

Paradiplomacy Roles in Border Diplomacy. Case Study: Camar Bulan, Temajok, West Kalimantan, Indonesia

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The paradiplomacy or the subnational actors who hold diplomatic practices has important role in diplomacy, including border diplomacy. Not only has it succeeded in influencing relations between countries, but they have also been a driver of development in the border area which most of them are often underdeveloped. In the Indonesia-Malaysia border region in West Kalimantan, especially the Camar Bulan hamlet, the role of paradiplomacy is also quite significant. This area is an underdeveloped area with minimal access to roads, communications, and electricity. Unfortunately, this area has some border conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia in Camar Bulan enclave. Through an in-depth interview method and documentation study, the research found that the subnational actors that are the local official of Regional Border Management Agency and the Paloh district officer were able to play a unique role in managing borders while attracting the attention of the central government to accelerate development in the region. It was unique because they were not always copying central government policy in maintaining territory sovereignty. The lack of information and coordination on national borders encourages subnational actors to choose their own way to solve the problem of national borders.

Keywords: Border Diplomacy, Paradiplomacy, Subnational Actor.

Introduction

Nowadays, the subnational actors have a significant role. They are believed to be able to manage the international cooperation with subnational actors from other countries. The idea of communication openness and easiness has given a significant support to them to contribute to the relationship between countries. The recognition of their roles is shown by giving them a privilege to do agreement and to manage a number of cooperation between countries, although the central government does not send delegation to the agreement and cooperation. However, most of the agreements and policies that have been arranged become part of the jurisdiction areas of the subnational governments, and at the same time, reveal a degree of their autonomy in respect to the central government¹.

The roles of subnational actors in the relationship between countries are at first done by the federation countries. However, nowadays, it is also increasingly

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¹Roberto Zepeda Martínez. 2018. "The Paradiplomacy of Subnational Governments In North America". *Ánfora*, 25(44), 17-41. Universidad Autónoma de Manizales. ISSN 0121-6538

relevant in many unitary but decentralized countries and the developing countries², including Indonesia. They also have various scopes of cooperation, that is, the cooperation in the issue of social, economy, culture, environment, technology, and even politic. In the politic area, the cooperation between subnational actors are usually done by making a shared rule that is forced in a number of border areas that has a high residents mobility. The cooperation between the subnational actors are identified to follow the cooperation patterns done by the central government, that is by adopting the policies and constructing the derivative rules that are supportive to the central government's rule.

In Indonesia, the role of paradiplomacy is based on the regulation number 24 year 2004 about International Agreement and regulation number 32 year 2004 where the central government gives authority to the Local Government, either the province or the district/city to manage a relationship and cooperation with foreign party. This regulation motivates a number of local governments to have cooperation with other local government of other country. The form of subnational actors in cooperation with foreign cooperation is dominated by sister city cooperation. Through sister city. A number of cities in Indonesia administered cooperation with big portions of cooperation in the sector of economy, social, and culture. In a research by Mukti, sister city cooperation administered with Flanders in Belgium and Catalonia in Spain, Gyeongsanbuk-Do in South Korea, and Shaanxi in China are posed in low politics such as the cooperation in economy and commerce, investment, technology, environment, and culture³. Meanwhile, the cooperation in the area of high politics is still the central government's part.

However, there are interesting on the practice of diplomacy done by the subnational actors. The diplomacy practices on high politics issue done by the subnational actors in border area. The border area condition that tends to be far from the central government motivates the subnational actors to come to solve a number of problems that happens in the sectors economy, social, and politics. The problems in the border area are in not only illegal trades or social issue, but also the problem of territorial claims. Since 1983, Indonesian government and Malaysia have formed cooperation in the regional level to handle the social and economy problems that is Malindo socio-economy Cooperation Work Group (then usually called as KK Seosek Malindo). In this forum, the two countries talk about the problems of social and economy that occur in border area and at the same time about the plans of cooperation to solve those problems. Unfortunately, their performances are closed and it is difficult to track the direct impact of the cooperation to the nations' border area issues. Practically, it is the roles of local officer that present in the problem solving in the border area.

This article is going to study about the roles of subnational actors in managing the relationship between countries in the border area of Indonesia, especially in the

²Noe Cornago. 2000. "Exploring The Global Dimensions Of Paradiplomacy Functional And Normative Dynamics In The Global Spreading Of Subnational Involvement In International Affairs" Workshop on Constituent Units in International Affairs, Hanover, Germany, October, 2000.

³Takdir Ali Mukti. 2015. "Paradiplomacy: The Rise of Local Actor in International for a The Politics". *Jurnal Magister Ilmu Politik*. Universitas Hasanuddin Volume 1, Number 1, January 2015

areas of Camar Bulan Hamlet, Temajok Village, Paloh District, and West Kalimantan Province of Indonesia. This area is chosen because it is located on the end of the borderline between Indonesia- Malaysia and it still has border area conflict, that is, Camar Bulan Enclave that has 1499 hectares width. The isolation of the area and the still-existing conflict in the border area make the subnational actors have a crucial role in the relationship between countries.

Literature Review

Studies about the role of subnational actors in the relationship between countries increase in line with the escalation of their activities in constructing the relations between countries. Fostered by new technologies and transnational connectivity, significantly affected local economies, also eroding subnational autonomy, particularly in decentralized and federal states. Resolved to respond to this adverse situation, local and regional governments from all over the world soon realized the importance of becoming more active in the global realm, particularly in those aspects of particular relevance for the political communities they represent. In other words, subnational governments rapidly understood that they had to respond to different global economic, environmental, technological, cultural, and security pressures, which go far beyond the conventional imaginary in which the sharp differentiation between domestic and foreign domains was historically founded⁴.

