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Special Issue on Democracy & Politics

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Athens Journal of Social Sciences

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The current issue is the second of the ninth volume of the *Athens Journal of Social Sciences* (AJSS), **published by the [Social Sciences Division](#) of ATINER.**

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
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Democracy and Politics: An Introduction to the Special Issue of the Athens Journal of Social Sciences

*By Gregory T. Papanikos**

This paper is an introduction to the special issue of the Athens Journal of Social Sciences on Politics. It includes six papers, which relate to various aspects of politics in today's democracies. The first paper examines populism in selecting political parties of the European Union (EU); the second explains a political experiment performed in USA; the third discusses the prospects of the 2022 elections in Brazil; the fourth states that democracies need leaders as this is the case with Israel; the fifth looks at a real threat to democracy which is radicalism and violence using the case of the Slovakian youth; and the last paper examines a case of primary elections of a Greek political party (PASOK).

Keywords: *politics, democracy, elections, Brazil, Greece, Israel, Slovakia, USA, European Union, Latin America*

Introduction

This note is an introduction to the special issue on politics of the *Athens Journal of Social Sciences*. It includes six papers; some of them were presented at ATINER's international conferences; the other papers were independent submissions. All papers have been blindly peer reviewed and accepted for publication. The six papers refer to different countries/areas: European Union (EU), USA, Brazil and Latin America, Israel, Slovakia and Greece.

What is common in all these countries? Democracy, which in the contemporary world, means elections. These elections are related to choosing a representative such as a president; they do not include voting on an issue. This is the reason this type of democracy is called representative democracy. Otherwise, if people were to vote on each specific issue, it would then be called direct democracy.

In Papanikos (2020, 2022a, 2022b), I have demonstrated that a representative democracy is different from the democracy practiced in Ancient Athens, and of course far from an ideal democracy discussed by Plato, John Stuart Mills and John Dewey. All these authors emphasized the role of education as a prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy. However, democracy is not a static concept, and in different countries and time periods, is practiced in different ways. For example, the system of democracy practiced in the USA is different from the one experienced in the countries of the EU.

All democracies can be evaluated on how "democratic" they are using five criteria presented in Papanikos (2022a): *isegoria* (freedom of speech); *isonomy* (equal before the law); *isocracy* (equal probability of being elected as an archon);

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isoteleia (taxes according to ability to pay) and *isopoliteia* (democracies should treat other states fairly).

The six papers presented in this special issue of the *Athens Journal of Social Sciences* echo these five criteria as I will demonstrate in this introductory paper by presenting each one of them in the separate sections of this note.

Populism Cannot be avoided in Democracies

Despite the differences in the practice of democracy it seems that populism cannot be avoided. The first paper of this special issue discusses populism in the countries of the EU. Since the times of Pericles in Ancient Athens, populism is a characteristic of democracy. One may give the following definition of democracy: democracy exists when populism is thriving. Only in countries that do not have democracy, populism is dead along with many dissidents. In Ancient Athens, Plutarch informs us, Pericles (even though he was losing), was able to persuade the Athenian public to cheer him as a winner through his populist rhetoric—the apotheosis of populism. In modern Greece, as in many other countries, this has survived as long as they have some kind of a democracy.

Colonescu (2022) discusses the issue of populism in a sample of political parties of the EU. As an instrument of his analysis, he used expert evaluations of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2017 data. A number of measures are used to differentiate between political parties: a party's stance (left-right) on economic matters; a party's stance on general matters, not only economic; a party's position from green, alternative, and libertarian at the lower end of the scale to traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist at the highest end; a party's position towards the European Union project; etc. He uses factor-analysis to identify similarities among the 26 variables, which represent a measure of populism.

His model shows, with a high degree of accuracy, that political parties in the EU can be classified into three groups: non-populist parties, left-populist, and right-populist. He concludes that his research, "...reveals, surprisingly sometimes, less understood features of some parties; it provokes reflection on the various shades of gray surrounding some political parties that are, otherwise, in the very spotlight of today's European politics."

Party Orientation: An Experiment from the USA

Al Marrar and Allevato (2022) examined whether political alignment along the lines of Republicans/Conservatives and Democrats/Liberals cause a "selective attention bias". Their sample consisted of 117 participants from the USA who were asked to read a political article on a social issue which was favorable to Democrats. Then, the participants were asked to recollect as much information as possible by typing it into a text box. Additionally, participants were asked to rate the article of how they felt reading it: neutral, positive or negative.

One would have predicted Democrats will recall more positive information and positive effects than the Republicans from reading the article, but the authors found the opposite. They concluded that it is very difficult for voters to think outside the box.

I find the article very important because democracy relates to education. Since the Hesiodic times, education relates to memory. It is not an accident that the mother of the nine muses (protectors of arts and sciences in ancient Greece) was Mnemosyne (memory).

A better democracy requires better-educated voters; people who read and write is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. Reading an article and recalling the message it portrays is a key issue for democracy. How people process this information becomes an integral part of the democratic process and is the necessary condition for a better democracy. My recollection of the information provided in the paper is that it contributes to this important literature.

Elections in Brazil

In October 2022 Brazil is heading into another election. The prospects of these elections are analyzed by De Caria Patrício (2022). She examines the current and the past of the Brazilian political process, but she extends her analysis to Latin American countries in general; a political relationship that goes back to the 19th century. She concentrates on the two frontrunners as this is currently shown in the polls: (a) the current President Bolsonaro and (b) the ex-President Lula. The latter candidate is running first in the polls at the time that the paper was written (December 2021).

The author gives an excellent presentation of the facts which can explain the win of Bolsonaro in the previous elections and his demagogue and populism which is his characteristic style. Nevertheless, he commands a high rate of acceptance among Brazilian voters.

On the other hand, Lula is returning as a frontrunner in the polls, but his public image has been shattered by the allegations of embezzlement.

Both are considered populists by the author and if either win, Brazil's future looks dismal. The author emphasizes the international image of Brazil, which has been deteriorated due to Bolsonaro's response to the pandemic of COVID-19. She suggests that Brazil needs a moderate president which will reestablish Brazil's image in international relations.

Democracy Needs Leaders: The Case of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel

Ever since the Ancient Athenian democracy, political leaders put their stamp on the quality of democracy. This was the case in the previous paper in Brazil. The next paper in this special issue looks at another well-known leader in the international area; that of Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. Buskila et al. (2022)

examine Netanyahu's political personality. The emphasis of the authors was on emotional intelligence.

Their analysis is based on a questionnaire, which was sent out to 411 Israeli voters with at least an academic degree. The perception of the participants of the study thought highly (a score of 5.06 with a maximum of 7) of Benjamin Netanyahu. Thus, the authors conclude that Israeli citizens perceive Netanyahu as a smart, intelligent and shroud politician.

According to the authors, this evidence does not support the thesis that emotional intelligence has only positive sides. It can be interpreted that leaders with emotional intelligence may use this skill to manipulate others to meet their personal political objectives.

A similar conclusion was reached by Plutarch about Pericles who ruled the city-state of Athens in the fifth century BCE.

Radicalism is a Serious Threat to Democracy: The Case of Slovakia

Populism is a problem that all democracies face. If it is kept within the limits of the framework of checks and balances set by a democratic society, then it cannot undermine democracy itself even though it undermines its effectiveness. Populism has no real future in a democracy unless it turns into radicalism which uses violence.

Brutovská and Béreš (2022) address this issue of youth radicalism in Slovakia. Their approach is empirical and is based on a qualitative probe among young people aged 14-17 years. One of the characteristics of radicals is their mistrust for parliamentary democracy. They also think that the state is unable to solve the modern problems of society. During the recent crises in Europe of the Great Recession and immigration, extremism (which included violence) was reappearing in many European countries.

This is a typical attitude of radicalism which is developed in a democracy. It reminds me of the rebellious Alcibiades, who, in his youth, resulted to violence to achieve political means. However, and contrary to the study's results, Alcibiades and other Athenian youth at the time belonged to upper class, whose members were well-educated as was Alcibiades himself.

I do believe that a strong democracy can tolerate rebellious and radical youth as long as the process of socialization is such that sooner or later the aspirations of the youth are aligned with the aspirations of a truly democratic society.

An Example of Primary Elections: The Case of PASOK (Greece)

The last paper is about primary elections in Greece (Papanikos 2022c). The author uses the case of PASOK to analyze all previous elections of party leaders going back to 1996. PASOK was the first political party to implement such a primary electoral system. A few years later the opposition party, New Democracy,

adopted such a system. Primary elections are an integral part of contemporary representative democracies.

The author reviews the relevant literature of primary elections systems. Three are identified in the literature. Firstly, the partisan system where only party members vote. Secondly, a system that party members and friends vote to elect the party leader and other party representatives. Thirdly, a blanket system whereby all eligible voters can vote, including the members of other parties.

The author focuses his analysis in the most recent primary elections of December 2021. An emphasis is given on the ideology of the candidates, but other factors played a significant role, such as the disappointing campaign of ex-leader and ex-prime minister who was frontrunner, but he came second in the first round and lost the primary elections in the second round.

His failure is further analyzed in the paper by arguing that he failed to mobilize his own supporters. One explanation may be given by the first paper of this issue. Populists may appeal once, but they are usually not attractive the second time who test their political chances.

Conclusions

The overall conclusion that emerges from these studies is that democracy is not an ideal political system. Many have envisaged political systems that resemble a paradise on earth. Democracy is a continuous struggle and countries with a true democracy can tolerate and absorb extreme behaviors such as populism and radicalism.

After all, the best indicator that a country has a democracy is that any citizen can openly question its existence without any direct or indirect repercussions—this is the essence of democracy, and the six papers presented in this special issue is a testimony to this principle. All six countries have a democratic system of organizing their political affairs. In a nutshell, this system was defined by Pericles that the “many rule”. Until a better practical political system is found, democracy is second to none from all the implemented systems of ruling a politeia.

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Measures of Populism in the CHES 2017 Dataset

By Constantin Colonescu*

Populism is a fuzzy concept in world politics; it can take many shapes and colors, thus evading rigorous definition. Using expert evaluations provided in Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2017 data, we try to identify features that predict populism and to characterize various European parties on a populism scale. As a byproduct, we find that experts have often diverging opinions on a party's stance on various issues.

Keywords: *populism, CHES 2017, EU politics*

Introduction and Scope

Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017) is a collection of expert evaluations of party positions in several European Union countries; the survey asks questions concerning a party's position with respect to the European Union project, general left-right positioning, both political and economic, and, for the first time in the sequence of the CHES surveys, questions about populism, migration, and coordination of European Union policies. Most of the data are scores on a scale of 1 to 7 or 0 to 10. Since the scales are different for different variables, the data will be standardized for the purpose of this analysis. Using various statistical methods, such as clustering, structural equation modeling and recursive partitioning, we provide an image of how close various parties are with respect to each other when multiple aspects are considered and identify the most relevant attributes in predicting the degree of populism for all parties.

Hooghe et al. (2010) compare the 2002 and 2006 waves of the CHES survey with other sources (Comparative Manifesto, Benoit-Laver, and Rohrschneider-Whitefield) and conclude that the CHES data are “reasonably valid and reliable.” Hooghe et al. (2010) use listwise deletion for missing data but are somehow cryptic about the details of their method. As opposed to many of the studies using CHES data, which share a dismissive attitude towards how they treat missing data, we try to pay more attention to this aspect.

The dataset contains 2168 observations on 31 variables, 14 countries, and 132 political parties; a total number of 228 experts provided assessments for one party or another. The CHES 2017 Codebook contains detailed information about the data (CHES 2017).

Here is a succinct guide to the symbols representing the variables in CHES data: *lrecon* measures a party's stance (left-right) on economic matters, with low values for left and high values for right; *lrgen* is the same, but on general matters, not only economic; *galtan* is a party's position from green, alternative, and libertarian at the lower end of the scale to traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist at the highest end, a variable sometimes criticized for being difficult to measure;

* Associate Professor, MacEwan University, Canada.

position measures a party's position toward the European Union project; the attributes *clear* and *saliency* in the name of a variable refers to such qualities of a party's rhetoric on the respective issue; the attribute *dissent* refers to the degree of dissent within a party on the respective issue. Other variable names are more self-explanatory.

Descriptive Statistics and Missing Data in CHES 2017

Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics, including the percentage of missing values for each variable¹; the variables are sorted in descending percentage of missing values. It shows that the variable *lr_econ saliency* (saliency of economic issues in a party's stance) has the least percentage of missing data, while *multicult_dissent* (the degree of within-party dissent concerning the integration of immigrants) has the highest percentage (about 28%).

Of the total number of 2168 observations in CHES 2017, only 960 are complete (with no missing data whatsoever), or about 44%. Thus, if listwise deletion is used in an analysis involving all variables, more than half of the dataset must be discarded. The situation is, though, less serious when the observations and the variables having the most missing data are eliminated from the analytic model, instead of applying list-wise deletion to the whole dataset. It will be useful, therefore, to identify the variables and observations containing the most missing values.

Let us count all missing values by country, to determine whether potentially eliminating all parties in a country may substantially reduce the missing values proportion in the data. Table 2 shows a country ranking by missing values; the *prMiss* variable is the percentage of missing values in all variables, by country, sorted in descending order of this percentage.

Table 2 shows that Italy stands out with the highest number and percentage of missing values. Table 3 shows the parties having the highest number of missing values in the dataset, across all variables. The parties with 75% or more missing values will be removed from the dataset. These parties are VdA(UV) and LKR.

Listwise, or pairwise deletion may be acceptable when a suitable combination of observations and variables is selected to minimize the percentage of missing values, a combination that still serves the purpose of one's investigation. For most purposes, though, there are better alternatives to listwise deletion. These are either multiple imputation, or some full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) method that can use all the information available in an incomplete dataset, without imputation.

An important step in dealing with missing data is to determine what kind of missingness we have: missing completely at random (MCAR), when missingness has no relation to observed or unobserved data, missing at random (MAR), when missingness has some relationship with observed, but not unobserved data, or not at random (MNAR), when missingness is more likely to happen for some sub-groups of observed or unobserved variables; missingness of MNAR data is

¹All tables and figures are available at the end of the paper after the References section.

directly related to the values of the missing data. In other words, MNAR data is missing precisely because of their values. MCAR values cannot be predicted with existing data, but dropping them from analysis is not likely to substantially alter the results; MAR can, and should be predicted using the available information; and, finally, MNAR can be neither predicted, nor ignored; this type of missingness is, therefore, the most problematic. Even detecting MNAR data is difficult and requires good knowledge of the data being analyzed.

The next passages try to determine the type of missingness in the CHASE dataset. To do so, a missingness matrix is calculated; each entry in this matrix is binary, with 0 for non-missing and 1 for missing. Then, we try to detect relationships between each variable in the dataset and missingness in the other variables. This part uses the R package *naniar* (Tierney et al. 2018) and the *MissMech* package (Mohan and Pearl 2014).

First, a test based on Jamshidian and Jalal (2010), using the *TestMCARNormality* function in the *MissMech* package (Mohan and Pearl 2014) rejects the hypothesis that the data is MCAR, leaving us only the MAR and MNAR possibilities. Now, we should remember that CHES data are scores, or rankings provided by independent experts, who should have no personal reason for refusing to answer certain questions; therefore, there is no conceivable reason to believe that missing data would be not at random (MNAR), leaving us with the only alternative that the CHES data is MAR, which makes it suitable for multiple imputation. After having removed the parties with more than 75% missing data, we complete the dataset by multiple imputation, using the *Amelia* package (Honaker et al. 2011); the country and party identifier variables are not used for imputation.

Factor Analysis in CHES 2017

The purpose of factor analysis is to get a sense of the similarities existing among the 26 variables in the dataset and, if possible, to identify a dimension – a linear combination of the variables – that best represents some measure of populism. The dataset will be scaled before performing factor analysis to account for differences in the scales of different variables.

Therefore, in some of the following graphs the values are in standard deviations from the mean; in other words, negative values correspond to lower values of a variable or factor. The scores provided by several experts for one party have been aggregated using the median.

Figure 1 displays a scree plot where each bar indicates the percentage of variance covered by a factor (dimension). Such diagrams allow determining an “optimal” number of factors; an extra factor shall only be included if it adds a significant share to the variance. We retain only three dimensions, those that individually contain more than 10% of the variation in the data. The fact that each dimension or group of dimensions captures a rather small amount of the total variance reflects low correlation among the measured variables. This characteristic of the CHES data makes the data not too useful beyond the usefulness of each

variable taken separately.

In Figure 2, each row of graphs contains the contributions of variables and individual parties to the first three dimensions. Again, each dimension appears to be made of small contributions by many primary variables and by many individual parties, indicating that most variables are but weakly distinct and most parties have rather indistinct profiles.

Exploring Inter-Variable Relationships

Grouping (clustering) the variables in a dataset is a simpler alternative to factor analysis, based on the assumption that each variable belongs to only one group (hierarchical cluster analysis, Revelle 1979). Figure 3 shows such a variable grouping, assigning the variables to 5 high-level groups and several sub-groups. As in a regular, by-observation clustering, one can decide how many groups to use for clustering. Such variable grouping could be informative when designing a structural equation model, as we do in the next section. More generally, this method could help constructing composite scales for measuring features that are not directly observable; according to Revelle (2018), the criteria of selecting certain variables to form a construct could be “rational, empirical, or factorial.”

In Figure 3, high values for the alpha and beta statistics indicate good grouping; two groups will merge into a higher-level group if alpha and beta are increased by the merger. After experimenting with different numbers of groups, we settle on an eight-group model (see Figure 3); some of the groups, such as the ones labeled C17 and C18 turn out to be quite stable when the number of groups is changed; others, such as C14, only appears when the number of groups becomes equal to eight. Higher values of α and β for the C18 and C14 groups also indicate good reliability of these groups. The composition of most of the smaller groups does not seem to provide too much insight; therefore, we focus on the three larger groups.

The group labeled C17 in Figure 3, probably not incidentally, brings together three out of the four variables collected in the CHES 2017 Codebook under the title “Populism, Corruption, and Internal Party Democracy Questions;” the fourth variable, *members_vs_leadership*, does not seem to belong to the C17 group. To our knowledge, the CHES authors do not justify why the four variables have been placed under the same title. The group labeled C14 collects the variables measuring the salience and clarity in a party’s stance about their GAL–TAN (Green, Alternative, and Libertarian, versus Traditional, Authoritarian, and Nationalist) characteristics. Interestingly, though, the two “real” GAL–TAN variables, namely *galtan* and *galtan_new* are not in this group. The group labeled C18 has a complex structure, which remains very stable with respect to changes in the number of groups. Getting clues from this and the other major groups, we build a structural equation model in the next section.

A Latent Variable Model for the CHES 2017 Data

Exploratory factor analysis gives us an idea about how accurately different variables describe different features of the individual parties, as well as how different parties are located along several dimensions. Our conclusion is, so far, that CHES data do not identify very well cleavages among parties, and that each variable can be found in several dimensions (principal components). This conclusion is not too helpful in our quest of better defining populism or better identifying it based on parties' scores over a particular set of CHES variables. This section attempts to create a structural equation (latent-variable) model that would better describe and classify the parties in our dataset. For building this model, we rely on the grouping-by-variable result in Figure 3 and use the R package *lavaan* (Rosseel 2012).

The following hypothesized relationships define our latent variable model; The “~” symbol indicates the usual regression relationship, the symbol “= ~” indicates a measurement relationship, where the left-hand side is a latent variable, *manifested by* the latent or measured variables in the right-hand side; the symbol “~ ~” represents unexplained correlation between variables. Since all the variables in the CHES data aim at measuring some underlying, unobservable characteristics of the parties, our model cannot aim at revealing any causal relationship, but only at identifying commonalities and exposing those unobservable characteristics such as populism, nationalism, and left-right orientations.

The following hypothesized relationships describe our structural equation model:

- $\text{populism} = \sim \text{people_vs_elite} + \text{antielite_salience} + \text{corrupt_salience}$
- $\text{nationalism} = \sim \text{immigrate_policy} + \text{eu_asylum} + \text{ethnic_minorities} + \text{multiculturalism}$
- $\text{proEU} = \sim \text{position} + \text{eu_budgets}$
- $\text{left_right} = \sim \text{lrgen} + \text{lrecon} + \text{lrecon_clear} + \text{lrecon_salience}$
- $\text{ideology} = \sim \text{galtan} + \text{galtan_salience} + \text{galtan_new} + \text{galtan_new_clear} + \text{galtan_new_salience}$
- $\text{proEU} \sim \text{populism} + \text{nationalism} + \text{left_right}$
- $\text{left_right} \sim \sim \text{ideology}$
- $\text{nationalism} \sim \sim \text{populism}$

In a structural equations model, latent variables determine, rather than being determined by the observed, manifest variables. CHES variables that would measure nationalism could be the following, as defined in the CHES 2017 Codebook: *eu_asylum* (1 – party leadership strongly opposes common policy on asylum, 7 – strongly favors common policy); *immigrate_policy* (1 – strongly

opposes a restrictive policy on immigration, 10 – strongly in favor of restrictive policy on immigration); *eu_dissent* (0 – party completely united on EU integration, 10 – party extremely divided); and *multicult_dissent* (0 – party is completely united on integration policy for immigrants, 10 – party extremely divided on policy). The definitions of the first two variables show some inconsistency in establishing the scales. The scale for *eu_asylum* is low if party opposes common policy (whether such a party opposes asylum in itself or just a common policy is unclear), while the scale for *immigrate_policy* is low for a party that favors immigration. In other words, one would expect that an anti-immigration party would score low on the *eu_asylum* scale and high on the *immigrate_policy* scale.

Now, suppose our model predicts a high probability, close to one, on the *nationalism* latent variable. Is this indeed a mostly nationalist party? Hard to tell, upfront, given the inconsistency in the scales just mentioned. To tackle this issue, however, we may turn to the results of the model and try to calibrate our interpretation of the results. For instance, let us look at a party that many observers would consider as nationalist, such as France’s National Front (FN; see Table 5). Our model predicts a maximum score (equal to 1) for this party, which suggests that indeed a higher predicted score on nationalism corresponds to a more nationalist party.

Table 4 gives estimated coefficients of the model. The effect of a latent variable on the first variable in its corresponding equation is scaled to 1; its effects on the remaining variables are scaled relative to the first variable. For instance, we see that a party’s underlying *populism* affects the party’s *antielite_salience* measure more than it affects the party’s *people_vs_elite* measure.

As it turns out, the CHES data allow very little space in creating a reliable model. Our model’s chi-square value, as a measure of reliability, is rather modest. However, many of the predictions of the model, as displayed in Table 5 seem reasonable. (The table shows predicted values, on a scale from 0 to 1, for only 40 out of the about 130 parties; the 40 parties have been selected for having the highest scores on the *populism* scale.) Figure 4 illustrates the Structural Equation Model, where the various boxes contain shortened latent and manifest variable names, and the direction of the arrows show the hypothesized directions of causality. The thickness and color intensity of the arrows are proportional to the strength of the respective effect. An interesting result revealed by the model is the rather weak correlation (equal to 0.2) between populism and ideology, as defined in our model.

Clustering by Parties

This section explores commonalities among parties, using a different approach: clustering by observations, rather than by variables as in a previous section. When several observations are available for one party (several expert assessments), we aggregate the observations by their median, so that each

aggregate observation corresponds to one party.

First, we evaluate how prone the CHES 2017 dataset is to clustering (we assess the clustering tendency of the dataset) by calculating the Hopkins statistic, which tests the (null) hypothesis that there are no adequate clusters in the data. A value close to 0.5 indicates that the data is not suitable for clustering, while a value close to zero indicates high clusterability. We find a value of the Hopkins statistic $H = 0.33$, which is somewhere at the limit of clusterability.

The optimal number of clusters is determined by the *gap statistic*, which maximizes the difference (*gap*) between the sum of intra-cluster distances of the data and an amorphous artificially created dataset, one with no obvious clusters. As Figure 5 shows, the optimal number of clusters is four. Figure 6 displays the clusters and the parties in each cluster.

Table 6 shows a count of cases (parties) by category and cluster. This can give an image of how “pure” each cluster is. For instance, most of the populist parties (category 2) can be found in cluster 2.

Table 7 shows the means of the CHES variables by cluster, retaining only the variables that have the mean at the center of Cluster 2 greater than those in the other three clusters. The means are given in percentages of their scores. This table helps identifying the attributes that are common to the parties in this cluster, namely KSCM, EKRE, DLF, FN, AfD, BLAU, ANEL, XA, Fidesz, JOBBIK, FdI, LN, FvD, PVV, SGP, Korwin, Kukiz, PiS, Kotleba LSNS, Sme Rodina, SNS, SD, DUP, UKIP.

So, what can we say about these parties? Table 7 indicates that the *ethnic_minorities* variable has the highest score, suggesting that these parties tend to oppose more rights for ethnic minorities; they advocate stronger restrictions on immigration and stronger policies of assimilation of immigrants as opposed to multiculturalism; ideologically, they lean toward extreme right; they also outscore the other clusters in the variables that are supposed to measure populism as per the CHES Codebook, namely the variables *people_vs_elite* and *members_vs_leadership*. A higher value of the *people_vs_elite* variable reflects the stance that “the people,” not politicians should make the important decisions; a higher value of the *members_vs_leadership* variable reflects the stance that the leadership of a party should have control over policies, not the members. A similar message is conveyed by the high value of the *galtan* variable: these parties lean toward the TAN (Traditional, Authoritarian, and Nationalist) side on the GAL–TAN scale.

Table 8 gives the means of the variables at the center of Cluster 4; the parties in this cluster are EA/EH Bildu, IU, Podemos, PSOE, SDE, EELV, Insoumis, Grunen, DIMAR, Potami, SYRIZA, DK, E14, MLP, PM, FI, MDP, PD, SI, D66, GL, Nowo, Razem, TR, BE/O Bloco, PAN, FI, MP, V, Greens, LibDem. While this cluster is less well defined than cluster 2, the values displayed in Table 8 still identify some commonalities. As compared to the other clusters, these parties support a common EU policy concerning political asylum; while their stance on supporting the EU project is less than spectacular, it is still greater than the one of the other clusters. These parties also tend to support EU authority over the member states budgetary policies.

Cluster Validation

A good clustering algorithm should identify clusters that are compact (low distance between within-cluster cases) and well separated (high distance between clusters), if such clusters exist in the data. Various validation statistics, such as the Dunn index, are used by some clustering algorithms to determine the optimal number of clusters. Thus, further investigation of such validation statistics is not necessary. An exception, though, is the silhouette index, which takes values between -1 and 1; a silhouette index closer to 1 indicates a more compact cluster, a desirable feature of clustering. Figure 7 shows the average silhouette statistics by group; it indicates that clusters 2 is the most compact, while cluster 4 is more heterogeneous.

A Recursive Partitioning Model

The purpose of this section is to determine the variables that best predict the populist character of a political party or, from a different perspective, to identify the attributes that make a party belong to a certain category. We use the CHES 2017 data and an additional, original classification of EU parties by expert opinion. We classify the parties into three categories: 0 = “not populist,” 1 = “populist-left,” and 2 = “populist-right.”

A *recursive partitioning* model (Breiman et al. 1983), creates a decision tree by repeatedly splitting variables into ranges. Figure 8 displays a simpler version, while Figure 9 displays a more complex version of the model. The shaded boxes at the bottom of the diagram in Figure 8 display the following information: the number at the top is the most likely of the three categories, 0, 1, or 2; the three numbers in the middle row give the probabilities for each of the categories and, finally, the number at the bottom of the box gives the percentage of observations that have the combination of characteristics leading to the respective box.

This combination is shown as the path from the top of the diagram to the respective box at the bottom. Let’s take, for example, box 43: it represents 1% of the parties in the dataset; these parties have been predicted as left-populist (coded as 1); the probability that these parties are indeed in category 1 is 0.94, the probability that they are not populist is 0.06, and the probability that they are right-populist is about 0. The parties in box 43 have the following attributes, starting from the top of the tree: they favor common asylum policies in various degrees ($eu_asylum \geq 2$), they somehow oppose European integration or are neutral ($position < 3.9$), they take a clear stand towards left-oriented economic policies, and they consider immigration to be an important topic.

An interesting insight produced by the recursive partitioning algorithm is that the right-populist parties identified in boxes 23, 51, 55, and 109 have less defined attributes, with probabilities between 0.59 and 0.67; on the contrary, those identified in box 7 are well defined (probability = 0.9). Moreover, box 7 is at the end of a very simple path: $eu_asylum < 2$ and $lrgen > 7.3$. In other words, they are to the far right on the ideology scale and oppose a common asylum policy.

An unexpected outcome of this model is how important the variable *eu_asylum* is in predicting the stance of a party between being populist or not.

We can use now the recursive partitioning model (Therneau and Atkinson 2019) to predict a party's belonging to one of our three categories: not populist (0), left-populist (1), and right-populist (2). Table 9 is a contingency table, showing the actual categories as determined by expert assessment as row names and those predicted by the model as column names. The degree of accuracy of this prediction can be assessed using the Rand index; the closer the Rand index is to 1, the better the prediction. Our calculated Rand index is equal to 0.76, showing a reasonably good fit.

Discussion

We use CHES 2017 data to identify common features of parties deemed to be “populist” in political science literature.

The first part of the analysis examines the missing-value structure of the data and finds that there is a substantial amount of missing values in the CHES 2017 dataset. We find that, for this dataset, imputation is the least invasive method to deal with missing data. We checked our results on several versions of imputed data and the results were very similar. The second motive of our investigation sets to characterize the profiles of various European parties by two methods. First, we try to identify patterns in the data that would classify European parties according to underlying, latent categories; a “latent variable” model allows us to predict the proportion of *populism*, *nationalist*, and other ideological features for each party in the dataset; clustering analysis finds at least one cluster that comprises most of the known right-wing, nationalist, and populist parties. Second, we create a new variable in the dataset named *populism* by expert opinion, a variable we then use as a dependent variable in a recursive partitioning model. The outcome of the model shows a high degree of accuracy in predicting three classes (non-populist parties, left-populist, and right-populist). Perhaps the reason for this high level of accuracy could be an over-fitting of the model. The recursive partitioning model, however, even being over-fit, is useful because it helps us identify the variables that are instrumental in classifying the parties.

