

Ontological and Temporal Complications of the Social Sciences' Approach to the Intersubjectivity in the IR Field: The Example of Constructivism and Phenomenology's Proposal¹

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As international relations are directly related to societies and social/ socio-psychological dynamics, the main axes of the IR theorising refer to social sciences to the point of making the IR studies a branch of them. However, they also differ fundamentally from them since they constitute a purely intersubjective field, including their “actors”. Social sciences, while also operating in intersubjectivity, have their independently present and accessible actors, therefore a certain anchor in the objectivity. Social sciences theorise and build explicative narratives of genetic nature for phenomena and events, which are independently assessable on that ontological ground. The IR theorising, by importing social sciences' theoretical grounds and genetic approaches into their purely intersubjective sphere without being validly able to produce a similar anchor, bring serious ontological and temporal complications into their study of IR phenomena and events. These complications are amplified by a particular branch of the IR theorising, the constructivism, as it also theorises-therefore-narrates the IR intersubjectivity itself on social sciences' grounds and through their genetic approach, which are exogenous to IR. On the other hand, the IR phenomena and events may be studied in their pre-theoretical, immediate, post-genetic, intersubjective appearance/givenness on their own ontological and temporal grounds. Phenomenology, with contributions from the phenomenological ontology, already provides such an attempt with fundamental notions and tools..

Introduction

Current international relations studies rely heavily on social sciences in their understanding of and approaches to phenomena and events, in their definitions of the actors and explanations of their interactions. This is displayed by these studies' main theoretical axes, namely realism/structural realism, liberalism and constructivism, whereas as a fourth, critical line of thought, the post-structuralism refers to the same grounds as well, if only “negatively”. After all, the IR theorising takes social sciences as axiomatic grounds and methods, adapting them to international relations to the point that the IR itself becomes a social science.

This appears to be only natural, since it would be difficult to question the IR actors', phenomena's and events' direct relationship with individuals and groups which meaningfully exist within societies, therefore with social and socio-

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psychological dynamics. This is certainly so in the larger and relatively “newer” sense of the international relations, where many types of actors and relationships are defined. It is also valid in the narrower, more classical, perhaps archaic sense of the IR, which is almost exclusively centred on interstate interactions.

On the other hand, the IR field is fundamentally, purely intersubjective. Its actors, phenomena and events are not self-standingly, objectively present. As such, they contrast not only to the matters of the positive sciences which have self-standing, objective reality, but also to the proper sphere of the social sciences. However social sciences’ phenomena and events are also intersubjective, such as norms, values or institutions, their actors are real, self-standing and accessible as such, possible to assess as such. They are ontologically anchored to objectivity. The IR has no such correspondence and no such anchor.

When social sciences constitute the ground of the IR studies, this differentiation between the two spheres become problematic in ontological and subsequently, in temporal senses. Social sciences, due to their anchor to the objectivity, may and do proceed with theorising about the geneses of their entities, phenomena and events in defining them and the patterns of their interaction. Their constructs and findings may be assessed against this relatedness to objectivity, which is accessible independently from the theoretical construct. However, the IR field’s lack of such anchor makes the genetic approach to phenomena and events exogenous to the field, even artificial, even despite deduction from collective experiences, since deduction toward theorising itself has *telos* as *a priori* and no *a priori* imported from social sciences into the IR theorising has the ontological anchor it otherwise possesses in its proper field. The current variants of the IR theorising become therefore closed circuits, a series of genetic narratives about phenomena and events that are built on exogenous grounds. They precede the intersubjective, immediate, pre-theoretical givenness/appearance of the IR phenomena and events and fit them into the framework they bring forward as malleable material. Imposing the theoretically narrated geneses upon the immediacy of these appearances further add a temporal distortion to this ontological complication, since they are by nature post-genetic.

These problems of the current IR theorising require a debate on the very nature of the IR phenomena and events, therefore on the intersubjectivity. However, one particular line of thought in the IR theorising does the same, yet with a genetic understanding. Constructivism adopts the intersubjective nature of the IR field. However, it approaches intersubjectivity genetically, in an act of theorising and again on the ground of social sciences. It narrates, on this ground and through social dynamics and communicative processes, the genesis of the intersubjectivity itself. It therefore does two things the other branches of the IR theorising do not, at least directly or at that scale: Firstly, it furthers the acts of theorising and narrating into the genuine ontological grounds of the IR field, radicalising the abovementioned complications. Secondly, it rigourously employs social sciences’ notions and methods in the IR field, leaving much less place to “assumptions” such as that of objectivity of the State-as-actor in the realist school, which in fact serve to provide the immediate and intersubjective recognisances of phenomena and events an escape route. Everything becomes subject to social and socio-psychological *a*

prioris and narratives in the constructivist theorising. Therefore, not only the debate on the intersubjectivity in a context that is related to IR theorising needs to refer particularly to constructivism, but also grounds for a non-narrative method of working with the IR intersubjectivity should be proposed. These grounds are already present, not within the sphere of social sciences but within the philosophy, in a branch of it that is directly related to ontology and temporality, that works with intersubjectivity in this framework and that *unintendedly* devises tools for approaching the *sui generis* phenomena and events of the IR.

In this vein, the first section of this paper shall be reserved to a general debate on the ontological and temporal complications of the current IR theorising in employing social sciences' notions, proposals and methods. The first sub-section shall present a general framework on the matter, in reference to the main axes of the IR theorising. The second sub-section shall dwell on a particular result of these complications, which is the discrepancy between the singularity of the IR phenomena and events at their pre-theoretical and intersubjective immediacy of givenness/appearance and the current multiplicity of genetic narratives about them, stemming from the artificial multiplicity of theoretical constructs that alter/reshape the singular givenness through their varying *a prioris*.