The activities of subnational actors in the relationship between countries are also called paradiplomacy. Originally, paradiplomacy can be defined as subnational governmental involvement in international relations, through the establishment of formal and informal permanent or *ad hoc* contacts, with foreign public or private entities, with the aim to promote socioeconomic or political issues, as well as any other foreign dimension of their own constitutional competences. Although quite contested, the concept of paradiplomacy does not preclude the existence of other forms of subnational participation in foreign policy process, more directly subordinated to central governments priorities and objectives, nor the increasing role of subnational governments in multilayered structures for global or regional governance⁵. They have a vast area of cooperation, not only in foreign trade and investment, environmental issues, scientific and technological cooperation, transportation or critical infrastructures, but also in areas of social and political concern such as ethnic conflict, public health, education, cultural diversity, human security, human rights, and humanitarian relief or development aid.

A number of researches on paradiplomacy show the significance of their contribution on the social and economic activities between countries but they only have little contribution on political area. A research by Sergounin found that the development of a border area in Russian North West is good results of the inter-

⁴Lequesne, C., & Paquin, S. 2017. "Federalism, Paradiplomacy and Foreign Policy: A Case of Mutual Neglect." *International Negotiation*, 22(2): 183-204.

⁵Noe Cornago. *Op. Cit.* p. 5.

regional cooperation, between the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions (Russian Federation) and the Komi and Karelia Republics (Finland)⁶. Kempe & Van Meurs research found the same thing that inter regional cooperation is also done by the governor in Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia by making a Cooperation Council with the aim of promoting socioeconomic and political transborder relations in 1996⁷. Furthermore, and in order to promote interregional co-operation, Sakhalin has signed agreements with Alaska and the Japanese Hokkaido prefecture⁸. It also happened in the border areas in North Sumatra and Aceh in Indonesia, Malaysia's northern states of Kedah, Perak, Penang, and Perlis, and Thailand's southern provinces of Satun, Songkhla, Yala, Narathiwath, and Pattani. The promoters of the idea were the three central governments involved, which decided in 1994 to set up this cross-border initiative following the recommendations of an Asian Development Bank report about the economic potential of the area⁹.

In political issue, paradiplomacy tends to develop in cooperation in border area. The adjacent regions of different countries usually have closeness in terms of history and culture, but they are far from the central government's policy reach. This situation makes them to cooperate in order to develop the regions neglected from the central government's attention and development. The cooperation is done by making regulations that make them easier to access other neighboring regions although they have different authority. Furthermore, this kind of cooperation is even claimed to be able to minimize conflict. "Aymaras without Borders Strategic Alliance" established by 50 municipalities in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru are believed by Bustamen and Canas¹⁰ to be able to become a media for the municipalities joined in it to minimize conflict with the investors and create adequate living and working conditions for the majority of the indigenous population, guaranteeing the continuation of human life in symbiosis with the natural environment.

Cooperation as it is managed by paradiplomacy in a geographically adjacent area but belong to different countries is also noted by Jackson as a new form of political strategy by the subnational actors in geopolitics¹¹. The article is also asserting the important role of subnational actors in making cooperation and managing political relation on the border area. Geography is not only a matter of physic but it is also related to the culture, history, and politics. Therefore, geography give a crucial factor in the management of inter states relationship, including the role of subnation actors who live in border area.

⁶A. Sergounin. 1999. "The Bright side of Russia's Regionalism", PONARS Memo Series, no. 59: <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/Sergounin59.html>. Accessed April 2019.

⁷Noe Cornago. *Op. Cit.*p.4.

⁸M.J. Bradsahaw. 1998. "Going global: The Political Economy of Oil and Gas Development Offshore of Sakhalin", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 12, no.1, p. 167

⁹A. Jordan & J. Khanna.1995 "Economic Interdependence and Challenges to the Nation-State: The Emergence of Natural Economic Territories in the Asia-Pacific". *International Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 48, p. 455.

¹⁰Gilberto Aranda & Sergio Salinas . 2017. Paradiplomacia Aymara: Empoderamiento En La Frontera [Aymara Paradiplomacy: Empowerment On The Border]. *Estudios Fronterizos*, 18(35), 90-106, DOI:10.21670/ref.2017.35.a05

¹¹Thomas Jackson. 2017."Paradiplomacy And Political Geography: The Geopolitics Of Substate Regional Diplomacy". *Geography Compass*. 2017;e12357.

Such cooperation between subnational actors related to geography becomes the early study of paradiplomacy by Duchacek. Duchacek defined international actions by non-central governments (NCGS) as ‘micro diplomacy,’ then established a difference between cross-border (neighbor) diplomacy, cross-regional diplomacy (without a common border), and global paradiplomacy (issues that concern the entire world)¹². On the other hand, Roberto Miranda states that paradiplomacy refers to international actions that are performed by sub-state actors within the framework of globalization; that is, under the framework of non-traditional or unconventional diplomacy: “With this type of diplomacy, the sub-state actor has sought to differentiate itself from government practices by central state organisms”¹³. Miranda’s statement becomes an important reference in the practice of diplomacy by paradiplomacy in border areas. The minimum presence of the state in the order area gives distance between policies and the needs of border area in the form of policies either physically or socially different from other areas. Besides the minimum presence of the state in the border area either in the form of developmental policies or the representative of the state in solving the problems related to border problems, the low coordination, and the minimum amount of communication about the policy in border area stimulate the local official to take the policy that is not always the same as the policy of central government.