Overall, our analysis is descriptive in nature given the nature of the CHES 2017 data, but it sheds light on the similarities and differences between European parties. It reveals, surprisingly sometimes, less understood features of some parties; it provokes reflection on the various shades of gray surrounding some political parties that are, otherwise, in the very spotlight of today's European politics.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Observed Variables

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Missing
multicult_dissent	2.53	2.25	0	10	28.41
ethnic_minorities	4.90	3.18	0	10	23.75
immigrate_dissent	2.74	2.50	0	10	23.25
eu_budgets	3.51	1.96	1	7	21.96
multiculturalism	5.86	3.09	0	10	20.71
multicult_salience	6.13	2.74	0	10	19.79
eu_asylum	4.23	2.18	1	8	18.50
eu_dissent	2.47	2.33	0	10	17.90
corrupt_salience	5.09	3.28	0	10	16.14
people_vs_elite	5.11	2.99	0	10	16.14
galtan_new_clear	7.17	2.52	0	10	15.64
members_vs_leadership	6.76	2.54	0	10	15.50
galtan_new_salience	6.69	2.47	0	10	14.85
immigra_salience	6.45	2.60	0	10	13.51
immigrate_policy	5.66	3.14	0	10	12.82
galtan_salience	6.49	2.49	0	10	12.04
antielite_salience	4.92	3.34	0	10	11.53
galtan_clear	7.31	2.38	0	10	11.02
galtan_new	5.34	3.09	0	10	10.61
lrecon_clear	6.20	2.71	0	10	10.52
lrecon	4.94	2.69	0	10	9.64
position	4.74	2.07	1	7	9.55
galtan	5.08	3.17	0	10	9.36
lrgen	5.37	2.69	0	10	7.20
eu_salience	6.29	2.50	0	10	6.83
lrecon_salience	6.24	2.61	0	10	4.43

Table 2. Missing Values by Country

country_name	nMissing	nValsByCountry	prMiss
it	1538	4680	32.9
por	492	2496	19.7
ge	723	3744	19.3
nl	888	5070	17.5
hu	760	4576	16.6
esp	563	3640	15.5
uk	471	3276	14.4
sk	716	5200	13.8
pl	701	5148	13.6
swe	588	4680	12.6
fr	384	5200	7.4
gr	192	3042	6.3
est	115	2340	4.9
cz	142	3276	4.3

Table 3. *Top Twenty Parties by Missing Values*

Party	Party ID	Missing (%)
VdA(UV)	847	87.9
LKR	350	76.4
PIRAT	1611	72.0
SVP	827	71.3
BLAU	351	61.8
Siet	2816	55.8
MPT	1209	51.9
PDR	1251	48.1
CD	843	42.8
50PLUS	1020	40.5
SF	1150	39.8
CC	517	39.6
TR	2613	38.5
MLP	2313	36.9
AP	852	36.7
Denk	1050	36.2
SI	850	35.6
EA/EH Bildu	507	35.2
FI	1612	33.3
SMK-MKP	2804	33.3

Table 4. *Structural Equation Model Coefficients*

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
populism = ~ people_vs_elite	1.000	0.000	NA	NA
populism = ~ antielite_salience	1.432	0.132	10.873	0
populism = ~ corrupt_salience	0.734	0.109	6.729	0
nationalism = ~ immigrate_policy	1.000	0.000	NA	NA
nationalism = ~ eu_asylum	-0.854	0.055	-15.433	0
nationalism = ~ ethnic_minorities	0.943	0.043	21.793	0
nationalism = ~ multiculturalism	1.016	0.028	35.943	0
proEU = ~ position	1.000	0.000	NA	NA
proEU = ~ eu_budgets	0.952	0.047	20.277	0
left_right = ~ lrgen	1.000	0.000	NA	NA
left_right = ~ lrecon	0.705	0.057	12.273	0
left_right = ~ lrecon_clear	-0.248	0.070	-3.520	0
left_right = ~ lrecon_salience	-0.258	0.070	-3.665	0
ideology = ~ galton	1.000	0.000	NA	NA

Table 5. *Predicted Latent Variables in the Structural Equation Model*

party	populism	nationalism	proEU	left_right	ideology
PiS	0.939	0.937	0.159	0.991	0.906
UKIP	0.938	0.942	0.030	0.896	0.937
DLF	0.935	0.943	0.031	0.915	0.924
AfD	0.934	0.941	0.066	0.880	0.908
Kotleba LSNS	0.917	0.949	0.031	0.996	0.950
ANO	0.911	0.758	0.275	0.114	0.590
XA	0.911	0.950	0.031	0.999	0.951
FN	0.909	0.950	0.032	0.999	0.947
Insoumis	0.901	0.164	0.078	0.053	0.163
PVV	0.897	0.948	0.032	0.996	0.944
Fidesz	0.892	0.935	0.096	0.995	0.948
Korwin	0.891	0.940	0.032	0.985	0.916
SD	0.888	0.941	0.047	0.739	0.928
FvD	0.881	0.942	0.033	0.965	0.906
M5S	0.880	0.630	0.174	0.290	0.467
KKE	0.866	0.261	0.036	0.004	0.353
Podemos	0.861	0.094	0.440	0.216	0.069
EKRE	0.855	0.947	0.073	0.959	0.950
Kukiz	0.846	0.904	0.143	0.875	0.899
SYRIZA	0.845	0.096	0.636	0.110	0.073
Sme Rodina	0.841	0.918	0.141	0.450	0.901
BLAU	0.807	0.873	0.160	0.896	0.825
EVE	0.798	0.593	0.657	0.665	0.465
ANEL	0.797	0.876	0.276	0.845	0.900
Greens	0.784	0.089	0.845	0.117	0.051
OLaNO-NOVA	0.782	0.827	0.330	0.506	0.739
Razem	0.780	0.081	0.796	0.051	0.068
PDR	0.780	0.451	0.432	0.339	0.515
SF	0.774	0.307	0.675	0.063	0.355
JOBBIK	0.767	0.933	0.139	0.948	0.907
Lab	0.765	0.320	0.221	0.100	0.316
Pirates	0.764	0.270	0.498	0.339	0.128
EA/EH Bildu	0.759	0.098	0.428	0.045	0.091
LN	0.754	0.929	0.074	0.968	0.905
LMP	0.721	0.259	0.692	0.426	0.133
EK	0.708	0.424	0.673	0.316	0.583
Linke	0.707	0.212	0.427	0.055	0.212
PIRAT	0.699	0.252	0.333	0.563	0.208
PCF	0.694	0.218	0.189	0.014	0.214
LREM	0.677	0.351	0.895	0.285	0.255

Table 6. *Number of Parties by Category and Cluster*

	1	2	3	4
0	22	2	35	25
1	6	1	2	5
2	4	21	5	1

Table 7. *Variable Means by Cluster, in Percentage, Highest of Cluster 2*

Variable	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
ethnic_minorities	33.6	93.0	56.6	16.1
multiculturalism	34.2	92.7	62.1	11.8
galtan_new	35.5	92.6	61.9	11.4
immigrate_policy	32.0	92.6	63.5	12.1
galtan	35.2	91.9	62.7	11.7
immigra_salience	17.9	91.7	48.2	45.0
multicult_salience	21.0	89.5	48.0	45.0
lrgen	24.3	89.4	66.5	18.5
galtan_new_salience	19.3	89.0	34.6	67.0
antielite_salience	59.2	87.8	22.8	45.1
galtan_new_clear	15.8	87.2	36.1	72.3
members_vs_leadership	38.0	84.4	59.0	20.6
galtan_salience	15.1	81.6	43.7	70.3
people_vs_elite	66.5	76.6	17.6	61.6
corrupt_salience	54.1	64.4	31.7	60.6

Table 8. *Variable Means by Cluster, in Percentage, Highest of Cluster 4*

Variable	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
eu_asylum	53.3	6.4	55.7	82.5
galtan_clear	16.3	77.4	38.9	78.1
position	48.0	7.9	68.2	69.7
eu_budgets	52.1	9.5	65.4	67.0
lrecon_clear	41.4	23.8	60.2	66.5
eu_salience	36.2	59.2	47.5	60.1

Table 9. *Contingency Table Comparing Predicted vs. True Categories*

	0	1	2
0	82	1	1
1	5	9	0
2	3	0	28

Figure 1. Scree Plot for Factor Analysis




Figure 2. Contributions of Variables and Parties to Factors




Figure 3. A Cluster Analysis of Variables




Figure 4. Graph Showing the Estimated Model




Figure 5. Optimal Number of Clusters Using the Gap Statistic Method




Figure 6. Clusters of European Parties




Figure 7. Silhouette Diagram with Four Clusters




Figure 8. A Simplified Recursive Partitioning Diagram





Figure 9. A More Complex Recursive Partitioning Diagram



Cognitive Dissonance: Affecting Party Orientation and Selective Recall of Political Information

By Moayad Al Marrar* & Eugene Allevato[‡]

Cognitive dissonance theory posits that inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviors cause an uncomfortable arousal state, and people are motivated to reduce this discomfort by changing attitudes or behaviors to increase consistency. This principle applies to research on political affiliation. Due to dissonance processes, individuals focus less on political information that opposes their views and pay greater attention when it is congruent with their views. This study adds to this research by examining whether political orientation causes a similar pattern of selective attention bias during the recall stage. Participants (117) studied a political article on a social issue representing a viewpoint that was favorable to Democrats. Next, participants recalled as much information as possible by typing the information in a textbox. Using a sliding scale, they also rated how they felt about the article in terms of arousal and affect, and indicated whether the article was neutral, positive, or negative. Democrats were predicted to recall more positive information and more positive affect after reading the article than Republicans. Surprisingly, more Republicans, rather than Democrats, recalled more positive information about the article. Finally, those who scored more conservatively on the political slider also reported more positive affect toward the article. Although contrary to the study hypotheses, these results have implications for our current understanding of selective attention in a political context by showing the bias also occurs at the recall stage. It takes a special effort to be able to think outside the bubble. The purpose of this study is to find what it takes to pop the bubble and change the mindset of political engaged people.

Keywords: *cognitive dissonance, attentional bias, political orientation, selective recall*

Seeing what you want to see

Selective attention bias denotes the tendency of individuals to favor or become predisposed towards a certain stimulus or a set of stimuli. Individuals who display a selective attentional bias tend to select, read, or process information that is in harmony with their views in a biased manner (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2009). In recent years, researchers have contributed to an ongoing debate in the literature regarding selective attentional bias in the field of communication with regard to political affiliations. It is hence important that this subject is studied because if individuals are only attentive to information that matches with their personal views, the result may be the proliferation of echo chambers (Jamieson and Cappella 2008). Echo chambers refer to the process whereby the opinion of an

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individual is amplified by media that they view or consume as well as by being around personal social networks that have views that are in agreement with their position and viewpoints. One can imagine that in a political context, not being fully informed and aware of how these biases shape behavior could have negative consequences. After the results of the 2016 presidential election, it is more important than ever to understand political polarization and the processes that contribute to it. Knowing that the difference between winners and losers is the mindset, the question is what it takes to think outside the bubble? Within the different spheres of mindset, what causes a change in mindset? The hypothesis is that a transformative experience is necessary.

Existence of such echo chambers in various communities could jeopardize opinion diversity as well as have damaging consequences for deliberative democracies; if people constantly surround themselves with information with which they already agree, there may be little room for growth, tolerance, creativity, and other group processes such as group cooperation and innovation. Some researchers have gone as far as to say that a preference for information consistent with one's views and an intolerance of information that is inconsistent with one's views goes against the very principles of democracy (Neuman et al. 2011). Although some research has explored how individuals tend to focus on information consistent with their existing opinions, not as much research has focused on the selective attentional bias in a political context. This includes, for example, how people assign their attention according to their political affiliation and the information presented to them, whether that is in the form of what news channel to watch, what clubs to join, or what books or newspapers to read. Given events in recent history, the present study seeks to bring these areas of literature together to propose a study that explores the role of selective attention on subsequent recall of political information.

Selective Attention

Selective attention is a very specific cognitive-perceptual process that has received a lot of research attention over the years. Original models proposed in the early to mid-1900s sought to try to explain why individuals seemed to be able to pay attention to some things, but not all things, and how this subsequently affected a person's memory (Broadbent 1957, Deutsch and Deutsch 1963, Treisman 1960). These kinds of models put forth the idea that people only have a limited capacity to pay attention to the vast amount of stimuli in their immediate environment, similar to the concept of "cognitive misers," which refers to individuals who take shortcuts when processing information due to the overwhelming amount of surrounding stimuli (Fiske and Taylor 1984). Individuals do, however, influence what information is attended to and kept in memory, using filters of incoming information. These models also were the first to imply that what is focused on or remembered depends on the information that is of interest or relevant to the person perceiving the information (Deutsch and Deutsch 1963). Since these beginnings, much research has explored how selective attention biases can arise in a number of

different contexts. There has also been much research done that seeks to pinpoint what the reasons or personal motivations are (if any) that underlie selective attention processes

Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Although many theoretical models could be particularly relevant to understand selective attention bias, perhaps the most helpful theory to apply is Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, which states that people possess an inner drive to hold all their beliefs and attitudes in harmony and to avoid disharmony. According to the theory, people's attitudes may change owing to the inconsistency of these factors within an individual. The focus of this theory is hence the principle of "cognitive consistency" as Festinger (1957) called it. This theory emanates from the idea that people seek consistency in their attitudes and beliefs in all situations whenever the two are inconsistent. The theory also applies to when a thought or feeling is incompatible with a previous action, thought, or feeling. Festinger (1957) proposed that people tend to hold many perceptions regarding the world and themselves; therefore, when behaviors and attitudes clash, an inconsistency is created for the individual. This inconsistency stemming from incompatible cognitions causes arousal, or a tension state referred to as cognitive dissonance. Because experiencing dissonance is a state of aversive arousal and is uncomfortable, people are often motivated to find ways to diminish or eliminate it in a way that will regain consonance. Empirical findings on cognitive dissonance in Festinger's original research showed that to resolve this dissonance, participants changed their attitude toward the tasks in a direction that was more favorable and brought more consistency between their actions and feelings. Specifically, participants convinced themselves that they enjoyed a boring task they had just completed to justify their action of lying to the other participants and saying the task was enjoyable. Festinger's work was the first experimental study to demonstrate this drive and to show that individuals are motivated to achieve this consistent state of mind. Considering the fact that in the sixth century B.C. the fable "The Fox and the Grapes" attributed to Aesop describes the story of a fox that tries to eat grapes from a vine but cannot reach them. After attempting again and again, rather than accepting the defeat, she walked away saying that they were sour to eliminate the discomfort of the failure of not been able to reach the grapes. This seems to indicate that cognitive dissonance may be a constituent element of human nature.

Cognitive dissonance processes have clear value in explaining selective attention and can help apply this principle to attentional bias research. Research finds that selective attention stems from the feeling of dissonance (which Festinger originally proposed) that occurs due to reading or viewing information that is incongruent with one's views (an inconsistency that individuals are motivated to resolve) (e.g., Vraga 2015). Thus, this feeling of inconsistency and dissonance is resolved by focusing one's cognitive attention on information or stimuli that fit with one's beliefs, and also by avoiding information or stimuli that do not fit. In

fact, one of the originally proposed forms of cognitive dissonance was selective exposure to information (Festinger 1957), where individuals choose to seek out biased information to fit in line with a choice, they have already made in the past in order to avoid dissonance. If a past action or behavior is no longer consistent with a changed opinion or piece of information, the person must rationalize either the previous behavior or their current opinion somehow to reduce this inconsistency.

There is empirical evidence to support the idea that people alter their opinions or seek out information in a biased manner, specifically for the sake of consistency. For example, priming participants with a cognitive consistency goal increased the rate that they distorted information to be in line with their views, and it also increased the frequency that they made biased choices that justified their previous actions (Chaxel et al. 2016). Thus, information was mentally altered to fit an existing view. A key conclusion from these findings is that selective exposure to information is a key human motivation and this kind of motivated reasoning is caused by a specific desired outcome: consistency between one's beliefs. According to this research, people are motivated to attain a consistent state between their beliefs and take part in goal-oriented behaviors to get to this state.

Dissonance in a Political Context

Several research studies also support the idea that individuals prefer information that is congruent with their views, and that they are motivated to avoid counter-attitudinal information, specifically within a political context (e.g., Beasley and Joslyn 2001). Individuals experience cognitive dissonance in a variety of political contexts. For instance, they may feel a commitment to supporting a certain candidate due to the past action of having voted for them, and they may then experience dissonance due to the inconsistency between attitude and behavior from having voted for a candidate that lost. Voters may compensate for such inconsistencies by changing their attitudes towards the winning or losing candidates, depending on for whom they voted. This branch of research also suggests that cognitive dissonance processes may be different and maybe even stronger when something such as one's political party affiliation or political identity is at stake, where individuals tend to have very strong attitudes. Confirmation bias takes place, where people prefer to seek out information congruent with their attitudes when looking at political information online and avoid information or articles that contradict their political attitudes (Knobloch-Westerwick and Kleinman 2012). However, this research also found that this confirmation bias effect is stronger or weaker depending on the political context. For example, for participants who felt their favored party was likely to win the election and who didn't consume news often, the biased seeking of confirming the information was strongest, however, for those who felt that there might be a chance of a government change and their preferred candidate might not win, these individuals did not show the confirmation bias (Knobloch-Westerwick and Kleinman 2012). It seems that the details of the political situation can alter just how strong the preference for congruent information is.

In addition to the influence of a specific historical and political context, this tendency for people to seek out congruent information consistent with their own political beliefs is also tied specifically to cognitive dissonance processes and motivations. Members of a political party experience dissonance when presented with counter-attitudinal information and they are motivated to reduce this dissonance by selectively seeking out information that is congruent with their views or the views of their political party (Vraga 2015). In this case, a traditional dissonance paradigm was used where participants were either in a high choice condition or a low choice condition, and then had to write a counter-attitudinal essay either about a political topic or a neutral, non-political topic. In the high choice condition, this meant that participants were told that they were being asked to volunteer to write an essay, while in the low choice condition participants were instead told that they had been randomly assigned a specific essay. When writing a political essay in the high choice condition, Republicans (but not Democrats) not only experienced more dissonance, but their political attitudes also became more polarized, and they showed stronger intentions to seek out congruent versus incongruent information (Vraga 2015). This provides evidence that cognitive dissonance processes can have a strong effect on political attitudes, and that this process of seeking out congruent information can even have a causal effect on group polarization as people strengthen their attitudes in the face of incongruent information.

Also related to the idea of selective attention in the political realm is a large body of research that finds that individuals tend to show decreased attentional effort toward political information that opposes their views, but pay greater attention to political information that is congruent with their views. One online study of selective exposure from a cognitive dissonance perspective found that individuals preferred to read articles congruent with their political views over articles that are against their views (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2009). The authors designed a pretend website with several news articles about certain political issues. They made the articles either attitude-consistent or counter-attitudinal to the participants' reported political positions. They then told participants that they were allowed to spend time reading as many articles of their choice for as long as they liked on the fake website. The results showed that individuals spent about 58% of their time looking at articles that were consistent with their views, and 43% of their time looking at articles that were counter-attitudinal, regardless of the topic of the articles. Put another way, participants spent about 36% more time viewing information that was consistent with their pre-held political views. These researchers also found that this preference for congruent information was stronger for people who reported that they view news sources regularly and among individuals who had stronger or more certain political attitudes. The bias toward seeking attitudinal congruent information holds up regardless of the context or issue the content is related to and has been found to boost the self-concept by increasing accessibility of one's political self-concept (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2011). In this way, avoiding information that goes against one's views and seeking information in line with it seems to provide a confirming, positive sense of self.

In another poignant example, a three-wave panel study was conducted that collected data before, during, and near the end of the Senate Watergate hearings of 1973, which documented both general knowledge and as well as differences in approach and avoidance of information related to the scandal among Nixon supporters, McGovern supporters, and undecided voters (Sweeney and Gruber 1984). Their research confirmed the same pattern of attentional bias; dissonance processes were the cause of differences in both the amount of knowledge the three groups had about the hearings, as well as differences in the amount of attention they paid to it (e.g., watching the news). This provides additional evidence that selective attention in political contexts takes place both through approach processes, or seeking out information that confirms beliefs, and avoidance processes, or the avoidance of disconfirming information in order to reduce cognitive dissonance.

There is also research on the functioning of the physiological system that is responsible for how individuals show selective attention effects when viewing political information or campaign ads (Wang et al. 2012). In a communications study, the authors used advanced physiological measures to capture the amount of attention that participants were paying to various political stimuli. Specifically, they manipulated whether participants saw a Barack Obama campaign ad or a John McCain campaign ad and used several measures of physiology that indicate the degree of arousal in the body to determine the amount of attention paid. The authors found that participants' physiological measures increased substantially (indicating that the participant was experiencing arousal) when they were viewing an ad of the candidate they felt favorably about, but not for a candidate they did not prefer. These results demonstrate, according to the authors, that it is a complicated cognitive and neurological system that is responsible for the selective attention effect, and that this is a process humanity may not be able to detect or report. It also has implications for the effectiveness of political ads and campaigns. These tools may be useful for people who already feel favorably about the candidate or party, but they may be at a disadvantage when trying to reach out to those on the other side. People simply are not motivated to hear out a campaign ad, commercial, speech, or any other form of political propaganda, unless it represents a viewpoint that the person already agrees with or finds favorable.

The present study takes the literature described above one step further by examining whether this pattern occurs at the recall stage. There is some reason to believe that the same bias toward information congruent with one's views would occur at the recall stage. Research in cognitive psychology supports the idea that a person's selective attention serves as a guide for the brain to not hold on to irrelevant information, but only retain self-relevant information in the mind (Downing 2000). If a person tends to focus only on certain information, then they should also be more likely to store that information into short-term or long-term memory and be able to later recall it. The effect also operates in the opposite direction. A person's memory also can guide them in how they perceive political information and may have a causal effect on their selective attention bias (Downing 2000). For this reason, we predicted that similar patterns to the research on selective attention to political information will happen with regard to the recall

of political information. Specifically, we hypothesized that participants would recall more information when it was congruent with their political views, either in the form of positive information about their party or their party's viewpoint on the issue, or negative information about the opposing party or its viewpoint on the issue. They should also feel more positively about the information that is congruent with their views, and more negatively about viewing information that is against their views.

The current study explored whether political orientation influences selective recall of political information. Specifically, we expected that participants would recall more positive information when it is in line with their party's views, and more negative information when in line with an opposing party's views (Houston et al. 1999). The key independent variable of interest was political orientation. The two dependent variables were the amount of positive versus negative information recalled, as well as affective rating response to the article. For this study, since the article was about raising the minimum wage, which is an issue that is more favorable to Democrats (Bloch 1980), we predicted that Democrats would recall more positive information and feel more positive affect after reading the article. We predicted that Republicans, on the other hand, would recall less positive information and more negative affect. The formal study hypotheses were as follows:

H1: Democrats will recall more positive information from the article than Republicans.

H2: Democrats will report more positive affect than Republicans after reading the article.

Experimental Method

Participants

A sample of 117 individuals ranging from various political backgrounds, states, and ages participated in the study. Participants were recruited using non-random, snowball/convenience sampling methods. A total of 247 participants began the survey, however, only 117 (64 males and 57 females) provided complete data and were used in the study. Participants were originally from different locations within the United States. Only 33 percent of participants were from California. The average age of the sample was around 30 years old ($M = 29.78$, $SD = 12.48$). Just over 31% of the sample had obtained a bachelor's degree, and all participants had at least a high school degree or GED.

The recruitment process consisted of participants who were reached via social media networks, such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and the like. Faculty members, students, and university club leaders used their personal network to reach a larger population outside of the university. They shared the link with other individuals, creating a snowball sample comprising of a wide range of participants.

Measures

The study used Qualtrics online survey software, and the data were analyzed using SPSS and LIWC language processing software.

Political Article

The article that all participants were required to read, discussed a social issue that is believed to be a political issue: the minimum wage system in the United States. The article described basic information about different minimum wages, different policies, and individuals who are involved in supporting or opposing raising the minimum wage. The article was selected from a database of articles on opposing viewpoints, and although the article does have information from both viewpoints on the issue, it was deemed to be somewhat more favorable for Democrats, for instance, because it discussed recent gains in the movement to increase the minimum wage (Bloch 1980). The article was only a few paragraphs long to be sure participants had enough time to view and study the article.

Free Recall Task

The first task was a recall measure assessing how many pieces of information participants could recall from the article. This task was a free recall task, where participants could write down as many pieces of information as they liked into a text box. Two aspects of the recalled information were assessed: the amount of information recalled and whether the participant viewed the information as positive or negative. The nature of information recalled was assessed using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC2015) software developed by Pennebaker and colleagues (Pennebaker et al. 2015). LIWC is a demonstrably efficient way to analyze the structural and emotional components of language in written text. Amounts of positive and negative information were established by the language analysis provided by LIWC. The open-ended information recalled by each participant was entered into the software and analyzed for the number of words written, and each entry was also given a score for the amount of positive emotional content and negative emotional content. Since the amount of positive and negative emotional content was pulled from the information participants recalled about the article, this was deemed to be an appropriate measure of positive or negative information. These were the measures used to indicate the amount of information, positive information, and negative information. For instance, the following quote was given a “positive emotion” score of 5.56 by the LIWC program: “This article is very good. I like the suggestion that minimum wage should be left to the state and should be increased slowly not jumping from seven dollars to \$15 because the only one who are minimum wage are young people who don't have skills or some immigrants who don't speak English very well.” As another example, the following quote was given a “negative emotion” score of 5.88: “So many people in the United States have low income job. The majority of the people. Most of those people are young and work for low income jobs, for example, a fast food chain. Economy is bad. Panera bread are thinking of using robots to serve people instead of real people.”

Affect

Affect was measured using the affective slider scale (Betella and Verschure 2016). The affective slider is an online self-reporting tool that uses two sliding scales from negative to positive, one to measure arousal and one to measure pleasure or affect. On the arousal slider, the anchors were a face showing very low arousal and a face showing very high arousal. Likewise, on the affect or pleasure slider, the anchors were a very sad face and a very happy face. Participants were able to slide the tool up and down on each slider and select the position that best indicated how they felt. Each point on the slider produced a numerical value between 0 and 100 indicating the person's level of affect or arousal on the measure. This brief measure was chosen over longer scales that measure affect to avoid overburdening the participants after a challenging cognitive task. The affective slider has also been widely used and empirically validated by prior research (Betella and Verschure 2016).

Article Neutrality

Participants were asked one multiple-choice item to assess whether they thought the article that they read was "positive", "negative", or "neutral." This measure served as an alternative method of assessing positive feelings vs. negative feelings toward the article.

Demographic Characteristics

We collected several demographic characteristics from the participants, including self-reported age, gender, highest level of education attained, current state of residence, and their primary source of news. The demographic questionnaire also included items regarding political orientation: specifically, whether participants are Republican, Independent, or Democrat. This item was a simple multiple-choice question, with the three political orientation choices and an "other" category.

During the course of the study, based on a preliminary view of the data, another political orientation measure was added. Participants after this point also answered a slider measure similar to the affective slider to assess their political leaning, ranging from liberal to conservative. This item was added in response to a large portion of participants selecting "Independent" so that the researcher would be able to consider participants who may not feel confined to one of the four categorical responses provided. It also was added to help measure the strength of political attitude, or how politically invested participants were.

Procedure

At first, participants read that they were taking part in a study about information processing. They then were prompted to read the political article. The researcher instructed them to read the article carefully and closely since they would be asked to recall information later. A timer feature on the Qualtrics survey platform was used to require participants to spend a certain amount of time reviewing the article before they could continue to the next page of the study, and

this was included in the instructions that participants read about studying the article carefully. Initially, the timer required participants to remain on the page with the article for at least five minutes before being able to move on to the recall stage. However, this was changed to two minutes during the course of the study based on feedback from participants that the five minutes was for too long to spend on the article. After viewing the article, participants wrote as many pieces of information that they could remember about the article. Next, they indicated how the article made them feel using the affective slider measure (Betella and Verschure 2016) where participants reported whether they felt the article was positive, negative, or neutral. Finally, participants answered all of the demographic questions (age, gender, state of residence, highest level of education completed, political orientation, etc.). After reading the article and completing all of the study questions, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Political orientation was fairly evenly represented in the sample; 38 identified as Democrat, 28 identified as Republican, 32 identified as Independent, and 20 selected the “other” category. Several participants were residents of California (33.6%). Participants seemed to be fairly politically informed, as many reported consuming one or more sources of news. They most commonly listed the Internet and TV as their source of news, while also listing many different news channels and websites, such as Fox News, BBC, as well as social media sources such as Facebook and Twitter.

Results and Discussion

Currently, the United States is split by a polarized political environment, social unrest, economic uncertainty, and deterioration of civil rights. This exploratory study attempts to give some insights on the root cause that may have contributed to this impasse and provided measures and hints to policymakers to inform the populace to make educated choices. News at times can be harbored by biased wording and supported by partisan sources. One needs to critically think and use an inquiry approach to analyze the information and check its facts.

The histogram in Figure 1 represents the distribution of the variable affect based on respondents’ self-report. Using the tool affective slider, respondents could range from negative to positive in reference to the article content, with zero representing a negative response and 100 a positive.

Figure 1. *Affect Slider Selection Distribution*





Table 1. *Test of Normality of the Affect Distribution*


Tests of Normality						
	Kolmogorov-Smirnov ^a			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Affect Slider	0.090	99	0.044	0.965	99	0.010

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction.