The first part of the second section shall focus on a debate on intersubjectivity, in reference to constructivism for reasons mentioned above. The second sub-section shall esquisse the proposal of phenomenology under this light, as a possible way to approach the IR phenomena and events at their singular, pre-theoretical, intersubjective and immediate givenness, in contrast to the social sciences' proposals the current IR theorising, in particular the constructivist thought, imports into the very grounds of the study with complications.

The Ontological and Temporal Complications of Social Sciences in the IR Field

Social Sciences' Genetic Approach in the IR Theorising

Social sciences are before all, "sciences". They search for valid patterns in order to explain phenomena and events. Validity is that of repeating causal links, which are theoretically definable and empirically demonstrable. They do not significantly differ from the positive sciences as to their attitude toward their study objects. Yet, the nature of their objects substantially differs from those of the positive sciences as they involve intersubjective constructions of entities and meaning-attributions to phenomena and events which do not objectively exist, in the sense of independence from collective recognisance/belief. This self-evident difference is certainly acknowledged by the social sciences yet scarcely affects their scientific "attitude" and rigor in the study of the non-objective/intersubjective phenomena and events. This becomes possible as they are not totally devoid of an anchor in the objectivity. Their objects may certainly be intersubjective, yet their main subjects are independently "there". The individuals' groupings with their behaviour patterns and communicative processes are objectively present. They are accessible as such and their self-standing presence provides the social sciences

with ground for pursuing/developing scientific methods and attitude in their studies of related phenomena and events. In other words, social sciences mainly operate through explaining the intersubjective phenomena and events on the ground of objective, self-standingly present subjects-in-interaction.

However, the IR field has a peculiarity which distances it from the social sciences' "objectivity ground". It is purely, fundamentally intersubjective, not only as to phenomena and events that are studied but also as to its immediate subjects/actors. These are appearances and collective recognisances. No one has directly, non-mediately experienced a State, a nation, a war, a border, an international organisation as the experience of a physical phenomenon or occurrence or individuals in social groups and interactions. Such experiences become possible only through the medium of collective meaning-attribution to other entities, acts and occurrences. A "real", "physical" official represents (and appresents) the State or an organisation on a matter, official papers constitute the concrete media in displaying the validity of the act on behalf of the State, organisation or their appendages which also refer to it, uniforms and insignia convey the presence of "legal" armed forces, their clashes are recognised as war between their States, some buildings "incarnate" institutions, border signs "mean" jurisdictional demarcations between States and so on. Having no direct correspondences in the objective reality in the narrow sense, IR actors, phenomena and events are referred-to, gain meaning and are experienced on the ground of their pre-theoretical, intersubjective immediacy of givenness through other but meaningfully related occurrences, in fact they make these occurrences possible and meaningful.

Inquiring about the "true" subjects/actors of the IR phenomena and events could constitute the main counter-argument to the proposal of the differentiation of the IR from the social sciences, due to its lack of objectivity anchor. If the apparent subjects of the IR field, for example the State, are not objectively present but gain appearance only mediately, the subjects that make them are nevertheless "real" and same with those of the social sciences. Consequently, in order to establish an objectivity anchor and thus provide the social sciences with a valid ground in the field of the IR, the relationship between self-standingly, objectively present subjects of the social sciences and the purely intersubjective actors/subjects, phenomena and events of the IR field needs to be defined and elaborated. Here, the almost reflexive definition of the said relationship becomes genetic/constitutive, defining the coming-into-being of the IR actors and their behaviour patterns as engendered by the social dynamics/communicative processes of the objectively present subjects of social sciences. As such, the IR actor is to reflect these genetic-natured social elements and dynamics as its very substance in its interactions, which take form of IR phenomena and events. In other words, the IR study becomes reducible to matters of social sciences.

The genetic approach varies regarding which social sciences discipline is referred-to in the study of IR phenomena and events. The realist/structural realist, marxist, liberal and constructivist schools refer to different social/socio-economic/socio-psychological fields and notions in building their fundamental proposals as to the nature and behaviour patterns of the IR actors in their interaction.

For example, face to a given phenomenon or event such as the war, the realist/structural realist approaches, be they systemic or reductionist in Waltz's terms, rely on "objective", even "quantifiable" *social* patterns of power-relations, interests or threats on the ground of their "assumption of the objectivity" of the State as a kind of microeconomic agent (see for example Waltz 1979, Waltz 2001, Morgenthau 1948, Mearsheimer 2014, Gilpin 1981, Walt 1990, Lebow 2010, Snyder 1984, Copeland 2015). The Marxists refer, in the same cases, to a genetic narrative of the actor and of its behaviour patterns in the form of class dialectic and –for example- imperialism or hegemony as the reflects on international behaviour (see for example Lenin 2011 or for the specific case of Germany Blackbourn and Eley 1984, Blackbourn 1998). The (neo)liberal view shall put forward a genetic narrative referring to rationality, irrationality, inclination to interdependence and relationship with normative frameworks related to regime and international behavior (see for example Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, Lipson 1984, Keohane 1984, Nye 2002, Risse-Kappen 1995, Keohane and Nye 1977).