Cornago¹⁴ argues that paradiplomacy is driven by two competing forces: (a) the mobilisation of substate governments and (b) attempts to place limits on their pursuit of international involvement by the state through legal and political means. He argues that the result is the “normalisation” of paradiplomacy which he defines as “a mode of institutional control that recognizes as valid—albeit reluctantly—an otherwise deviant practice, while the limits of that practice are immediately fixed and carefully monitored”. In other words, acceptance of some forms of paradiplomacy by states is a mechanism through which they limit its overall scope. This statement by Cornago straightens the emergence of image that the central government is not by all heart managing and solves the problems in border areas. The heave of local government in the interstate cooperation should be allowed to happen if it is supportive to the central government’s policy and should be limited if the policy and or attitude they take are considered to be not in line with the central government’s policy.

Methodology

This article is a research done in Camar Bulan Hamlet, Temajok village, Paloh District, West Kalimantan Province, Indonesia by using direct survey methods and in-depth interview methods with a number of respondents. They are

¹²Gilberto Aranda & Sergio Salinas. *Op. Cit.* p. 93.

¹³Gilberto Aranda & Sergio Salinas. *Op. Cit.* p. 93

¹⁴Noe, Cornago. 2018. “Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy”, Gordon Martel (ed) *Encyclopedia of Diplomacy* (Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley) doi: 10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0211.

local officials in Temajuk and Camar Bulan Hamlet. In-depth interview was also done with border military officer and officer in Badan Pengelolaan Perbatasan Daerah/Regional Border Management Agency. Some local residents as a practitioner of illegal farming in Camar Bulan enclave also become a target of in-depth interview in this interview. Besides, this research also discuss legal document owned by Indonesian government about the conflict of Indonesia-Malaysia border in Camar Bulan and a number of related articles with the issue of Indonesia-Malaysia border.

Findings/Results

Camar Bulan is a little hamlet in Temajok Village, Paloh District, Sambas Regency, West Kalimantan Province. Two other villages that become parts of Temajok are Dusun Maludin and Sempadan. These three villages are located in the North Western End of Kalimantan Island. Besides its location that is far away from the capital of the province Pontianak, that is 400 km, this region also has minimum public facility such as roadway, communications, and electricity. Because of the great distance and the minimum condition of the roadway, (the government had not opened roadway until 2014 and it is not finished yet in 2019), the residents are highly dependent on the main stuff they get from Malaysia. From Camar Bulan to the nearest village in Malaysia, Kampong Telok Melano it is only needed 10 minutes journey with motorcycle passing through rubber forest. From this village, the residents of Temajok get their daily needs such as rice grain, cooking oil, sugar, LPG, and so on. Besides having cheaper prices (a number of stuffs get subsidy from the government of Malaysia), the availability is the main matter. If they have to rely on the supply from the municipality or the province, it would surely take a very long time.

Most residents of Temajok are Malayan people who are not far different from the residents of Kampong Telok Melano in Malaysia, this area has a direct border with Malaysia. Most people in this area work as farmers and some of them work as anglers and carpenter and latex tappers. The average economic condition of these people is not sufficiently good and they have relatively low level of education. A new high school was established in mid 2000 in Temajok village. The condition of the economy was slightly increase when Camar Bulan become a new tourism destination in 2017. The beach is beautiful and there is a turtle sanctuary attracting domestic tourists and foreign tourists from Malaysia.

The two neighboring villages do not have any social problem, moreover when both societies that belong to different countries have close relations of kinship. The social relationship is even well maintained by holding social and religious activities together. Often they have football match between the two villages on some special occasions. Moreover, the wedding party that becomes a media of companionship between the residents of the two. Besides visiting each other by the people, the local officers of the two villages / municipality and even district meetings are also done regularly. The meetings were not only used to maintain the good relations, but also to solve problems that sometimes happened like illegal

smuggling or trades.

Unfortunately both countries still have the conflict of borderline (in 2011 they have reached a new MoU about the enclave of Camar Bulan but it had not been ratified by the Indonesia House of Representatives). The borderline conflict is known as Tanjung Datu, although Tanjung Datu region is located in different area that is on the northern end of Indonesia-Malaysia. This could happen because the map inherited by English and Dutch name the territory- that is now has become an independent region called Temajok- as Tanjung Datu. On the document named as Tractate London 1891 it is stated that the borderline between English and Dutch in West Kalimantan was based on a watershed that was taken from Sebatik Island and ended in Tanjung Datu region. The northern part of the watershed belongs to English' jurisdiction and the southern part of the region belong to Dutch's jurisdiction.

“the boundary-line shall follow the watershed of the rivers running to the south-west and west coasts, north of Tanjung Datu, and of those running to the west coast south of Tanjung Datoe, the south coast, and the east coast south of 4' 10" north latitude”¹⁵.