The test of normality is shown in Table 1 with a significance value of 0.044 for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and 0.010 for Shapiro-Wilk, thus we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the data for the affect variable is statistically different from a normal distribution. As we observe Figure 1, it seems that the distribution has high counts for low, medium, and high values of the variable. This outcome of extreme values for the counts may have contributed to the deviation from normality. The skewness is very close to zero (-0.65) indicating a symmetric behavior, but it may be based on a trimodal behavior, ranging from negative, neutral and positive responses, with neutral being the most frequent choice. In Figure 2, the Normal Q-Q (Quantile-Quantile) plot depicts a moderate nonlinearity. The Detrended Normal plot, which represents the magnitude and direction of deviation in the observed quantiles, indicates that we might have three main distinct groups in the way the article affected respondents based on their selection at the slider, namely negative, neutral and positive.

Figure 2. *Normal Q-Q Plot and Deviation from Normal Plot*





In Figure 3, a bar chart was created with the three denominated responses and we found that neutral selection constitutes 59%, while the positive and negative accounts for 26% and 15% respectively.

Figure 3. Bar Chart Describing the Three Main Responses of Affect towards the Article





Figure 4. Boxplot of Affect towards the Article for Different Political Orientation



In Figure 4, the boxplot for different political orientations seems to indicate that the distribution is normal for each of the political orientations because the median is close to the middle of the boxplot. This can be confirmed by the tests of Normality for each political party shown in Table 2 with significance values above 0.05 for both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk. However, the boxplot for the republican party has a median and distribution higher than the other political parties. This result may indicate that republicans in general have a positive attitude towards the article.


Table 2. Test of Normality for Affect Response for Each Political Orientation

What is your political orientation?		Tests of Normality					
		Kolmogorov-Smirnov ^a			Shapiro-Wilk		
Affect Slider		Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Affect Slider	Democrat	0.120	28	0.200*	0.966	28	0.481
	Republican	0.116	26	0.200*	0.934	26	0.095
	Independent	0.155	26	0.111	0.948	26	0.211
	Other	0.161	15	0.200*	0.963	15	0.751

* This is a lower bound of the true significance.

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction.

Figure 5. Bar Chart of Affect towards the Article for Different Political Orientation



In Figure 5, the bar chart shows a pattern of a positive affect towards the article for the republican orientation which is confirmed with the highest residual value (3.1) found in Table 3. Democrats seem to have the highest value for the neutral selection, but this result is not supported by a low residual analysis (1.3). In addition, there is a trend for democrats, independents, and other political orientations on the affect towards the article where the neutral selection is much higher than the positive. This trend is not observed for the republicans. In fact, the Republicans have an opposite behavior with the positive count being about three times higher than the other political parties.

Table 3. Cross-Tabulation including Political Orientation and Affect towards the Article Including Bonferroni Correction for 12 Comparisons

What is your political orientation? - Selected Choice * Affect towards article Cross tabulation						
		Affect towards article			Total	
		Positive	Negative	Neutral		
What is your political orientation?	Democrat	Count	4	5	20	29
		Expected Count	7.5	4.5	17	29
		% within What is your political orientation?	13.80%	17.20%	69.00%	100.00%
		Adjusted Residual	-1.8	0.3	1.3	
		Significance value of the adjusted residuals	0.0781	0.7519	0.1825	
	Republican	Count	13	3	11	27
		Expected Count	7	4.2	15.9	27
		% within What is your political orientation?	48.10%	11.10%	40.70%	100.00%
		Adjusted Residual	3.1	-0.7	-2.2	
		Significance value of the adjusted residuals	0.0018	0.4615	0.0251	
	Independent	Count	4	7	15	26
		Expected Count	6.7	4	15.3	26
		% within What is your political orientation?	15.40%	26.90%	57.70%	100.00%
		Adjusted Residual	-1.4	1.9	-0.1	
		Significance value of the adjusted residuals	0.1569	0.0589	0.8969	
	Other	Count	4	0	11	15
		Expected Count	3.9	2.3	8.8	15
		% within What is your political orientation?	26.70%	0.00%	73.30%	100.00%
		Adjusted Residual	0.1	-1.8	1.2	
			Significance value of the adjusted residuals	0.9314	0.0716	0.2125
			alpha	New alpha		
			0.05	0.0042		

Table 4. Chi-Square Test of Independence - Political Orientation and Affect towards the Article

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.423 ^a	6	0.017
Likelihood Ratio	16.927	6	0.010
Linear-by-Linear Association	0	1	0.992
N of Valid Cases	97		

a. 5 cells (41.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.32.

A Chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the association between political orientations and affect toward the article. The relation between these variables was significant $\chi^2(1, N=97) = 16.927, p= 0.010$, as shown in Table 4. In this case, since 5 cells (41.7%) have expected count values less than 5, we used the likelihood ratio test instead of Pearson Chi-square. Because the p-

value is below our usual cut off point of 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis, therefore we must assume that there is a significant association between political orientation and affect towards the article. In Table 5, the value of Cramer's V is 0.282, with an approximate significance of 0.017 indicating a low to moderate association. However, in Table 3 the cross-tabulation shows that the highest adjusted residual is 3.1 with an observed count much higher than expected, indicating that republicans have a positive affect towards the article. This may suggest that republicans were more likely than other political orientations to be positively affected by this article. The residuals for other political orientations were negative, indicating that the actual count was less than the expected count. These results lead us to conclude that political orientation seems to interfere with the decoding of the information or news source.


Table 5. *Symmetric Measures the Strength of Association*

Symmetric Measures		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	0.399	0.017
	Cramer's V	0.282	0.017
N of Valid Cases		97	

The Bonferroni correction was used because of the risk of a type I error when making multiple statistical tests simultaneously. With Bonferroni correction, the statistical significance was set at 0.0042 (Adjusted alpha - correction for 12 comparisons 0.05/12). In Table 3 we see that there were 13 republicans that responded positively, and the expected value was 7 with a significance value of the adjusted residual of 0.0018 that is less than the Bonferroni correction of 0.0042. This confirms the finding that republicans were positively affected by the article. The neutral position for republicans was another area that could be statistically significant. Since the observed count (11) was less than the expected value (15.9) the adjusted value is -2.2. The significance value of the adjusted value (0.02521) is greater than Bonferroni correction (0.0042) indicating that neutral position is not statistically significant. The democratic selection of positive affect with residual (-1.8) also seems to indicate a tendency to be statistically significant. However, the finding of 0.0781 for the significance value of the adjusted value is greater than 0.0042 with a count of 4 that is less than the expected count of 7.5. Thus, the democratic selection of positive affect in relation to the article is not significant.

In Figure 6, the bar chart shows similar behavior for both male and female in relation to affect toward the article indicating that gender is not a factor. The Chi-square test was performed and confirmed that there is no significant difference due to gender with the asymptotic significance well above 0.05.

Figure 6. Clustered Bar Chart of Effect towards the Article for Different Gender



In Figure 7 the clustered bar chart seems to indicate that there might be a pattern of disproportional high counts for a neutral position for respondents with higher education in comparison to high school graduates, while there is an equivalent number of counts for both positive and neutral counts for respondents with only a high school education. This may imply that education is an important factor in political awareness and understanding of social and political events. This observation seems to be in agreement with the adjusted residual value of (-2.2) for the neutral selection. This high value of the residual, within fifteen comparisons as shown in Table 6 may indicate statistical significance where the count of 9 was much less than the expected count of 13.6.

However, the Chi-square test does not indicate any association between affect toward the article due to education level. Further analysis using Bonferroni correction was performed and the significance value of the adjusted value is 0.0272 for the adjusted residual of -2.2 failed to reject the null hypothesis since the Bonferroni correction cut off value is 0.0033.

Despite the apparent association, there is not enough evidence available to suggest the dependence between the education’s level and affect towards the article. As this work was exploratory, we recommend further investigation with higher sampling and one-on-one interviews.

Figure 7. Clustered Bar Chart of Affect towards the Article for Different Education Levels






Table 6. Cross-Tabulation including Education Level and Affect towards the Article

		What is the highest level of education you have completed? * Affect towards article				Total
		Affect towards article			Total	
		Positive	Negative	Neutral		
What is the highest level of education you have completed?	High School/GED	Count	8	6	9	23
		Expected Count	6	3.5	13.6	23
		% within highest level of education	34.80%	26.10%	39.10%	100.00%
		Adjusted Residual	1.1	1.7	-2.2	
	Some college, no degree	Count	5	3	19	27
		Expected Count	7	4.1	15.9	27
		% within highest level of education	18.50%	11.10%	70.40%	100.00%
		Adjusted Residual	-1	-0.7	1.4	
	Associate's degree	Count	1	0	3	4
		Expected Count	1	0.6	2.4	4
		% within highest level of education	25.00%	0.00%	75.00%	100.00%
		Adjusted Residual	0	-0.9	0.7	
	Bachelor's degree	Count	7	5	18	30
		Expected Count	7.8	4.5	17.7	30
		% within highest level of education	23.30%	16.70%	60.00%	100.00%
		Adjusted Residual	-0.4	0.3	0.1	
Graduate or professional degree	Count	5	1	10	16	
	Expected Count	4.2	2.4	9.4	16	
	% within highest level of education	31.30%	6.30%	62.50%	100.00%	
	Adjusted Residual	0.5	-1.1	0.3		
<i>Total</i>		Count	26	15	59	100
		Expected Count	26	15	59	100
		% within highest level of education	26.00%	15.00%	59.00%	100.00%

Figure 8. Relative Frequencies of Different Political Orientation

In Figure 8, a pie chart represents the relative frequencies of different political orientations. It shows that most republicans that participated in this survey have education beyond high school. Responders that only completed high school identified themselves as either independent (34.8%), Democrats (26.1%), others (26.1%) or Republicans (13%).

Figure 9. Cluster Bar Chart of Different Political Orientation



The clustered bar shown in Figure 9 represents affect responses towards the article for respondents that utilized a single source of news information or multiple sources to become aware of political activities. We see a telling pattern of high counts of neutral position towards the article for respondents that rely on multiple sources of information. However, respondents that review only a single source of information seem to have a higher count for a positive position towards the article.

This observation is reassured by the cross-tabulation in Table 7 where the value of the adjusted residual for the cell of single source and positive affect towards the article has the highest value of 1.9 due to a larger count observed (17) than the expected (12.9). The value of 1.9 for the adjusted residual with the significance value of 0.0556 seems to suggest a mild significance between respondents that utilize a single source of news may be affected positively towards the article. However, Bonferroni correction with the statistical significance set at 0.0083 (Adjusted alpha - correction for 6 comparisons 0.05/6) is less than the adjusted residual significance of 0.0556 so we do not reject the null hypothesis indicating that there is no association between a single source of news and a positive effect.

Table 7. Cross-Tabulation including Source of News and Affect towards the Article

<i>Source News Quality * Affect towards article Cross tabulation</i>						
			Affect towards article			Total
			Positive	Negative	Neutral	
<i>Source News Quality</i>	Single Source	Count	17	8	24	49
		Expected Count	12.9	7.7	28.4	49
		% within Source_News_Quality	34.7%	16.3%	49.0%	100.0%
		Adjusted Residual	1.9	0.1	-1.8	
	Significance value of the adjusted residuals		0.0556		0.0693	
	Multiple Reliable Sources	Count	8	7	31	46
		Expected Count	12.1	7.3	26.6	46
		% within Source_News_Quality	17.4%	15.2%	67.4%	100.0%
Adjusted Residual		-1.9	-0.1	1.8		

		Significance value of the adjusted residuals	0.0556		0.0693	
<i>Total</i>		Count	25	15	55	95
		Expected Count	25	15	55	95
		% within Source_News_Quality	26.3%	15.8%	57.9%	100.0%
			alpha	New alpha		
			0.05	0.0083		

What did the Respondents Remember after Reading the Article?

An analysis of the word choice and themes in the answers of the respondents reveal their thoughts, feelings, and motivations in relation to minimum wage. Three main categories were identified: people's status of poverty, job market change, and cost of living. Respondents who identify as democrats believe that the increase of minimum wage impacts society positively by helping reduce poverty. They also seem to understand that a minimum wage increase may reduce job opportunities due to the cost to the businesses and the subsequent implementation of automation. Lastly, the cost of living is hardly discussed by the democrats' respondents.

Republican respondents also display concerns about job opportunity reduction due to the increased financial toll on businesses. However, instead of linking the increase of minimum wages to the reduction of poverty, the republicans emphasize the ensuing increase in cost of living.

Transcripts from both republicans and democrats were processed for nouns by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count program (LIWC 2015) for cognitive process words as described in Table 8.

Table 8. *LIWC Dimension Data of Transcripts for Both Republicans and Democrats*

Traditional Liwc Dimension	Republicans	Democrats	% Difference
I-Words (I, Me, My)	0.6	0	-
Social Words	5.8	5.6	4%
Positive Emotions	1.2	1.4	15%
Negative Emotions	1.5	2	29%
Cognitive Processes	11.5	8.9	25%
Summary Variables			
Analytic	87	87.8	1%
Clout	54.6	57.1	4%
Authenticity	24.2	15.8	42%
Emotional Tone	20.5	17.1	18%

Cognitive processes were most pervasive for republicans than for democrats, averaging 11.5%, whereas words reflecting negative emotions (1.5%) were least prevalent. This may indicate that Republicans made more effort to process thinking. A major difference between republicans and democrats is authenticity,

with 42% difference where republicans had higher number associated with a more honest, personal and disclosing text. Similarly, republicans had a higher number for emotional tone reflecting a more positive, while a lower number as observed for the democrats, reveals anxiety, sadness or hostility. Still both were significantly lower than 50 indicating a lack emotionality or some level of ambivalence.

Findings suggest that democrats were more negative and less authentic with lack of emotional tone. It is important to note that this study was executed during the period of 2016 when the democrats lost the presidential election. This event could have caused the results observed in this study. It is expected that a social crisis will naturally evoke negative sentiment and the public mourns their loss and growing anxious about the future.

Recommendation

Nature's diversity is a fundamental pillar of our existence. Without diversity, there is no life. This diversity also holds through for our political affiliations. Unfortunately, we are very vulnerable to our implicit biases. We seem to accept news (real or fake) that favors and benefits our party or social group, while we reject information that goes against our political views. It is important to question our own ideological views by exposing ourselves to a greater number of viewpoints. We should try to gain an understanding and appreciation of our own cognitive biases and update some of our questionable beliefs to avoid the thinking that evidence is only in the domain of our own social group. In addition, the development of tolerance, empathy, and respect to others' point of view is crucial to prevent the creation of toxic environments that make critical thinking and persuasive activities difficult to materialize. If we allow ourselves to be unbiased, there are many possibilities that could be explored such as controversial theories suggested by economist Milton Friedman in favor of taxes on pollution.

This study suggests that education may play a role in the awareness of politics as well as the interpretation of sources of news and information. Thus, we need to ensure that social and political comprehension is emphasized in secondary education. With this improved political awareness, we can learn to listen carefully, reflect critically, and act accordingly to overcome news stories that are clearly designed to manipulate our intuitions and our emotions.

Discussion

This study sought to add to the literature on selective attention in a political context, by demonstrating that the same motivated processing of information as laid out in cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) drives people to selectively pay attention to, and therefore selectively recall, political information that is in line with their existing political attitudes. Overall, there was a somewhat surprising lack of support for the study hypotheses. Although not statistically significant, the trend in the average total amount of information recalled, as well as positive or

negative information recalled seemed to imply that Republicans recalled more of each kind of information than the other political groups. Stronger support was found for the hypothesis that political orientation would be a factor influencing participants' affect towards the article, however, the result was in the opposite direction than what was hypothesized. Those who self-reported as Republican or Conservative more frequently reported that the article was positive. Interestingly, the other political orientation categories (i.e., Democrat, Independent, Liberal, Other) more frequently reported that it was neutral, not necessarily negative. The same pattern was found for participants' reports of their affective state after reading the article.

There are many possible mechanisms that were operating during the study that could have influenced these results. First, it is possible that there were some issues of internal validity and that historical and contextual factors relating to the recent 2016 election may have affected participants' responses. Indeed, research shows that people's tendency to prefer congruent information can be swayed by how confident they are in their preferred party, such as in their party's ability to win an election (Knobloch-Westerwick and Kleinman 2012). Those who have a strong belief in the ability of their preferred party tend to show the *strongest* preference for confirming information, whereas those who feel less secure or confident in a win for their party do not show the confirmation bias. Although the election has passed at the point of writing this paper, it is possible that Republicans and Conservatives feel emboldened and empowered by the Republican party's presidential win, as well as their control of the House and the Senate. This political context may have been what was driving Republicans and Conservatives in this sample to feel confident and, therefore, to exhibit the bias of only focusing on things they found positive about the article. Other political orientation groups would not have been operating under the confirmation bias and may have simply focused equally on both the confirming and disconfirming parts of the article, which would explain their responses showing that the article was neutral.

There is also the possibility that when perceived information matches the reader's own opinions or outlooks, they may find the material neutral rather than positive. Work on the confirmation bias and the expectation of seeing certain information indicates that if someone reads an article that is already in line with their views, they may not be motivated to process the article very highly (Nickerson 1998). Since this article seemed to be somewhat favorable towards Liberals or Democrats (since it described recent gains in the movement for raising the minimum wage), these participants may not have been triggered to have an emotional reaction to the article, viewing it as unsurprising. Since we did not ask participants what positive or negative meant to them, it is difficult to address this possibility. Still, this could be one possible explanation of Republicans' and Conservatives' greater recall of more positively themed information and more information overall.

Another possible reason for these findings lies in the cognitive differences in processing and behavior between conservative individuals and liberal individuals. For instance, liberals and conservatives react to others in need very differently for a number of different reasons, for example, depending on whether they have

violated societal conventions or whether shared resources are scarce (Skitka and Tetlock 1993). In fact, Skitka and Tetlock (1993) found that while liberals seemed to help others out of a motivation to avoid awkward or socially unacceptable outcomes, conservatives were more likely to withhold assistance out a motive to punish individuals they viewed as responsible for their own negative situation, ostensibly in order to punish them for “riding on the coattails” of others. It is possible that the article used for this study triggered this kind of feeling towards individuals who would benefit from a raising of the minimum wage. Indeed, several respondents recalled information that described this population, using phrases such as “single parent, immigrant, working two jobs, choosing between paying bills or putting food on the table” etc. It is possible, then, that for liberals/Democrats, this same information – that lower-income people are struggling – was perhaps met with empathy and even evaluation of both sides of the article. However, for Republicans or Conservatives – who might read the description of these low-income communities and react in a “that’s what they get” sort of sense – might actually respond positively to this content. For example, those higher in the need to believe in a just world (Lerner and Simmons 1966, Hafer and Bègue 2005) have the tendency to blame others who are disadvantaged and believe that they somehow caused their own predicament and therefore deserve it. These individuals are also less likely to have compassion towards or provide assistance to such “deservingly disadvantaged” targets, and through the belief that their situation is just, people boost their own self-esteem and worldview. This explanation is beyond the scope of this paper, however, it is possible that the rationalization of low-income people’s situation led to a positive state of mind for Republicans/Conservatives, since they are more likely to believe in a just world (Hafer and Bègue 2005).

There were several limitations to the present study. There was a large number of surveys that were started but not completed, leading to a lot of missing data. A possible reason to why this may have occurred is that since 2017, 58% of Americans, including Democrats (52%), independents (59%) and Republicans (77%), agree that they have political opinions they are afraid to share (Ekins 2020). A larger sample size may have helped detect any effects that are truly in the population with regard to processing political information. Future studies should try to address this research question with a larger, more representative sample. A larger sample size would be more conclusive as it would be composed of a bigger population consisting of political groups.

The results could have also been affected by several aspects of the study design. First, the article may have been too long, too difficult, or unengaging for participants, and they may not have made the effort to try to remember as much information about it, as they were instructed. There was some evidence of this, as some participants admitted they did not read the article. Since these participants’ data could not be used, this may have also limited the power of the study to detect effects. If the article had been more engaging for participants, perhaps the study would have better-detected differences in recall between political orientation groups. Related to this limitation is the fact that the researcher adjusted the length of time participants had to spend reading the article before they could advance and

continue the study. At the start of data collection, the timer was set to 5 minutes, but after receiving some feedback that this may be too long, this time was reduced to 2 minutes. Although unlikely, it is possible that the difference in time limits influenced the results of the study, and results should be interpreted with caution. Similarly, the addition of the political slider measure after the initiation of the study meant that those who participated before this change took place did not complete this second measure of political leaning.

Another limitation lies in the nature of the method of analysis. The dependent variables of positive and negative information were operationalized for this study as the amount of positive and negative emotional content of the information participants recalled about the article. Despite the potential pitfalls of off-the-shelf text analysis software, there is a growing popularity of computerized text analysis, it is important that reductive, word-count programs such as LIWC are used with caution. However, we used LIWC in conjunction with other qualitative analysis strategies and it has become clear from the experiments presented that results were consistent.

It is also possible that LIWC did not take into account the number of independent pieces of information when calculating word counts and other analyses. It is possible that Republican/Conservative participants were simply more verbose, but not necessarily writing about more distinct pieces of information from the article. Future studies could use more intensive, word-by-word coding techniques to see if the results might be different with a different type of language analysis.

Conclusion

Overall, this paper provides an exploration of selective attention processes in a political context. It was found that when tasked with recalling as much information as they could from an ostensibly neutral political article, it appeared the Republicans/Conservatives, not Democrats/Liberals, recalled more positive information, said the article was positive vs. neutral, and themselves felt more positive affect and arousal after reading the article. Although in the opposite of what was expected, this finding does indicate that something is going on involving the information processing of information by these different political groups. Further research should work to unpack what this mechanism is, perhaps by assessing other social-personality and cognitive variables that are known to accompany different political orientations. For instance, right-wing authoritarianism, the need for cognitive closure, openness to change, system-justification, and social dominance orientation are all individual difference variables that have been tied to how people approach political situations and social issues (Jost et al. 2003). One's tendency to respond by helping others compared to maintaining the status quo could have certainly affected how participants responded in this study. In addition, it is suggested that future studies should include a political knowledge assessment in order to better estimate the validity of the results. Overall, the present paper provides an interesting starting point to

pinpoint the effects of political orientation on selective attention, and the subsequent selective recall of political information. In the Internet age, we are saddled with an educational system for the industrial age, modeled on mass production and designed for efficiency, not for high standards.

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Brazil: Country on Hold, Political Tension Running High

By Raquel de Caria Patrício*

This paper discusses the Brazilian 2022 presidential elections, presenting Bolsonaro and Lula as the two frontrunners who have too many other candidates to face, who compose a third way that together joins around 30% of voting intention. Approaching the way how Bolsonaro arrived at power in the 2018 elections – when Lula could not be a candidate because he was incarcerated – this paper also discusses Bolsonaro’s government so that it can be possible to understand from where Bolsonaro comes and who he is, which mistakes he is doing that justifies the low levels of popularity, especially compared to Lula. Looking forward to seeing what the best for Brazil is and based on the hypothesis that a coup led by Bolsonaro would never succeed, not because of the international support to Brazil but due to the resilience of internal defenders of the rule of law, this paper is theoretically supported on the paradigmatic theory and concludes from the scenarios structured that Lula seems to be victorious in all of them.

Keywords: Brazil, 2022 elections, 2018 elections, Bolsonaro, Lula, third way

Introduction

On October 2, 2022, nearly 146 million Brazilians will head to the polls to select who will be their president until 2026. They will also choose representatives for the Congress and their state governors. And while the polls will only open a year from now, make no mistake: the 2022 election has already begun (Ribeiro 2021).

Brazil is currently facing a scenario of strong political, economic, and social tension in which President Jair Bolsonaro faces a declining popularity and a deficient performance in the election polls for 2022 (Winter 2021). Considering a Datafolha (2021) poll from September, 59% of respondents said they would not vote for Bolsonaro “under any circumstances”. Overall, just 38% said the same about Lula. Additionally, 63% said Bolsonaro is “incapable of leading the country”, while great majorities also described him as dishonest (52%) and unprepared (62%).

These numbers show that more than losing popularity President Bolsonaro has lost the respect of his citizens, which rarely comes back. Indeed, Bolsonaro’s popularity has been steadily eroding since January 2021, when an emergency social program was scaled back just as the *Manaus variant* took the pandemic into its most brutal phase. COVID-19 has killed around 600,000 Brazilians, the world’s second-highest toll behind the USA and on a per-capita basis, Brazil is among the ten worst countries in the world. Today the cases and deaths are finally falling thanks to the vaccination drive, but constantly questioned by Bolsonaro, who has

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accomplished the feat of receiving little to no political credit for the improvement because he is part of the denial movement (Winter 2021).

The question that arises, therefore, is whether the support Mr. Bolsonaro still benefits will be sufficient to withstand his isolation in domestic and international political life. We seek to answer this question and have the aim to assess whether former president Lula da Silva is the political force best placed to achieve the Presidency of the Republic instead of Bolsonaro. It is also our goal to understand whether in any of the cases the best for Brazil will be in the first place, improving Brazil's image at the international level. The reactions to the events in the country have been one of concern and dissatisfaction. Moreover, it is necessary to consider that a third way exists and joins around 30% of voting intentions, which may exclude Bolsonaro from a second turn. Therein, we can rely on the central hypothesis that even if the democratic regime seems to have established itself as dominant, one should not overestimate the means that international community has to contain Bolsonaro's authoritarian impulses. If he fails in an eventual attempt of a coup, it will certainly not be due to pressure from external actors, but due to the resilience of internal defenders of the rule of law.

The framework of this research is a middle-range theory that covers the period from independence to the present day of Brazil's socio-political and economic evolution throughout paradigmatic models. Therefore, the liberal-conservative model is followed by the developmental model, which is ensued by the neoliberal model. This is succeeded by the rise to power at the beginning of the XXI century by left governments (Cervo 2008, 2003, 2001), until between 2010 and 2018 there is a rise of right or far-right governments to power in the Latin American countries. Nowadays, those countries have been living in a phase in which left governments have been returning to power in a cohabitation between right and left governments that prevents the formulation of a single model.

To do our research this paper is divided into three sections, one of them subdivided into two. After this introduction, a first section approaches the paradigmatic model (Cervo 2008, 2003, 2001), which analysis the conservative wave in Brazil and Latin America, and the recent new progressive wave in the region and possibly in Brazil, while the second section analyses Jair Bolsonaro's election and government and the third approaches the October 2022 pre-elections and its candidates and polls, constructing scenarios for the elections coming to an end with the conclusions of our research.

We must however warn our readers that due to the nature of the assignment and the ongoing political developments, the reflections recounted here are limited in scope, while they do follow the recent literature on the subject. The research uses primary sources founded in the media complemented by some theoretical approaches. Therefore, this paper should be read like a puzzle with missing pieces that will be sparingly added by history.

Paradigmatic Model – Conservative and New Progressive Wave in the Region

The framework of Latin American used here provide the support of the centre-periphery model that constitutes the foundation of Latin American structuralism (Bernal-Meza 2005 p. 65), which is of fundamental relevance for understanding the socio-political-economic transformations that Latin America has been going through since the independence process (Cervo 2008, p. 17).

The economic development strategies collide with each other because there is a very clear distinction between two dominant trends. The one that privileges free trade and liberal investment policies, benefiting both agrarian-export interests and the interests of transnational capital, since 1880 or even before; and the one that prefers the adoption of protectionist policies and state intervention, favouring the local business class as well as workers and populist coalitions (Klesner 2011, p. 914).

What has been occurring throughout the historical process of Latin America from the colonial period to the present days is a cyclical evolution of these two distinct and opposing visions regarding the sub-region's socio-political-economic development strategies (Klesner 2011, p. 915). Therefore, the contemporary history of Latin America can be divided into historical periods, in relation to which there is a consensus among the epistemic community of Latin American International Relations.

It can thus be said that in the liberal-conservative paradigm, from the end of the XIX century when the independence process ends to the mid-1930s, Latin America adopted the scheme of international relations based on the exchange of its primary goods for manufactured products from industrialized countries. Consequently, it originated the creation and consolidation of domination and dependence structures on them by the USA and the United Kingdom (Cervo 2001, 2003, 2008, pp. 69-70) based on the agrarian-export diplomacy (Bueno 1995).

According to Cervo (2008, p. 72), from the 1930s onwards:

“the leaders break with the agrarian-export diplomacy based on the European market doctrine and provide new functionalities to the states”, giving rise to the developmental model, which presents three essential foundations that guide the internal action of the states: “a) the consistency of the transition, b) the development as a path of foreign policy, and c) the realism of conduct.”

The new model, that begins in the mid-1930s and gains relevance at the end of World War II extending to the debt crisis of the mid-1980s, bestows a different functionality to the external sector determining that in terms of foreign policy states must adopt three main purposes. Firstly, they must fulfil the interests of a complex society and conceive of development as an expansion of industry. Then, they must provide foreign policy with the necessary efficiency throughout decision-making autonomy, flexible and non-doctrinal foreign trade policy, and subordination of security policy to economic purposes. States must also negotiate with great powers and neighbours (Cervo 2008, p. 72). States must do all these in a pragmatic and non-ideological stance conducted through the import-substitution industrialization model.

The recurrent deficits of the Balances of Payments of Latin American countries resulting from the contradictions of the import-substitution industrialization model led to the imposition of orthodox structural adjustments policies required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to resolve these imbalances (Klesner 2011, p. 915, Loxton 2021, p. 10) in the 1970s.

When the Cold War ends and the capitalist system spreads throughout the world, conservative governments would also arise to power in the Latin American countries adopting the new socio-political-economic strategy. First in Mexico and Bolivia (1985), then in Argentina (1989) and then in Peru and Brazil (1990) (Klesner 2011, p. 915).

The new socio-political-economic strategy comes to say that neoliberalism means a movement of initiatives that are largely promoted by the IMF, the World Bank, and other international institutions (MacNamara 2011, p. 913). Therefore, measures were taken by the *New Right* to reduce the size of the public sector, redirect the surplus to the private capitalist sector, create private capital markets and open the economy to world free trade (Bernal-Meza 2005, p. 152, Loxton 2021, p. 11) The right electoral took the form of conservatives winning the Presidency through blatantly personalistic vehicles like Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil in 1989 or Álvaro Uribe in Colombia in 2002 (Loxton 2021, p. 11).