In this context, a particular branch of the IR studies, the constructivist thought, is of special importance, with its variants (Wendt 1999, Onuf 1989, Onuf 2013, Katzenstein 1996, Katzenstein 2010, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, Kratochwil 1989, Finnemore 2009, Finnemore 2004, and as examples to "philosophical" grounds, see for example Schutz 1967 and Habermas 1987). Face to an IR event, it puts forward mechanisms of social and socio-psychological construct, referring-to *selected* social sciences-based notions and proposals as main genetic factors. These may be perceptions, discourses, identities, cultural patterns, social interactions, political/economic/ideological/cultural stratifications, practices and motivations, institutions/international institutions, which serve to build a genetic narrative. It understands the IR agents, phenomena and events as products of social and communicative processes, which meaningfully appear on the ground of social structures, norms, group identities and so on. At the same time, constructivism has another distinctive feature that is related to the ontology of the IR field: It recognises the intersubjective nature of the IR in contrast to the other schools' varying degrees of assumption of objectivity within the field. As shall be debated in the following section, these two proprieties of the constructivist thought produce a unique and very consequential combination. Constructivism is more flexible as to its emphases and methodology in comparison with the realist/structural realist, Marxist and liberal lines of thought, since it is not immediately restricted by concrete and relatively few fundamental proposals but by a whole spectrum of social sciences from which the selection of *a priori* prove to be suppler. It also theoretically penetrates deeper into the ontology of the IR as it, while recognising intersubjectivity as the nature of the IR field, makes of intersubjectivity an object of social sciences that is approached genetically.

On the other hand, social sciences may have but a mediate link to the subjects/actors of IR phenomena and events, in contrast to their immediate one to their true subjects. Whereas social sciences' theorising and genetic narrative have this anchor of self-standing objectivity-of-subjects, it is not so when they are imported into the IR field. Yet theorising operates as if such an anchor existed after all, as the very condition of its own possibility to operate, since there would be no other

ground due to difference between the proper sphere of social science and the one into which they are imported. As such, social sciences’ differing postulates engender not only an explanatory framework which the IR theorising intends to, but also an unintended “alternative” reality that is composed of actors, behavior patterns, phenomena and events that are constituted, altered, reshaped, fit in the said framework which precedes them.

In other words, the IR theorising brings an ontological complication into the IR study by reconstituting the IR actors, phenomena and events as it refers to social sciences’ postulates through a genetic approach, in order to create an objectivity anchor for a purely intersubjective field. The IR actor, phenomenon or event as they meaningfully appear/ are given in their immediacy differ from, or at least are eclipsed by their reconstruction on a theoretical basis which precedes their immediacy. The theoretical basis precedes the immediately given phenomenon, actor or event without being anchored to their sphere of existence. Here the social sciences provide the IR theorising with these “imported” *a priori*s and constructivism, in particular, furthers their altering effects deeper into the ontological ground of the IR, the pure intersubjectivity.

The ontological complication appears as the IR phenomena and events are not accessible directly through self-standingly present subjects/actors of social sciences, but through the IR subjects, such as States, which are themselves purely intersubjective. Here, even the self-standingly present actors, such as decision-makers, agents or their groupings, consequently their acts, become meaningful only in their relationship with these intersubjective entities. On the other hand, social sciences need to approach, against the immediacy of the intersubjective givenness, the expression of the State as an actor as a mere *convenience of expression* (Salice and Schmid 2016, pp. 2–13, referring to Stein). As mentioned above, the social sciences-referring theoretical bases have access to such entities through preceding, theory-built meanings/genetic approach instead of what immediately appears in their givenness. In a field where the only self-standing element of an actor, phenomenon or event is its immediate and intersubjective givenness, social sciences’ mediate access to it instead of at least partial directness of access in their proper sphere, results in the alteration of the immediate givenness on a genetic theoretical ground beforehand.

Furthermore, the ontological problem brought by social sciences into the IR theorising also engenders a temporal distortion in the study of a given IR phenomenon or event. The immediate appearance/givenness of the IR actor, phenomenon or event is, by nature, *post-genetic*. Its temporality is “now”, which is not necessarily equivalent to its theoretically narrated moment of coming-into-being. This does not mean that the intersubjective givenness is an isolated moment: It appresents/co-presents a past-self as well as an anticipatory horizon toward its future. However, these temporal extensions originate and gain meaning from the present immediacy, whereas the theory brings upon the same immediacy a pre-formulated narrative of the past, in particular that of its coming-into-being, its genesis, which adds a temporal complication to the ontological one. The narrative naturally extends toward the anticipatory horizon of the givenness. Like the ontological problem, the temporal distortion may be prevented or corrected

within the proper sphere of the social sciences thanks to the self-standing presence of, therefore to independent and direct accessibility to its actors. However, within the IR field, the pure intersubjectivity of and mediate accessibility to the actors, phenomena and events preserve the distortion within the confines of the narrative issue of imported grounds of theorising.

On the Singularity of the Givenness of the IR Phenomena and Events

The IR theories' ground of social sciences, which are quite freely manifold due to the lack of anchor in the IR field which permits selectiveness in theorising, conduct to the multiplicity of genetic narratives of IR phenomena and events. Face to the givenness of a particular phenomenon or event, there may be –and often is– as many narratives as there are theoretical *a priori*s, constructs or critics to them, each being coherent with its own grounds. Such multiplicity is not only tolerable but may also be productive within the proper sphere of the social sciences, since an independent connection to objectivity is there, if not to the extent of the positive sciences' matters. There, narratives and theoretical constructs may be assessed against objectivity with a significant robustness. However, when social sciences' proposals and constructs are imported, as groundwork, into the purely intersubjective field of the IR, such assessment becomes difficult, if not effervescent. The result becomes a multiplicity of narratives on phenomena and events, each being assessed against its own fundamental proposals and each being apparently coherent and “explicative” since their genetic narratives reshapes, at various degrees, the phenomenon or event at hand in accordance with these proposals themselves.