Referring to the Direktorat Topography Angkatan Darat, the proceeding of resolving the borderline of Tanjung Datu had been done in 1973 until 2000 resulted 20.311 pillars. However, it has not been completed thoroughly because it still leaving a number of points that are not agreed and they are named as Outstanding Boundary Problems (OBP). Indonesia had ever proposed the *outstanding boundary problems that are located in 5 places, that is Sebatik island, Sungai Sinapad, Sungai Semantipal, B2700-B3100 and C500-C600*, whereas in the western sectors (Kalimantan Barat-Serawak) are Batu Aum, Sungai Buan, Gunung Raya, D.400 point in Bengkayang regency and Camar Bulan. However, Malaysia has a different opinion related to the number of OBP. For Malaysia, Tanjung Datu is considered to be finished by Malaysia so it does not belong to OBP between Indonesia and Malaysia, however for Indonesia this borderline is not final (not ratified yet).

In the area of Tanjung Datu itself, Indonesia and Malaysia had made a demarcation process. There were three agreements by Indonesia and Malaysia that resulted in three memorandum of Understanding. The first MoU is the MoU administered in Kinabalu to agree on Tanjung Datu border on hook number A1-A98 in 1976. The second MoU was administered in the same year in Yogyakarta reached agreement that the border is the hooks number A156-A31. The third MoU was agreed to be done in Semarang in 1978 for hooks number A98-A156 (Enclave Camar Bulan is noted to be in hooks number A88-A156). Referring to Rizki and Merdekawati (2016) there are 221 tokens of borderline that spread from the end of Ujung Tanjung Datu up to Camar Bulan with various condition. Some tokens are in good condition while some other are not/deteriorated.

¹⁵Muhammad Rizki and Agustina Merdekawati, 2018. “The Significance of Boundary Construction at Land Border between Indonesia-Malaysia in Temajuk Village, Sambas Regency as Manifestations of Indonesia's Sovereignty” in The 1st International Conference on South East Asia Studies, 2016, KnE Social Sciences, p 405–423. DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i5.2346

Figure 1. Camar Bulan (Tanjung Datu A88-A156)



Source: Purwo Mursito. 2010. "Peran Arsip Dalam Mendukung Upaya Diplomasi Guna Penyelesaian Sengketa Perbatasan Camar Bulan Dan Tanjung Datu". *Jurnal Kearsipan*. VOL 7/ANRI/12/2012. p. 101.

However, Indonesia seek for permission to postpone the signing of the MoU because the survey team wished to make a follow up and deem the content of the agreement of borderline. In 2001, Indonesian surveyor team found that Malaysia's territory was indented toward Indonesia and it was profitable to Malaysia as much as 1440 hectares. The area mentioned was that which is bordered by hooks number A.88 – A.156 that is known as enclave Camar Bulan. The point of the borderline was in fact had been made in 1976 and was profoundly studied for 2 years by Indonesia and was agreed in the MoU of year 1976. The MoU is then brought into issue when watershed method is used to determine the borderline demarcation, they said that they did not find it, whereas when the surveyor team re-measure using straight-line withdrawal, the demarcation hook is found. This is the reason why Indonesia claimed that the MoU of borderline of 1976 is false and there has to be a review on the agreement in order that it could be cancellation due to a fundamental of circumstance reason that referred to article 62 verse 1 of VCLT 1969. The agreement was also incompatible with the map of Malaysia and the map of the Federated Malay State Survey published in 1935. The claim also contradicted the map of the mapping vessel Dutch Van Doorn in 1905 and 1906 as well as the Sambas Borneo map (N120E10908/40Greenwid)¹⁶. They also explained that the nature of the MoU in the borderline agreement is non-legally binding because there is no agreement from the state institution (People Representative Board/DPR) and the use of nomenclature of the MoU is deemed not to have a binding power in the legitimating of international agreement.

The agreement of borderline area (special for enclave Camar Bulan) was

¹⁶Selamat Ginting. 2011. "Sandirwara Dua Saudara". *Republika*. http://ftp.unpad.ac.id/koran/republika/2011-10-19/republika_2011-10-19_023.pdf Accessed April 2019.

administered again in 2011 by a team that consist of the Domestic Affair Ministry, Foreign Affair Ministry, Mabes TNI (the Great Headquarter of Indonesian Arm Force), and Geospatial Information Board. The meeting made a discussion about the problem of determining the territorial demarcation, in Tanjung Datu. Besides, they also hold a coordination meeting on the level of minister in the Ministry of Coordinator of Politic, Law, and Security led by Minister of Coordinator of Politics, Law, and Security on October 20th, 2011. This meeting specially talked about the problem that happen in Tanjung Datu. The conclusion that is taken from the meeting are: a. the determination of territory demarcation between Malaysia and Indonesia in Tanjung Datu, West Kalimantan, use watershade method, b. in accordance with the treaty of 1891 article 3, the process of demarcation is based on borderline determined using watershade. A joint survey was managed in 1976 and was repeated in 1978 with an identical result. c. the vision to change the MoU from international law aspect did not have an adequate legal basis remembering that: MoU of year 1978 is an agreement of survey result to implement the treaty of year 1891 article 3 and it has determine the demarcation line based on watershade, not the straight line. 2) The MoU is an agreement of the two parties that could not be cancelled by one side. 3) VCLT 1969 about International Agreement assert that borderline agreement that has been reached by two parties could not be cancelled.