This is the globalization from above, parallel to which there is the globalization from below promoted by the development of technology and communications, which allowed various movements organized by civil society in Latin American countries to emerge and gain voice (MacNamara 2011, p. 913), fighting for social justice and countless other related causes structuring the great international fora that would have a relevant role to play at the beginning of the XXI century.

Largely because of this globalization from below, the economic and political measures imposed on Latin American countries within the scope of the Washington Consensus provoked a wave of social protests in the most varied countries and in different layers of Latin American civil society against the respective governments thanks to the “perception of the futility and cruelty of free market solutions” (MacNamara 2011, p. 913).

Although they have been differentiated, the effects of orthodox neoliberal policies on Latin American countries led in most of them to “another wave of democratic presidents generally coming from disadvantaged social circles and so-called leftists”, which aimed at “banish that regional model” (Cervo 2008, p. 82-83) and replace it for another one. In Brazil, the direction followed was that of the responsible left, according to which:

“some legacies of neoliberalism were kept, such as fiscal responsibility, monetary stability, stimulus to foreign investment, and opening of markets”. These legacies were softened by “another paradigm of international relations, called logistics state, in a dose capable of attenuating the effects of neoliberalism in the spheres of political, economic, and social life.” (Cervo 2008, p. 83)

The left-order in Latin America would not be, contrary to what leaders like Lula, the Kirchner couple, Hugo Chávez, and Nicolás Maduro, or even Evo Morales and Rafael Correa thought at the time a lasting order. Roughly from 2010

until 2018/2019, the lefts began to lose their place and to be replaced in power through elections or subversive processes by right or centre-right leaders. As right-wing authoritarian populists reached positions of power across the globe (Rydgren 2018, Scoones et al. 2018), Latin America entered a new wave contrary to the trend that stretched the beginning of this millennium and Brazil's right turn has become a source of concern (Escobar 2018, Abessa et al. 2019, Barbosa Jr. and Roriz 2021).

In 2011, the left turn was in full swing; during 2010 and 2018, the number of democracies with left wing presidents could be counted in one hand. Following the election of leaders like Mauricio Macri in Argentina in 2015, Iván Duque in Colombia in 2018, Mario Abdo Benitez in Paraguay in 2018, Luis Lacalle Pou in Uruguay in 2019 and, most importantly, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in 2018, a natural question to ask is whether Latin America was then in the midst of a right turn. Following Loxton (2021, p. xi), conservative parties emerged because of their authoritarian inheritance and counter revolutionary struggle. The election of Bolsonaro in Brazil is not, clearly, an evidence of an authoritarian successor party² of the right thriving under democracy because the party that he ran with was not an authoritarian successor party and he was too young to have played a relevant role in the military dictatorship of 1964-1985, although he was a retired Army captain. Nevertheless, Bolsonaro's enthusiastic embraced of the memory of the dictatorship and echoed that of authoritarian successor parties, demonstrating that the sort of provocative rhetoric he used was not confined to the distant past.

Notwithstanding, from 2018/2019 onwards we have witnessed to a different phenomenon in Latin America. The right-wing governments that appeared so powerful seem now to be giving their places to left-wing governments. Or, in other words, it seems that in the region it exists both right-wing and left-wing governments with a predominance of these last ones. Indeed, in Chile, where polls pointed out the left's presidential victory, the leftist, former student leader Gabriel Boric truly defeated the right-wing candidate Antonio Kast, in last December. In Argentina, the president is the Peronist Alberto Fernández, while in Bolivia is Luis Arce since 2020, from the Movement for Socialism (MAS). In Peru, the president, from the leftist party Free Peru, is the professor and unionist Pedro Castillo. In Venezuela governs Nicolás Maduro, from the radical left, while in Guyana Irfaan Ali since 2020, from the People's Progressive Party, and in Mexico López Obrador since 2018, from the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). Just in Uruguay with Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou since 2020, when he got his first conservative government after fifteen years of left-wing leadership under the Broader Front Coalition; in Paraguay with Mario Abdo Benitez since 2018, from a right-wing political party in the country; in Jair Bolsonaro's Brazil; and in Colombia with Iván Duque Márquez, from the Democratic Centre Party since 2018, from the Grand Alliance for Colombia, a right-wing movement that took Duque to the Presidency we have right-wing governments in Latin America. This means that from 2018/2019 onwards there is a cohabitation in the region of right-wing and left-wing governments, with a possible new turn to the left. In this sense,

²An *authoritarian successor party* is a political party that emerges from an authoritarian regime, but that operates after a transition to democracy (Loxton 2021, p. 2).

another possibility is that the region is experiencing a less ideologically coherent *anti-incumbent turn* (Loxton 2021, p. xi).

Leftist presidents are being elected by their citizens, which shows a great disappointment with the right policies applied before. For the time being, there is indeed a cohabitation of leftist and right governments in the region, which seems to be united around the instability that is common to almost all its countries. This might be a brand new and very recent social-political and economic model that the 2022 Brazilian election may come to follow.

Bolsonaro's Government – How Did we Get Here?

The Victory Vote in Bolsonaro in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections

Bolsonaro won the October 2018 election with the coalition *Brazil Above Everything, God Above Everyone*, with his vice-president General Hamilton Mourão – a conservative retired general in the Brazilian Armed Forces – in the second round with 55.13% of the total vote since no candidate received more than 50% of the vote in the first round, held on the 7th of October (TSE 2018). He won against the Workers' Party (PT) candidate Fernando Haddad who obtained 44.87% of the total vote with the alliance *The People Happy Again* (TSE 2018).

The candidacy of Mr. Bolsonaro, a controversial federal deputy from Rio de Janeiro known for his far-right politics and defence of the former Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985) (Barón 2014), overshadowed the other conservative candidates. Observed for his intense opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage, Bolsonaro joined the small Social Liberal Party (PSL) to frame his attempt for Presidency shifting the party's ideology in favour of social conservatism and nationalism (Rennó 2020). Until 6th October, PSL was a small even a runt party. After 7th October, following the first round of the 2018 elections, Bolsonaro's PSL became the second biggest force in the Chamber of Deputies, occupying 55 of the 513 seats and 4 seats in Senate³ (Venturini 2018), although Bolsonaro would retreat from the party later and become an independent, joining the Liberal Party (PL) in November 30 in preparation for the 2022 elections. Moreover, his candidacy in 2018 gained from the great opposition to the former PT government and ran in benefit of expanding gun ownership as a reaction to high crime levels, legalizing death penalty, and the privatization of state-owned companies (Finchelstein 2018).

Notwithstanding, during the campaign Bolsonaro was also subject of widespread protests for his homophobic, racist, and misogynistic beliefs (Simões 2018).

³These numbers are not enough to pass any bill. Nonetheless, the president refuses to negotiate the formation of a government coalition, calling it *politics as usual* or *old politics*. Bolsonaro rejects politics, associating it with corruption, clientelism and gerrymandering, which is precisely what he has been doing since taking office, but calling it *new politics* or *non-ideologic politics* (Chagas-Bastos 2019, p. 98).

Former president Lula⁴, once considered one of the most popular politicians in the world, intended to run for president with the PT but he had to choose the former mayor of São Paulo, Fernando Haddad, as his running mate. This was a last-minute substitute during the first round because Lula had been imprisoned since April 2018 on corruption charges linked to Brazil's enormous Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) scandal. Indeed, polling taken during the campaign found Lula as the favourite in both the first and the second rounds of the election, with 39% of voting intention (Datafolha 2018).

It is possible to affirm that Bolsonaro's victory in 2018 called attention for a possible change in the Latin American electoral behaviour since it has been clear the emergence of a gender and race gap in the analysis of electoral preferences. Bolsonaro's electoral offer has been characterized by a sexist, racist and praiseworthy on the dictatorship discourse searching for a traditional *family order* value (Murillo 2019). Not to mention his anti-Lula and anti-leftist discourse that has tried to join the PT to corruption.

On the other hand, the debate on party identification and voting in Brazil in these presidential elections had changed the traditional growing importance of voter positioning with respect to the main presidential parties so far – PT and Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). These parties had indeed been the main presidential parties in the choice of presidential candidates at the 2002 and 2014 – and even before – presidential elections (Borges and Vidigal 2018, p. 53).

Over the past three decades, political power in Brazil has been shared between these two parties. Although both sides never admitted it publicly, the same social-democratic orientations drove many of their policies. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FCH) from PSDB was responsible for the macroeconomic adjustment policy during the 1990s and Lula and Rousseff – riding on the international commodity boom – implemented and deepened social redistribution initially promoted by Cardoso. This means that during the 2000s, a time when everyone – from entrepreneurs to traditional politicians – was benefitting from significant economic growth, any threats to the turbid links between business and politics was easily neutralised by the system (Chagas-Bastos 2019, p. 94).

The Brazilian state had never been structured to be nurtured by the society, but to exert tutelage over the citizenry (Faoro 2001). This top-down structure, with exceptionally low representation and accountability, led to multiple obscure links between private and state-run businesses (Lazzarini 2010), creating an environment in which the act of taking from the state – in short, corruption – was a widely accepted and worthwhile practice.

There has been in Brazil a trend that points for the importance of the presidential dispute and of the social and economic micropolitics implemented by presidents to build genuinely national parties able to divide electoral preferences

⁴During Lula and Rousseff administrations (2003-2016), Brazil lived a unique moment. In this historical period, the ruling classes did not dominate the federal government, as they had done for centuries, but they remained in power. Those governments developed distribution policies to combat the huge existing social inequalities as well as recognition policies, and even sought to make the most oppressed sectors, always excluded from national life, visible, endowing them with legitimacy (Rubim 2015, Calabre 2015).

(Key 1955, Milkis and Rhodes 2007, Sundquist 2011). In Brazil, a share of the electorate could manage to position relatively consistently in between the two main parties in the presidential race (Samuels and Zucco 2014), a trend that Jair Bolsonaro came to interrupt. Empirical evidence has shown that party identification has been a weighting factor in voters' choice (Braga and Pimentel Jr. 2011, Peixoto and Rennó 2011).

Therefore, the 2018 presidential election showed how fragile the Brazilian political system was. The presidential race has been portrayed as the most unpredictable since 1989. The lead up to first round vote was indeed volatile, but the features of the Brazilian political landscape offer us some clues to make sense of the country's reality.

It is also interesting considering that positions on troublesome issues related to social, political, and cultural factors influenced vote choice and *bolsonarism* – supporters' affection toward Bolsonaro – in the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections. Results indicate that in addition to resentment against the Workers' Party, a cultural backlash perspective, and strict views on law and order, as well as economic liberalism and rejection of social policies were the characteristics of support for Bolsonaro (Rennó 2020).

The fact is that on the 28th of October of 2018, Brazilian voters delivered a sweeping victory to Bolsonaro putting the far-right populist at the helm of the world's fourth-largest democracy. After a loud campaign in which the former Army captain demonized his political opponents and promised to save the country from total ruin, Bolsonaro defeated the PT along with the social media and the networks of Pentecostal churches, which helped to disseminate his incendiary messages and his broad multiclass supporters (Hunter and Power 2019, p. 68).

In Alberto Fujimori's 1990 victory, Latin American political scientists had been amazed at the potential of the evangelical networks for the victory of a non-party outsider. However, in Bolsonaro's case, the process was not at all that surprising. In 2003 the Evangelical Parliamentary Front had already been created in Brazil to bring together legislators from different parties. Therefore, evangelical support for Bolsonaro, pushed by the faithful, was truly relevant for his victory. However, this support is based on personal relationships that become a fundamental asset in contexts of party disarticulation and political support is contingent, as indeed became clear when evangelicals abandoned their political options for the PT and for Marina Silva (Murillo 2019). There seems to be no confessional vote but a sensibility that drives the defence of the *status quo* of hierarchies associated with the traditional family, networks that become attractive in the context of disenchantment with traditional parties and the emergence of outsiders.

The dramatic ascent of this far-right figure caught many by surprise. Brazilian presidential elections since 1994 had been marked by a duopoly, with the left-leaning PT and the centre-right PSDB as the predictable finalists. These two parties consistently won between 70 and 90 percent of the vote. The three presidents elected in this period – Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), Lula (2003-2010) and Dilma (2003-2016) – had all won second terms in office lending an air of stability to party politics (Hunter and Power 2019, p. 69).

Yet, viewed in the context of the several crises affecting Brazil since 2013, for which Brazilians widely blame the establishment parties, the Bolsonaro backlash begins to make sense. The PT was being blamed for the thoughtful downturn in the economy after 2013; for the huge corruption scheme uncovered since 2014 by the Car Wash investigations; and for the unprecedented levels of crime on the streets of Brazil. Lula, the PT's spearhead since 1980, might have been able to overcome these circumstances and going forward. Indeed, his popularity as a candidate depended on his strong base of personal support (*lulismo*), which had always been much broader than the partisan support for the PT (*petismo*). With Lula out of the run, he could do nothing. Moreover, overwhelming popular rejection of incumbent President Michel Temer and the nomination, as the PSDB's candidate a bland establishment figure, four-term São Paulo governor Geraldo Alckmin, who had lost badly to Lula in 2006, the way was ready to Bolsonaro and a broad political space from the centre to the far-right became vulnerable and the opportunity was seized by Bolsonaro (Hunter and Power 2019, p. 69-70).

In the end, what led Bolsonaro to Presidency was a combination of fundamental background conditions – economic recession, corruption, and crime –, political contingencies – most notably, the weakness of rival candidates –, and a shakeup in campaign dynamics produced by the strategic use of social media (Hunter and Power 2019, p. 70). María Victoria Murillo (2019) states that the issues that have most contributed to the electoral behaviour in the 2018 Brazilian presidential election have been: a) the economic crisis; b) the disenchantment with traditional parties; c) the significant decline in the support for democracy in Latin America between 2014 and 2016; d) the growing political insecurity that undermines government performance evaluations; e) the corruption scandals that affect the legitimacy of all political institutions; f) the *antipetismo* discourse; and g) the evangelical support (Burity 2021, p. 5).

This is all part of the democratic process. Indeed, much has been written about what a democracy is. To Papanikos (2022a),

“democracy exists when all participate to direct [govern, rule, manage, administer] the politeia. The word [direct] means that all directly (not through representatives) manage their politeia, e.g., its economy, its military, its erection of monuments of arts and worship, and its organization of religious, athletic, and educational festivities. In other words, all people govern and there is no need for anybody to govern for the people. Without the all, the many does not define democracy”.

Indeed, Papanikos (2022a) calls attention to the fact that Abraham Lincoln had stated democracy was the “government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the Earth”. According to Papanikos (2022a),

“many use this phrase as a praise of democracy. It is not. In a democracy there is no such thing as ‘for the people’. There was nothing ‘for the people’ in Ancient Athens. By definition, democracy was and is the people! Again, it should be mentioned that democracy is not necessarily the best of all available alternatives. It is absurd though to call something democracy when it is not”.

Representative democracy grants citizens the ability to elect and replace their governors. This ability to establish a vertical accountability is what, according to O'Donnell (2009), should make politicians in power pay attention to their voters. However, electoral behaviour is not the only tool for citizens in a democracy. They can organize demonstrations, denouncements, demands and other forms of pressure in non-electoral moments. Several Latin American countries have lived in the last decades mobilizations that have forced early resignations or have accompanied political judgment processes that have disrupted presidential terms. Nevertheless, voting remains the essential component of democratic functioning. Indeed, what matters so far as democracy is its future. And considering this, education is the most important factor which will contribute to a better democracy even if this process would not be linear but there will be ups and downs (Papanikos 2022b). Although necessary, education is not enough for the future of democracy. As Papanikos (2022b) states, “we know from the white-collar crime idea that educated people can be criminals and can undermine the political process towards democracy”. Therefore, as Papanikos (2022b) says, “we need virtue, we need pedagogy”, “without the two democracy cannot progress” and “not all people are able to achieve high levels of education, but all people can be self-ruled by the socially-accepted norms of morality, ethos and virtue”.

Bolsonaro's Government – 2019-so Far

A Brazilian politician and a retired military officer who has been the 38th president of Brazil since the 1st of January of 2019, Jair Bolsonaro had announced his candidacy for Presidency in March 2016 as a member of the Social Christian Party. He left the party in 2018 and joined the Social Liberal Party, and then launched his presidential campaign in August that year, with also retired general Hamilton Mourão as his running mate. He described himself as an outsider and a supporter of family values, coming in first place both in the first and second round of the election and thus becoming a president, succeeding Michel Temer.

The former Army captain has inherited a country with shocking numbers, both in economics as in social terms. This clearly salient two main aspects of his presidency. Firstly, it is obvious that Bolsonaro was not tailored for the position he holds. Secondly, the lack of preparation of his entourage and the absence of Congress support has led the country to a permanent state of crisis. Bolsonaro has failed to show any effectiveness, his leadership has been non-existent outside Twitter, the aura of victory had faded away quickly and has already seemed stale, and his impact on Congress has never been very significant, being still liable to drop further (Chagas-Bastos 2019, p. 93).

Once in office, Bolsonaro's officials working in the *Esplanada dos Ministérios*⁵ fell under three main categories, according to Chagas-Bastos (2019, p. 96). The first are the so-called *anti-globalists*, in line with Olavo de Carvalho, who is an eccentric YouTuber who became the ideological guru for Bolsonaro and his sons (Stefanoni 2019). In this category is the ministry of Foreign Affairs Ernesto

⁵The area of Brasilia where the ministerial buildings, with the ministers, are located is called *Esplanada dos Ministérios*.

Araújo. In the second group are the many Army officers who Bolsonaro placed in key positions in his cabinet and who were early supporters of the president, like the vice-president Hamilton Mourão. In the third category are the technocrats invited by Bolsonaro to legitimise his ignorance towards the markets, the Congress, and the public opinion since he had affirmed that would fill positions in his government only based on technical qualifications and skills rather than ideological sympathy (Scrivano and Ribeiro 2018). This group includes the two almost super-ministers Sérgio Moro (Justice and Public Order) and the ultraliberal Paulo Guedes (Economy).

The fact is that these groups often sabotage and collide against each other. The disharmony among them made Bolsonaro hesitate several times during his administration so far, passing a bad image to the outside, and forced him to fire several ministers and second-tier appointees.

In this regard, all the political confusion portrayed since the beginning of Bolsonaro's presidency shows a pattern of rehearsed drawings to demonstrate cohesion around the conservative values since Bolsonaro makes his best efforts to maintain the public debate around beliefs, his only strategy. This strategy means an imaginary crusade where *bolsonarism* uses inappropriate comments as his weapons giving rise to false political crises (Chagas-Bastos 2019, p. 97).

These false political crises mobilise a political electorate that sees few political advances and no political agenda to tackle with the increasingly unemployment and the stagnant economy. They keep Bolsonaro's anti-system and transgressive character alive since he ran on a political liturgy filled with nonsenses. Finally, they disguise the government's administrative incapacity and help to cover its setbacks (Chagas-Bastos 2019, p. 97).

These crises, however, hijack the public debate. Bolsonaro is capable of emulating and neutralising his opposition since when he and his sons issue controversial statements mostly on social media they occupy the national debate instantly, blocking any possibility of serious debate around the real country's needs. In doing so, *bolsonarism* occupies all roles. It stimulates opposition and criticism, destroying the nature of politics and the essence of democracy. By dictating the rhythm and content of the days, he turned an entire country into a hostage. All of this would not be possible without the massive presence of the president and his aides on social media, as if they were still on the electoral campaign (Chagas-Bastos 2019, p. 97).

Bolsonaro structured his program around three features: a) a neoliberal orientation and a consequent withdrawal of state intervention in economy; b) a conservative social behaviour control based on the safeguard of *Western and Christian* values; c) a critique of democracy and the political party system, combined with nostalgia for military dictatorship and its values (Santos and Tanscheit 2019, p. 157).

Considering the way Bolsonaro drove Brazil's several policies, as well as his characteristics, in the end he is considered a far-right populist, who challenges the parliamentary model by suggesting that legislative representatives not only fail to adequately represent the interests of their people but also undermine them. Indeed, populism suggests that politics hinges upon the confrontation between the people

and the elite or the powerful. Consequently, populism is not just a different kind of party politics within liberal-democratic states but constitutes the “crisis of parliamentary democracy” (Schmitt 1988). This global phenomenon threatens the building of democratic constitutionalism, and its growth is associated with the weakness of liberal democracies (Gouvêa and Castelo Branco 2021).

The variables of populism in Bolsonaro government are divided into four: a) the use of political and religious moralism; b) the unserved use and impulsion of disinformation and fake news; c) the polarization of policy; and d) the militarization of politics (Gouvêa and Castelo Branco 2021).

October 2022 Pre-Electoral Campaign – Candidates and Polls

Apart from Bolsonaro and Lula – the two frontrunners – there are still other third-way candidates. João Doria since entering electoral politics in 2016 has set his eyes on the Presidency of the Republic. Every election since – from the São Paulo mayoral dispute in 2016 and the gubernatorial race two years later – were mere steppingstones towards this businessman ultimate goal (Camelo 2021). However, governor Doria’s party, PSDB, has hold its presidential primaries late in November and he and governor Eduardo Leite from Rio Grande do Sul were the two favourite, whose fight for the nomination of the party had not been easy, though the chosen has been João Doria.

Mr. Doria has done a lot for the state of São Paulo and for Brazil but even though there is little enthusiasm around him as a presidential candidate, neither from voters, who often see him as an opportunistic false person, nor from political allies, who do not see him as a trustworthy man. However, during the pandemic, Doria was the first politician to bring COVID vaccines to Brazil and signed a contract with China’s Sinovac to purchase Corona Vac. On the other hand, from the early stages of the spread, Doria sought to provide a counterpoint to president Bolsonaro’s pandemic denialism, trying to present himself as a true statesman (Ribeiro 2021).

Another candidate, who is trying to join the centre-left, though increasingly centrist, is Ciro Gomes from the PDT from which he is vice-president.

An experiment politician, Ciro has already served as a federal representative, governor of Ceará and within Lula’s cabinet. Additionally, he has run for president three times before, never winning more than 12.5% of the vote. This time, Mr. Gomes is trying to marry his leftist background with more conservative undertones – a marriage that has been orchestrated by João Santana, Brazil’s most respected political marketing guru, who has previously worked for Lula and has done time for laundering campaign money (Ribeiro 2021).

The former lead judge of the Operation Car Wash anti-corruption task force, Sérgio Moro is also another presidential candidate for the October 2022 election. Mr. Moro briefly served as Justice Minister under the Bolsonaro administration, but he resigned in 2020 accusing the president of trying to interfere with the work of the federal police (Ribeiro 2021). Early December, Moro officially stepped into the political arena by joining Podemos, a right-wing party that has mostly voted in

favour of the Bolsonaro government's legislative proposals. Subsequently, he confirmed his intention to run for president during a television interview (Hatzikidi 2021).

Sérgio Moro also has a personal history with Lula. He led the investigations under the Operation Car Wash and convicted Lula for corruption and money laundering, incarcerating him and thus excluding him from the 2018 elections. Though, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions declaring that Mr. Moro was biased during the case. Therefore, all evidence gathered under Mr. Moro's supervision was thrown out and Lula was released from prison.

In spite of the divisive nature of both Lula and Bolsonaro, which the Brazilian media's portrayal of the battle between them has been one of polarisation since a vote for one or the other is seen as a preference that pushes the country to the extremes of the political spectrum, many see a middle path, a so-called *third way*, with a moderate candidate as the best way forward for Brazil (Hatzikidi 2021).

Both frontrunners will have to deal with disaffected voter bases. If Lula appears with the image of *thief* in the eyes of many – a reason they find not to vote for him again –, Bolsonaro is often labelled as *mad* or *crazy* especially in the context of managing COVID-19 and the vaccination effort. They see Bolsonaro's management of the pandemic as cruel, indifferent, and incompetent governance, which has marked an extreme decline in his approval rates.

At a first glance, it seems that Bolsonaro's unpopularity is directly causing Lula to flow in the polls. Though, disenchanted voters do not always migrate to another candidate, much less to Lula. Rocha and Solano (2020) note that "regretful" voters, those who had chosen Bolsonaro in 2018 but now feel disappointed, admit they might support his re-election mostly because they see no other political alternative. However, these "regretful" voters face a dilemma. Most of them affirm they will support Bolsonaro "if they have to", which means that if Bolsonaro faces Lula in second round they will prefer Bolsonaro, unless a third way with a credible chance of success emerged. Nevertheless, many of these "regretful" voters confess they are uncertain about both the frontrunners since one is a *thief* and the other is *crazy*.

The question that arises is to know who is the most viable third way for Brazil.

Moro's electorate is an anti-PT basis, compound by supporters of the Car Wash Operation, who sees the former judge as a hero and look for a more centrist candidate (DIAP 2021).

Moro's performance shows a positive recall of the former judge and former minister, who left the scene in 2019. Yet, the expectation that he would embrace an electoral campaign was always in the air and it came into light on November 10, when Moro joined Podemos with the intention of leading the third way.

Nevertheless, Moro's reliable performance in the polls also demonstrates Ciro Gomes' campaign mistakes. Ciro took a confrontational stance with the PT looking for votes within *bolsonarism* but the truth is that his votes ended up migrating to Sérgio Moro. He is also attracting a considerable number of former Bolsonaro's voters. 18% of those who voted Bolsonaro in 2018 say that in 2022 will vote for Moro. Likewise, 29% of voters who, in the last election, voted blank

or null, and 22% of those who did not show up to vote in that election, say that they will vote for Moro in 2022. Indeed, Moro's electorate is very balanced in terms of gender and education and in general they are 35 years or more and they are the richest. 30% of voters with income above 10,000 Reais intend to vote for the former judge (DIAP 2021).

The same research shows that 7% of those who affirm to have voted for Bolsonaro in 2018, have the intention to vote in 2022 for Lula, who is also attracting 40% of those who say they have voted blank or null and 48% of those who have not shown up in the 2018 election. Lula is also a strong candidate among women (49%). Likewise, Lula is a strong candidate among those who have completed elementary school (45%) and high school (46%), as well as those who live in the Northeast region (51%). Besides, Lula is still in the preference of the voters with an income less than 2,000 Reais (56%) and young people (46%) (DIAP 2021).

Bolsonaro is preferred by male voters (39%), 37% from the Southeast region and 35% from the Midwest region. Most of his voters earn between 2,000 and 3,000 Reais (40%), are evangelicals (47%) and are over 35 years old, still maintaining a loyal following: 65% of those who voted for the president in 2018 intend to repeat the vote (DIAP 2021).

Facing these candidates and their characteristics, at least four scenarios can be drawn.

According to research done by the Atlas Político (DIAP 2021) at the end of November 2021, Lula extended his advantage over his opponents in the 2022 electoral race, counting with 42.8% of voting intentions. Bolsonaro appears in second place with 31.5% – with a failure rate of 65.3% –, whereas the entry of former judge Sérgio Moro into the dispute messed up the third way dividing the preferences of anti-PT voters. Moro took the third place with 13.7% of the votes removing a portion of the votes from Bolsonaro, but also from Ciro Gomes, who comes in fourth with 6.1% of the votes, and especially from João Doria with just 1.7% of voting intentions.

In a second-round scenario, the research shows that Lula wins all the candidates. Against Bolsonaro, he wins with 50.5% of the votes; in a dispute against Moro with 46.4% of the votes; against Ciro with 42.3%; and against Doria with 47.2%. Moreover, the number of voters who declare their vote blank, null or who do not know which candidate is going to choose is still high in scenarios where Lula is fighting against Moro (24.4%) and against Doria (37.4%), which shows the indecision of voters, who have not yet decided on their vote. In a scenario of dispute between Lula and Bolsonaro, only 13.5% of voters remain in doubt (DIAP 2021).

According to Ipec⁶ (2021), in a survey presented in mid-December 2021, in the two scenarios pointed out, the first with all the pre-presidential candidates and the second with just the most important ones, Lula's victory in the first round is

⁶Ipec stands for *Inteligência em Pesquisa e Consultoria*, which means Intelligence in Research and Consulting, an institute formed by former executives of the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics – Ibope.

clear. In the first scenario, Lula would win with 48% of the votes and, in the second, with 49%.

In the first scenario, Bolsonaro appears in second place with 21% of the votes, followed by Sérgio Moro with 6% and Ciro Gomes with 5%. Tied with João Doria with 2% comes André Janones from AVANTE, followed by pre-candidates who receive 1% or less of voting intentions (Ipec 2021).

In the second scenario, Bolsonaro is also in second place but with 22% of voting intentions, followed by Sérgio Moro with 8%, Ciro Gomes with 5% and Doria with 3% (Ipec 2021).

An eventual new scenario might be the dispute between Lula and Sérgio Moro in the second turn since both have exchange accusations in the media. Indeed, it is very probably that the election come to be more clearly decided around March. At that time, if Bolsonaro downs even more in the polls, Sérgio may come to occupy his space and goes into a second turn with Lula. This scenario is very much plausible. That is why both Bolsonaro and Lula fear Moro so much that they have been accusing him of several things in the media and have also been trying to wear off his image by criticising him every time.

Conclusion

Considering that the trend today is one of cohabitation of left and right governments in Latin America since the right-wing governments have been falling, it is possible that Brazil, like other countries of the region, follow that trend and their voters choose for the left in the 2022 elections, as has recently happened in Chile with the victory of Gabriel Boric. Besides, Bolsonaro's government does nothing to help due to its mistakes in all policies that have been developed, the lack of support from the Congress and Bolsonaro's lack of negotiation skills.

Indeed, in October 2022, Brazilians will head to the polls to select their new president, their representatives for Congress and their state governors. Nevertheless, the conjuncture is incredibly stressful since the two frontrunners – Bolsonaro and Lula – face also candidates who compose a third way that joins around 30% of voting intention.