However, a phenomenon or event is strictly singular, both ontologically and temporally. It is encountered/experienced/given singularly, as appearance/ occurrence at a specific moment. It is not bound to the multiplicity of the genetic narratives about itself. It is intersubjectively self-standing at the moment of its givenness, akin to an appearance of objectivity. This self-standing givenness is unaltered, without intervention of theoretical *a priori*s and ensuing narratives, which artificially precede the givenness at its immediacy and which impose their genetic narrative upon their post-genetic appearance. The multiplicity of social sciences- referring genetic narratives about the IR actors and their behaviour patterns as well as those about the IR phenomena and events contrast to the singularity of the phenomenon or event that is being studied and to the individuality of the actor as it is intersubjectively given to recognisance.

Here the question is not to choose a theoretical ground and a –genetic- narrative that would be more “accurate” in comparison to others which are already there or contingent. Due to the nature of the IR field, the accuracy of a theoretical construct often correlates to the possibility of “explicative alteration” of the phenomenon or event in accordance with the theoretical construct itself, except obvious, irrefutable cases of discrepancy. Even then the theory may, occasionally, be adapted to “irregularities” the given occurrence presents. The structural realist differentiation between the theory of international politics and the field of foreign policies constitutes a good example to that, as the individualities of actors, in other words “why the actors similarly placed in a system behave in different ways” are

transferred to a vague-and separate area of “internal compositions of the actors”, thus purifying the theoretical construct itself (Waltz 1996). After all, there are as many alterations/reshaping of the studied phenomenon or event as there are theoretical constructs and narratives, almost invariably built on imported proposals of the social sciences.

The immediate givenness of the phenomenon or event is not a narrative. It does not appear through a genesis or meaning attribution on a preceding, theoretical ground. Still, it appears meaningfully. In contrast to phenomena and events of positive and even, to an extent, of social sciences there may not be independent, self-standing occurrences in the IR field which need to be “given” meaning in order to be grasped. Without meaning, the givenness itself may not occur in the IR field, as it is purely intersubjective, therefore purely *not-self standing*. In other words, meaning and occurrence are ontologically inseparable and temporally simultaneous in the IR field. The social sciences-referring IR theorising intervenes at that point and separates this ontological and temporal unity of meaning and occurrence. This intervention becomes deeper in the case of constructivism, as it deals with the intersubjectivity itself and the “meaning” on a theoretical/genetic basis. From this separation stems the multiplicity of narratives, in accordance with the multiplicity of the separating sources, of the theoretical constructs.

And yet, what is given is pre-theoretically and meaningfully “there”. It appears singularly in the intersubjectivity. This singular appearance constitutes the not-narrated, unaltered substance of the phenomenon/event and provides the IR study with the sole possible anchor akin to the objectivity anchor in other fields of study. As such, the phenomenon/the event, as it appears, constitutes its own anchor, in reference to which it can be studied. Here the study needs to begin by the singular immediacy of givenness and not by the pre-postulated reflective frameworks that intervene in the substance and the temporality of it. This anchor provides the IR studies with an alternative to the ontological and temporal complications engendered by the social sciences’ ground-references. Such a study would begin by the singularity of givenness and not from a selection among multiple “preceding” constructs or by building a new one of the same nature.

The Constructivist Theorising Ground and Phenomenology’s Proposal in the IR Field

The Question of Intersubjectivity

The very existence of constructivism in the IR studies makes a debate on the nature of intersubjectivity necessary. Constructivism takes intersubjectivity, in the appearance of social construction, as its *theoretical* ground and while doing so, also theorises intersubjectivity itself, with the same ontological and temporal complications that were mentioned previously. Moreover, the theorisation of intersubjectivity and subsequent building of narratives follow the most direct –yet selective- importation of the social sciences’ proposals among the IR theories, amplifying the complications.

The constructivist theorising of intersubjectivity does encourage, at a very fundamental level, the pursuance of a genetic approach at a more fundamental level compared to other branches of the IR theorising. As an example, the constructivist search for the genesis goes quite beyond the realist/structural realist theorising, since the latter also relies on assumptions of objectivity, which the constructivists do not. Whereas the realist school takes a sort of self-standing objectivity and the State's actor character as granted (Morgenthau 1948) or the structural realist school repeats the same assumptions in reducing the States to quite uniform units of a system, gaining limited individuality within the framework of assumed parameters of interaction such as power-relations, interests and threats (Waltz 1979), the constructivist thought tends to dissect these assumptions. The dissection is performed on the ground of other assumed parameters that focus on the coming-into-being of the entities, phenomena and events. However these parameters vary among the constructivist works, such as identity-building, norm-building, social practices, communicative patterns, discourse and so on, they may be reduced to a common ground, which is that of the social sciences.

Here, the constructivist thought does not only theorise the genesis of phenomena and events in line with these parameters, but also the coming-into-being of the intersubjectivity itself as phenomenon. At that point, the constructivist understanding of the nature of intersubjectivity and means to work with it replicates the directionalities of more profound lines of thought, such as Schutz' phenomenology and Habermas' communicative action. Schutz's outline of the *awareness* of intersubjectivity (Schutz 1967, pp. 198–201, also Schutz 1970) and his criticism of the causal adequacy in favour of meaning-adequacy (Schutz 1967, pp. 229–236) might have opened the way to a rigorous study of the pre-theoretical, which would have its repercussions in the IR field as well. Still, a shift to the sociology *as intermediary* seems to have “balanced” his otherwise phenomenological work, which presents a similarity with the constructivist approach to the IR intersubjectivity. As for Habermas' understanding of the lifeworld/intersubjective environment as coherent sum of inter-communicated/learned “things” including thought processes, roles, identities and consequent behavior, while being adequate to his proper sphere of work, which is that of social sciences, when indirectly imported into the field of the IR studies through constructivist theorising, loses its ontological anchor, becomes researcher's postulates related to the genesis of entities and occurrences of another kind, detaches from the post-genetic immediacy of givenness and therefore leads to complications that are mentioned before (see Habermas 1987, pp. 119–198).