However, adversely the result of the agreement is not well socialized until the lowest level of government. On the field, some hooks are damaged and covered by grass. The borderline condition is not well cared while the borderline area gets broader because of abrasion (Camar Bulan is located on a beach that decrease the land. The distance between the beach and border hook is only 700 meters. Even, the minimum information result in the emergence of Camar Bulan annexation issue by Malaysia after the agreement in 2011. The issue was firstly emerged by a member of People Representative Board, TB Hasanudin. This became a relatively hot issue between Indonesia and Malaysia at that time. He said that Malaysia had taken 1400 hectares of Indonesian territory in Camar Bulan and 80.000 m² in Tanjung Datu¹⁷. Even, the governor of West Kalimantan, Cornelis, at that time stated that 1440 hectares of Indonesian territory go into Serawak (Malaysia's territory) because the hooks moved in the limit point in A88-A156 Camar Bulan that belongs to Paloh municipality, Sambas regency. He admitted that he had got information that the National Board of Coordinator of Survey and Mapping (Bakosurtanal) had insert Camar Bulan to Malaysia's territory. Forcefully he asked that this is not signed because it harmed Indonesia very much, especially the administrative area of West Kalimantan¹⁸. The disorderliness made the relationship of the two countries unconvincing, although funnily enough the local residents in Temajok become confused because they never lost anything. Their space of dwelling did not change. What came next precisely a worry if there was any annexation then where would they stay? Although later, they felt happy

¹⁷Aldi Gultom. 2011. "TB Hasanuddin: Klaim Malaysia di Camar Bulan dan Tanjung Datu Tidak Sesuai Peta Tua". *RMOL.id*. <https://rmol.co/dpr/read/2011/10/09/41852/>. Accessed April 2019.

¹⁸-----, 2011. "Dikabarkan Dicaplok Malaysia, Aktivitas TNI di Camar Bulan Meningkat". *Suara Pembaharuan* 11 Oktober 2011.

because their village became so famous¹⁹.

However, what actually happened was, the enclave of Camar Bulan, whose width is 1.499 hectares became a piece of land that is cultivated by some residents of Camar Bulan. A number of farmers who are known as group 31 cultivated the land and grew productive plants such as rubber, pepper, banana, durian, and other productive trees since the year of 2000. After cultivating the land for several years, in 2017 Serawak government asked them go because the area belongs to Malaysia's territory in accordance with the agreement of 2011. From a number of interviews with the farmers that belong to group 31, they admitted to know that the land belongs to Malaysia although they were not sure that the hooks that show the boundary belongs to Malaysia because the hooks are small and they do not form straight lines. Besides the decrease of job as woodcutters, the motivation from local officer support them to cultivate the land.

Discussion

The cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia in managing border area is not only the collaboration to solve the problem of demarcation but they also have forums to talk about social and economic problems that the borderline area of the states. The management of border area between Indonesia and Malaysia had been started in 1983 through the forum of *Kelompok Kerja Sosek Malindo* or *KK Sosek Malindo* between Indonesia and Malaysia. *KK Sosek Malindo* was proposed by Dato Musa Hitam, a vice prime minister of Malaysia and the chairman of *General Border Committee* (GBC) Malaysia that was delivered on the Court of GBC XII in Kuala Lumpur on November 14th, 1983. His idea was responded positively by General LB Moerdani as the chief of Indonesian Arm Forces, the chairman of GBC of Indonesia. Based on the report from the joint chairman of Malindo, then the chairman of Malindo in the court Malindo in its XIII court in Yogyakarta on December 3rd, 1984 decided and order SPC form a committee or bureau of joint authority that has the duty to plan and coordinate the development of socio-economic between Indonesia and Malaysia for the sake of both states' security. Based on the above consideration then the Chief of Indonesian Military Forces as the chairman of Indonesia's GBC form a group work or *Kelompok Kerja* (KK) *Sosek Indonesia*. *KK Sosek Indonesia* was formed based on the Decision Letter of the Chief of Indonesian Military Force Number Dkep/278/V/1985.

KK Sosek Malindo is one of international collaboration of subnational actors because it does not only exist in the central level but also in regional level. *KK Sosek Malindo* at the central level is located in the Territorial staff of Indonesian Military Force (Ster TNI) and led by the Assistant of Staff Chief of Indonesian Military (Aster Kasum TNI). Meanwhile the regional level of *KK Malindo* is located in The Board of Regional Planning and Development or *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (Bappeda) of West Kalimantan Province. The

¹⁹In-depth Interview,, Herlin, local resident of Camar Bulan, at Camar Bulan, in March 2019.

chairperson of the regional level of Sosek Malindo is the chief of Bappeda of West Kalimantan. The duty of KK Sosek Malindo are:

The duty and Authority of The Central KK Malindo:

1. Formulating, preparing the policy and plan of developmental cooperation in the field of social economy between Malaysia and Indonesia.
2. Formulating, preparing the policy suggestion and steps that are necessarily taken by the leaders of GBC in the frame of cooperation in social and economic development of Malaysia-Indonesia.
3. Coordinating and collaborating with sectoral departments in order to help maintaining the smoothness of the administration of development in border area.
4. Collecting, evaluating, concluding, and advising the matters related to the administration of collaboration of social and economic development in Malaysia-Indonesia border area.
5. Reviewing and studying the problems that could be collaborated by the two states.

Meanwhile the duty and responsibility of KK Sosek Malindo of each region are:

1. Determining the social and economic development project according the following criteria:
 - a) The projects that will bring the balance of the development in the joint border area.
 - b) The project that will bring advantages for both parties and they could utilize it together.
 - c) The project of joint business.
2. Formulating the matters related to the administration of social and economic development in border area.
3. Formulating the information exchange with neighboring country (Malaysia-Serawak) about the project of social economic development in each the joint border area.
4. Delivering reports to the governor of West Kalimantan and KK Sosek Malindo in the central level about the administration of social economic development of border area of Indonesia-Malaysia.