Bolsonaro, a controversial federal deputy from Rio de Janeiro, won the 2018 election due to a change in the Brazilian electoral behaviour since in this election it has been clear the emergence of a gender and race gap in the analysis of electoral preferences, a sexist, racist and praiseworthy on dictatorship discourse searching for a traditional *family order* values, not to mention his anti-Lula and anti-leftist discourse that has tried to join the PT to corruption (Murillo 2019). Apart from that, Bolsonaro interrupted the trend in the choice of presidential candidates, always from the two main presidential parties so far – PT and PSDB (Borges and Vidigal 2018, p. 55). Besides, Bolsonaro benefited from the enormous support of the evangelical networks and of the dramatic corruption scandal that had led Lula to prison on the case of the Car Wash Operation.

During his government, Bolsonaro showed that he was not tailored for the position he holds. Additionally, the lack of preparation of his entourage and the

absence of Congress support has led the country to a permanent state of crisis. All he does is his best efforts to maintain the public debate around beliefs, his only strategy, which means an imaginary crusade where *bolsonarism* uses inappropriate comments as his weapons giving rise to false political crises (Chagas-Bastos 2019, p. 97).

In the end, Bolsonaro is a right-wing populist who evidences the crisis of parliamentary democracy (Schmitt 1988), with his anti-establishment and authoritarian dimensions (Laclau 2005).

This Bolsonaro wants to win the 2022 elections. Lula wants the same. However, apart from Bolsonaro and Lula – the two frontrunners – there are still other third-way candidates. Polls are much more favourable to Lula.

In all scenarios presented above, Lula emerges as the victorious in the 2022 presidential elections, leaving no margin for the third way. This does not seem to be the best for Brazil since Lula's image is not the best especially abroad, which may not contribute to improve Brazil's image at the international level facing the reactions to the events in the country, which have been one of concern and dissatisfaction. Indeed, Lula is seen by many as a *thief* – an image difficult to clean.

Moreover, Lula would come to power in a different conjuncture from the boom of the commodities of the 2000s that had allowed a good management of the resources on the part of the former president. For 2022, the Brazilian Central Bank (2021, p. 18) has estimated a GDP growth at just 2.1%.

On the other hand, it seems impossible Bolsonaro wins the presidential elections or even to be able to reach the second turn, given his reduce rates provided by the polls, although his voting intentions indicate the maintenance of his far-right electorate, who is, however, insufficient.

It is possible, therefore, and considering the exchanges of accusations through the media, that the biggest confrontation occurs from March 2022 onwards between Lula and Sérgio Moro, who very probably will go into a second turn.

In any of the cases, if Bolsonaro tries, from now until the elections, an eventual attempt of a coup in order to maintain himself in power, it will not for sure be successful, due to the resilience of internal defenders of the rule of law. Brazilians are more powerful and, most importantly, are more conscious of their power.

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"If you rake me over the coals..." – The Emotional Intelligence of Benjamin Netanyahu: The Prime Minister of Israel, as Perceived by Israeli Citizens

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Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, held the premiership for the longest period in the history of the Jewish nation. He considered as a very strong and influential leader. Leadership has manifestations of Emotional Intelligence (EI). The study aims to construct new knowledge about how Israeli citizens perceive the EI of Netanyahu. Questionnaire was sent to 414 Israeli participants who own first academic degree or above. Results show that the Israeli citizens perceived Bibi's EI as high, with average of 5.08 out of 7. It was assumed that in order to achieve his goals, Netanyahu uses also dark side of EI. This study demonstrated that EI could be used with positive-oriented and can also use with negative-oriented.

Keywords: emotional intelligence, Benjamin Netanyahu, leadership, dark EI

Introduction

Benjamin Netanyahu (Bibi), the Prime Minister of Israel, held the premiership for the fifth time and for the longest period in the history of the Jewish nation. Bibi is considered a very strong and very influential leader not only in Israel but around the world. He was ranked by the *Forbes*, as one of the world's 25 most powerful leaders (Haaretz 2015). Friends and foes know him as no stranger to controversy (Pfeffer 2018). He is the object, however, of numerous criminal accusations. His legacy is mixed, and he is also credited with bringing Israel to a place where it is viewed as a powerful country by any standard and a good place in which to live (David 2020). Although Israel is a small state that has been facing existential threats from its neighbors since its establishment, during Bibi's time as prime minister, Israel is a very strong country from many points of view. Israel has built a mighty military machine that has successfully overcome many military threats and deterred nuclear options. Israel has a strong economy and was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2010 and which brings together the most 33 developed countries that are committed to democracy and market economies.

Israel is also an attractive site for overseas investors particularly in the high-tech sector. Despite the long- simmering social rift, the Ashkenazi-Sephardic cleavage, and religious-secular divide, Israel is a strong and mostly unified society.

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It has a highest ratio of university degrees to the population in the world, produces more scientific papers per capita than any other nation by a large margin, and the highest rate per capita of patents filed (Inbar 2018).

Netanyahu does have many admirers, but most of them are Sephardic, right-wing people, religious and people from the periphery that support him with a blind eye and no matter what he does, they will still support him and vote for him. The other side, comprised of Ashkenazi educated left-wingers, hates him and would do anything in order to get rid of him (Hecht 2017). Although commentators argue that even if his career would soon end and he would not be elected again to premiership in Israel, his influence would endure (Pfeffer 2018). He is considered a very bright, organized, strong, and powerful leader (Ball 1996) but there is no research that investigated how the Emotional Intelligence (EI) of Netanyahu is perceived by Israeli citizens.

EI is widely used in organizational leadership and graduate schools with an increase in published research supporting its benefits (Boyatzis 2018). EI has varied definitions. Salovey and Mayer (1990) define it as the "ability to perceive and express emotion, assimilate emotions in thought, understand and reason with emotion, and regulate emotion in self and others, for the mutual benefit of self and others" (Salovey and Mayer 1990). EI can matter more than IQ (Goleman 2006). Leaders, managers, politicians and CEO's excel, not just through cognitive skills and smarts, but also by emotionally connecting with others. The EI construct was brought to the forefront of public attention because the emotional task of the leader is primal, in two senses: it is the original and the most important. Great leadership works through the emotions (Goleman et al. 2004).

However, there is no research that has explored the perceived EI (or lack thereof) of Netanyahu, and it is important to investigate it mostly because of his controversial personality in that some know him as very successful, influential and high achieving leader and others view him as a failure. This study aims to investigate how Israeli citizens perceive the EI of Netanyahu. Understanding his perceived EI will help leaders understand what enables him to be perceived as a success and/or failure.

Conceptual Framework

Benjamin Netanyahu, Bibi, was born in Tel Aviv to secular Jewish parents (Remnik 2013) in 1949. His family lived in the United States (US) in 1956–1958 and in 1963–1967 in a suburb of Philadelphia, where he graduated from high school. In 1967, he returned to Israel to serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Specifically, he served for five years in an elite unit, Sayeret Matkal, and took part in cross-border assaults including the rescue of the hijacked Sabena Flight 571 in May 1972 in which he was injured (Melman 2010).

In late 1972, Netanyahu returned to US to study and graduated from the MIT Sloan School of Management in 1976. His studies for a doctorate in political science (Hartley et al. 2004) was cut short because of the death of his older brother Jonatan Netanyahu that was killed in Operation Entebbe while fighting to rescue more than 100 hostages hijacked by terrorists. After working for Boston

Consulting Group between 1976–1978, he returned to Israel to run the Jonatan Netanyahu Anti-Terror Institute between 1978–1980 and between 1980–1982 he was a marketing director for Rim Industries in Jerusalem (Warshaw 2009). Netanyahu has been married three times. His first wife was Miriam Weizmann and they have one daughter, Noa. His second wife, Fleur Cates, converted to Judaism for him and his third wife is Sara Ben-Artzi with whom they have two sons, Yair and Avner (Kalman 2013).

Political Career

In 1982, Netanyahu was appointed as Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington D.C. and in 1984, he was appointed the Israeli ambassador to UN (Benjamin Netanyahu Archive 2012). In 1988, he joined the Likud party and became the head of the Likud party in 1993. After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, Bibi won the election and became the youngest and the first Prime Minister (PM) who had been born in Israel. Netanyahu's victory over Shimon Peres surprised many, mainly because shortly before the elections on March 3rd and 4th 1996, Palestinians carried out two suicide bombings, killing 32 Israelis. Unlike Shimon Peres, Netanyahu did not trust Yasser Arafat, the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and conditioned any progress in the peace process with the PLO on fulfilling its obligations to fight terrorism. At the election of 1999, Netanyahu was defeated by Ehud Barak and he moved to the private sector and returned to politics in 2000.

On 2003 during uncertain economic times in Israel, PM Ariel Sharon, appointed Netanyahu as Finance Minister and commentators accredited him as having achieved an "economic miracle". He liberalized the markets, capped the budget deficit at 1%, reduced individual tax rate from 64% to 44% and the corporate tax rate from 36% to 18%. He privatized state assets worth billions of dollars, including banks, oil refineries, the El Al national airline, Zim Integrated Shipping Services and the ports in Haifa and Ashdod (Scott 2015). Commercial banks were forced to spin off their long-term savings, increase competition, and the currency exchange laws were liberalized. He ended welfare dependency by requiring people to apply for jobs or training. The retirement age was raised and unemployment declined while economic growth soared, the debt-to-GDP ratio dropped to one of the lowest in the world, and foreign investment reached a record high (Asa-El 2014). Netanyahu resigned from government in 2005, over disagreements regarding the Gaza disengagement plan (Hoffman 2005). Netanyahu won his second premiership between 2009–2013, the third premiership between, 2013–2015, (Baum et al. 2013) and the fourth premiership, 2015–2019. On 17 May 2020, Netanyahu was sworn-in for a fifth term as prime minister in a coalition with Benny Gantz (Eglish 2020).

Israel Palestinian Conflict

In general, PM Netanyahu emphasized a policy of "three no(s)": no withdrawal from the Golan Heights, no discussion of the division of Jerusalem, no negotiations with the Palestinians under any preconditions (Akram 2011). He opposed the commitments made by previous Israeli governments and the PLO under the Oslo accords that were signed in Washington, D.C., in 1993 and Oslo II, that was signed in Taba, Egypt, on 1995 (Remnik 2013); both were aimed at achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians. In his Bar-Ilan speech from June 14th 2009, Bibi expressed his willingness to accept a Palestinian state alongside Israel. He indicated, however, that any negotiations with the Palestinians, would be under a few conditions: (a) The Palestinians recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people; (b) The Palestinian State would be demilitarized; (c) Jerusalem would remain the united capital of Israel; (d) Palestinians would give up demand for a right of return; (e) Security settlements; (f) A "natural growth" in the existing Jewish settlements in the West Bank (Efuno 2014). A July 2009 survey by Ha'aretz found that most Israelis supported the Netanyahu government, giving him a personal approval rating of 49% (Berger 2009). Another study that was done by The Israeli Democracy Institute found overall support for Netanyahu's solution reached 63% among Jewish Israelis. However, since then support has fallen dramatically. In August 2018 the support has fallen to 47% (Cubbison 2018).

The reaction from the international community for the Bar Ilan Speech was mixed (Yamany and Gongzheng 2009). The Palestinians, the Hamas, the Islamic Jihad the Arab League, (Whatley 2009) Egypt (Mark 2009) Syria, Lebanese, Jordan and Iran rejected the conditions. The Czech Republic praised it while Sweden saw it as a small step forward. Russia saw it as a sign of readiness for dialogue, but did not accept the conditions and France praised it but called on ceasing the settlements in the West Bank. President Barack Obama stated that solution must ensure both Israel's security and the Palestinians' aspirations for a state (Yamany and Gongzheng 2009).

In April 2014 and again in June, Netanyahu expressed his deep concerns when Hamas and the Palestinian formed a unity government. He was severely critical of the decision of the US and European governments to work with the Palestinian coalition (Leas 2015). He blamed Hamas for kidnapping and murdering three Israeli teenagers in June 2014 (Eglash and Branigin 2014) and in a round of television shows in the US, he described Hamas as "genocidal terrorists". As to Iran, since 2007, Netanyahu opposed the Iranian regime, asserting that they were seeking to obtain a nuclear weapon and once it has them will then start a world war. Since he first became a PM of Israel in 2009, he described Iran as the greatest threat that Israel has ever faced (Bergman 2012).

Netanyahu has close ties with US president Donald Trump, with Republican Senator Mitt Romney (Bernstein 2011), with former US Vice President, a Democrat, Joe Biden (The White House 2010) and was a friend of Trump's father (Sherman 2016). His relationship with previous president of US, Barack Obama, was problematic. They reportedly did not like and did not trust each other.

Obama's administration wanted to stop the settlements in the West Bank and Netanyahu accused Obama of "acting contrary to American values" and blamed him as failing to protect Israel against the UN. Because of Netanyahu's accusations Secretary of State John Kerry phoned Netanyahu to clarify that his blames are disgraceful, unacceptable and do not reflect the position of the US (Keinon 2014).

Netanyahu has been described as very bright, organized, strong, and powerful leader (Ball 1996). Another study describes Netanyahu as seeing himself as more qualified than others and as very gifted politician. He loves the good life that his position and his power have offered him. He has been described as using manipulation in order to promote his goals, mostly to insure his political survival. He is very suspicious and perceives himself as a victim, as if the entire political world is always against him. He has problems in making important decisions about basic questions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His ambitions to keep his premiership come from the will to stay in power no matter what. He is very fluent speaker with a great ability to bestow his message (Kimchi et al. 2017).

Since January 2017, Netanyahu has been investigated by Israeli police in four cases and is also considered suspicious in three cases. Netanyahu was suspected of bribery, among other things. His former chief of staff, Ari Harow, had signed a deal with prosecutors to become state's witness and testify against him. In case 4000, Netanyahu intervened with regulators to help the Bezeq group, which was controlled by Shaul Elovitch. In exchange, Elovitch, a friend of Netanyahu's, allegedly ordered Bezeq's Walla news site to provide favorable coverage of the PM and his wife Sara (Ziv 2018).

What is Emotional Intelligence?

Emotional Intelligence (EI) is widely used in organizations and graduate schools with an increase in published research supporting it (Boyatzis 2018). EI has varied definitions. Salovey & Mayer observe EI as the ability to "perceive and express emotion, assimilate emotion thought, understand and reason with emotion, and regulate emotion in self and others, for the mutual benefit of self and others" (Salovey and Mayer 1990).

According to Goleman et al. (2004) EI is also evident in leadership competencies of excellent leaders that are very good in relationships and the best way to look at leadership is through social skills of EI that has four clusters and 18 competences: The first is *Self-Awareness* that contains: (a) Emotional self-awareness - Leaders with good self-awareness are aware to their inner hints, and know how to use their feelings and intuition for best performance. They speak openly about their emotions and authentically, knowing to convince about their vision. (b) Accurate self-Assessment – They know their strengths and weaknesses, know where they need to improve, welcome constructive feedback. They know to ask for help and use humor about themselves. (c) Self-confidence – They have a sense of presence, a self-assurance that lets them stand out in a group. They exhibit their strengths and abilities. Self-confident leaders are not afraid from challenges and difficult tasks.

The second cluster, *Self-Management* contains: (a) Self-control - Leaders who control themselves able to manage disturbing emotions and channel them in useful styles. They are clear-headed under stress and crises, stays calm even in confronted situation. (b) Transparency - An authentic openness to others about feelings, beliefs, and actions. Such leaders, have integrity, admit mistakes and faults, and confront unethical behavior. (c) Adaptability – Adaptable leaders can juggle multiple requires, with focus and energy. They can leave with ambiguities and flexible with new challenges. (d) Achievement – Achiever leaders have high standards that drive them to seek improvements and high performance for themselves and those they lead. They are continually learning, setting challengeing goals and measurable goals that are worthy but attainable. (e) Initiative - The excel in initiative, have a sense of efficacy and seize opportunities, or create them. They do not hesitate to cut through red tape or bend rules, to create better possibilities. (f) Optimism – They see others positively, expecting the best of them, their "glass half full" (p. 255) and can see an opportunities rather than threats.

Social-Awareness the third cluster is with three competencies: (a) Empathy - Empathy makes a leader able to get along well with other of diverse cultures. They are attune to a wide range of emotional signals and unspoken, emotions. They listen attentively and can grasp perspectives of others. (b) Organizational Awareness - They have strong social awareness, can understand political forces in an organization and their guiding values. They are able to detect crucial social networks, read relationships between people and can be politically astute. (c) Service – They are service oriented, foster an emotional climate and keep relationship with others on the right track. Such leaders are available as needed for others, they tend to monitor customer satisfaction to make sure they are getting the best service.

The fourth cluster is *Relationship-Management* that with five competencies: (a) Inspiration – These leaders are inspiring and move people with their convincing vision. They embody what they ask of others. They share a sense of common purpose, making work exciting. (b) Influence – They are influential people, good listeners, able to build a network of support for an initiative. They are are persuasive and engaging when they address a group. (c) Developing others – They are expert in cultivating people's abilities show a genuine interest in those they are helping along, understanding their goals, weaknesses and strengths, knowing to give timely and constructive feedback. (d) Change catalyst - They are able to recognize the need for the change and challenge, can be strong advocates for the change even in the face of opposition and find practical ways to overcome barriers to change. (e) Conflict Management – In conflict management they are able to draw out all parties, understand the differing perspectives, and find a common ideal for both sides. (f) Teamwork and Collaboration – These leaders generate an atmosphere of friendly collegiality and are themselves models of respect helpfulness and cooperation. They draw others into commitment to the collective effort and spend time for cementing relationships beyond work.

Gross (1988) and Wang and Law (2002) definitions of EI are match. They argue that before people can regulate their emotions, they should have a good understanding of these emotions (Self Emotional Appraisal - SEA). Since many of

our emotional responses are stimulated by the emotions of other individuals, our understanding of our own emotions is related to our ability to understand the emotions of other's (Other's Emotional Appraisal, OEA). Just after understanding our own and other's emotions, we can modulate how to experience these emotions and how to regulate them (Regulation of Emotions, ROE) as well as how to express them (Use of Emotions – UOE). Therefore, according to the definitions of EI and emotional regulation, a person with high EI should be more able to modulate his response tendencies and have more effective emotion regulation processes (Gross 1988, Wang and Law 2002). The authors decided to use this definition for the research.

All the emotional competencies involve some degree of skill in the realm of feelings and cognitive elements, emotions and cognition combined (Goleman et al. 2004). Emotions play a critical role in developing and maintaining social relationships (Ashkanasy 2003). While intellectual intelligence is the pre-eminent predictor for individual work performance, group performance is more a function of emotional than intellectual intelligence (Ashkanazy and Dause 2005). According to Goleman (2006) "EI counts more than IQ or expertise for determining who excels at any job" (Goleman 2006, p. 13). "Outstanding leaders' emotional competencies make up 85% to 100% of the competences crucial for success. Understanding emotions can make people more satisfied and happier and happy people tend to function better in life than less happy people. They are more productive, more socially engaged, tend to be more enhancing and enabling than those low in subjective well-being. Positive emotions can lead to positive cognitions, which, in turn contribute to positive emotions as well (Huppert 2009).

Hypothesis 1: The Israeli citizens who support Bibi would perceive his EI above average and his opponent will perceive his EI as low.

Dark Side of EI

Although there are many positive sides of EI, there are also studies exploring the dark sides of the EI (Furnham and Rosen 2016). For example: Individuals can use their EI to fabricate favorable impressions of themselves, to advance their self-interest and welfare at the expense of others (Kilduff et al. 2010). Emotionally intelligent individuals with dark sides, are prone to utilize their EI to influence strategically important targets, to disguise and or display certain emotions to maximize personal gain to shape others' emotions via misattribution and to strategically control emotion-laden information. Research also shown link between EI and Dark Triad traits such as taking advantage of others by manipulating their emotions and prone to engage in callous exploitation (Nagler et al. 2014). EI can also associate with antisocial impulsive features, managing others' emotions to achieve personal goals, ingratiating supervisors by reporting successes and hiding failures and mortifying others to maximize personal gain (Fix and Fix 2015).

Hypothesis 2: The Israeli citizens would perceive that Netanyahu knows highly how to use and regulate his emotions in order to achieve his goals.

Description of the Sample

Four hundred fourteen (N=414) Israeli legal citizens participated in the study, 275 women (67.2%) and 134 men (32.8%). All the participants are currently living in Israel and eligible to vote for the Israeli government. All of them have earned one or more academic degrees. Additional information about participants can be seen in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1. *Participants Matrix*

	Participants	Total (N = 414)	Percentage 100%
Gender	Men	134	32.8%
	Woman	275	67.2%
	Other	0	0%
Age	22–30	54	13.1%
	31–40	121	29.4%
	41–50	111	27%
	51–60	71	17.3%
	60 and Above	61	13.1%
Academic Education	BA, B.Ed	224	59.6%
	MA, M.Ed	123	32.7%
	PhD, Ed.D	29	7.7 %
Religion	Jewish	366	79.7%
	Muslim	29	7.1%
	Christian	6	1.5%
	Other	7	1.7%

Research Tools

We used a structured questionnaire that was developed by Wang and Law (2002). The questionnaire was validated to measure EI of incumbents and contains 16 items, which divided to four clusters. The response format was a 7-point Likert-type scale, with an open-ended question for the participants to write additional information that she or he thinks that is important to know about Netanyahu. The questionnaire was translated from English to Hebrew and from Hebrew to English and to Hebrew again by one of the authors. In the introduction of the questionnaire, the authors explained the meaning of the term EI. The authors also included basic demographic data including gender, age, academic education, religion, and political belonging. In addition, they further questioned as to how they perceive the EI of Benjamin Netanyahu.

Table 2. *Participants Political Belonging*

Likud	Kachol Lavan	Avoda	Hayamin Chadash	Chadsh Taal	Balad Raam	Yahadut Hatora	Shas	Miflagot Hayamin	Israel Betemu	Kulanu	Meretz	Gesher	Zehut
97	136	27	18	9	9	17	20	15	5	6	23	6	10
24.4%	34.2%	6.8	4.5%	2.3%	2.3%	4.3%	5%	3.8%	1.3%	1.5%	5.8%	1.5%	2.5%

Table 3. *Mean and SD of the Four Clusters of Bibi's EI, as Described by Participants*

Descriptive Statistics of Bibi's EI		
Four Cluster of EI	Mean	Std. Deviation
Self-emotional appraisal	5.24	1.47
Others' emotional appraisal	4.10	1.79
Use of emotions	6.02	1.24
Regulation of emotion	4.98	1.55

Reliability estimates of Alfa Cronbach for the four dimensions of EI according to Wong and Law: Self-emotion appraisal (SEA) 0.89, Other emotion appraisal (OEA) 0.89, Use of emotion (UOE) 0.76, and Regulation of emotion 0.85. According to our examination, the Alpha Cronbach reliability is 0.95. The Factor Analysis test of the four clusters as divided by Wong and Law, confirmed by us. Reliability estimates of Alfa Cronbach for the four dimensions of EI according us: Self-emotion appraisal (SEA) 0.92, Other emotion appraisal (OEA) 0.93, Use of emotion (UOE) 0.89, and Regulation of emotion 0.93. Questionnaire was distributed either by email or online, using a Google doc format. It was sent to people who have a BA degree and above such as to students who participated in a Masters Degree program in educational leadership and to faculty members in three colleges and in a big university in central Israel. It was also sent to nurses and physicians in two big hospitals one in south Israel and one in the center of Israel.


Statistical Analysis

The purpose of the study was to construct new knowledge about how Israeli citizens perceived the EI of their PM in his fifth term, over 10 years in power. The authors converted the information that collected through google forms to SPSS software, then we calculated the following data: the reliability and the descriptive data about demographic information. In order to check the perception of the Israeli citizens about the EI of their PM, we used descriptive statistics to calculate the means and standard deviations for each question and for each cluster separately. We also used the T-Test, Person Correlation, to check the correlation among the variables.

Results

The purpose of the study was to construct new knowledge about how Israeli citizens perceived EI of their PM Binyamin Netanyahu. From the descriptive data, we learn that the Israeli citizens perceived the mean the four clusters that consists the EI of Bibi as 5.08% out of 7, which means, the Israeli citizens perceived Bibi's EI as high and above average. The highest grade that was given to Bibi among the four clusters was on cluster number three, UOE, with scores of 6.02% out of 7. On the second-place ranked cluster number one, SEA, with grade of 5.24%. On the third place, ranked cluster number four, ROE, with grade of 4.98% and on the fourth place ranked cluster number two, OEA, with grade of 4.10%. Table 3 demonstrates the Mean and SD of the four clusters of Bibi's EI as described by the participants.

See also Figure 1 that demonstrates how the Israeli participants ranked their PM Benymin Netanyahu while the highest ranked cluster was UOE, on the second place the SEA, on the third ROE and the lowest is the OEA.

Figure 1. The Mean of Netanyahu's EI as Perceived by Participants*Gender Differences as Perceived Netanyahu's EI by Participants*

The T test for independent samples was used in order to find if there were differences in the perceptions between men and women. Significance differences were found between man and women as on cluster number 1, SEA, $t(171)=-2.017$, $p<0.05$ and cluster number 3, ROE, $t(172)=-2.526$, $p<0.05$. That means, women rated Netanyahu in cluster 1 and 3 significantly higher than rated him. Table 4 demonstrates the mean of genders differences, SD, T test and DF.

Table 4. Gender's Differences between Man and Women in Cluster 1 and 3

		MAN	WOMAN	t	DF
Cluster 1	Mean	4.75	5.30	-2.017*	82.12
	SD	1.75	1.39		
Cluster 3	Mean	4.64	5.31	-2.526*	71.26
	DS	1.91	1.38		

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$

Age Differences in Perception of Netanyahu's EI

In order to check if there were age differences as to the perception of Netanyahu's EI, we used a one-way ANOVA test. In the analysis we found significant differences in the perception of Netanyahu's EI: In cluster number one, SEA, $F(4,402)=2.84$, $p<0.05$ and in cluster number three, ROE, $F(4,403)=6.51$, $p<0.01$. In Scheffe analysis was found a significant different between cluster one, SEA and cluster number three ROE. ROE, was found significantly higher. Group age of 25–36, rated Netanyahu significantly lower, compare the other age groups (see Table 5).

Table 5. Age Differences between Cluster SEA and ROE

	Age Group	N	Mean	SD	F	DF
Cluster 1, SEA					2.837**	(4,402)
	1	53	4.75	1.75		
	2	120	5.30	1.39		
	3	110	5.53	1.23		
	4	70	5.19	1.64		
Cluster 3, ROE	5	54	5.07	1.46	6.515**	(4,403)
	1	54	5.31	1.87		
	2	120	6.00	1.14		
	3	110	6.31	.99		
	4	70	6.07	1.15		
	5	54	6.17	0.99		

*p<0.05**p<0.01

Political Inclination: Differences between Left and Right

In order to check possible differences of the political affiliation and perception of Netanyahu's EI, we used a one-way ANOVA test. In the analysis we found significant differences between the parties. In all the four clusters, it was found that the political right significantly rated Netanyahu higher in EI compared to the political left (see Table 6).

Table 6. Political Inclination - Comparison between Left and Right

		Mean	SD	F	DF
Cluster 1, SEA	Tendency to right	5.76	1.16	53.502***	(1,392)
	Tendency to left	4.75	1.54		
Cluster 2, OEA	Tendency to right	5.07	1.428	164.728***	(1,392)
	Tendency to left	3.13	1.57		
Cluster 3, ROE	Tendency to right	6.36	6.9	30.220***	(1,393)
	Tendency to left	15.7	1.37		
Cluster 4, UOE	Tendency to right	5.73	1.19	119.930***	(1,392)
	Tendency to left	4.25	1.48		

*p<0.05, **p<0.01

Academic Educational Differences of Netanyahu's EI

In order to check if there were differences in the academic education belonging as to the EI of Netanyahu, we used one-way ANOVA test. In the analysis was not found different among those who own first, second or third academic degree.

Additional results were produced by an open-ended question. People were asked to write their opinions about Netanyahu. 63 participants out of the 414 wrote their opinions about him. 7 people wrote a mixed opinions, 26 people wrote negative opinions about Netanyahu and 30 people wrote a positive opinion about

him. Among the negative opinions were statements such as: In questionnaire number 3: "He is A liar who ignored injured people in the battle field. His personal interest is above all for those who are loyal to him, mostly the Druse people"; Questionnaire number 8: "He is corrupted and discasting"; Questionnaire number 9: "He is competitive, narcissistic, only serves the rich people, and is manipulative".

Among the positive opinions were statements such as: Questionnaire number 6: "The best prime-minister in the history of the Jewish nation"; Questionnaire number 14: "Excellent prime-minister even though I'm not among the people who voted for him". Questionnaire number 52: Netanyahu is a very sophisticated politician. He is educated, intelligent; his IQ is very high. He is a genius who has high speech qualifications and brought the country to beautiful and impressive achievements. It is not surprising that he was elected for the fifth time. He has charisma".

Discussion

The purpose of the study was to construct new knowledge about how Israeli citizens perceive the EI of their PM Netanyahu. From the descriptive data, we have learned that the Israeli citizens have been perceiving the mean of the four clusters that construct the EI of Bibi as 5.06% out of 7. That means, the Israeli citizens perceived his EI as high and above average. Not only the mean of the four clusters was high, but also that mean that was given to each cluster, has been rated above average. The highest grade that was given to Bibi among the four clusters was on cluster number three, UOE, with scores of 6.02% out of 7. The cluster that was rated on the second place was number one, SEA, with grade of 5.24%. On the third place, rated cluster number four, ROE, with grade of 4.98% and on the fourth and the lowest place rated cluster number two, OEA, which also was above average, with 4.10%.

Table 3 displays the mean and SD of the four clusters of Bibi's EI, which shows that his EI is high. Bibi knows to appraise his emotions and have good understanding of them (SEA). He knows how to use his emotions, experience them, modulate them and regulate them (ROE). As well as a charismatic speaker (Fisher-Ilan 2015) he knows how to express his emotions (UOE), the best and the highest part of his EI. These emotions reinforced by Boal and Hooijberg (2001), as behavioral complexities that articulate a core element of leader effectiveness, since leaders need to play different roles at different times and need to have the ability to select the right roles for the situation. EI or social intelligence is the underlying ability that governs the behavioral complexity of leaders, and viewed in the leadership literature as a core variable that affects leader effectiveness. People with high levels of EI as perceived Netanyahu, can make Use of Emotion Regulation mechanism effectively and promote emotional and intellectual growth (Wang and Law 2002, p. 247).