In line with the fundamental nature of theorising within the pure intersubjectivity of the IR field, the constructivist study tends to define, as *a priori*, the genetic ground of the phenomena and events. This tendency is apparently amplified by the constructivist criticism of the realist school, which concentrates on its assumption of objectivity, yet without questioning the very nature of theorising in doing so. Consequently, constructivism theorises the “alternative” to taking the IR field as objective, therefore the intersubjectivity, building a genetic narrative that precedes the immediate, encompassing givenness of it. The constructivist thought therefore reproduces the ontological and temporal complications of the IR theorising at a

level even more fundamental than other theoretical approaches in the field. In questioning the assumption of objectivity of the realist approaches, such as that of States, it also avoids the immediacy of the meaningful givenness of the IR entities, phenomena and events, incorporating them into its genetic narrative.

Now we face a dilemma in approaching the constructivist thought as regards the IR field. On the one hand, the constructivists recognise intersubjectivity, even not using the term specifically but replacing it with the social construct, as the nature of the IR field and on the other hand, they do this precisely for theorising, therefore for their genetic approach and subsequent narrative. The very act of adopting intersubjectivity as theoretical ground makes it also an object of theorising, therefore of a genetic narrative of its own. Here, the genetic approach of theorising automatically and in fact ironically necessitates an anchor in the “objectivity”, even when defining and narrating intersubjectivity. The constructivist thought therefore imports the social sciences’ notions for such a purpose, reproducing the ontological and temporal complications which are mentioned before.

As mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section, constructivists do not understand the IR field’s entities, phenomena (and events related to them) of the IR field as objectivities with self-standing meanings, but intersubjective constructs and meaning-attributions. On the other hand, the theoretical ground imported from the social sciences varies as to which notion is being underlined as anchor for the ensuing genetic narrative, both of the intersubjectivity itself and the intersubjective constructions, which were also mentioned above, through examples of the constructivist literature. In other words, the multiplicity of constructivist narratives stems from the adopted social sciences-referring theoretical grounds, which vary as to their *selected* notions. These subsequently precede the immediacy of the encounter with IR phenomena and events, pre-define their geneses, impose upon and shape them in their narrative. At a fundamental level, the intersubjectivity itself is narrated as such, its coming-into-being is pre-defined as to its “mechanisms” such as communicative processes, social stratification and explained through geneses of values, identities, beliefs, of discourse, of political, cultural, institutional narratives and so on. Beyond a question of accuracy, the constructivist works themselves reinterpret “worlds”, in Onuf’s terms, yet according to its pre-postulates (Onuf 2013). It gives significantly less room to omission and assumption compared to the realist/structural realist thought, for example as regards the State, which is by nature beneficial to preserve, to an extent, the immediacy of givenness in the IR study: Constructivism does not, after all, neglect its theoretical dissection and genetic narrative. In other words, the constructivist theorising radicalises, with Wendt’s partial exception, social sciences’ ontological and temporal complications within the IR studies.

At that point a parenthesis should be opened for Wendt’s approach, which he names “thin constructivism” due to its concessions on important points to “materialist and individual perspectives and endorses a scientific approach to social inquiry” (Wendt 1999, pp. 1–4). This may be combined with, for example, his legitimisation of referring to the State as an “actor” (Wendt 1999, pp. 193–245), however it is but a socially constructed entity. In fact, these “concessions” appear to stem, inversely, from the problems of the “scientific approach to social

inquiry”, the theoretical/genetic approach in other words, which prove to be incompatible with the immediate, pre-theoretical, intersubjective referentiality to the elements of the IR field, in this example to the State-as-actor, as a “living entity”.

Here, one argument against the exogeneity of theorising/ground-building to the intersubjective givenness can be deduction, which signifies the link between the experience of the said phenomena and events and the formation of a theoretical ground, from the former toward the latter. However, the act of deducing is possible only with a preceding referentiality, as deduction may not be random, chaotic, arbitrary. Here the theoretical ground, in its exogeneity, again precedes the said link, providing the act of deducing with directionality and selectiveness, in fact an almost pre-ordained *telos*, in accordance with the exogenous, *a priori* proposals of the IR theorising. The preceding referentiality in the constructivist thought is the selected –according to the individual constructivist work- proposals of social sciences and not the immediate, intersubjective one, such as in the example of the appearance of the State-as-actor. Deduction becomes therefore the drive of building a –genetic- narrative on the pre-existing theoretical grounds, instead of preceding the said grounds as their genetic drive.

At that point another parenthesis may be opened for Kratochwil’s *Rules, Norms and Decisions*, as regards his statement on the three worlds of knowledge, the one of the observational facts, that of the intention and meaning and the world of institutional facts (Kratochwil 1989, pp. 21–45). The author separates the sphere of positive sciences and that of the subjectivity/subjectivity-guided occurrences. Then and in fact from the second one rather than the first, he makes the distinction of rules/norms that resemble to sanitized and well-delimited intersubjective constructs. He privileges the “third” world and proceeds into its genetic narrative within the IR sphere, with pre-selected parameters, all apparently being deduced (Kratochwil 1989, pp. 43–44). In the ensuing analyses, sociology’s and socio-psychology’ proposals but also and emphasisingly language and discourse, also through preceding postulates and selectiveness, guide the work *toward* concepts also pre-formulated. Deduction serves exogeneity of theorising to givenness, instead of serving to avoid it. The same parenthesis should include the author’s *Praxis On Acting and Knowing* (Kratochwil 2018) on the same ground, where a critical approach to the constructivist understanding of social sciences results in the proposal of importing other disciplines’ fundamental proposals into the study ground, in other words, of enriching the selective pre-postulation of deductions aiming at “substantive problems” that also pre-formulated as to their substances and forms of working-with (Kratochwil 2018, pp. 13–46), persisting the exogeneity of theorising to givenness.