The cooperation of social and economy that is held by KK Sosek Malindo besides aimed at cooperating in developing the border area, it also has the objective to maintain the relationship between the two states, remembering that the borderline issues are sensitive for inter states relationship. Through the cooperation in social and economic sector, it is expected that all problems related to the borderline could be solved in good ways and therefore it could maintain the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Unfortunately, the performance of KK Malindo had not touched the lowest level, namely, village. The actors that are included in KK Sosek Malindo meetings

are in the level of province, whereas actually those who are in the front line are the villagers. Not only on this matter, the cooperation in economic development has not been able to solve the problem at the level of village. Rachmawati and Fauzan²⁰ identifies that this could happen because of two things. First, from technical facet, the existence of coordination plot that could not realize the plan into action because KK Sosek Malindo Indonesia is under the Ministry of Defense. Second, in the substantive side, GBC still use the security approach, not the prosperity approach. It has an unopened nature where the people may not access the result of KK Malindo²¹. It caused there is no control and evaluation on the result of the implementation of KK Sosek Malindo. Meanwhile, a research by Wirawan (2019) states that one of the cause of the slow pace of KK Sosek Malindo is the difference of interpretations toward development in border area among instancies. For example, 3 regencies in West Kalimantan (Sanggau, Sambas, Kapuas Hulu) proposed access to be able to buy electricity from Malaysia because the electricity supply from the States' Electricity Company was limited. However, this proposal was rejected by the Indonesian Military Forces because they thought that it could make Indonesia's dependency on Malaysia.

The low capability of KK Sosek Malindo to function as the bridge for the government of the two countries is seen in two ways. First, the agreement on the border of the states, either on the border of the states and the management of the border of the states, is not well socialized. The minimum information about the state's border made the issue of the violation of the state's border spread easily. The role of KK Sosek Malindo as the main actor of the management of Indonesia and Malaysia bilateral relationship should have been able to avoid the issue of borderline violation by giving socialization to the apparatus in the level of province to the village level. Second, the low pace of the development in Temajok Village also shows that KK Sosek Malindo had not been able to function as the motivator of border area development through the collaboration in the sectors of social and economy. Temajok was still an isolated village and dependent on Malaysia for a number of main daily needs. It became the definitive village based on Regent Decree Number 186 dated on June 5, 2002 but unfortunately, this village is still very lack of public facility, like the roadway that connects it to the center of the municipality, communication tools, electricity, and school. Meanwhile, the village of Kampong Teluk Melano that becomes the border area in Malaysia had experienced a significant development only in 2 years period. A roadway that connect it to the capital of the province has brought the village to be a new tourism destination and many tourists have visited it. The wide gap shows that there has been a good collaboration in economy.

However, on the other hand, subnational actors on the low level precisely have an important role through informal lines in managing the problems of border area. The relationship that is administered by the local government and residents could be a bridge for the social and economy relation between the states. Even, the sub national actors at the level of municipality or village precisely could have a

²⁰Iva Rachmawati and Fauzan, 2012. "Problem Diplomasi Perbatasan dalam Tata Kelola Perbatasan Indonesia-Malaysia". *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Politik* Vol. 16 . No.2 (2012).

²¹In-depth Interview, Manto Saidi, the Former BPPD head office, at Pontianak April 2019.

more independent attitude in deciding a policy. They do not wait for the agreement from the central government in administering social activity like a hospitality visit. The hospitality visits are done by the local officer of the municipality or village levels on a regular basis. On the celebration of each state's independence day both make a joint activity like sport competition and art. They do it in purpose to minimize the conflict between the residents of the two countries. The former head of Paloh municipality, Usman, stated that the hospitality visit was done in order to keep the good relation between the two states:

“Maka saya untuk menghilangkan konflik-konflik ini saya muhibah dengan tumenggungnya, imigresennya, termasuk TNI nya pokoknya muhibahlah. Untuk Tanjung Datu ini saya muhibah dengan dia di Melano saya kesana dengan rombongan. Ndak masalahlah saya muhibah kesana. Kalo di Sajingan memang saya lakukan muhibah dengan rombongan dari kabupaten makanya agak aman”

(“So I, in order to delete the conflicts, I pay a visit with the chief, immigration staff, including the army staff, for hospitality. For Tanjung Datu I pay a hospitality visit in Melano. I went there in-group. It is not a problem for me to pay a visit. For Sajingan I do a hospitality visit in-group so it was more safe”).²².

The local officer of the municipality also tried in solving the problems that emerge in border area at the low level. Illegal trade, illegal logging, violation of borderline, and a number of social problems, are labored to be finished at the lower level. Through some interviewed with a number of local officers, finishing the problems at higher levels (province or national levels) will be far more complicated. Whereas the problems they face are merely the conflict between residents, domestic problems, and that same kind. However, because it involved residents with different nationality, it seems that the problems become big. The former Paloh district head stated that if the problems are solved at the higher level, they are anxious that they would be serious problems between countries that involved nationalism. If this happens, finishing the problems would be more difficult²³.