The Political Inclination: Between Left and Right

In order to examine how the political inclination of the participants possibly connected to how they evaluated Netanyahu's EI, we used one-way ANOVA test. Significant differences were found between the political inclination and perception of EI. In the mean of all the four clusters, it was found that people from the right block rated Netanyahu significantly higher than the left block voters. However, the left wingers also perceived him with high EI since the mean of the EI was high, 5.06% out of 7 (see Table 6). Although it was expected that Bibi who leads a historic right-wing political party would be evaluated with high EI only by the right wing voters, he was perceived with high EI also by the left voters. Which means that our first hypothesis was confirmed partially, since we hypothesized that the left voters will perceive him with low EI.

However, it is interesting to examine who are the majority of right-wing voters, where they from are and why they vote for Netanyahu. The majority of them are lifelong Likud voters, Sephardic people, Jews of Middle Eastern decent, or Jews who immigrated to Israel from North Africa such as Morocco, Tunis, Libya etc. The Sephardic people, or Spharadim, who also known as Mizrahim, (Reider 2015), are disproportionately poorer than Israel's Ashkenazi Jews with roots in Europe and descendants of the founding elite of the state of Israel. Most of the Sephardim are from lower-income areas and from the periphery of Israel. They can also be found in Jerusalem's Mahaney-Yehuda market, Haifa marketplace, and other low-income areas, but not only.

Most of the Spharadim migrated to Israel in the fifties after years of yearning to come to the homeland of their ancestors and after long journeys. They come to fulfil the Jewish dream, to build a Jewish country and crushed to the left political leaders from Mapai, the Labor Zionist governments who deprived them by sending them to Ma'abara, a kind of poor villages in places that no one wants to live, with bad education and no access to jobs. Despite the abundant heritage and beautiful culture of the Spharadim, the Labor Zionist of Mapai despised their culture and heritage, and looked at it as primitive or barbarian behavior. They treated them disrespectfully and when Netanyahu took the election, they saw him as their own salvation. But, he also ignores them (Fisher-Ilan 2015) letting them feel like "strangers in their own land" (Hochschild 2019, p. 12). Despite it, they still vote for him and the question is why.

The Likud's liberal capitalists approach opened a path for many Mizrahim through the nepotist economy set up by the Labour Zionists. While the Labour party tends to frown on any mention of the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide, the Likud emphasized individual opportunity, rather than collective rights, and never bothered with affirmative action or systemic reforms. It made it easier for an ambitious individual to overcome discrimination but did not do enough to prevent the discrimination from all Mizrahim. They are still deprived, under-represented in upper-middle class professions and in academia (Reider 2015). So again, why despite the fact that Bibi is ruling the government more than twelve years do they still vote for him? Another reason for why they vote for him lays in the following

comparison between the Likud voters in Israel and the Republicans who vote for Trump in USA.

It is interesting to compare between the Likud voters in Israel to the Republican voters in the USA. Hochschild (2019) described the Republicans voters who immigrated to the USA in the nineteenth to fulfil the "American Dream" (p. 209), settled in the south, feeling culturally marginalized and part of the demographic declined, besieged minority (p. 221), in the lowest of social ladder (p. 222). The Likud voters, migrated to their Homeland, to fulfil the Jewish Dream of building a Jewish country for the Jewish nation in Israel. They were settled in the Ma'abara and in the Peripheries of Israel, discriminated by getting bad education, being far behind in economy, education and in the lower level of the society (Reider 2015). The common denominator between Bibi and Trump is that their speeches evoking national pride and personal uplift, inspiring an emotional transformation. Like the Republicans, the Likud voters yearn to feel pride but instead have felt shame (p. 225). Netanyahu, a charismatic speaker like Trump, shifted despair to hope, depression to elation and shame to pride promises them prosperity (Fisher-Ilan 2015). It is easier for them to lean on hope rather on despair. Netanyahu gave them hope. Like Trump (Hochschild 2019, p. 226) he promises them to be lifted up from bitterness, despair and depression, promising them secure and safe.

Netanyahu's speeches do not impress the younger voters of group of 25–36, that rated him significance differences from older groups. They rated Netanyahu on cluster SEA and on cluster ROE, significantly lower than all older groups. This group-age did not born yet in the period of Mapai, the Labour Zionists who created the deprived reality of the Mizrahim and they did not remember their suffering and were not part of these bad reality who cause a lot of suffer to the Mizrahim. They ratd him according to what they see and experience of his leadership and they have higher expectations than the older generation who compar him the Zionist leadership of Mapai.

According to Mina Tzemach, one of the national pollsters for the last 42 years in Israel, there is another answer to this question beyond the issue of Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide and beyond the economic issue. The Likud voters believe that if the left wing will win the elections, they will harm the security of the country, while the left wing believes that if the right wing will win the elections, the democracy of the country will be harmed. Security was always a fragil issue in Israel because of the anamies that the country surranded with, and "security and fear" as said Mina Tzemach "are stronger than thirst or hunger" (Makover-Blikove 2019). Additionally, the Israeli electorate does not forget the fear of the wave of Palestinian susiced bombings in the first years of the 21st century. According to Friedman (2019) much of what we see in 2019, and every election since, has been held in its shadow these attaks which killed hundred of Israeli civiliance. Edding to these, Bibi is embedding in his speeches over and over the fear from the Iranians (Makover-Blikove 2019). So, the reason that the Mizrahim still vote for Bibi is because of the fear of the security situation in Israel.

It is important to highlight the competencies that associated to people with high EI and confront them with Bibi's reality. "Leaders with high EI, allow

integrity, admit mistakes and confront unethical behavior" (Goleman et al. 2004, p. 254). "They listen attentively and keep relationships on the right track" (p. 256). "They are a model of respect, helpfulness and cooperation" (p. 256). In reality Bibi did not demonstrate those competencies and we will prove it by two examples: Orna Peretz, a political activist in the Likud party and a lifelong Likud voter from one of the north periphery of Israel, Kiryat Shmona, became sick with head cancer. She interrupted Netanyahu when he was speaking about the rights of all citizens to receive adequate medical treatment no matter where they are. "Then why did you take away the emergency room?" she shouted, to which Netanyahu responded: "You're not interesting. You're boring us". Peretz said in interviews that she did not deserve to be treated disrespectfully by the PM (Bollag 2018). In his answer to Peretz, Netanyahu did not apply any of the competencies that highlighted above. Another demonstration of an unexpected behavior to follow was while Ayoob Kara, Druze, a Likud minister, who was blindly committed and loyal to Bibi, supported him along the way and even supported the nation-state law, which abandoned the Druze rights and upset much of the Druze population (The Jerusalem Post 2019). Kara announced his resignation as a communication minister after withdrawing his candidacy to serve as the next ambassador to Egypt. According to him "I was Netanyahu's shield, for months now I am being deceived using all sorts of tricks to embarrass me and drive me out. I have a problem with a leader who does not know how to protect his people" (Bachner 2019).

Despite the radical left seems concerned about country's future, according to Inbar (2018) Israel in age of 71 is successful more than ever from every point of view mainly because of the Likud party and Netanyahu the PM. That reminds us the statements of the positive opinions from the qualitative data and might be more reasons why Spharadic people vote for him. For example participant number 6 about wrote about Netanyahu: "He is the best prime-minister in the history of the Jewish nation" or participant number 14 who said: he is "Excellent prime-minister" and participant number 52: "He is a genius who has high speech qualifications and brought the country to beautiful and impressive achievements".

However, we cannot ignore the participants in our study who wrote severe statements against Netanyahu. We cannot also ignore the fact that Netanyahu has been suspected in crimes, including bribery and intervention with regulators to help the Bezeq group to provide favorable coverage of him and his wife Sara (Ziv 2018). Among the negative opinions were statements that wrote by participants number 3: "He is A liar who ignored injured people in the battle field. His personal interest is above all for those who are loyal to him" or as said by participant number 8: "He is corrupted" or participant number 9: "He is competitive, narcissistic, only serves the rich people, and is manipulative". These statements can explain why people did not vote for him.

Apparently, these accusations against Netanyahu, are not suitable with the characteristics that the research relate to leader with high EI. Studies demonstrate that EI leaders use effective leadership behavior to influence followers in positive ways (Walter et al. 2011) and studies are clear with regards to many positive sides of EI. However, there are also dark sides of the EI (Furnham and Rosen 2016). For example: Individuals can use their EI to fabricate favorable impressions of

themselves, to advance their self-interest and welfare at the expense of others (Kilduff et al. 2010). Emotionally intelligent individuals with dark sides, are prone to utilize their EI to influence strategically important targets, to display certain emotions to maximize personal gain, to shape others' emotions via misattribution and to strategically control emotion-laden information. Research also shown link between EI and Dark Triad traits such as taking advantage of others by manipulating their emotions and prone to engage in callous exploitation (Nagler et al. 2014). EI can also associate with antisocial impulsive features, managing others' emotions to achieve personal goals, ingratiating supervisors by reporting successes and hiding failures and mortifying others to maximize personal gain (Fix and Fix 2015). That means that our second hypothesis was confirmed. Netanyahu would do everything to reach his own goals.

Conclusion

Netanyahu's EI is high according to the perceptions of the Israeli citizens. He is a smart, intelligent and shroud politician. However, it does not prove that his high EI demonstrates positive sides of the EI. Some scholars have claimed that people high on EI can use their emotionally skills to manipulate others in order to achieve their own goals (Kimchi et al. 2017).

Limitation, Meaning and Further Research

Our study provides some preliminary support for researchers who have high EI that know how to utilize dark sides of his EI. However, there is limitation for these statements since the study was done during two period of time that was around the election for the premiership. We started to collect data on February 2019 and on April 2019 were elections and Netanyahu failed to build a coalition. The Knesset was dismissed and next elections supposed to be on September 17, 2019. Because people were eager to win an election, they may not have been able to be objective. Further research is needed to be done in other neutral times and not around elections. We believe that there are both, theoretical and practical implications of this study. Theoretically, we have applied the high EI of Benyamin Netanyahu as perceived by the Israeli citizens. We hypothesized that the perception of Netanyahu's EI and his ability to use his emotions is high. However, we assume in order to achieve his goals, he uses also his dark side of his EI. Practically, this study demonstrated that EI could be used with positive-oriented and can also use with negative-oriented.

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How do Revolting Young People Become Radicals – The Case of Slovakia

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Radicalisation of young people is a gradual process. Emptiness in a form of distrust has spread into all areas of human life (work, family, church, etc.) and has led to indifference and passivity. This, coupled with young person's disintegration in terms of values and norms (disintegration) and social isolation (disorganization), prompts some sort of revolt. Losing footing in many life situations, the young person resorts to expressions of anger, which, if left unresolved, gradually grows into aggression and violence. The paper aims to identify and describe the sources of anger and frustration of young radicals in Slovakia. It also outlines the most common targets of their aggression. Close attention is paid to Slovak conscripts (Slovenskí branci), one of the radical groups in Slovakia. The Slovak Ministry of Defence regards this paramilitary group as a security threat. The theoretical part of the paper is based on works of sociologists who introduce the concept of indifferent society (Lipovetsky 2008) and examine barriers that hinder young people's integration (Durkheim 1973). Defining aggression and violence that originate in anger is based on Arendt's study (2004). The empirical part of the paper is a result of the qualitative research conducted among young radicals, aged 14-17 in Slovakia in a form of case studies.

Keywords: *indifference, disintegration, revolt, anger, aggression*

Introduction

Radicalisation of young people in Slovakia, as a social problem, did not occur overnight. It is a gradual process that has been intensified as a result of pandemic measures (young people feel restricted in their freedom of movement; they miss face-to-face classroom learning; they were forced to reduce social contacts; they are at risk of becoming unemployed, losing their part-time or full-time jobs in businesses that had to be closed; they have limited opportunities for leisure and cultural activities; they get into debt, etc.), despite the pandemic posing the smallest health risk to this age group. Social networking sites also considerably contribute to spreading of radical ideas (for example, through hyperemotional Facebook statuses and vulgar and aggressive comments). The result of the abovementioned factors is the emergence of various real-life (not just virtual) radical groups, such as Slovak conscripts.

Quantitative researches conducted by non-profit organizations among young people in Slovakia, for instance *Hodnoty mladých – veria mladí v demokraciu?* (Rada mládeže Slovenska 2021); *Ako vidíš extrémistov Ty?* (IUVENTA 2013); *Pravicový extrémizmus a mládež na Slovensku* (Štefančík et al. 2013) and *Súčasný*

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pravicový extrémizmus a ultranacionalizmus na Slovensku (Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová 2016) show that there is a relatively high level support for radical and even extremist solutions among young people in Slovakia.

The research conducted by the Youth Council of Slovakia (2021) revealed that in the 2020 election, 11% of young people would have voted for right-wing extremist parties and 41% would have voted for parties with a populist agenda. It is an increase of more than 10% in comparison to the previous two years. Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová (2016) list numerous factors that influence young people's attitudes towards radicalisation: problems linked to the overall development of society; loss of social security; disillusionment with the political elite; effectiveness involved in the exercise of political power and solutions to social problems offered by the mainstream political elite; prevalent value orientation patterns and types of political culture of the population (authoritarianism, paternalism, xenophobia); the use of a specific segment of social networking sites for communication, obtaining and disseminating information; promotion of "alternative" political and historical narratives, including the popular conspiracy theories; unexplained "white spots" in modern Slovak history; ideological infiltration of foreign ideas supporting views rejecting liberal democracy and the ideological legacy of the fascist wartime Slovak State and socialism. Above all, however, it is the underlying mobilizing force of ethnic nationalism and anti-Roma racism (Roma people in Slovakia represent about 8% of the population. They are one of the most numerous national minorities. Many of them live socially and spatially excluded/in settlements/from the majority population. They are extremely poor, they live in houses without the necessary equipment, the parents of the children are without a job. In many settlements there is no source of drinking water, public lighting, no sewerage, no access road) as well as the citizens' response to the migration wave from countries with different ethnic and confessional grounds to Europe (even if Slovakia was actually not affected by this wave of migration whatsoever).

The paper outlines the process of radicalisation of young people in Slovakia and identifies its sources and forms, in both theoretical and empirical dimensions. The theoretical part of the paper analyses the individual phases of radicalisation. The first phase of radicalisation - revolt is linked to the overall character of the contemporary society (indifferent, distrustful, individualized), which, for many young people, results in a process of disintegration coupled with disorientation in terms of values and disorganization in terms of social interactions. The second phase involves transition from revolt and frustration (feeling disconcerted) to anger associated with the inability to improve (or influence) and quickly (and effectively) solve their personal problems and problems within society. The third phase is transition from anger to aggression and violence that present to these young people a way of accepting the views, attitudes, and solutions they want to achieve. One of such radical groups that show young people "the right path" is the radical group Slovenskí branci [Slovak conscripts]. The empirical part of the paper presents findings of the qualitative research, which analysed the character of a radical and non-radical teenager in Slovakia, using the life-story approach. It also attempted to identify the sources and forms of radicalisation.

Literature Review

Research into radicalisation of young people cannot be separated from the legal, societal, social, ideological (including religious), and political contexts in which it takes place. When young people are concerned, we need to take into account their age and their family background that are both important factors determining the manner in which they find their place within society or construct their idea of life. The legal context provides a foundation for defining radicalisation as such given the possible ramifications concerning criminal proceedings, since radicalisation poses a security threat to society. To see a broader social context, it is required, among other things, to know shared values in that society, for instance, trust (in a political system and democratic system, in institutions of a democratic society, in other people, etc.), equality, justice, tolerance, solidarity, independence (self-reliance and self-confidence) and so on. The way in which wealth in society is distributed among different nationalities, ethnicities, minorities is an important indicator of the social context. The possibilities of ideological freedom (including religious freedom) and their equal status lay a foundation for the ideological context. The political context of radicalisation requires a description of activities of political parties in society.

The impetus for radicalisation in general, and for young people too, is dissatisfaction with the current (legal, social, societal, ideological and political) state of society measured against their own quality of life. Smolík (2020) analysed tension and radicalisation in post-communist countries and identified several causes:

- a division of society into the rich and the poor,
- ethnic and national differences,
- majority-minority relations,
- conflicts between political parties declaring different orientation in terms of politics, integration and security,
- different value and cultural patterns of behaviour.

Khosrokhavar (2005, p. 286) defines radicalisation as a process whereby, “...an individual or a group adopts and acts violently as a result of an extreme political, social, or religious ideology that challenges the prevailing social, cultural, and political order.” In general, radicalisation is an attitude of subjecting existing circumstances to critical questioning and advocating the reform or abolition of those circumstances unless their existence can be justified as a matter of principle. It does not demand elimination of the democratic constitutional state as a whole, only its individual aspects. Radical demands and attitudes remain within the bounds of legal definitions, but are mostly on the verge thereof (Smolík and Vejvodová 2010).

Radicalisation is often seen as a grey zone between the democratic and the extremist. One of the pitfalls of conventional theories of radicalisation is the urge to explain the process of radicalisation using the concepts of abnormality, irrationality, or even mental or social weakness. Radicalised individuals are

regarded as socially deviant (excluded from the social world), even pathological (ruthless, driven by mental disorders). Several research studies, e.g., Crenshaw (2000) and Silke (2011) seriously challenge this pathological perception of the radical individual. As Crenshaw (2000) suggests, one of the common characteristics of radicals is their “normality”. Radicalisation can be both intrapersonal (on the individual level) and interpersonal process (e.g. in the form of a radicalised group - in our instance - Slovenskí branci, communities, subcultures, etc.).

Society as a whole can become radicalised, too. Radicalisation processes are complex and hard to predict, especially when young people are concerned. Academic approaches to radicalisation are based on a combination of two theories: frustration (relative deprivation theory) and contamination (exposure theory). The relative deprivation theory, proposed by Ted Gurr, is largely referred to as an efficient explanation of “why men rebel.” According to Gurr (1970), when external conditions change (e.g., financial crisis, existential threat, or shaking of essential moral values in society) that do not match the individual’s attitudes (expectations of conditions), a personal attitude (perception of relative deprivation) leads the individual to a political attitude (discontent), which in turn can lead to radicalism coupled with violent acts.

Khosrokhavar (2005), however, has shown that radicalisation cannot be directly and simply linked to expressions of frustration, preliminary indoctrination, political repression, or economic deprivation alone. As he points out, the research on radicalisation is mostly based on post factum justifications put forward by actors, which can be problematic as they are likely to fill the moral void that the actors experience. This focus on specific but limited individual reflections on radicalisation reinforces the individualistic and psychological orientation of current radicalisation researches towards a decontextualized perspective of individual’s experience of the radicalisation process.

A simplistic view of the radicalisation process of young people can be summarized into several phases. It is important to bear in mind that it is neither a linear process, nor a causal one, when one phase conditions the emergence of the other, although this cannot be fully ruled out.

From Passivity and Indifference to Revolt

In a sense, contemporary society can be described as indifferent that have stripped all institutions, values and goals of their essence and content. The void and emptiness of contemporary society has been spreading in all spheres assuming the form of distrust. Science, power, work, the army, family, the church, political parties, and so on, have ceased to function as absolute and inviolable principles - no one believes in them, no one puts anything into them anymore (Lipovetsky 2008). All this results in emotional emptiness, a comfort coupled with passivity and indifference in relation to social events, but also in distrust in everyone and everything. The research conducted by the Youth Council of Slovakia (2021) revealed that almost 62% of young people do not trust political parties.

Young people are very dissatisfied with the way political parties and politicians are (un)able to solve the problems they consider important. 68% of

young Slovaks think that elections are a waste of time. Trust in some public institutions is also very low. 61% of young people do not trust the courts; almost half of the young people do not trust the members of the National Council and the government of the Slovak Republic. Young people in Slovakia are also very distrustful and suspicious of other people. Up to 80% of young people are cautious when dealing with other people. Up to 54% think that their personal freedom must not be restricted even if it may put other people's health at risk. This is one of the factors that points to a disrupted social solidarity and a lack of understanding of one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, namely the need to protect the weak and disadvantaged.

One phenomenon that is responsible for such condition in society is increased individualisation (even egoism) that can lead to disintegration of a young person in contemporary society. According to Durkheim (1973), disintegration is immanent to the ambivalence of individualisation processes. At the social structure level, it represents phenomena of social inequality. At the institutional level, it leads to declining rates of citizen participation in activities of individuals. At the social level, it is the absence of emotional support for young people. At the personal level, we see identity crisis and insufficient and inconsistent value education. An analytical interpretation of the concept of disintegration points to two sub-categories, one of which is disorientation manifesting itself primarily in the realm of values and norms. A plurality of choices (even the contradictory ones) is one of the basic features of the individualisation process. Therefore, it is very likely to identify some symptoms of disorientation in terms of norms and their violation, or indecisiveness when it comes to commonly held values.

Disorientation encompasses an emotional aspect too, in particular the instability in social relationships caused by the pressure of competition and compelling the young people to be unique.

The second sub-category of disintegration is disorganization, which manifests itself in social differentiation that hinders integration in social relations and results in isolation of an individual, which promotes greater anonymity of young people's lives.

The process of disintegration in which both of the sub-categories merge poses serious problems linked with a certain degree of radicalisation - revolt. "Radicalisation, therefore, cannot be directly and simply linked to forms of frustration, preliminary indoctrination or to political repression or economic deprivation" (Khosrokhavar 2005). The process of disintegration must also be taken into account.

From Revolt to Anger

Disintegration leads to insecurity. Young people's insecurity can be anticipated in a number of life situations (Heitmeyer and Olk 1990):

- intractable situations, "the dead ends" in which they find themselves,
- unpredictability of life events and the demands placed upon them,
- uncertainty about their own status, e.g. in a family, a peer group, etc.,

- inconsistency of their own self-assessment and the expectations from others (parents, institutions, schools),
- inconsistency between own expectations, actual position and behaviour of important persons,
- absence of approval, not receiving any approval and understanding, or appreciation for something they believe is theirs,
- feeling helpless in terms of direction in life,
- when failure is seen as an expression of an unattainable goal, or when behaviour or performance does not match the expectations.

These insecurities lead to anger as the joint action of multiple external influences (social, economic and political) and their internal processing. Anger is thus not an automatic reaction to poverty and suffering, i.e., social problems. “Anger arises only where there is a reason to think that conditions could be changed, but are not. It is only when our sense of justice is offended that we react angrily, and this reaction by no means necessarily reflects personal injury” (Arendt 2004).

Self-radicalisation, which is related to the development of new communication technologies (especially the Internet and social networking sites), represents yet another form of a radicalisation mode. The use of new technologies for agitation and propaganda is an undeniable fact. However, their role and impact should not be overestimated. The advent of new media does not directly have the potential to bring about political or social change. Social actors make use of the communication tools they simply have at their disposal - it were newspapers, radio and television in the past, and today it is the Internet, social media, etc. Surely, new information and communication technologies have changed the ways in which extremists communicate, collaborate, and demonstrate their power. Violent action, however, is unlikely to originate from purely virtual ties (Cardon and Granjon 2010).

From Anger to Aggression and Violence

When there is a change in external conditions (e.g., financial crisis, existential threat, or shaking of essential moral values in society) that do not match the individual's attitudes (expectations of conditions), a personal attitude (perceptions of personal deprivation) leads the young person to a political attitude (discontent, anger), which in turn can lead to aggression coupled with acts of violence (Gurr 1970). Aggression in a form of aggressive behaviour commonly occurs in response to a real or only perceived threat. It manifests itself in obvious ways, at least as an attitude approving of violence against “the other”, “the different”, or “the unknown”. “Violence arises from anger. To resort to violence in view of outrageous events or conditions is enormously tempting because of the immediacy and swiftness inherent in it. Under certain circumstances violence, which is to act without argument and without reckoning with consequences, is the only possibility of setting the scales of justice right again” (Arendt 2004).

Ondrejškovič (2000) states that violence perpetrated by youth can be considered a specific human behaviour, directed at enforcing the fulfilment of wishes, interests,

laws, orders, etc., and is most often associated with power or domination. In the last decade, more and more young people have chosen the path of violence in their struggle for self-acceptance, recognition, promotion within a group or society or in their effort to gain a certain status. A contemporary society fosters individualisation process and that creates a constantly growing individual competition in the marketplace, which results in young people being forced to incorporate some violent elements of behaviour into their individual concepts and life plans.

The social success or effectiveness of such behaviour, i.e. the acquisition of more and more positive experiences with violence, especially in problem situations, contributes to the development of youth behaviour with an increasing number of violent elements. The logic behind youth violence is different, since a society “provides” youth violence with a certain platform in which it is tolerated. This includes rage that is rooted in exclusion of young people from the real social, political, cultural, and economic life. Alongside the expressive violence that is perceived as revolt, there is also the instrumental violence, which usually assumes the form of a delinquent strategy and delinquent career.

For Tilly (2003), a question as to why radicalisation occurs is not as important as a question of how radicalisation shifts towards extremism encompassing elements of violence. Extremist manifestations, attitudes, and actions represent a set of very diverse activities that generally take place in a public space, but can also be conspiratorial in nature. The activity of extremists covers a wide range of individual engagement activities, only some of which break the law. Extremists use a variety of instruments to achieve their goals, including modern communication and information technologies and modern propaganda techniques. It is this variability and heterogeneity of extremist actions and their actors that make it extremely hard to identify extremism (Vegrichtova 2017). Examining how someone becomes an extremist is much more interesting and important than knowing why one does so (Horgan 2008). Having knowledge of the agitation process (how does someone become an extremist) makes it possible to explore the following aspects:

- different incentives that motivate individuals to seek, accept or reject a particular ideology (the ideological basis of both radicalism and extremism are different ideologies that challenge democratic foundations of societies or some basic human rights and freedoms);
- particular roles, ‘areas of agitation’ that potential members assume;
- selection criteria, their characteristics and also objectives of the selection.

An “attitudinal affinity” with the goals of a particular group (a movement or even a political party) or a well-interconnected set of disagreements (complaints and protests) in line with their ideology can partially explain the agitation process. These purely individualistic explanations turn into reality only when agitation takes places in specific social and political contexts. In many ways, agitation in radical organisations is no different from agitation in mainstream organisations. From an organisational point of view, agitation is never a static process, but it is driven by the identified needs and expectations of an individual. All forms of

agitation involve those who are engaged, committed (which is very characteristic of a certain segment of youth population) and reliable.

Any clandestine or legal organisation that seeks to attract new supporters will make use of both formal structures and informal networks and every communication channel open to them. There are numerous documented cases of the family environment and friendship networks that had an impact on recruitment to high-risk activism (transition from radicalism to extremism) (Della Porta 2013). A majority of young people becomes radicalised and turns to extremism when they come into a contact with active members of extremist groups through family or friendship routes and as a part of a micro-mobilisation context (Diani 2004). Their involvement and commitment deepens over time, although it does not happen in a logical, let alone a uniform way. The context, the method, and the personal characteristics of the future radicals differ. Media and news reports rightly claim that effective prevention of radicalisation should begin in the environment where agitation takes place.

Slovak Conscripts

One of the examples of radical groups in Slovakia and the most numerous in Slovakia is paramilitary organization Slovak conscripts (Slovenskí branci, SB), established in 2012. According to its website, Slovak conscripts is “military and physical-educational organization which, conducting military trainings, prepare itself for potential homeland defence. It is actively intervening and helping also in natural disasters such as floods and calamities” (Slovenskí branci 2021a). The organization, claiming itself as militia, brings mostly young people together and actually has approximately two hundred active members (Osvaldová 2018), but there are estimations about approx. two thousand people passed their trainings. (Macko 2020) Its Facebook fan page has more than 20,000 fans and almost 21,000 followers (as in April 2021). Just before the creation of Slovak conscripts, its founder Peter Svrček together with Michal Feling and Marek Rusyniak who studied in one of Russian universities (Hrammitino 2018), passed Russian Cossacks training of paramilitary organization Stjag which is part of patriotic organization Narodny sobor in Russia, supported by Russian orthodox church. After returning home, they established SB and two of Russian training graduates are still members of SB: Peter Svrček – commander of SB and Michal Feling – one of SB instructors. (Mesežnikov – Bránik 2017, p. 22) SB is currently divided on territorial principle into 17 territorial units across Slovakia, resembling official armed forces or police. In addition, “Reserves of the Slovak conscripts” have been formed within SB in 2016, “which caters to members who cannot regularly attend the trainings” (Mesežnikov – Bránik 2017, p. 21). SB activities include trainings such as physical, topographic, medical, tactical, firearm and engineering training. They even conduct regular exercises (Slovenskí branci 2021b) and assist with environmental issues, e.g., cleaning after floods, picking up the trash (Mesežnikov – Bránik 2017, p. 22).

However, functioning and activities of Slovak conscripts constitutes a security threat for the society and the state. This is based on the fact that SB is not backed

up by any Slovak law and it operates in parallel with official state armed forces. Hence, that undermines the very essence of being a state based on “monopoly on legal and legitimate use of physical force...” (Paulička 2002, p. 430) State monopoly on violence is “concept that the state alone has the right to use or authorize the use of physical force. It is widely regarded as a defining characteristic of the modern state” (Britannica 2021). As concluded Pavel Macko, retired Slovak general, former highest positioned representative of the Slovak Armed forces within the NATO and former deputy chief of the General staff of Slovak Armed forces, “they are not backed up by law... Militia called Slovak conscripts does not exist. It has no authorization to act, which means that it is just group of citizens proclaiming themselves to be authorized group... empowered to act as security service which is reserved exclusively for the state” (Macko 2020). Next reason of considering SB as a security threat is fact that its leading persons express their xenophobic attitudes, which poses a risk to adolescents who are the most of SB’s members (Jursa 2014, Gebert 2018). In addition, Slovak conscripts “after long period of support and cooperation” appointed Tibor Eliot Rostas, editor-in-chief of Slovak conspiracy magazine *Zem&Vek* [Earth&Age] who has been sentenced for anti-Semitic article, as “supreme command member of militia forces of Slovak conscripts” (*Zem&Vek* 2020). Every year since 2017, Slovak conscripts are subject of every annual report of Slovak information service which is one of two Slovak secret services (*Slovenská informačná služba* 2020). Since Slovak conscripts attract young people interested in military, they are also competitors of official army recruitment programs – Voluntary military training and Active reserves. In addition, they are questioning these army programs on their website (*Slovenskí branci* 2019a) and Facebook fan page (*Slovenskí branci* 2019b).

