

67.1% (Mean=1232, SD=826). On the other hand, assaults causing actual bodily harm have remained virtually unchanged the years before 2009 with no important variations, followed by a steady decrease to 572 cases in 2013. As a result, the CV for assaults is estimated to be 15.5%, which is much lower than that of thefts (value up to €1,000) and "common nuisance, idle and disorderly persons".

As also identified in the ESB (Aebi et al. 2014), a trend in recorded crime is not the same among the several types of offences. Despite the failure of relating the trends of all types of minor crime to the economic crisis in Cyprus, the detailed examination pointed out another factor, namely the "Introduction of new laws" as described below.


#### *Introduction of New Laws*

As also suggested by Clark (2013) in a Eurostat report, the change in the frequency of committed offences could be affected by new policing strategies or changes in the methodology. Similarly, in Cyprus, a main reason of the increase in minor crime over the last decade seems to be the induction of new offences based on the initiation of recent laws, together with the organised campaigns and intensive efforts by the police for implementing these laws. Specifically, as seen in Figure 5, the amendment of the Law for smoking in 2010, for preventing smoking in public places (restaurants, clubs etc.) has more than doubled the recorded cases from 455 in 2009 to 1027 in 2010. Similar is the case with the introduction of the Law for "using instruments that enhance the sound without authorization or in breach of permit conditions", with 1689 cases being reported in 2011, 2,087 cases in 2012 and 1,676 cases in 2013.

#### *Accession of Cyprus in the European Union*

Cyprus suffered massive population shifts following the accession in EU in 2004 and the movement of EU residents across EU countries, together with the phenomenon of immigration (legal or not). This has contributed not only to the reclassification of the population of the island but also of crime as well. Consistent with the survey analysis in Switzerland (Eisner and Killias 2004), the change in the ethnic composition of offenders is causing considerable shifts.

Based on the cases recorded and detected by the police, as seen in Figure 6, it is obvious that the involvement of non-Cypriot citizens in total crime is constantly rising.

**Figure 6.** *Involvement of Cypriot and non-Cypriot Citizens in Total Crime for the Period 2003-2013*

In 2003, non-Cypriots counted for 14% of the total detected cases reaching 27% in 2013. The maximum proportion (31%) was recorded in 2010. Moreover, in 2010, the maximum percentage of aliens among the offenders in the EU countries was recorded in Cyprus (Aebi et al. 2014). At the same time the proportion of Cypriot citizens continued to decrease from 83% in 2003 to 66% in 2013. The proportion of cases in which both Cypriots and non-Cypriots were involved ranges at lower levels, from 3% to 9%. Additionally, due to the free movement across EU countries, few itinerant criminal groups claiming to be tourists were discovered while committing crimes against property like thefts (Kokkinos and Kapardis 2015). As also discussed by Brunt et al. (2000), in some cases the purpose of travelling is unrelated with holidays.

## Conclusions

The phenomenon of crime is characterised by perplexity and complexity and is thus difficult to measure due to its secretive nature and the long lasting procedures needed for reporting and investigating crime and bringing an offender before the criminal courts. Recorded crime in Cyprus kept increasing until reaching the peak in 2011, with rising drug and property offences as well as several 'minor' offences. Even though organized crime cannot yet be identified in Cyprus, there is evidence for a link with organised groups outside the country. This, together with the demographic changes of the island's population, could be considered as a warning for a change of Cyprus' small, closed and traditional society to a bigger and more multicultural one. The small size of Cyprus, though, was a challenge for this study, as it is identified that for analyzing such small populations extra caution should be given, since they are vulnerable to minor

changes (Aebi and Linde 2010). Still, the methodology used and the overall agreement between the data presented in this study with the data from the various other sources have ensured the quality and reliability of this research work.

Considering that crime nowadays emerges in more complicated and advanced forms, the absence of specialised studies in the area of crime for the case of Cyprus, together with the absence of any local estimates of the size of the dark figure of crime in general is a weakness in the mission of crime prevention. Hence, there is an urgent request for more research work in this field in order to prevent and reduce crime. A key challenge for policy makers is the effective investigation and measure of crime trends and evaluation of the major driving factors.

Apart from the global economic crisis in 2009 and the negative impacts on the country's economic status, some other political and social changes have been identified and described in this report as the main causes of the trends in crime in Cyprus; namely the opening of the "green line" in 2003, the accession of Cyprus into the EU in 2004 and the initiation of new laws. These events were included and approached without implying that these are the only ones that affected crime trends. The limitations under which the phenomenon was studied were well acknowledged and reported prior to the findings.

The empirical work of this study is believed to initialise more investigations and research with further results, by considering other relevant determinants or extensions of the problem under study, such as the degree by which each identified factor drives and impacts patterns of crime. It is a great benefit for decision makers to recognise which factors cause crime and the level at which they are interacted, in order to know how to better alter policies and action plans for mitigating crime determinants and decreasing crime rates.

From the existing bibliography it is identified that countries' crime rates respond to different factors and also differently to each factor. Thus, the results of this project work cannot wholly be applied to other countries, while also some of the identified factors and events took place only in Cyprus. It is also pointed out that these factors recognised were evolved from the analysis only of the period under examination, namely 2003-2013. Other aspects and potential causes that are linked to delinquent behaviours should be considered to explain the reasoning criminal. According to Scott (2014), the assumption that rewards and punishments influence our choices of behaviour underlies economic, sociological, psychological, and legal thinking about human action.

As most of the researches and reports in Cyprus have so far been restricted on presenting only crime trends, this study, which identified causes and factors, is an innovating report for the country's police and criminal justice system. The findings of this article are believed to provide extra information in understanding crime levels, predicting crime rates and supporting policing practises, since from now resources and coordinated efforts against crime can better be allocated and aimed at. Moreover, it is believed that they further add to results and help to answer questions in the criminology area, not only for the case of Cyprus, but worldwide, as crime has no boundaries and cannot be restricted within one area only.

Regardless of the increasing crime trend observed in the period under examination, it is pointed out that Cyprus' criminality rate is among the lowest in

EU, indicating that Cyprus is still a safe place to live in. Moreover, the drop of crime figures in 2012 and 2013 is promising for the future.

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