In accordance with the constructivist thought, intersubjectivity can be defined as the collective meaning-attribution as well as collectively attributed meanings which make objective/self-standing or non-objective/not self-standingly existing things, entities, phenomena or events. In this sense, intersubjectivity becomes collectively lived reality as well as the collective act of living reality. Now in both senses, it should be true that intersubjectivity is both the product of ongoing/inherited social/socio-psychological/communicative processes between individuals and these processes themselves as they constitute the act of collective bestowal of

meanings, in other words, collective genetic act of the lived reality. Intersubjectivity should therefore be a matter of social sciences, in particular of sociology and socio-psychology, but only as long as the study is confined to the genetic processes of phenomena and events and as long as it is directly related to observable true subjects and groupings as accessible study matters in the objectivity. Yet in the IR field, the study of an intersubjectively given phenomenon or event in its singularity and immediacy is neither a genetic one (that of the object’s or the collective meaning-attribution act’s coming-into-being) nor is related to true, self-standing subjects directly (but mediately, as the subjects are themselves intersubjective).

Consequently, intersubjectivity of the IR field differs from that of the social sciences’ proper sphere, as it does not permit a direct relationship between the true subject and the object, therefore an objectivity-anchored genetic theorisation applicable to it. Intersubjectivity here appears not as a derivation of the objectivity but an already-present and all encompassing, living, meaningful reality of its own.

The IR intersubjectivity is therefore an environment which is self-anchored and post-genetic, with entities, phenomena and events with the same proprieties. True subjects that are involved in their immediate, living givenness do not “make” these singular, immediate givenness in contrast to the constructivist thought: Instead, as they are related to them in the living moment of their experience and within their context, they gain their own meanings and validity from them, such as identities or roles like decision-makers, implementers or opposers. Consequently, the study may not be centred on theorising and narrating the intersubjectivity’s or the intersubjective givenness’ *construction* by subjects which refer to them in the first place, without even repeating its ontological/temporal complications that were mentioned before. In other words, the IR study, as that of an intersubjective environment and of intersubjective phenomena and events within, needs to be anchored to their immediate, living givenness.

This necessity sends to another line of thought in relation with intersubjectivity, which is different from social sciences: Phenomenology and phenomenological ontology.

However, it is of note that the Husserlian phenomenology approaches intersubjectivity also in genetic terms, quite similarly with social sciences (see also Schnell 2010). Husserl *narrates* the *genesis* of intersubjectivity in the Vth Mediation (*Cartesian Meditations*) on the ground of communicative processes, in the form of the ego’s experience of the “Other”, its grasping the “Other” in empathy yet with its irreducibility to “mine-ness”, leading to the knowledge of the collective constitution of the world. (Husserl 1982, pp. 92–105, 108–116, Husserl 2001, pp. 27–29, 63–87, 382–383). In the Vth Meditation, he describes the “personalities of higher order” (including the State) also as to their genesis, which is again the result of communicative processes (Husserl 1982, pp. 128–135). Husserl attempts to remedy the complications stemming from this genetic approach in his later work, the *Crisis*, where he redefines intersubjectivity as transcendental and pre-given (Husserl 1970). That attempt remains however genetic and social/communicative, as the pre-givenness signifies a cultural heritage –which had been constituted in the past through same processes- and not the post-genetic immediacy of givenness. It therefore reproduces the ontological and temporal complications of the constructivist

thought. In this sense, Schutz's work constitutes a sort of bridge between the Husserlian phenomenology and the constructivist understanding of social sciences, yet on these "problematic" grounds related to intersubjectivity proposed by the Vth Meditation and the *Crisis* (Schutz 1967).

On the other hand, the Heideggerian phenomenological ontology brings forward another understanding of intersubjectivity, one that overcomes Husserl's "regression" into genetic theorising (Heidegger 1985, Heidegger 1996). Heidegger depicts intersubjectivity on the ground of inherence of the being-with-others to being, as the very state of existence within the world. Intersubjectivity is, in other words, the state-of-being rather than a communicatively co-produced or socially/historically inherited awareness: In fact, because of the inherence of intersubjectivity to being that communicative/social processes become possible at all. Intersubjectivity thus precedes any genetic act, individual or collective, in fact provides any genetic act with ground and not the other way around. It is because the being is precedingly, pre-reflectively interactional within a self-evident, pre-given, pre-genetic intersubjectivity that social/communicative processes, non-solipsistic experience, meaning-attribution and constitution/genesis of things can be possible. It thus contrasts to both Husserlian intersubjectivity formulas and to that of the social sciences, as well as to that of the constructivist thought. Heidegger uses two interlaced terms for intersubjectivity: *Mitsein* signifies the inherence of being-with-others to being that precedes any communicative process of genetic nature and in fact that enables them to take place meaningfully. *Mitwelt* depicts the inherence of the intersubjective world/environment to being, lived-in as innerworldliness (Heidegger 1985, pp. 238–239, Heidegger 1996, pp. 111–112). This understanding of intersubjectivity answers to the problem of singular, immediate, post-genetic appearance/experience of the IR phenomena and events, underlining at the same time the exogeneity of theorising to purely intersubjective givenness.

A Phenomenological Proposal

Is it possible to avoid, within the IR studies, the ontological and temporal complications of adopting social sciences' ground, in particular that of the constructivism? In avoiding them, is it possible to perform a rigorous study that properly takes the intersubjective nature of the IR into account?

Avoidance of the genetic approach necessitates a firm study ground akin to the positive sciences' and to a degree, social sciences' objectivity anchor, yet within the purely intersubjective field of the IR. As the nature of the IR field does not permit direct observation of its actors, phenomena and events in contrast to those of the positive sciences and to an extent, of the social sciences, where then such an anchor may be found -and not built-?