Although love and commitment to Slovakia is considered as the supreme value, SB puts an emphasis also on Slavic mutuality, as reflected e.g., in their recent Facebook post from 11 April 2021 in the context of actual increasing tension in the area of Ukrainian-Russian borders, stating that “We refuse to take part in inflammatory campaign against Russia and everything Slavic, similar to one from the time of Third Reich. We shall not take arms against Russian brothers and other brotherly nations” (*Slovenskí branci* 2021c). SB’s affiliation with Russia indicates also fact that Slovak conscripts conducted training in the property of Jozef Hambálek – founder of Slovak branch of Russian motorcycle club Night wolves, which openly supports Putin’s regime. As written by Slovak non-governmental security think-tank Globsec, since such group is not organized or controlled by the state, there is serious risk that “foreign state actors including secret services could, naturally, focus their attention on such groups, which shares many ideological and geopolitical attitudes with them” (Kupková and Milo 2019, p. 5).

Methodology

The research aimed to describe and analyse the character of a radical and non-radical teenager in Slovakia and identify the sources and forms of radicalisation. As a research method, we utilized a qualitative probe among young people aged 14-17 adopting the life story approach. Data were gathered using semi-structured dyadic and individual interviews. We carried out thirteen dyads (the average length of the interview was 90 minutes) and sixteen individual interviews (the average length of the interview was 60 minutes). The first research sample comprised 16 respondents - radical teenagers (in various stages of radicalisation) of different ages, from different socio-economic backgrounds and types of schools residing in six different self-governing regions. Only the teenagers who would consider voting for a radical party if he or she were to go to polls were included. The second sample group (created for comparison purposes) comprised 26 young non-radical teenagers (many of them with ingrained prejudices and xenophobic attitudes towards minorities). They were of different ages and genders, came from different socio-economic backgrounds, studied in different types of schools, and resided in villages and towns across Slovakia. Only the teenagers who would not consider voting for a radical party if he or she were to go to polls were included in the sample group.

Results

Radical teenagers live in all regions of Slovakia, in both towns and villages; they come from different family backgrounds and types of schools. They differ in the degree of radicalisation. They are boys and girls of different nationalities and they have reported that “even” young Roma are organized in some radical groups. There is no visible difference between them and their non-radical peers. They all dress similarly. At school, they differ from their classmates in being either non-communicative or, on the other hand, more interested in discussing the issues pertaining to the recent Slovak history and the current affairs. To most of the topics they have prepared answers (they believe in them and will not allow any other alternatives), which they obtained mostly from their families or from the radical groups that are active in Slovakia (personal attendance of their gatherings, videos shared on social media).

They have no limits of self-criticism. They want to belong somewhere, since they belong nowhere (no family background, their immediate environment does not accept them, causes their suffering and exposes them to problems they cannot deal with) or they belong where they do not really want to. They want to be different and have an unfulfilled desire for discipline and order from their family environment. They seek a sense of security in an uncertain world of freedom and democracy. They often have problems (mental, social, family, etc.) they cannot solve or have failed at solving it. They have problems at school associated with learning, motivation, relationships, and a poor quality of the school they attend.

The research findings revealed that young teenagers are amongst the priority target groups of radical political subjects, organizations, and individuals. There are several reasons as to why young people fall prey to them: from frustration with the current social and “political” system in Slovakia often linked with ignorance of history, through the “supportive” family background, the ongoing state policy aimed at solving the problems of a certain segment of the Roma minority, to copying negative sentiments towards migrants in society. Every radical individual processes these individual motives or their combination internally and does so with a varied intensity.

One of the main sources of radicalisation of young people is their family background. What we have in mind is: a compatible pattern of parents, grandparents and older siblings; family problems (disintegration, reconstruction, and dysfunction); the social status of families and value orientations of their members. Both direct and indirect impacts of family on radicalisation of a young teenager were recorded. The teenagers are influenced directly by their parents, one of them or their siblings who themselves are supporters or sympathisers of a radical group. The family indirectly contributes to radicalisation of a teenager when parents do not provide their child with the harmonious equilibrium and balance in life in terms of sustainability and potential for creating valuable family, interpersonal relationships, conditions for education, social security, and preparation for a dignified life and life choices (Table 1).

Table 1. *Direct and Indirect Influence of the Family on the Radicalization*

Direct	Indirect
The parent profoundly influences the formation of socio-political opinions of their children - teenagers. Following the parent’s example, teenagers lean towards radical solutions to the socio-political situation in society (not in a form of typical teenage revolt and resistance to older authorities). Teenagers who have no other important and trustworthy institution besides their families such as friends and teachers with different political beliefs and value orientations are “programmed” to join radical groups and become more radicalized with time.	Teenagers have a close relationship with grandparents, who are oftentimes their co-educators (as a result of family dissolution or parents being busy); teenagers often visit them, stay over for the weekend and associate with different groups outside their permanent residence and control of their parent (s). Clearly, grandparents share with their grandchildren memories of a better life under the communist regime (without pointing out some serious drawbacks of that regime). Such teenagers then claim that socialism provided everyone with the proclaimed social equality and obligation to work.
Parents of young radicals have different professional orientations, but they are mainly entrepreneurs, state employees in the security forces (police/army); some associate themselves with communities that have to do with weapons, cars or motorcycles.	Teenagers might also grow up in families with authoritarian parents and experience violence.

Teenagers are oftentimes under the influence of older radicalized siblings, they look up to them, they seek the company of young people that are older than them; they mirror their behaviours and adopt their opinions without a deeper understanding of the matter and the consequences.	Families of radical teenagers might also have a family member who is disabled or seriously ill and who requires extra care and financial resources for treatment or special care.
Siblings have a close relationship with an authoritarian worldview.	Teenagers often live in incomplete, broken families (without one biological parent), in blended, reconstructed families with a stepparent, and even with grandparents and step-siblings.
	Upon dissolution of the original family unit, teenagers often move to a new place (village or town), they had to adapt to a new environment and establish new relationships.
	Parents of radical teenagers are often people with lower level of education, working class or farmers who lead “the simple people” lifestyle, or are in or on the verge of poverty.

The critical state of society and problematic functioning of the state structures in Slovakia together with the overall social “climate” and immorality is a breeding ground for youth radicalisation. Teenagers are very perceptive of this situation, respond vigorously and revolt against it and/or want to remedy the situation in a radical manner. Teenagers are particularly frustrated with the unresolved issues in society (Table 2).

Table 2. *The Influence of Society on the Radicalization (Expressions of Young Radicals)*

The State of Society	The Functioning of the State	Social Climate
They are critical of injustice and the great social disparities between individual people, groups of people, regions and countries.	They do not trust anyone who is currently in power.	They dislike chaos and morals (?) in society (mess, dirt, decay, parasitizing).
They do not trust the system of parliamentary democracy, they do not believe that state administration or any political party truly address problems that Slovakia faces.	They condemn corruption - in general terms, and criticize all politicians, primarily those from the ruling government party; they pay close attention to corruption in distribution/embezzlement of the EU funds.	

They compare (poor) Slovakia to foreign countries, (rich) Western Europe; they point out to huge differences in income, lower standard of living, import of goods at the expense of domestic production, (road) infrastructure, health and social care.	They critically evaluate the schools they attend, they are dissatisfied with the content (a lot of theory), teaching styles and teachers (their (lack of) expertise and (lack of) enthusiasm), school code of conduct (strict attendance), insufficient equipment at schools (premises, material and technical equipment, textbooks).	
They criticize the EU and NATO, of which Slovakia is a member state, at the expense of Slovak autonomy in decision-making and economic self-sufficiency		

One of groups that are targeted by radical teenagers is the Roma minority, against which they wage an “imaginary” but (unfortunately) sometimes also a real-life war. For radical teenagers the Roma represent the enemies in a system that is not working well and need to be changed. Slovakia is a home for both the majority and the Roma minority. For one of these segments of population, however, it is difficult to integrate into society while the other has problems accepting them.

The only experience of many of the radical teenagers with migrants/immigrants to Europe was that presented in the media. In spite of that, the ideological argumentation of many is saturated with the topic of migration. They perceive migrants as a threat to Slovakia and it undermines the sense of solidarity even among the non-radical teenagers. Teenagers link the arrival of migrants to Europe, and possibly also to Slovakia with a number of potential problems (Table 3).

Table 3. *Roma and Migrants as a Source of the Radicalization (Expressions of Young Radicals)*

Roma People	Migrants
They are angry with the maladjusted Roma people who: make life uncomfortable for them or their families, neighbours and even the unknown fellow citizens; pose threat to their property; verbally assault or physically attack them; for some teenagers these experiences have led to undisguised hatred towards the Roma; some of the teenagers are even	They see chaos, destabilization and disorder in the coastal European countries through which migrants enter the mainland.

scared of the Roma people.	
They are angry with the double standard (“positive discrimination”) that is applied – “the whites” and the Roma, who are better off in terms of their place in the social system, a specific place in a village or town, the life with some “privileges” in school.	They are particularly worried about the arrival of large numbers of migrants to Slovakia and they are worried about migrants being in their neighbourhoods.
They have a (mostly) negative experience from the encounters and coexistence with the Roma people, when the Roma are hostile, aggressive, but also loud/dirty/intrusive, they make a mess, they are always in separate groups, they isolate themselves at school, etc.	They believe that migrants pose a security threat to Slovakia, since ISIS terrorists often infiltrate themselves among the groups of migrants.
They criticise unemployment of Roma people, saying that they mostly do not want to work.	They believe that migrants pose a security threat to Slovakia, since ISIS terrorists often infiltrate themselves among the groups of migrants.
They heard about or were even victims of a crime committed by the Roma, e.g., when they steal, vandalise, deal drugs, rob people.	They believe conspiracy theories claiming that migration is controlled “from the higher places”.
They regard the Roma as irresponsible parents who bear offspring whilst being unable to care and provide for themselves, they do not take care of their children, who then do drugs..., skip school or are not prepared for school.	They think that the reports of mainstream media on migration cannot be trusted. Young people think that migrants do not want to stay in Slovakia and they would find it difficult to get used to living here.
They are annoyed with the fact that no one addresses these problems and nothing changes for the better.	They understand the motivations of war refugees, but have decided to listen to and believe those who claim that there are socio-economic reasons for migrants settling in Europe.

Teenagers susceptible to radicalisation seek a way out of the problems of society posed to them by an extremist politician, a former teacher - a man of the people who speaks clearly, boldly and “without beating about the bush”, someone who has already taken care of them and their families, defended their interests (“rights”) and who, as they say, would deal with the Roma. That someone also offers them a place in their youth fraction of their political party. Additionally, their party network has functional informal structures in which a young confused person acquires ideological beliefs, establishes friendships (with “smarter older” people), finds personal protection, and maybe money too. Most of all, such a teenager finds much needed support (both financial and emotional) there.

Differences in Perception among Radical and Non-Radical Teenagers in Particular Areas of Life in Slovakia

Slovakia as a Country

Non-radical teenagers hold mostly a positive view of Slovakia, in terms of its nature, history, and culture. They also speak well of people and interpersonal relationships. When radical teenagers talk about Slovakia, they mostly refer to its cultural and historical sights and natural wonders.

Regional Differences

Both groups see that there are great socio-economic disparities between the regions. Radical teenagers talk about a significantly higher quality of life in western Slovakia. Both groups are aware that a city offers more opportunities (and a higher quality of life) in comparison to the country. Radical teenagers reported to have stronger ties to the country and smaller towns.

Social Differences

Radical teenagers are bound by the same idea - equality. They demand a change of the current social and political system. Non-radical teenagers perceive social differences to a much lesser extent and they are more likely to seek new opportunities of becoming actively involved in helping the social and other minorities, including the poor. They hardly ever consider the change of the social system.

Under Communism

The call for socialism - the idea of equality and prosperity for all and communism - but without taking into account any of the negative phenomena associated with the regime - is prevalent mainly in statements of radical teenagers.

The World

Both groups worry about terrorism in the global world. These worries, however, do not stand in the way of their plans to travel, or even work or live abroad. It is hard to assess members of which group have a stronger desire to return and live in Slovakia again.

Roma

Radical teenagers present a strongly negative attitude towards the Roma, which, however, does not always correspond with their own personal experience. On the contrary, if a non-radical teenager holds a negative attitude or prejudices towards the Roma people it is because of his or her negative personal experience. Non-radical teenagers view the differences between the majority and the Roma more sensitively and talk more often about the need to help them. On the other hand, radical teenagers tend to generalize more often and (some) promote (exclusively) radical solutions to problems associated with the Roma minority.

Food Self-Sufficiency

Radical teenagers repeat the learned phrases about their vision of Slovakia that one day will grow local produce again...and will rebuild “sugar factories and breweries”. Non-radical teenagers do not focus on this topic at all unless prompted.

Slovak History

Non-radical teenagers do not show a great interest in history (of Slovakia), so they tend to be ignorant when it comes to it or present different levels of knowledge acquired at school. Radical teenagers, on the other hand, tend to explain the historical events of Slovakia during the World War II according to allegedly uncensored sources that are mostly inconsistent with the established scientific interpretation. In addition, they do so without making any effort to seek the truth, or without any broader discussion in other than a party or radicalized environment.

Solidarity

Many of the non-radical teenagers either do not feel the need for solidarity or do not articulate it, and therefore do not get involved. Those non-radical teenagers who express the need for solidarity advocate help or support for all who need it, not just the selected groups. Radical teenagers more often distinguish between people who deserve help and those who do not. Solidarity with the Roma population is out of the question for radicals with a higher degree of activism.

Seniors

On the one hand, radical teenagers take on the role of lobbyists who promote the increase of pensions for senior citizens. On the other hand, they blame seniors for their persistent electoral support for the ruling party. Some radical teenagers even talk about the upper age limit for senior voters. Non-radical teenagers tend to perceive the status of seniors in society as unproblematic, especially of those who had been well-situated during their active lives or those who are still actively working.

Media - Information

Most teenagers do not trust the mainstream media. Both groups relativize information from the Internet. For non-radicals the people from their family, school, or interest groups seem to be the trustworthy sources, whereas radicals mostly trust people from the radical group to which they belong (primarily the young people who are older than them), or family members with similar mentality and way of thinking.

Politicians

All radical teenagers have no trust in politicians in Slovakia, especially then those in the current government. They also do not trust the majority of politicians in the parliament. They deem them corrupt, ‘recycled’ and without charisma. For non-radicals, the president of the Slovak Republic seems to be the most popular.

Migrants

Radical teenagers fear possible terrorism, economic disruption of the country and an increase in crime. They base their opinions on information reproduced within their group, and on their sources shared on social media sites. Non-radical teenagers are mainly concerned with migrants taking up the low-income jobs. They also worry about migrants bringing economic, cultural and security instability to Slovakia. Nevertheless, they also share positive attitude towards them.

Corruption

“The system in Slovakia is rotten” (read: corrupted) is a typical phrase of a radical. Corruption is rife especially in top politics. Non-radicals do not go into a debate about corruption, which is a symptom of estrangement of an average teenager from the wider community.

Concerns - Fear

Radical teenagers formulate their worries about Slovakia, they comment on the world events, their fear war, and share different conspiracy theories about the world governance and the persecution of those who know the “truth”. Other radicals would say that they are not afraid of anything, but are (very) sceptical and perceive the world very negatively. Non-radicals worry more about issues related to their age. Their worries concern the near future, successful completion of their education, finding a job or a partner of their dreams. They are able to say what they can do to dispel their fears and uncertainties. Nevertheless, similarly to radical teenagers, they assume that a change for the better in Slovakia is not a matter of the foreseeable future.

Conclusions

The common denominator of radical teenagers in Slovakia is the need and desire to belong somewhere. Security is what they lack in their lives. They are searching for the haven of security, prosperity, hope and the sanctified violence. The reasons behind their not belonging anywhere should be sought in families, schools, among peers, in communities and in society as such. It is there where we need to search for that exact moment when the child has “disconnected” from the guidelines on his or her path to a desired way of thinking about justice, humanity and the truth.

“Social injustice” is yet another domain that shapes the Slovak radical teenager. It evokes anger and frustration that is gradually growing. Outside their homes, they encounter yet another burden for their “radical” mind - the system which, as they see (encouraged by the others) does not function in the same way for everyone; it does not favour those who have little and have worries that others cannot even imagine.

Radical teenagers come from a specific family background, where the word ‘discipline’ is the basis for the family functioning. The family thus becomes a

place for radicalism or escape. There is no doubt that the mind of a teenager becomes “infected” with radicalism where it is commonly presented. Elsewhere, a teenager seeks radical group as an escape from families that are tormented by serious relational problems, health issues of a family member, difficult socio-economic situation, and unfulfilled life expectations. This all presents one vicious circle from which a young person wishes to escape.

Radical teenagers cannot truly “progress” at home or at school. Many have already got burnt for presenting their opinions and they want to achieve more and want to do something big in their lives. So, with or without support they dare to look around and find others in the same situation and with the same mindset. Many have found AUTHORITY in the form of a leader/commander who shows them the right path...

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The Use of Primaries by Political Parties: The Case of PASOK

By Gregory T. Papanikos*

This paper examines the primary elections of the PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) which were held on 5th and 12th of December 2021. Six candidates run for the position of the president in the first round and two runners-up in the second. As mentioned in the literature, there is a dearth of primary elections studies relative to general elections. The latter attract the attention of mass media for the obvious reason: they determine who or which party will govern the country or any other political entity. Nevertheless, there is a growing literature on primary studies. There are three aspects researched in this literature: (a) primary elections systems, (b) why a political party decides to hold primary elections and (c) the selection criteria of candidates and voters. This paper uses the existing literature to analyze some facets of the history of PASOK's primary elections, emphasizing the most recent one of 2021. The most important conclusion emerging from this analysis is that ideology did play a role, particularly the candidates' stance on their possible collaboration with the right-wing or the left-wing parties, which has been a controversial issue in the last decade. Another important conclusion is that PASOK voters opted for a younger candidate primarily because they wanted to get out of the current stalemate of PASOK's low performance in general elections. As predicted from the literature, the competition between the six candidates resulted in a large turnout on the ballot date even though other factors played a positive role such as very good weather and a wide media coverage.

Keywords: primaries, elections, voting, political parties, PASOK, Greece

Introduction

In recent years, the primary elections of political candidates and their parties have attracted the interest of the relevant literature even though general elections remain at the top of the research and media agenda. This paper contributes to the literature for primary elections by looking at one such case of a Greek political party which was the first in Greece to adopt primary elections. The PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) initiated such a system in 2004. Subsequently, five more followed during the years of: 2007, 2012, 2015, 2017 and 2021. Although all are discussed in this paper, the emphasis is put on the most recent one of 2021 when 6 candidates competed for the position of the president of the PASOK party.

The paper is organized into eight sections, including this brief introduction. The next section reviews the relative literature. There are three types of studies included in this paper. Firstly, many studies have analyzed the theoretical and empirical aspects of primary political systems. In this paper, the review of this

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literature is contained within the framework of those studies which include ideology as a determining factor in selecting the system and in choosing a candidate. The reason is that this literature is very much relevant to analyzing the primary elections of PASOK, especially the most recent one in 2021. The second strand of literature explains why political parties choose to select their leader through the primary elections' mechanism. Five reasons are mentioned in the literature: (a) keep the party united; (b) mobilize membership and ideological friends; (c) chose the best candidate; (d) increase the involvement of the leader in winning the next elections; and (e) generate media attention. Finally, in the review section of this paper the selection criteria of a leader are discussed. The most important criteria appear to be ideological affinities and electability in general elections, which in many cases pose a dilemma on voters' decision.

The literature review guides the analysis of PASOK's primary elections. Four sections are devoted to this analysis (sections three to six). Section three briefly discusses the history of PASOK's primary elections. Sections four and five analyze the ideology of the candidates and the voters of the primary elections of 2021 and the voting results in more detail. The latter are discussed in terms of ideology as well the selection criteria of viability and electability. Section seven looks at the probability of success of the most controversial candidacy—that of the former President and former Prime Minister of Greece, George A. Papandreou. Section eight concludes by summarizing the main arguments.

Primary Elections: A Literature Review

The relevant literature on primary elections discusses a number of diverse issues, including the development of theoretical models and their application to specific empirical cases. A survey of this literature is given by IDEA (2017). The researcher selected three issues to briefly review: (a) the system of primary voting and its relation to ideology; (b) the reasons a political party adopts primary elections; and (c) the criteria by which candidates are chosen. This section's literature review will guide the analysis and the discussion of the primary elections of PASOK on 5th and 12th of December 2021.

Primary Elections Systems and Ideology

The primary elections system is a process whereby voters decide, from a range of different candidates, who will lead the party or run for public office. A distinction is made between three types of voters: party members¹, members of another party and non-party affiliated members. The primary elections systems are defined according to who, from the three types of voters, is allowed to participate. Table 1 distinguishes these three primary elections system.

¹May's (1973) classical paper of party activists whose motivations depend on ideology trichotomized the party activists (or members) into non-leaders, sub-leaders and leaders. Subleaders are considered as the most extreme group from an ideological point of view while the other two are more moderate.

Table 1. *Primary Elections System*

Types of Voters	Members of the Same Party	Friends of the Party	Members of Other Parties
Primary Elections System			
Closed (partisan)	X		
Open	X	X	
Blanket	X	X	X

If it is assumed that the voting system does not affect the voters' motivation to show up on the date of the ballot and vote², then the system of primary elections has an effect on the number of people who turnout to vote. The blanket system permits all eligible voters to vote and includes members of the party, non-members and members of other parties. Such a system will maximize, *ceteris paribus*, the number of voters. The open system allows members and friends who are not members of other parties to participate in the election process. The closed (partisan) system permits only members to vote. In this case, fewer people turnout in a primary election process.

It is also assumed in this literature that candidates are not identical and voters can distinguish between each one of them. The candidates' differences may depend on a number of characteristics and preferences, but usually these can be summed up as ideological deviations (Westley et al. 2004)³. These differences are usually related to candidate's ideological deviations from: (a) the ideology of the median voter of the party, and (b) the ideology of the median voter of the total electorate.

As has been identified in the literature (Westley et al. 2004), a closed system is related to the success of a candidate who aspires to an extreme ideology. On the other hand, a blanket system shifts the winning candidate's ideology towards the

²This would be the case if some party members decide to boycott their party's primary elections if non-members are allowed to vote. In some cases, they might even quit the party altogether. One solution to this problem is to adopt a stepwise approach, combining two systems. For example, the party holds closed (partisan) primary elections first by selecting a list of candidates who then run in an open system of primary elections with the participation of members and friends. The Democratic Party (PD) in Italy has adopted such a system. Of course, the order can be reversed. Firstly, the candidates are selected from an open system and then partisan primary elections follow.

³In today's world of screens, the attractiveness and facial competence of a candidate may mislead the signaling extracting process of voters as it relates to left/right ideology. In an interesting paper, Herrmann and Shikano (2016) found that good looks may mislead voters to take a candidate of an extreme ideology as mainstream or moderate. Herrmann and Shikano (2016, pp. 414–415) concluded that, "... our results suggest that political extremists (or non-moderate candidates) might benefit from good looks by being perceived as less extreme by moderate voters. Thus, moderate voters should view a competent-looking extremist as less extreme (i.e., politically closer) than an incompetent looking extremist. Likewise, good-looking extremists (or non-moderate candidates) might afford a visually less extreme appearance without being perceived as moderate by their extremist core supporters. Together, this might help explain why populist right-wing parties often have good-looking, charismatic leaders. If political facial stereotypes are an electoral asset, good-looking candidates should have greater leeway in using that asset to their advantage." However, there are other ways to discern the ideology of candidates. Bonica (2013, p. 308) developed a statistical method which uses primary contributions "...to recover accurate and reliable ideological measures from contribution data."

national median voter. In between, candidates with a party mainstream ideology may win if party members and friends are the only ones who are allowed to participate. It is assumed that ideologies can be ranked as follows⁴:

$$\text{party's median voter} > \text{overall median voter} > \text{opposition's median voter}$$

Table 2 relates the primary electoral systems to the ideological deviations of the candidates. There are two types of deviations; firstly, the deviation of the candidate from the ideology of the median voter of his/her political party in a general election, and secondly, the deviation from the ideology of the median voter of all national voters in a general election. Of course, a party which has governing aspirations would propose policies and programs which appeal to median voters of all the electorate as has been demonstrated by Downs (1957) and an example of how to win the median voter of the total electorate see De Caria Patrício (2022).

An extreme ideological deviation is defined as the one which is located far away from the median voter of the party. A mainstream party ideology is the one which is defined as the one which is identical with the ideology of the party's median voter's ideology and a moderate ideology as the one which lies between the party's median voter and the overall median voter⁵. It is assumed that ideology distribution is unimodal. A bimodal distribution requires a different analysis along the lines suggested by Downs (1957) and discussed by many others thereafter. This literature is not discussed here because it is not considered relevant to the issue discussed here.

Table 2. *Primary Election System and Candidates' Ideological Deviations*

Ideological Deviations Primary Election System	Extreme	Mainstream	Moderate
Blanket			X
Open		X	
Closed	X		

In the 1970s, Williams et al. (1976) argued that there was a dearth of research on primary voting in comparison to general elections⁶. Their contribution aimed at filling this gap. The authors discussed three models of voting evaluations and selection of candidates. Their study focused upon the 1972 presidential primary

⁴If we assume that the party is left oriented, then the inequality sign has the interpretation of more left.

⁵Actually, this is the ideological position which a ruling party of the left or the right would aim at, as is predicted by Downs (1957). To a certain extent, there will be a convergence of ideology towards the ideology of the median voter. However, this depends on a number of variables. Curini (2015), applying an iterative algorithm, found that this tendency depends on the internal rules for candidate and leader selection. If party members elect the leader, then the leader will be free to form policies which come closer to the median voter's ideology aiming at a better performance in future general elections.

⁶This is still true. Relative to general elections, primary elections do attract as much media and voters' attention. One other reason is that voters at large consider primary elections as being dominated by debates between candidates who aspire to extreme ideologies as was pointed out by Kaufmann et al. (2003) and they are therefore not interested in them.

elections in New Hampshire, USA, which "... constituted a major test of candidate strength across a broad spectrum of political ideologies and enabled a nontrivial examination of voter decision-making" (Williams et al. 1976, pp. 40–41). Since then, a number of studies examined the effect of ideology in the primary elections system.

Ideology is an important determinant of voting decision-making along with many other characteristics such as party size⁷, party organization, territory⁸, etc. Studies have shown that ideology is a central characteristic but the empirical evidence is inconclusive⁹. Shomer (2014), using a large data set of 512 parties in 46 countries, found that ideology was not statistically significant. Carroll and Kubo (2019) related the heterogeneity of party ideology to party size. The position of the party on the left-right line is of significance. In left-oriented parties, ideology plays a more important role than in right-wing parties. Westley and Calcagno (2005) argued that the political science and public choice literature have correlated the political system of primary elections to the deviation of candidates' ideology from the median voters' positions on the various ideologically-determined issues. Using data from primary elections in the USA over the period 1980-2000, they concluded that a more open primary is related to fewer ideological deviations, and therefore candidates spend less to win elections.

In another context, Norrander (1989) examined whether there is a difference between the ideology of those who vote in the primaries and those who vote in the general elections. She finds no difference. This is an important finding of choosing candidates who are representative of the general public. The issue of electability is also addressed. She likewise adds the issue of the ability of the candidate to govern well once they are elected. She argues that the primary elections system and the alleged ideological unrepresentativeness is not to blame and one should look at other variables.

Bochel and Denver (1983, p. 68) examined the selection of a leader in the Labour Party (UK) and concluded that "...left-wing selectors do place more emphasis on ideology and tend to support more left-wing candidates. Even though leftwingers were a minority they could have considerable influence upon the choice made. If they act cohesively and view ideology as the primary criterion in

⁷In an early study, Lundell (2004) found that party size matters in selecting an election system. Large parties choose more centralized systems than smaller parties. He also found that north European parties adhere to a more decentralized system than the southern European political parties.

⁸Spies and Kaiser (2014) studied the impact of inclusion and centralization on the degree of representation of voters by political parties. The issue of centralization included national, regional and local. They associated it to the system of selecting candidates. They found differences between the selection of candidates by party elites and a more inclusive system such as the primary election system. On the other hand, Hopkin (2001) applied the experience of USA primaries to two European countries: Spain and UK. He found that party leaders were able to control the selection of party candidates. This is true, but the issue is whether party leaders are themselves selected through a primary election mechanism.

⁹Nielson and Visalvanich (2017), using data from USA congressional candidates, found that ideology does play a role and voters are responsive to different candidates. As a matter of fact, they found that extreme Republicans have a greater chance to win a primary and be selected as a party nominee.

making decisions while other selectors employ a variety of criteria then clearly candidates favoured by the left will be at an advantage.”

A key issue here is the variation of candidates’ ideological differences, i.e., what are the extreme ideological stances of a candidate within one party. Or, viewed from the side of voters, how much ideological deviation could be accepted by the followers of the party or by the participants in the primary voting process. The relevant literature asserts that this depends upon the type of the primary elections system.

Why Do Parties Use Primaries?

According to the literature, political parties use primaries for the following reasons:

- a) Unify the party’s different factions (unifying effect)
- b) Mobilize members and ideological friends which results to increasing the membership (mobilization effect)
- c) Improve the selection of a better candidate or reinforce the legitimacy of an existing one (selection effect)
- d) Increase the competition of candidates (incentive effect)
- e) Generate media attention and publicity by sending a message to the electorate (media effect)

These effects have been theoretically discussed and empirically tested using different data sets by a number of studies—see among many others the studies by Cross et al. (2016); Faucher (2015); Hortala-Vallve and Mueller (2015); and Aragón (2014).