An example of the case of finishing the problems of borderline violation was done by a palm businessman. He made the borderline of his farm using a ditch without paying attention to the states borderline hooks because of his ignorance. This often happens because there were not any clear borderline signs. The distance of one hook to another is some meters away, which is not always in the form of straight line. The small hooks also often disappear because they were covered by the grass. For Usman, this is a common problem because the real problem lies on economy and it is not related to politics at all. Cases of these kinds will be solved simply by giving the information to the farmer and to revise the border they had made. Usman stated that at the time he became the head of Paloh district, he often made a hospitality visit to keep the communication with

²²In-depth interviewed, Usman, The former Paloh District Head, at Kampong Telok Keramat, March 2019.

²³In-depth interviewed, Usman, The former Paloh District Head, at Kampong Telok Keramat, March 2019.

Malaysia. He believed that if the communication is good then whenever problems happen both will see this in a peaceful way. He worried if both parties perceived the problems in a tense feeling and even involving the security forces, the residents might feel afraid. If they feel afraid, they would deem their area unsafe like in Aceh or Papua. There would be no comfort for people. The duty of the army forces located in borderline besides keeping the state's is socializing the borderline to the people and always control the hooks so that they would be always on their correct position in accordance with the coordinates²⁴.

The same thing happens for social problem, the role of local officer at the lowest level precisely has an important role in finishing the problem. Uray Willy, a Province Officer, stated that the social problems arise between two society in Indonesia and Malaysia are common social problems. Unfortunately, it happened between two different nationalities, which can turn the commotion of soccer match, becomes national problems. This situation also happened in marriage that involves two persons from different nationality. If there is a problem in the marriage sometimes, it widens to the extended family scope. If this problem is solved in a formal level, then it would be very complicated and need a long time. Local officers would usually mediate both family to finish it through customs²⁵. Both economic and social problems were usually finished at the lower level and usually in informal ways. "If Jokowi uses fried rice lobby, we have a lobby of drinking coffee together at the district office. So be nice with the officer especially those who are in PLBN Aruk-Biawak by visiting each other"²⁶.

However, the relations built by subnational actors are not always cooperative. The minimum role of KK Sosek Malindo as a means of communication makes the information about the collaboration or agreement between the two states not well delivered. The great distance and minimum condition of the road way makes the officers of central or provincial officers rarely come to visit Temajok. As a result, the different views about managing the border area emerged. This is found in the interpretation of enclave of Camar Bulan with the width of 1499 hectares in which the ownership status was still unclear, was once ever been cultivated by a number of Camar Bulan farmers. The case that emerged in 2017 in fact started from a willingness of the residents to cultivate the land that was abandoned unproductive. The land was then cultivated by the residents. Their doubt to cultivate the unproductive land disappeared when an officer of the Board of Management of Regional Borderline (BPPD) precisely supported them to plant the land.

An officer of BPPD admitted that he purposively provoked the residents to cultivate the land.

"... tahun 2012 waktu itu masih ada radio kecamatan yang masih menjangkau wilayah Malaysia .. Saya provokasi masyarakat saya di aula kantor camat supaya mengupayakan lahan produktif di sana. Pada waktu itu bupati merespon provokasi saya dengan memberikan bibit-bibit tanaman produktif. Akhirnya dari 2012-2014 masyarakat lokal nanam sana, tapi kita beri tahu bahwa sewaktu-waktu lahan ini bisa

²⁴In-depth interviewed, Usman, The former Paloh District Head, at Kampong Telok Keramat, March 2019.

²⁵In-depth interviewed, Uray Willy, Sambas District Officer at Sambas April 2019.

²⁶In-depth interviewed, Uray Willy, Sambas District Officer at Sambas April 2019.

terlepas dari tangan kita sebab lahan ini masih lahan sengketa. Kami memberi pengertian seperti itu”

“...in 2012 when there was still district radio that still reach Malaysia’s territory I provoked the local people to in the district hall in order that they make a productive land there. At that time, the regent officer responded to my provocation by giving productive plants seeds. Finally, in 2012-2014, the local people grow plants there, but we let them know that the land might be lost at any time because the land is still a divergent land. We told them so... “²⁷.

This is confirmed by a number of residents who became part of the farmers that open a farming land at that time. The farmers who opened the illegal farming land are named Group 31 because it consists of 31 farmers. The interview result shows that in fact they knew that the area belong to Malaysia. However, because the land was abandoned while most woods had been cut, means that they could not work in Malaysian wood factory anymore, then they widened their own farmland in the area. One of the farmers even stated that they have planted rubber, pepper, palm, and other food plants since 2000. Before there was no problem with any party²⁸. Meanwhile, other farmers stated that he make himself brave to open a land and build a house in the region after a military officer made him sure that it would be no problem to build a house there, because the borderline is still more than 1 km away²⁹.

Manto Saidi, former BPPD head, stated that the effort to manage the empty land in fact is a way to show that local residents have a high motivation to manage borderline area. At least this will attract the central government’s attention so that they will be more care to the farmers. Besides, the abrasion of the beach has made the beach get closer to the outer end of enclave of Camar Bulan. When this research is done, the distance of the hooks from the beach is only 700 meters. If the enclave of Camar Bulan could be owned by Indonesia, then Indonesia would have a wider area. The management of the land is expected to push the central government to keep fighting for Enclave of Camar Bulan and at the same time to prevent abrasion from getting worse³⁰.