If what is at hand as irrefutable, unaltered, not pre-built experience pertaining to the IR field is only the immediate and intersubjectively meaningful givenness/appearance of the phenomena and events, then perhaps the "anchor" for its study also needs to be looked for there as well. This contrasts to attempting to select/build/theorise a study ground which engenders ontological/temporal complications, since such a ground becomes exogenous to the givenness and *artificially* precedes

it ontologically and temporally. As mentioned previously, the constructivist thought even furthers these complications by theorising the genesis of intersubjectivity itself, which it otherwise correctly adopts as the nature of the IR phenomena and events.

Then how to anchor the study to the immediate, intersubjective givenness of the phenomena and events? The Husserlian phenomenology offers notions and tools those are applicable to the intersubjective field of the IR, which is to be understood in Heideggerian terms as mentioned previously. The notions are related to appresentative links and the temporal states of phenomena and events that form their givenness as synthetic unities.

The extension of the moment of appearance toward a meaningful synthetic unity of givenness means neither a genetic or volitional act from the part of the researcher, nor a temporal process with precedence-subsequence, but merely constitutes a convenience of expression for pointing at the appresentative links in terms of substance and temporality that form, at the very immediacy of givenness, a synthetic unity that is substantially and temporally “complete”, meaningful. Husserl employs the term appresentation in the Vth Meditation, in describing the monadological intersubjectivity on the grounds of the ego’s experience of the “Other”. The immediate appearance of the “Other” appresents, in the form of empathy, its equivalence to “I” as well as its “otherness” which is irreducible to “I” (Husserl 1982, pp. 92–105, 108–116), thus giving the “Other” in a meaningful synthetic unity rather than a merely incomplete image. Within the intersubjectivity that is inherent-to-being and post-genetic, appresentative links are even more prominent as they make appear the givenness in a meaningful synthetic unity (also see Husserl 2001, pp. 27–29, 63–87, 382–383).

Here, what is immediately, pre-reflectively given as the phenomenon or event is a synthetic unity including its also immediate, direct, intersubjective appresented contents, which are not attributed in reference to a preceding construct and as part of an ensuing genetic narrative. This constitutes the intersubjective anchor for the study of a phenomenon or event and gives, in the individual case of a particular phenomenon or event, its ontological data, its immediately and intersubjectively appearing, self-evident *substance*. This is equivalent to the observation of an occurrence in the objective reality.

Secondly, the immediate givenness as a synthetic unity may not be an isolated “moment” in temporal terms, which is present then and not present, not valid, not-existent in its immediate past or immediate future. The intersubjective givenness of something is temporal, as any occurrence in the objective reality, as the *conditio sine qua non* of the experience of something. At the moment of appearance/givenness, the phenomenon or event appresents a past of itself and an anticipated future, in other words a “temporal thickness” (Husserl 1964, p. 87). Therefore, the synthetic unity of the givenness includes, along and interlaced with the substance, also the appresentation of its temporal states of past, present and future, expressed in terms of that very substance.

The Husserlian phenomenology employs the term retention-protection for the actuality of the givenness that appresents its immediate past and immediate future (Husserl 1964, pp. 39–50, Carr 1991, pp. 24, 40–45, also Rodemeyer 2006, pp. 73–176). This temporal state, while being the immediacy of the givenness, is still a

continuing, progressive “moment” which does not include a past or a future-as-anticipatory horizon in the sense of non-actuality. However, it is this very actuality of the givenness that appresents its non-actuality, therefore these two temporal states. The Husserlian phenomenology names the appresentation of the not-immediate past and future as recollection and anticipation respectively (Marion 1998, pp. 77–97, Carr 1991, p. 24, Rodemeyer 2006, pp. 12–13). On the other hand, Husserl also detaches these two temporal states from the intersubjective givenness itself, focusing on “making” them as temporalisations, thus furthering his genetic approach into the coming-into-being of the past and future besides the actuality of the intersubjectivity and intersubjective givenness (Carr 1991, p. 24). Here, similarly to the case of the nature of intersubjectivity, the Heideggerian understanding of the inherence-to-being provides the temporal states of the givenness with its non-genetic definition. Heidegger’s three temporal *extases* of having been (with), dwelling-with and to be-with (Heidegger 1985, pp. 238–239, Heidegger 1982, pp. 266–267, Heidegger 1996, pp. 111–112) express, in temporal terms, the givenness’ fundamental inherence to the subject that *within* intersubjectivity in a fundamental, existential, non-genetic relationship with the intersubjectively given “things” (being-as-*Mitsein* within the *Mitwelt*). This connects the recollection (past) and the anticipation (future) to the retentional-protentional actuality in forming (the description of) the synthetic unity of givenness (Bernet 1994, also Ozgici 2022). With this note, the Husserlian terms of retention-protention, recollection and anticipation as temporal states of the givenness may be employed as they express better the object of study than the Heideggerian *extases* which rather focus on the “life of the subject” as related to phenomena, events, things.

Now, how to reach to the synthetic unity of the purely intersubjective givenness? In order to reach to the phenomenon and the event as they are given in their intersubjective immediacy, phenomenology proposes reductions, of universal and eidetic character (Brainard 2002, pp. 68–74, Husserl 1982, pp. 71–81, Husserl 1983, pp. 57–59, 220–221). The universal reduction is bracketing the “natural attitude” of approaching the things, phenomena and events as self standingly meaningful objectivities (Luft 1998). This reduction puts into perspective the mental acts such as assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, predications, emotions that form meaningful appearances from encounters with things, phenomena and events (Kueng 1975, Schmitt 1959, Husserl 1982, pp. 71–81; Husserl 1983, pp. 57–59, 220–221). As such, the universal reduction makes theoretical attitude also “discernible” and at the same time, possible to suspend with all its attached contents. The universal reduction needs to be a constant in the study of the IR phenomena and events in order to be able to bracket the theoretical/genetic approach and ensuing narrative (also see Luft 2004). However, the study of these phenomena and events on the ground of intersubjectivity would not need to go into the egological mental processes themselves in the natural direction of the universal reduction. This reduction, at the level of bracketing mentioned above, provides another reduction with ground, one which is directly related to “objects” of experience and not to the experiencing subjects themselves. This reduction is eidetic.