A political party may use a primary elections system to unify the different factions of the party, and in doing so decreases the probability of a party split. This relates to ideology in that the higher the heterogeneity of ideology, the higher the positive effect of using primary elections. Hortala-Vallve and Mueller (2015) developed a theoretical model which showed that primaries are adopted in two cases. Firstly, if there is a threat that a dissenting faction which does not agree with party elite threatens to leave the party and form another one with more homogeneous ideology and policy preferences, then the political elite may decide to settle such a dispute using a system of primary elections. Secondly, primary elections are held to make the party bigger, a winning coalition or better integration of various factions which now exist inside and outside the party. A leader may appeal to all these factions by forming a policy program that satisfies part of each faction’s policy preferences. Thus, merging and integrating the various factions of an ideological space (e.g., center left) increases the chances of winning general elections.

Faucher (2015) pointed out that in the last thirty years, membership is declining. Parties have responded by decreasing the cost of membership and by increasing their participation in decision making which includes the selection of candidates to run for public office. In doing so, they increase the intra-party

competition which has another important effect. Through the intra-party competition, a better candidate is chosen. For various reasons, citizens in the advanced democracies refrain from joining political parties and participating in the general political process. They feel disengaged from the deliberations which take place inside the party, especially in the large political parties. Using open primaries is one way of engaging citizens to political processes and decision-making. They feel that their opinion, and therefore vote, is taken into account in selecting leaders and candidates to run for public office. This is the first step for ideological friends of the party to become members.

Finally, primary elections attract the media attention, which by itself might have positive and negative effects. The positive effect depends on the quality of the debate between the candidates. If this debate is held in a civilized manner and each candidate has the opportunity to clearly state what his ideological stance and policy preferences are, then the publicity of this may be beneficial to the overall appeal of the party. However, if the competition is fierce and gets too personal, then the publicity has a negative effect on the party's image. In some cases, such bitter intra-party debates may lead to party splits which is the opposite from what one expects from a primary elections campaign.

The Selection Criteria

Voters in primary elections base their decision on a number of criteria. Ideology is one of them. In some cases, ideology may not be a decisive one. Those who participate in primary elections may choose a candidate who is not close to their ideology on the various issues, but they have a higher probability to be elected in the general election and form a government. It is only in this case of success that the party can implement its program and policies. Thus, the voter faces a dilemma: what is the best alternative? To vote for a candidate in the primary election who is close to one's ideology, or to vote for a candidate that has the highest probability of all candidates to win the next general election? If the preferred candidate on ideological grounds fails to win the next general election, then a government will be formed by the opposition winning party, which presumably has an ideology which is further away from any party candidate's ideology in the primary elections.

Abramowitz (1989) tested three models of selection criteria using data from an exit poll of presidential primary voters in Dekalb County, Georgia in March 1988. He presented three simple models based on three independent variables. The first variable is the preference of the voter. For various reasons, a voter prefers one candidate over another. This variable is called the "candidate evaluation" variable and might be affected by many other variables such as socio-demographics of the voter and/or the cultural affinity of the voter to the candidate, e.g., ideology, religion, ethnic background, education level. The second and the third variables relate to what can be called "trendy" voting behaviour. Voters vote for those who are deemed as "winners". But there are two types of them: those candidates who are favored to win the party nomination and those who are favored to win the next general election. Abramowitz (1989) calls the first variable "viability" and the

second “electability”. Of course, these two variables may be highly correlated. In a blanket primary election system, these two variables of “viability” and “electability” may not be distinguished from each other because of the large turnout of voters. At the extreme, all potential voters of the party in general elections take part in the primary elections as well.

The issue of electability was discussed by Hall and Thompson (2018). They examined the link of congressional candidates’ ideology to turnout. Extreme nominees fail to win general elections, primarily because they decrease the party’s share of turnout in the general elections. Extremism has two effects. Firstly, it scares away voters and they will vote for another party. Secondly, loyal party voters may decide to abstain from voting in the election altogether.

This analysis and findings are similar to what has been happening to PASOK after the 2009 general elections. Many voters thought that there was a shift of its ideology to the right by adopting austerity measures after the Great Recession beset the Greek economy in 2009, creating an unprecedented sovereign debt crisis in peace years. The mass shift of PASOK voters was caused by a perception that there was a dramatic shift in the party’s ideology. In the rest of this section, an overview of the main political issues is briefly presented which determined the political debates since the first intra-party election of PASOK in 1996. I have extensively studied and published on these issues and even though I review my own published work, these works, nevertheless, cite many references which the interested reader can easily access.

Papanikos (2015a) claimed that the main reason Greece was hit so hard by the economic crisis was an overvalued Euro, and not so much the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy—such as tax evasion—that have always existed¹⁰. The Greek exchange rate dynamics were examined in Papadopoulos and Papanikos (2002). In a book publication, Papanikos (2014a) examined all the historical details which led to the crisis, as well as the future of a leftwing party in Greece. At the Greek economic policy level, these thorny issues—both at micro and macro level—have been examined by the author of this paper in a series of papers; see Papanikos (2015b, 2014b, 2014c). The issue of regional disparities which always play a role in determining elections results¹¹ was examined in Papanikos (2004a, 2004b). In a series of short political papers (Papanikos, 2015d-2015j), I have examined the downfall of PASOK and the emergence of a left party which ruled Greece from 2015-2019 in collaboration with an extreme right-wing party even though they had the choice to collaborate with two center-left parties. These issues were important not only in the general elections, but in PASOK’s primary elections. In Papanikos (2015c), I argued that a Grexit would not be catastrophic for all Greeks; some would have benefited from the exit and some would have emerged as the big winners. However, the majority of Greeks opted for staying in. I speculated that another general election would be inevitable (Papanikos 2015h) in 2015 because the issue of in or out of the Eurozone was a controversial one and was not settled by the general elections of January 2015. As

¹⁰The controversial issue of Greek tax evasion has been discussed in Papanikos (2015b).

¹¹Even in the primary elections, regionality plays an important role as the 2021 primary elections of PASOK demonstrate. This issue is not addressed in this paper.

I predicted in my book (Papanikos 2014a, p. 147), the government organized a referendum on the issue. Before the first elections of 2015, I wrote that, “Germany has sent the message that a Greek exit from the Eurozone might be the lesser of two evils” (Papanikos 2015j). This played an important role in pressuring the coalition government of left and extreme right to decide to stay in the Eurozone and yield to the demands of the other Eurozone members.

All these issues were in one way or another part of the debate of the last 25 years of Greek politics, including the primary elections of PASOK which are examined in the next section. Politicians and parties’ ideology were revealed according to their stance on the issue of (a) ideology, (b) European Union and (c) Eurozone.

The History of Electing a Leader

The first leader of PASOK was Andreas G. Papandreou¹². He founded the party in 1974 and had remained the leader until his death in 1996. There was no election process during this period. Andreas G. Papandreou was the undisputable leader of the party and nobody dared to challenge his power and leadership. He appointed, directly or indirectly, all the party executives and the candidates for all levels of general elections: for the European Parliament, the National Parliament, the Regional and Local Officers. No party congress was held for ten years after the founding of PASOK in 1974. The first party congress was held on 10 May 1984 with 2,500 congress members who were exhilarated and cheering for the President and Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou who spoke for three hours. Two more party congresses followed in 1990 and 1994, but Papandreou’s leadership was not challenged even though in the 1990 congress there were some discussions of electing a new leader, although nothing happened. It was after Papandreou’s death in 1996 that the leadership question became a real one. After 1996, all party leaders were selected by primary party elections.

An Overview of the Intra-PASOK Elections Since 1996


Table 3 shows the dates, the election system, the number of candidates and the turnout of all PASOK’s elections of leaders. A few comments for each one of them are provided in this section with the exception of the 2021 primary election which is discussed in more detail in the following sections.

Overall, there were seven election processes (one with a second round of the first two candidates) of which six used the system of primary elections. Of great interest is the number of candidates in the seven elections as is also depicted in Figure 1.

¹²I have examined in my book (Papanikos 2019) Andreas G. Papandreou’s record as an academic economist and as a prime minister.

Table 3. *Elections, 1996-2021*

N	Date	Election System	Number of Candidates	Number of Voters
1	30 June 1996	Party Congress	2	5111
2	8 February 2004	Primary Elections	1	1020145
3	11 November 2007	Primary Elections	3	738078
4	18 March 2012	Primary Elections	1	236151
5	14 June 2015	Primary Elections	3	52388
6a	12 November 2017	Primary Elections	9	211191
6b	12 November 2017	Primary Elections	2	156103
7a	5 December 2021	Primary Elections	6	270706
7b	12 December 2021	Primary Elections	2	206339

Figure 1. *Number of Candidates*

The second and fourth primary elections had only one candidate which eliminated any competition. Nevertheless, the turnout was significant for another very important reason: it was supposed to show the strength of the party, sending an optimistic signal for the next general elections. It was used as a marketing tool. As shown below, this did not work and in both cases the general elections were lost even though in the second case PASOK formed a coalition government with the right-wing party of New Democracy. It was this coalition which was considered as an anathema and many voters quit the party or they decided not to vote. Table 4 shows the performance of PASOK in general elections since 2009.

In 2009 PASOK won the election with 43.93% of the vote. In the double elections of 2012, PASOK obtained the lowest-ever percentage of votes with 13.18% and 12.28% respectively. In 2015 a new leader was elected, but the party was split and faced fierce political competition because the previous leader and the prime minister left PASOK and in the 2015 elections participated with a new party, but was not successful in gaining the minimum 3% of the popular vote to win seats in the Greek Parliament. However, he succeeded in attracting 152,557 votes, which of course all of them can be considered as votes for PASOK in the 2012 elections.

Table 4. PASOK's Election Results, 2009-2019

Year	PASOK Votes	Loss of Votes	%	Turnout	Abstention	Abstention (dif)
2009	3012542		43.92	7044606	2884459	
2012	833452	-2179090	13.18	6476751	3469108	584649
2012	756024	-77428	12.28	6216798	3731078	261970
2015	289469	-466555	4.68	6330356	3619328	-111750
2019	457623	168154	8.1	5769542	4192719	573391

In addition, there was a new party which ideologically was very close to PASOK, called POTAMI, which was able to meet the requirement of 3% by gaining 373,924 votes. These two events brought PASOK into the 2015 general elections in its worse performance ever. In the 2019 elections, these two parties joined with PASOK as one coalition party and won 8.1% of the popular vote. The new primary elections of 2021 are considered by many as the last opportunity to revive PASOK to its past glory of a ruling party. This aspect is examined in the next section but in the remaining of this section, some comments are made regarding the previous intra-party elections as shown in Table 3.

The First Election of a Leader by the Party Congress in 1996

The first intra-party election to select a leader was made on 30th June 1996 during a party congress with the participation of 5,111 elected congress members¹³. As mentioned in the second section, this was an indirect way to elect a leader. Party members elected the congress delegates, who in turn, voted for the next leader. With very few exceptions, my guess estimate is that there were no more than 5% of the delegates, and the rest of the delegates were committed to vote for one of the two candidates. This was known to all party members. Thus, a party member will vote for those delegates who were committed to vote for one of the two candidates. The result was very close. The winner got 53.77% of the congress members. Despite this, the party was not split; it remained united and as a result won the next general elections which took place during the same year (in 1996).

The two candidates were split on ideological grounds, but this was not so important as many congress members were emphasizing in their private deliberations. Most were motivated by self-interest and self-centered motivations of clientelism and nepotism. The two candidates had strong personal ambitions not only to lead the party but, at the same time, become the prime minister of Greece. One of the two candidates was already the prime minister selected by PASOK's members of parliament in a very close race to replace the sick Andreas G. Papandreou who resigned from prime minister but not from the position of the

¹³The big issue discussed in this period was the uncertainty of Greece's participation in the Eurozone. All candidates supported the Euro, but neither of them realized the difficulties of adjusting. I have examined elsewhere the problems of Greece's participation in the Eurozone, and in general, its economic problems including tax evasion, agricultural and small and medium sized enterprises; see Papanikos (2015a, 2004a, 2004b) and Papadopoulos and Papanikos (2005).

party leader. As a matter of fact, Papandreou was preparing his participation for the party congress of 30 June 1996 but he died one week earlier, on 23 of June 1996.

During the party congress the participants were facing a dilemma. It was possible to select a leader of the party who would be different from the prime minister, but the prime minister at the time, and the candidate for the party leadership, declined in a very controversial and emotional speech. In front of all of the congress members, he stated that if he were to lose the intra-party elections he would resign from prime minister. Since he won the elections and became the leader of the party, nobody could tell whether this threat was a real one or a bluff to win some party members who were undecided. Real or not, given the closeness of the result, some congress members were influenced. They voted after taking the threat as a serious one. They rightly assumed that the two candidates did not have the same chances to win the next elections and therefore they voted for the one with the higher probability. This might have determined the result.

This very much relates to the three criteria of choosing a candidate. Even though this was not a primary election, it nevertheless can be considered as one because of the great majority of congress members who were elected by party members solely on the grounds of who of the two candidates would support a party leader. Very few, and I assume less than 5%, were indecisive and were considered independent.

Many voters in the congress had an ideological preference, but most importantly a self-interest to select a candidate who had the highest possible probability to win the next general elections. The perception among the independent congress members was that one candidate was good as a prime minister because they appealed to a wider spectrum of voters mainly from the center-right. The other was considered good as a party leader and many would have chosen him as a party leader if the viability (preference) effect was more powerful than the electability effect. Thus, there were two effects: the preference effect and electability effect. It seems that the latter dominated. As it turned out, the elected leader and prime minister not only won the next general elections in 1996, but the following one in 2000 as well.

The Primary Elections of 2004

By the end of 2003, the popularity of PASOK as a ruling party was declining and just before the election of March 2004, the prime minister resigned from party leader and for the first time a primary elections process was adopted to elect the new leader. However, this could not be considered an election because there was only one candidate: the son of the founder of PASOK.

Nobody else dared to submit an application to be a candidate. Despite this, the party elite decided to hold the primaries. After all, there was a choice of a void ballot. Only 0.3% chose to cast a void ballot; the rest overwhelmingly voted for the one candidate, giving him an approval of 99.7%. The winner and his supporters were cheering for the great number—over a million—who turned out and voted. Anecdotal evidence supports the hypothesis that there was a mass fraud

and the actual number was less than one-third of that which was reported. However, it was a good political marketing tool for the next general elections which were held on 7 March 2004. PASOK lost, but the loss was a respected one with 3,003,275 voters, or 40.55%. The winning right-wing party got 45.36% and formed a government.

The experience of the primary elections was unique. It was positively accepted by all voters of all parties. This forced the right-wing ruling party to adopt the same electoral system a few years later.

The Primary Elections of 2007

PASOK lost the elections of 2007 but retained the percentage of votes as in the 2004 election. A new primary election was called. This time there were three candidates including the existing leader who ran again. Relative to the 2004 primary elections (see Table 3), fewer voters turned out in the 2007 elections despite the fact there was strong political competition. The result reinstated the current leader who led PASOK to victory in the next elections of 2009. However, because of the crisis and the many mistakes he made, he decided to step down from prime minister and the leader of PASOK.

The Primary Elections of 2012

On the 18th March 2012, PASOK had yet another primary election but only one candidate ran for the position of president. The number of people who voted was 236,151. The new leader participated in the double elections of 2012 and participated in a coalition government, 2012-2015. It is important to note that the double elections of 2012 were fought on a number of issues. Three were very important as shown in Table 5.

Apart from ideology, the most important issue was whether Greece could stay in the Eurozone without the need of austerity measures. As turned out, this was not possible.

Table 5. *Typology of Issues*

Issue	Options	
	Center-Right	Center-Left
Eurozone-European Union	Pull out	Stay in
Austerity Measures	Necessary	Not Necessary

The Primary Elections of 2015

PASOK did very bad in the elections of 2015 and as a result the leader stepped down. In a new primary election, a new leader was elected, and for the first time a woman ran the party. She successfully brought all various factions into the party, which have demonstrated ideological proximity and agree on basic strategies and policies as are shown in Table 5. After this process, it was considered imperative to hold new primary elections.

The Primary Elections of 2017

New primary elections were called to elect the leader of the coalition on the 12th November 2017. This time no candidate was able to get more than 50% of the vote. The leader was elected between the first two in a second round. In this case there were splits and those who lost decided to follow an independent political course or join other parties. By this time, PASOK had gained experience in organizing primary elections and the most recent one is discussed in the next section.


The Primary Elections of 2021: The Ideology

The primary elections were held on 5th and 12th December 2021 where six candidates were running for office. One of the issues was the ideology of the candidates and the ideology of voters. The latter was unknown because the electoral system was open. Members and friends could come on the day of the vote, register and then vote. Members of other parties were not allowed, but friends of other parties could vote and this was an important factor because PASOK lost many voters in the last decade that opted to vote for parties to the left and to the right of PASOK. According to various polls conducted prior to primary elections, 44% of the total Greek voters declared that could vote again PASOK; this was the percentage of votes PASOK won in the 2009 general elections. Compare this with the 8% of the previous general elections of 2019; if all the 44% voters could turn out on the ballot date of the primaries, then the effect would have been much different. The reason for abstaining might be that they are not very keen to vote in primaries. As I said in the previous section, the turnout in 2004 of more than one million voters most probably was the result of fraud rather than an actual number.

The Ideology of the Three Leading Candidates

The ideology of the candidate is one of the most important characteristics that voters have taken into consideration in deciding who to vote for in a primary election. In the 2021 PASOK's primary election this became an important issue and a topic of debate and discussion. In Figure 2 the three leading candidates are depicted according to their ideologies as this was perceived by voters and the mass media during the election campaign of each candidate. It is important to note that no candidate openly declared his ideology. Therefore, voters and the mass media were using a signaling extracting process which mainly consisted of a possible future collaboration with political parties, which on the ideological spectrum are located left and right of PASOK (the vertical lines in Figure 2).

Figure 2. *The Ideological Location of the Three Leading Candidates*




C1: Androulakis; C2: Loverdos; C3: Papandreou.

The Ideology of Voters

Figure 3 shows the ideology of voters in the primary elections where three types of voters are distinguished. All are determined according to their attitudes towards the left-wing and the right-wing opposing to PASOK parties. From an ideology point of view, PASOK stands in the middle of the governing party (right-wing) and the official opposition party (left-wing). PASOK is the third party in the Greek Parliament. Firstly, they are those voters whose ideology is close to the right-wing party and therefore they would not have a problem in collaborating with them to form a coalition government. Secondly, they are those whose ideology is close to the left-wing party and they would feel comfortable collaborating with them. Thirdly, they are those who oppose any collaboration with either the left-wing or the right-wing parties of Greece.

The primary election results during the first round can be interpreted as confirming this depiction of voters' ideology. This is discussed in the following section.

Figure 3. *The Venn Diagram of Party Members' and Friends' Attitudes Towards the Other Parties Left and Right Ideologies*



The Primary Election of 2021: Results and Discussion

In the 2021 primary elections of PASOK an open system was adopted. Only members of other parties were excluded from voting. Each voter had to fill out and sign a form stating that he/she was not a member of another party and they wanted to become members or friends of PASOK. Members of the other parties were not allowed to vote even though it was very difficult to distinguish between them. All voters can register on the same date that they vote by paying a fee of 3 euro. During the second round no fee was required, but only those who voted in the first round could participate in the second round as well.

Six candidates run for office but not all six candidates had the same motivation to run for the leadership race. There were two groups of candidates. Each group consisted of three candidates. The first group included the favored to win the race. The three candidates with the higher probabilities of success were the former prime minister of Greece George Papandreou (born in 1952), the second was Andreas Loverdos (born in 1956), a member of the Greek Parliament and Nikos Androulakis (born in 1979), an elected member of the European Parliament. All three candidates had run in previous primary elections and therefore had the experience. Only Papandreou had run two times before and won both times in 2004 and 2007. His case is of great interest and is further discussed in the next section.

The total number of party members and friends of PASOK who voted in the first round was 270,706. The results of the first round of primary elections are reported in Table 6. The total number of votes obtained by all six candidates was 268,798, of whom 266,347 voted in Greece and 2,451 in countries outside Greece.

A number of conclusions emerge from the results reported in Table 6. Firstly, despite all the media fuss about the renewal of the party, the election results show that voters overwhelmingly voted for older candidates. Three candidates were born in the 1950s, one in the 1960s, one in the last year of the 1970s (the winner) and the youngest in 1983. The average age was 56 years. If the group of candidates is split into young (two of them) and old (three of them), then close to 60% of voters chose old and close to 40% chose young candidates. However, I should mention that the youngest of all candidates did an excellent campaign. Even though he entered late in the race, he was able to get a respectable percentage of PASOK's voters. For many of the voters he was an unknown political figure, which is an additional advantage of primary elections; they give the opportunity to young and relatively inexperienced candidates to demonstrate that they deserve not only the party's attention but the general electorate as well. This "investment" in political exposure will bear its fruits pretty soon if it is managed appropriately.

Table 6. *Results of the First Round of Primary Elections*

	Candidate	Votes Greece	Votes Global	Votes Total	Percentage	Birth Year
1	Androulakis	98431	689	99120	36.88%	1979
2	Papandreou	74093	1090	75183	27.97%	1952
3	Loverdos	69411	416	69827	25.98%	1956
4	Christidis	8642	91	8733	3.25%	1983

5	Geroulanos	7946	81	8027	2.99%	1966
6	Kastanidis	7824	84	7908	2.94%	1956
Total		266347	2451	268798	100	Avg Age = 56

Playing the youth card in the political debate had a double meaning. PASOK's members and friends decided to pass over the leadership of the party to the new generation. However, this might be the result of either the old generation (over 60) voting for a young leader, and/or the youth of the party (under 40) voted for someone who had the same age. On the other hand, the winner was not involved with governmental responsibilities because of his age and therefore nobody was able to accuse him of wrongdoings.

Secondly, voters seem to have voted for mainstream ideology which stands on an independent course rather than collaborating with either the left or the right, but this should be interpreted with caution. If the party becomes great again and gets a high percentage of votes in the next general elections, then the issue of collaboration with other parties to form a government is not crucial. The issue becomes a real one if PASOK had no choice but to collaborate. Again, this might not be a critical issue if the general election results are such that there is only one choice, i.e., to collaborate with only one of the two parties. The real issue of choice is only when PASOK would have the option to collaborate with a left or a right political party. In 2012, PASOK had no choice but to form a coalition government with the right-wing parties even though in the beginning was a small left party that participated in the coalition. This is in contrast with SYRIZA in 2015 which had the choice to collaborate with two center-left parties (PASOK and POTAMI), but instead decided to collaborate with an extreme right-wing party to form a government from 2015 to 2019.

Autonomy and renewal were the slogan of the winner of this round of primary elections. Autonomy is an ideological stance while renewal was used to state the obvious, i.e., he was young.

Table 7 reports the results of the second round. As many had expected, the winner of the first round won the second round as well. Some comments are made which are guided by the literature review of the second section.

Table 7. Results of the Second Round of Primary Elections

	Candidate	Votes Total	Percentage	Birth Year
1	Androulakis	139,492	67.6	1979
2	Papandreou	66,847	32.4	1952
Total		206,339	100	Age Difference = 27 years

From an ideology point of view, this was something to be expected because in terms of votes, the third candidate was closer to the winner's ideology in the first round. I do not want to overemphasize the issue of ideology because intra-party personal politics played a role as well in terms of factions which were more personal rather than ideological.

The oldest candidate competed with the second youngest. The age difference was one generation, i.e., 27 years. This played the most important role. There was a general call to renew the party. They thought that by electing a relatively young candidate the probability of winning the next elections is higher. This is according to the criterion of electability mentioned in the literature. There is another interesting stylized fact which rarely occurs in primary system of two rounds. The second runner-up got fewer absolute votes in the second round relative to the first round. He obtained 74,093 votes in the first round and 66,847 votes in the second round. My interpretation is that this occurred because of the electability argument. Many voters considered that he failed to mobilize as many votes as they expected from him in the first-round and therefore, he had no chance to bring more votes from the general electorate to win the next general elections. They chose to abstain. Of course, this assumes that they did not believe that the winner was a good choice either. More on Papandreou's chances to win the primaries is discussed in the next section.

The other selection criterion was viability, i.e., who the party members would feel closer to their own preferences for a good leader of the party. The winner served in the past as the General Secretary of the party and had persuaded many partisans that he had the skills to run the party effectively.

In conclusion, it seems that the criteria set by the literature review explain the results of the second round.

George A. Papandreou's Chances of Success

This section is devoted to Papandreou's candidacy because his case has great theoretical interest. In the literature review section, it was mentioned that one of the reasons parties organize primary elections is to either avoid or integrate splits. This is the case with Papandreou's candidacy and is further discussed in the remaining section of this paper.

Papandreou entered the race late compared with his main opponents. He decided to run just before the unexpected death of PASOK's leader on 25th October 2021. She was also planning to run to be reelected but due to serious health reasons, quit. After this, Papandreou decided to run again for the presidency of the party. Despite his lateness, he was in a better position if he could mobilize his followers. As a matter of fact, Papandreou's problem was not the loyal supporters and friends of all other candidates, but his own large niche of supporters. Papandreou's problem was to mobilize the members of his own faction. I assume that the others had no problem in mobilizing their supporters because they have been working for their candidacy for more than two years.

On 25th January 2015, Papandreou competed in the general elections with his own party after splitting from PASOK despite the fact that (a) his father was the founding member of PASOK; (b) he was an elected member of parliament since a very early age (under 30); (c) became the leader of the party in 2004, and as a result (d) the prime minister in 2019.

In 2015, he was unable to win parliament seats because he did not get the required minimum percentage of 3% of total votes. He obtained 2.47% or 152,557 votes. Thus, he had only one task: to mobilize these loyal followers to turnout on the date of the primary election and vote for him. This would have given him a probability of success from the first round.

According to my guess estimates which were published as a small working paper on 30th October 2021 (Papanikos 2021), Papandreou would have an easy ride and win the leadership race if he could mobilize his supporters. As expected from the theoretical literature, his candidacy increased the mass media attention; not only the Greek but the international as well because Papandreou was the President of the Socialist International. My assumption was that Papandreou would bring new and old friends into the group of voters.

Following a rule of thumb approach, I estimated a critical value of 300,000 voters. If the turnout was more than this number, then Papandreou would win not only the first round but the second round as well. Some other assumptions were not as critical, e.g., (a) the Papandreou's political brand name would bring him an additional 10% of the total vote and (b) supporters of the deceased president of PASOK would vote for Papandreou as well; I assumed that 30% to 40% of this block of party supporters would vote for Papandreou. Table 8 reports the actual votes and their percentage per candidate, and the percentage of votes per candidate for three scenarios: 400,000 voters, 350,000 voters and 300,000 voters.

Table 8. *Three Scenarios of Papandreou's Potential Win (see Papanikos, 2021)¹⁴*

	Candidate	Actual Votes	Percentage	Scenario A 400,000	Scenario B 350,000	Scenario C 300,000
1	Androulakis	99120	36.88%	24.8%	28.3%	33.0%
2	Papandreou	75183	27.97%	51.6%	44.7%	35.5%
3	Loverdos	69827	25.98%	17.5%	20.0%	23.3%
4	Christidis	8733	3.25%	2.2%	2.5%	2.9%
5	Geroulanos	8027	2.99%	2.0%	2.3%	2.7%
6	Kastanidis	7908	2.94%	2.0%	2.3%	2.6%
	Total	268798	100	100	100	100

The best scenario of Papandreou would have been to mobilize the maximum of all his loyal supporters which could have increased the total turnout to 400,000. In this case Papandreou would have won from the first round with 51.5%. As a matter of fact, in the primary elections of 2015, the president of PASOK was elected from the first round with almost the same percentage of 51.7%. On the other hand, if he could have mobilized his supporters so the total turnout would have been 350,000, then Papandreou would have obtained the 44.7% of total ballots casted. Finally, at the threshold level of 300,000, Papandreou would have come first with 35.5% of votes and the second would have received 33%.

Papandreou failed to mobilize all his supporters. As a result, the overall turnout was less than 10% of the threshold of 300,000 voters. Thus, this

¹⁴https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356529365_Oi_Ektimeseis_gia_ten_Ekloge_Proedrou_tou_PASOK_stis_Epikeimenes_Ekloges_stis_5_e_kai_12_Dekembriou_2021/

precondition was not satisfied and Papandreou did not come first in the first round, but got the second position which permitted him to participate in the second round. The point I wanted to make was that if he could have mobilized his 2015 voters, he would have had a chance of winning the elections even from the first round.

Conclusions

Primary elections make democracy better. As in Ancient Athens, citizens (those who have the right to vote) express their opinion on who they want to run their party. By doing so, and if all ruling parties do so, then who runs for public office is the peoples' choice. PASOK was the first Greek political party which instigated primary elections. Immediately the opposition center-right party followed by adopting primary elections.

This paper examines PASOK's primary election, discussing further the most recent one of December 2021. As would have been predicted by the relevant theoretical literature on primary elections, ideology and party renewal did play a role. The aim to keep the party united is too early to tell, but even if one of the candidates attempt to split the party, the chances that he will be successful are very slim.

In Greece primary elections have been welcome with enthusiasm. An unexpected number of citizens turn out to vote. It is expected that not only the system of electing leaders will remain but it will expand towards two directions. Firstly, other parties will adopt the same system, especially those which attract a relatively high number of popular votes. Secondly, the primary system will be expanded to other issues and elections. For example, primaries can be held for important decisions to be made or to elect the members of party elite. It seems that democracy will have a snowballing effect and reverse the long-observed apathy of citizens. One may conclude that primaries serve two purposes. Firstly, political parties would become better by becoming more democratic. Secondly, citizens would become better and accept democracy because they would like to be informed before they vote. Educating citizens is a precondition for a better democracy. Primary elections serve this objective and they are here to stay.

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