Unfortunately, there are still many local officers that have the different interpretations. Usman, the head of Paloh district, stated that opening a land for people’s farming land is a way to show that it is Indonesian people who have the authority in the area. Malaysia does not have any power to the area because they are far away from it. Even, Malaysian people are not willing to cultivate the land. He even stated that it is no problem if they cultivate the land for food as long as they do not sell it or use it for other commercial goal³¹. He did not know that this area was developed as a protective forest by Malaysia so it was not opened as a

²⁷In-depth Interviewed, Manto Saidi, the Former BPPD head office, at Pontianak April 2019.

²⁸In-depth Interviewed, Ibrahim, local resident of Camar Bulan, at Camar Bulan, in March 2019.

²⁹In-depth Interviewed, Rahmad, local resident of Camar Bulan, at Camar Bulan, in March 2019.

³⁰In-depth Interviewed, Manto Saidi, the Former BPPD head office, at Pontianak April 2019.

³¹In-depth interviewed, Usman, The former Paloh District Head, at Kampong Telok Keramat, March 2019.

farming land. The minimum information made him have different view in managing the borderline area.

On the support of a number of subnational actors, local residents were motivated to cultivate the land by growing rubber, pepper, clove, durian, and some other productive plants. In 2017, Malaysian government in Kucing sent a letter of objection on the one sided cultivation by the farmers. The letter was sent to the chief of Temajok. The letter ordered that the chief of Temajok asked the farmers who cultivate the land in enclave of Camar Bulan to leave the land. As the help of the local officer, Malaysia permitted them to wait until the harvest time. After harvesting, the farm must be burned down and the farmers are not allowed to cultivate the land in the enclave of Camar Bulan.

On this incident, the government of the regency granted a number of compensation to the farmers who had to surrender their farm to Malaysian authority. They were given 100 kilograms of rice grain for one family unit. The residents accepted this in a good way. They knew that basically, although not accurately, that some part of the land they cultivate is Malaysia's land. The abandoned hooks and spread irregularly make the residents difficult to determine the states' borderline.

The attainment of agreement in 2011 about the enclave of Camar Bulan motivated Malaysian government to repost its borderline. This had the impact on the control of the land cultivation in Camar Bulan done by some farmers there. This control precisely became annexation issue of Malaysia and triggered a negative sentiment in Indonesia. The Indonesian residents moved through social media and made the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia a bit tense because the issue of borderline between Indonesia and Malaysia is always sensitive in Indonesia.

However, again the local officer and local resident even made use of this incident to steal the government's attention either at the level of province or central government. The attention on this issue of the condition of Temajok that was still isolated is shown by the policy that have a tendency to the infrastructure development. In 2011, the roadway that connect Temajok village and the capital of the province was built. The electricity and communication facility was also started to be constructed. A number of local and central government officers and people's representatives came to Temajok with a promise to give more attention and develop the village of Temajok. In 2012, 13 ministries gave aid through the National Program of Integrated Village Development Movement or (Program Pandu Gerbang Kampung) and the Program of Poverty Resolution for the State's Border Area (Pronankis). The aid as much as Rp. 20 billion for Program Pandu Gerbang and Rp 200 billion for pronankis are expected to be able to free Sambas from isolation (TribunBengkayang.com., 2012). Temajuk also become one of the destinations for a number of universities to do their students' service programs like Tanjung Pura University, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah University, and Pembangunan Nasional University. Besides, the arrival of some private investors has supported Camar Bulan to be a new tourism destination. Although it is still far from the word 'advanced'. At least this area is closer to the

state's policy that takes sides to the development of the prosperity because of the roles of subnational actors.

Conclusions

Subnational actors on the area of borderline in Indonesia have a unique role in influencing the relationship and management of borderline of Indonesia-Malaysia. Even, the role of subnational actors in the level of district or village has a greater influence than those who have a role formally in KK Sosek Malindo. Subnational actors tend to take a different approach from the central government in managing the social, economic, or politic relationship.

Their independency in managing the relationship is seen from the high informal interaction done by the subnational actors at the lowest level, that is, village. Therefore, subnational actors in the concepts of paradiplomacy is not only subnational actor is not only at the level of province. The independence is also shown by their effort in solving all the problems of social and economy at the lowest level. The trades on the main daily needs had an exception through the relationship being constructed. The isolated condition has forced them to make peace with the trade that post them into the consumers of subsidized or granted main daily needs from Malaysia. They are also becoming actors that take the role in finishing the social problems of the residents at the lowest level through the family or custom approach.

Also in the problems of politics, that is, the states' borderline. The subnational actor's role is sufficiently influential in how the residents see the issue of managing the borderline area. Affected by the minimum information about the management of the state's borderline, the subnational actors motivate the residents to manage the border area through the territorial awareness they have. This s also aimed at gaining the attention from the central government to give policies that take the side to the development in the border area.

Therefore, this research found that the concept of paradiplomacy does not only refer to the government actors at the level of province or city but also at the lowest level of village those actors do not only manage the relationship between states through the way that is mostly cooperative but also the non cooperative ways if it deals with politics (right on territory). What is the most interesting from the practices of paradiplomacy is that the issue between state could precisely be an equipment for the local actors to attract the central government's attention to give a better attention for the development of the borderline area.

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- In-depth Interviewed, Manto Saidi, the Former BPPD head office, at Pontianak April 2019.
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- In-depth Interviewed, Ibrahim , local resident, at Camar Bulan, April 2019.
- In-depth Interviewed Rahmad, local resident, at Camar Bulan, April 2019.