The eidetic reduction to experience is toward the objects’s, here the IR phenomenon’s/event’s “*generic way of presenting itself, its Erscheinen*” (Taminiaux

1988, p. 62, Bernet 2016, Heidegger 2005, pp. 210–211). In the intersubjectivity of the IR field, this “generic way” becomes the meaningful, immediately given substance, which is unaltered by the theoretical attitude and construct. The bracketing here would mean putting into perspective any judgement and predication that is not simultaneous with and inherent to the givenness. The eidetic reduction is not applied to an idea but to a state of affairs, an occurrence, an event in the everydayness, to something which is immediately, intersubjectively, individually, pre-theoretically given. The reduction needs to be restrained by the individuality of the givenness, therefore should not denature it by altering/reshaping its immediate meaning and content, for example in reducing the givenness to its supposedly constitutive components, in repeating the ontological complications brought by, in particular, the social sciences into the IR study. In other words, the eidetic reduction should not reproduce a genetic narrative from “the other end” of the study, from the givenness toward an artificial *a priori* ground. It suspends/brackets any narrative pertaining to the givenness at hand, including any *act* of narrating it through mental acts relating the subject to the object’ that is also the matter of the universal reduction. The *residuum* of this reduction, the studied givenness’ “generic way of presenting itself”, is its intersubjectively and immediately meaningful substance, the phenomenon or event in its irreducible appearance, its “what”, its *noematic core* in Husserl’s terms (Husserl 1983, pp. 60–64, 220–221).

The noematic core of the phenomenon/event, thus constitutes the anchor, the available ground for studying the givenness as a meaningful synthetic unity within the IR intersubjectivity. At the same time, it is the object of elaboration and alteration, therefore subject to IR theory’s, in particular constructivism’s ontological/temporal complications. Consequently, a phenomenological proposal in the IR studies must reside on separating exogeneity, in particular the theoretical/ genetic exogeneity from the elements of the givenness’ synthetic unity. These elements, substance and temporal states, are appresented in immediacy. Therefore, they are directly reducible to the noematic core of the givenness being studied, whereas elements which are exogenous, which are parts of the genetic narrative, are reducible to the theory’s *a prioris*. Consequently, the eidetic reduction would ultimately serve to discern and describe the phenomenon or the event in its synthetic unity, as it is given in its unaltered, pre-theoretical state.

Conclusion

Intersubjectivity constitutes the fundamental character of the IR field. In contrast to those that belong to the sphere of the social sciences, not only the phenomena and events of the IR field gain their existence intersubjectively, but also its very actors. Whereas individuals and their collectivities are self-standingly present in the objective reality, no element of the IR has direct correspondence in the objectivity. On the other hand, intersubjectivity constitutes a secondary, *a posteriori* interactional environment for the social sciences, which is itself constituted and reproduced by true subjects and their groupings. Consequently, the

genesis and the formation of intersubjectivity and intersubjective contents constitute the main focus of the social sciences. However, the IR field entirely consists of immediate, inherently intersubjective and post-genetic givennesses, which take ontological/temporal precedence. Yet the study of the IR phenomena and occurrences practically constitutes a branch of social sciences despite this fundamental difference between the two fields of study. Acting as social sciences in an otherwise pure intersubjectivity, the IR study relies on genetic theorising and genetic narratives, bringing ontological and temporal complications stemming from this fundamental incompatibility.

In particular, the constructivist IR theorising further accentuates these complications. In contrast to the realist/structural realist or liberal theorising as well as their variants, it correctly adopts intersubjectivity as the study ground. Yet, it also adopts proposals, approaches and methods of social sciences and deepens their ontological/ temporal complications, as it applies their genetic narrative to the very substance of intersubjectivity along with the IR phenomena and events. As such, the very ontology of the IR field becomes subject to the thoroughly genetic theorising of constructivism, with no assumptive omissions of the other IR theories which gives them an ontological “superficiality” that works, to some extent, to the benefit of the study of the givenness. Still, the very existence of constructivist thought forces a thorough debate on the nature of intersubjectivity and on the importation of the social sciences into the fabric of the IR studies. This debate displays a need for an IR study that would focus on the singular, intersubjective, pre-theoretical, post-genetic immediacy of the IR phenomena and events, on their givenness as meaningful synthetic unities.

Here phenomenology may propose a solid, non-imported and (even partially differing from Husserl) non-genetic ground for the IR studies, relying on intersubjectivity itself as inherent to the singularity and immediacy of IR phenomena and events. In contrast to social sciences’ genetic constructs that artificially position themselves prior to intersubjective givenness of phenomena and events and subsequently alter them in their narratives, an ontological ground proper to the nature of the IR field may be spotted through phenomenological concepts and tools. Universal and eidetic reductions provide the study with these tools to reach the IR phenomena’s and events’ immediate and intersubjective “noematic cores”. The furtherance of reductions toward their appresented contents serves to discern exogenous, theoretical/ narrated attributions to them from substantial and temporal elements that are directly related to their givenness. As such, a description of IR phenomena and events in their unaltered, un-narrated synthetic unity may become possible, on their “original” ontological ground.

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